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> THE  RISE 
AN  D FALL 
OF  THE 
THIRD 
REICH 

I 

© 

A History  of  Nazi  Germany 

by  WILLIAM  L.  SHIRER 


I 


THE 

RISE  AND  FALL 
OF  THE 
THIRD  REICH 


Here  for  the  first  time  is  the 
complete  story  of  Hitler’s  empire,  one  of 
the  most  important  stories  ever  told, 
written  by  one  of  the  men  best  equipped 
to  write  it. 

No  other  powerful  empire  ever 
bequeathed  to  historians  such  mountains 
of  evidence  about  its  rise  and  fall  as  the 
Third  Reich.  The  Allied  demand  for  un- 
conditional surrender  produced,  when 
the  bitter  war  was  over  and  before  the 
Nazis  could  destroy  their  files,  an  almost 
hour-to-hour  record  of  the  nightmare 
empire  built  by  Adolf  Hitler. 

William  L.  Shirer,  who  had 
watched  and  reported  on  the  Nazis  since 
1925,  spent  five  and  a half  years  sifting 
this  documentation.  Out  of  it,  and  out  of 
his  own  on-the-spot  reporting  of  Ger- 
many and  Europe  over  nearly  four  dec- 
ades, he  has  written  the  definitive  history 
of  a great  frightening  chapter  in  the  his- 
tory of  mankind. 


Here  is  the  story  of  Hitler  him- 
self, his  love  affairs,  his  imprisonment, 
his  passion  for  the  arts  of  war,  his  sui- 
cide, and  the  maniacal  fury  which  led 
him  to  destroy  the  country  he  claimed  to 
love  so  much.  Here  is  the  record  of  the 
German  General  Staff,  the  concentration 
camps,  the  brutal  terror  of  anti-Semi- 
tism, the  degradation  of  the  German  peo- 
ple, and  the  little-known  resistance  plots 
against  the  Nazis.  Here  are  new  and  sen- 
sational details  about  the  Nazi-Soviet 
Pact  of  1930,  the  frame-up  of  leading 
German  generals,  the  shabby  efforts  to 
appease  Hitler,  the  reasons  for  Ger- 
many’s failure  to  invade  England,  Hit- 
ler’s secret  speeches  to  his  generals,  a 
plot  to  kidnap  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of 
Windsor,  and  hundreds  of  other  inside 
stories  of  the  war. 


"Masterly.  Movingly  told.  A 
splendid  work  of  scholarship .” 

—The  New  York  Times 


1 have  often  felt  a hitter  sorrow  at  the  thought  of  the 
German  people,  which  is  so  estimable  in  the  individual 
and  so  wretched  in  the  generality  . . . — Goethe 


Hitler  was  the  fate  of  Germany  and  this  fate  could  not 
be  stayed. 

— Field  Marshal  Walther  von  Brauchitsch, 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Army,  1938—41 


A thousand  years  will  pass  and  the  guilt  of  Germany 
will  not  be  erased. 

— Hans  Frank,  Governor  General  of  Poland, 
before  he  was  hanged  at  Nuremberg 


Those  who  do  not  remember  the  past  are  condemned 
to  relive  it. 


• — Santayana 


THE 

RISE  AND  FALL 
OF  THE 

THIRD  REICH 

A History  of  Nazi  Germany 

BY 

WILLIAM  L.  S HIRER 


A CHEST  REPRINT 


FAWCETT  PUBLICATIONS,  INC.,  GREENWICH,  CONN. 
MEMBER  OF  AMERICAN  BOOK  PUBLISHERS  COUNCIL,  INC. 


A Crest  Book  published  by  arrangement  with  Simon  & Schuster,  Inc. 


Copyright  © 1959,  1960  by  William  L.  Shirer 
All  rights  reserved,  including  the  right  of  reproduction 
in  whole  or  in  part  in  any  form. 


PRINTING  HISTORY 

First  Simon  and  Schuster  printing,  August  1960 
Fourteenth  printing,  August  1961 
A Book-of-the-Month  Club  selection,  November  1960 


First  Crest  printing,  May  1962 


Crest  Books  are  published  by  Fawcett  World  Library, 
67  West  44th  Street,  New  York  36,  New  York. 
Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


CONTENTS 

Foreword  ix 

Book  One:  THE  RISE  OF  ADOLF  HITLER 

1.  Birth  of  the  Third  Reich  17 

2.  Birth  of  the  Nazi  Party  52 

3.  Versailles,  Weimar  and  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch  83 

4.  The  Mind  of  Hitler  and  the  Roots 

of  the  Third  Reich  120 

Book  Two:  TRIUMPH  AND  CONSOLIDATION 

5.  The  Road  to  Power:  1925-31  167 

6.  The  Last  Days  of  the  Republic:  1931-33  211 

7.  The  Nazification  of  Germany:  1933-34  263 

8.  Life  in  the  Third  Reich:  1933-37  320 

Book  Three:  THE  ROAD  TO  WAR 

9.  The  First  Steps:  1934-37  385 

10.  Strange,  Fateful  Interlude:  The  Fall  of 

Blomberg,  Fritsch,  Neurath  and  Schacht  423 

11.  Anschluss:  The  Rape  of  Austria  440 

12.  The  Road  to  Munich  485 

13.  Czechoslovakia  Ceases  to  Exist  578 

14.  The  Turn  of  Poland  612 

15.  The  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  685 

16.  The  Last  Days  of  Peace  726 

17.  The  Launching  of  World  War  II  791 

vii 


via 


Contents 


Book  Four:  WAR:  EARLY  VICTORIES  AND 
THE  TURNING  POINT 


18.  The  Fall  of  Poland  827 

19.  Sitzkrieg  in  the  West  838 

20.  The  Conquest  of  Denmark  and  Norway  889 

21.  Victory  in  the  West  939 

22.  Operation  Sea  Lion:  The  Thwarted  Invasion 

of  Britain  996 

23.  Barbarossa:  The  Turn  of  Russia  1040 

24.  A Turn  of  the  Tide  1117 

25.  The  Turn  of  the  United  States  1140 

26.  The  Great  Turning  Point:  1942 — Stalingrad 

and  El  Alamein  1180 

Book  Five:  BEGINNING  OF  THE  END 

27.  The  New  Order  1223 

28.  The  Fall  of  Mussolini  1293 

29.  The  Allied  Invasion  of  Western  Europe  and 

the  Attempt  to  Kill  Hitler  1316 

Book  Six:  THE  FALL  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 

30.  The  Conquest  of  Germany  1409 

31.  Goetterdaemmerung:  The  Last  Days  of  the 

Third  Reich  1437 

A Brief  Epilogue  1480 

Notes  1487 

Acknowledgments  1527 

Bibliography  1533 


Index 


1549 


FOREWORD 


though  I lived  and  worked  in  the  Third  Reich  during 
the  first  half  of  its  brief  life,  watching  at  first  hand  Adolf 
Hitler  consolidate  his  power  as  dictator  of  this  great  but 
baffling  nation  and  then  lead  it  off  to  war  and  conquest,  this 
personal  experience  would  not  have  led  me  to  attempt  to 
write  this  book  had  there  not  occurred  at  the  end  of  World 
War  II  an  event  unique  in  history. 

This  was  the  capture  of  most  of  the  confidential  archives 
of  the  German  government  and  all  its  branches,  including 
those  of  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Army  and  Navy,  the 
National  Socialist  Party  and  Heinrich  Himmler’s  secret 
police.  Never  before,  I believe,  has  such  a vast  treasure 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  contemporary  historians.  Hitherto 
the  archives  of  a great  state,  even  when  it  was  defeated  in 
war  and  its  government  overthrown  by  revolution,  as 
happened  to  Germany  and  Russia  in  1918,  were  preserved 
by  it,  and  only  those  documents  which  served  the  interests 
of  the  subsequent  ruling  regime  were  ultimately  published. 

The  swift  collapse  of  the  Third  Reich  in  the  spring  of 
1945  resulted  in  the  surrender  not  only  of  a vast  bulk  of 
its  secret  papers  but  of  other  priceless  material  such  as 
private  diaries,  highly  secret  speeches,  conference  reports 
and  correspondence,  and  even  transcripts  of  telephone 
conversations  of  the  Nazi  leaders  tapped  by  a special  office 
set  up  by  Hermann  Goering  in  the  Air  Ministry.. 

General  Franz  Haider,  for  instance,  kept  a voluminous 
diary,  jotted  down  in  Gabelsberger  shorthand  not  only  from 
day  to  day  but  from  hour  to  hour  during  the  day.  It  is  a 
unique  source  of  concise  information  for  the  period  be- 
tween August  14,  1939,  and  September  24,  1942,  when 
he  was  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff  and  in  daily  con- 
tact with  Hitler  and  the  other  leaders  of  Nazi  Germany. 
It  is  the  most  revealing  of  the  German  diaries,  but  there 
are  others  of  great  value,  including  those  of  Dr.  Joseph 

ix 


X 


Foreword 


Goebbels,  the  Minister  of  Propaganda  and  close  party  as- 
sociate of  Hitler,  and  of  General  Alfred  Jodi,  Chief  of 
Operations  of  the  High  Command  of  the  Armed  Forces 
(OKW).  There  are  diaries  of  the  OKW  itself  and  of  the 
Naval  High  Command.  Indeed  the  sixty  thousand  files  of 
the  German  Naval  Archives,  which  were  captured  at 
Schloss  Tambach  near  Coburg,  contain  practically  all  the 
signals,  ships’  logs,  diaries,  memoranda,  etc.,  of  the  Ger- 
man Navy  from  April  1945,  when  they  were  found,  back 
to  1868,  when  the  modern  German  Navy  was  founded. 

The  485  tons  of  records  of  the  German  Foreign  Office, 
captured  by  the  U.S.  First  Army  in  various  castles  and 
mines  in  the  Harz  Mountains  just  as  they  were  about  to 
be  burned  on  orders  from  Berlin,  cover  not  only  the  period 
of  the  Third  Reich  but  go  back  through  the  Weimar  Re- 
public to  the  beginning  of  the  Second  Reich  of  Bismarck. 
For  many  years  after  the  war  tons  of  Nazi  documents  lay 
sealed  in  a large  U.S.  Army  warehouse  in  Alexandria, 
Virginia,  our  government  showing  no  interest  in  even  open- 
ing the  packing  cases  to  see  what  of  historical  interest 
might  lie  within  them.  Finally  in  1955,  ten  years  after 
their  capture,  thanks  to  the  initiative  of  the  American 
Historical  Association  and  the  generosity  of  a couple  of 
private  foundations,  the  Alexandria  papers  were  opened 
and  a pitifully  small  group  of  scholars,  with  an  inadequate 
staff  and  equipment,  went  to  work  to  sift  through  them  and 
photograph  them  before  the  government,  which  was  in  a 
great  hurry  in  the  matter,  returned  them  to  Germany. 
They  proved  a rich  find. 

So  did  such  documents  as  the  partial  stenographic  record 
of  fifty-one  “Fuehrer  Conferences”  on  the  daily  military 
situation  as  seen  and  discussed  at  Hitler’s  headquarters,  and 
the  fuller  text  of  the  Nazi  warlord’s  table  talk  with  his  old 
party  cronies  and  secretaries  during  the  war;  the  first  of 
these  was  rescued  from  the  charred  remains  of  some  of 
Hitler’s  papers  at  Berchtesgaden  by  an  intelligence  officer 
of  the  U.S.  101st  Airborne  Division,  and  the  second  was 
found  among  Martin  Bormann’s  papers. 

Hundreds  of  thousands  of  captured  Nazi  documents 
were  hurriedly  assembled  at  Nuremberg  as  evidence  in  the 
trial  of  the  major  Nazi  war  criminals.  While  covering  the 
first  part  of  that  trial  I collected  stacks  of  mimeographed 
copies  and  later  the  forty-two  published  volumes  of  testi- 


— _ 


Foreword  xi 

mony  and  documents,  supplemented  by  ten  volumes  of 
English  translations  of  many  important  papers.  The  text 
of  other  documents  published  in  a fifteen-volume  series  on 
the  twelve  subsequent  Nuremberg  trials  was  also  of  value, 
though  many  papers  and  much  testimony  were  omitted. 

Finally,  in  addition  to  this  unprecedented  store  of  docu- 
ments, there  are  the  records  of  the  exhaustive  interrogation 
of  German  military  officers  and  party  and  government  offi- 
cials and  their  subsequent  testimony  under  oath  at  the 
various  postwar  trials,  which  provide  material  the  like  of 
which  was  never  available,  I believe,  from  such  sources 
after  previous  wars. 

I have  not  read,  of  course,  all  of  this  staggering  amount 
of  documentation — it  would  be  far  beyond  the  power  of  a 
single  individual.  But  I have  worked  my  way  through  a 
considerable  part  of  it,  slowed  down,  as  all  toilers  in  this 
rich  vineyard  must  be,  by  the  lack  of  any  suitable  indexes. 

It  is  quite  remarkable  how  little  those  of  us  who  were 
stationed  in  Germany  during  the  Nazi  time,  journalists 
and  diplomats,  really  knew  of  what  was  going  on  behind 
the  facade  of  the  Third  Reich.  A totalitarian  dictator- 
ship, by  its  very  nature,  works  in  great  secrecy  and  knows 
how  to  preserve  that  secrecy  from  the  prying  eyes  of  out- 
siders. It  was  easy  enough  to  record  and  describe  the  bare, 
exciting  and  often  revolting  events  in  the  Third  Reich: 
Hitler’s  accession  to  power,  the  Reichstag  fire,  the  Roehm 
Blood  Purge,  the  Anschluss  with  Austria,  the  surrender 
of  Chamberlain  at  Munich,  the  occupation  of  Czecho- 
slovakia, the  attacks  on  Poland,  Scandinavia,  the  West, 
the  Balkans  and  Russia,  the  horrors  of  the  Nazi  occupa- 
tion and  of  the  concentration  camps  and  the  liquidation 
of  the  Jews.  But  the  fateful  decisions  secretly  made,  the 
intrigues,  the  treachery,  the  motives  and  the  aberrations 
which  led  up  to  them,  the  parts  played  by  the  principal 
actors  behind  the  scenes,  the  extent  of  the  terror  they  exer- 
cised and  their  technique  of  organizing  it — all  this  and 
much  more  remained  largely  hidden  from  us  until  the 
secret  German  papers  turned  up. 

Some  may  think  that  it  is  much  too  early  to  try  to  write 
a history  of  the  Third  Reich,  that  such  a task  should  be 
left  to  a later  generation  of  writers  to  whom  time  has  given 
perspective.  I found  this  view  especially  prevalent  in 
France  when  I went  to  do  some  research  there.  Nothing 


xu  Foreword 

more  recent  than  the  Napoleonic  era,  I was  told,  should 
be  tackled  by  writers  of  history. 

There  is  much  merit  in  this  view.  Most  historians  have 
waited  fifty  years  or  a hundred,  or  more,  before  attempting 
to  write  an  account  of  a country,  an  empire,  an  era.  But 
was  this  not  principally  because  it  took  that  long  for  the 
pertinent  documents  to  come  to  light  and  furnish  them 
with  the  authentic  material  they  needed?  And  though  per- 
spective was  gained,  was  not  something  lost  because  the 
authors  necessarily  lacked  a personal  acquaintance  with 
the  life  and  the  atmosphere  of  the  times  and  with  the  his- 
torical figures  about  which  they  wrote? 

In  the  case  of  the  Third  Reich,  and  it  is  a unique  case, 
almost  all  of  the  documentary  material  became  available  at 
its  fall,  and  it  has  been  enriched  by  the  testimony  of  all  the 
surviving  leaders,  military  and  civilian,  in  some  instances 
before  their  death  by  execution.  With  such  incomparable 
sources  so  soon  available  and  with  the  memory  of  life 
in  Nazi  Germany  and  of  the  appearance  and  behavior  and 
nature  of  the  men  who  ruled  it,  Adolf  Hitler  above  all,  still 
fresh  in  my  mind  and  bones,  I decided,  at  any  rate,  to 
make  an  attempt  to  set  down  the  history  of  the  rise  and  fall 
of  the  Third  Reich. 

“I  lived  through  the  whole  war,”  Thucydides  remarks  in 
his  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  one  of  the  greatest 
works  of  history  ever  written,  “being  of  an  age  to  compre- 
hend events  and  giving  my  attention  to  them  in  order 
to  know  the  exact  truth  about  them.” 

I found  it  extremely  difficult  and  not  always  possible 
to  learn  the  exact  truth  about  Hitler’s  Germany.  The 
avalanche  of  documentary  material  helped  one  further 
along  the  road  to  truth  than  would  have  seemed  possible 
twenty  years  ago,  but  its  very  vastness  could  often  be 
confusing.  And  in  all  human  records  and  testimony  there 
are  bound  to  be  baffling  contradictions. 

No  doubt  my  own  prejudices,  which  inevitably  spring 
from  my  experience  and  make-up,  creep  through  the  pages 
of  this  book  from  time  to  time.  I detest  totalitarian  dictator- 
ships in  principle  and  came  to  loathe  this  one  the  more  I 
lived  through  it  and  watched  its  ugly  assault  upon  the  hu- 
man spirit.  Nevertheless,  in  this  book  I have  tried  to  be  se- 
verely objective,  letting  the  facts  speak  for  themselves  and 
noting  the  source  for  each.  No  incidents,  scenes  or  quo- 


Foreword 


xiii 


tations  stem  from  the  imagination;  all  are  based  on  docu- 
ments, the  testimony  of  eyewitnesses  or  my  own  personal 
observation.  In  the  half-dozen  or  so  occasions  in  which 
there  is  some  speculation,  where  the  facts  are  missing,  this 
is  plainly  labeled  as  such. 

My  interpretations,  I have  no  doubt,  will  be  disputed  by 
many.  That  is  inevitable,  since  no  man’s  opinions  are  in- 
fallible. Those  that  I have  ventured  here  in  order  to  add 
clarity  and  depth  to  this  narrative  are  merely  the  best 
I could  come  by  from  the  evidence  and  from  what  knowl- 
edge and  experience  I have  had. 

Adolf  Hitler  is  probably  the  last  of  the  great  adventurer- 
conquerors  in  the  tradition  of  Alexander,  Caesar  and  Napo- 
leon, and  the  Third  Reich  the  last  of  the  empires  which  set 
out  on  the  path  taken  earlier  by  France.  Rome  and  Mace- 
donia. The  curtain  was  rung  down  on  that  phase  of  history, 
at  least,  by  the  sudden  invention  of  the  hydrogen  bomb, 
of  the  ballistic  missile  and  of  rockets  that  can  be  aimed  to 
hit  the  moon. 

In  our  new  age  of  terrifying,  lethal  gadgets,  which 
supplanted  so  swiftly  the  old  one,  the  first  great  aggressive 
war,  if  it  should  come,  will  be  launched  by  suicidal  little 
madmen  pressing  an  electronic  button.  Such  a war  will  not 
last  long  and  none  will  ever  follow  it.  There  will  be  no 
conquerors  and  no  conquests,  but  only  the  charred  bones 
of  the  dead  on  an  uninhabited  planet. 


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Book  One 


# * ® 


THE  RISE 
OF 

ADOLF  HITLER 


1 


BIRTH  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 


on  the  very  eve  of  the  birth  of  the  Third  Reich  a 
feverish  tension  gripped  Berlin.  The  Weimar  Republic, 
it  seemed  obvious  to  almost  everyone,  was  about  to  expire. 
For  more  than  a year  it  had  been  fast  crumbling.  General 
Kurt  von  Schleicher,  who  like  his  immediate  predecessor, 
Franz  von  Papen,  cared  little  for  the  Republic  and  less 
for  its  democracy,  and  who,  also  like  him,  had  ruled  as 
Chancellor  by  presidential  decree  without  recourse  to 
Parliament,  had  come  to  the  end  of  his  rope  after  fifty- 
seven  days  in  office. 

On  Saturday,  January  28,  1933,  he  had  been  abruptly 
dismissed  by  the  aging  President  of  the  Republic,  Field 
Marshal  von  Hindenburg.  Adolf  Hitler,  leader  of  the  Na- 
tional Socialists,  the  largest  political  party  in  Germany, 
was  demanding  for  himself  the  chancellorship  of  the  demo- 
cratic Republic  he  had  sworn  to  destroy. 

The  wildest  rumors  of  what  might  happen  were  rife  in 
the  capital  that  fateful  winter  weekend,  and  the  most 
alarming  of  them,  as  it  happened,  were  not  without  some 
foundation.  There  were  reports  that  Schleicher,  in  collu- 
sion with  General  Kurt  von  Hammerstein,  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Army,  was  preparing  a putsch  with 
the  support  of  the  Potsdam  garrison  for  the  purpose  of 
arresting  the  President  and  establishing  a military  dicta- 
torship. There  was  talk  of  a Nazi  putsch.  The  Berlin  storm 
troopers,  aided  by  Nazi  sympathizers  in  the  police,  were  to 
seize  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  where  the  President’s  Palace 
and  most  of  the  government  ministries  were  located.  There 
was  talk  also  of  a general  strike.  On  Sunday,  January  29,  a 
hundred  thousand  workers  crowded  into  the  Lustgarten 
in  the  center  of  Berlin  to  demonstrate  their  opposition  to 
making  Hitler  Chancellor.  One  of  their  leaders  attempted 

17 


18 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  get  in  touch  with  General  von  Hammerstein  to  pro- 
pose joint  action  by  the  Army  and  organized  labor  should 
Hitler  be  named  to  head  a new  government.1  Once  before 
at  the  tune  of  the  Kapp  putsch  in  1920,  a general  strike 
had  saved  the  Republic  after  the  government  had  fled  the 
capital. 

Throughout  most  of  the  night  from  Sunday  to  Monday 
Hitler  paced  up  and  down  his  room  in  the  Kaiserhof 
hotel  on  the  Reichskanzlerplatz,  just  down  the  street 
from  the  Chancellery.2  Despite  his  nervousness  he  was 
supremely  confident  that  his  hour  had  struck.  For  nearly 
a month  he  had  been  secretly  negotiating  with  Papen  and 
the  other  leaders  of  the  conservative  Right.  He  had  had  to 
compromise.  He  could  not  have  a purely  Nazi  government. 
But  he  could  be  Chancellor  of  a coalition  government 
whose  members,  eight  out  of  eleven  of  whom  were  not 

a^is’  a£reed  with  him  on  the  abolition  of  the  democratic 
Weimar  regime.  Only  the  aged,  dour  President  had  seemed 
to  stand  in  his  way.  As  recently  as  January  26,  two 
days  before  the  advent  of  this  crucial  weekend,  the  grizzly 
old  Field  Marshal  had  told  General  von  Hammerstein 
that  he  had  “no  intention  whatsoever  of  making  that 
Austrian  corporal  either  Minister  of  Defense  or  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Reich.”  3 

Yet  under  the  influence  of  his  son,  Major  Oskar  von 
Hindenburg,  of  Otto  von  Meissner,  the  State  Secretary 
to  the  President,  of  Papen  and  other  members  of  the 
palace  camarilla,  the  President  was  finally  weakening. 
He  was  eighty-six  and  fading  into  senility.  On  the  after- 
noon of  Sunday,  January  29,  while  Hitler  was  having 
coffee  and  cakes  with  Goebbels  and  other  aides,  Hermann 
Goering,  President  of  the  Reichstag  and  second  to  Hitler 
in  the  Nazi  Party,  burst  in  and  informed  them  categorically 
that  on  the  morrow  Hitler  would  be  named  Chancellor.4 

Shortly  before  noon  on  Monday,  January  30,  1933,  Hit- 
ler drove  over  to  the  Chancellery  for  an  interview  with 
Hindenburg  that  was  to  prove  fateful  for  himself,  for 
Germany  and  for  the  rest  of  the  world.  From  a window 
in  the  Kaiserhof,  Goebbels,  Roehm  and  other  Nazi  chiefs 
kept  an  anxious  watch  on  the  door  of  the  Chancellery, 
where  the  Fuehrer  would  shortly  be  coming  out.  “We 
would  see  from  his  face  whether  he  had  succeeded  or 
not,  Goebbels  noted.  For  even  then  they  were  not  quite 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


19 


sure.  “Our  hearts  are  torn  back  and  forth  between  doubt, 
hope,  joy  and  discouragement,”  Goebbels  jotted  down  in 
his  diary.  “We  have  been  disappointed  too  often  for  us  to 
believe  wholeheartedly  in  the  great  miracle.”  5 

A few  moments  later  they  witnessed  the  miracle.  The 
man  with  the  Charlie  Chaplin  mustache,  who  had  been 
a down-and-out  tramp  in  Vienna  in  his  youth,  an  unknown 
soldier  of  World  War  I,  a derelict  in  Munich  in  the  first 
grim  postwar  days,  the  somewhat  comical  leader  of  the 
Beer  Hall  Putsch,  this  spellbinder  who  was  not  even  Ger- 
man but  Austrian,  and  who  was  only  forty-three  years  old, 
had  just  been  administered  the  oath  as  Chancellor  of  the 
German  Reich. 

He  drove  the  hundred  yards  to  the  Kaiserhof  and  was 
soon  with  his  old  cronies,  Goebbels,  Goering,  Roehm  and 
the  other  Brownshirts  who  had  helped  him  along  the 
rocky,  brawling  path  to  power.  “He  says  nothing,  and  all 
of  us  say  nothing,”  Goebbels  recorded,  “but  his  eyes  are 
full  of  tears.”  6 

That  evening  from  dusk  until  far  past  midnight  the 
delirious  Nazi  storm  troopers  marched  in  a massive  torch- 
light parade  to  celebrate  the  victory.  By  the  tens  of 
thousands,  they  emerged  in  disciplined  columns  from  the 
depths  of  the  Tiergarten,  passed  under  the  triumphal  arch 
of  the  Brandenburg  Gate  and  down  the  Wilhelmstrasse, 
their  bands  blaring  the  old  martial  airs  to  the  thunderous 
beating  of  the  drums,  their  voices  bawling  the  new  Horst 
Wessel  song  and  other  tunes  that  were  as  old  as  Germany, 
their  jack  boots  beating  a mighty  rhythm  on  the  pave- 
ment, their  torches  held  high  and  forming  a ribbon  of 
flame  that  illuminated  the  night  and  kindled  the  hurrahs 
of  the  onlookers  massed  on  the  sidewalks.  From  a window 
in  the  palace  Hindenburg  looked  down  upon  the  marching 
throng,  beating  time  to  the  military  marches  with  his  cane, 
apparently  pleased  that  at  last  he  had  picked  a Chancellor 
who  could  arouse  the  people  in  a traditionally  German  way. 
Whether  the  old  man,  in  his  dotage,  had  any  inkling 
of  what  he  had  unleashed  that  day  is  doubtful.  A story, 
probably  apocryphal,  soon  spread  over  Berlin  that  in  the 
midst  of  the  parade  he  had  turned  to  an  old  general  and 
said,  ‘ I didn’t  know  we  had  taken  so  many  Russian 
prisoners.” 

A stone’s  throw  down  the  Wilhelmstrasse  Adolf  Hitler 


20 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


stood  at  an  open  window  of  the  Chancellery,  beside 
himself  with  excitement  and  joy,  dancing  up  and  down, 
jerking  his  arm  up  continually  in  the  Nazi  salute,  smiling 
and  laughing  until  his  eyes  were  again  full  of  tears. 

One  foreign  observer  watched  the  proceedings  that 
evening  with  different  feelings.  “The  river  of  fire  flowed 
past  the  French  Embassy,”  Andre  Fran?ois-Poncet, 
the  ambassador,  wrote,  “whence,  with  heavy  heart  and 
filled  with  foreboding,  I watched  its  luminous  wake.” 7 

Tired  but  happy,  Goebbels  arrived  home  that  night  at 
3 a.m.  Scribbling  in  his  diary  before  retiring,  he  wrote: 
“It  is  almost  like  a dream  ...  a fairy  tale  . . . The  new 
Reich  has  been  born.  Fourteen  years  of  work  have  been 
crowned  with  victory.  The  German  revolution  has 
begun!”  8 

The  Third  Reich  which  was  bom  on  January  30,  1933, 
Hitler  boasted,  would  endure  for  a thousand  years,9 
and  in  Nazi  parlance  it  was  often  referred  to  as  the 
“Thousand-Year  Reich.”  It  lasted  twelve  years  and  four 
months,  but  in  that  flicker  of  time,  as  history  goes,  it 
caused  an  eruption  on  this  earth  more  violent  and  shat- 
tering than  any  previously  experienced,  raising  the  Ger- 
man people  to  heights  of  power  they  had  not  known  in 
more  than  a millennium,  making  them  at  one  time  the 
masters  of  Europe  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Volga,  from 
the  North  Cape  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  then  plunging 
them  to  the  depths  of  destruction  and  desolation  at  the 
end  of  a world  war  which  their  nation  had  cold-bloodedly 
provoked  and  during  which  it  instituted  a reign  of  terror 
over  the  conquered  peoples  which,  in  its  calculated 
butchery  of  human  life  and  the  human  spirit,  outdid  all 
the  savage  oppressions  of  the  previous  ages. 

The  man  who  founded  the  Third  Reich,  who  ruled  it 
ruthlessly  and  often  with  uncommon  shrewdness,  who 
led  it  to  such  dizzy  heights  and  to  such  a sorry  end,  was 
a person  of  undoubted,  if  evil,  genius.  It  is  true  that  he 
found  in  the  German  people,  as  a mysterious  Providence 
and  centuries  of  experience  had  molded  them  up  to  that 
time,  a natural  instrument  which  he  was  able  to  shape  to 
his  own  sinister  ends.  But  without  Adolf  Hitler,  who 
was  possessed  of  a demonic  personality,  a granite  will, 
uncanny  instincts,  a cold  ruthlessness,  a remarkable  intel- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


21 


lect,  a soaring  imagination  and — until  toward  the  end, 
when,  drunk  with  power  and  success,  he  overreached  him- 
self— an  amazing  capacity  to  size  up  people  and  situations, 
there  almost  certainly  would  never  have  been  a Third 
Reich. 

“It  is  one  of  the  great  examples,”  as  Friedrich  Meinecke, 
the  eminent  German  historian,  said,  “of  the  singular  and 
incalculable  power  of  personality  in  historical  life.”  10 

To  some  Germans  and,  no  doubt,  to  most  foreigners  it 
appeared  that  a charlatan  had  come  to  power  in  Berlin. 
To  the  majority  of  Germans  Hitler  had — or  would  shortly 
assume — the  aura  of  a truly  charismatic  leader.  They 
were  to  follow  him  blindly,  as  if  he  possessed  a divine 
judgment,  for  the  next  twelve  tempestuous  years. 

THE  ADVENT  OF  ADOLF  HITLER 

Considering  his  origins  and  his  early  life,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  imagine  a more  unlikely  figure  to  succeed  to 
the  mantle  of  Bismarck,  the  Hohenzollern  emperors  and 
President  Hindenburg  than  this  singular  Austrian  of  peas- 
ant stock  who  was  bom  at  half  past  six  on  the  evening  of 
April  20,  1889,  in  the  Gasthof  zum  Pommer,  a modest 
inn  in  the  town  of  Braunau  am  Inn,  across  the  border 
from  Bavaria. 

The  place  of  birth  on  the  Austro-German  frontier  was 
to  prove  significant,  for  early  in  his  life,  as  a mere  youth, 
Hitler  became  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  there  should  be 
no  border  between  these  two  German-speaking  peoples 
and  that  they  both  belonged  in  the  same  Reich.  So  strong 
and  enduring  were  his  feelings  that  at  thirty-five,  when 
he  sat  in  a German  prison  dictating  the  book  that  would 
become  the  blueprint  for  the  Third  Reich,  his  very  first 
lines  were  concerned  with  the  symbolic  significance  of 
his  birthplace.  Mein  Kampf  begins  with  these  words: 

Today  it  seems  to  me  providential  that  fate  should  have 
chosen  Braunau  am  Inn  as  my  birthplace.  For  this  little 
town  lies  on  the  boundary  between  two  German  states 
which  we  of  the  younger  generation  at  least  have  made  it 
our  life-work  to  reunite  by  every  means  at  our  disposal.  . . . 
This  little  city  on  the  border  seems  to  me  the  symbol  of  a 
great  mission.11 

Adolf  Hitler  was  the  third  son  of  the  third  marriage  of  a 


22 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

minor  Austrian  customs  official  who  had  been  born  an 
illegitimate  child  and  who  for  the  first  thirty-nine  years 
of  his  life  bore  his  mother’s  name,  Schicklgruber.  The 
name  Hitler  appears  in  the  maternal  as  well  as  the  paternal 
line.  Both  Hitler’s  grandmother  on  his  mother’s  side  and 
his  grandfather  on  his  father’s  side  were  named  Hitler, 
or  rather  variants  of  it,  for  the  family  name  was  variously 
written  as  Hiedler,  Huetler,  Huettler  and  Hitler.  Adolf’s 
mother  was  his  father’s  second  cousin,  and  an  episcopal 
dispensation  had  to  be  obtained  for  the  marriage. 

The  forebears  of  the  future  German  Fuehrer,  on  both 
sides,  dwelt  for  generations  in  the  Waldviertel,  a district 
in  Lower  Austria  between  the  Danube  and  the  borders  of 
Bohemia  and  Moravia.  In  my  own  Vienna  days  I some- 
times passed  through  it  on  my  way  to  Prague  or  to 
Germany.  It  is  a hilly,  wooded  country  of  peasant  villages 
and  small  farms,  and  though  only  some  fifty  miles  from 
Vienna  it  has  a somewhat  remote  and  impoverished  air, 
as  if  the  main  currents  of  Austrian  life  had  passed  it 
by.  The  inhabitants  tend  to  be  dour,  like  the  Czech  peas- 
ants just  to  the  north  of  them.  Intermarriage  is  common, 
as  in  the  case  of  Hitler’s  parents,  and  illegitimacy  is  fre- 
quent. 

On  the  mother’s  side  there  was  a certain  stability.  For 
four  generations  Klara  Poelzl’s  family  remained  on  peas- 
ant holding  Number  37  in  the  village  of  Spital.12  The 
story  of  Hitler’s  paternal  ancestors  is  quite  different.  The 
spelling  of  the  family  name,  as  we  have  seen,  changes;  the 
place  of  residence  also.  There  is  a spirit  of  restlessness 
among  the  Hitlers,  an  urge  to  move  from  one  village  to 
the  next,  from  one  job  to  another,  to  avoid  firm  human 
ties  and  to  follow  a certain  bohemian  life  in  relations 
with  women. 

Johann  Georg  Hiedler,  Adolf’s  grandfather,  was  a wan- 
dering miller,  plying  his  trade  in  one  village  after  another 
in  Lower  Austria.  Five  months  after  his  first  marriage, 
in  1824,  a son  was  born,  but  the  child  and  the  mother 
did  not  survive.  Eighteen  years  later,  while  working  in 
Duerenthal,  he  married  a forty-seven-year-old  peasant 
woman  from  the  village  of  Strones,  Maria  Anna 
Schicklgruber.  Five  years  before  the  marriage,  on  June  7, 
1837,  Maria  had  had  an  illegitimate  son  whom  she  named 
Alois  and  who  became  Adolf  Hitler’s  father.  It  is  most 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


23 


probable  that  the  father  of  Alois  was  Johann  Hiedler, 
though  conclusive  evidence  is  lacking.  At  any  rate  Johann 
eventually  married  the  woman,  but  contrary  to  the  usual 
custom  in  such  cases  he  did  not  trouble  himself  with 
legitimizing  the  son  after  the  marriage.  The  child  grew 
up  as  Alois  Schicklgruber. 

Anna  died  in  1 847,  whereupon  Johann  Hiedler  vanished 
for  thirty  years,  only  to  reappear  at  the  age  of  eighty-four 
in  the  town  of  Weitra  in  the  Waldviertel,  the  spelling  of  his 
name  now  changed  to  Hitler,  to  testify  before  a notary 
in  the  presence  of  three  witnesses  that  he  was  the  father 
of  Alois  Schicklgruber.  Why  the  old  man  waited  so  long 
to  take  this  step,  or  why  he  finally  took  it,  is  not  known 
from  the  available  records.  According  to  Heiden,  Alois 
later  confided  to  a friend  that  it  was  done  to  help  him 
obtain  a share  of  an  inheritance  from  an  uncle,  a brother 
of  the  miller,  who  had  raised  the  youth  in  his  own  house- 
hold.13 At  any  rate,  this  tardy  recognition  was  made  on 
June  6,  1876,  and  on  November  23  the  parish  priest  at 
Doellersheim,  to  whose  office  the  notarized  statement  had 
been  forwarded,  scratched  out  the  name  of  Alois  Schickl- 
gruber in  the  baptismal  registry  and  wrote  in  its  place  that 
of  Alois  Hitler. 

From  that  time  on  Adolf’s  father  was  legally  known  as 
Alois  Hitler,  and  the  name  passed  on  naturally  to  his  son. 
It  was  only  during  the  1930s  that  enterprising  journalists 
in  Vienna,  delving  into  the  parish  archives,  discovered  the 
facts  about  Hitler’s  ancestry  and,  disregarding  old  Johann 
Georg  Hiedler’s  belated  attempt  to  do  right  by  a bastard 
son,  tried  to  fasten  on  the  Nazi  leader  the  name  of  Adolf 
Schicklgruber. 

There  are  many  weird  twists  of  fate  in  the  strange  life 
of  Adolf  Hitler,  but  none  more  odd  than  this  one  which 
took  place  thirteen  years  before  his  birth.  Had  the  eighty- 
four-year-old  wandering  miller  not  made  his  unexpected 
reappearance  to  recognize  the  paternity  of  his  thirty-nine- 
year-old  son  nearly  thirty  years  after  the  death  of  the 
mother,  Adolf  Hitler  would  have  been  born  Adolf  Schickl- 
gruber. There  may  not  be  much  or  anything  in  a name,  but 
I have  heard  Germans  speculate  whether  Hitler  could  have 
become  the  master  of  Germany  had  he  been  known  to  the 
world  as  Schicklgruber.  It  has  a slightly  comic  sound  as  it 
rolls  off  the  tongue  of  a South  German.  Can  one  imagine 


24 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  frenzied  German  masses  acclaiming  a Schicklgruber 
with  their  thunderous  “Heils”?  “Heil  Schicklgruber!”? 
Not  only  was  “Heil  Hitler!”  used  as  a Wagnerian,  pagan- 
like chant  by  the  multitude  in  the  mystic  pageantry  of 
the  massive  Nazi  rallies,  but  it  became  the  obligatory  form 
of  greeting  between  Germans  during  the  Third  Reich, 
even  on  the  telephone,  where  it  replaced  the  conventional 
“Hello.”  “Heil  Schicklgruber!”?  It  is  a little  difficult  to 
imagine.* 

Since  the  parents  of  Alois  apparently  never  lived  to- 
gether, even  after  they  were  married,  the  future  father  of 
Adolf  Hitler  grew  up  with  his  uncle,  who  though  a brother 
of  Johann  Georg  Hiedler  spelled  his  name  differently, 
being  known  as  Johann  von  Nepomuk  Huetler.  In  view  of 
the  undying  hatred  which  the  Nazi  Fuehrer  would  develop 
from  youth  on  for  the  Czechs,  whose  nation  he  ultimately 
destroyed,  the  Christian  name  is  worthy  of  passing  men- 
tion. Johann  von  Nepomuk  was  the  national  saint  of  the 
Czech  people  and  some  historians  have  seen  in  a Hitler’s 
being  given  this  name  an  indication  of  Czech  blood  in  the 
family. 

Alois  Schicklgruber  first  learned  the  trade  of  shoemaker 
in  the  village  of  Spital,  but  being  restless,  like  his  father, 
he  soon  set  out  to  make  his  fortune  in  Vienna.  At  eighteen 
he  joined  the  border  police  in  the  Austrian  customs 
service  near  Salzburg,  and  on  being  promoted  to  the  cus- 
toms service  itself  nine  years  later  he  married  Anna  Glasl- 
Hoerer,  the  adopted  daughter  of  a customs  official.  She 
brought  him  a small  dowry  and  increased  social  status, 
as  such  things  went  in  the  old  Austro-Hungarian  petty 
bureaucracy.  But  the  marriage  was  not  a happy  one.  She 
was  fourteen  years  older  than  he,  of  failing  health,  and 
she  remained  childless.  After  sixteen  years  they  were 
separated  and  three  years  later,  in  1883,  she  died. 

Before  the  separation  Alois,  now  legally  known  as 
Hitler,  had  taken  up  with  a young  hotel  cook,  Franziska 
Matzelsberger,  who  bore  him  a son,  named  Alois,  in  1882. 
One  month  after  the  death  of  his  wife  he  married  the 

* Hilter  himself  seems  to  have  recognized  this.  In  his  youth  he  confided 
to  the  only  boyhood  friend  he  had  that  nothing  had  ever  pleased  him  as 
much  as  his  father’s  change  of  names.  He  told  August  Kubizek  that  the 
name  Schicklgruber  “seemed  to  him  so  uncouth,  so  boorish,  apart  from 
being  so  clumsy  and  unpractical.  He  found  ‘Hiedler’  ...  too  soft;  but 
‘Hitler’  sounded  nice  and  was  easy  to  remember.”  (August  Kubizek,  The 
Young  Hitler  I Knew,  p.  40.) 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


25 


cook  and  three  months  later  she  gave  birth  to  a daughter, 
Angela.  The  second  marriage  did  not  last  long.  Within  a 
year  Franziska  was  dead  of  tuberculosis.  Six  months  later 
Alois  Hitler  married  for  the  third  and  last  time. 

The  new  bride,  Klara  Poelzl,  who  would  shortly  be- 
come the  mother  of  Adolf  Hitler,  was  twenty-five,  her 
husband  forty-eight,  and  they  had  long  known  each  other. 
Klara  came  from  Spital,  the  ancestral  village  of  the  Hit- 
lers. Her  grandfather  had  been  Johann  von  Nepomuk 
Huetler,  with  whom  his  nephew,  Alois  Schicklgruber- 
Hitler,  had  grown  up.  Thus  Alois  and  Klara  were  second 
cousins  and  they  found  it  necessary,  as  we  have  seen,  to 
apply  for  episcopal  dispensation  to  permit  the  marriage. 

It  was  a union  which  the  customs  official  had  first  con- 
templated years  before  when  he  had  taken  Klara  into  his 
childless  home  as  a foster  daughter  during  his  first  mar- 
riage. The  child  had  lived  for  years  with  the  Schickl- 
grubers  in  Braunau,  and  as  the  first  wife  ailed  Alois 
seems  to  have  given  thought  to  marrying  Klara  as  soon  as 
his  wife  died.  His  legitimation  and  his  coming  into  an 
inheritance  from  the  uncle  who  was  Klara’s  grandfather 
occurred  when  the  young  girl  was  sixteen,  just  old 
enough  to  legally  marry.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  the  wife 
lingered  on  after  the  separation,  and,  perhaps  because 
Alois  in  the  meantime  took  up  with  the  cook  Franziska 
Matzelsberger,  Klara,  at  the  age  of  twenty,  left  the  house- 
hold and  went  to  Vienna,  where  she  obtained  employ- 
ment as  a household  servant. 

She  returned  four  years  later  to  keep  house  for  her 
cousin;  Franziska  too,  in  the  last  months  of  her  life,  had 
moved  out  of  her  husband’s  home.  Alois  Hitler  and  Klara 
Poelzl  were  married  on  January  7,  1885,  and  some  four 
months  and  ten  days  later  their  first  child,  Gustav,  was 
born.  He  died  in  infancy,  as  did  the  second  child,  Ida, 
born  in  1886.  Adolf  was  the  third  child  of  this  third 
marriage.  A younger  brother,  Edmund,  bom  in  1894,  lived 
only  six  years.  The  fifth  and  last  child,  Paula,  bom  in  1896, 
lived  to  survive  her  famous  brother. 

Adolf’s  half-brother,  Alois,  and  his  half-sister,  Angela, 
the  children  of  Franziska  Matzelsberger,  also  lived 
to  grow  up.  Angela,  a handsome  young  woman,  married  a 
revenue  official  named  Raubal  and  after  his  death  worked 
in  Vienna  as  a housekeeper  and  for  a time,  if  Heiden’s  in- 


26  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

formation  is  correct,  as  a cook  in  a Jewish  charity  kitch- 
en.14 In  1928  Hitler  brought  her  to  Berchtesgaden  as  his 
housekeeper,  and  thereafter  one  heard  a great  deal  in 
Nazi  circles  of  the  wondrous  Viennese  pastries  and  des- 
serts she  baked  for  him  and  for  which  he  had  such  a 
ravenous  appetite.  She  left  him  in  1936  to  marry  a profes- 
sor of  architecture  in  Dresden,  and  Hitler,  by  then  Chan- 
cellor and  dictator,  was  resentful  of  her  departure  and 
declined  to  send  a wedding  present.  She  was  the  only 
person  in  the  family  with  whom,  in  his  later  years,  he 
seems  to  have  been  close — with  one  exception.  Angela 
had  a daughter,  Geli  Raubal,  an  attractive  young  blond 
woman  with  whom,  as  we  shall  see,  Hitler  had  the  only 
truly  deep  love  affair  of  his  life. 

Adolf  Hitler  never  liked  to  hear  mention  of  his  half- 
brother.  Alois  Matzelsberger,  later  legitimized  as  Alois  Hit- 
ler, became  a waiter,  and  for  many  years  his  life  was  full 
of  difficulties  with  the  law.  Heiden  records  that  at  eighteen 
the  young  man  was  sentenced  to  five  months  in  jail  for 
theft  and  at  twenty  served  another  sentence  of  eight 
months  on  the  same  charge.  He  eventually  moved  to 
Germany,  only  to  become  embroiled  in  further  troubles. 
In  1924,  while  Adolf  Hitler  was  languishing  in  prison  for 
having  staged  a political  revolt  in  Munich,  Alois  Hitler  was 
sentenced  to  six  months  in  prison  by  a Hamburg  court 
for  bigamy.  Thereafter,  Heiden  recounts,  he  moved  on  to 
England,  where  he  quickly  established  a family  and  then 
deserted  it.15 

The  coming  to  power  of  the  National  Socialists  brought 
better  times  to  Alois  Hitler.  He  opened  a Bierstube — a 
small  beerhouse — in  a suburb  of  Berlin,  moving  it  shortly 
before  the  war  to  the  Wittenbergplatz  in  the  capital’s  fash- 
ionable West  End.  It  was  much  frequented  by  Nazi 
officials  and  during  the  early  part  of  the  war  when  food 
was  scarce  it  inevitably  had  a plentiful  supply.  I used 
to  drop  in  occasionally  at  that  time.  Alois  was  then  nearing 
sixty,  a portly,  simple,  good-natured  man  with  little  phys- 
ical resemblance  to  his  famous  half-brother  and  in  fact 
indistinguishable  from  dozens  of  other  little  pub  keepers 
one  had  seen  in  Germany  and  Austria.  Business  was  good 
and,  whatever  his  past,  he  was  now  obviously  enjoying  the 
prosperous  life.  He  had  only  one  fear:  that  his  half-brother, 
in  a moment  of  disgust  or  rage,  might  revoke  his  license. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


27 


Sometimes  there  was  talk  in  the  little  beerhouse  that  the 
Chancellor  and  Fuehrer  of  the  Reich  regretted  this  re- 
minder of  the  humble  nature  of  the  Hitler  family.  Alois 
himself.  I remember,  refused  to  be  drawn  into  any  talk 
whatsoever  about  his. half-brother — a wise  precaution  but 
frustrating  to  those  of  us  who  were  trying  to  learn  all  we 
could  about  the  background  of  the  man  who  by  that  time 
had  already  set  out  to  conquer  Europe. 

Except  in  Mein  Kampf,  where  the  sparse  biographical 
material  is  often  misleading  and  the  omissions  monu- 
mental, Hitler  rarely  discussed — or  permitted  discussion  of 
in  his  presence — his  family  background  and  early  life.  We 
have  seen  what  the  family  background  was.  What  was 
the  early  life? 

THE  EARLY  LIFE  OF  ADOLF  HITLER 

The  year  his  father  retired  from  the  customs  service  at 
the  age  of  fifty-eight,  the  six-year-old  Adolf  entered  the 
public  school  in  the  village  of  Fischlham,  a short  dis- 
tance southwest  of  Linz.  This  was  in  1895.  For  the  next 
four  or  five  years  the  restless  old  pensioner  moved  from 
one  village  to  another  in  the  vicinity  of  Linz.  By  the  time 
the  son  was  fifteen  he  could  remember  seven  changes  of 
address  and  five  different  schools.  For  two  years  he  at- 
tended classes  at  the  Benedictine  monastery  at  Lambach, 
near  which  his  father  had  purchased  a farm.  There 
he  sang  in  the  choir,  took  singing  lessons  and,  according 
to  his  own  account,16  dreamed  of  one  day  taking  holy 
orders.  Finally  the  retired  customs  official  settled  down  for 
good  in  the  village  of  Leonding,  on  the  southern  outskirts 
of  Linz,  where  the  family  occupied  a modest  house  and 
garden. 

At  the  age  of  eleven,  Adolf  was  sent  to  the  high  school 
at  Linz.  This  represented  a financial  sacrifice  for  the  father 
and  indicated  an  ambition  that  the  son  should  follow  in 
his  father’s  footsteps  and  become  a civil  servant.  That, 
however,  was  the  last  thing  the  youth  would  dream  of. 

“Then  barely  eleven  years  old,”  Hitler  later  recounted,17 
“I  was  forced  into  opposition  (to  my  father)  for  the  first 
time.  ...  I did  not  want  to  become  a civil  servant.” 

The  story  of  the  bitter,  unrelenting  struggle  of  the  boy, 
not  yet  in  his  teens,  against  a hardened  and,  as  he  said, 


28 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

domineering  father  is  one  of  the  few  biographical  items 
which  Hitler  sets  down  in  great  detail  and  with  apparent 
sincerity  and  truth  in  Mein  Kampf.  The  conflict  aroused 
the  first  manifestation  of  that  fierce,  unbending  will  which 
later  would  carry  him  so  far  despite  seemingly  insuperable 
obstacles  and  handicaps  and  which,  confounding  all 
those  who  stood  in  his  way,  was  to  put  an  indelible 
stamp  on  Germany  and  Europe. 

I did  not  want  to  become  a civil  servant,  no,  and  again 
no.  All  attempts  on  my  father’s  part  to  inspire  me  with  love 
or  pleasure  in  this  profession  by  stories  from  his  own  life 
accomplished  the  exact  opposite.  I . . . grew  sick  to  my 
stomach  at  the  thought  of  sitting  in  an  office,  deprived  of 
my  liberty;  ceasing  to  be  master  of  my  own  time  and  being 
compelled  to  force  the  content  of  my  whole  life  into  paper 
forms  that  had  to  be  filled  out.  . . . 

One  day  it  became  clear  to  me  that  I would  become  a 
painter,  an  artist  . . . My  father  was  struck  speechless. 

“Painter?  Artist?” 

He  doubted  my  sanity,  or  perhaps  he  thought  he  had 
heard  wrong  or  misunderstood  me.  But  when  he  was  clear 
on  the  subject,  and  particularly  after  he  felt  the  serious- 
ness of  my  intention,  he  opposed  it  with  all  the  determina- 
tion of  his  nature.  . . . 

“Artist!  No!  Never  as  long  as  I live!”  . . . My  father 
would  never  depart  from  his  “Never!”  And  I intensified  my 
“Nevertheless!”  18 

One  consequence  of  this  encounter,  Hitler  later  ex- 
plained, was  that  he  stopped  studying  in  school.  “I 
thought  that  once  my  father  saw  how  little  progress  I 
was  making  at  high  school  he  would  let  me  devote  myself 
to  my  dream,  whether  he  liked  it  or  not.” 19 

This,  written  thirty-four  years  later,  may  be  partly  an 
excuse  for  his  failure  at  school.  His  marks  in  grade 
school  had  been  uniformly  good.  But  at  the  Linz  high 
school  they  were  so  poor  that  in  the  end,  without  obtain- 
ing the  customary  certificate,  he  was  forced  to  transfer 
to  the  state  high  school  at  Steyr,  some  distance  from 
Linz.  He  remained  there  but  a short  time  and  left  before 
graduating. 

Hitler’s  scholastic  failure  rankled  in  him  in  later  life, 
when  he  heaped  ridicule  on  the  academic  “gentry,”  their 
degrees  and  diplomas  and  their  pedagogical  airs.  Even 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hiller 


29 


in  the  last  three  or  four  years  of  his  life,  at  Supreme 
Army  Headquarters,  where  he  allowed  himself  to  be  over- 
whelmed with  details  of  military  strategy,  tactics  and 
command,  he  would  take  an  evening  off  to  reminisce  with 
his  old  party  cronies  on  the  stupidity  of  the  teachers  he 
had  had  in  his  youth.  Some  of  these  meanderings  of  this 
mad  genius,  now  the  Supreme  Warlord  personally  direct- 
ing his  vast  armies  from  the  Volga  to  the  English  Chan- 
nel, have  been  preserved. 

When  I think  of  the  men  who  were  my  teachers,  I realize 
that  most  of  them  were  slightly  mad.  The  men  who  could 
be  regarded  as  good  teachers  were  exceptional.  It’s  tragic 
to  think  that  such  people  have  the  power  to  bar  a young 
man’s  way. — March  3,  1942  20 

I have  the  most  unpleasant  recollections  of  the  teachers 
who  taught  me.  Their  external  appearance  exuded  unclean- 
liness; their  collars  were  unkempt  . . . They  were  the  product 
of  a proletariat  denuded  of  all  personal  independence  of 
thought,  distinguished  by  unparalleled  ignorance  and  most 
admirably  fitted  to  become  the  pillars  of  an  effete  system  of 
government  which,  thank  God,  is  now  a thing  of  the 
past. — April  12,  1942.21 

When  I recall  my  teachers  at  school,  I realize  that  half  of 
them  were  abnormal.  . . . We  pupils  of  old  Austria  were 
brought  up  to  respect  old  people  and  women.  But  on  our 
professors  we  had  no  mercy;  they  were  our  natural  enemies. 
The  majority  of  them  were  somewhat  mentally  deranged, 
and  quite  a few  ended  their  days  as  honest-to-God  lunatics! 
...  I was  in  particular  bad  odor  with  the  teachers.  I showed 
not  the  slightest  aptitude  for  foreign  languages — though  I 
might  have,  had  not  the  teacher  been  a congenital  idiot.  I 
could  not  bear  the  sight  of  him. — August  29,  1942  22 

Our  teachers  were  absolute  tyrants.  They  had  no  sympathy 
with  youth;  their  one  object  was  to  stuff  our  brains  and  turn 
us  into  erudite  apes  like  themselves.  If  any  pupil  showed  the 
slightest  trace  of  originality,  they  persecuted  him  relent- 
lessly, and  the  only  model  pupils  whom  I have  ever  got  to 
know  have  all  been  failures  in  after-life.  September  7,  1942.23 

To  his  dying  day,  it  is  obvious,  Hitler  never  forgave  his 
teachers  for  the  poor  marks  they  had  given  him — nor 
could  he  forget.  But  he  could  distort  to  a point  of  gro- 
tesqueness. 


30 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  impression  he  made  on  his  teachers,  recollected 
after  he  had  become  a world  figure,  has  been  briefly 
recorded.  One  of  the  few  instructors  Hitler  seems  to  have 
liked  was  Professor  Theodor  Gissinger,  who  strove  to  teach 
him  science.  Gissinger  later  recalled,  “As  far  as  I was 
concerned,  Hitler  left  neither  a favorable  nor  an  unfavor- 
able impression  in  Linz.  He  was  by  no  means  a leader  of 
the  class.  He  was  slender  and  erect,  his  face  pallid  and 
very  thin,  almost  like  that  of  a consumptive,  his  gaze 
unusually  open,  his  eyes  brilliant.”  24 

Professor  Eduard  Huemer,  apparently  the  “congenital 
idiot”  mentioned  by  Hitler  above — for  he  taught  French 
— came  to  Munich  in  1923  to  testify  for  his  former  pupil, 
who  was  then  being  tried  for  treason  as  the  result  of  the 
Beer  Hall  Putsch.  Though  he  lauded  Hider’s  aims  and 
said  that  he  wished  from  the  bottom  of  his  heart  to  see 
him  fulfill  his  ideals,  he  gave  the  following  thumbnail 
portrait  of  the  young  high-school  student: 

Hider  was  certainly  gifted,  although  only  for  particular 
subjects,  but  he  lacked  self-control  and,  to  say  the  least, 
he  was  considered  argumentadve,  autocratic,  self-opinion- 
ated and  bad-tempered,  and  unable  to  submit  to  school 
discipline.  Nor  was  he  industrious;  otherwise  he  would 
have  achieved  much  better  results,  gifted  as  he  was.25 

There  was  one  teacher  at  the  Linz  high  school  who  exer- 
cised a strong  and,  as  it  turned  out,  a fateful  influence  on 
the  young  Adolf  Hider.  This  was  a history  teacher.  Dr. 
Leopold  Poetsch,  who  came  from  the  southern  German- 
language  border  region  where  it  meets  that  of  the  South 
Slavs  and  whose  experience  with  the  racial  struggle  there 
had  made  him  a fanatical  German  nationalist.  Before 
coming  to  Linz  he  had  taught  at  Marburg,  which  later, 
when  the  area  was  transferred  to  Yugoslavia  after  the 
First  World  War,  became  Maribor. 

Though  Dr.  Poetsch  had  given  his  pupil  marks  of  only 
“fair”  in  history,  he  was  the  only  one  of  Hitler’s  teachers 
to  receive  a warm  tribute  in  Mein  Kampf.  Hitler  readily 
admitted  his  debt  to  this  man. 

It  was  perhaps  decisive  for  my  whole  later  life  that  good 
fortune  gave  me  a history  teacher  who  understood,  as  few 
others  did,  this  principle  . . . — of  retaining  the  essential 
and  forgetting  the  nonessential  ...  In  my  teacher.  Dr. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


31 


Leopold  Poetsch  of  the  high  school  in  Linz,  this  require- 
ment was  fulfilled  in  a truly  ideal  manner.  An  old  gentle- 
man, kind  but  at  the  same  time  firm,  he  was  able  not 
only  to  hold  our  attention  by  his  dazzling  eloquence  but  to 
carry  us  away  with  him.  Even  today  I think  back  with 
genuine  emotion  on  this  gray-haired  man  who,  by  the  fire  of 
his  words,  sometimes  made  us  forget  the  present;  who,  as  if 
by  magic,  transported  us  into  times  past  and,  out  of  the 
millennium  mists  of  time,  transformed  dry  historical  facts  into 
vivid  reality.  There  we  sat,  often  aflame  with  enthusiasm, 
sometimes  even  moved  to  tears  ...  He  used  our  budding 
national  fanaticism  as  a means  of  educating  us,  frequently 
appealing  to  our  sense  of  national  honor. 

This  teacher  made  history  my  favorite  subject. 

And  indeed,  though  he  had  no  such  intention,  it  was 
then  that  I became  a young  revolutionary.26 

Some  thirty-five  years  later,  in  1938,  while  touring 
Austria  in  triumph  after  he  had  forced  its  annexation  to 
the  Third  Reich,  Chancellor  Hitler  stopped  off  at  Klagen- 
furt  to  see  his  old  teacher,  then  in  retirement.  He  was  de- 
lighted to  find  that  the  old  gentleman  had  been  a member 
of  the  underground  Nazi  S.S.,  which  had  been  outlawed 
during  Austria’s  independence.  He  conversed  with  him 
alone  for  an  hour  and  later  confided  to  members  of  his 
party,  “You  cannot  imagine  how  much  I owe  to  that  old 
man.”  22 

Alois  Hitler  died  of  a lung  hemorrhage  on  January  3, 
1903,  at  the  age  of  sixty-five.  He  was  stricken  while 
taking  a morning  walk  and  died  a few  moments  later  in  a 
nearby  inn  in  the  arms  of  a neighbor.  When  his  thirteen- 
year-old  son  saw  the  body  of  his  father  he  broke  down 
and  wept.28 

His  mother,  who  was  then  forty-two,  moved  to  a modest 
apartment  in  Urfahr,  a suburb  of  Linz,  where  she  tried 
to  keep  herself  and  her  two  surviving  children,  Adolf 
and  Paula,  on  the  meager  savings  and  pension  left  her. 
She  felt  obligated,  as  Hitler  remarks  in  Mein  Kampf,  to 
continue  his  education  in  accordance  with  his  father’s 
wishes — “in  other  words,”  as  he  puts  it,  “to  have  me  study 
for  the  civil  servant’s  career.”  But  though  the  young  widow 
was  indulgent  to  her  son,  and  he  seems  to  have  loved  her 
dearly,  he  was  “more  than  ever  determined  absolutely,” 
he  says,  “not  to  undertake  this  career.”  And  so,  despite  a 


32 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tender  love  between  mother  and  son,  there  was  fric- 
tion and  Adolf  continued  to  neglect  his  studies. 

“Then  suddenly  an  illness  came  to  my  help  and  in  a few 
weeks  decided  my  future  and  the  eternal  domestic  quar- 
rel.” 29 

The  lung  ailment  which  Hitler  suffered  as  he  was  near- 
ing sixteen  necessitated  his  dropping  out  of  school  for 
at  least  a year.  He  was  sent  for  a time  to  the  family 
village  of  Spital,  where  he  recuperated  at  the  home  of  his 
mother’s  sister,  Theresa  Schmidt,  a peasant  woman.  On  his 
recovery  he  returned  briefly  to  the  state  high  school  at 
Steyr.  His  last  report,  dated  September  16,  1905,  shows 
marks  of  “adequate”  in  German,  chemistry,  physics,  ge- 
ometry and  geometrical  drawing.  In  geography  and  his- 
tory ^he  was  “satisfactory”;  in  free-hand  drawing,  “excel- 
lent.” He  felt  so  excited  at  the  prospect  of  leaving  school 
for  good  that  for  the  first  and  last  time  in  his  life  he  got 
drunk.  As  he  remembered  it  in  later  years  he  was  picked 
up  at  dawn,  lying  on  a country  road  outside  of  Steyr,  by 
a milkmaid  and  helped  back  to  town,  swearing  he  would 
never  do  it  again.*  In  this  matter,  at  least,  he  was  as 
good  as  his  word,  for  he  became  a teetotaler,  a nonsmoker 
and  a vegetarian  to  boot,  at  first  out  of  necessity  as  a 
penniless  vagabond  in  Vienna  and  Munich,  and  later  out 
of  conviction. 

The  next  two  or  three  years  Hitler  often  described  as  the 
happiest  days  of  his  life.f  While  his  mother  suggested — 
and  other  relatives  urged — that  he  go  to  work  and  learn  a 
trade  he  contented  himself  with  dreaming  of  his  future 
as  an  artist  and  with  idling  away  the  pleasant  days  along 
the  Danube.  He  never  forgot  the  “downy  softness”  of  those 
years  from  sixteen  to  nineteen  when  as  a “mother’s  dar- 
ling” he  enjoyed  the  “hollowness  of  a comfortable  life.”  30 
Though  the  ailing  widow  found  it  difficult  to  make  ends 
meet  on  her  meager  income,  young  Adolf  declined  to 
help  out  by  getting  a job.  The  idea  of  earning  even  his 

* He  told  this  story  on  himself  in  one  of  his  reminiscing  moods  on  the 
evening  of  January  8-9,  1942,  at  Supreme  Headquaters.  ( Hitler’s  Secret 
Conversations,  p.  160.) 

t ‘‘These  were  the  happiest  days  of  my  life  and  seemed  to  me  almost 
a dream  . . ( Mem  Kampf,  p.  18.)  In  a letter  dated  August  4,  1933, 

six  months  after  he  became  Chancellor,  Hitler  wrote  his  boyhood  friend, 
August  Kubizek:  “I  should  be  very  glad  ...  to  revive  once  more  with 
you  those  memories  of  the  best  years  of  my  life.”  (Kubizek,  The  Young 
Hitler  I Knew,  p.  273.) 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


33 


own  living  by  any  kind  of  regular  employment  was  re- 
pulsive to  him  and  was  to  remain  so  throughout  his  life. 

What  apparently  made  those  last  years  of  approaching 
manhood  so  happy  for  Hitler  was  the  freedom  from  hav- 
ing to  work,  which  gave  him  the  freedom  to  brood,  to 
dream,  to  spend  his  days  roaming  the  city  streets  or  the 
countryside  declaiming  to  his  companion  what  was  wrong 
with  the  world  and  how  to  right  it,  and  his  evenings 
curled  up  with  a book  or  standing  in  the  rear  of  the 
opera  house  in  Linz  or  Vienna  listening  enraptured  to 
the  mystic,  pagan  works  of  Richard  Wagner. 

A boyhood  friend  later  remembered  him  as  a pale, 
sickly,  lanky  youth  who,  though  usually  shy  and  reti- 
cent, was  capable  of  sudden  bursts  of  hysterical  anger 
against  those  who  disagreed  with  him.  For  four  years  he 
fancied  himself  deeply  in  love  with  a handsome  blond 
maiden  named  Stefanie,  and  though  he  often  gazed  at 
her  longingly  as  she  strolled  up  and  down  the  Landstrasse 
in  Linz  with  her  mother  he  never  made  the  slightest  ef- 
fort to  meet  her,  preferring  to  keep  her,  like  so  many 
other  objects,  in  the  shadowy  world  of  his  soaring  fan- 
tasies. Indeed,  in  the  countless  love  poems  which  he 
wrote  to  her  but  never  sent  (one  of  them  was  entitled 
“Hymn  to  the  Beloved”)  and  which  he  insisted  on  read- 
ing to  his  patient  young  friend,  August  Kubizek,*  she 
became  a damsel  out  of  Die  Walkuerie,  clad  in  a dark- 
blue  flowing  velvet  gown,  riding  a white  steed  over  the 
flowering  meadows.31 

Although  Hitler  was  determined  to  become  an  artist, 
preferably  a painter  or  at  least  an  architect,  he  was  al- 
ready obsessed  with  politics  at  the  age  of  sixteen.  By  then 
he  had  developed  a violent  hatred  for  the  Hapsburg  mon- 
archy and  all  the  non-German  races  in  the  multinational 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  over  which  it  ruled,  and  an 
equally  violent  love  for  everything  German.  At  sixteen 

* Kubizek,  who  appears  to  have  been  the  only  f riend  Hitler  ever  had  in 
his  youth,  has  given  in  his  book,  The  Young  Hitler  I Knew,  an  interest- 
ing picture  of  his  companion  in- the  last  four  years  before,  at  the  age 
of  nineteen, _ he  skidded  down  to  the  life  of  a vagabond  in  Vienna — a 
portrait,  incidentally,  that  not  only  fills  a biographical  gap  in  the  life  of 
the  German  Fuehrer  but  corrects  somewhat  the  hitherto  prevalent 
impressions  of  his  early  character.  Kubizek  was  as  unlike  Hitler  as  can 
be  imagined.  He  had  a happy  home  in  Linz,  learned  his  father’s  trade 
as  an  upholsterer,  worked  diligently  at  it  while  studying  music,  was 
graduated  with  honors  from  the  Vienna  Conservatory  of  Music  and  began 
a promising  professional  career  as  a conductor  and  composer  which  was 
shattered  by  the  First  World  War. 


34 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


he  had  become  what  he  was  to  remain  till  his  dying 
breath:  a fanatical  German  nationalist. 

He  appears  to  have  had  little  of  the  carefree  spirit  of 
youth  despite  all  the  loafing.  The  world’s  problems 
weighed  down  on  him.  Kubizek  later  recalled,  “He  saw 
everywhere  only  obstacles  and  hostility  . . . He  was  al- 
ways up  against  something  and  at  odds  with  the  world 
...  I never  saw  him  take  anything  lightly  . . .” 32 

It  was  at  this  period  that  the  young  man  who  could  not 
stand  school  became  a voracious  reader,  subscribing  to 
the  Library  of  Adult  Education  in  Linz  and  joining  the 
Museum  Society,  whose  books  he  borrowed  in  large  num- 
bers. His  young  friend  remembered  him  as  always  sur- 
rounded by  books,  of  which  his  favorites  were  works  on 
German  history  and  German  mythology.33 

Since  Linz  was  a provincial  town,  it  was  not  long  be- 
fore Vienna,  the  glittering  baroque  capital  of  the  empire, 
began  to  beckon  a youth  of  such  ambition  and  imagina- 
tion. In  1906,  just  after  his  seventeenth  birthday,  Hitler 
set  out  with  funds  provided  by  his  mother  and  other  rela- 
tions to  spend  two  months  in  the  great  metropolis. 
Though  it  was  later  to  become  the  scene  of  his  bitterest 
years  when,  at  times,  he  literally  lived  in  the  gutter,  Vi- 
enna on  this  first  visit  enthralled  him.  He  roamed  the 
streets  for  days,  filled  with  excitement  at  the  sight  of  the 
imposing  buildings  along  the  Ring  and  in  a continual 
state  of  ecstasy  at  what  he  saw  in  the  museums,  the  opera 
house,  the  theaters. 

He  also  inquired  about  entering  the  Vienna  Academy 
of  Fine  Arts,  and  a year  later,  in  October  1907,  he  was 
back  in  the  capital  to  take  the  entrance  examination  as  the 
first  practical  step  in  fulfilling  his  dream  of  becoming  a 
painter.  He  was  eighteen  and  full  of  high  hopes,  but  they 
were  dashed.  An  entry  in  the  academy’s  classification  list 
tells  the  story. 

The  following  took  the  test  with  insufficient  results,  or 
were  not  admitted  . . . Adolf  Hitler,  Braunau  a.  Inn,  April 
20,  1889,  German,  Catholic.  Father  civil  servant.  4 classes 
in  High  School.  Few  Heads.  Test  drawing  unsatisfactory.34 

Hitler  tried  again  the  following  year  and  this  time  his 
drawings  were  so  poor  that  he  was  not  admitted  to  the 
test.  For  the  ambitious  young  man  this  was,  as  he  later 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


35 


wrote,  a bolt  from  the  blue.  He  had  been  absolutely  con- 
vinced that  he  would  be  successful.  According  to  his  own 
account  in  Mein  Kampf,  Hitler  requested  an  explanation 
from  the  rector  of  the  academy. 

That  gentleman  assured  me  that  the  drawings  I had  sub- 
mitted incontrovertibly  showed  my  unfitness  for  painting, 
and  that  my  ability  obviously  lay  in  the  field  of  archi- 
tecture; for  me,  he  said,  the  Academy’s  School  of  Painting 
was  out  of  the  question,  the  place  for  me  was  at  the 
School  of  Architecture.35 

The  young  Adolf  was  inclined  to  agree  but  quickly  re- 
alized to  his  sorrow  that  his  failure  to  graduate  from 
high  school  might  well  block  his  entry  into  the  archi- 
tectural school. 

In  the  meantime  his  mother  was  dying  of  cancer  of  the 
breast  and  he  returned  to  Linz.  Since  Adolf’s  departure 
from  school  Klara  Hitler  and  her  relatives  had  supported 
the  young  man  for  three  years,  and  they  could  see  noth- 
ing to  show  for  it.  On  December  21,  1908,  as  the  town 
began  to  assume  its  festive  Christmas  garb,  Adolf  Hitler’s 
mother  died,  and  two  days  later  she  was  buried  at  Leon- 
ding  beside  her  husband.  To  the  nineteen-year-old  youth 

it  was  a dreadful  blow  ...  I had  honored  my  father,  but 
my  mother  I had  loved  . . . [Her]  death  put  a sudden 
end  to  all  my  highflown  plans  . . . Poverty  and  hard  reality 
compelled  me  to  take  a quick  decision  ...  I was  faced  with 
the  problem  of  somehow  making  my  own  living.36 

Somehow!  He  had  no  trade.  He  had  always  disdained 
manual  labor.  He  had  never  tried  to  earn  a cent.  But  he 
was  undaunted.  Bidding  his  relatives  farewell,  he  de- 
clared that  he  would  never  return  until  he  had  made  good. 

With  a suitcase  full  of  clothes  and  underwear  in  my  hand 
and  an  indomitable  will  in  my  heart,  I set  out  for  Vienna. 
I too  hoped  to  wrest  from  fate  what  my  father  had  ac- 
complished fifty  years  before;  I too  hoped  to  become  “some- 
thing”— but  in  no  case  a civil  servant.37 

“THE  SADDEST  PERIOD  OF  MY  LIFE” 

The  next  four  years,  between  1909  and  1913,  turned 
out  to  be  a time  of  utter  misery  and  destitution  for  the 
conquering  young  man  from  Linz.  In  these  last  fleeting 


36 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


years  before  the  fall  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  end  of  the 
city  as  the  capital  of  an  empire  of  fifty-two  million  peo- 
ple in  the  heart  of  Europe,  Vienna  had  a gaiety  and  charm 
that  were  unique  among  the  capitals  of  the  world.  Not 
only  in  its  architecture,  its  sculpture,  its  music,  but  in  the 
lighthearted,  pleasure-loving,  cultivated  spirit  of  its  peo- 
ple, it  breathed  an  atmosphere  of  the  baroque  and  the 
rococo  that  no  other  city  of  the  West  knew. 

Set  along  the  blue  Danube  beneath  the  wooded  hills  of 
the  Wienerwald,  which  were  studded  with  yellow-green 
vineyards,  it  was  a place  of  natural  beauty  that  captivated 
the  visitor  and  made  the  Viennese  believe  that  Provi- 
dence had  been  especially  kind  to  them.  Music  filled  the 
air,  the  towering  music  of  gifted  native  sons,  the  greatest 
Europe  had  known,  Haydn,  Mozart,  Beethoven  and  Schu- 
bert, and,  in  the  last  Indian-summer  years,  the  gay,  haunt- 
ing waltzes  of  Vienna’s  own  beloved  Johann  Strauss.  To  a 
people  so  blessed  and  so  imprinted  with  the  baroque  style 
of  living,  life  itself  was  something  of  a dream  and  the 
good  folk  of  the  city  passed  the  pleasant  days  and  nights 
of  their  lives  waltzing  and  wining,  in  light  talk  in  the 
congenial  coffeehouses,  listening  to  music  and  viewing 
the  make-believe  of  theater  and  opera  and  operetta,  in 
flirting  and  making  love,  abandoning  a large  part  of  their 
lives  to  pleasure  and  to  dreams. 

To  be  sure,  an  empire  had  to  be  governed,  an  army  and 
navy  manned,  communications  maintained,  business 
transacted  and  labor  done.  But  few  in  Vienna  worked 
overtime — or  even  full  time — at  such  things. 

There  was  a seamy  side,  of  course.  This  city,  like  all 
others,  had  its  poor:  ill-fed,  ill-clothed  and  living  in  hov- 
els. But  as  the  greatest  industrial  center  in  Central  Eu- 
rope as  well  as  the  capital  of  the  empire,  Vienna  was 
prosperous,  and  this  prosperity  spread  among  the  people 
and  sifted  down.  The  great  mass  of  the  lower  middle 
class  controlled  the  city  politically;  labor  was  organizing 
not  only  trade  unions  but  a powerful  political  party  of 
its  own,  the  Social  Democrats.  There  was  a ferment  in 
the  life  of  the  city,  now  grown  to  a population  of  two 
million.  Democracy  was  forcing  out  the  ancient  autocracy 
of  the  Hapsburgs,  education  and  culture  were  opening 
up  to  the  masses  so  that  by  the  time  Hitler  came  to  Vi- 
enna in  1909  there  was  opportunity  for  a penniless  young 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hiller 


37 


man  either  to  get  a higher  education  or  to  earn  a fairly 
decent  living  and,  as  one  of  a million  wage  earners,  to  live 
under  the  civilizing  spell  which  the  capital  cast  over  its 
inhabitants.  Was  not  his  only  friend,  Kubizek,  as  poor 
and  as  obscure  as  himself,  already  making  a name  for 
himself  in  the  Academy  of  Music? 

But  the  young  Adolf  did  not  pursue  his  ambition  to 
enter  the  School  of  Architecture.  It  was  still  open  for 
him  despite  his  lack  of  a high-school  diploma — young 
men  who  showed  “special  talent”  were  admitted  without 
such  a certificate — but  so  far  as  is  known  he  made  no 
application.  Nor  was  he  interested  in  learning  a trade  or 
in  taking  any  kind  of  regular  employment.  Instead  he 
preferred  to  putter  about  at  odd  jobs:  shoveling  snow, 
beating  carpets,  carrying  bags  outside  the  West  Railroad 
Station,  occasionally  for  a few  days  working  as  a build- 
ing laborer.  In  November  1909,  less  than  a year  after  he 
arrived  in  Vienna  to  “forestall  fate,”  he  was  forced  to 
abandon  a furnished  room  in  the  Simon  Denk  Gasse,  and 
for  the  next  four  years  he  lived  in  flophouses  or  in  the 
almost  equally  miserable  quarters  of  the  men’s  hostel  at 
27  Meldemannstrasse  in  the  Twentieth  District  of  Vienna, 
near  the  Danube,  staving  off  hunger  by  frequenting  the 
charity  soup  kitchens  of  the  city. 

No  wonder  that  nearly  two  decades  later  he  could 
write: 

To  me  Vienna,  the  city  which  to  so  many  is  the  epitome 
of  innocent  pleasure,  a festive  playground  for  merrymakers, 
represents,  I am  sorry  to  say,  merely  the  living  memory  of 
the  saddest  period  of  my  life. 

Even  today  this  city  can  arouse  in  me  nothing  but  dismal 
thoughts.  For  me  the  name  of  this  Phaeacial  city  represents 
five  years  of  hardship  and  misery.  Five  years  in  which  I 
was  forced  to  earn  a living,  first  as  a day  laborer,  then  as  a 
small  painter;  a truly  meager  living  which  never  sufficed  to 
appease  even  my  daily  hunger.38 

Always,  he  says  of  these  times,  there  was  hunger. 

Hunger  was  then  my  faithful  bodyguard;  he  never  left  me 
for  a moment  and  partook  of  all  I had  . . . My  life  was  a 
continual  struggle  with  this  pitiless  friend.39 

It  never,  however,  drove  him  to  the  extremity  of  trying 
to  find  a regular  job.  As  he  makes  clear  in  Mein  Kampf, 


38 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


he  had  the  petty  bourgeoisie’s  gnawing  fear  of  sliding 
back  into  the  ranks  of  the  proletariat,  of  the  manual  la- 
borers— a fear  he  was  later  to  exploit  in  building  up  the 
National  Socialist  Party  on  the  broad  foundation  of  the 
hitherto  leaderless,  ill-paid,  neglected  white-collar  class, 
whose  millions  nourished  the  illusion  that  they  were  at 
least  socially  better  off  than  the  “workers.” 

Although  Hitler  says  he  eked  out  at  least  part  of  a liv- 
ing as  “a  small  painter,”  he  gives  no  details  of  this  work 
in  his  autobiography  except  to  remark  that  in  the  years 
1909  and  1910  he  had  so  far  improved  his  position  that 
he  no  longer  had  to  work  as  a common  laborer. 

“By  this  time,”  he  says,  “I  was  working  independently 
as  a small  draftsman  and  painter  of  water  colors.”  40 

This  is  somewhat  misleading,  as  is  so  much  else  of  a 
biographical  nature  in  Mein  Kampf.  Though  the  evidence 
of  those  who  knew  him  at  the  time  appears  to  be  scarcely 
more  trustworthy,  enough  of  it  has  been  pieced  together 
to  give  a picture  that  is  probably  more  accurate  and  cer- 
tainly more  complete.* 

That  Adolf  Hitler  was  never  a house  painter,  as  his  po- 
litical opponents  taunted  him  with  having  been,  is  fairly 
certain.  At  least  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  ever  fol- 
lowed such  a trade.  What  he  did  was  draw  or  paint  crude 
little  pictures  of  Vienna,  usually  of  some  well-known 
landmark  such  as  St.  Stephen’s  Cathedral,  the  opera 
house,  the  Burgtheater,  the  Palace  of  Schoenbrunn  or 
the  Roman  ruins  in  Schoenbrunn  Park.  According  to  his 
acquaintances  he  copied  them  from  older  works;  appar- 
ently he  could  not  draw  from  nature.  They  are  rather 
stilted  and  lifeless,  like  a beginning  architect’s  rough  and 
careless  sketches,  and  the  human  figures  he  sometimes 
added  are  so  bad  as  to  remind  one  of  a comic  strip.  I 
find  a note  of  my  own  made  once  after  going  through  a 
portfolio  of  Hitler’s  original  sketches:  “Few  faces.  Crude. 
One  almost  ghoulish  face.”  To  Heiden,  “they  stand  like 

* See  Das  Ende  des  Hitler -Mythos,  by  Josef  Greiner,  who  was  personally 
acquainted  with  Hitler  during  part  of  his  Vienna  days.  See  also  Hitler 
the  Pawn,  by  Rudolf  Olden;  Olden’s  book  includes  statements  from  Rein- 
hold Hanisch,  a Sudeten  tramp  who  for  a time  was  a roommate  of 
Hitler’s  in  the  men’s  hostel  and  who  hawked  some  of  his  paintings. 
Konrad  Heiden,  in  Der  Fuehrer,  also  quotes  material  from  Hanisch,  in- 
cluding the  court  records  of  a lawsuit  which  Hitler  brought  against  the 
tramp  for  cheating  him  out  of  a share  of  a painting  which  Hanisch 
allegedly  sold  for  him. 


39 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

tiny  stuffed  sacks  outside  the  high,  solemn  palaces.”  41 

Probably  hundreds  of  these  pitiful  pieces  were  sold  by 
Hitler  to  the  petty  traders  to  ornament  a wall,  to  dealers 
who  used  them  to  fill  empty  picture  frames  on  display 
and  to  furniture  makers  who  sometimes  tacked  them  to 
the  backs  of  cheap  sofas  and  chairs  after  a fashion  in 
Vienna  in  those  days.  Hitler  could  also  be  more  com- 
mercial. He  often  drew  posters  for  shopkeepers  advertis- 
ing such  products  as  Teddy’s  Perspiration  Powder,  and 
there  was  one,  perhaps  turned  out  to  make  a little  money 
at  Christmas  time,  depicting  Santa  Claus  selling  brightly 
colored  candles,  and  another  showing  St.  Stephen’s  Gothic 
spire,  which  Hitler  never  tired  of  copying,  rising  out  of  a 
mountain  of  soap  cakes. 

This  was  the  extent  of  Hitler’s  “artistic”  achievement, 
yet  to  the  end  of  his  life  he  considered  himself  an  “art- 
ist.” 

Bohemian  he  certainly  looked  in  those  vagabond  years 
in  Vienna.  Those  who  knew  him  then  remembered  later 
his  long  black  shabby  overcoat,  which  hung  down  to  his 
ankles  and  resembled  a caftan  and  which  had  been  given 
him  by  a Hungarian  Jewish  old-clothes  dealer,  a fellow 
inmate  of  the  dreary  men’s  hostel  who  had  befriended 
him.  They  remembered  his  greasy  black  derby,  which  he 
wore  the  year  round;  his  matted  hair,  brushed  down  over 
his  forehead  as  in  later  years  and,  in  the  back,  hanging 
disheveled  over  his  soiled  collar,  for  he  rarely  appeared 
to  have  had  a haircut  or  a shave  and  the  sides  of  his  face 
and  his  chin  were  usually  covered  with  the  black  stubble 
of  an  incipient  beard.  If  one  can  believe  Hanisch,  who 
later  became  something  of  an  artist.  Hitler  resembled  “an 
apparition  such  as  rarely  occurs  among  Christians.”  42 

Unlike  some  of  the  shipwrecked  young  men  with  whom 
he  lived,  he  had  none  of  the  vices  of  youth.  He  neither 
smoked  nor  drank.  He  had  nothing  to  do  with  women — 
not,  so  far  as  can  be  learned,  because  of  any  abnormality 
but  simply  because  of  an  ingrained  shyness. 

“I  believe,”  Hitler  remarked  afterward  in  Mein  Kampf, 
in  one  of  his  rare  flashes  of  humor,  “that  those  who  knew 
me  in  those  days  took  me  for  an  eccentric.”  43 

They  remembered,  as  had  his  teachers,  the  strong,  star- 
ing eyes  that  dominated  the  face  and  expressed  something 
embedded  in  the  personality  that  did  not  jibe  with  the 


40 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


miserable  existence  of  the  unwashed  tramp.  And  they  re- 
called that  the  young  man,  for  all  his  laziness  when  it 
came  to  physical  labor,  was  a voracious  reader,  spending 
much  of  his  days  and  evenings  devouring  books. 

At  that  time  I read  enormously  and  thoroughly.  All  the 
free  time  my  work  left  me  was  employed  in  my  studies.  In 
this  way  I forged  in  a few  years’  time  the  foundations  of  a 
knowledge  from  which  I still  draw  nourishment  today.44 

In  Mein  Kampf  Hitler  discourses  at  length  on  the  art 
of  reading. 

By  “reading,”  to  be  sure,  I mean  perhaps  something  differ- 
ent than  the  average  member  of  our  so-called  “intelligentsia.” 

I know  people  who  “read”  enormously  . . . yet  whom  I 
would  not  describe  as  “well-read.”  True,  they  possess  a 
mass  of  “knowledge,”  but  their  brain  is  unable  to  organize 
and  register  the  material  they  have  taken  in  ...  On  the 
other  hand,  a man  who  possesses  the  art  of  correct  reading 
will  . . . instinctively  and  immediately  perceive  everything 
which  in  his  opinion  is  worth  permanently  remembering, 
either  because  it  is  suited  to  his  purpose  or  generally  worth 
knowing  . . . The  art  of  reading,  as  of  learning,  is  this:  . . . 
to  retain  the  essential,  to  forget  the  nonessential.*  . . . Only 
this  kind  of  reading  has  meaning  and  purpose  . . . Viewed 
in  this  light,  my  Vienna  period  was  especially  fertile  and 
valuable.45 

Valuable  for  what?  Hitler’s  answer  is  that  from  his 
reading  and  from  his  life  among  the  poor  and  disinherited 
of  Vienna  he  learned  all  that  he  needed  to  know  in  later 
life. 

Vienna  was  and  remained  for  me  the  hardest,  though  most 
thorough,  school  of  my  life.  I had  set  foot  in  this  town 
while  still  half  a boy  and  I left  it  a man,  grown  quiet  and 
grave. 

In  this  period  there  took  shape  within  me  a world  pic- 
ture and  a philosophy  which  became  the  granite  foundation 
of  all  my  acts.  In  addition  to  what  I then  created,  I have 
had  to  learn  little;  and  I have  had  to  alter  nothing.46 

What,  then,  had  he  learned  in  the  school  of  those  hard 
knocks  which  Vienna  had  so  generously  provided?  What 
were  the  ideas  which  he  acquired  there  from  his  reading 


* The  italics  are  Hitler's. 


41 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

and  his  experience  and  which,  as  he  says,  would  remain 
essentially  unaltered  to  the  end?  That  they  were  mostly 
shallow  and  shabby,  often  grotesque  and  preposterous, 
and  poisoned  by  outlandish  prejudices  will  become  ob- 
vious on  the  most  cursory  examination.  That  they  are  im- 
portant to  this  history,  as  they  were  to  the  world,  is 
equally  obvious,  for  they  were  to  form  part  of  the  foun- 
dation for  the  Third  Reich  which  this  bookish  vagrant 
was  soon  to  build. 

THE  BUDDING  IDEAS  OF  ADOLF  HITLER 

They  were,  with  one  exception,  not  original  but  picked 
up,  raw,  from  the  churning  maelstrom  of  Austrian  poli- 
tics and  life  in  the  first  years  of  the  twentieth  century. 
The  Danube  monarchy  was  dying  of  indigestion.  For  cen- 
turies a minority  of  German-Austrians  had  ruled  over 
the  polyglot  empire  of  a dozen  nationalities  and  stamped 
their  language  and  their  culture  on  it.  But  since  1848 
their  hold  had  been  weakening.  The  minorities  could  not 
be  digested.  Austria  was  not  a melting  pot.  In  the  1860s 
the  Italians  had  broken  away  and  in  1867  the  Hungarians 
had  won  equality  with  the  Germans  under  a so-called 
Dual  Monarchy.  Now,  as  the  twentieth  century  began, 
the  various  Slav  peoples — the  Czechs,  the  Slovaks,  the 
Serbs,  the  Croats  and  the  others — were  demanding  equal- 
ity and  at  least  national  autonomy.  Austrian  politics  had 
become  dominated  by  the  bitter  quarrel  of  the  nationali- 
ties. 

But  this  was  not  all.  There  was  social  revolt  too  and 
this  often  transcended  the  racial  struggle.  The  disenfran- 
chised lower  classes  were  demanding  the  ballot,  and  the 
workers  were  insisting  on  the  right  to  organize  trade  un- 
ions and  to  strike — not  only  for  higher  wages  and  better 
working  conditions  but  to  gain  their  democratic  political 
ends.  Indeed  a general  strike  had  finally  brought  universal 
manhood  suffrage  and  with  this  the  end  of  political  domi- 
nance by  the  Austrian  Germans,  who  numbered  but  a 
third  of  the  population  of  the  Austrian  half  of  the  em- 
pire. 

To  these  developments  Hitler,  the  fanatical  young 
German-Austrian  nationalist  from  Linz,  was  bitterly  op- 
posed. To  him  the  empire  was  sinking  into  a “foul  mo- 


42 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

rass.”  It  could  be  saved  only  if  the  master  race,  the  Ger- 
mans, reasserted  their  old  absolute  authority.  The  non- 
German  races,  especially  the  Slavs  and  above  all  the 
Czechs,  were  an  inferior  people.  It  was  up  to  the  Germans 
to  rule  them  with  an  iron  hand.  The  Parliament  must  be 
abolished  and  an  end  put  to  all  the  democratic  “non- 
sense.” 

Though  he  took  no  part  in  politics,  Hitler  followed 
avidly  the  activities  of  the  three  major  political  parties  of 
old  Austria:  the  Social  Democrats,  the  Christian  Socialists 
and  the  Pan-German  Nationalists.  And  there  now  began 
to  sprout  in  the  mind  of  this  unkempt  frequenter  of  the 
soup  kitchens  a political  shrewdness  which  enabled  him 
to  see  with  amazing  clarity  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  contemporary  political  movements  and  which,  as  it  ma- 
tured, would  make  him  the  master  politician  of  Germany. 

At  first  contact  he  developed  a furious  hatred  for  the 
party  of  the  Social  Democrats.  “What  most  repelled  me,” 
he  says,  “was  its  hostile  attitude  toward  the  struggle  for 
the  preservation  of  Germanism  [and]  its  disgraceful 
courting  of  the  Slavic  ‘comrade’  ...  In  a few  months  I 
obtained  what  might  have  otherwise  required  decades:  an 
understanding  of  a pestilential  whore,*  cloaking  herself 
as  social  virtue  and  brotherly  love.”  47 

And  yet  he  was  already  intelligent  enough  to  quench 
his  feelings  of  rage  against  this  party  of  the  working  class 
in  order  to  examine  carefully  the  reasons  for  its  popular 
success.  He  concluded  that  there  were  several  reasons, 
and  years  later  he  was  to  remember  them  and  utilize 
them  in  building  up  the  National  Socialist  Party  of  Ger- 
many. 

One  day,  he  recounts  in  Mein  Kampf,  he  witnessed  a 
mass  demonstration  of  Viennese  workers.  “For  nearly 
two  hours  I stood  there  watching  with  bated  breath  the 
gigantic  human  dragon  slowly  winding  by.  In  oppressed 
anxiety  I finally  left  the  place  and  sauntered  home- 
ward.” 48 

At  home  he  began  to  read  the  Social  Democratic  press, 
examine  the  speeches  of  its  leaders,  study  its  organiza- 
tion, reflect  on  its  psychology  and  political  techniques  and 
ponder  the  results.  He  came  to  three  conclusions  which 


4 The  word  was  cut  out  in  the  second  and  all  subsequent  editions  of 
Mem  Kampf,  and  the  noun  “pestilence”  substituted. 


43 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

explained  to  him  the  success  of  the  Social  Democrats: 
They  knew  how  to  create  a mass  movement,  without 
which  any  political  party  was  useless;  they  had  learned 
the  art  of  propaganda  among  the  masses;  and,  finally, 
they  knew  the  value  of  using  what  he  calls  “spiritual  and 
physical  terror.” 

This  third  lesson,  though  it  was  surely  based  on  faulty 
observation  and  compounded  of  his  own  immense  preju- 
dices, intrigued  the  young  Hitler.  Within  ten  years  he 
would  put  it  to  good  use  for  his  own  ends. 

I understood  the  infamous  spiritual  terror  which  this 
movement  exerts,  particularly  on  the  bourgeoisie,  which  is 
neither  morally  nor  mentally  equal  to  such  attacks;  at  a 
given  sign  it  unleashes  a veritable  barrage  of  lies  and 
slanders  against  whatever  adversary  seems  most  dangerous, 
until  the  nerves  of  the  attacked  persons  break  down  . . . 
This  is  a tactic  based  on  precise  calculation  of  all  human 
weaknesses,  and  its  result  will  lead  to  success  with  almost 
mathematical  certainty  . . . 

I achieved  an  equal  understanding  of  the  importance  of 
physical  terror  toward  the  individual  and  the  masses  . . . 
For  while  in  the  ranks  of  their  supporters  the  victory 
achieved  seems  a triumph  of  the  justice  of  their  own  cause, 
the  defeated  adversary  in  most  cases  despairs  of  the  suc- 
cess of  any  further  resistance.49 

No  more  precise  analysis  of  Nazi  tactics,  as  Hitler  was 
eventually  to  develop  them,  was  ever  written. 

There  were  two  political  parties  which  strongly  attract- 
ed the  fledgling  Hitler  in  Vienna,  and  to  both  of  them 
he  applied  his  growing  power  of  shrewd,  cold  analysis. 
His  first  allegiance,  he  says,  was  to  the  Pan-German 
Nationalist  Party  founded  by  Georg  Ritter  von  Schoener- 
er,  who  came  from  the  same  region  near  Spital  in  Lower 
Austria  as  had  Hitler’s  family.  The  Pan-Germans  at  that 
time  were  engaged  in  a last-ditch  struggle  for  German 
supremacy  in  the  multinational  empire.  And  though  Hit- 
ler thought  that  Schoenerer  was  a “profound  thinker”  and 
enthusiastically  embraced  his  basic  program  of  violent 
nationalism,  anti-Semitism,  anti-socialism,  union  with 
Germany  and  opposition  to  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  Holy 
See,  he  quickly  sized  up  the  causes  for  the  party’s  failure: 

“This  movement’s  inadequate  appreciation  of  the  impor- 
tance of  the  social  problem  cost  it  the  truly  militant  mass 


44 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  the  people;  its  entry  into  Parliament  took  away  its 
mighty  impetus  and  burdened  it  with  all  the  weaknesses 
peculiar  to  this  institution;  the  struggle  against  the  Catho- 
lic Church  . . . robbed  it  of  countless  of  the  best  elements 
that  the  nation  can  call  its  own.”  50 

Though  Hitler  was  to  forget  it  when  he  came  to  power 
in  Germany,  one  of  the  lessons  of  his  Vienna  years  which 
he  stresses  at  great  length  in  Mein  Kampf  is  the  futility 
of  a political  party’s  trying  to  oppose  the  churches.  “Re- 
gardless of  how  much  room  for  criticism  there  was  in  any 
religious  denomination,”  he  says,  in  explaining  why 
Schoenerer’s  Los-von-Rom  (Away  from  Rome)  movement 
was  a tactical  error,  “a  political  party  must  never  for  a 
moment  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  in  all  previous  histori- 
cal experience  a purely  political  party  has  never  succeeded 
in  producing  a religious  reformation.”  51 

But  it  was  the  failure  of  the  Pan-Germans  to  arouse 
the  masses,  their  inability  to  even  understand  the  psy- 
chology of  the  common  people,  that  to  Hitler  constituted 
their  biggest  mistake.  It  is  obvious  from  his  recapitulation 
of  the  ideas  that  began  to  form  in  his  mind  when  he  was 
not  much  past  the  age  of  twenty-one  that  to  him  this  was 
the  cardinal  error.  He  was  not  to  repeat  it  when  he  found- 
ed his  own  political  movement. 

There  was  another  mistake  of  the  Pan-Germans  which 
Hitler  was  not  to  make.  That  was  the  failure  to  win  over 
the  support  of  at  least  some  of  the  powerful,  established 
institutions  of  the  nation — if  not  the  Church,  then  the 
Army,  say,  or  the  cabinet  or  the  head  of  state.  Unless  a 
political  movement  gained  such  backing,  the  young  man 
saw,  it  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  it  to  as- 
sume power.  This  support  was  precisely  what  Hitler  had 
the  shrewdness  to  arrange  for  in  the  crucial  January  days 
of  1933  in  Berlin  and  what  alone  made  it  possible  for  him 
and  his  National  Socialist  Party  to  take  over  the  rule  of  a 
great  nation. 

There  was  one  political  leader  in  Vienna  in  Hitler’s 
time  who  understood  this,  as  well  as  the  necessity  of 
building  a party  on  the  foundation  of  the  masses.  This 
was  Dr.  Karl  Lueger,  the  burgomaster  of  Vienna  and 
leader  of  the  Christian  Social  Party,  who  more  than  any 
other  became  Hitler’s  political  mentor,  though  the  two 
never  met.  Hitler  always  regarded  him  as  “the  greatest 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


45 


German  mayor  of  all  times  ...  a statesman  greater  than 
all  the  so-called  ‘diplomats’  of  the  time  ...  If  Dr.  Karl 
Lueger  had  lived  in  Germany  he  would  have  been  ranked 
among  the  great  minds  of  our  people.”  52 

There  was,  to  be  sure,  little  resemblance  between  Hitler 
as  he  later  became  and  this  big,  bluff,  genial  idol  of  the 
Viennese  lower  middle  classes.  It  is  true  that  Lueger  be- 
came the  most  powerful  politician  in  Austria  as  the  head 
of  a party  which  was  drawn  from  the  disgruntled  petty 
bourgeoisie  and  which  made  political  capital,  as  Hitler 
later  did,  out  of  a raucous  anti-Semitism.  But  Lueger, 
who  had  risen  from  modest  circumstances  and  worked  his 
way  through  the  university,  was  a man  of  considerable 
intellectual  attainments,  and  his  opponents,  including  the 
Jews,  readily  conceded  that  he  was  at  heart  a decent, 
chivalrous,  generous  and  tolerant  man.  Stefan  Zweig,  the 
eminent  Austrian  Jewish  writer,  who  was  growing  up  in 
Vienna  at  this  time,  has  testified  that  Lueger  never  al- 
lowed his  official  anti-Semitism  to  stop  him  from  being 
helpful  and  friendly  to  the  Jews.  “His  city  administra- 
tion,” Zweig  recounted,  “was  perfectly  just  and  even  typi- 
cally democratic  . . . The  Jews  who  had  trembled  at  this 
triumph  of  the  anti-Semitic  party  continued  to  live  with 
the  same  rights  and  esteem  as  always.”  53 

This  the  young  Hitler  did  not  like.  He  thought  Lueger 
was  far  too  tolerant  and  did  not  appreciate  the  racial 
problem  of  the  Jews.  He  resented  the  mayor’s  failure  to 
embrace  Pan-Germanism  and  was  skeptical  of  his  Roman 
Catholic  clericalism  and  his  loyalty  to  the  Hapsburgs. 
Had  not  the  old  Emperor  Franz-Josef  twice  refused  to 
sanction  Lueger’s  election  as  burgomaster? 

But  in  the  end  Hitler  was  forced  to  acknowledge  the 
genius  of  this  man  who  knew  how  to  win  the  support  of 
the  masses,  who  understood  modern  social  problems  and 
the  importance  of  propaganda  and  oratory  in  swaying 
the  multitude.  Hitler  could  not  help  but  admire  the  way 
Lueger  dealt  with  the  powerful  Church — “his  policy  was 
fashioned  with  infinite  shrewdness.”  And,  finally,  Lueger 
“was  quick  to  make  use  of  all  available  means  for  winning 
the  support  of  long-established  institutions,  so  as  to  be 
able  to  derive  the  greatest  possible  advantage  for  his 
movement  from  those  old  sources  of  power.”  54 

Here  in  a nutshell  were  the  ideas  and  techniques  which 


46 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Hitler  was  later  to  use  in  constructing  his  own  political 
party  and  in  leading  it  to  power  in  Germany.  His  origi- 
nality lay  in  his  being  the  only  politician  of  the  Right 
to  apply  them  to  the  German  scene  after  the  First  World 
War.  It  was  then  that  the  Nazi  movement,  alone  among 
the  nationalist  and  conservative  parties,  gained  a great 
mass  following  and,  having  achieved  this,  won  over  the 
support  of  the  Army,  the  President  of  the  Republic  and 
the  associations  of  big  business — three  “long-established 
institutions”  of  great  power,  which  led  to  the  chancellor- 
ship of  Germany.  The  lessons  learned  in  Vienna  proved 
useful  indeed. 

Dr.  Karl  Lueger  had  been  a brilliant  orator,  but  the 
Pan-German  Party  had  lacked  effective  public  speakers. 
Hitler  took  notice  of  this  and  in  Mein  Kampf  makes  much 
of  the  importance  of  oratory  in  politics. 

The  power  which  has  always  started  the  greatest  religious 
and  political  avalanches  in  history  rolling  has  from  time 
immemorial  been  the  magic  power  of  the  spoken  word,  and 
that  alone. 

The  broad  masses  of  the  people  can  be  moved  only  by 
the  power  of  speech.  All  great  movements  are  popular  move- 
ments, volcanic  eruptions  of  human  passions  and  emotional 
sentiments,  stirred  either  by  the  cruel  Goddess  of  Distress  or 
by  the  firebrand  of  the  word  hurled  among  the  masses;  they 
are  not  the  lemonade-like  outpourings  of  the  literary 
aesthetes  and  drawing-room  heroes.55 

Though  refraining  from  actual  participation  in  Austrian 
party  politics,  young  Hitler  already  was  beginning  to  prac- 
tice his  oratory  on  the  audiences  which  he  found  in  Vi- 
enna’s flophouses,  soup  kitchens  and  on  its  street  corners. 
It  was  to  develop  into  a talent  (as  this  author,  who  later 
was  to  listen  to  scores  of  his  most  important  speeches, 
can  testify)  more  formidable  than  any  other  in  the  Ger- 
many between  the  wars,  and  it  was  to  contribute  in  a 
large  measure  to  his  astounding  success. 

And  finally  in  Hitler’s  Vienna  experience  there  were 
the  Jews.  In  Linz,  he  says,  there  had  been  few  Jews.  “At 
home  I do  not  remember  having  heard  the  word  during 
my  father’s  lifetime.”  At  high  school  there  was  a Jewish 
boy — “but  we  didn’t  give  the  matter  any  thought  ...  I 
even  took  them  [the  Jews]  for  Germans.” 56 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


47 


According  to  Hitler’s  boyhood  friend,  this  is  not  the 
truth.  “When  I first  met  Adolf  Hitler,”  says  August 
Kubizek,  recalling  their  days  together  in  Linz,  “his  anti- 
Semitism  was  already  pronounced  . . . Hitler  was  already 
a confirmed  anti-Semite  when  he  went  to  Vienna.  And 
although  his  experiences  in  Vienna  might  have  deepened 
this  feeling,  they  certainly  did  not  give  birth  to  it.”  57 

“Then,”  says  Hitler,  “I  came  to  Vienna.” 

Preoccupied  by  the  abundance  of  my  impressions  . . . 
oppressed  by  the  hardship  of  my  own  lot,  I gained  at  first 
no  insight  into  the  inner  stratification  of  the  people  in  this 
gigantic  city.  Notwithstanding  that  Vienna  in  those  days 
counted  nearly  two  hundred  thousand  Jews  among  its  two 
million  inhabitants,  I did  not  see  them  . . . The  Jew  was 
still  characterized  for  me  by  nothing  but  his  religion,  and 
therefore  on  grounds  of  human  tolerance  I maintained  my 
rejection  of  religious  attacks  in  this  case  as  in  others. 
Consequently  the  tone  of  the  Viennese  anti-Semitic  press 
seemed  to  me  unworthy  of  the  cultural  tradition  of  a great 
nation.58 

One  day,  Hitler  recounts,  he  went  strolling  through  the 
Inner  City.  “I  suddenly  encountered  an  apparition  in  a 
black  caftan  and  black  sidelocks.  Is  this  a Jew?  was  my 
first  thought.  For,  to  be  sure,  they  had  not  looked  like  that 
in  Linz.  I observed  the  man  furtively  and  cautiously,  but 
the  longer  I stared  at  this  foreign  face,  scrutinizing  fea- 
ture for  feature,  the  more  my  first  question  assumed  a 
new  form:  Is  this  a German?”  59 

Hitler’s  answer  may  be  readily  guessed.  He  claims, 
though,  that  before  answering  he  decided  “to  try  to  re- 
lieve my  doubts  by  books.”  He  buried  himself  in  anti- 
Semitic  literature,  which  had  a large  sale  in  Vienna  at  the 
time.  Then  he  took  to  the  streets  to  observe  the  “phe- 
nomenon” more  closely.  “Wherever  I went,”  he  says,  “I 
began  to  see  Jews,  and  the  more  I saw,  the  more  sharply 
they  became  distinguished  in  my  eyes  from  the  rest  of 
humanity  . . . Later  I often  grew  sick  to  the  stomach 
from  the  smell  of  these  caftan-wearers.”  60 

Next,  he  says,  he  discovered  the  “moral  stain  on  this 
‘chosen  people’  . . . Was  there  any  form  of  filth  or  profli- 
gacy, particularly  in  cultural  life,  without  at  least  one 
Jew  involved  in  it?  If  you  cut  even  cautiously  into  such 
an  abscess,  you  found,  like  a maggot  in  a rotting  body, 


48 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


often  dazzled  by  the  sudden  light — a kike!”  The  Jews 
were  largely  responsible,  he  says  he  found,  for  prostitu- 
tion and  the  white-slave  traffic.  “When  for  the  first  time,” 
he  relates,  “I  recognized  the  Jew  as  the  cold-hearted, 
shameless  and  calculating  director  of  this  revolting  vice 
traffic  in  the  scum  of  the  big  city,  a cold  shudder  ran 
down  my  back.”  61 

There  is  a great  deal  of  morbid  sexuality  in  Hitler’s  rav- 
ings about  the  Jews.  This  was  characteristic  of  Vienna’s 
anti-Semitic  press  of  the  time,  as  it  later  was  to  be  of  the 
obscene  Nuremberg  weekly  Der  Stuermer,  published  by 
one  of  Hitler’s  favorite  cronies,  Julius  Streicher,  Nazi  boss 
of  Franconia,  a noted  pervert  and  one  of  the  most  un- 
savory characters  in  the  Third  Reich.  Mein  Kampf  is 
sprinkled  with  lurid  allusions  to  uncouth  Jews  seducing 
innocent  Christian  girls  and  thus  adulterating  their  blood. 
Hitler  can  write  of  the  “nightmare  vision  of  the  seduction 
of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  girls  by  repulsive,  crooked- 
legged Jew  bastards.”  As  Rudolf  Olden  has  pointed  out, 
one  of  the  roots  of  Hitler’s  anti-Semitism  may  have  been 
his  tortured  sexual  envy.  Though  he  was  in  his  early 
twenties,  so  far  as  is  known  he  had  no  relations  of  any 
kind  with  women  during  his  sojourn  in  Vienna. 

“Gradually,”  Hitler  relates,  “I  began  to  hate  them  . . . 
For  me  this  was  the  time  of  the  greatest  spiritual  upheaval 
I have  ever  had  to  go  through.  I had  ceased  to  be  a weak- 
kneed  cosmopolitan  and  become  an  anti-Semite.”  62 

He  was  to  remain  a blind  and  fanatical  one  to  the  bit- 
ter end;  his  last  testament,  written  a few  hours  before  his 
death,  would  contain  a final  blast  against  the  Jews  as  re- 
sponsible for  the  war  which  he  had  started  and  which 
was  now  finishing  him  and  the  Third  Reich.  This  burning 
hatred,  which  was  to  infect  so  many  Germans  in  that  em- 
pire, would  lead  ultimately  to  a massacre  so  horrible  and 
on  such  a scale  as  to  leave  an  ugly  scar  on  civilization 
that  will  surely  last  as  long  as  man  on  earth. 

In  the  spring  of  1913,  Hitler  left  Vienna  for  good  and 
went  to  live  in  Germany,  where  his  heart,  he  says,  had 
always  been.  He  was  twenty-four  and  to  everyone  except 
himself  he  must  have  seemed  a total  failure.  He  had  not 
become  a painter,  nor  an  architect.  He  had  become  noth- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


49 


ing,  so  far  as  anyone  could  see,  but  a vagabond — an  ec- 
centric, bookish  one,  to  be  sure.  He  had  no  friends,  no 
family,  no  job,  no  home.  He  had,  however,  one  thing:  an 
unquenchable  confidence  in  himself  and  a deep,  burning 
sense  of  mission. 

Probably  he  left  Austria  to  escape  military  service.* 
This  was  not  because  he  was  a coward  but  because  he 
loathed  the  idea  of  serving  in  the  ranks  with  Jews,  Slavs 
and  other  minority  races  of  the  empire.  In  Mein  Kampf 
Hitler  states  that  he  went  to  Munich  in  the  spring  of 
1912,  but  this  is  an  error.  A police  register  lists  him  as 
living  in  Vienna  until  May  1913. 

His  own  stated  reasons  for  leaving  Austria  are  quite 
grandiose. 

My  inner  revulsion  toward  the  Hapsburg  State  steadily 
grew  ...  I was  repelled  by  the  conglomeration  of  races 
which  the  capital  showed  me,  repelled  by  this  whole  mix- 
ture of  Czechs,  Poles,  Hungarians,  Ruthenians,  Serbs,  and 
Croats,  and  everywhere  the  eternal  mushroom  of  humanity 
— Jews  and  more  Jews.  To  me  the  giant  city  seemed  the  em- 
bodiment of  racial  desecration  . . . The  longer  I lived  in  this 
city  the  more  my  hatred  grew  for  the  foreign  mixture  of 
peoples  which  had  begun  to  corrode  this  old  site  of  German 
culture  . . . For  all  these  reasons  a longing  rose  stronger 
and  stronger  in  me  to  go  at  last  whither  since  my  childhood 
secret  desires  and  secret  love  had  drawn  me.63 

His  destiny  in  that  land  he  loved  so  dearly  was  to  be 
such  as  not  even  he,  in  his  wildest  dreams,  could  have 

* Since  1910,  when  he  was  twenty -one,  he  had  been  subject  to  military 
service.  According  to  Heiden  the  Austrian  authorities  could  not  put 
their  finger  on  him  while  he  was  in  Vienna.  They  finally  located  him 
in  Munich  and  ordered  him  to  report  for  examination  in  Linz.  Josef 
Greiner,  in  his  Das  Ende  des  Hitler-Mythos,  publishes  some  of  the  cor- 
respondence between  Hitler  and  the  Austrian  military  authorities  in 
which  Hitler  denies  that  he  went  to  Germany  to  avoid  Austrian  military 
service.  On  the  ground  that  he  lacked  funds,  he  requested  to  be  allowed 
to  take  his  examination  in  Salzburg  because  of  its  nearness  to  Munich. 
He  was  examined  there  on  February  5,  1914,  and  found  unfit  for  mili- 
tary or  even  auxiliary  service  on  account  of  poor  health — apparently 
he  still  had  a lung  ailment.  His  failure  to  report  for  military  service 
until  the  authorities  finally  located  him  at  the  age  of  twenty-four 
must  have  bothered  Hitler  when  his  star  rose  in  Germany.  Greiner 
confirms  a story  that  was  current  in  anti-Nazi  circles  when  I was  in 
Berlin  that  when  the  German  troops  occupied  Austria  in  1938  Hitler 
ordered  the  Gestapo  to  find  the  official  papers  relating  to  his  military 
service.  The  records  in  Linz  were  searched  in  vain — to  Hitler’s  mount- 
ing fury.  They  had  been  removed  by  a member  of  the  local  government, 
who,  after  the  war,  showed  them  to  Greiner. 


50 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


then  imagined.  He  was,  and  would  remain  until  shortly 
before  he  became  Chancellor,  technically  a foreigner,  an 
Austrian,  in  the  German  Reich.  It  is  only  as  an  Austrian 
who  came  of  age  in  the  last  decade  before  the  collapse  of 
the  Hapsburg  Empire,  who  failed  to  take  root  in  its  civi- 
lized capital,  who  embraced  all  the  preposterous  prejudices 
and  hates  then  rife  among  its  German-speaking  extremists 
and  who  failed  to  grasp  what  was  decent  and  honest 
and  honorable  in  the  vast  majority  of  his  fellow  citizens, 
were  they  Czechs  or  Jews  or  Germans,  poor  or  well  off, 
artists  or  artisans,  that  Hitler  can  be  understood.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  German  from  the  north,  from  the  Rhine- 
land in  the  west,  from  East  Prussia  or  even  from  Bavaria 
in  the  south  could  have  had  in  his  blood  and  mind  out  of 
any  possible  experience  exactly  the  mixture  of  ingredients 
which  propelled  Adolf  Hitler  to  the  heights  he  eventually 
reached.  To  be  sure,  there  was  added  a liberal  touch  of 
unpredictable  genius. 

But  in  the  spring  of  1913  his  genius  had  not  yet  shown. 
In  Munich,  as  in  Vienna,  he  remained  penniless,  friend- 
less and  without  a regular  job.  And  then  in  the  summer 
of  1914  the  war  came,  snatching  him,  like  millions  of  oth- 
ers, into  its  grim  clutches.  On  August  3 he  petitioned 
King  Ludwig  III  of  Bavaria  for  permission  to  volunteer 
in  a Bavarian  regiment  and  it  was  granted. 

This  was  the  heaven-sent  opportunity.  Now  the  young 
vagabond  could  satisfy  not  only  his  passion  to  serve  his 
beloved  adopted  country  in  what  he  says  he  believed  was 
a fight  for  its  existence — “to  be  or  not  to  be” — but  he 
could  escape  from  all  the  failures  and  frustrations  of  his 
personal  life. 

“To  me,”  he  wrote  in  Mein  Kampf,  “those  hours  came 
as  a deliverance  from  the  distress  that  had  weighed  upon 
me  during  the  days  of  my  youth.  I am  not  ashamed  to 
say  that,  carried  away  by  the  enthusiasm  of  the  moment, 
I sank  down  on  my  knees  and  thanked  Heaven  out  of  the 
fullness  of  my  heart  for  granting  me  the  good  fortune  of 
being  permitted  to  live  in  such  a time  . . . For  me,  as  for 
every  German,  there  now  began  the  most  memorable 
period  of  my  life.  Compared  to  the  events  of  this  gigantic 
struggle  all  the  past  fell  away  into  oblivion.” 64 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  5j 

For  Hitler  the  past,  with  all  its  shabbiness,  loneliness 
and  disappointments,  was  to  remain  in  the  shadows, 
though  it  shaped  his  mind  and  character  forever  after- 
ward. The  war,  which  now  would  bring  death  to  so  many 
millions,  brought  for  him,  at  twenty-five,  a new  start  in 
life. 


2 


BIRTH  OF  THE  NAZI  PARTY 


on  the  dark  autumn  Sunday  of  November  10,  1918, 
Adolf  Hitler  experienced  what  out  of  the  depths  of  his 
hatred  and  frustration  he  called  the  greatest  villainy  of 
the  century.*  A pastor  had  come  bearing  unbelievable 
news  for  the  wounded  soldiers  in  the  military  hospital  at 
Pasewalk,  a small  Pomeranian  town  northeast  of  Berlin, 
where  Hitler  was  recovering  from  temporary  blindness 
suffered  in  a British  gas  attack  a month  before  near  Ypres. 

That  Sunday  morning,  the  pastor  informed  them,  the 
Kaiser  had  abdicated  and  fled  to  Holland.  The  day  before 
a republic  had  been  proclaimed  in  Berlin.  On  the  morrow, 
November  11,  an  armistice  would  be  signed  at  Compiegne 
in  France.  The  war  had  been  lost.  Germany  was  at  the 
mercy  of  the  victorious  Allies.  The  pastor  began  to  sob. 

“I  could  stand  it  no  longer,”  Hitler  says  in  recounting 
the  scene.  “Everything  went  black  again  before  my  eyes; 
I tottered  and  groped  my  way  back  to  the  ward,  threw 
myself  on  my  bunk,  and  dug  my  burning  head  into  my 
blanket  and  pillow  ...  So  it  had  all  been  in  vain.  In  vain 
all  the  sacrifices  and  privations;  ...  in  vain  the  hours  in 
which,  with  mortal  fear  clutching  at  our  hearts,  we  never- 
theless did  our  duty;  in  vain  the  death  of  two  millions 
who  died  . . . Had  they  died  for  this?  . . . Did  all  this 
happen  only  so  that  a gang  of  wretched  criminals  could 
lay  hands  on  the  Fatherland?”  1 

For  the  first  time  since  he  had  stood  at  his  mother’s 
grave,  he  says,  he  broke  down  and  wept.  “I  could  not 
help  it.”  Like  millions  of  his  fellow  countrymen  then  and 
forever  after,  he  could  not  accept  the  blunt  and  shattering 

* The  expression  appeared  in  the  first  German  edition  of  Mein  Kampf , 
but  was  changed  to  “revolution”  in  all  subsequent  editions. 

52 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


53 


fact  that  Germany  had  been  defeated  on  the  battlefield 
and  had  lost  the  war. 

Like  millions  of  other  Germans,  too,  Hitler  had  been  a 
brave  and  courageous  soldier.  Later  he  would  be  accused 
by  some  political  opponents  of  having  been  a coward  in 
combat,  but  it  must  be  said,  in  fairness,  that  there  is  no 
shred  of  evidence  in  his  record  for  such  a charge.  As  a 
dispatch  runner  in  the  First  Company  of  the  16th 
Bavarian  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment,  he  arrived  at  the 
front  toward  the  end  of  October  1914  after  scarcely  three 
months  of  training,  and  his  unit  was  decimated  in  four 
days  of  hard  fighting  at  the  first  Battle  of  Ypres,  where 
the  British  halted  the  German  drive  to  the  Channel.  Ac- 
cording to  a letter  Hitler  wrote  his  Munich  landlord,  a 
tailor  named  Popp,  his  regiment  was  reduced  in  four  days 
of  combat  from  3,500  to  600  men;  only  thirty  officers  sur- 
vived, and  four  companies  had  to  be  dissolved. 

During  the  war  he  was  wounded  twice,  the  first  time  on 
October  7,  1916,  in  the  Battle  of  the  Somme,  when  he 
was  hit  in  the  leg.  After  hospitalization  in  Germany  he 
returned  to  the  List  Regiment — it  was  named  after  its 
original  commander — in  March  1917  and,  now  promoted 
to  corporal,  fought  in  the  Battle  of  Arras  and  the  third 
Battle  of  Ypres  during  that  summer.  His  regiment  was  in 
the  thick  of  the  fighting  during  the  last  all-out  German 
offensive  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1918.  On  the  night 
of  October  13  he  was  caught  in  a heavy  British  gas  at- 
tack on  a hill  south  of  Werwick  during  the  last  Battle  of 
Ypres.  “I  stumbled  back  with  burning  eyes,”  he  relates, 
“taking  with  me  my  last  report  of  the  war.  A few  hours 
later,  my  eyes  had  turned  into  glowing  coals;  it  had  grown 
dark  around  me.”  2 

He  was  twice  decorated  for  bravery.  In  December  1914 
he  was  awarded  the  Iron  Cross,  Second  Class,  and  in 
August  1918  he  received  the  Iron  Cross,  First  Class,  which 
was  rarely  given  to  a common  soldier  in  the  old  Imperial 
Army.  One  comrade  in  his  unit  testified  that  he  won  the 
coveted  decoration  for  having  captured  fifteen  Englishmen 
singlehanded;  another  said  it  was  Frenchmen.  The  official 
history  of  the  List  Regiment  contains  no  word  of  any  such 
exploit;  it  is  silent  about  the  individual  feats  of  many 
members  who  received  decorations.  Whatever  the  reason, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Corporal  Hitler  earned  the  Iron 


54  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Cross,  First  Class.  He  wore  it  proudly  to  the  end  of  his 
life. 

And  yet,  as  soldiers  go,  he  was  a peculiar  fellow,  as 
more  than  one  of  his  comrades  remarked.  No  letters  or 
presents  from  home  came  to  him,  as  they  did  to  the  oth- 
ers. He  never  asked  for  leave;  he  had  not  even  a combat 
soldier’s  interest  in  women.  He  never  grumbled,  as  did 
the  bravest  of  men,  about  the  filth,  the  lice,  the  mud,  the 
stench,  of  the  front  line.  He  was  the  impassioned  warrior, 
deadly  serious  at  all  times  about  the  war’s  aims  and 
Germany’s  manifest  destiny. 

“We  all  cursed  him  and  found  him  intolerable,”  one  of 
the  men  in  his  company  later  recalled.  “There  was  this 
white  crow  among  us  that  didn’t  go  along  with  us  when 
we  damned  the  war  to  hell.” 3 Another  man  described 
him  as  sitting  “in  the  corner  of  our  mess  holding  his  head 
between  his  hands,  in  deep  contemplation.  Suddenly  he 
would  leap  up  and,  running  about  excitedly,  say  that  in 
spite  of  our  big  guns  victory  would  be  denied  us,  for  the 
invisible  foes  of  the  German  people  were  a greater  dan- 
ger than  the  biggest  cannon  of  the  enemy.”  4 Whereupon 
he  would  launch  into  a vitriolic  attack  on  these  “invisible 
foes” — the  Jews  and  the  Marxists.  Had  he  not  learned  in 
Vienna  that  they  were  the  source  of  all  evil? 

And  indeed  had  he  not  seen  this  for  himself  in  the 
German  homeland  while  convalescing  from  his  leg  wound 
in  the  middle  of  the  war?  After  his  discharge  from  the 
hospital  at  Beelitz,  near  Berlin,  he  had  visited  the  capital 
and  then  gone  on  to  Munich.  Everywhere  he  found 
“scoundrels”  cursing  the  war  and  wishing  for  its  quick 
end.  Slackers  abounded,  and  who  were  they  but  Jews? 
“The  offices,”  he  found,  “were  filled  with  Jews.  Nearly 
every  clerk  was  a Jew  and  nearly  every  JeW  was  a clerk 
...  In  the  year  1916-17  nearly  the  whole  production  was 
under  control  of  Jewish  finance  . . . The  Jew  robbed  the 
whole  nation  and  pressed  it  beneath  his  domination  . . . 
I saw  with  horror  a catastrophe  approaching  ...”  6 Hitler 
could  not  bear  what  he  saw  and  was  glad,  he  says,  to  re- 
turn to  the  front. 

He  could  bear  even  less  the  disaster  which  befell  his 
beloved  Fatherland  in  November  1918.  To  him,  as  to  al- 
most all  Germans,  it  was  “monstrous”  and  undeserved. 
The  German  Army  had  not  been  defeated  in  the  field. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


55 


It  had  been  stabbed  in  the  back  by  the  traitors  at  home. 

Thus  emerged  for  Hitler,  as  for  so  many  Germans,  a 
fanatical  belief  in  the  legend  of  the  “stab  in  the  back” 
which,  more  than  anything  else,  was  to  undermine  the 
Weimar  Republic  and  pave  the  way  for  Hitler’s  ultimate 
triumph.  The  legend  was  fraudulent.  General  Ludendorff, 
the  actual  leader  of  the  High  Command,  had  insisted  on 
September  28,  1918,  on  an  armistice  “at  once,”  and  his 
nominal  superior,  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  had 
supported  him.  At  a meeting  of  the  Crown  Council  in 
Berlin  on  October  2 presided  over  by  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II, 
Hindenburg  had  reiterated  the  High  Command’s  demand 
for  an  immediate  truce.  “The  Army,”  he  said,  “cannot  wait 
forty-eight  hours.”  In  a letter  written  on  the  same  day 
Hindenburg  flatly  stated  that  the  military  situation  made 
it  imperative  to  stop  the  fighting.”  No  mention  was  made 
of  any  stab  in  the  back.”  Only  later  did  Germany’s  great 
war  hero  subscribe  to  the  myth.  In  a hearing  before  the 
Committee  of  Inquiry  of  the  National  Assembly  on  No- 
vember 18,  1919,  a year  after  the  war’s  end,  Hindenburg 
declared,  As  an  English  general  has  very  truly  said,  the 
German  Army  was  ‘stabbed  in  the  back.’  ” * 

In  point  of  fact,  the  civilian  government  headed  by 
Prince  Max  of  Baden,  which  had  not  been  told  of  the 
worsening  military  situation  by  the  High  Command  until 
file  end  of  September,  held  out  for  several  weeks  against 
Ludendorff’s  demand  for  an  armistice. 

One  had  to  live  in  Germany  between  the  wars  to  realize 
how  widespread  was  the  acceptance  of  this  incredible 


Wheeler-Bennetl"  °il  “S.  ”Jth  *S..?n  EnIfI.is>  general  was  hardly  factual. 

one  evening,  and  with  his  usual  tuVuS  Vi  dining  with  the  General 

how  the  High  Command  had  always  7"  exp?tl?tinS  on 

Civilian  Government  and  how  the  RevoluUon  had  l^a^V/T  the 

repeated.°n,Yes,  fiff  * 


56 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


legend  by  the  German  people.  The  facts  which  exposed 
its  deceit  lay  all  around.  The  Germans  of  the  Right  would 
not  face  them.  The  culprits,  they  never  ceased  to  bellow, 
were  the  “November  criminals” — an  expression  which 
Hitler  hammered  into  the  consciousness  of  the  people.  It 
mattered  not  at  all  that  the  German  Army,  shrewdly  and 
cowardly,  had  maneuvered  the  republican  government  into 
signing  the  armistice  which  the  military  leaders  had  in- 
sisted upon,  and  that  it  thereafter  had  advised  the  gov- 
ernment to  accept  the  Peace  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Nor  did 
it  seem  to  count  that  the  Social  Democratic  Party  had 
accepted  power  in  1918  only  reluctantly  and  only  to  pre- 
serve the  nation  from  utter  chaos  which  threatened  to 
lead  to  Bolshevism.  It  was  not  responsible  for  the  Ger- 
man collapse.  The  blame  for  that  rested  on  the  old  order, 
which  had  held  the  power.*  But  millions  of  Germans 
refused  to  concede  this.  They  had  to  find  scapegoats  for 
the  defeat  and  for  their  humiliation  and  misery.  They 
easily  convinced  themselves  that  they  had  found  them  in 
the  “November  criminals”  who  had  signed  the  surrender 
and  established  democratic  government  in  the  place  of  the 
old  autocracy.  The  gullibility  of  the  Germans  is  a subject 
which  Hitler  often  harps  on  in  Mein  Kampf.  He  was 
shortly  to  take  full  advantage  of  it. 

When  the  pastor  had  left  the  hospital  in  Pasewalk  that 
evening  of  November  10,  1918,  “there  followed  terrible 
days  and  even  worse  nights”  for  Adolf  Hitler.  “I  knew,” 
he  says,  “that  all  was  lost.  Only  fools,  liars  and  criminals 
could  hope  for  mercy  from  the  enemy.  In  these  nights 
hatred  grew  in  me,  hatred  for  those  responsible  for  this 
deed  . . . Miserable  and  degenerate  criminals!  The  more 
I tried  to  achieve  clarity  on  the  monstrous  event  in  this 
hour,  the  more  the  shame  of  indignation  and  disgrace 
burned  my  brow.  What  was  all  the  pain  in  my  eyes  com- 
pared to  this  misery?” 

And  then:  “My  own  fate  became  known  to  me.  I de- 
cided to  go  into  politics.”  6 

* A few  generals  were  courageous  enough  to  say  so.  On  August  23, 
1924,  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  published  an  article  by  General  Freiherr 
von  _ Schoenaich  analyzing  the  reasons  for  Germany’s  defeat.  He  came 
to  “the  irresistible  conclusion  that  we  owe  our  ruin  to  the  supremacy 
of  our  military  authorities  over  civilian  authorities  ...  In  fact,  German 
militarism  simply  committed  suicide.’’  (Quoted  by  Telford  Taylor  in 
Sword  and  Swastika,  p.  16.) 


57 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

As  it  turned  out,  this  was  a fateful  decision  for  Hitler 
and  for  the  world. 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  NAZI  PARTY 

The  prospects  for  a political  career  in  Germany  for  this 
thirty-year-old  Austrian  without  friends  or  funds,  without 
a job,  with  no  trade  or  profession  or  any  previous  record 
of  regular  employment,  with  no  experience  whatsoever  in 
politics,  were  less  than  promising,  and  at  first,  for  a brief 
moment,  Hitler  realized  it.  “For  days,”  he  says,  “I  won- 
dered what  could  be  done,  but  the  end  of  every  medita- 
tion was  the  sober  realization  that  I,  nameless  as  I was, 
did  not  possess  the  least  basis  for  any  useful  action.”  7 

He  had  returned  to  Munich  at  the  end  of  November 
1918,  to  find  his  adopted  city  scarcely  recognizable.  Revo- 
lution had  broken  out  here  too.  The  Wittelsbach  King 
had  also  abdicated.  Bavaria  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Social 
Democrats,  who  had  set  up  a Bavarian  “People’s  State” 
under  Kurt  Eisner,  a popular  Jewish  writer  who  had 
been  born  in  Berlin.  On  November  7,  Eisner,  a familiar 
figure  in  Munich  with  his  great  gray  beard,  his  pince-nez, 
his  enormous  black  hat  and  his  diminutive  size,  had 
traipsed  through  the  streets  at  the  head  of  a few  hundred 
men  and,  without  a shot  being  fired,  had  occupied  the 
seat  of  parliament  and  government  and  proclaimed  a re- 
public. Three  months  later  he  was  assassinated  by  a 
young  right-wing  officer,  Count  Anton  Arco-Valley.  The 
workers  thereupon  set  up  a soviet  republic,  but  this  was 
short-lived.  On  May  1,  1919,  Regular  Army  troops 
dispatched  from  Berlin  and  Bavarian  “free  corps” 

( Freikorps ) volunteers  entered  Munich  and  overthrew  the 
Communist  regime,  massacring  several  hundred  persons, 
including  many  non-Communists,  in  revenge  for  the 
shooting  of  a dozen  hostages  by  the  soviet.  Though  a 
moderate  Social  Democratic  government  under  Johannes 
Hoffmann  was  nominally  restored  for  the  time  being,  the 
real  power  in  Bavarian  politics  passed  to  the  Right. 

What  was  the  Right  in  Bavaria  at  this  chaotic  time?  It 
was  the  Regular  Army,  the  Reichswehr;  it  was  the 
monarchists,  who  wished  the  Wittelsbachs  back.  It  was  a 
mass  of  conservatives  who  despised  the  democratic  Re- 
public established  in  Berlin;  and  as  time  went  on  it  was 


58 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


above  all  the  great  mob  of  demobilized  soldiers  for  whom 
the  bottom  had  fallen  out  of  the  world  in  1918,  uprooted 
men  who  could  not  find  jobs  or  their  way  back  to  the 
peaceful  society  they  had  left  in  1914,  men  grown  tough 
and  violent  through  war  who  could  not  shake  themselves 
from  ingrained  habit  and  who,  as  Hitler,  who  for  a while 
was  one  of  them,  would  later  say,  “became  revolutionaries 
who  favored  revolution  for  its  own  sake  and  desired  to 
see  revolution  established  as  a permanent  condition.” 

Armed  free-corps  bands  sprang  up  all  over  Germany 
and  were  secretly  equipped  by  the  Reichswehr.  At  first 
they  were  mainly  used  to  fight  the  Poles  and  the  Balts  on 
the  disputed  eastern  frontiers,  but  soon  they  were  backing 
plots  for  the  overthrow  of  the  republican  regime.  In 
March  1920,  one  of  them,  the  notorious  Ehrhardt  Brigade, 
led  by  a freebooter,  Captain  Ehrhardt,  occupied  Berlin 
and  enabled  Dr.  Wolfgang  Kapp,*  a mediocre  politician 
of  the  extreme  Right,  to  proclaim  himself  Chancellor.  The 
Regular  Army,  under  General  von  Seeckt,  had  stood  by 
while  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  the  government 
fled  in  disarray  to  western  Germany.  Only  a general 
strike  by  the  trade  unions  restored  the  republican  govern- 
ment. 

In  Munich  at  the  same  time  a different  kind  of  military 
coup  d’etat  was  more  successful.  On  March  14,  1920, 
the  Reichswehr  overthrew  the  Hoffmann  Socialist  govern- 
ment and  installed  a right-wing  regime  under  Gustav  von 
Kahr.  And  now  the  Bavarian  capital  became  a magnet  for 
all  those  forces  in  Germany  which  were  determined  to 
overthrow  the  Republic,  set  up  an  authoritarian  regime 
and  repudiate  the  Diktat  of  Versailles.  Here  the  condot- 
tieri  of  the  free  corps,  including  the  members  of  the 
Ehrhardt  Brigade,  found  a refuge  and  a welcome.  Here 
General  Ludendorff  settled,  along  with  a host  of  other 
disgruntled,  discharged  Army  officers,  t Here  were  plotted 

* Kapp  was  bom  in  New  York  on  July  24,  1868. 

t At  the  war’s  end  Ludendorff  fled  to  Sweden  disguised  in  false  whiskers 
and  blue  spectacles.  He  returned  to  Germany  in  February  1919,  writing 
his  wife:  “It  would  be  the  greatest  stupidity  for  the  revolutionaries  to 
allow  us  all  to  remain  alive.  Why,  if  ever  I come  to  power  again  there 
will  be  no  pardon.  Then  with  an  easy  conscience,  I would  have  Ebert, 
Scheidemann  and  Co.  hanged,  and  watch  them  dangle.”  (Margaritte 
Ludendorff,  A Is  ich  Ludendorff  s Frau  war,  p.  229.)  Ebert  was  the  first 
President  and  Scheidemann  the  first  Chancellor  of  the  Weimar  Republic. 
Ludendorff,  though  second-in-command  to  Hindenburg,  had  been  the 
virtual  dictator  of  Germany  for  the  last  two  years  of  the  war. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


59 


the  political  murders,  among  them  that  of  Matthias 
Erzberger,  the  moderate  Catholic  politician  who  had  had 
the  courage  to  sign  the  armistice  when  the  generals 
backed  out;  and  of  Walther  Rathenau,  the  brilliant,  cul- 
tured Foreign  Minister,  whom  the  extremists  hated  for 
being  a Jew  and  for  carrying  out  the  national  government’s 
policy  of  trying  to  fulfill  at  least  some  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Versailles  Treaty. 

It  was  in  this  fertile  field  in  Munich  that  Adolf  Hitler 
got  his  start. 

When  he  had  come  back  to  Munich  at  the  end  of  No- 
vember 1918,  he  had  found  that  his  battalion  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  “Soldiers’  Councils.”  This  was  so  repellent 
to  him,  he  says,  that  he  decided  “at  once  to  leave  as  soon 
as  possible.”  He  spent  the  winter  doing  guard  duty  at  a 
prisoner-of-war  camp  at  Traunstein,  near  the  Austrian 
border.  He  was  back  in  Munich  in  the  spring.  In  Mein 
Kampf  he  relates  that  he  incurred  the  “disapproval”  of 
the  left-wing  government  and  claims  that  he  avoided  arrest 
only  by  the  feat  of  aiming  his  carbine  at  three  “scoun- 
drels” who  had  come  to  fetch  him.  Immediately  after 
the  Communist  regime  was  overthrown  Hitler  began  what 
he  terms  his  “first  more  or  less  political  activity.”  This 
consisted  of  giving  information  to  the  commission  of  in- 
quiry set  up  by  the  2nd  Infantry  Regiment  to  investigate 
those  who  shared  responsibility  for  the  brief  soviet  regime 
in  Munich. 

Apparently  Hitler’s  service  on  this  occasion  was  con- 
sidered valuable  enough  to  lead  the  Army  to  give  him 
further  employment.  He  was  assigned  to  a job  in  the  Press 
and  News  Bureau  of  the  Political  Department  of  the 
Army’s  district  command.  The  German  Army,  contrary  to 
its  traditions,  was  now  deep  in  politics,  especially  in  Ba- 
varia, where  at  last  it  had  established  a government  to  its 
liking.  To  further  its  conservative  views  it  gave  the  sol- 
diers courses  of  “political  instruction,”  in  one  of  which 
Adolf  Hitler  was  an  attentive  pupil.  One  day,  according 
to  his  own  story,  he  intervened  during  a lecture  in  which 
someone  had  said  a good  word  for  the  Jews.  His  anti- 
Semitic  harangue  apparently  so  pleased  his  superior  offi- 
cers that  he  was  soon  posted  to  a Munich  regiment  as  an 
educational  officer,  a Bildungsoffizier,  whose  main  task 


60  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

was  to  combat  dangerous  ideas — pacifism,  socialism, 
democracy;  such  was  the  Army’s  conception  of  its  role  in 
the  democratic  Republic  it  had  sworn  to  serve. 

This  was  an  important  break  for  Hitler,  the  first  recog- 
nition he  had  won  in  the  field  of  politics  he  was  now  trying 
to  enter.  Above  all,  it  gave  him  a chance  to  try  out  his 
oratorical  abilities — the  first  prerequisite,  as  he  had  al- 
ways maintained,  of  a successful  politician.  “All  at  once,” 
he  says,  “I  was  offered  an  opportunity  of  speaking  before 
a larger  audience;  and  the  thing  that  I had  always  pre- 
sumed from  pure  feeling  without  knowing  it  was  now 
corroborated:  I could  ‘speak.’  ” The  discovery  pleased  him 
greatly  even  if  it  came  as  no  great  surprise.  He  had  been 
afraid  that  his  voice  might  have  been  permanently  weak- 
ened by  the  gassing  he  had  suffered  at  the  front.  Now  he 
found  it  had  recovered  sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  make 
himself  heard  “at  least  in  every  comer  of  the  small  squad 
rooms.”  8 This  was  the  beginning  of  a talent  that  was  to 
make  him  easily  the  most  effective  orator  in  Germany, 
with  a magic  power,  after  he  took  to  radio,  to  sway  mil- 
lions by  his  voice. 

One  day  in  September  1919,  Hitler  received  orders 
from  the  Army’s  Political  Department  to  have  a look  at 
a tiny  political  group  in  Munich  which  called  itself  the 
German  Workers’  Party.  The  military  were  suspicious  of 
workers’  parties,  since  they  were  predominantly  Socialist 
or  Communist,  but  this  one,  it  was  believed,  might  be  dif- 
ferent. Hitler  says  it  was  “entirely  unknown”  to  him.  And 
yet  he  knew  one  of  the  men  who  was  scheduled  to  speak 
at  the  party’s  meeting  which  he  had  been  assigned  to  in- 
vestigate. 

A few  weeks  before,  in  one  of  his  Army  educational 
courses,  he  had  heard  a lecture  by  Gottfried  Feder,  a con- 
struction engineer  and  a crank  in  the  field  of  economics, 
who  had  become  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  “speculative” 
capital,  as  opposed  to  “creative”  and  “productive”  capital, 
was  the  root  of  much  of  Germany’s  economic  trouble.  He 
was  for  abolishing  the  first  kind  and  in  1917  had  formed 
an  organization  to  achieve  this  purpose:  the  German 
Fighting  League  for  the  Breaking  of  Interest  Slavery. 
Hitler,  ignorant  of  economics,  was  much  impressed  by 
Feder’s  lecture.  He  saw  in  Feder’s  appeal  for  the  “break- 
ing of  interest  slavery”  one  of  the  “essential  premises  for 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


61 


the  foundation  of  a new  party.”  In  Feder’s  lecture,  he 
says,  “I  sensed  a powerful  slogan  for  this  coming 
struggle.”  9 

But  at  first  he  did  not  sense  any  importance  in  the 
German  Workers’  Party.  He  went  to  its  meeting  because 
he  was  ordered  to,  and,  after  sitting  through  what  he 
thought  was  a dull  session  of  some  twenty-five  persons 
gathered  in  a murky  room  in  the  Sterneckerbrau  beer 
cellar,  he  was  not  impressed.  It  was  “a  new  organization 
like  so  many  others.  This  was  a time,”  he  says,  “in  which 
anyone  who  was  not  satisfied  with  developments  . . . felt 
called  upon  to  found  a new  party.  Everywhere  these  or- 
ganizations sprang  out  of  the  ground,  only  to  vanish 
silently  after  a time.  I judged  the  German  Workers’  Party 
no  differently.” 10  After  Feder  had  finished  speaking 
Hitler  was  about  to  leave,  when  a “professor”  sprang  up, 
questioned  the  soundness  of  Feder’s  arguments  and  then 
proposed  that  Bavaria  should  break  away  from  Prussia 
and  found  a South  German  nation  with  Austria.  This 
was  a popular  notion  in  Munich  at  the  time,  but  its  ex- 
pression aroused  Hitler  to  a fury  and  he  rose  to  give 
“the  learned  gentleman,”  as  he  later  recounted,  a piece  of 
his  mind.  This  apparently  was  so  violent  that,  according  to 
Hitler,  the  “professor”  left  the  hall  “like  a wet  poodle,” 
while  the  rest  of  the  audience  looked  at  the  unknown 
young  speaker  “with  astonished  faces.”  One  man — Hitler 
says  he  did  not  catch  his  name — came  leaping  after  him 
and  pressed  a little  booklet  into  his  hands. 

This  man  was  Anton  Drexler,  a locksmith  by  trade,  who 
may  be  said  to  have  been  the  actual  founder  of  National 
Socialism.  A sickly,  bespectacled  man,  lacking  a formal 
education,  with  an  independent  but  narrow  and  confused 
mind,  a poor  writer  and  a worse  speaker,  Drexler  was 
then  employed  in  the  Munich  railroad  shops.  On  March 
7,  1918,  he  had  set  up  a “Committee  of  Independent 
Workmen”  to  combat  the  Marxism  of  the  free  trade  unions 
and  to  agitate  for  a “just”  peace  for  Germany.  Actually,  it 
was  a branch  of  a larger  movement  established  in  North 
Germany  as  the  Association  for  the  Promotion  of  Peace 
on  Working-Class  Lines  (the  country  was  then  and  would 
continue  to  be  until  1933  full  of  countless  pressure  groups 
with  highfalutin  titles). 

''  Drexler  never  recruited  more  than  forty  members,  and 


62 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

in  January  1919  he  merged  his  committee  with  a similar 
group,  the  Political  Workers’  Circle,  led  by  a newspaper 
reporter,  one  Karl  Harrer.  The  new  organization,  which 
numbered  less  than  a hundred,  was  called  the  German 
Workers’  Party  and  Harrer  was  its  first  chairman.  Hitler, 
who  has  little  to  say  in  Mein  Kampf  of  some  of  his  early 
comrades  whose  names  are  now  forgotten,  pays  Harrer 
the  tribute  of  being  “honest”  and  “certainly  widely  edu- 
cated” but  regrets  that  he  lacked  the  “oratorical  gift.” 
Perhaps  Harrer’s  chief  claim  to  fleeting  fame  is  that  he 
stubbornly  maintained  that  Hitler  was  a poor  speaker,  a 
judgment  which  riled  the  Nazi  leader  ever  after,  as  he 
makes  plain  in  his  autobiography.  At  any  rate,  Drexler 
seems  to  have  been  the  chief  driving  force  in  this  small, 
unknown  German  Workers’  Party. 

The  next  morning  Hitler  turned  to  a perusal  of  the 
booklet  which  Drexler  had  thrust  into  his  hands  He 
describes  the  scene  at  length  in  Mein  Kampf.  It  was  5 
a.m.  Hitler  had  awakened  and,  as  he  says  was  his  custom, 
was  reclining  on  his  cot  in  the  barracks  of  the  2nd  Infan- 
try Regiment  watching  the  mice  nibble  at  the  bread 
crumbs  which  he  invariably  scattered  on  the  floor  the  night 
before.  “I  had  known  so  much  poverty  in  my  life,”  he 
muses,  ‘ that  I was  well  able  to  imagine  the  hunger  and 
hence  also  the  pleasure  of  the  little  creatures.”  He  remem- 
bered the  little  pamphlet  and  began  to  read  it.  It  was  en- 
titled My  Political  Awakening.”  To  Hitler’s  surprise,  it 
reflected  a good  many  ideas  which  he  himself  had  ac- 
quired over  the  years.  Drexler’s  principal  aim  was  to  build 
a political  party  which  would  be  based  on  the  masses  of 
the  working  class  but  which,  unlike  the  Social  Democrats, 
would  be  strongly  nationalist.  Drexler  had  been  a member 
of  the  patriotic  Fatherland  Front  but  had  soon  become 
disillusioned  with  its  middle-class  spirit  which  seemed 
to  have  no  contact  at  all  with  the  masses.  In  Vienna,  as 
we  have  seen,  Hitler  had  learned  to  scorn  the  bourgeoisie 
for  the  same  reason — its  utter  lack  of  concern  with  the 
working-class  families  and  their  social  problems.  Drexler’s 
ideas,  then,  definitely  interested  him. 

Later  that  day  Hitler  was  astonished  to  receive  a post- 
card saying  that  he  had  been  accepted  in  the  German 
Workers  Party.  ‘ I didn’t  know  whether  to  be  angry  or 
to  laugh,”  he  remembered  later.  “I  had  no  intention  of 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


63 


joining  a ready-made  party,  but  wanted  to  found  one  of 
my  own.  What  they  asked  of  me  was  presumptuous  and 
out  of  the  question.”  11  He  was  about  to  say  so  in  a letter 
when  “curiosity  won  out”  and  he  decided  to  go  to  a com- 
mittee meeting  to  which  he  had  been  invited  and  explain 
in  person  his  reasons  for  not  joining  “this  absurd  little 
organization.” 

The  tavern  in  which  the  meeting  was  to  take  place  was 
the  Alte  Rosenbad  in  the  Herrenstrasse,  a very  run-down 
place  ...  I went  through  the  ill-lit  dining  room  in  which  not 
a soul  was  sitting,  opened  the  door  to  the  back  room,  and 
there  I was  face  to  face  with  the  Committee.  In  the  dim 
light  of  a grimy  gas  lamp  four  young  people  sat  at  a table, 
among  them  the  author  of  the  little  pamphlet,  who  at  once 
greeted  me  most  joyfully  and  bade  me  welcome  as  a new 
member  of  the  German  Workers’  Party. 

Really,  I was  somewhat  taken  aback.  The  minutes  of  the 
last  meeting  were  read  and  the  secretary  given  a vote  of 
confidence.  Next  came  the  treasury  report — all  in  all  the 
association  possessed  seven  marks  and  fifty  pfennigs — for 
which  the  treasurer  received  a vote  of  confidence.  This  too 
was  entered  in  the  minutes.  Then  the  first  chairman  read  the 
answers  to  a letter  from  Kiel,  one  from  Duesseldorf,  and 
one  from  Berlin  and  everyone  expressed  approval.  Next  a 
report  was  given  on  the  incoming  mail  . . . 

Terrible,  terrible!  This  was  club  life  of  the  worst  manner 
and  sort.  Was  I to  join  this  organization? 12 

Yet  there  was  something  about  these  shabby  men  in  the 
ill-lit  back  room  that  attracted  him:  “the  longing  for  a 
new  movement  which  should  be  more  than  a party  in  the 
previous  sense  of  the  word.”  That  evening  he  returned  to 
the  barracks  to  “face  the  hardest  question  of  my  life: 
should  I join?”  Reason,  he  admits,  told  him  to  decline. 
And  yet  . . . The  very  unimportance  of  the  organization 
would  give  a young  man  of  energy  and  ideas  an  oppor- 
tunity “for  real  personal  activity.”  Hitler  thought  over 
what  he  could  “bring  to  this  task.” 

That  I was  poor  and  without  means  seemed  to  me  the 
most  bearable  part  of  it,  but  it  was  harder  that  I was  num- 
bered among  the  nameless,  that  I was  one  of  the  millions 
whom  chance  permits  to  live  or  summons  out  of  existence 
without  even  their  closest  neighbors  condescending  to  take 


64 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

any  notice  of  it.  In  addition,  there  was  the  difficulty  which 
inevitably  arose  from  my  lack  of  schooling. 

After  two  days  of  agonized  pondering  and  reflection,  I 
finally  came  to  the  conviction  that  I had  to  take  this  step. 

It  was  the  most  decisive  resolve  of  my  life.  From  here 
there  was  and  could  be  no  turning  back.13 

Adolf  Hitler  was  then  and  there  enrolled  as  the  seventh 
member  of  the  committee  of  the  German  Workers’  Party. 

There  were  two  members  of  this  insignificant  party  who 
deserve  mention  at  this  point;  both  were  to  prove  im- 
portant in  the  rise  of  Hitler.  Captain  Ernst  Roehm,  on  the 
staff  of  the  Army’s  District  Command  VII  in  Munich,  had 
joined  the  party  before  Hitler.  He  was  a stocky,  bull- 
necked, piggish-eyed,  scar-faced  professional  soldier — the 
upper  part  of  his  nose  had  been  shot  away  in  1914 — with 
a flair  for  politics  and  a natural  ability  as  an  organizer. 
Like  Hitler  he  was  possessed  of  a burning  hatred  for  the 
democratic  Republic  and  the  “November  criminals”  he 
held  responsible  for  it.  His  aim  was  to  re-create  a strong 
nationalist  Germany  and  he  believed  with  Hitler  that 
this  could  be  done  only  by  a party  based  on  the  lower 
classes,  from  which  he  himself,  unlike  most  Regular  Army 
officers,  had  come.  A tough,  ruthless,  driving  man — albeit, 
like  so  many  of  the  early  Nazis,  a homosexual — he  helped 
to  organize  the  first  Nazi  strong-arm  squads  which  grew 
into  the  S.A.,  the  army  of  storm  troopers  which  he  com- 
manded until  his  execution  by  Hitler  in  1934.  Roehm 
not  only  brought  into  the  budding  party  large  numbers  of 
ex-servicemen  and  freecorps  volunteers,  who  formed  the 
backbone  of  the  organization  in  its  early  years,  but,  as  an 
officer  of  the  Army,  which  controlled  Bavaria,  he  ob- 
tained for  Hitler  and  his  movement  the  protection  and 
sometimes  the  support  of  the  authorities.  Without  this 
help,  Hitler  probably  could  never  have  got  a real  start  in 
his  campaign  to  incite  the  people  to  overthrow  the  Re- 
public. Certainly  he  could  not  have  got  away  with  his 
methods  of  terror  and  intimidation  without  the  tolerance 
of  the  Bavarian  government  and  police. 

Dietrich  Eckart,  twenty-one  years  older  than  Hitler, 
was  often  called  the  spiritual  founder  of  National  Social- 
ism. A witty  journalist,  a mediocre  poet  and  dramatist, 
he  had  translated  Ibsen’s  Peer  Gynt  and  written  a number 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


65 


of  unproduced  plays.  In  Berlin  for  a time  he  had  led,  like 
Hitler  in  Vienna,  the  bohemian  vagrant’s  life,  become  a 
drunkard,  taken  to  morphine  and,  according  to  Heiden, 
been  confined  to  a mental  institution,  where  he  was  final- 
ly able  to  stage  his  dramas,  using  the  inmates  as  actors. 
He  had  returned  to  his  native  Bavaria  at  the  war’s  end 
and  held  forth  before  a circle  of  admirers  at  the  Bren- 
nessel  wine  cellar  in  Schwabling,  the  artists’  quarter  in 
Munich,  preaching  Aryan  superiority  and  calling  for  the 
elimination  of  the  Jews  and  the  downfall  of  the  “swine” 
in  Berlin. 

“We  need  a fellow  at  the  head,”  Heiden,  who  was  a 
working  newspaperman  in  Munich  at  the  time,  quotes 
Eckart  as  declaiming  to  the  habitues  of  the  Brennessel 
wine  cellar  in  1919,  “who  can  stand  the  sound  of  a ma- 
chine gun.  The  rabble  need  to  get  fear  into  their  pants. 
We  can’t  use  an  officer,  because  the  people  don’t  respect 
them  any  more.  The  best  would  be  a worker  who  knows 
how  to  talk  ....  He  doesn’t  need  much  brains  ...  He 
must  be  a bachelor,  then  we’ll  get  the  women.”  14 

What  more  natural  than  that  the  hard-drinking  poet  * 
should  find  in  Adolf  Hitler  the  very  man  he  was  looking 
for?  He  became  a close  adviser  to  the  rising  young  man 
in  the  German  Workers’  Party,  lending  him  books,  helping 
to  improve  his  German — both  written  and  spoken — and 
introducing  him  to  his  wide  circle  of  friends,  which  in- 
cluded not  only  certain  wealthy  persons  who  were  in- 
duced to  contribute  to  the  party’s  funds  and  Hitler’s  living 
but  such  future  aides  as  Rudolf  Hess  and  Alfred  Rosen- 
berg. Hitler’s  admiration  for  Eckart  never  flagged,  and  the 
last  sentence  of  Mein  Kampf  is  an  expression  of  gratitude 
to  this  erratic  mentor:  He  was,  says  Hitler  in  concluding 
his  book,  “one  of  the  best,  who  devoted  his  life  to  the 
awakening  of  our  people,  in  his  writings  and  his  thoughts 
and  finally  in  his  deeds.”  5 

Such  was  the  weird  assortment  of  misfits  who  founded 
National  Socialism,  who  unknowingly  began  to  shape  a 
movement  which  in  thirteen  years  would  sweep  the  coun- 
try, the  strongest  in  Europe,  and  bring  to  Germany  its 
Third  Reich.  The  confused  locksmith  Drexler  provided  the 
kernel,  the  drunken  poet  Eckart  some  of  the  “spiritual” 

* Eckart  died  of  overdrinking  in  December  1923. 


66 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


foundation,  the  economic  crank  Feder  what  passed  as  an 
ideology,  the  homosexual  Roehm  the  support  of  the  Army 
and  the  war  veterans,  but  it  was  now  the  former  tramp, 
Adolf  Hitler,  not  quite  thirty-one  and  utterly  unknown, 
who  took  the  lead  in  building  up  what  had  been  no  more 
than  a back-room  debating  society  into  what  would  soon 
become  a formidable  political  party. 

All  the  ideas  which  had  been  bubbling  in  his  mind  since 
the  lonesome  days  of  hunger  in  Vienna  now  found  an 
outlet,  and  an  inner  energy  which  had  not  been  observable 
in  his  make-up  burst  forth.  He  prodded  his  timid  com- 
mittee into  organizing  bigger  meetings.  He  personally  typed 
out  and  distributed  invitations.  Later  he  recalled  how 
once,  after  he  had  distributed  eighty  of  these,  “we  sat 
waiting  for  the  masses  who  were  expected  to  appear.  An 
hour  late,  the  ‘chairman’  had  to  open  the  ‘meeting.’  We 
were  again  seven,  the  old  seven.” 16  But  he  was  not  to 
be  discouraged.  He  increased  the  number  of  invitations 
by  having  them  mimeographed.  He  collected  a few  marks 
to  insert  a notice  of  a meeting  in  a local  newspaper.  “The 
success,”  he  says,  “was  positively  amazing.  One  hundred 
and  eleven  people  were  present.”  Hitler  was  to  make  his 
first  “public”  speech,  following  the  main  address  by  a 
“Munich  professor.”  Harrer,  nominal  head  of  the  party, 
objected.  “This  gentleman,  who  was  certainly  otherwise 
honest,”  Hitler  relates,  “just  happened  to  be  convinced  that 
I might  be  capable  of  doing  certain  things,  but  not  of 
speaking.  I spoke  for  thirty  minutes,  and  what  before  I 
had  simply  felt  within  me,  without  in  any  way  knowing  it, 
was  now  proved  by  reality:  I could  speak!”  17  Hitler  claims 
the  audience  was  “electrified”  by  his  oratory  and  its  en- 
thusiasm proved  by  donations  of  three  hundred  marks, 
which  temporarily  relieved  the  party  of  its  financial 
worries. 

At  the  start  of  1920,  Hitler  took  over  the  party’s  propa- 
ganda, an  activity  to  which  he  had  given  much  thought 
since  he  had  observed  its  importance  in  the  Socialist 
and  Christian  Social  parties  in  Vienna.  He  began  immedi- 
ately to  organize  by  far  the  biggest  meeting  ever  dreamt  of 
by  the  pitifully  small  party.  It  was  to  be  held  on  February 
24,  1920,  in  the  Festsaal  of  the  famous  Hofbrauhaus, 
with  a seating  capacity  of  nearly  two  thousand.  Hitler’s 
fellow  committeemen  thought  he  was  crazy.  Harrer  re- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


67 


signed  in  protest  and  was  replaced  by  Drexler,  who  re- 
mained skeptical.*  Hitler  emphasizes  that  he  personally 
conducted  the  preparations.  Indeed  the  event  loomed  so 
large  for  him  that  he  concludes  the  first  volume  of  Mein 
Kampf  with  a description  of  it,  because,  he  explains,  it 
was  the  occasion  when  “the  party  burst  the  narrow  bonds 
of  a small  club  and  for  the  first  time  exerted  a determining 
influence  on  the  mightiest  factor  of  our  time:  public 
opinion.” 

Hitler  was  not  even  scheduled  as  the  main  speaker.  This 
role  was  reserved  for  a certain  Dr.  Johannes  Dingfelder,  a 
homeopathic  physician,  a crackpot  who  contributed  arti- 
cles on  economics  to  the  newspapers  under  the  pseudonym 
of  “Germanus  Agricola,”  and  who  was  soon  to  be  for- 
gotten. His  speech  was  greeted  with  silence;  then  Hitler 
began  to  speak.  As  he  describes  the  scene: 

There  was  a hail  of  shouts,  there  were  violent  clashes  in 
the  hall,  a handful  of  the  most  faithful  war  comrades  and 
other  supporters  battled  with  the  disturbers  . . . Communists 
and  Socialists  . . . and  only  little  by  little  were  able  to  re- 
store order.  I was  able  to  go  on  speaking.  After  half  an 
hour  the  applause  slowly  began  to  drown  out  the  screaming 
and  shouting  . . . When  after  nearly  four  hours  the  hall 
began  to  empty  I knew  that  now  the  principles  of  the 
movement  which  could  no  longer  be  forgotten  were  moving 
out  among  the  German  people.18 

In  the  course  of  his  speech  Hitler  had  enunciated  for  the 
first  time  the  twenty-five  points  of  the  program  of  the 
German  Workers’  Party.  They  had  been  hastily  drawn  up 
by  Drexler,  Feder  and  Hitler.  Most  of  the  heckling  at 
Hitler  had  really  been  directed  against  parts  of  the  pro- 
gram which  he  read  out,  but  he  nevertheless  considered 
all  the  points  as  having  been  adopted  and  they  became  the 
official  program  of  the  Nazi  Party  when  its  name  was 
altered  on  April  1,  1920,  to  the  National  Socialist  German 
Workers’  Party.  Indeed,  for  tactical  reasons  Hitler  in  1926 
declared  them  “unalterable.” 

They  are  certainly  a hodgepodge,  a catchall  for  the 
workers,  the  lower  middle  class  and  the  peasants,  and  most 
of  them  were  forgotten  by  the  time  the  party  came  to 


* Harrer  also  was  opposed  to  Hitler’s  violent  anti-Semitism  and  believed 
that  Hitler  was  alienating  the  working-class  masses.  These  were  the 
real  reasons  why  he  resigned. 


68 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


power.  A good  many  writers  on  Germany  have  ridiculed 
them,  and  the  Nazi  leader  himself  was  later  to  be  em- 
barrassed when  reminded  of  some  of  them.  Yet,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  main  principles  laid  down  in  Mein  Kampf,  the 
most  important  of  them  were  carried  out  by  the  Third 
Reich,  with  consequences  disastrous  to  millions  of  people, 
inside  and  outside  of  Germany. 

The  very  first  point  in  the  program  demanded  the 
union  of  all  Germans  in  a Greater  Germany.  Was  this  not 
exactly  what  Chancellor  Hitler  would  insist  on  and  get 
when  he  annexed  Austria  and  its  six  million  Germans,  when 
he  took  the  Sudetenland  with  its  three  million  Germans? 
And  was  it  not  his  demand  for  the  return  of  German 
Danzig  and  the  other  areas  in  Poland  inhabited  predom- 
inantly by  Germans  which  led  to  the  German  attack  on 
Poland  and  brought  on  World  War  II?  And  cannot  it  be 
added  that  it  was  one  of  the  world’s  misfortunes  that  so 
many  in  the  interwar  years  either  ignored  of  laughed  off 
the  Nazi  aims  which  Hitler  had  taken  the  pains  to  put 
down  in  writing?  Surely  the  anti-Semitic  points  of  the 
program  promulgated  in  the  Munich  beer  hall  on  the  eve- 
ning of  February  24,  1920,  constituted  a dire  warning. 
The  Jews  were  to  be  denied  office  and  even  citizenship  in 
Germany  and  excluded  from  the  press.  All  who  had  en- 
tered the  Reich  after  August  2,  1914,  were  to  be  expelled. 

A good  many  paragraphs  of  the  party  program  were  ob- 
viously merely  a demagogic  appeal  to  the  mood  of  the 
lower  classes  at  a time  when  they  were  in  bad  straits  and 
were  sympathetic  to  radical  and  even  socialist  slogans. 
Point  11,  for  example,  demanded  abolition  of  incomes  un- 
earned by  work;  Point  12,  the  nationalization  of  trusts; 
Point  13,  the  sharing  with  the  state  of  profits  from  large 
industry;  Point  14,  the  abolishing  of  land  rents  and 
speculation  in  land.  Point  18  demanded  the  death  penalty 
for  traitors,  usurers  and  profiteers,  and  Point  16,  calling 
for  the  maintenance  of  “a  sound  middle  class,”  insisted  on 
the  communalization  of  department  stores  and  their  lease 
at  cheap  rates  to  small  traders.  These  demands  had  been 
put  in  at  the  insistence  of  Drexler  and  Feder,  who  appar- 
ently really  believed  in  the  “socialism”  of  National  Social- 
ism. They  were  the  ideas  which  Hitler  was  to  find  embar- 
rassing when  the  big  industrialists  and  landlords  began  to 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


69 


pour  money  into  the  party  coffers,  and  of  course  nothing 
was  ever  done  about  them. 

There  were,  finally,  two  points  of  the  program  which 
Hitler  would  carry  out  as  soon  as  he  became  Chancellor. 
Point  2 demanded  the  abrogation  of  the  treaties  of  Ver- 
sailles and  St.  Germain.  The  last  point,  number  25,  in- 
sisted on  “the  creation  of  a strong  central  power  of  the 
State.”  This,  like  Points  1 and  2 demanding  the  union  of 
all  Germans  in  the  Reich  and  the  abolition  of  the  peace 
treaties,  was  put  into  the  program  at  Hitler’s  insistence 
and  it  showed  how  even  then,  when  his  party  was  hardly 
known  outside  Munich,  he  was  casting  his  eyes  on  further 
horizons  even  at  the  risk  of  losing  popular  support 
in  his  own  bailiwick. 

Separatism  was  very  strong  in  Bavaria  at  the  time  and 
the  Bavarians,  constantly  at  odds  with  the  central  govern- 
ment in  Berlin,  were  demanding  less,  not  more,  centraliza- 
tion, so  that  Bavaria  could  rule  itself.  In  fact,  this  was 
what  it  was  doing  at  the  moment;  Berlin’s  writ  had  very 
little  authority  in  the  states.  Hitler  was  looking  ahead 
for  power  not  only  in  Bavaria  but  eventually  in  the  Reich, 
and  to  hold  and  exercise  that  power  a dictatorial  regime 
such  as  he  already  envisaged  needed  to  constitute  itself 
as  a strong  centralized  authority,  doing  away  with  the 
semiautonomous  states  which  under  the  Weimar  Republic, 
as  under  the  Hohenzollern  Empire,  enjoyed  their  own 
parliaments  and  governments.  One  of  his  first  acts  after 
January  30,  1933,  was  to  swiftly  carry  out  this  final 
point  in  the  party’s  program  which  so  few  had  noticed 
or  taken  seriously.  No  one  could  say  he  had  not  given 
ample  warning,  in  writing,  from  the  very  beginning. 

Inflammatory  oratory  and  a radical,  catchall  program, 
important  as  they  were  for  a fledgling  party  out  to  at- 
tract attention  and  recruit  mass  support,  were  not  enough, 
and  Hitler  now  turned  his  attention  to  providing  more — 
much  more.  The  first  signs  of  his  peculiar  genius  began 
to  appear  and  make  themselves  felt.  What  the  masses  need- 
ed, he  thought,  were  not  only  ideas — a few  simple  ideas, 
that  is,  that  he  could  ceaselessly  hammer  through  their 
skulls — but  symbols  that  would  win  their  faith,  pageantry 
and  color  that  would  arouse  them,  and  acts  of  violence 
and  terror,  which  if  successful,  would  attract  adherents 


70 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


(were  not  most  Germans  drawn  to  the  strong?)  and  give 
them  a sense  of  power  over  the  weak. 

In  Vienna,  as  we  have  seen,  he  was  intrigued  by  what 
he  called  the  “infamous  spiritual  and  physical  terror” 
which  he  thought  was  employed  by  the  Social  Democrats 
against  their  political  opponents.*  Now  he  turned  it  to 
good  purpose  in  his  own  anti-Socialist  party.  At  first  ex- 
servicemen  were  assigned  to  the  meetings  to  silence  heck- 
lers and,  if  necessary,  toss  them  out.  In  the  summer  of 

1920,  soon  after  the  party  had  added  “National  Socialist” 
to  the  name  of  the  “German  Workers’  Party”  and  became 
the  National  Socialist  German  Workers’  Party,  or 
N.S.D.A.P.,  as  it  was  now  to  be  familiarly  known,  Hitler 
organized  a bunch  of  roughneck  war  veterans  into  “strong- 
arm”  squads,  Ordnertruppe,  under  the  command  of  Emil 
Maurice,  an  ex-convict  and  watchmaker.  On  October  5, 

1921,  after  camouflaging  themselves  for  a short  time  as  the 
“Gymnastic  and  Sports  Division”  of  the  party  to  escape 
suppression  by  the  Berlin  government,  they  were  officially 
named  the  Sturmabteilung,  from  which  the  name  S.A. 
came.  The  storm  troopers,  outfitted  in  brown  uniforms, 
were  recruited  largely  from  the  freebooters  of  the  free 
corps  and  placed  under  the  command  of  Johann  Ulrich 
Klintzich,  an  aide  of  the  notorious  Captain  Ehrhardt,  who 
had  recently  been  released  from  imprisonment  in  connec- 
tion with  the  murder  of  Erzberger. 

These  uniformed  rowdies,  not  content  to  keep  order  at 
Nazi  meetings,  soon  took  to  breaking  up  those  of  the 
other  parties.  Once  in  1921  Hitler  personally  led  his  storm 
troopers  in  an  attack  on  a meeting  which  was  to  be  ad- 
dressed by  a Bavarian  federalist  by  the  name  of  Baller- 
stedt,  who  received  a beating.  For  this  Hitler  was  sen- 
tenced to  three  months  in  jail,  one  of  which  he  served. 
This  was  his  first  experience  in  jail  and  he  emerged  from 
it  somewhat  of  a martyr  and  more  popular  than  ever. 
“It’s  all  right,”  Hitler  boasted  to  the  police.  “We  got  what 
we  wanted.  Ballerstedt  did  not  speak.”  As  Hitler  had  told 
an  audience  some  months  before,  “The  National  Socialist 
Movement  will  in  the  future  ruthlessly  prevent — if  neces- 
sary by  force — all  meetings  or  lectures  that  are  likely  to 
distract  the  minds  of  our  fellow  countrymen.” 19 


* See  above,  p.  43. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


71 


In  the  summer  of  1920  Hitler,  the  frustrated  artist  but 
now  becoming  the  master  propagandist,  came  up  with  an 
inspiration  which  can  only  be  described  as  a stroke  of 
genius.  What  the  party  lacked,  he  saw,  was  an  emblem, 
a flag,  a symbol,  which  would  express  what  the  new  organi- 
zation stood  for  and  appeal  to  the  imagination  of  the 
masses,  who,  as  Hitler  reasoned,  must  have  some  striking 
banner  to  follow  and  to  fight  under.  After  much  thought 
and  innumerable  attempts  at  various  designs  he  hit  upon 
a flag  with  a red  background  and  in  the  middle  a white 
disk  on  which  was  imprinted  a black  swastika.  The  hooked 
cross — the  hakenkreuz — of  the  swastika,  borrowed  though 
it  was  from  more  ancient  times,  was  to  become  a mighty 
and  frightening  symbol  of  the  Nazi  Party  and  ultimately 
of  Nazi  Germany.  Whence  Hitler  got  the  idea  of  using  it 
for  both  the  flag  and  the  insignia  of  the  party  he  does 
not  say  in  a lengthy  dissertation  on  the  subject  in  Mein 
Kampf. 

The  hakenkreuz  is  as  old,  almost,  as  man  on  the  planet. 
It  has  been  found  in  the  ruins  of  Troy  and  of  Egypt  and 
China.  I myself  have  seen  it  in  ancient  Hindu  and  Bud- 
dhist relics  in  India.  In  more  recent  times  it  showed  up 
as  an  official  emblem  in  such  Baltic  states  as  Estonia  and 
Finland,  where  the  men  of  the  German  free  corps  saw 
it  during  the  fighting  of  1918-19.  The  Ehrhardt  Brigade 
had  it  painted  on  their  steel  helmets  when  they  entered 
Berlin  during  the  Kapp  putsch  in  1920.  Hitler  had  un- 
doubtedly seen  it  in  Austria  in  the  emblems  of  one  or  the 
other  anti-Semitic  parties  and  perhaps  he  was  struck  by  it 
when  the  Ehrhardt  Brigade  came  to  Munich.  He  says  that 
numerous  designs  suggested  to  him  by  party  members  in- 
variably included  a swastika  and  that  a “dentist  from 
Sternberg”  actually  delivered  a design  for  a flag  that  “was 
not  bad  at  all  and  quite  close  to  my  own.” 

For  the  colors  Hitler  had  of  course  rejected  the  black, 
red  and  gold  of  the  hated  Weimar  Republic.  He  declined 
to  adopt  the  old  imperial  flag  of  red,  white  and  black, 
but  he  liked  its  colors  not  only  because,  he  says,  they 
form  “the  most  brilliant  harmony  in  existence,”  but  be- 
cause they  were  the  colors  of  a Germany  for  which  he  had 
fought.  But  they  had  to  be  given  a new  form,  and  so  a 
swastika  was  added. 

Hitler  reveled  in  his  unique  creation.  “A  symbol  it  really 


72 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

is!  he  exclaims  in  Mein  Kampf.  “In  red  we  see  the  social 
idea  of  the  movement,  in  white  the  nationalist  idea,  in  the 
swastika  the  mission  of  the  struggle  for  the  victory  of  the 
Aryan  man.”  29 

Soon  the  swastika  armband  was  devised  for  the  uni- 
forms of  the  storm  troopers  and  the  party  members,  and 
two  years  later  Hitler  designed  the  Nazi  standards  which 
would  be  carried  in  the  massive  parades  and  would 
adorn  the  stages  of  the  mass  meetings.  Taken  from  old 
Roman  designs,  they  consisted  of  a black  metal  swastika 
on  top  with  a silver  wreath  surmounted  by  an  eagle,  and, 
below,  the  initials  NSDAP  on  a metal  rectangle  from 
which  hung  cords  with  fringe  and  tassels,  a square  swas- 
tika flag  with  “Deutschland  Erwache!  (Germany  Awake!)” 
emblazoned  on  it. 

This  may  not  have  been  “art,”  but  it  was  propaganda  of 
the  highest  order.  The  Nazis  now  had  a symbol  which  no 
other  party  could  match.  The  hooked  cross  seemed  to 
possess  some  mystic  power  of  its  own,  to  beckon  to  action 
in  a new  direction  the  insecure  lower  middle  classes 
which  had  been  floundering  in  the  uncertainty  of  the  first 
chaotic  postwar  years.  They  began  to  flock  under  its  ban- 
ner. 

ADVENT  OF  THE  “FUEHRER” 

In  the  summer  of  1921  the  rising  young  agitator  who  had 
shown  such  surprising  talents  not  only  as  an  orator  but 
as  an  organizer  and  a propagandist  took  over  the  undis- 
puted leadership  of  the  party.  In  doing  so,  he  gave  his 
fellow  workers  a first  taste  of  the  ruthlessness  and  tactical 
shrewdness  with  which  he  was  to  gain  so  much  success  in 
more  important  crises  later  on. 

Early  in  the  summer  Hitler  had  gone  to  Berlin  to  get  in 
touch  with  North  German  nationalist  elements  and  to 
speak  at  the  National  Club,  which  was  their  spiritual  head- 
quarters. He  wanted  to  assess  the  possibilities  of  carrying 
his  own  movement  beyond  the  Bavarian  borders  into  the 
rest  of  Germany.  Perhaps  he  could  make  some  useful  al- 
liances for  that  purpose.  While  he  was  away  the  of^er 
members  of  the  committee  of  the  Nazi  Party  decided  the 
moment  was  opportune  to  challenge  his  lead  rs'  ip.  He  had 
become  too  dictatorial  for  them.  They  proposed  some  al- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  73 

liances  themselves  with  similarly  minded  groups  in  South 
Germany,  especially  with  the  “German  Socialist  Party” 
which  a notorious  Jew-baiter,  Julius  Streicher,  a bitter 
enemy  and  a rival  of  Hitler,  was  building  up  in  Nurem- 
berg. The  committee  members  were  sure  that  if  these 
groups,  with  their  ambitious  leaders,  could  be  merged 
with  the  Nazis,  Hitler  would  be  reduced  in  size. 

Sensing  the  threat  to  his  position,  Hitler  hurried  back  to 
Munich  to  quell  the  intrigues  of  these  “foolish  lunatics,” 
as  he  called  them  in  Mein  Kampf.  He  offered  to  resign 
from  the  party.  This  was  more  than  the  party  could  afford, 
as  the  other  members  of  the  committee  quickly  realized. 
Hitler  was  not  only  their  most  powerful  speaker  but  their 
best  organizer  and  propagandist.  Moreover,  it  was  he 
who  was  now  bringing  in  most  of  the  organization’s 
funds — from  collections  at  the  mass  meetings  at  which 
he  spoke  and  from  other  sources  as  well,  including  the 
Army.  If  he  left,  the  budding  Nazi  Party  would  surely  go 
to  pieces.  The  committee  refused  to  accept  his  resigna- 
tion. Hitler,  reassured  of  the  strength  of  his  position,  now 
forced  a complete  capitulation  on  the  other  leaders.  He 
demanded  dictatorial  powers  for  himself  as  the  party’s 
sole  leader,  the  abolition  of  the  committee  itself  and  an 
end  to  intrigues  with  other  groups  such  as  Streicher’s. 

This  was  too  much  for  the  other  committee  members. 
Led  by  the  party’s  founder,  Anton  Drexler,  they  drew  up 
an  indictment  of  the  would-be  dictator  and  circulated  it  as 
a pamphlet.  It  was  the  most  drastic  accusation  Hitler  was 
ever  confronted  with  from  the  ranks  of  his  own  party — 
from  those,  that  is,  who  had  firsthand  knowledge  of  his 
character  and  how  he  operated. 

A lust  for  power  and  personal  ambition  have  caused  Herr 
Adolf  Hitler  to  return  to  his  post  after  his  six  weeks’  stay 
in  Berlin,  of  which  the  purpose  has  not  yet  been  disclosed. 
He  regards  the  time  as  ripe  for  bringing  disunion  and 
schism  into  our  ranks  by  means  of  shadowy  people  behind 
him,  and  thus  to  further  the  interests  of  the  Jews  and  their 
friends.  It  grows  more  and  more  clear  that  his  purpose  is 
simply  to  use  the  National  Socialist  party  as  a springboard 
for  his  own  immoral  purposes,  and  to  seize  the  leadership 
in  order  to  force  the  Party  onto  a different  track  at  the 
psychological  moment.  This  is  most  clearly  shown  by  an 
ultimatum  which  he  sent  to  the  Party  leaders  a few  days 


74 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ago,  in  which  he  demands,  among  other  things,  that  he  shall 
have  a sole  and  absolute  dictatorship  of  the  Party,  and  that 
the  Committee,  including  the  locksmith  Anton  Drexler,  the 
founder  and  leader  of  the  Party,  should  retire.  . . . 

And  how  does  he  carry  on  his  campaign?  Like  a Jew. 
He  twists  every  fact  . . . National  Socialists!  Make  up  your 
minds  about  such  characters!  Make  no  mistake.  Hitler  is  a 
demagogue  . . . He  believes  himself  capable  ...  of  filling 
you  up  with  all  kinds  of  tales  that  are  anything  but  the 
truth.21 

Although  weakened  by  a silly  anti-Semitism  (Hitler 
acting  like  a Jew!),  the  charges  were  substantially  true,  but 
publicizing  them  did  not  get  the  rebels  as  far  as  might 
be  supposed.  Hitler  promptly  brought  a libel  suit  against 
the  authors  of  the  pamphlet,  and  Drexler  himself,  at  a 
public  meeting,  was  forced  to  repudiate  it.  In  two  special 
meetings  of  the  party  Hitler  dictated  his  peace  terms.  The 
statutes  were  changed  to  abolish  the  committee  and  give 
him  dictatorial  powers  as  president.  The  humiliated 
Drexler  was  booted  upstairs  as  honorary  president,  and  he 
soon  passed  out  of  the  picture.*  As  Heiden  says,  it  was 
the  victory  of  the  Cavaliers  over  the  Roundheads  of  the 
party.  But  it  was  more  than  that.  Then  and  there,  in 
July  1921,  was  established  the  “leadership  principle”  which 
was  to  be  the  law  first  of  the  Nazi  Party  and  then  of  the 
Third  Reich.  The  “Fuehrer”  had  arrived  on  the  German 
scene. 

The  “leader”  now  set  to  work  to  reorganize  the  party. 
The  gloomy  tap-room  in  the  back  of  the  Sterneckerbrau, 
which  to  Hitler  was  more  of  “a  funeral  vault  than  an 
office,”  was  given  up  and  new  offices  in  another  tavern 
in  the  Comeliusstrasse  occupied.  These  were  lighter  and 
roomier.  An  old  Adler  typewriter  was  purchased  on  the 
installment  plan,  and  a safe,  filing  cabinets,  furniture,  a 
telephone  and  a full-time  paid  secretary  were  gradually 
acquired. 

Money  was  beginning  to  come  in.  Nearly  a year  be- 
fore, in  December  of  1920,  the  party  had  acquired  a run- 
down newspaper  badly  in  debt,  the  Voelkischer  Beo- 
bachter,  an  anti-Semitic  gossip  sheet  which  appeared  twice 

* He  left  the  party  in  1923  but  served  as  Vice-President  of  the  Bavarian 
Diet  from  1924  to  1928.  In  1930  he  became  reconciled  with  Hitler,  but 
he  never  returned  to  active  poiitics.  The  fate  of  all  discoverers,  as 
Heiden  observed,  overtook  Drexler. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


75 


a week.  Exactly  where  the  sixty  thousand  marks  for  its 
purchase  came  from  was  a secret  which  Hitler  kept  well, 
but  it  is  known  that  Eckart  and  Roehm  persuaded  Major 
General  Ritter  von  Epp,  Roehm’s  commanding  officer  in 
the  Reichswehr  and  himself  a member  of  the  party,  to 
raise  the  sum.  Most  likely  it  came  from  Army  secret 
funds.  At  the  beginning  of  1923  the  Voelkischer  Beo- 
bachter  became  a daily,  thus  giving  Hitler  the  prerequisite 
of  all  German  political  parties,  a daily  newspaper  in  which 
to  preach  the  party’s  gospels.  Running  a daily  political 
journal  required  additional  money,  and  this  now  came 
from  what  must  have  seemed  to  some  of  the  more  prole- 
tarian roughnecks  of  the  party  like  strange  sources.  Frau 
Helene  Bechstein,  wife  of  the  wealthy  piano  manufacturer, 
was  one.  From  their  first  meeting  she  took  a liking  to  the 
young  firebrand,  inviting  him  to  stay  at  the  Bechstein 
home  when  he  was  in  Berlin,  arranging  parties  in  which 
he  could  meet  the  affluent,  and  donating  sizable  sums  to 
the  movement.  Part  of  the  money  to  finance  the  new  daily 
came  from  a Frau  Gertrud  von  Seidlitz,  a Balt,  who 
owned  a stock  in  some  prosperous  Finnish  paper  mills. 

In  March  1923,  a Harvard  graduate,  Ernst  (Putzi)  Hanf- 
staengl,  whose  mother  was  American  and  whose  cultivated 
and  wealthy  family  owned  an  art-publishing  business  in 
Munich,  loaned  the  party  one  thousand  dollars  against  a 
mortgage  on  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter*  This  was  a 

* In  his  memoirs,  Unheard  Witness,  Hanfstaengl  says  that  he  was  first 
steered  to  Hitler  by  an  American.  This  was  Captain  Truman  Smith, 
then  an  assistant  military  attache  at  the  American  Embassy  in  Berlin. 
In  November  1922  Smith  was  sent  by  the  embassy  to  Munich  to  check 
on  an  obscure  political  agitator  by  the  name  of  Adolf  Hitler  and  his 
newly  founded  National  Socialist  Labor  Party.  For  a young  professional 
American  Army  office:.  Captain  Smith  had  a remarkable  bent  for  politi- 
cal analysis.  In  one  week  in  Munich,  November  15-22,  he  managed  to 
see  Ludendorff,  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  and  a dozen  political  leaders 
in  Bavaria,  most  of  whom  told  him  that  Hitler  was  a rising  star 
and  his  movement  a rapidly  growing  political  force.  Smith  lost  no 
time  in  attending  an  outdoor  Nazi  rally  at  which  Hitler  spoke.  “Never 
saw  such  a sight  in  my  life  I"  he  scribbled  in  his  diary  immediately 
afterward.  “Met  Hitler,”  . he  wrote,  “and  he  promises  to  talk  to  me 
Monday  and  explain  his  aims.”  On  the  Monday,  Smith  made  his  way 
to  Hitler’s  residence — “a  little  bare  bedroom  on  the  second  floor  of  a 
run-down  house,”  as  he  described  it — and  had  a long  talk  with  the 
future  dictator,  who  was  scarcely  known  outside  Munich.  “A  marvelous 
demagogue’”  the  assistant  U.S.  military  attache  began  his  -diary  that 
evening.  “Have  rarely  listened  to  such  a logical  and  fanatical  man.” 
The  date  was  November  22,  1922. 

Just  before  leaving  for  Berlin  that  evening  Smith  saw  Hanfstaengl, 
told  him  of  his  meeting  with  Hitler  and  advised  him  to  take  a look 
at  the  man.  The  Nazi  leader  was  to  address  a rallv  that  evening  and 
Captain  Smith  turned  over  his  press  ticket  to  Hanfstaengl.  The  latter. 


76 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


fabulous  sum  in  marks  in  those  inflationary  days  and  was 
of  immense  help  to  the  party  and  its  newspaper.  But  the 
friendship  of  the  Hanfstaengls  extended  beyond  monetary 
help.  It  was  one  of  the  first  respectable  families  of  means 
in  Munich  to  open  its  doors  to  the  brawling  young  politi- 
cian. Putzi  became  a good  friend  of  Hitler,  who  eventual- 
ly made  him  chief  of  the  Foreign  Press  Department  of  the 
party.  An  eccentric,  gangling  man,  whose  sardonic  wit 
somewhat  compensated  for  his  shallow  mind,  Hanfstaengl 
was  a virtuoso  at  the  piano  and  on  many  an  evening,  even 
after  his  friend  came  to  power  in  Berlin,  he  would  excuse 
himself  from  the  company  of  those  of  us  who  might  be 
with  him  to  answer  a hasty  summons  from  the  Fuehrer.  It 
was  said  that  his  piano-playing- — he  pounded  the  instru- 
ment furiously — and  his  clowning  soothed  Hitler  and 
even  cheered  him  up  after  a tiring  day.  Later  this  strange 
but  genial  Harvard  man,  like  some  other  early  cronies  of 
Hitler,  would  have  to  flee  the  country  for  his  life.* 

Most  of  the  men  who  were  to  become  Hitler’s  closest 
subordinates  were  now  in  the  party  or  would  shortly 
enter  it.  Rudolf  Hess  joined  in  1920.  Son  of  a German 
wholesale  merchant  domiciled  in  Egypt,  Hess  had  spent 
the  first  fourteen  years  of  his  life  in  that  country  and  had 
then  come  to  the  Rhineland  for  his  education.  During  the 

like  so  many  others,  was  overwhelmed  by  Hitler’s  oratory,  sought  him 
out  after  the  meeting  and  quickly  became  a convert  to  Nazism. 

Back  in  Berlin,  which  at  that  time  took  little  notice  of  Hitler,  Captain 
Smith  wrote  a lengthy  report  which  the  embassy  dispatched  to  Wash- 
ington on  November  25,  1922.  Considering  when  it  was  written, 

it  is  a remarkable  document. 

The  most  active  political  force  in  Bavaria  at  the  present  time  [Smith 
wrote]  is  the  National  Socialist  Labor  Party.  Less  a political  party 
than  a popular  movement,  it  must  be  considered  as  the  Bavarian  count- 
erpart to  the  Italian  fascisti  ...  It  has  recently  acquired  a political 
influence  quite  disproportionate  to  its  actual  numerical  strength.  . . . 

Adolf  Hitler  from  the  very  first  has  been  the  dominating  force  in 
the  movement,  and  the  personality  of  this  man  has  undoubtedly  been 
one  of  the  most  important  factors  contributing  to  its  success  . . . His 
ability  to  influence  a popular  assembly  is  uncanny.  In  private  con- 
versation he  disclosed  himself  as  a forceful  and  logical  speaker,  which, 
when  tempered  with  a fanatical  earnestness,  made  a very  deep  im- 
pression on  a neutral  listener. 

Colonel  Smith,  who  later  served  as  American  military  attach^  in  Berlin 
during  the  early  years  of  the  Nazi  regime,  kindly  placed  his  diary  and 
notes  of  his  trip  to  Munich  at  the  disposal  of  this  writer.  They  have 
been  invaluable  in  the  preparation  of  this  chapter. 

* Hanfstaengl  spent  part  of  World  War  II  in  Washington,  ostensibly  as 
an  interned  enemy  alien  but  actually  as  an  “adviser”  to  the  United 
States  government  on  Nazi  Germany.  This  final  role  of  his  life,  which 
seemed  so  ludicrous  to  Americans  who  knew  him  and  Nazi  Germany, 
must  have  amused  him. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  77 

war  he  served  for  a time  in  the  List  Regiment  with  Hitler 
— though  they  did  not  become  acquainted  then — and  after 
being  twice  wounded  became  a flyer.  He  enrolled  in  the 
University  of  Munich  after  the  war  as  a student  of  econo- 
mics but  seems  to  have  spent  much  of  his  time  distributing 
anti-Semitic  pamphlets  and  fighting  with  the  various  armed 
bands  then  at  loose  in  Bavaria.  He  was  in  the  thick  of 
the  firing  when  the  soviet  regime  in  Munich  was  over- 
thrown on  May  1,  1919,  and  was  wounded  in  the  leg.  One 
evening  a year  later  he  went  to  hear  Hitler  speak,  was 
carried  away  by  his  eloquence  and  joined  the  party,  and 
soon  he  became  a close  friend,  a devoted  follower  and 
secretary  of  the  leader.  It  was  he  who  introduced  Hitler 
to  the  geopolitical  ideas  of  General  Karl  Haushofer,  then 
a professor  of  geopolitics  at  the  university. 

Hess  had  stirred  Hitler  with  a prize-winning  essay 
which  he  wrote  for  a thesis,  entitled  “How  Must  the  Man 
Be  Constituted  Who  Wifi  Lead  Germany  Back  to  Her 
Old  Heights?” 

Where  all  authority  has  vanished,  only  a man  of  the  peo- 
pie  can  establish  authority  . . . The  deeper  the  dictator 
was  originally  rooted  in  the  broad  masses,  the  better  he  un- 
derstands how  to  treat  them  psychologically,  the  less  the 
workers  will  distrust  him,  the  more  supporters  he  will  win 
among  these  most  energetic  ranks  of  the  people.  He  himself 
has  nothing  in  common  with  the  mass;  like  every  great 
man  he  is  all  personality  . . . When  necessity  commands  he 
does  not  shrink  before  bloodshed.  Great  questions  are  always 
decided  by  blood  and  iron  ...  In  order  to  reach  his  goal,  he 
is  prepared  to  trample  on  his  closest  friends  . . . The  law- 
giver proceeds  with  terrible  hardness  ...  As  the  need  arises, 
he  can  trample  them  [the  people]  with  the  boots  of  a 
grenadier  . . .22 

No  wonder  Hitler  took  to  the  young  man.  This  was  a 
portrait  perhaps  not  of  the  leader  as  he  was  at  the  mo- 
ment but  of  the  leader  he  wanted  to  become — and  did. 
For  all  his  solemnity  and  studiousness,  Hess  remained  a 
man  of  limited  intelligence,  always  receptive  to  crackpot 
ideas,  which  he  could  adopt  with  great  fanaticism.  Until 
nearly  the  end,  he  would  be  one  of  Hitler’s  most  loyal  and 
trusted  followers  and  one  of  the  few  who  was  not  bitten 
by  consuming  personal  ambition. 

Alfred  Rosenberg,  although  he  was  often  hailed  as  the 


78  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“intellectual  leader”  of  the  Nazi  Party  and  indeed  its 
“philosopher,”  was  also  a man  of  mediocre  intelligence. 
Rosenberg  may  with  some  truth  be  put  down  as  a Russian. 
Like  a good  many  Russian  “intellectuals,”  he  was  of  Baltic 
German  stock.  The  son  of  a shoemaker,  he  was  born  Jan- 
uary 12,  1893,  at  Reval  (now  Tallinn)  in  Estonia,  which 
had  been  a part  of  the  Czarist  Empire  since  1721. 
He  chose  to  study  not  in  Germany  but  in  Russia  and  re- 
ceived a diploma  in  architecture  from  the  University  of 
Moscow  in  1917.  He  lived  in  Moscow  through  the  days  of 
the  Bolshevik  revolution  and  it  may  be  that,  as  some  of 
his  enemies  in  the  Nazi  Party  later  said,  he  flirted  with  the 
idea  of  becoming  a young  Bolshevik  revolutionary.  In  Feb- 
ruary 1918,  however,  he  returned  to  Reval,  volunteered 
for  service  in  the  German  Army  when  it  reached  the 
city,  was  turned  down  as  a “Russian”  and  finally,  at  the 
end  of  1918,  made  his  way  to  Munich,  where  he  first  be- 
came active  in  White  Russian  emigre  circles. 

Rosenberg  then  met  Dietrich  Eckart  and  through  him 
Hitler,  and  joined  the  party  at  the  end  of  1919.  It  was 
inevitable  that  a man  who  had  actually  received  a diploma 
in  architecture  would  impress  the  man  who  had  failed 
even  to  get  into  a school  of  architecture.  Hitler  was  also 
impressed  by  Rosenberg’s  “learning,”  and  he  liked  the 
young  Balt’s  hatred  of  the  Jews  and  the  Bolsheviks. 
Shortly  before  Eckart  died,  toward  the  end  of  1923, 
Hitler  made  Rosenberg  editor  of  the  Voelkischer  Beo- 
bachter,  and  for  many  years  he  continued  to  prop  up  this 
utterly  muddled  man,  this  confused  and  shallow  “philoso- 
pher,” as  the  intellectual  mentor  of  the  Nazi  movement 
and  as  one  of  its  chief  authorities  on  foreign  policy. 

Like  Rudolf  Hess,  Hermann  Goering  had  also  come  to 
Munich  some  time  after  the  war  ostensibly  to  study  eco- 
nomics at  the  university,  and  he  too  had  come  under  the 
personal  spell  of  Adolf  Hitler.  One  of  the  nation’s  great 
war  heroes,  the  last  commander  of  the  famed  Richt- 
hofen Fighter  Squadron,  holder  of  the  Pour  le  Merite, 
the  highest  war  decoration  in  Germany,  he  found  it  even 
more  difficult  than  most  war  veterans  to  return  to  the  hum- 
drum existence  of  peacetime  civilian  life.  He  became  a 
transport  pilot  in  Denmark  for  a time  and  later  in  Sweden. 
One  day  he  flew  Count  Eric  von  Rosen  to  the  latter’s 
estate  some  distance  from  Stockholm  and  while  stopping 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


79 

over  as  a guest  fell  in  love  with  Countess  Rosen’s  sister, 
Carin  von  Kantzow,  nee  Baroness  Fock,  one  of  Sweden’s 
beauties.  Some  difficulties  arose.  Carin  von  Kantzow  was 
epileptic  and  was  married  and  the  mother  of  an  eight- 
year-old  son.  But  she  was  able  to  have  the  marriage  dis- 
solved and  marry  the  gallant  young  flyer.  Possessed  of 
considerable  means,  she  went  with  her  new  husband  to 
Munich,  where  they  lived  in  some  splendor  and  he  dabbled 
in  studies  at  the  university. 

But  not  for  long.  He  met  Hitler  in  1921,  joined  the 
party,  contributed  generously  to  its  treasury  (and  to  Hitler 
personally),  threw  his  restless  energy  into  helping  organize 
the  storm  troopers  and  a year  later,  in  1922,  was  made 
commander  of  the  S.A. 

A swarm  of  lesser-known  and,  for  the  most  part,  more 
unsavory  individuals  joined  the  circle  around  the  party 
dictator.  Max  Amann,  Hitler’s  first  sergeant  in  the  List 
Regiment,  a tough,  uncouth  character  but  an  able 
organizer,  was  named  business  manager  of  the  party  and 
the  Voelkischer  Boebachter  and  quickly  brought  order  into 
the  finances  of  both.  As  his  personal  bodyguard  Hitler 
chose  Ulrich  Graf,  an  amateur  wrestler,  a butcher’s  ap- 
prentice and  a renowned  brawler.  As  his  “court  photog- 
rapher, the  only  man  who  for  years  was  permitted  to 
photograph  him,  Hitler  had  the  lame  Heinrich  Hoffmann, 
whose  loyalty  was  doglike  and  profitable,  making  him  in 
the  end  a millionaire.  Another  favorite  brawler  was 
Christian  Weber,  a horse  dealer,  a former  bouncer  in  a 
Munich  dive  and  a lusty  beer  drinker.  Close  to  Hitler  in 
these  days  was  Hermann  Esser,  whose  oratory  rivaled 
the  leader’s  and  whose  Jew-baiting  articles  in  the  Voel- 
kischer Beobachter  were  a leading  feature  of  the  party 
newspaper.  He  made  no  secret  that  for  a time  he  lived 
well  off  the  generosity  of  some  of  his  mistresses.  A no- 
torious blackmailer,  resorting  to  threats  to  “expose”  even 
his  own  party  comrades  who  crossed  him,  Esser  became 
so  repulsive  to  some  of  the  older  and  more  decent  men 
in  the  movement  that  they  demanded  his  expulsion.  “I 
know  Esser  is  a scoundrel,”  Hitler  retorted  in  public,  “but 
I shall  hold  on  to  him  as  long  as  he  can  be  of  use  to 
me.  -’  This  was  to  be  his  attitude  toward  almost  all  of 

his  close  collaborators,  no  matter  how  murky  their  past 

or  indeed  their  present.  Murderers,  pimps,  homosexual 


80 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

perverts,  drug  addicts  or  just  plain  rowdies  were  all  the 
same  to  him  if  they  served  his  purposes. 

He  stood  Julius  Streicher,  for  example,  almost  to  the  end. 
This  depraved  sadist,  who  started  life  as  an  elementary- 
school  teacher,  was  one  of  the  most  disreputable  men 
around  Hitler  from  1922  until  1939,  when  his  star  finally 
faded.  A famous  fornicator,  as  he  boasted,  who  black- 
mailed even  the  husbands  of  women  who  were  his  mis- 
tresses, he  made  his  fame  and  fortune  as  a blindly  fanati- 
cal anti-Semite.  His  notorious  weekly,  Der  Stuermer, 
thrived  on  lurid  tales  of  Jewish  sexual  crimes  and  Jewish 
“ritual  murders”;  its  obscenity  was  nauseating,  even  to 
many  Nazis.  Streicher  was  also  a noted  pornographist. 
He  became  known  as  the  “uncrowned  King  of  Franconia” 
with  the  center  of  his  power  in  Nuremberg,  where  his 
word  was  law  and  where  no  one  who  crossed  him  or 
displeased  him  was  safe  from  prison  and  torture.  Until  I 
faced  him  slumped  in  the  dock  at  Nuremberg,  on  trial  for 
his  life  as  a war  criminal,  I never  saw  him  without  a whip 
in  his  hand  or  in  his  belt,  and  he  laughingly  boasted  of  the 
countless  lashings  he  had  meted  out. 

Such  were  the  men  whom  Hitler  gathered  around  him 
in  the  early  years  for  his  drive  to  become  dictator  of  a 
nation  which  had  given  the  world  a Luther,  a Kant,  a 
Goethe  and  a Schiller,  a Bach,  a Beethoven  and  a Brahms. 

On  April  1,  1920,  the  day  the  German  Workers’  Party 
became  the  National  Socialist  German  Workers’  Party — 
from  which  the  abbreviated  name  “Nazi”  emerged — Hitler 
left  the  Army  for  good.  Henceforth  he  would  devote  all 
of  his  time  to  the  Nazi  Party,  from  which  neither  then 
nor  later  did  he  accept  any  salary. 

How,  then,  it  might  be  asked,  did  Hitler  live?  His  fellow 
party  workers  themselves  sometimes  wondered.  In  the 
indictment  which  the  rebel  members  of  the  party  com- 
mittee drew  up  in  July  1921,  the  question  was  bluntly 
posed:  “If  any  member  asks  him  how  he  lives  and  what 
was  his  former  profession,  he  always  becomes  angry 
and  excited.  Up  to  now  no  answer  has  been  supplied  to 
these  questions.  So  his  conscience  cannot  be  clean,  espe- 
cially as  his  excessive  intercourse  with  ladies,  to  whom 
he  often  describes  himself  as  ‘King  of  Munich,’  costs 
a great  deal  of  money.” 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


81 


Hitler  answered  the  question  during  the  subsequent  libel 
action  which  he  brought  against  the  authors  of  the  pam- 
phlet. To  the  question  of  the  court  as  to  exactly  how  he 
lived,  he  replied,  “If  I speak  for  the  National  Socialist 
Party  I take  no  money  for  myself.  But  I also  speak  for 
other  organizations  . . . and  then  of  course  I accept  a fee. 
I also  have  my  midday  meal  with  various  party  comrades 
in  turn.  I am  further  assisted  to  a modest  extent  by  a 
few  party  comrades.”  24 

Probably  this  was  very  close  to  the  truth.  Such 
well-heeled  friends  as  Dietrich  Eckart,  Goering  and 
Hanfstaengl  undoubtedly  “lent”  him  money  to  pay  his 
rent,  purchase  clothes  and  buy  a meal.  His  wants  were 
certainly  modest.  Until  1929  he  occupied  a two-room 
flat  in  a lower-middle-class  district  in  the  Thierschstrasse 
near  the  River  Isar.  In  the  winter  he  wore  an  old  trench 
coat — it  later  became  familiar  to  everyone  in  Germany 
from  numerous  photographs.  In  the  summer  he  often 
appeared  in  shorts,  the  Lederhosen  which  most  Bavarians 
donned  in  seasonable  weather.  In  1923  Eckart  and  Esser 
stumbled  upon  the  Platterhof,  an  inn  near  Berchtesgaden, 
as  a summer  retreat  for  Hitler  and  his  friends.  Hitler 
fell  in  love  with  the  lovely  mountain  country;  it  was 
here  that  he  later  built  the  spacious  villa,  Berghof,  which 
would  be  his  home  and  where  he  would  spend  much  of 
his  time  until  the  war  years. 

There  was,  however,  little  time  for  rest  and  recreation 
in  the  stormy  years  between  1921  and  1923.  There  was 
a party  to  build  and  to  keep  control  of  in  the  face  of 
jealous  rivals  as  unscrupulous  as  himself.  The  N.S.D.A.P. 
was  but  one  of  several  right-wing  movements  in  Bavaria 
struggling  for  public  attention  and  support,  and  beyond, 
in  the  rest  of  Germany,  there  were  many  others. 

There  was  a dizzy  succession  of  events  and  of  con- 
stantly changing  situations  for  a politician  to  watch,  to 
evaluate  and  to  take  advantage  of.  In  April  1921  the 
Allies  had  presented  Germany  the  bill  for  reparations, 
a whopping  132  billion  gold  marks — 33  billion  dollars — 
which  the  Germans  howled  they  could  not  possibly  pay. 
The  mark,  normally  valued  at  four  to  the  dollar,  had 
begun  to  fall;  by  the  summer  of  1921  it  had  dropped  to 
seventy-five,  a year  later  to  four  hundred,  to  the  dollar. 
Erzberger  had  been  murdered  in  August  1921.  In  June 


82 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1922,  there  was  an  attempt  to  assassinate  Philipp  Scheide- 
mann,  the  Socialist  who  had  proclaimed  the  Republic.  The 
same  month,  June  24,  Foreign  Minister  Rathenau  was  shot 
dead  in  the  street.  In  all  three  cases  the  assassins  had 
been  men  of  the  extreme  Right.  The  shaky  national  govern- 
ment in  Berlin  finally  answered  the  challenge  with  a special 
Law  for  the  Protection  of  the  Republic,  which  imposed 
severe  penalties  for  political  terrorism.  Berlin  demanded 
the  dissolution  of  the  innumerable  armed  leagues  and 
the  end  of  political  gangsterism.  The  Bavarian  government, 
even  under  the  moderate  Count  Lerchenfeld,  who  had 
replaced  the  extremist  Kahr  in  1921,  was  finding  it  difficult 
to  go  along  with  the  national  regime  in  Berlin.  When  it 
attempted  to  enforce  the  law  against  terrorism,  the  Ba- 
varian Rightists,  of  whom  Hitler  was  now  one  of  the 
acknowledged  young  leaders,  organized  a conspiracy 
to  overthrow  Lerchenfeld  and  march  on  Berlin  to  bring 
down  the  Republic. 

The  fledgling  democratic  Weimar  Republic  was  in 
deep  trouble,  its  very  existence  constantly  threatened  not 
only  from  the  extreme  Right  but  from  the  extreme  Left. 


3 


VERSAILLES,  WEIMAR 
AND  THE  REER  HALL  PUTSCH 


to  most  men  in  the  victorious  Allied  lands  of  the  West,  the 
proclamation  of  the  Republic  in  Berlin  on  November  9, 
1918,  had  appeared  to  mark  the  dawn  of  a new  day  for 
the  German  people  and  their  nation.  Woodrow  Wilson,  in 
the  exchange  of  notes  which  led  to  the  armistice,  had 
pressed  for  the  abolition  of  the  Hohenzollem  militarist 
autocracy,  and  the  Germans  had  seemingly  obliged  him, 
although  reluctantly.  The  Kaiser  had  been  forced  to  ab- 
dicate and  to  flee;  the  monarchy  was  dissolved,  all  the 
dynasties  in  Germany  were  quickly  done  away  with, 
and  republican  government  was  proclaimed. 

But  proclaimed  by  accident!  On  the  afternoon  of  Novem- 
ber 9,  the  so-called  Majority  Social  Democrats  under  the 
leadership  of  Friedrich  Ebert  and  Phillipp  Scheidemann 
met  in  the  Reichstag  in  Berlin  following  the  resignation 
of  the  Chancellor,  Prince  Max  of  Baden.  They  were  sorely 
puzzled  as  to  what  to  do.  Prince  Max  had  just  announced 
the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser.  Ebert,  a saddler  by  trade, 
thought  that  one  of  Wilhelm’s  sons — anyone  except  the 
dissolute  Crown  Prince— might  suceed  him,  for  he  fa- 
vored a constitutional  monarchy  on  the  British  pattern. 
Ebert,  though  he  led  the  Socialists,  abhorred  social  revolu- 
tion. “I  hate  it  like  sin,”  he  had  once  declared. 

But  revolution  was  in  the  air  in  Berlin.  The  capital  was 
paralyzed  by  a general  strike.  Down  the  broad  Unter  den 
Linden,  a few  blocks  from  the  Reichstag,  the  Spartacists, 
led  by  the  Left  Socialists  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Karl 
Liebknecht,  were  preparing  from  their  citadel  in  the 
Kaiser’s  palace  to  proclaim  a soviet  republic.  When  word 
of  this  reached  the  Socialists  in  the  Reichstag  they  were 

83 


84  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

consternated.  Something  had  to  be  done  at  once  to  fore- 
stall the  Spartacists.  Scheidemann  thought  of  something. 
Without  consulting  his  comrades  he  dashed  to  the  window 
overlooking  the  Koenigsplatz,  where  a great  throng  had 
gathered,  stuck  his  head  out  and  on  his  own,  as  if  the  idea 
had  just  popped  into  his  head,  proclaimed  the  Republic! 
The  saddle  maker  Ebert  was  furious.  He  had  hoped,  some- 
how, to  save  the  Hohenzollern  monarchy. 

Thus  was  the  German  Republic  born,  as  if  by  a fluke.  If 
the  Socialists  themselves  were  not  staunch  republicans  it 
could  hardly  be  expected  that  the  conservatives  would 
be.  But  the  latter  had  abdicated  their  responsibility. 
They  and  the  Army  leaders,  Ludendorff  and  Hindenburg, 
had  pushed  political  power  into  the  hands  of  the  reluctant 
Social  Democrats.  In  doing  so  they  managed  also  to  place 
on  the  shoulders  of  these  democratic  working-class  leaders 
apparent  responsibility  for  signing  the  surrender  and  ulti- 
mately the  peace  treaty,  thus  laying  on  them  the  blame 
for  Germany’s  defeat  and  for  whatever  suffering  a lost 
war  and  a dictated  peace  might  bring  upon  the  German 
people.  This  was  a shabby  trick,  one  which  the  merest 
child  would  be  expected  to  see  through,  but  in  Germany 
it  worked.  It  doomed  the  Republic  from  the  start. 

Perhaps  it  need  not  have.  In  November  1918  the  Social 
Democrats,  holding  absolute  power,  might  have  quickly 
laid  the  foundation  for  a lasting  democratic  Republic.  But 
to  have  done  so  they  would  have  had  to  suppress  perma- 
nently, or  at  least  curb  permanently,  the  forces  which  had 
propped  up  the  Hohenzollern  Empire  and  which  would 
not  loyally  accept  a democratic  Germany:  the  feudal 
Junker  landlords  and  other  upper  castes,  the  magnates  who 
ruled  over  the  great  industrial  cartels,  the  roving  condot- 
tieri  of  the  free  corps,  the  ranking  officials  of  the  imperial 
civil  service  and,  above  all,  the  military  caste  and  the 
members  of  the  General  Staff.  They  would  have  had  to 
break  up  many  of  the  great  estates,  which  were  wasteful 
and  uneconomic,  and  the  industrial  monopolies  and  car- 
tels, and  clean  out  the  bureaucracy,  the  judiciary,  the 
police,  the  universities  and  the  Army  of  all  who  would 
not  loyally  and  honestly  serve  the  new  democratic  regime. 

This  the  Social  Democrats,  who  were  mostly  well-mean- 
ing trade-unionists  with  the  same  habit  of  bowing  to 
old,  established  authority  which  was  ingrained  in  Germans 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  85 

of  other  classes,  could  not  bring  themselves  to  do.  In- 
stead they  began  by  abdicating  their  authority  to  the  force 
which  had  always  been  dominant  in  modern  Germany,  the 
Army.  For  though  it  had  been  defeated  on  the  battlefield 
the  Army  still  had  hopes  of  maintaining  itself  at  home  and 
of  defeating  the  revolution.  To  achieve  these  ends  it 
moved  swiftly  and  boldly. 

On  the  night  of  November  9,  1918,  a few  hours  after 
the  Republic  had  been  “proclaimed,”  a telephone  rang  in 
the  study  of  Ebert  in  the  Reich  Chancellery  in  Berlin.  It 
was  a very  special  telephone,  for  it  was  linked  with 
Supreme  Headquarters  at  Spa  by  a private  and  secret  line. 
Ebert  was  alone.  He  picked  up  the  telephone.  “Groener 
speaking,”  a voice  said.  The  former  saddle  maker,  still  be- 
wildered by  the  day’s  events  which  had  suddenly  thrust 
into  his  unwilling  hands  whatever  political  power  remained 
in  a crumbling  Germany,  was  impressed.  General  Wilhelm 
Groener  was  the  successor  of  Ludendorff  as  First  Quarter- 
master General.  Earlier  on  that  very  day  at  Spa  it  was  he 
who,  when  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg  faltered, 
had  bluntly  informed  the  Kaiser  that  he  no  longer  com- 
manded the  loyalty  of  his  troops  and  must  go — a brave 
act  for  which  the  military  caste  never  forgave  him.  Ebert 
and  Groener  had  developed  a bond  of  mutual  respect 
since  1916,  when  the  General,  then  in  charge  of  war  pro- 
duction, had  worked  closely  with  the  Socialist  leader. 
Early  in  November — a few  days  before — they  had  con- 
ferred in  Berlin  on  how  to  save  the  monarchy  and  the 
Fatherland. 

Now  at  the  Fatherland’s  lowest  moment  a secret  tele- 
phone line  brought  them  together.  Then  and  there  the 
Socialist  leader  and  the  second-in-command  of  the  Ger- 
man Army  made  a pact  which,  though  it  would  not  be 
publicly  known  for  many  years,  was  to  determine  the 
nation’s  fate.  Ebert  agreed  to  put  down  anarchy  and  Bol- 
shevism and  maintain  the  Army  in  all  its  tradition. 
Groener  thereupon  pledged  the  support  of  the  Army  in 
helping  the  new  government  establish  itself  and  carry  out 
its  aims. 

“Will  the  Field  Marshal  (Hindenburg)  retain  the  com- 
mand?” Ebert  asked. 

General  Groener  replied  that  he  would. 


86  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“Convey  to  the  Field  Marshal  the  thanks  of  the  govern- 
ment,” Ebert  replied.1 

The  German  Army  was  saved,  but  the  Republic,  on  the 
very  day  of  its  birth,  was  lost.  The  generals,  with  the  hon- 
orable exception  of  Groener  himself  and  but  few  others, 
would  never  serve  it  loyally.  In  the  end,  led  by  Hinden- 
burg,  they  betrayed  it  to  the  Nazis. 

At  the  moment,  to  be  sure,  the  specter  of  what  had 
just  happened  in  Russia  haunted  the  minds  of  Ebert 
and  his  fellow  Socialists.  They  did  not  want  to  become 
the  German  Kerenskys.  They  did  not  want  to  be  sup- 
planted by  the  Bolshevists.  Everywhere  in  Germany  the 
Soldiers’  and  Workers’  Councils  were  springing  up  and 
assuming  power,  as  they  had  done  in  Russia.  It  was  these 
groups  which  on  Nobember  10  elected  a Council  of 
People’s  Representatives,  with  Ebert  at  its  head,  to  govern 
Germany  for  the  time  being.  In  December  the  first  Soviet 
Congress  of  Germany  met  in  Berlin.  Composed  of  dele- 
gates from  the  Soldiers’  and  Workers’  Councils  throughout 
the  country,  it  demanded  the  dismissal  of  Hindenburg,  the 
abolition  of  the  Regular  Army  and  the  substitution  of  a 
civil  guard  whose  officers  would  be  elected  by  the  men  and 
which  would  be  under  the  supreme  authority  of  the 
Council. 

This  was  too  much  for  Hindenburg  and  Groener.  They 
declined  to  recognize  the  authority  of  the  Soviet  Congress. 
Ebert  himself  did  nothing  to  carry  out  its  demands.  But 
the  Army,  fighting  for  its  life,  demanded  more  positive 
action  from  the  government  it  had  agreed  to  support.  Two 
days  before  Christmas  the  People’s  Marine  Division,  now 
under  the  control  of  the  Communist  Spartacists,  occupied 
the  Wilhemstrasse,  broke  into  the  Chancellery  and  cut  its 
telephone  wires.  The  secret  line  to  Army  headquarters, 
however,  continued  to  function  and  over  it  Ebert  appealed 
for  help.  The  Army  promised  liberation  by  the  Potsdam 
garrison,  but  before  it  could  arrive  the  mutinous  sailors 
retired  to  their  quarters  in  the  stables  of  the  imperial 
palace,  which  the  Spartacists  still  held. 

The  Spartacists,  with  Karl  Liebknecht  and  Rosa  Luxem- 
burg, the  two  most  effective  agitators  in  Germany,  at  their 
head,  continued  to  push  for  a soviet  republic.  Their 
armed  power  in  Berlin  was  mounting.  On  Christmas  Eve 
the  Marine  Division  had  easily  repulsed  an  attempt  by 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


87 


regular  troops  from  Potsdam  to  dislodge  it  from  the 
imperial  stables.  Hindenburg  and  Groener  pressed  Ebert 
to  honor  the  pact  between  them  and  suppress  the  Bolshe- 
vists. This  the  Socialist  leader  was  only  too  glad  to  do. 
Two  days  after  Christmas  he  appointed  Gustav  Noske  as 
Minister  of  National  Defense,  and  from  this  appointment 
events  proceeded  with  a logic  which  all  who  knew  the 
new  Minister  might  have  expected. 

Noske  was  a master  butcher  by  trade  who  had  worked 
his  way  up  in  the  trade-union  movement  and  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  becoming  a member  of  the  Reichstag  in 
1906,  where  he  became  recognized  as  the  party’s  expert  on 
military  affairs.  He  also  became  recognized  as  a strong 
nationalist  and  as  a strong  man.  Prince  Max  of  Baden  had 
picked  him  to  put  down  the  naval  mutiny  at  Kiel  in  the 
first  days  of  November  and  he  had  put  it  down.  A stocky, 
square-jawed  man  of  great  physical  strength  and  energy, 
though  of  abbreviated  intelligence- — typical,  his  enemies 
said,  of  his  trade — Noske  announced  on  his  appointment 
as  Defense  Minister  that  “someone  must  be  the  blood- 
hound.” 

Early  in  January  1919  he  struck.  Between  January  10  and 
17 — “Bloody  Week,”  as  it  was  called  in  Berlin  for  a time — 
regular  and  free-corps  troops  under  the  direction  of 
Noske  and  the  command  of  General  von  Luettwitz  * 
crushed  the  Spartacists.  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Karl  Lieb- 
knecht  were  captured  and  murdered  by  officers  of  the 
Guard  Cavalry  Division. 


As  soon  as  the  fighting  in  Berlin  was  over,  elections 
were  held  throughout  Germany  for  the  National  Assembly, 
which  was  to  draw  up  the  new  constitution.  The  voting, 
which  took  place  on  January  19,  1919,  revealed  that  the 
middle  and  upper  classes  had  regained  some  of  their 
courage  in  the  little  more  than  two  months  which  had 


A year  later  General  Freiherr  Walther  von  Luettwitz,  a reactionary 
officer  of  the  old  school,  would  show  how  loyal  he  was  to  the  Republic 
m general  and  to  Noske  in  particular  when  he  led  free-corps  troops 
in  the  capture  of  Berlin  in  support  of  the  Kapp  putsch.  Ebert,  Noske 
and  the  other  members  of  the  government  were  forced  to  flee  at  five  in 
the  morning  of  March  13,  1920.  General  von  Seeckt,  Chief  of  Staff  of 
the  Army  and  nominally  subordinate  to  Noske,  the  Minister  of  Defense, 
had  refused  to  allow  the  Army  to  defend  the  Republic  against  Luettwitz 
and  Kapp  This  night  has  shown  the  bankruptcy  of  all  my  policy,” 
Noske  cried  out  My  faith  in  the  Officer  Corps  is  shattered.  You  have 
ivSverte<^  me*  (Quoted  by  Wheeler-Bennett  in  The  Nemesis  of  Power, 
p.  77.) 


88 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


elapsed  since  the  “revolution.”  The  Social  Democrats 
(the  Majority  and  Independent  Socialists),  who  had  gov- 
erned alpne  because  no  other  group  would  share  the 
burden,  received  13,800,000  votes  out  of  30,000,000  cast 
and  won  185  out  of  421  seats  in  the  Assembly,  but  this 
was  considerably  less  than  a majority.  Obviously  the  new 
Germany  was  not  going  to  be  built  by  the  working  class 
alone.  Two  middle-class  parties,  the  Center,  representing 
the  political  movement  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
and  the  Democratic  Party,  born  of  a fusion  in  December 
of  the  old  Progressive  Party  and  the  left  wing  of  the 
National  Liberals,  polled  11,500,000  votes  between  them 
and  obtained  166  seats  in  the  Assembly.  Both  parties 
professed  support  for  a moderate,  democratic  Republic, 
though  there  was  considerable  sentiment  for  an  eventual 
restoration  of  the  monarchy. 

The  Conservatives,  some  of  whose  leaders  had  gone 
into  hiding  in  November  and  others  who,  like  Count  von 
Westarp,  had  appealed  to  Ebert  for  protection,  showed 
that  though  reduced  in  numbers  they  were  far  from  ex- 
tinguished. Rechristened  the  German  National  People’s 
Party,  they  polled  over  three  million  votes  and  elected  44 
deputies;  their  right-wing  allies,  the  National  Liberals,  who 
had  changed  their  name  to  the  German  People’s  Party, 
received  nearly  a million  and  a hajf  votes  and  won  19 
seats.  Though  decidedly  in  the  minority,  the  two  con- 
servative parties  had  won  enough  seats  in  the  Assembly 
to  be  vocal.  Indeed,  no  sooner  had  the  Assembly  met  in 
Weimar  on  February  6,  1919,  than  the  leaders  of  these 
two  groups  sprang  up  to  defend  the  name  of  Kaiser  Wil- 
helm II  and  the  way  he  and  his  generals  had  conducted 
the  war.  Gustav  Stresemann,  the  head  of  the  People’s 
Party,  had  not  yet  experienced  what  later  seemed  to  many 
to  be  a change  of  heart  and  mind.  In  1919  he  was  still 
known  as  the  man  who  had  been  the  Supreme  Command’s 
mouthpiece  in  the  Reichstag — “Ludendorff’s  young  man,” 
as  he  was  called — a violent  supporter  of  the  policy  of 
annexation,  a fanatic  for  unrestricted  submarine  warfare. 

The  constitution  which  emerged  from  the  Assembly 
after  six  months  of  debate — it  was  passed  on  July  31,  1919, 
and  ratified  by  the  President  on  August  31 — was,  on 
paper,  the  most  liberal  and  democratic  document  of  its 
kind  the  twentieth  century  had  seen,  mechanically  well- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


89 


nigh  perfect,  full  of  ingenious  and  admirable  devices 
which  seemed  to  guarantee  the  working  of  an  almost  flaw- 
less democracy.  The  idea  of  cabinet  government  was 
borrowed  from  England  and  France,  of  a strong  popular 
President  from  the  United  States,  of  the  referendum  from 
Switzerland.  An  elaborate  and  complicated  system  of  pro- 
portional representation  and  voting  by  lists  was  established 
in  order  to  prevent  the  wasting  of  votes  and  give  small 
minorities  a right  to  be  represented  in  Parliament.* 

The  wording  of  the  Weimar  Constitution  was  sweet 
and  eloquent  to  the  ear  of  any  democratically  minded 
man.  The  people  were  declared  sovereign:  “Political 
power  emanates  from  the  people.”  Men  and  women  were 
given  the  vote  at  the  age  of  twenty.  “All  Germans  are 
equal  before  the  law  . . . Personal  liberty  is  inviolable  . . . 
Every  German  has  a right  ...  to  express  his  opinion 
freely  . . . All  Germans  have  the  right  to  form  associa- 
tions or  societies  . . . All  inhabitants  of  the  Reich  enjoy 
complete  liberty  of  belief  and  conscience  . . .”  No  man  in 
the  world  would  be  more  free  than  a German,  no  gov- 
ernment more  democratic  and  liberal  than  his.  On  paper, 
at  least. 

THE  SHADOW  OF  VERSAILLES 

Before  the  drafting  of  the  Weimar  Constitution  was 
finished  an  inevitable  event  occurred  which  cast  a spell  of 
doom  over  it  and  the  Republic  which  it  was  to  establish. 
This  was  the  drawing  up  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Dur- 
ing the  first  chaotic  and  riotous  days  of  the  peace  and 
even  after  the  deliberations  of  the  National  Assembly 

* There  were  flaws,  to  be  sure,  and  in  the  end  some  of  them  proved 
disastrous.  The  system  of  proportional  representation  and  voting  by  list 
may  have  prevented  the  wasting  of  votes,  but  it  also  resulted  in  the 
multiplication  of  small  splinter  parties  which  eventually  made  a stable 
majority  in  the  Reichstag  impossible  and  led*  to  frequent  changes  in 
government.  In  the  national  elections  of  1930  some  twenty-eight  parties 
were  listed. 

The  Republic  might  have  been  given  greater  stability  had  some  of  the 
lderr.  of  j o’  r-or  Hugo  Pieuss.  the  principal  drafter  of  the  on  'itution, 
not  been  rejected.  He  proposed  at  Weimar  that  Germany  be  made  into 
a centralized  state  and  that  Prussia  and  the  other  single  states  be  dis- 
solved and  transformed  into  provinces.  But  the  Assembly,  turned  his 
pronoc-a!s  down. 

Fin'djy,  Article  48  of  the  constitution  conferred  upon  the  President 
dictatorial  rowers  during  an  emergency  The  use  made  of  this  clause 
by  Ur  " »l!o  -s  Bruen  ng,  von  Pap- n and  von  Schlri  her  under  Presi- 
dent Hin;l  nburg  enabl'd  them  to  govern  without  approval  of  the  Reich- 
stag and  thus,  even  before  the  advent  of  Hitler,  brought  an  end  to 
democratic  parliamentary  government  in  Germany. 


90 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


got  under  way  in  Weimar  the  German  people  seemed  to 
give  little  thought  to  the  consequences  of  their  defeat.  Or 
if  they  did,  they  appeared  to  be  smugly  confident  that  hav- 
ing, as  the  Allies  urged,  got  rid  of  the  Hohenzollerns, 
squelched  the  Bolshevists  and  set  about  forming  a demo- 
cratic, republican  government,  they  were  entitled  to  a 
just  peace  based  not  on  their  having  lost  the  war  but  on 
President  Wilson’s  celebrated  Fourteen  Points. 

German  memories  did  not  appear  to  stretch  back  as  far 
as  one  year,  to  March  3,  1918,  when  the  then  victorious 
German  Supreme  Command  had  imposed  on  a defeated 
Russia  at  Brest  Litovsk  a peace  treaty  which  to  a British 
historian,  writing  two  decades  after  the  passions  of  war 
had  cooled,  was  a “humiliation  without  precedent  or  equal 
in  modern  history.”  2 It  deprived  Russia  of  a territory 
nearly  as  large  as  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  combined, 
with  56,000,000  inhabitants,  or  32  per  cent  of  her  whole 
population;  a third  of  her  railway  mileage,  73  per  cent  of 
her  total  iron  ore,  89  per  cent  of  her  total  coal  produc- 
tion; and  more  than  5,000  factories  and  industrial  plants. 
Moreover,  Russia  was  obliged  to  pay  Germany  an  in- 
demnity of  six  billion  marks. 

The  day  of  reckoning  arrived  for  the  Germans  in  the 
late  spring  of  1919.  The  terms  of  the  Versailles  Treaty, 
laid  down  by  the  Allies  without  negotiation  with  Ger- 
many, were  published  in  Berlin  on  May  7.  They  came  as 
a staggering  blow  to  a people  who  had  insisted  on  delud- 
ing themselves  to  the  last  moment.  Angry  mass  meetings 
were  organized  throughout  the  country  to  protest  against 
the  treaty  and  to  demand  that  Germany  refuse  to  sign  it. 
Scheidemann,  who  had  become  Chancellor  during  the 
Weimar  Assembly,  cried,  “May  the  hand  wither  that  signs 
this  treaty!”  On  May  8 Ebert,  who  had  become  Provi- 
sional President,  and  the  government  publicly  branded 
the  terms  as  “unrealizable  and  unbearable.”  The  next  day 
the  German  delegation  at  Versailles  wrote  the  unbending 
Clemenceau  that  such  a treaty  was  “intolerable  for  any 
nation.” 

What  was  so  intolerable  about  it?  It  restored  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France,  a parcel  of  territory  to  Belgium,  a 
similar  parcel  in  Schleswig  to  Denmark — after  a plebi- 
scite— -which  Bismarck  had  taken  from  the  Danes  in  the 
previous  century  after  defeating  them  in  war.  It  gave 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


91 


back  to  the  Poles  the  lands,  some  of  them  only  after  a 
plebiscite,  which  the  Germans  had  taken  during  the  parti- 
tion of  Poland.  This  was  one  of  the  stipulations  which 
infuriated  the  Germans  the  most,  not  only  because  they 
resented  separating  East  Prussia  from  the  Fatherland  by 
a corridor  which  gave  Poland  access  to  the  sea  but  be- 
cause they  despised  the  Poles,  whom  they  considered  an 
inferior  race.  Scarcely  less  infuriating  to  the  Germans 
was  that  the  treaty  forced  them  to  accept  responsibility 
for  starting  the  war  and  demanded  that  they  turn  over  to 
the  Allies  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  and  some  eight  hundred 
other  “war  criminals.” 

Reparations  were  to  be  fixed  later,  but  a first  payment 
of  five  billion  dollars  in  gold  marks  was  to  be  paid  be- 
tween 1919  and  1921,  and  certain  deliveries  in  kind — 
coal,  ships,  lumber,  cattle,  etc.— were  to  be  made  in  lieu 
of  cash  reparations. 

But  what  hurt  most  was  that  Versailles  virtually  dis- 
armed Germany  * and  thus,  for  the  time  being  anyway, 
barred  the  way  to  German  hegemony  in  Europe  And  yet 
the  hated  Treaty  of  Versailles,  unlike  that  which  Germany 
had  imposed  on  Russia,  left  the  Reich  geographically 
and  economically  largely  intact  and  preserved  her  politi- 
cal  unity  and  her  potential  strength  as  a great  nation. 

The  provisional  government  at  Weimar,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Erzberger,  who  urged  acceptance  of  the  treaty  on 
the  grounds  that  its  terms  could  be  easily  evaded,  was 
strongly  against  accepting  the  Versailles  Diktat , as  it  was 
now  being  called.  Behind  the  government  stood  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  citizens,  from  right  to  left. 

And  the  Army?  If  the  treaty  were  rejected,  could  the 
Army  resist  an  inevitable  Allied  attack  from  the  west? 
Ebert  put  it  up  to  the  Supreme  Command,  which  had  now 
moved  its  headquarters  to  Kolberg  in  Pomerania.  On 
June  17  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  prodded  by  Gen- 
eral Groener,  who  saw  that  German  military  resistance 
would  be  futile,  replied: 

In  the  event  of  a resumption  of  hostilities  we  can  re- 
conquer  the  province  of  Posen  [in  Poland]  and  defend 


rIl5 1 ul5t<jd  the,  Army  mow  long-term  volunteers  and  prohibited 

Tt/  N h ng  p,3nes°r  ‘f.nks.  The  General  Staff  was  also  outlawed 
has  reduced  to  little  more  than  a token  force  and  forbidden 
to  build  submarines  or  vessels  over  10,000  tons.  lacten 


92 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


our  frontiers  in  the  east.  In  the  west,  however,  we  can 
scarcely  count  upon  being  able  to  withstand  a serious  offen- 
sive on  the  part  of  the  enemy  in  view  of  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  Entente  and  their  ability  to  outflank  us  on 
both  wings. 

The  success  of  the  operation  as  a whole  is  therefore  very 
doubtful,  but  as  a soldier  I cannot  help  feeling  that  it  were 
better  to  perish  honorably  than  accept  a disgraceful  peace. 

The  concluding  words  of  the  revered  Commander  in 
Chief  were  in  the  best  German  military  tradition  but  their 
sincerity  may  be  judegd  by  knowledge  of  the  fact  which 
the  German  people  were  unaware  of — that  Hindenburg 
had  agreed  with  Groener  that  to  try  to  resist  the  Allies 
now  would  not  only  be  hopeless  but  might  result  in  the 
destruction  of  the  cherished  officer  corps  of  the  Army 
and  indeed  of  Germany  itself. 

The  Allies  were  now  demanding  a definite  answer  from 
Germany.  On  June  16,  the  day  previous  to  Hindenburg’s 
written  answer  to  Ebert,  they  had  given  the  Germans  an 
ultimatum:  Either  the  treaty  must  be  accepted  by  June  24 
or  the  armistice  agreement  would  be  terminated  and  the 
Allied  powers  would  “take  such  steps  as  they  think  nec- 
essary to  enforce  their  terms.” 

Once  again  Ebert  appealed  to  Groener.  If  the  Supreme 
Command  thought  there  was  the  slightest  possibility  of 
successful  military  resistance  to  the  Allies,  Ebert  prom- 
ised to  try  to  secure  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  by  the 
Assembly.  But  he  must  have  an  answer  immediately.  The 
last  day  of  the  ultimatum,  June  24,  had  arrived.  The  cabi- 
net was  meeting  at  4:30  p.m.  to  make  its  final  decision. 
Once  more  Hindenburg  and  Groener  conferred.  “You 
know  as  well  as  I do  that  armed  resistance  is  impossible,” 
the  aging,  worn  Field  Marshal  said.  But  once  again,  as  at 
Spa  on  November  9,  1918,  when  he  could  not  bring  him- 
self to  tell  the  Kaiser  the  final  truth  and  left  the  unpleas- 
ant duty  to  Groener,  he  declined  to  tell  the  truth  to  the 
Provisional  President  of  the  Republic.  “You  can  give  the 
answer  to  the  President  as  well  as  I can,”  he  said  to  Groe- 
ner.3 And  again  the  courageous  General  took  the  final 
responsibility  which  belonged  to  the  Field  Marshal, 
though  he  must  have  known  that  it  would  eventually 
make  doubly  sure  his  being  made  a scapegoat  for  the  of- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  93 

ficer  corps.  He  telephoned  the  Supreme  Command’s  view 
to  the  President. 

Relieved  at  having  the  Army’s  leaders  take  the  responsi- 
bility a fact  that  was  soon  forgotten  in  Germany — the 
National  Assembly  approved  the  signing  of  the  peace 
treaty  by  a large  majority  and  its  decision  was  communi- 
cated to  Clemenceau  a bare  nineteen  minutes  before  the 
Allied  ultimatum  ran  out.  Four  days  later,  on  June  28, 
1919,  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  in  the  Hall  of  Mir- 
rors in  the  Palace  of  Versailles. 

A HOUSE  DIVIDED 

From  that  day  on  Germany  became  a house  divided. 

The  conservatives  would  accept  neither  the  treaty  of 
peace  nor  the  Republic  which  had  ratified  it.  Nor,  in  the 
long  run,  would  the  Army — General  Groener  excepted — 
though  it  had  sworn  to  support  the  new  democratic  re- 
gime and  had  itself  made  the  final  decision  to  sign  at 
Versailles.  Despite  the  November  “revolution,”  the  con- 
servatives still  held  the  economic  power.  They  owned  the 
industries,  the  large  estates  and  most  of  the  country’s 
capital.  Their  wealth  could  be  used,  and  was,  to  subsidize 
political  parties  and  a political  press  that  would  strive 
from  now  on  to  undermine  the  Republic. 

The  Army  began  to  circumvent  the  military  restric- 
tions of  the  peace  treaty  before  the  ink  on  it  was  scarcely 
dry.  And  thanks  to  the  timidity  and  shortsightedness  of 
the  Socialist  leaders,  the  officer  corps  managed  not  only 
to  maintain  the  Army  in  its  old  Prussian  traditions,  as  we 
have  seen,  but  to  become  the  real  center  of  political’ power 
in  the  new  Germany.  The  Army  did  not,  until  the  last 
days  of  the  short-lived  Republic,  stake  its  fortunes  on  any 
one  political  movement.  But  under  General  Hans  von 
Seeckt,  the  brilliant  creator  of  the  100,000-man  Reich- 
swehr,  the  Army,  small  as  it  was  in  numbers,  became  a 
state  within  a state,  exerting  an  increasing  influence  on 
the  nation’s  foreign  and  domestic  policies  until  a point 
was  reached  where  the  Republic’s  continued  existence  de- 
pended on  the  will  of  the  officer  corps. 

As  a state  within  a state  it  maintained  its  independence 
of  the  national  government.  Under  the  Weimar  Constitu- 
tion the  Army  could  have  been  subordinated  to  the  cabi- 


94  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

net  and  Parliament,  as  the  military  establishments  of  the 
other  Western  democracies  were.  But  it  was  not.  Nor  was 
the  officer  corps  purged  of  its  monarchist,  antirepublican 
frame  of  mind.  A few  Socialist  leaders  such  as  Scheide- 
mann  and  Grzesinski  urged  “democratizing”  the  armed 
forces.  They  saw  the  danger  of  handing  the  Army  back  to 
the  officers  of  the  old  authoritarian,  imperialist  tradition. 
But  they  were  successfully  opposed  not  only  by  the  gen- 
erals but  by  their  fellow  Socialists,  led  by  the  Minister  of 
Defense,  Noske.  This  proletarian  minister  of  the  Republic 
openly  boasted  that  he  wanted  to  revive  “the  proud  soldier 
memories  of  the  World  War.”  The  failure  of  the  duly 
elected  government  to  build  a new  Army  that  would  be 
faithful  to  its  own  democratic  spirit  and  subordinate  to 
the  cabinet  and  the  Reichstag  was  a fatal  mistake  for  the 
Republic,  as  time  would  tell. 

The  failure  to  clean  out  the  judiciary  was  another.  The 
administrators  of  the  law  became  one  of  the  centers  of 
the  counterrevolution,  perverting  justice  for  reactionary 
political  ends.  “It  is  impossible  to  escape  the  conclusion,” 
the  historian  Franz  L.  Neumann  declared,  “that  political 
justice  is  the  blackest  page  in  the  life  of  the  German  Re- 
public.” 4 After  the  Kapp  putsch  in  1920  the  government 
charged  705  persons  with  high  treason;  only  one,  the  po- 
lice president  of  Berlin,  received  a sentence — five  years  of 
“honorary  confinement.”  When  the  state  of  Prussia  with- 
drew his  pension  the  Supreme  Court  ordered  it  restored. 
A German  court  in  December  1926  awarded  General 
von  Luettwitz,  the  military  leader  of  the  Kapp  putsch, 
back  payment  of  his  pension  to  cover  the  period  when 
he  was  a rebel  against  the  government  and  also  the  five 
years  that  he  was  a fugitive  from  justice  in  Hungary. 

Yet  hundreds  of  German  liberals  were  sentenced  to 
long  prison  terms  on  charges  of  treason  because  they  re- 
vealed or  denounced  in  the  press  or  by  speech  the  Army’s 
constant  violations  of  the  Versailles  Treaty.  The  treason 
laws  were  ruthlessly  applied  to  the  supporters  of  the  Re- 
public; those  on  the  Right  who  tried  to  overthrow  it,  as 
Adolf  Hitler  was  soon  to  learn,  got  off  either  free  or  with 
the  lightest  of  sentences.  Even  the  assassins,  if  they  were 
of  the  Right  and  their  victims  democrats,  were  leniently 
treated  by  the  courts  or,  as  often  happened,  helped  to 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


95 


escape  from  the  custody  of  the  courts  by  Army  officers 
and  right-wing  extremists. 

And  so  the  mild  Socialists,  aided  by  the  democrats  and 
the  Catholic  Centrists,  were  left  to  carry  on  the  Republic, 
which  tottered  from  its  birth.  They  bore  the  hatred,  the 
abuse  and  sometimes  the  bullets  of  their  opponents,  who 
grew  in  number  and  in  resolve.  “In  the  heart  of  the  peo- 
ple,” cried  Oswald  Spengler,  who  had  skyrocketed  to  fame 
with  his  book  The  Decline  of  the  West,  “the  Weimar 
Constitution  is  already  doomed.”  Down  in  Bavaria  the 
young  firebrand  Adolf  Hitler  grasped  the  strength  of  the 
new  nationalist,  antidemocratic,  antirepublican  tide.  He 
began  to  ride  it. 

He  was  greatly  aided  by  the  course  of  events,  two  in 
particular:  the  fall  of  the  mark  and  the  French  occupa- 
tion of  the  Ruhr.  The  mark,  as  we  have  seen,  had  begun 
to  slide  in  1921,  when  it  dropped  to  75  to  the  dollar;  the 
next  year  it  fell  to  400  and  by  the  beginning  of  1923  to 
7,000.  Already  in  the  fall  of  1922  the  German  government 
had  asked  the  Allies  to  grant  a moratorium  on  reparation 
payments.  This  the  French  government  of  Poincare  had 
bluntly  refused.  When  Germany  defaulted  in  deliveries  of 
timber,  the  hardheaded  French  Premier,  who  had  been 
the  wartime  President  of  France,  ordered  French  troops 
to  occupy  the  Ruhr.  The  industrial  heart  of  Germany, 
which,  after  the  loss  of  Upper  Silesia  to  Poland,  furnished 
the  Reich  with  four  fifths  of  its  coal  and  steel  produc- 
tion, was  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the  country. 

This  paralyzing  blow  to  Germany’s  economy  united 
the  people  momentarily  as  they  had  not  been  united  since 
1914.  The  workers  of  the  Ruhr  declared  a general  strike 
and  received  financial  support  from  the  government  in 
Berlin,  which  called  for  a campaign  of  passive  resistance. 
With  the  help  of  the  Army,  sabotage  and  guerrilla  war- 
fare were  organized.  The  French  countered  with  arrests, 
deportations  and  even  death  sentences.  But  not  a wheel 
in  the  Ruhr  turned. 

The  strangulation  of  Germany’s  economy  hastened  the 
final  plunge  of  the  mark.  On  the  occupation  of  the  Ruhr 
in  January  1923,  it  fell  to  18,000  to  the  dollar;  by  July  1 
it  had  dropped  to  160.000;  by  August  1 to  a million.  By 
November,  when  Hitler  thought  his  hour  had  struck,  it 
took  four  billion  marks  to  buy  a dollar,  and  thereafter 


96 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  figures  became  trillions.  German  currency  had  become 
utterly  worthless.  Purchasing  power  of  salaries  and  wages 
was  reduced  to  zero.  The  life  savings  of  the  middle  classes 
and  the  working  classes  were  wiped  out.  But  something 
even  more  important  was  destroyed:  the  faith  of  the  peo- 
ple in  the  economic  structure  of  German  society.  What 
good  were  the  standards  and  practices  of  such  a society, 
which  encouraged  savings  and  investment  and  solemnly 
promised  a safe  return  from  them  and  then  defaulted? 
Was  this  not  a fraud  upon  the  people? 

And  was  not  the  democratic  Republic,  which  had  sur- 
rendered to  the  enemy  and  accepted  the  burden  of  repara- 
tions, to  blame  for  the  disaster?  Unfortunately  for  its  sur- 
vival, the  Republic  did  bear  a responsibility.  The  inflation 
could  have  been  halted  by  merely  balancing  the  budget — 
a difficult  but  not  impossible  feat.  Adequate  taxation 
might  have  achieved  this,  but  the  new  government  did  not 
dare  to  tax  adequately.  After  all,  the  cost  of  the  war — 
164  billion  marks — had  been  met  not  even  in  part  by  di- 
rect taxation  but  93  billions  of  it  by  war  loans,  29  billions 
out  of  Treasury  bills  and  the  rest  by  increasing  the  issue 
of  paper  money.  Instead  of  drastically  raising  taxes  on 
those  who  could  pay,  the  republican  government  actually 
reduced  them  in  1921. 

From  then  on,  goaded  by  the  big  industrialists  and 
landlords,  who  stood  to  gain  though  the  masses  of  the 
people  were  financially  ruined,  the  government  deliberate- 
ly let  the  mark  tumble  in  order  to  free  the  State  of  its 
public  debts,  to  escape  from  paying  reparations  and  to 
sabotage  the  French  in  the  Ruhr.  Moreover,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  currency  enabled  German  heavy  industry  to 
wipe  out  its  indebtedness  by  refunding  its  obligations  in 
worthless  marks.  The  General  Staff,  disguised  as  the 
“Truppenamt”  (Office  of  Troops)  to  evade  the  peace  treaty 
which  supposedly  had  outlawed  it,  took  notice  that  the 
fall  of  the  mark  wiped  out  the  war  debts  and  thus  left 
Germany  financially  unencumbered  for  a new  war. 

The  masses  of  the  people,  however,  did  not  realize  how 
much  the  industrial  tycoons,  the  Army  and  the  State  were 
benefiting  from  the  ruin  of  the  currency.  All  they  knew 
was  that  a large  bank  account  could  not  buy  a straggly 
bunch  of  carrots,  a half  peck  of  potatoes,  a few  ounces 
of  sugar,  a pound  of  flour.  They  knew  that  as  individuals 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


97 


they  were  bankrupt.  And  they  knew  hunger  when  it 
gnawed  at  them,  as  it  did  daily.  In  their  misery  and  hope- 
lessness they  made  the  Republic  the  scapegoat  for  all 
that  had  happened. 

Such  times  were  heaven-sent  for  Adolf  Hitler. 

REVOLT  IN  BAVARIA 

“The  government  calmly  goes  on  printing  these  scraps 
of  paper  because,  if  it  stopped,  that  would  be  the  end  of 
the  government,”  he  cried.  “Because  once  the  printing 
presses  stopped — and  that  is  the  prerequisite  for  the  sta- 
bilization of  the  mark — the  swindle  would  at  once  be 
brought  to  light  . . . Believe  me,  our  misery  will  increase. 
The  scoundrel  will  get  by.  The  reason:  because  the  State 
itself  has  become  the  biggest  swindler  and  crook.  A rob- 
bers’ state!  ...  If  the  horrified  people  notice  that  they 
can  starve  on  billions,  they  must  arrive  at  this  conclusion: 
we  will  no  longer  submit  to  a State  which  is  built  on  the 
swindling  idea  of  the  majority.  We  want  a dictator- 
ship ...”  6 

No  doubt  the  hardships  and  uncertainties  of  the  wan- 
ton inflation  were  driving  millions  of  Germans  toward  that 
conclusion  and  Hitler  was  ready  to  lead  them  on.  In  fact, 
he  had  begun  to  believe  that  the  chaotic  conditions  of 
1923  had  created  an  opportunity  to  overthrow  the  Re- 
public which  might  not  recur.  But  certain  difficulties  lay 
in  his  way  if  he  were  himself  to  lead  the  counterrevolu- 
tion, and  he  was  not  much  interested  in  it  unless  he  was. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Nazi  Party,  though  it  was  grow- 
ing daily  in  numbers,  was  far  from  being  even  the  most 
important  political  movement  in  Bavaria,  and  outside 
that  state  it  was  unknown.  How  could  such  a small  party 
overthrow  the  Republic?  Hitler,  who  was  not  easily  dis- 
couraged by  odds  against  him,  thought  he  saw  a way.  He 
might  unite  under  his  leadership  all  the  antirepublican, 
nationalist  forces  in  Bavaria.  Then  with  the  support  of 
the  Bavarian  government,  the  armed  leagues  and  the 
Reichswehr  stationed  in  Bavaria,  he  might  lead  a march 
on  Berlin — as  Mussolini  had  marched  on  Rome  the  year 
before — and  bring  the  Weimar  Republic  down.  Obviously 
Mussolini’s  easy  success  had  given  him  food  for  thought. 

The  French  occupation  of  the  Ruhr,  though  it  brought 


98  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

a renewal  of  German  hatred  for  the  traditional  enemy 
and  thus  revived  the  spirit  of  nationalism,  complicated 
Hitler’s  task.  It  began  to  unify  the  German  people  behind 
the  republican  government  in  Berlin  which  had  chosen  to 
defy  France.  This  was  the  last  thing  Hitler  wanted.  His 
aim  was  to  do  away  with  the  Republic.  France  could  be 
taken  care  of  after  Germany  had  had  its  nationalist  revo- 
lution and  established  a dictatorship.  Against  a strong 
current  of  public  opinion  Hitler  dared  to  take  an  unpopu- 
lar line:  “No — not  down  with  France,  but  down  with  the 
traitors  of  the  Fatherland,  down  with  the  November  crim- 
inals! That  must  be  our  slogan.”  6 

All  through  the  first  months  of  1923  Hitler  dedicated 
himself  to  making  the  slogan  effective.  In  February,  due 
largely  to  the  organizational  talents  of  Roehm,  four  of 
the  armed  “patriotic  leagues”  of  Bavaria  joined  with  the 
Nazis  to  form  the  so-called  Arbeitsgemeinschaft  der  Vat- 
erlaendischen  Kampfverbaende  (Working  Union  of  the 
Fatherland  Fighting  Leagues)  under  the  political  leader- 
ship of  Hitler.  In  September  an  even  stronger  group  was 
established  under  the  name  of  the  Deutscher  Kampfbund 
(German  Fighting  Union),  with  Hitler  one  of  a trium- 
virate of  leaders.  This  organization  sprang  from  a great 
mass  meeting  held  at  Nuremberg  on  September  2 to  cele- 
brate the  anniversary  of  the  German  defeat  of  France  at 
Sedan  in  1870.  Most  of  the  fascist-minded  groups  in 
southern  Germany  were  represented  and  Hitler  received 
something  of  an  ovation  after  a violent  speech  against 
the  national  government.  The  objectives  of  the  new 
Kampfbund  were  openly  stated:  overthrow  of  the  Re- 
public and  the  tearing  up  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

At  the  Nuremberg  meeting  Hitler  had  stood  in  the  re- 
viewing stand  next  to  General  Ludendorff  during  a pa- 
rade of  the  demonstrators.  This  was  not  by  accident.  For 
some  time  the  young  Nazi  chief  had  been  cultivating  the 
war  hero,  who  had  lent  his  famous  name  to  the  makers 
of  the  Kapp  putsch  in  Berlin  and  who,  since  he  continued 
to  encourage  counterrevolution  from  the  Right,  might  be 
tempted  to  back  an  action  which  was  beginning  to  germi- 
nate in  Hitler’s  mind.  The  old  General  had  no  political 
sense;  living  now  outside  Munich,  he  did  not  disguise  his 
contempt  for  Bavarians,  for  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht,  the 


99 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

Bavarian  pretender,  and  for  the  Catholic  Church  in  this 
most  Catholic  of  all  states  in  Germany.  All  this  Hitler 
knew,  but  it  suited  his  purposes.  He  did  not  want  Luden- 
dorff  as  the  political  leader  of  the  nationalist  counter- 
revolution, a role  which  it  was  known  the  war  hero  was 
ambitious  to  assume.  Hitler  insisted  on  that  role  for  him- 
self. But  Ludendorff’s  name,  his  renown  in  the  officer 
corps  and  among  the  conservatives  throughout  Germany 
would  he  an  asset  to  a provincial  politician  still  largely 
unknown  outside  Bavaria.  Hitler  began  to  include  Luden- 
dorff  in  his  plans. 

In  the  fall  of  1923  the  German  Republic  and  the  state 
of  Bavaria  reached  a point  of  crisis.  On  September  26, 
Gustav  Stresemann,  the  Chancellor,  announced  the  end 
of  passive  resistance  in  the  Ruhr  and  the  resumption  of 
German  reparation  payments.  This  former  mouthpiece  of 
Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff,  a staunch  conservative  and, 
at  heart,  a monarchist,  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
if  Germany  were  to  be  saved,  united  and  made  strong 
again  it  must,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  accept  the  Re- 
public, come  to  terms  with  the  Allies  and  obtain  a period 
of  tranquillity  in  which  to  regain  its  economic  strength. 
To  drift  any  further  would  only  end  in  civil  war  and  per- 
haps in  the  final  destruction  of  the  nation. 

The  abandonment  of  resistance  to  the  French  in  the 
Ruhr  and  the  resumption  of  the  burden  of  reparations 
touched  off  an  outburst  of  anger  and  hysteria  among  the 
German  nationalists,  and  the  Communists,  who  also  had 
been  growing  in  strength,  joined  them  in  bitter  denuncia- 
tion of  the  Republic.  Stresemann  was  faced  with  serious 
revolt  from  both  extreme  Right  and  extreme  Left.  He  had 
anticipated  it  by  having  President  Ebert  declare  a state  of 
emergency  on  the  very  day  he  announced  the  change  of 
policy  on  the  Ruhr  and  reparations.  From  September  26, 
1923,  until  February  1924,  executive  power  in  Germany 
under  the  Emergency  Act  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
Minister  of  Defense,  Otto  Gessler,  and  of  the  Command- 
er of  the  Army,  General  von  Seeckt.  In  reality  this  made 
the  General  and  his  Army  virtual  dictators  of  the  Reich. 

Bavaria  was  in  no  mood  to  accept  such  a solution.  The 
Bavarian  cabinet  of  Eugen  von  Knilling  proclaimed  its 


100  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

own  state  of  emergency  on  September  26  and  named  the 
right-wing  monarchist  and  former  premier  Gustav  von 
Kahr  as  State  Commissioner  with  dictatorial  powers.  In 
Berlin  it  was  feared  that  Bavaria  might  secede  from  the 
Reich,  restore  the  Wittelsbach  monarchy  and  perhaps  form 
a South  German  union  with  Austria.  A meeting  of  the 
cabinet  was  hastily  summoned  by  President  Ebert,  and 
General  von  Seeckt  was  invited  to  attend.  Ebert  wanted 
to  know  where  the  Army  stood.  Seeckt  bluntly  told  him. 
“The  Army,  Mr.  President,  stands  behind  me.”  7 

The  icy  words  pronounced  by  the  monocled,  poker- 
faced  Prussian  Commander  in  Chief  did  not,  as  might 
have  been  expected,  dismay  the  German  President  or  his 
Chancellor.  They  had  already  recognized  the  Army’s  po- 
sition as  a state  within  the  State  and  subject  only  to  itself. 
Three  years  before,  as  we  have  seen,  when  the  Kapp 
forces  had  occupied  Berlin  and  a similar  appeal  had  been 
made  to  Seeckt,  the  Army  had  stood  not  behind  the  Re- 
public but  behind  the  General.  The  only  question  now, 
in  1923,  was  where  Seeckt  stood. 

Fortunately  for  the  Republic  he  now  chose  to  stand 
behind  it,  not  because  he  believed  in  republican,  demo- 
cratic principles  but  because  he  saw  that  for  the  moment 
the  support  of  the  existing  regime  was  necessary  for  the 
preservation  of  the  Army,  itself  threatened  by  revolt  in 
Bavaria  and  in  the  north,  and  for  saving  Germany  from 
a disastrous  civil  war.  Seeckt  knew  that  some  of  the 
leading  officers  of  the  Army  division  in  Munich  were 
siding  with  the  Bavarian  separatists.  He  knew  of  a con- 
spiracy of  the  “Black  Reichswehr”  under  Major  Buch- 
rucker,  a former  General  Staff  officer,  to  occupy  Berlin  and 
turn  the  republican  government  out.  He  now  moved  with 
cool  precision  and  absolute  determination,  to  set  the 
Army  right  and  end  the  threat  of  civil  war. 

On  the  night  of  September  30,  1923,  “Black  Reichswehr” 
troops  under  the  command  of  Major  Buchrucker  seized 
three  forts  to  the  east  of  Berlin.  Seeckt  ordered  regular 
forces  to  besiege  them,  and  after  two  days  Buchrucker 
surrendered.  He  was  tried  for  high  treason  and  actually 
sentenced  to  ten  years  of  fortress  detention.  The  “Black 
Reichswehr,”  which  had  been  set  up  by  Seeckt  himself 
under  the  cover  name  of  Arbeitskommandos  (Labor  Com- 


101 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

mandos)  to  provide  secret  reinforcements  for  the  100,000- 
man  Reichswehr,  was  dissolved.* 

Seeckt  next  turned  his  attention  to  the  threats  of  Com- 
munist uprisings  in  Saxony,  Thuringia,  Hamburg  and  the 
Ruhr.  In  suppressing  the  Left  the  loyalty  of  the  Army 
could  be  taken  for  granted.  In  Saxony  the  Socialist-Com- 
munist government  was  arrested  by  the  local  Reichswehr 
commander  and  a Reich  Commissioner  appointed  to  rule. 
In  Hamburg  and  in  the  other  areas  the  Communists  were 
quickly  and  severely  squelched.  It  now  seemed  to  Berlin 
that  the  relatively  easy  suppression  of  the  Bolshevists  had 
robbed  the  conspirators  in  Bavaria  of  the  pretext  that  they 
were  really  acting  to  save  the  Republic  from  Communism, 
and  that  they  would  now  recognize  the  authority  of  the 
national  government.  But  it  did  not  turn  out  that  way. 

Bavaria  remained  defiant  of  Berlin.  It  was  now  under 
the  dictatorial  control  of  a triumvirate:  Kahr,  the  State 
Commissioner,  General  Otto  von  Lossow,  commander  of 
the  Reichswehr  in  Bavaria,  and  Colonel  Hans  von  Seisser, 
the  head  of  the  state  police.  Kahr  refused  to  recognize  that 
President  Ebert’s  proclamation  of  a state  of  emergency 
in  Germany  had  any  application  in  Bavaria.  He  declined 
to  carry  out  any  orders  from  Berlin.  When  the  national 
government  demanded  the  suppression  of  Hitler’s  news- 
paper, the  Voelkischer  Beobachter,  because  of  its  vitriolic 
attacks  on  the  Republic  in  general  and  on  Seeckt,  Strese- 
mann  and  Gessler  in  particular,  Kahr  contemptuously  re- 
fused. 

A second  order  from  Berlin  to  arrest  three  notorious 
leaders  of  some  of  the  armed  bands  in  Bavaria,  Captain 
Heiss,  Captain  Ehrhardt  (the  “hero”  of  the  Kapp 
putsch)  and  Lieutenant  Rossbach  (who  was  a friend  of 
Roehm),  was  also  ignored  by  Kahr.  Seeckt,  his  patience 
strained,  ordered  General  von  Lossow  to  suppress  the 

* The  “Black  Reichswehr”  troops,  numbering  roughly  twenty  thousand, 
were  stationed  on  the  eastern  frontier  to  help  guard  it  against  the 
Poles  in  the  turbulent  days  of  1920-23.  The  illicit  organization  became 
notorious  for  its  revival  of  the  horrors  of  the  medieval  Femegenchte — 
secret  courts — which  dealt  arbitrary  death  sentences  against  Germans 
who  revealed  the  activities  of  the  “Black  Reichswehr”  to  the  Allied 
Control  Commission.  Several  of  these  brutal  murders  reached  the 
courts.  At  one  trial  the  German  Defense  Minister,  Otto  Gessler,  who 
had  succeeded  Noske,  denied  any  knowledge  of  the  organization  and 
insisted  that  it  did  not  exist.  But  when  one  of  his  questioners  protested 
against  such  innocence  Gessler  cried,  “He  who  speaks  of  the  ‘Black 
Reichswehr’  commits  an  act  of  high  treason  1” 


102 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Nazi  newspaper  and  arrest  the  three  free-corps  men.  The 
General,  himself  a Bavarian  and  a confused  and  weak 
officer  who  had  been  taken  in  by  Hitler’s  eloquence  and 
Kahr’s  persuasiveness,  hesitated  to  obey.  On  October  24 
Seeckt  sacked  him  and  appointed  General  Kress  von 
Kressenstein  in  his  place.  Kahr,  however,  would  not  take 
such  dictation  from  Berlin.  He  declared  that  Lossow 
would  retain  the  command  of  the  Reichswehr  in  Ba- 
varia and  defying  not  only  Seeckt  but  the  constitution, 
forced  the  officers  and  the  men  of  the  Army  to  take  a 
special  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Bavarian  government. 

This,  to  Berlin,  was  not  only  political  but  military  re- 
bellion, and  General  von  Seeckt  was  now  determined 
to  put  down  both.8 

He  issued  a plain  warning  to  the  Bavarian  triumvirate 
and  to  Hitler  and  the  armed  leagues  that  any  rebellion 
on  their  part  would  be  opposed  by  force.  But  for  the  Nazi 
leader  it  was  too  late  to  draw  back.  His  rabid  followers 
were  demanding  action.  Lieutenant  Wilhelm  Brueckner, 
one  of  his  S.A.  commanders,  urged  him  to  strike  at  once. 
“The  day  is  coming,”  he  warned,  “when  I won’t  be  able  to 
hold  the  men  back.  If  nothing  happens  now,  they’ll  run 
away  from  us.” 

Hitler  realized  too  that  if  Stresemann  gained  much  more 
time  and  began  to  succeed  in  his  endeavor  to  restore 
tranquillity  in  the  country,  his  own  opportunity  would  be 
lost.  He  pleaded  with  Kahr  and  Lossow  to  march  on 
Berlin  before  Berlin  marched  on  Munich.  And  his  sus- 
picion grew  that  either  the  triumvirate  was  losing  heart 
or  that  it  was  planning  a separatist  coup  without  him  for 
the  purpose  of  detaching  Bavaria  from  the  Reich.  To  this. 
Hitler,  with  his  fanatical  ideas  for  a strong,  nationalist, 
unified  Reich,  was  unalterably  opposed. 

Kahr,  Lossow  and  Seisser  were  beginning  to  lose  heart 
after  Seeckt’s  warning.  They  were  not  interested  in  a futile 
gesture  that  might  destroy  them.  On  November  6 they 
informed  the  Kampfbund,  of  which  Hitler  was  the  leading 
political  figure,  that  they  would  not  be  hurried  into  preci- 
pitate action  and  that  they  alone  would  decide  when 
and  how  to  act.  This  was  a signal  to  Hitler  that  he  must 
seize  the  initiative  himself.  He  did  not  possess  the  back- 
ing to  carry  out  a putsch  alone.  He  would  have  to  have  the 
support  of  the  Bavarian  state,  the  Army  and  the  police 


103 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

this  was  a lesson  he  had  learned  in  his  beggarly  Vienna 
days.  Somehow  he  would  have  to  put  Kahr,  Lossow  and 
Seisser  in  a position  where  they  would  have  to  act 
with  him  and  from  which  there  would  be  no  turning 
back.  Boldness,  even  recklessness,  was  called  for,  and 
that  Hitler  now  proved  he  had.  He  decided  to  kidnap 
the  triumvirate  and  force  them  to  use  their  power  at  his 
bidding. 

The  idea  had  first  been  proposed  to  Hitler  by  two  refugees 
from  Russia,  Rosenberg  and  Scheubner-Richter.  The  latter, 
who  had  ennobled  himself  with  his  wife’s  name  and  called 
himself  Max  Erwin  von  Scheubner-Richter,  was  a dubious 
character  who,  like  Rosenberg,  had  spent  most  of  his  life 
in  the  Russian  Baltic  provinces  and  after  the  war  made 
his  way  with  other  refugees  from  the  Soviet  Union  to 
Munich,  where  he  joined  the  Nazi  Party  and  became  one  of 
Hitler’s  close  confidants. 

On  November  4,  Germany’s  Memorial  Day  ( Totenge - 
denktag ) would  be  observed  by  a military  parade  in  the 
heart  of  Munich,  and  it  had  been  announced  in  the  press 
that  not  only  the  popular  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  but 
Kahr,  Lossow  and  Seisser  would  take  the  salute  of  the 
troops  from  a stand  in  a narrow  street  leading  from  the 
Feldherrnhalle.  Scheubner-Richter  and  Rosenberg  pro- 
posed to  Hitler  that  a few  hundred  storm  troopers, 
transported  by  trucks,  should  converge  on  the  little  street 
before  the  parading  troops  arrived  and  seal  it  off  with  ma- 
chine guns.  Hitler  would  then  mount  the  tribune,  pro- 
claim the  revolution  and  at  pistol  point  prevail  upon  the 
notables  to  join  it  and  help  him  lead  it.  The  plan 
appealed  to  Hitler  and  he  enthusiastically  endorsed  it.  But, 
on  the  appointed  day,  when  Rosenberg  arrived  early  on 
the  scene  for  purposes  of  reconnaissance  he  discovered 
to  his  dismay  that  the  narrow  street  was  fully  protected  by 
a large  body  of  well-armed  police.  The  plot,  indeed 
the  “revolution,”  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Actually  it  was  merely  postponed.  A second  plan  was 
concocted,  one  that  could  not  be  balked  by  the  presence  of 
a band  of  strategically  located  police.  On  the  night  of 
November  10-11,  the  S.A.  and  the  other  armed  bands  of 
the  Kampfbund  would  be  concentrated  on  the  Froett- 
maninger  Heath,  just  north  of  Munich,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  eleventh,  the  anniversary  of  the  hated,  shameful 


104 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

armistice,  would  march  into  the  city,  seize  strategic  points, 
proclaim  the  national  revolution  and  present  the  hesitant 
Kahr,  Lossow  and  Seisser  with  a fait  accompli. 

At  this  point  a not  very  important  public  announcement 
induced  Hitler  to  drop  that  plan  and  improvise  a new  one. 
A brief  notice  appeared  in  the  press  that,  at  the  request 
of  some  business  organizations  in  Munich,  Kahr  would 
address  a meeting  at  the  Buergerbriiukeller,  a large  beer 
hall  on  the  southeastern  outskirts  of  the  city  The  date 
was  November  8,  in  the  evening.  The  subject  of  the 
Commissioner’s  speech,  the  notice  said,  would  be  the 
program  of  the  Bavarian  government.  General  von  Los- 
sow, Colonel  von  Seisser  and  other  notables  would  be 
present. 

„ Two  considerations  led  Hitler  to  a rash  decision.  The 
first  was  that  he  suspected  Kahr  might  use  the  meeting 
to  announce  the  proclamation  of  Bavarian  independence 
and  the  restoration  of  the  Wittelsbachs  to  the  Bavarian 
throne.  All  day  long  on  November  8 Hitler  tried  in  vain 
to  see  Kahr,  who  put  him  off  until  the  ninth.  This  only 
increased  the  Nazi  leader’s  suspicions.  He  must  forestall 
Kahr.  Also,  and  this  was  the  second  consideration,  the 
Buergerbraukeller  meeting  provided  the  opportunity 
which  had  been  missed  on  November  4:  the  chance  to 
rope  in  all  three  members  of  the  triumvirate  and  at  the 
point  of  a pistol  force  them  to  join  the  Nazis  in  carrying 
out  the  revolution.  Hitler  decided  to  act  at  once.  Plans 
for  the  November  10  mobilization  were  called  off;  the 
storm  troops  were  hastily  alerted  for  duty  at  the  big  beer 
hall. 

THE  BEER  HALL  PUTSCH 

About  a quarter  to  nine  on  the  evening  of  November  8, 
1923,  after  Kahr  had  been  speaking  for  half  an  hour  to 
some  three  thousand  thirsty  burghers,  seated  at  rough- 
hewn  tables  and  quaffing  their  beer  out  of  stone  mugs 
in  the  Bavarian  fashion,  S.A.  troops  surrounded  the 
Buergerbraukeller  and  Hitler  pushed  forward  into  the  hall. 
While  some  of  his  men  were  mounting  a machine  gun  in 
the  entrance.  Hitler  jumped  up  on  a table  and  to  attract 
attention  fired  a revolver  shot  toward  the  ceiling.  Kahr 
paused  in  his  discourse.  The  audience  turned  around  to 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


105 


see  what  was  the  cause  of  the  disturbance.  Hitler,  with 
the  help  of  Hess  and  of  Ulrich  Graf,  the  former  butcher, 
amateur  wrestler  and  brawler  and  now  the  leader’s  body- 
guard, made  his  way  to  the  platform.  A police  major 
tried  to  stop  him,  but  Hitler  pointed  his  pistol  at  him  and 
pushed  on.  Kahr,  according  to  one  eyewitness,  had  now 
become  “pale  and  confused.”  He  stepped  back  from  the 
rostrum  and  Hitler  took  his  place. 

“The  National  Revolution  has  begun!”  Hitler  shouted. 
“This  building  is  occupied  by  six  hundred  heavily  armed 
men.  No  one  may  leave  the  hall.  Unless  there  is  immediate 
quiet  I shall  have  a machine  gun  posted  in  the  gallery. 
The  Bavarian  and  Reich  governments  have  been  removed 
and  a provisional  national  government  formed.  The  bar- 
racks of  the  Reichswehr  and  police  are  occupied.  The 
Army  and  the  police  are  marching  on  the  city  under  the 
swastika  banner.” 

This  last  was  false;  it  was  pure  bluff.  But  in  the  confusion 
no  one  knew  for  sure.  Hitler’s  revolver  was  real.  It  had 
gone  off.  The  storm  troopers  with  their  rifles  and  machine 
guns  were  real.  Hitler  now  ordered  Kahr,  Lossow  and 
Seisser  to  follow  him  to  a nearby  private  room  off  stage. 
Prodded  by  storm  troopers,  the  three  highest  officials  of 
Bavaria  did  Hitler’s  bidding  while  the  crowd  looked  on  in 
amazement. 

But  with  growing  resentment  too.  Many  businessmen 
still  regarded  Hitler  as  something  of  an  upstart.  One  of 
them  shouted  to  the  police,  “Don’t  be  cowards  as  in 
1918.  Shoot!”  But  the  police,  with  their  own  chiefs  so  docile 
and  the  S.A.  taking  over  the  hall,  did  not  budge.  Hitler 
had  arranged  for  a Nazi  spy  at  police  headquarters, 
Wilhelm  Frick,  to  telephone  the  police  on  duty  at  the  beer 
hall  not  to  interfere  but  merely  to  report.  The  crowd 
began  to  grow  so  sullen  that  Goering  felt  it  necessary  to 
step  to  the  rostrum  and  quiet  them.  “There  is  nothing 
to  fear,”  he  cried.  “We  have  the  friendliest  intentions.  For 
that  matter,  you’ve  no  cause  to  grumble,  you’ve  got  your 
beer!”  And  he  informed  them  that  in  the  next  room  a new 
government  was  being  formed. 

It  was,  at  the  point  of  Adolf  Hitler’s  revolver.  Once  he 
had  herded  his  prisoners  into  the  adjoining  room,  Hitler 
told  them,  “No  one  leaves  this  room  alive  without  my 
permission.”  He  then  informed  them  they  would  all  have 


106  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

key  jobs  either  in  the  Bavarian  government  or  in  the 
Reich  government  which  he  was  forming  with  Luden- 
dorff.  With  Ludendorff?  Earlier  in  the  evening  Hitler  had 
dispatched  Scheubner-Richter  to  Ludwigshoehe  to  fetch  the 
renowned  General,  who  knew  nothing  of  the  Nazi  con- 
spiracy, to  the  beerhouse  at  once. 

The  three  prisoners  at  first  refused  even  to  speak  to 
Hitler.  He  continued  to  harangue  them.  Each  of  them  must 
join  him  in  proclaiming  the  revolution  and  the  new  govern- 
ments; each  must  take  the  post  he,  Hitler,  assigned  them, 
or  “he  has  no  right  to  exist.”  Kahr  was  to  be  the  Regent 
of  Bavaria;  Lossow,  Minister  of  the  National  Army;  Seis- 
ser,  Minister  of  the  Reich  Police.  None  of  the  three  was 
impressed  at  the  prospect  of  such  high  office.  They  did 
not  answer. 

Their  continued  silence  unnerved  Hitler.  Finally  he 
waved  his  gun  at  them.  “I  have  four  shots  in  my  pistol! 
Three  for  my  collaborators,  if  they  abandon  me.  The 
last  bullet  for  myself!”  Pointing  the  weapon  to  his  fore- 
head, he  cried,  “If  I am  not  victorious  by  tomorrow 
afternoon,  I shall  be  a dead  man!” 

Kahr  was  not  a very  bright  individual  but  he  had  physi- 
cal courage.  “Herr  Hitler,”  he  answered,  “you  can  have 
me  shot  or  shoot  me  yourself.  Whether  I die  or  not  is 
no  matter.” 

Seisser  also  spoke  up.  He  reproached  Hitler  for  breaking 
his  word  of  honor  not  to  make  a putsch  against  the  police. 

“Yes,  I did,”  Hitler  replied.  “Forgive  me,  but  I had  to 
for  the  sake  of  the  Fatherland.” 

General  von  Lossow  disdainfully  maintained  silence. 
But  when  Kahr  started  to  whisper  to  him,  Hitler  snapped, 
“Halt!  No  talking  without  my  permission!” 

He  was  getting  nowhere  with  his  own  talk.  Not  one  of 
the  three  men  who  held  the  power  of  the  Bavarian  state 
in  their  hands  had  agreed  to  join  him,  even  at  pistol  point. 
The  putsch  wasn’t  going  according  to  plan.  Then  Hitler 
acted  on  a sudden  impulse.  Without  a further  word,  he 
dashed  back  into  the  hall,  mounted  the  tribune,  faced  the 
sullen  crowd  and  announced  that  the  members  of  the 
triumvirate  in  the  next  room  had  joined  him  in  forming 
a new  national  government. 

“The  Bavarian  Ministry,”  he  shouted,  “is  removed. 

. . . The  government  of  the  November  criminals  and  the 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


107 


Reich  President  are  declared  to  be  removed.  A new 
national  government  will  be  named  this  very  day  here 
in  Munich.  A German  National  Army  will  be  formed 
immediately  ...  I propose  that,  until  accounts  have  been 
finally  settled  with  the  November  criminals,  the  direction 
of  policy  in  the  National  Government  be  taken  over  by 
me.  Ludendorff  will  take  over  the  leadership  of  the 
German  National  Army  . . . The  task  of  the  provisional 
German  National  Government  is  to  organize  the  march 
on  that  sinful  Babel,  Berlin,  and  save  the  German  people 
. . . Tomorrow  will  find  either  a National  Government 
in  Germany  or  us  dead!” 

Not  for  the  first  time  and  certainly  not  for  the  last, 
Hitler  had  told  a masterful  lie,  and  it  worked.  When  the 
gathering  heard  that  Kahr,  General  von  Lossow  and  Police 
Chief  von  Seisser  had  joined  Hitler  its  mood  abruptly 
changed.  There  were  loud  cheers,  and  the  sound  of  them 
impressed  the  three  men  still  locked  up  in  the  little  side 
room. 

Scheubner-Richter  now  produced  General  Ludendorff, 
as  if  out  of  a hat.  The  war  hero  was  furious  with  Hitler 
for  pulling  such  a complete  surprise  on  him,  and  when, 
once  closeted  in  the  side  room,  he  learned  that  the  former 
corporal  and  not  he  was  to  be  the  dictator  of  Germany 
his  resentment  was  compounded.  He  spoke  scarcely  a 
word  to  the  brash  young  man.  But  Hitler  did  not  mind 
so  long  as  Ludendorff  lent  his  famous  name  to  the  desper- 
ate undertaking  and  won  over  the  three  recalcitrant  Bavar- 
ian leaders  who  thus  far  had  failed  to  respond  to  his  own 
exhortations  and  threats.  This  Ludendorff  proceeded  to 
do.  It  was  now  a question  of  a great  national  cause,  he 
said,  and  he  advised  the  gentlemen  to  co-operate.  Awed 
by  the  attention  of  the  generalissimo,  the  trio  appeared  to 
give  in,  though  later  Lossow  denied  that  he  had  agreed 
to  place  himself  under  Ludendorff’s  command.  For  a few 
minutes  Kahr  fussed  over  the  question  of  restoring  the 
Wittelsbach  monarchy,  which  was  so  dear  to  him.  Finally 
he  said  he  would  co-operate  as  the  “King’s  deputy.” 

Ludendorff’s  timely  arrival  had  saved  Hitler.  Overjoyed 
at  this  lucky  break,  he  led  the  others  back  to  the  platform, 
where  each  made  a brief  speech  and  swore  loyalty  to  each 
other  and  to  the  new  regime.  The  crowd  leaped  on 


108 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

chairs  and  tables  in  a delirium  of  enthusiasm.  Hitler 
beamed  with  joy.  “He  had  a childlike,  frank  expression 
of  happiness  that  I shall  never  forget,”  an  eminent  his- 
torian who  was  present  later  declared.9 

Again  mounting  the  rostrum,  Hitler  spoke  his  final 
word  to  the  gathering : 

I want  now  to  fulfill  the  vow  which  I made  to  myself 
five  years  ago  when  I was  a blind  cripple  in  the  military 
hospital:  to  know  neither  rest  nor  peace  until  the  November 
criminals  had  been  overthrown,  until  on  the  ruins  of  the 
wretched  Germany  of  today  there  should  have  arisen  once 
more  a Germany  of  power  and  greatness,  of  freedom  and 
splendor. 

This  meeting  began  to  break  up.  At  the  exits  Hess, 
aided  by  storm  troopers,  detained  a number  of  Bavarian 
cabinet  members  and  other  notables  who  were  trying  to 
slip  out  with  the  throng.  Hitler  kept  his  eye  on  Kahr, 
Lossow  and  Seisser.  Then  news  came  of  a clash  between 
storm  troopers  of  one  of  the  fighting  leagues,  the  Bund 
Oberland,  and  regular  troops  at  the  Army  Engineers’ 
barracks.  Hitler  decided  to  drive  to  the  scene  and  settle 
the  matter  personally,  leaving  the  beer  hall  in  charge  of 
Ludendorff. 

This  turned  out  to  be  a fatal  error.  Lossow  was  the  first 
to  slip  away.  He  informed  Ludendorff  he  must  hurry  to 
his  office  at  Army  headquarters  to  give  the  necessary  or- 
ders. When  Scheubner-Richter  objected,  Ludendorff  re- 
joined stiffly,  “I  forbid  you  to  doubt  the  word  of  a 
German  officer.”  Kahr  and  Seisser  vanished  too. 

Hitler,  in  high  spirits,  returned  to  the  Buergerbrau  to 
find  that  the  birds  had  flown  the  coop.  This  was  the 
first  blow  of  the  evening  and  it  stunned  him.  He  had 
confidently  expected  to  find  his  “ministers”  busy  at  their 
new  tasks  while  Ludendorff  and  Lossow  worked  out  plans 
for  the  march  on  Berlin.  But  almost  nothing  was  being 
done.  Not  even  Munich  was  being  occupied  by  the  revo- 
lutionary forces.  Roehm,  at  the  head  of  a detachment  of 
storm  troopers  from  another  fighting  league,  the  Reichs- 
kriegsflagge,  had  seized  Army  headquarters  at  the  War 
Ministry  in  the  Schoenfeldstrasse  but  no  other  strategic 
centers  were  occupied,  not  even  the  telegraph  office,  over 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


109 


whose  wires  news  of  the  coup  went  out  to  Berlin  and 
orders  came  back,  from  General  von  Seeckt  to  the  Army 
in  Bavaria,  to  suppress  the  putsch. 

Though  there  were  some  defections  among  the  junior 
officers  and  some  of  the  troops,  whose  sympathies  were 
with  Hitler  and  Roehm,  the  higher  officers,  led  by  General 
von  Danner,  commander  of  the  Munich  garrison,  not  only 
were  prepared  to  carry  out  Seeckt’s  command  but  were 
bitterly  resentful  of  the  treatment  meted  out  to  General 
von  Lossow.  In  the  Army’s  code  a civilian  who  pointed 
a revolver  at  a general  deserved  to  be  smitten  by  an  officer’s 
side  arms.  From  headquarters  at  the  19th  Infantry  bar- 
racks, where  Lossow  had  joined  Danner,  messages  went 
out  to  outlying  garrisons  to  rush  reinforcements  to  the 
city.  By  dawn  Regular  Army  troops  had  drawn  a cordon 
around  Roehm’s  forces  in  the  War  Ministry. 

Before  this  action  Hitler  and  Ludendorff  joined  Roehm 
at  the  ministry  for  a time,  to  take  stock  of  the  situation. 
Roehm  was  shocked  to  find  that  no  one  besides  himself 
had  taken  military  action  and  occupied  the  key  centers. 
Hitler  tried  desperately  to  re-establish  contact  with  Los- 
sow, Kahr  and  Seisser.  Messengers  were  dispatched  to  the 
19th  Infantry  barracks  in  the  name  of  Ludendorff  but 
they  did  not  return.  Poehner,  the  former  Munich  police 
chief  and  now  one  of  Hitler’s  supporters,  was  sent  with 
Major  Huehnlein  and  a band  of  the  S.A.  troopers  to  oc- 
cupy police  headquarters.  They  were  promptly  arrested 
there. 

And  what  of  Gustav  von  Kahr,  the  head  of  the  Bavarian 
government?  After  leaving  the  Buergerbraukeller  he  had 
quickly  recovered  his  senses  and  his  courage.  Not  wishing 
to  take  any  more  chances  on  being  made  a prisoner  of 
Hitler  and  his  rowdies,  Kahr  moved  the  government  to 
Regensburg.  But  not  before  he  had  ordered  placards 
posted  throughout  Munich  carrying  the  following  proc- 
lamation: 

The  deception  and  perfidy  of  ambitious  comrades  have 
converted  a demonstration  in  the  interests  of  national  re- 
awakening into  a scene  of  disgusting  violence.  The  - declara- 
tions extorted  from  myself.  General  von  Lossow  and  Colonel 
Seisser  at  the  point  of  the  revolver  are  null  and  void. 
The  National  Socialist  German  Workers’  Party,  as  well  as  the 


110  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

fighting  leagues  Oberland  and  Reichskriegsflagge,  are  dis- 
solved. 

Von  Kahr 

General  State  Commissioner 

The  triumph  which  earlier  in  the  evening  had  seemed 
to  Hitler  so  near  and  so  easily  won  was  rapidly  fading 
with  the  night.  The  basis  for  a successful  political  revolu- 
tion on  which  he  had  always  insisted — the  support  of 
existing  institutions  such  as  the  Army,  the  police,  the 
political  group  in  power — was  now  crumbling.  Not  even 
Ludendorff’s  magic  name,  it  was  now  clear,  had  won 
over  the  armed  forces  of  the  state.  Hitler  suggested  that 
perhaps  the  situation  could  be  retrieved  if  he  and  the 
General  withdrew  to  the  countryside  near  Rosenheim 
and  rallied  the  peasants  behind  the  armed  bands  for  an 
assault  on  Munich,  but  Ludendorff  promptly  rejected 
the  idea. 

Or  perhaps  there  was  another  way  out  which  at  least 
would  avert  disaster.  On  first  hearing  of  the  putsch, 
Crown  Prince  Rupprecht,  a bitter  personal  enemy  of 
Ludendorff,  had  issued  a brief  statement  calling  for  its 
prompt  suppression.  Now  Hitler  decided  to  appeal  to  the 
Prince  to  intercede  with  Lossow  and  Kahr  and  obtain  an 
honorable,  peaceful  settlement.  A Lieutenant  Neunzert, 
a friend  of  Hitler  and  of  Rupprecht,  was  hurried  off  at 
dawn  to  the  Wittelsbach  castle  near  Berchtesgaden  on  the 
delicate  mission.  Unable  to  find  an  automobile,  he  had  to 
wait  for  a train  and  did  not  arrive  at  his  destination 
until  noon,  at  which  hour  events  were  taking  a turn  not 
foreseen  by  Hitler  nor  dreamt  of  as  possible  by  Luden- 
dorff. 

Hitler  had  planned  a putsch,  not  a civil  war.  Despite  his 
feverish  state  of  excitement  he  was  in  sufficient  control 
of  himself  to  realize  that  he  lacked  the  strength  to  over- 
come the  police  and  the  Army.  He  had  wanted  to  make  a 
revolution  with  the  armed  forces,  not  against  them.  Blood- 
thirsty though  he  had  been  in  his  recent  speeches  and 
during  the  hours  he  held  the  Bavarian  triumvirs  at  gun- 
point, he  shrank  from  the  idea  of  men  united  in  their 
hatred  of  the  Republic  shedding  the  blood  of  each  other. 

So  did  Ludendorff.  He  would,  as  he  had  told  his  wife, 
string  up  President  Ebert  “and  Co.”  and  gladly  watch 


Ill 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

them  dangle  from  the  gallows.  But  he  did  not  wish  to 
kill  policemen  and  soldiers  who,  in  Munich  at  least,  be- 
lieved with  him  in  the  national  counterrevolution. 

To  the  wavering  young  Nazi  leader  Ludendorff  now 
proposed  a plan  of  his  own  that  might  still  bring  them 
victory  and  yet  avoid  bloodshed.  German  soldiers,  even 
German  police — who  were  mostly  ex-soldiers — would  never 
dare,  he  was  sure,  to  fire  on  the  legendary  commander  who 
had  led  them  to  great  victories  on  both  the  Eastern  and 
the  Western  fronts.  He  and  Hitler  would  march  with  their 
followers  to  the  center  of  the  city  and  take  it  over. 
Not  only  would  the  police  and  the  Army  not  dare  to 
oppose  him,  he  was  certain;  they  would  join  him  and 
fight  under  his  orders.  Though  somewhat  skeptical,  Hitler 
agreed.  There  seemed  no  other  way  out.  The  Crown 
Prince,  he  noted,  had  not  replied  to  his  plea  for  mediation. 

Toward  eleven  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  November  9, 
the  anniversary  of  the  proclamation  of  the  German  Repub- 
lic, Hitler  and  Ludendorff  led  a column  of  some  three 
thousand  storm  troopers  out  of  the  gardens  of  the 
Buergerbraukeller  and  headed  for  the  center  of  Munich. 
Beside  them  in  the  front  rank  marched  Goering,  com- 
mander of  the  S.A.,  Scheubner-Richter,  Rosenberg,  Ulrich 
Graf,  Hitler’s  bodyguard,  and  half  a dozen  other  Nazi 
officials  and  leaders  of  the  Kampfbund.  A swastika  flag 
and  a banner  of  the  Bund  Oberland  were  unfurled  at  the 
head  of  the  column.  Not  far  behind  the  first  ranks  a 
truck  chugged  along,  loaded  with  machine  guns  and 
machine  gunners.  The  storm  troopers  carried  carbines, 
slung  over  their  shoulders,  some  with  fixed  bayonets.  Hit- 
ler brandished  his  revolver.  Not  a very  formidable  armed 
force,  but  Ludendorff,  who  had  commanded  millions  of 
Germany’s  finest  troops,  apparently  thought  it  sufficient  for 
his  purposes. 

A few  hundred  yards  north  of  the  beer  cellar  the 
rebels  met  their  first  obstacle.  On  the  Ludwig  Bridge,  which 
leads  over  the  River  Isar  toward  the  center  of  the  city, 
stood  a detachment  of  armed  police  barring  the  route. 
Goering  sprang  forward  and,  addressing  the  police  com- 
mander, threatened  to  shoot  a number  of  hostages  he  said 
he  had  in  the  rear  of  his  column  if  the  police  fired  on  his 


112 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

men.  During  the  night  Hess  and  others  had  rounded 
up  a number  of  hostages,  including  two  cabinet  members, 
for  just  such  a contingency.  Whether  Goering  was  bluffing 
or  not,  the  police  commander  apparently  believed  he 
was  not  and  let  the  column  file  over  the  bridge  unmolested., 

At  the  Marienplatz  the  Nazi  column  encountered  a large' 
crowd  which  was  listening  to  an  exhortation  of  Julius 
Streicher,  the  Jew-baiter  from  Nuremberg,  who  had  rushed 
to  Munich  at  the  first  news  of  the  putsch.  Not  wishing  to 
be  left  out  of  the  revolution,  he  cut  short  his  speech  and 
joined  the  rebels,  jumping  into  step  immediately  behind 
Hitler. 

Shortly  after  noon  the  marchers  neared  their  objective, 
the  War  Ministry,  where  Roehm  and  his  storm  troopers 
were  surrounded  by  soldiers  of  the  Reichswehr.  Neither 
besiegers  nor  besieged  had  yet  fired  a shot.  Roehm  and 
his  men  were  all  ex-soldiers  and  they  had  many  wartime 
comrades  on  the  other  side  of  the  barbed  wire.  Neither 
side  had  any  heart  for  killing. 

To  reach  the  War  Ministry  and  free  Roehm,  Hitler 
and  Ludendorff  now  led  their  column  through  the  narrow 
Residenzstrasse,  which,  just  beyond  the  Feldherrnhalle, 
opens  out  into  the  spacious  Odeonsplatz.  At  the  end  of  the 
gullylike  street  a detachment  of  police  about  one  hun- 
dred strong,  armed  with  carbines,  blocked  the  way.  They 
were  in  a strategic  spot  and  this  time  they  did  not  give 
way. 

But  once  again  the  Nazis  tried  to  talk  their  way  through. 
One  of  them,  the  faithful  bodyguard  Ulrich  Graf,  stepped 
forward  and  cried  out  to  the  police  officer  in  charge, 
“Don’t  shoot!  His  Excellency  Ludendorff  is  coming!” 
Even  at  this  crucial,  perilous  moment,  a German  revolu- 
tionary, even  an  old  amateur  wrestler  and  professional 
bouncer,  remembered  to  give  a gentleman  his  proper  title. 
Hitler  added  another  cry.  “Surrender!  Surrender!”  he 
called  out.  But  the  unknown  police  officer  did  not  sur- 
render. Apparently  Ludendorff’s  name  had  no  magic 
sound  for  him;  this  was  the  police,  not  the  Army. 

Which  side  fired  first  was  never  established.  Each  put  the 
blame  on  the  other.  One  onlooker  later  testified  that 
Hitler  fired  the  first  shot  with  his  revolver.  Another 
thought  that  Streicher  did,  and  more  than  one  Nazi  later 


113 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


told  this  author  that  it  was  this  deed  which,  more  than 
any  other,  endeared  him  so  long  to  Hitler.* 

At  any  rate  a shot  was  fired  and  in  the  next  instant  a 
volley  of  shots  rang  out  from  both  sides,  spelling  in  that 
instant  the  doom  of  Hitler’s  hopes.  Scheubner-Richter  fell, 
mortally  wounded.  Goering  went  down  with  a serious 
wound  in  his  thigh.  Within  sixty  seconds  the  firing  stopped, 
but  the  street  was  already  littered  with  fallen  bodies — six- 
teen Nazis  and  three  police  dead  or  dying,  many  more 
wounded  and  the  rest,  including  Hitler,  clutching  the  pave- 
ment to  save  their  lives. 

There  was  one  exception,  and  had  his  example  been 
followed,  the  day  might  have  had  a different  ending.  Lu- 
dendorff  did  not  fling  himself  to  the  ground.  Standing 
erect  and  proud  in  the  best  soldierly  tradition,  with  his 
adjutant,  Major  Streck,  at  his  side,  he  marched  calmly  on 
between  the  muzzles  of  the  police  rifles  until  he  reached  the 
Odeonsplatz.  He  must  have  seemed  a lonely  and  bizarre 
figure.  Not  one  Nazi  followed  him.  Not  even  the  su- 
preme leader,  Adolf  Hitler. 

The  future  Chancellor  of  the  Third  Reich  was  the  first 
to  scamper  to  safety.  He  had  locked  his  left  arm  with 
the  right  arm  of  Scheubner-Richter  (a  curious  but  perhaps 
revealing  gesture)  as  the  column  approached  the  police 
cordon,  and  when  the  latter  fell  he  pulled  Hitler  down  to 
the  pavement  with  him.  Perhaps  Hitler  thought  he  had 
been  wounded;  he  suffered  sharp  pains  which,  it  was 
found  later,  came  from  a dislocated  shoulder.  But  the  fact 
remains  that  according  to  the  testimony  of  one  of  his  own 
Nazi  followers  in  the  column,  the  physician  Dr.  Walther 
Schulz,  which  was  supported  by  several  other  witnesses, 
Hitler  “was  the  first  to  get  up  and  turn  back,”  leaving  his 
dead  and  wounded  comrades  lying  in  the  street.  He  was 
hustled  into  a waiting  motorcar  and  spirited  off  to  the 
country  home  of  the  Hanfstaengls  at  Uffing,  where  Putzi’s 
wife  and  sister  nursed  him  and  where,  two  days  later,  he 


was  arrested. 

Ludendorff  was  arrested  on  the  spot.  He  was  contemp- 

* Some  years  later,  in  approving  Stretcher’s  appointment  as  Nazi  leader 
for  Franconia  over  the  opposition  of  many  party  comrades  Hitler  de- 
clared “Perhaps  there  are  one  or  two  who  don  t like  the  shape  ot 
Comrade  Streicher's  nose.  But  when  he  lay  beside  me  that  day  on  the 
pavement  by  the  Feldherrnhalle,  I vowed  to  myself  never  to  forsake 
him  so  long  as  he  did  not  forsake  me.”  (Heiden,  Hitler:  A Biography, 
p.  157.) 


114 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tuous  of  the  rebels  who  had  not  had  the  courage  to  march 
on  with  him,  and  so  bitter  against  the  Army  for  not 
coming  over  to  his  side  that  he  declared  henceforth  he 
would  not  recognize  a German  officer  nor  ever  again  wear 
an  officers  uniform.  The  wounded  Goering  was  given 

whlh'h  bh  ?!  J6W1Sh  Pr°Prietor  of  a nearby  bank8 into 
which  he  had  been  carried  and  then  smuggled  across  the 

frontier  into  Austria  by  his  wife  and  taken  to  a hospital 
m Innsbruck.  Hess  also  fled  to  Austria.  Roehm  surrendered 
at  the  War  Ministry  two  hours  after  the  collapse 
before  the  Feldherrnhalle.  Within  a few  days  all  the 
rebel  leaders  except  Goering  and  Hess  were  rounded  up 
and  jailed.  The  Nazi  putsch  had  ended  in  a fiasco  The 
party  was  dissolved.  National  Socialism,  to  all  appear- 
“>  ™as4  ^ead.  Its  dictatorial  leader,  who  had  run  away 
at  the  first  hail  of  bullets,  seemed  utterly  discredited  his 
meteoric  political  career  at  an  end. 

TRIAL  FOR  TREASON 

As  things  turned  out,  that  career  was  merely  inter- 
nipted,  and  not  for  long.  Hitler  was  shrewd  enough  to  see 
that  his  trial,  far  from  finishing  him,  would  provide  a new 
platform  from  which  he  could  not  only  discredit  the  com- 
promised authorities  who  had  arrested  him  but— and  this 
was  more  important— for  the  first  time  make  his  name 
known  far  beyond  the  confines  of  Bavaria  and  indeed  of 
Germany  itself.  He  was  well  aware  that  correspondents  of 
the  world  press  as  well  as  of  the  leading  German  news- 
papers were  flocking  to  Munich  to  cover  the  trial,  which 
S °“  F(*ruary  26>  1924,  before  a special  court  sit- 

g in  the  old  Infantry  School  in  the  Blutenburgstrasse. 
y the  time  it  had  ended  twenty-four  days  later  Hitler 
had  transformed  defeat  into  triumph,  made  Kahr  Los- 
sow  and  Seisser  share  his  guilt  in  the  public  mind  to 
their  ruin,  impressed  the  German  people  with  his  elo- 
quence and  the  fervor  of  his  nationalism,  and  emblazoned 
ms  name  on  the  front  pages  of  the  world 

Although  Ludendorff  was  easily  the  most  famous  of  the 

,n,Ih"dOCk'  Hit]er  at  once  grabbed  the  lime- 
hght  for  himself.  From  beginning  to  end  he  dominated 

J rr  Franz  Guertner>  the  Bavarian  Minister  of 
Justice  and  an  old  friend  and  protector  of  the  Nazi  leader, 


115 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hiller 

had  seen  to  it  that  the  judiciary  would  be  complacent 
and  lenient.  Hitler  was  allowed  to  interrupt  as  often  as 
he  pleased,  cross-examine  witnesses  at  will  and  speak  on 
his  own  behalf  at  any  time  and  at  any  length — his  open- 
ing statement  consumed  four  hours,  but  it  was  only  the 
first  of  many  long  harangues. 

He  did  not  intend  to  make  the  mistake  of  those  who, 
when  tried  for  complicity  in  the  Kapp  putsch,  had 
pleaded,  as  he  later  said,  that  “they  knew  nothing,  had 
intended  nothing,  wished  nothing.  That  was  what  de- 
stroyed the  bourgeois  world — that  they  had  not  the  cour- 
age to  stand  by  their  act  . . . to  step  before  the  judge  and 
say,  ‘Yes,  that  was  what  we  wanted  to  do;  we  wanted  to 
destroy  the  State.’  ” 

Now  before  the  judges  and  the  representatives  of  the 
world  press  in  Munich,  Hitler  proclaimed  proudly,  “I  alone 
bear  the  responsibility.  But  I am  not  a criminal  because 
of  that.  If  today  I stand  here  as  a revolutionary,  it  is  as  a 
revolutionary  against  the  revolution.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  high  treason  against  the  traitors  of  1918.” 

If  there  were,  then  the  three  men  who  headed  the  gov- 
ernment, the  Army  and  the  police  in  Bavaria  and  who 
had  conspired  with  him  against  the  national  government 
were  equally  guilty  and  should  be  in  the  dock  beside  him 
instead  of  in  the  witness  stand  as  his  chief  accusers. 
Shrewdly  he  turned  the  tables  on  the  uneasy,  guilt-ridden 
triumvirs: 

One  thing  was  certain,  Lossow,  Kahr  and  Seisser  had  the 
same  goal  that  we  had— to  get  rid  of  the  Reich  govern- 
ment ...  If  our  enterprise  was  actually  high  treason,  then 
during  the  whole  period  Lossow,  Kahr  and  Seisser  must 
have  been  committing  high  treason  along  with  us,  for  during 
all  these  weeks  we  talked  of  nothing  but  the  aims  of  which 
we  now  stand  accused. 

The  three  men  could  scarcely  deny  this,  for  it  was  true. 
Kahr  and  Seisser  were  no  match  for  Hitler’s  barbs.  Only 
General  von  Lossow  defended  himself  defiantly.  “I  was 
no  unemployed  komitadji he  reminded  the  - court.  I 
occupied  a high  position  in  the  State.  And  the  General 
poured  all  the  scorn  of  an  old  Army  officer  on  his  former 
corporal,  this  unemployed  upstart,  whose  overpowering 
ambition  had  led  him  to  try  to  dictate  to  the  Army  and 


116 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  State.  How  far  this  unscrupulous  demagogue  had 

wZe’khe^C  tlmed’  n°m  the  days>  not  so  far  distant, 
when  he  had  been  willing  to  be  merely  “the  drummer” 
in  a patriotic  movement! 

A drummer  merely?  Hitler  knew  how  to  answer  that: 

How  petty  are  the  thoughts  of  small  men!  Believe  me,  I 
do  not  regard  the  acquisition  of  a minister’s  portfolio  as  a 

min8  fW°rta  StnVlng  for-  1 do  not  hold  h worthy  of  a great 
man  to  endeavor  to  go  down  in  history  just  by  becoming  a 
minister.  One  might  be  in  danger  of  being  buried  beside 

h ghLmthanebe  ^ fr°?n.  **“  fifSt  W3S  a thousand  times 
dlstrovc?  of  M °mmg  ‘ mmister-  1 wanted  to  become  the 
I doTc  ? , frXArm-  1 ^ 8011,8  to  a^ieve  this  task,  and  if 
concerned  ^ °f  MuUSter  WlU  be  an  absurdity  so  far  as  I am 

He  invoked  the  example  of  Wagner. 

When  I stood  for  the  first  time  at  the  grave  of  Richard 
Wagner  my  heart  overflowed  with  pride  in  a man  who  hid 
dlllr  MD  anynSUCh  inscn'Ption  as  “Here  lies  Privy  Coun- 
WaLr^-T  Dlrector’  ?is  Excellency  Baron  Richard  von 
Wagner.  I was  proud  that  this  man  and  so  many  others  in 

ST?*-*?  Were  “toent  to  give  their  names  to  h£oS 

without  titles.  It  was  not  from  modesty  that  I wanted  to  be  a 
ST-  “ir  That  aspiration— 

He  had  been  accused  of  wanting  to  jump  from  drum- 
mer to  dictator.  He  would  not  deny  it.  Fate  had  decreed 

He^willTfi  S I'  te  f diCta‘°r  is  not  cotopelled. 

TW.  • ‘'.uH  • 0t  dnven  forward,  but  drives  himself 

Sr  lnV‘n,"1,fSt  ab°Ut  this‘  Is  h immodest  for  a 

worker  to  drive  himself  toward  heavy  labor?  Is  it  presumptu- 

throui  thT^r^  ,-ue  r,high  forehead  °f  a linker  to  ponder 
man  r 41  be  glves  *he  world  an  invention’  The 

say**  “If° vim  S ^ r6d  UP°n  ‘°  gOVern  a pe°ple  has  no  ri8ht  to 
*ay’,  . you  want  me  or  summon  me,  I will  co-otierate  ” 

No!  It  is  his  duty  to  step  forward.  co-operate. 

pough  he  might  be  in  the  dock  facing  a long  prison 
sentence  for  high  treason  against  his  country  his  ^onfi- 
dence  m himself,  in  the  call  to  “govern  a people  ” was 
undimimshed.  While  in  prison  awaiting  trial  he  had  al- 
ready analyzed  the  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the  putsch 


117 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

and  had  vowed  that  he  would  not  commit  the  same  mis- 
takes in  the  future.  Recalling  his  thoughts  thirteen  years 
later  after  he  had  achieved  his  goal,  he  told  his  old  fol- 
lowers, assembled  at  the  Buergerbraukeller  to  celebrate 
the  anniversary  of  the  putsch,  ‘ I can  calmly  say  that  it 
was  the  rashest  decision  of  my  life.  When  I think  back  on 
it  today,  I grow  dizzy  ...  If  today  you  saw  one  of  our 
squads  from  the  year  1923  marching  by,  you  would  ask, 
‘What  workhouse  have  they  escaped  from?’  . . . But  fate 
meant  well  with  us.  It  did  not  permit  an  action  to  succeed 
which,  if  it  had  succeeded,  would  in  the  end  have  inevi- 
tably crashed  as  a result  of  the  movement’s  inner  imma- 
turity in  those  days  and  its  deficient  organizational  and 
intellectual  foundation  ...  We  recognized  that  it  is  not 
enough  to  overthrow  the  old  State,  but  that  the  new  State 
must  previously  have  been  built  up  and  be  ready  to  one  s 
hand  ...  In  1933  it  was  no  longer  a question  of  over- 
throwing a State  by  an  act  of  violence;  meanwhile  the 
new  State  had  been  built  up  and  all  that  remained  to  do 
was  to  destroy  the  last  remnants  of  the  old  State — and 
that  took  but  a few  hours.” 

How  to  build  the  new  Nazi  State  was  already  in  his 
mind  as  he  fenced  with  the  judges  and  his  prosecutors 
during  the  trial.  For  one  thing,  he  would  have  to  have  the 
German  Army  with  him,  not  against  him,  the  next  time. 
In  his  closing  address  he  played  on  the  idea  of  reconcilia- 
tion with  the  armed  forces.  There  was  no  word  of  re- 
proach for  the  Army. 

I believe  that  the  hour  will  come  when  the  masses,  who 
today  stand  in  the  street  with  our  swastika  banner,  will  unite 
with  those  who  fired  upon  them  . . . When  I learned  that  it 
was  the  Green  police  which  fired,  I was  happy  that  it  was 
not  the  Reichswehr  which  had  stained  the  record;  the 
Reichswehr  stands  as  untarnished  as  before.  One  day  the 
hour  will  come  when  the  Reichswehr  will  stand  at  our  side, 
officers  and  men. 

It  was  an  accurate  prediction,  but  here  the  presiding 
judge  intervened.  “Herr  Hitler,  you  say  that  the  Green 
police  was  stained.  That  I cannot  permit.” 

The  accused  paid  not  the  slightest  attention  to  the  ad- 
monition. In  a peroration  that  held  the  audience  in  the 
courtroom  spellbound  Hitler  spoke  his  final  words; 


118 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  army  we  have  formed  is  growing  from  day  to  day 
...  I nourish  the  proud  hope  that  one  day  the  hour  will 
come  when  these  rough  companies  will  grow  to  battalions, 
Ih!  nfn :taho"s  ‘°  re8iments,  the  regiments  to  divisions,  that 

o d-nC°Ckade  W1!  be  laken  from  the  mud,  that  the  old 
flags  wtH  wave  again  that  there  will  be  a reconciliation  at 
the  last  great  divine  judgment  which  we  are  prepared  to  face. 

He  turned  his  burning  eyes  directly  on  the  judges. 

For  it  is  not  you,  gentlemen,  who  pass  judgment  on  us. 

Judgment  is  spoken  by  the  eternal  court  of  history 
What  judgment  you  will  hand  down  I know.  But  that  court 
nntr’n°Twk  US’/D'n  yoU  c°mmit  high  treason  or  did  you 
of  thP  hM  A°Urt  Tt  ,)udge  us’  the  Quartermaster  General 
German  t,  y ^udendorff],  his  officers  and  soldiers,  as 
pT  , ,°  ,Wanted  °"ly  the  8°od  their  own  people  and 

Fatherland,  who  wanted  to  fight  and  die.  You  may  pro- 
nounce us  guilty  a thousand  times  over,  but  the  goddessP  of 

brief  nf“*  CTl  °f  hlSl°ry  Wi“  Smile  and  tear  to  tatters  the 
brief  of  the  state  prosecutor  and  the  sentence  of  this  court 
.ror  she  acquits  us.10 

The  sentences,  if  not  the  verdicts,  of  the  actual  judges 

mem  of  w°t  Heiden  wrote,  not  so  far  from  the  judg- 
ment of  history.  Ludendorff  was  acquitted.  Hitler  and  the 
other  accused  were  found  guilty.  But  in  the  face  of  the 
law— Article  81  of  the  German  Penal  Code — which  de- 
clared that  “whosoever  attempts  to  alter  by  force  the  Con- 
stitution  of  the  German  Reich  or  of  any  German  state 
shal!  be  punished  by  lifelong  imprisonment,”  Hitler  was 
sentenced  to  five  years’  imprisonment  in  the  old  fortress 

veritv^f  EIen  thT  th?  lay  judges  Protested  the  se- 
venty  of  the  sentence,  but  they  were  assured  by  the  pre- 

after8hJe  haeHthat  pTi&onei  wouId  be  eligible  for  parole 
II  er„ht?  had  served  six  months.  Efforts  of  the  police  to 
®e‘  Hlt!er  deported  as  a foreigner— he  still  held  Austrian 
citizenship— came  to  nothing.  The  sentences  were  im- 
posed  on  April  1,  1924.  A little  less  than  nine  months 
ater  on  December  20,  Hitler  was  released  from  prison 
free  to  resume  his  fight  to  overthrow  the  democrats  state’ 
The  consequences  of  committing  high  treason,  if  you  were 
th°fithe  extreme  R,ght,  were  not  unduly  heavy  de- 
ticeof 3W’  3nd  3 8°°d  many  antirePubIicans  took  no- 
The  putsch,  even  though  it  was  a fiasco,  made  Hitler  a 


119 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

national  figure  and,  in  the  eyes  of  many,  a patriot  and  a 
hero.  Nazi  propaganda  soon  transformed  it  into  one  of 
the  great  legends  of  the  movement.  Each  year,  even  after 
he  came  to  power,  even  after  World  War  II  broke  out, 
Hitler  returned  on  the  evening  of  November  8 to  the  beer 
hall  in  Munich  to  address  his  Old  Guard  comrades — the 
alte  Kaempfer,  as  they  were  called — who  had  followed 
the  leader  to  what  seemed  then  such  a grotesque  disaster. 
In  1935  Hitler,  the  Chancellor,  had  the  bodies  of  the  six- 
teen Nazis  who  had  fallen  in  the  brief  encounter  dug  up 
and  placed  in  vaults  in  the  Feldherrnhalle,  which  became 
a national  shrine.  Of  them  Hitler  said,  in  dedicating  the 
memorial,  “They  now  pass  into  German  immortality. 
Here  they  stand  for  Germany  and  keep  guard  over  our 
people.  Here  they  lie  as  true  witnesses  to  our  movement.” 
He  did  not  add,  and  no  German  seemed  to  recall,  that 
they  were  also  the  men  whom  Hitler  had  abandoned  to 
their  dying  when  he  had  picked  himself  up  from  the  pave- 
ment and  ran  away. 

That  summer  of  1924  in  the  old  fortress  at  Landsberg, 
high  above  the  River  Lech,  Adolf  Hitler,  who  was  treated 
as  an  honored  guest,  with  a room  of  his  own  and  a splen- 
did view,  cleared  out  the  visitors  who  flocked  to  pay  him 
homage  and  bring  him  gifts,  summoned  the  faithful  Ru- 
dolf Hess,  who  had  finally  returned  to  Munich  and  re- 
ceived a sentence,  and  began  to  dictate  to  him  chapter 
after  chapter  of  a book.* 

* Before  the  arrival  of  Hess,  Emil  Maurice,  an  ex-convict,  a watch- 
maker and  the  first  commander  of  the  Nazi  ‘strong-arm”  squads,  took 
some  preliminary  dictation. 


4 


THE  MIND  OF  niTLER 
AND  THE  ROOTS 
OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 

HITLER  WANTED  to  call  his  book  “Four  and  a Half  Years 
of  Struggle  against  Lies,  Stupidity  and  Cowardice,”  but 
Max  Amann,  the  hard-headed  manager  of  the  Nazi  publish- 
ing business,  who  was  to  bring  it  out,  rebelled  against 
such  a ponderous — and  unsalable — title  and  shortened  it 
to  My  Struggle  ( Mein  Kampf).  Amann  was  sorely  disap- 
pointed in  the  contents.  He  had  hoped,  first,  for  a racy 
personal  story  in  which  Hitler  would  recount  his  rise 
from  an  unknown  “worker”  in  Vienna  to  world  renown. 
As  we  have  seen,  there  was  little  autobiography  in  the 
book.  The  Nazi  business  manager  had  also  counted  on  an 
inside  story  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch,  the  drama  and  dou- 
ble-dealing of  which,  he  was  sure,  would  make  good  read- 
ing. But  Hitler  was  too  shrewd  at  this  point,  when  the 
party  fortunes  were  at  their  lowest  ebb,  to  rake  over  old 
coals.*  There  is  scarcely  a word  of  the  unsuccessful 
putsch  in  Mein  Kampf. 

The  first  volume  was  published  in  the  autumn  of  1925.  A 
work  of  some  four  hundred  pages,  it  was  priced  at  twelve 
marks  (three  dollars),  about  twice  the  price  of  most  books 
brought  out  in  Germany  at  that  time.  It  did  not  by  any 

It  is  useless,”  he  wrote  at  the  end  of  the  second  volume,  “to  reopen 
wounds  that  seem  scarcely  healed;  . . . useless  to  speak  of  guilt  re- 
garding  men  who  in  the  bottom  of  their  hearts,  perhaps,  were  all  devoted 
to  their  nation  with  equal  love,  and  who  only  missed  or  failed  to  under- 
stand the  common  road.”  For  a man  so  vindictive  as  Hitler,  this  showed 
unexpected  tolerance  of  those  who  had  crushed  his  rebellion  and  jailed 
him;  or,  in  view  of  what  happened  later  to  Kahr  and  others  who 
crossed  him,  .it  was  perhaps  more  a display  of  will  power — an  ability 
to  restrain  himself  momentarily  for  tactical  reasons.  At  any  rate,  he 
refrained  from  recrimination. 

120 


121 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

means  become  an  immediate  best  seller.  Amann  boasted 
that  it  sold  23,000  copies  the  first  year  and  that  sales 
continued  upward — a claim  that  was  received  with  skepti- 
cism in  anti-Nazi  circles. 

Thanks  to  the  Allied  seizure  in  1945  of  the  royalty 
statements  of  the  Eher  Verlag,  the  Nazi  publishing  firm, 
the  facts  about  the  actual  sale  of  Mein  Kampf  can  now 
be  disclosed.  In  1925  the  book  sold  9,473  copies,  and 
thereafter  for  three  years  the  sales  decreased  annually. 
They  slumped  to  6,913  in  1926,  to  5,607  in  1927  and  to 
a mere  3,015  in  1928,  counting  both  volumes.  They  were 
up  a little— to  7,664— in  1929,  rose  with  the  fortunes  of 
the  Nazi  Party  in  1930,  when  an  inexpensive  one-volume 
edition  at  eight  marks  appeared,  to  54,086,  dropped  slight- 
ly to  50,808  the  following  year  and  jumped  to  90,351  in 

1932.  . 

Hitler’s  royalties — his  chief  source  of  income  from 
1925  on — were  considerable  when  averaged  over  those 
first  seven  years.  But  they  were  nothing  compared  to 
those  received  in  1933,  the  year  he  became  Chancellor. 
In  his  first  year  of  office  Mein  Kampf  sold  a million 
copies,  and  Hitler’s  income  from  the  royalties,  which  had 
been  increased  from  10  to  15  per  cent  after  January  1, 

1933,  was  over  one  million  marks  (some  $300,000),  mak- 
ing him  the  most  prosperous  author  in  Germany  and  for 
the  first  time  a millionaire.*  Except  for  the  Bible,  no  other 
book  sold  as  well  during  the  Nazi  regime,  when  few  fam- 
ily households  felt  secure  without  a copy  on  the  table.  It 
was  almost  obligatory — and  certainly  politic  to  present 
a copy  to  a bride  and  groom  at  their  wedding,  and  nearly 
every  school  child  received  one  on  graduation  from  what- 
ever school.  By  1940,  the  year  after  World  War  II  broke 
out,  six  million  copies  of  the  Nazi  bible  had  been  sold 
in  Germany.1 

Not  every  German  who  bought  a copy  of  Mein  Kampf 
necessarily  read  it.  I have  heard  many  a Nazi  stalwart 
complain  that  it  was  hard  going  and  not  a few  admit — in 
private — that  they  were  never  able  to  get  through  to  the 
end  of  its  782  turgid  pages.  But  it  might  be  argued  that 
had  more  non-Nazi  Germans  read  it  before  1933  and 

* Like  most  writers.  Hitler  had  his  difficulties  with  the  income  tax 
collector — at  least,  as  we  shall  see,  until  he  became  the  dictator  ot 
Germany. 


122 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

had  the  foreign  statesmen  of  the  world  perused  it  care- 
fully while  there  still  was  time,  both  Germany  and  the 
world  might  have  been  saved  from  catastrophe.  For  what- 
ever other  accusations  can  be  made  against  Adolf  Hitler, 
no  one  can  accuse  him  of  not  putting  down  in  writing 
exactly  the  kind  of  Germany  he  intended  to  make  if  he 
ever  came  to  power  and  the  kind  of  world  he  meant  to 
create  by  armed  German  conquest.  The  blueprint  of  the 
Third  Reich  and,  what  is  more,  of  the  barbaric  New 
Order  which  Hitler  inflicted  on  conquered  Europe  in  the 
triumphant  years  between  1939  and  1945  is  set  down  in 
all  its  appalling  crudity  at  great  length  and  in  detail  be- 
tween the  covers  of  this  revealing  book. 

As  we  have  seen,  Hitler’s  basic  ideas  were  formed  in 
his  early  twenties  in  Vienna,  and  we  have  his  own  word 
for  it  that  he  learned  little  afterward  and  altered  nothing 
in  his  thinking.*  When  he  left  Austria  for  Germany  in 
1913  at  the  age  of  twenty-four,  he  was  full  of  a burning 
passion  for  German  nationalism,  a hatred  for  democracy, 
Marxism  and  the  Jews  and  a certainty  that  Providence  had 
chosen  the  Aryans,  especially  the  Germans,  to  be  the 
master  race. 

In  Mein  Kampf  he  expanded  his  views  and  applied 
them  specifically  to  the  problem  of  not  only  restoring  a 
defeated  and  chaotic  Germany  to  a place  in  the  sun 
greater  than  it  had  ever  had  before  but  making  a new  kind 
of  state,  one  which  would  be  based  on  race  and  would 
include  all  Germans  then  living  outside  the  Reich’s  fron- 
tiers, and  in  which  would  be  established  the  absolute 
dictatorship  of  the  Leader — himself — with  an  array  of 
smaller  leaders  taking  orders  from  above  and  giving  them 
to  those  below.  Thus  the  book  contains,  first,  an  outline 
of  the  future  German  state  and  of  the  means  by  which  it 
can  one  day  become  “lord  of  the  earth,”  as  the  author 
puts  it  on  the  very  last  page;  and,  second,  a point  of  view, 
a conception  of  life,  or,  to  use  Hitler’s  favorite  German 
word,  a Weltanschauung.  That  this  view  of  life  would 
strike  a normal  mind  of  the  twentieth  century  as  a gro- 
tesque hodgepodge  concocted  by  a half-baked,  unedu- 
cated neurotic  goes  without  saying.  What  makes  it  im- 
portant is  that  it  was  embraced  so  fanatically  by  so  many 


* See  above,  p.  40. 


123 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

millions  of  Germans  and  that  if  it  led,  as  it  did,  to  their 
ultimate  ruin  it  also  led  to  the  ruin  of  so  many  millions 
of  innocent,  decent  human  beings  inside  and  especially 
outside  Germany. 

Now,  how  was  the  new  Reich  to  regain  her  position  as 
a world  power  and  then  go  on  to  world  mastery?  Hitler 
pondered  the  question  in  the  first  volume,  written  mostly 
when  he  was  in  prison  in  1924,  returning  to  it  at  greater 
length  in  Volume  Two,  which  was  finished  in  1926. 

In  the  first  place,  there  must  be  a reckoning  with 
France,  “the  inexorable  mortal  enemy  of  the  German  peo- 
ple.” TTie  French  aim,  he  said,  would  always  be  to  achieve 
a “dismembered  and  shattered  Germany  ...  a hodge- 
podge of  little  states.”  This  was  so  self-evident,  Hitler 
added,  that  “.  . . if  I were  a Frenchman  ...  I could  not 
and  would  not  act  any  differently  from  Clemenceau.” 
Therefore,  there  must  be  “a  final  active  reckoning  with 
France  ...  a last  decisive  struggle  . . . only  then  will  we 
be  able  to  end  the  eternal  and  essentially  so  fruitless  strug- 
gle between  ourselves  and  France;  presupposing,  of 
course,  that  Germany  actually  regards  the  destruction  of 
France  as  only  a means  which  will  afterward  enable  her 
finally  to  give  our  people  the  expansion  made  possible 
elsewhere.”  2 

Expansion  elsewhere?  Where?  In  this  manner  Hitler 
leads  to  the  core  of  his  ideas  on  German  foreign  policy 
which  he  was  to  attempt  so  faithfully  to  carry  out  when 
he  became  ruler  of  the  Reich.  Germany , he  said  bluntly, 
must  expand  in  the  East — largely  at  the  expense  of  Russia. 

In  the  first  volume  of  Mein  Kampf  Hitler  discoursed 
at  length  on  this  problem  of  Lebensraum — living  space — 
a subject  which  obsessed  him  to  his  dying  breath.  The 
Hohenzollern  Empire,  he  declared,  had  been  mistaken  in 
seeking  colonies  in  Africa.  “Territorial  policy  cannot  be 
fulfilled  in  the  Cameroons  but  today  almost  exclusively  in 
Europe.”  But  the  soil  of  Europe  was  already  occupied. 
True,  Hitler  recognized,  “but  nature  has  not  reserved  this 
soil  for  the  future  possession  of  any  particular  nation  or 
race;  on  the  contrary,  this  soil  exists  for  the  people  which 
possesses  the  force  to  take  it.”  What  if  the  present  pos- 
sessors object?  “Then  the  law  of  self-preservation  goes 
into  effect;  and  what  is  refused  to  amicable  methods,  it  is 
up  to  the  fist  to  take.”  3 


124  Tbe  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Acquisition  of  new  soil,  Hitler  continued,  in  explaining 
the  blindness  of  German  prewar  foreign  policy,  “was  pos- 
sible only  in  the  East  ...  If  land  was  desired  in  Europe 
it  could  be  obtained  by  and  large  only  at  the  expense  of 
Russia,  and  this  meant  that  the  new  Reich  must  again  set 
itself  on  the  march  along  the  road  of  the  Teutonic  Knights 
of  old  to  obtain  by  the  German  sword  sod  for  the  Ger- 
man plow  and  daily  bread  for  the  nation.”  4 

As  if  he  had  not  made  himself  entirely  clear  in  the  initial 
volume,  Hitler  returned  to  the  subject  in  the  second  one. 

Only  an  adequate  large  space  on  this  earth  assures  a na- 
L‘°"  °f  frfdoin  of  existence  . . . Without  consideration  of 
traditions  and  prejudices  [the  National  Socialist  move- 
ment] must  find  the  courage  to  gather  our  people  and 
their  strength  for  an  advance  along  the  road  that  will  lead 
this  people  from  its  present  restricted  living  space  to  new 
land  and  soil  . . . The  National  Socialist  movement  must 
strive  to  eliminate  the  disproportion  between  our  popula- 
tion and  our  area-viewing  this  latter  as  a source  of  food 

imfliTchin8!  a, baS1S  fOF  P°Wer  poIitics  • • • We  must  hold 
unflinchmgly  to  our  aim  . . . to  secure  for  the  German  peo- 
ple the  land  and  soil  to  which  they  are  entitled  .5  P 

How  much  land  are  the  German  people  entitled  to’  The 
bourgeoisie  says  Hitler  scornfully,  “which  does  not  pos- 
sess a single  creative  political  idea  for  the  future  ” had 
beeniClamormg  for  the  restoration  of  the  1914  German 

The  demand  for  restoration  of  the  frontiers  of  1914  is 
a Political  absurdity  of  such  proportions  and  consequences 

» v6  r Seem  3 Crime-  Quite  aside  from  *e  fact  that 

in  rfaTthS,lfr0ntlerS  m 1914  WMe  anythin8  but  logical.  For 
in  reahty  they  were  neither  complete  in  the  sense  of  em- 

racing  the  people  of  German  nationality  nor  sensible  with 
regard  to  geomilitary  expediency.  They  were  not  the  result 
of  a considered  political  action,  but  momentary  frontiers  in 
a political  struggle  that  was  by  no  means  concluded  . 

With  equal  right  and  in  many  cases  with  more  right  some 

anderthSamP  6 year  °r  °erman  hist0ry  couId  be  P^eci  out 

bedtbeh!-rC  °f  " °Vhe  conditions  at  time  declared  to 
be  the  aim  in  foreign  affairs.6 

Hitler’s  “sample  year”  would  go  back  some  six  cen- 
turies, to  when  the  Germans  were  driving  the  Slavs  back 


125 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

in  the  East.  The  push  eastward  must  be  resumed.  “Today 
we  count  eighty  million  Germans  in  Europe!  This  foreign 
policy  will  be  acknowledged  as  correct  only  if,  after 
scarcely  a hundred  years,  there  are  two  hundred  and  fifty 
million  Germans  on  this  continent.” 7 And  all  of  them 
within  the  borders  of  the  new  and  expanded  Reich. 

Some  other  peoples,  obviously,  will  have  to  make  way 
for  so  many  Germans.  What  other  peoples? 

And  so  we  National  Socialists  . . . take  up  where  we 
broke  off  six  hundred  years  ago.  We  stop  the  endless  Ger- 
man movement  to  the  south  and  west,  and  turn  our  gaze 
toward  the  land  in  the  East. 

If  we  speak  of  soil  in  Europe  today,  we  can  primarily 
have  in  mind  only  Russia  and  her  vassal  border  states. 

Fate,  Hitler  remarks,  was  kind  to  Germany  in  this  re- 
spect. It  had  handed  over  Russia  to  Bolshevism,  which, 
he  says,  really  meant  handing  over  Russia  to  the  Jews. 
“The  giant  empire  in  the  East,”  he  exults,  “is  ripe  for  col- 
lapse. And  the  end  of  Jewish  rule  in  Russia  will  also  be 
the  end  of  Russia  as  a state.”  So  the  great  steppes  to  the 
East,  Hitler  implies,  could  be  taken  over  easily  on  Rus- 
sia’s collapse  without  much  cost  in  blood  to  the  Germans. 

Can  anyone  contend  that  the  blueprint  here  is  not  clear 
and  precise?  France  will  be  destroyed,  but  that  is  second- 
ary to  the  German  drive  eastward.  First  the  immediate 
lands  to  the  East  inhabited  predominantly  by  Germans 
will  be  taken.  And  what  are  these?  Obviously  Austria,  the 
Sudetenland  in  Czechoslovakia  and  the  western  part  of 
Poland,  including  Danzig.  After  that,  Russia  herself.  Why 
was  the  world  so  surprised,  then,  when  Chancellor  Hitler, 
a bare  few  years  later,  set  out  to  achieve  these  very  ends? 

On  the  nature  of  the  future  Nazi  State,  Hitler’s  ideas 
in  Mein  Kampf  are  less  concise.  He  made  it  clear  enough 
that  there  would  be  no  “democratic  nonsense”  and  that 
the  Third  Reich  would  be  ruled  by  the  Fuehrerprinzip, 
the  leadership  principle — that  is,  that  it  would  be  a dic- 
tatorship. There  is  almost  nothing  about  economics  in 
the  book.  The  subject  bored  Hitler  and  he  never  bothered 
to  try  to  learn  something  about  it  beyond  toying  with  the 
crackpot  ideas  of  Gottfried  Feder,  the  crank  who  was 
against  “interest  slavery.”  _ 


* The  italics  are  mine. 


126  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

mt®reste<?  Hit,er  was  political  power;  economics 
could  somehow  take  care  of  itself. 

The  state  has  nothing  at  all  to  do  with  any  definite 
economic  conception  or  development  . . . The  state  is  a 
racial  organism  and  not  an  economic  organization  ...  The 
inner  strength  of  a state  coincides  only  in  the  rarest  cases 
wi  h so-called  economic  prosperity;  the  latter,  in  innumer- 
able cases,  seems  to  indicate  the  state’s  approaching  decline 
: . sla  demonstrates  with  marvelous  sharpness  that  not 
material  qualities  but  ideal  virtues  alone  make  possible  the 

nomic  hfefl  a.fte41°nly  their  protection  can  ect 
nomic  life  flourish.  Always  when  in  Germany  there  was  an 
upsurge  of  political  power  the  economic  conditions  began 
to  improve;  but  always  when  economics  became  the  sole 

stateencol,°anse0dUr  T-1”6’8  H*’  Stifling  the  ideaI  virtues,  the 
state  collapsed  and  in  a short  time  drew  economic  life  with 

economic  meins  I*  * ^ bee”  f°Unded  by  peaceful 

« Therefore,  as  Hitler  said  in  a speech  in  Munich  in  1923 
no  economic  policy  is  possible  without  a sword  no  in- 
dustnahzatmn  without  power.”  Beyond  that  vague  crude 
p llosophy  and  a passing  reference  in  Mein  Kampf  to 
economic  chambers,”  “chambers  of  estates”  and  a “cen- 
tral economic  parliament”  which  “would  keep  the  national 
economy  functioning,”  Hitler  refrains  from  any  expres- 

Reichf  °Pim0n  °n  the  economic  foundation  of  the  Third 

And  though  the  very  name  of  the  Nazi  Party  nro- 
tTV  f ..  SOcif,ist’”  Hitler  was  even  more  vague*  on 
manv'nThkf-  SOC'ahsm”.  he  envisaged  for  the  new  Ger- 
Jf-  not  surprising  in  view  of  a definition  of  a 
socialist  which  he  gave  in  a speech  on  July  28,  1922: 

Whoever  is  prepared  to  make  the  national  cause’ his  own 

welfare  of  \ kn°WS  "°  higher  ideal  than  the 

welfare  of  his  nation;  whoever  has  understood  our  great 

na  ional  anthem,  “Deutschland  ueber  Alles,”  to  mean  Ihat 

othing  in  the  wide  world  surpasses  in  his  eyes  this  Germany 

people  and  land — that  man  is  a Socialist.10  Y> 

Considerable  editorial  advice  and  even  pruning  on  the 
part  of  at  least  three  helpers  could  not  prevent  Hitler 

RuJotfH  fr°mh°ne  Subject  t0  another  ^ Mein 
Kampf.  Rudolf  Hess,  who  took  most  of  the  dictation  first 


127 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 

at  Landsberg  prison  and  later  at  Haus  Wachenfeld  near 
Berchtesgaden,  did  his  best  to  tidy  up  the  manuscript, 
but  he  was  no  man  to  stand  up  to  the  Leader.  More  suc- 
cessful in  this  respect  was  Father  Bernhard  Stempfle,  a 
former  member  of  the  Hieronymite  order  and  an  anti- 
Semitic  journalist  of  some  notoriety  in  Bavaria.  This 
strange  priest,  of  whom  more  will  be  heard  in  this  history, 
corrected  some  of  Hitler’s  bad  grammar,  straightened  out 
what  prose  he  could  and  crossed  out  a few  passages  which 
he  convinced  the  author  were  politically  objectionable. 
The  third  adviser  was  Josef  Czerny,  of  Czech  origin,  who 
worked  on  the  Nazi  newspaper,  Voelkischer  Beobachter, 
and  whose  anti-Jewish  poetry  endeared  him  to  Hitler. 
Czerny  was  instrumental  in  revising  the  first  volume  of 
Mein  Kampf  for  its  second  printing,  in  which  certain 
embarrassing  words  and  sentences  were  eliminated  or 
changed;  and  he  went  over  carefully  the  proofs  of  Vol- 
ume Two. 

Nevertheless,  most  of  the  meanderings  remained.  Hitler 
insisted  on  airing  his  thoughts  at  random  on  almost  every 
conceivable  subject,  including  culture,  education,  the  the- 
ater, the  movies,  the  comics,  art,  literature,  history,  sex, 
marriage,  prostitution  and  syphilis.  Indeed,  on  the  sub- 
ject of  syphilis,  Hitler  devotes  ten  turgid  pages,  declaring 
it  is  “ the  task  of  the  nation — not  just  one  more  task,”  * 
to  eradicate  it.  To  combat  this  dread  disease  Hitler  de- 
mands that  all  the  propaganda  resources  of  the  nation  be 
mobilized.  “Everything,”  he  says,  “depends  on  the  solu- 
tion of  this  question.”  The  problem  of  syphilis  and  prosti- 
tution must  also  be  attacked,  he  states,  by  facilitating 
earlier  marriages,  and  he  gives  a foretaste  of  the  eugenics 
of  the  Third  Reich  by  insisting  that  “marriage  cannot  be 
an  end  in  itself,  but  must  serve  the  one  higher  goal;  the 
increase  and  preservation  of  the  species  and  the  race. 
This  alone  is  its  meaning  and  its  task.”  11 

And  so  with  this  mention  of  the  preservation  of  the 
species  and  of  the  race  in  Mein  Kampf  we  come  to  the 
second  principal  consideration;  Hitler’s  Weltanschauung, 
his  view  of  life,  which  some  historians,  especially  in  Eng- 
land, have  seen  as  a crude  form  of  Darwinism  but  which 
in  reality,  as  we  shall  see,  has  its  roots  deep  in  German 


* The  italics  are  Hitler’s. 


128 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


history  and  thought.  Like  Darwin  but  also  like  a whole 
array  of  German  philosophers,  historians,  kings,  generals 
and  statesmen,  Hitler  saw  all  life  as  an  eternal  struggle 
and  the  world  as  a jungle  where  the  fittest  survived  and 
the  strongest  ruled — a “world  where  one  creature  feeds 
on  the  other  and  where  the  death  of  the  weaker  implies 
the  life  of  the  stronger.” 

Mem  Kampf  is  studded  with  such  pronouncements:  “In 
the  end  only  the  urge  for  self-preservation  can  conquer 
. . . Mankind  has  grown  great  in  eternal  struggle  and 
only  in  eternal  peace  does  it  perish.  . . . Nature  puts 
living  creatures  on  this  globe  and  watches  the  free  play 
ot  forces.  She  then  confers  the  master’s  right  on  her  fa- 
vorite child,  the  strongest  in  courage  and  industry  . . 

I he  stronger  must  dominate  and  not  blend  with  the 
weaker,  thus  sacrificing  his  own  greatness.  Only  the  born 
weakling  can  view  this  as  cruel  . . For  Hitler  the  pres- 
ervation of  culture  “is  bound  up  with  the  rigid  law  of 
necessity  and  the  right  to  victory  of  the  best  and  strongest 
in  the  world.  Those  who  want  to  live,  let  them  fight,  and 
those  who  do  not  want  to  fight,  in  this  world  of  eternal 
struggle,  do  not  deserve  to  live.  Even  if  this  were  hard 
— that  is  how  it  is!”  12 

And  who  is  “nature’s  favorite  child,  the  strongest  in 
courage  and  industry”  on  whom  Providence  has  con- 
ferred ‘the  master’s  right”?  The  Aryan.  Here  in  Mein 
Kampf  we  come  to  the  kernel  of  the  Nazi  idea  of  race 
superiority,  of  the  conception  of  the  master  race,  on 
which  the  Third  Reich  and  Hitler’s  New  Order  in  Europe 
were  based.  1 

All  the  human  culture,  all  the  results  of  art,  science  and 
technology  that  we  see  before  us  today,  are  almost  ex- 
clusively the  creative  product  of  the  Aryan.  This  very  fact 
admits  of  the  not  unfounded  inference  that  he  alone  was 
the  founder  of  all  higher  humanity,  therefore  representing 
me  prototype  of  all  that  we  understand  by  the  word  “man.” 
He  is  the  Prometheus  of  mankind  from  whose  shining  brow 
the  divine  spark  of  genius  has  sprung  at  all  times,  forever 
kindling  anew  that  fire  of  knowledge  which  illumined  the 
night  of  silent  mysteries  and  thus  caused  man  to  climb  the 
path  to  mastery  over  the  other  beings  of  this  earth  ...  It 
was  he  who  laid  the  foundations  and  erected  the  walls  of 
every  great  structure  in  human  culture.13 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


129 


And  how  did  the  Aryan  accomplish  so  much  and  be- 
come so  supreme?  Hitler’s  answer  is:  By  trampling  over 
others.  Like  so  many  German  thinkers  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  Hitler  fairly  revels  in  a sadism  (and  its  opposite, 
masochism)  which  foreign  students  of  the  German  spirit 
have  always  found  so  difficult  to  comprehend. 

Thus,  for  the  formation  of  higher  cultures  the  existence 
of  lower  human  types  was  one  of  the  most  essential  pre- 
conditions ...  It  is  certain  that  the  first  culture  of  hu- 
manity was  based  less  on  the  tamed  animal  than  on  the  use 
of  lower  human  beings.  Only  after  the  enslavement  of 
subject  races  did  the  same  fate  strike  beasts.  For  first  the 
conquered  warrior  drew  the  plow — and  only  after  him  the 
horse.  Hence  it  is  no  accident  that  the  first  cultures  arose 
in  places  where  the  Aryan,  in  his  encounters  with  lower 
peoples,  subjugated  them  and  bent  them  to  his  will  ...  As 
long  as  he  ruthlessly  upheld  the  master  attitude,  not  only 
did  he  remain  master,  but  also  the  preserver  and  increaser 
of  culture.14 

Then  something  happened  which  Hitler  took  as  a warn- 
ing to  the  Germans. 

As  soon  as  the  subjected  people  began  to  raise  themselves 
up  and  approach  the  level  of  their  conqueror,  a phase  of 
which  probably  was  the  use  of  his  language,  the  barriers  be- 
tween master  and  servant  broke  down. 

But  even  worse  than  sharing  the  master’s  language  was 
something  else. 

The  Aryan  gave  up  the  purity  of  his  blood  and,  there- 
fore, lost  his  sojourn  in  the  paradise  which  he  had  made 
for  himself.  He  became  submerged  in  a racial  mixture  and 
gradually  lost  his  cultural  creativeness. 

To  the  young  Nazi  leader  this  was  the  cardinal  error. 

Blood  mixture  and  the  resultant  drop  in  the  racial  level  is 
the  sole  cause  of  the  dying  out  of  old  cultures;  for  men  do 
not  perish  as  a result  of  lost  wars,  but  by  the  loss  of  that 
force  of  resistance  which  is  continued  only  in  pure  blood. 
All  who  are  not  of  good  race  in  this  world  are  chaff.15 

Chaff  were  the  Jews  and  the  Slavs,  and  in  time,  when 
he  became  dictator  and  conqueror,  Hitler  would  forbid 
the  marriage  of  a German  with  any  member  of  these 


130 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


races,  though  a fourth-grade  schoolmarm  could  have  told 
him  that  there  was  a great  deal  of  Slavic  blood  in  the 
Germans,  especially  in  those  who  dwelt  in  the  eastern 
provinces.  In  carrying  out  his  racial  ideas,  it  must  again 
be  admitted,  Hitler  was  as  good  as  his  word.  In  the  New 
Order  which  he  began  to  impose  on  the  Slavs  in  the  East 
during  the  war,  the  Czechs,  the  Poles,  the  Russians  were 
— and  were  to  remain,  if  the  grotesque  New  Order  had 
endured — the  hewers  of  wood  and  the  drawers  of  water 
for  their  German  masters. 

It  was  an  easy  step  for  a man  as  ignorant  of  history 
and  anthropology  as  Hitler  to  make  of  the  Germans  the 
modem  Aryans — and  thus  the  master  race.  To  Hitler  the 
Germans  are  “the  highest  species  of  humanity  on  this 
earth”  and  will  remain  so  if  they  “occupy  themselves  not 
merely  with  the  breeding  of  dogs,  horses  and  cats  but 
also  with  care  for  the  purity  of  their  own  blood.”  16 

Hitler’s  obsession  with  race  leads  to  his  advocacy  of 
the  “folkish”  state.  Exactly  what  kind  of  state  that  was — 
or  was  intended  to  be — I never  clearly  understood  de- 
spite many  rereadings  of  Mein  Kampf  and  listening  to 
dozens  of  addresses  on  the  subject  by  the  Fuehrer  him- 
self, though  more  than  once  I heard  the  dictator  declare 
that  it  was  the  central  point  of  his  whole  thinking.  The 
German  word  Volk  cannot  be  translated  accurately  into 
English.  Usually  it  is  rendered  as  “nation”  or  “people,” 
but  in  German  there  is  a deeper  and  somewhat  different 
meaning  that  connotes  a primitive,  tribal  community 
based  on  blood  and  soil.  In  Mein  Kampf  Hitler  has  a 
difficult  time  trying  to  define  the  folkish  state,  announc- 
ing, for  example,  on  page  379  that  he  will  clarify  “the 
‘folkish’  concept”  only  to  shy  away  from  any  clarification 
and  wander  off  on  other  subjects  for  several  pages.  Final- 
ly he  has  a go  at  it: 

In  opposition  to  [the  bourgeois  and  the  Marxist-Jewish 
worlds],  the  folkish  philosophy  finds  the  importance  of 
mankind  in  its  basic  racial  elements.  In  the  state  it  sees 
only  a means  to  an  end  and  construes  its  end  as  the  preser- 
vation of  the  racial  existence  of  man.  Thus,  it  by  no  means 
believes  in  an  equality  of  races,  but  along  with  their  differ- 
ence it  recognizes  their  higher  or  lesser  value  and  feels  itself 
obligated  to  promote  the  victory  of  the  better  and  stronger, 
and  demand  the  subordination  of  the  inferior  and  weaker 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


131 


in  accordance  with  the  eternal  will  that  dominates  this  uni- 
verse. Thus,  in  principle,  it  serves  the  basic  aristocratic  idea 
of  nature  and  believes  in  the  validity  of  this  law  down  to 
the  last  individual.  It  sees  not  only  the  different  value  of 
the  races,  but  also  the  different  value  of  individuals.  From 
the  mass  it  extracts  the  importance  of  the  individual  per- 
sonality and  thus  ...  it  has  an  organizing  effect.  It 
believes  in  the  necessity  of  an  idealization  of  humanity,  in 
which  alone  it  sees  the  premise  for  the  existence  of  hu- 
manity. But  it  cannot  grant  the  right  to  existence  even  to  an 
ethical  idea  if  this  idea  represents  a danger  for  the  racial 
life  of  the  bearers  of  a higher  ethics;  for  in  a bastardized 
and  niggerized  world  all  the  concepts  of  the  humanly  beau- 
tiful and  sublime,  as  well  as  all  ideas  of  an  idealized  fu- 
ture of  our  humanity,  would  be  lost  forever  . . . 

And  so  the  folkish  philosophy  of  life  corresponds  to  the 
innermost  will  of  nature,  since  it  restores  that  free  play  of 
forces  which  must  lead  to  a continuous  mutual  higher  breed- 
ing, until  at  last  the  best  of  humanity,  having  achieved 
possession  of  this  earth,  will  have  a free  path  for  activity  in 
domains  which  will  lie  partly  above  it  and  partly  outside  it. 

We  all  sense  that  in  the  distant  future  humanity  must  be 
faced  by  problems  which  only  a highest  race,  become  master 
people  and  supported  by  the  means  and  possibilities  of  an 
entire  globe,  will  be  equipped  to  overcome.17 

“Thus,”  Hitler  declares  a little  farther  on,  “the  highest 
purpose  of  a folkish  state  is  concern  for  the  preservation 
of  those  original  racial  elements  which  bestow  culture 
and  create  the  beauty  and  dignity  of  a higher  mankind.”  18 
This  again  leads  him  to  a matter  of  eugenics: 

The  folkish  state  . . . must  set  race  in  the  center  of  all 
life.  It  must  take  care  to  keep  it  pure  ...  It  must  see  to 
it  that  only  the  healthy  beget  children;  that  there  is  only 
one  disgrace:  despite  one’s  own  sickness  and  deficiencies, 
to  bring  children  into  the  world;  and  one  highest  honor:  to 
renounce  doing  so.  And  conversely  it  must  be  considered 
reprehensible  to  withhold  healthy  children  from  the  nation. 
Here  the  [folkish]  state  must  act  as  guardian  of  a millennial 
future  in  the  face  of  which  the  wishes  and  the  selfishness  of 
the  individual  must  appear  as  nothing  and  submit  ...  A 
folkish  state  must  therefore  begin  by  raising  marriage  from 
the  level  of  a continuous  defilement  of  the  race  and  give  it 
the  consecration  of  an  institution  which  is  called  upon  to 


132 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

produce  images  of  the  Lord  and  not  monstrosities  halfway 
between  man  and  ape.19 

Hitler’s  fantastic  conception  of  the  folkish  state  leads  to 
a good  many  other  wordy  considerations  which,  if  heeded, 
he  says,  will  bring  the  Germans  the  mastery  of  the  earth 
— German  domination  has  become  an  obsession  with 
him.  At  one  point  he  argues  that  the  failure  to  keep  the 
Germanic  race  simon-pure  “has  robbed  us  of  world  domi- 
nation. If  the  German  people  had  possessed  that  herd 
unity  which  other  peoples  enjoyed,  the  German  Reich 
today  would  doubtless  be  mistress  of  the  globe.”  20  Since 
a folkish  state  must  be  based  on  race,  “the  German  Reich 
must  embrace  all  Germans” — this  is  a key  point  in  his 
argument,  and  one  he  did  not  forget  nor  fail  to  act  upon 
when  he  came  to  power. 

Since  the  folkish  state  is  to  be  based  “on  the  aristocratic 
idea  of  nature”  it  follows  that  democracy  is  out  of  the 
question  and  must  be  replaced  by  the  Fuehrerprinzip. 
The  authoritarianism  of  the  Prussian  Army  is  to  be  adopt- 
ed by  the  Third  Reich:  “authority  of  every  leader  down- 
ward and  responsibility  upward.” 

There  must  be  no  majority  decisions,  but  only  responsible 
persons  . . . Surely  every  man  will  have  advisers  by  his 
side,  but  the  decision  will  be  made  by  one  man.*  . . . only 
he  alone  may  possess  the  authority  and  the  right  to  command 
...  It  will  not  be  possible  to  dispense  with  Parliament.  But 
their  councilors  will  then  actually  give  counsel  ...  In  no 
chamber  does  a vote  ever  take  place.  They  are  working  in- 
stitutions and  not  voting  machines.  This  principle — absolute 
responsibility  unconditionally  combined  with  absolute  au- 
thority— will  gradually  breed  an  elite  of  leaders  such  as 
today,  in  this  era  of  irresponsible  parliamentarianism,  is 
utterly  inconceivable.21 

Such  were  the  ideas  of  Adolf  Hitler,  set  down  in  all 
their  appalling  crudeness  as  he  sat  in  Landsberg  prison 
gazing  out  at  a flowering  orchard  above  the  River  Lech,  t 

* The  italics  are  Hitler's. 

t “Without  my  imprisonment,”  Hitler  remarked  long  afterward,  “Mein 
Kampf  would  never  have  been  written.  That  period  gave  me  the  chance 
of  deepening  various  notions  for  which  I then  had  only  an  instinctive 
feeling  . . . It’s  from  this  time,  too,  that  my  conviction  dates — a thing 
that  many  of  my  supporters  never  understood — that  we  could  no  longer 
win  power  by  force.  The  state  had  had  time  to  consolidate  itself,  and 
it  had  the  weapons.”  ( Hitler's  Secret  Conversations,  p.  235.)  The 
remark  was  made  to  some  of  his  cronies  at  headquarters  on  the  Russian 
front  on  the  night  of  February  3—4,  1942. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hiller 


133 


or  later,  in  1925-26,  as  he  reclined  on  the  balcony  of  a 
comfortable  inn  at  Berchtesgaden  and  looked  out  across 
the  towering  Alps  toward  his  native  Austria,  dictating  a 
torrent  of  words  to  his  faithful  Rudolf  Hess  and  dreaming 
of  the  Third  Reich  which  he  would  build  on  the  shoddy 
foundations  we  have  seen,  and  which  he  would  rule  with 
an  iron  hand.  That  one  day  he  would  build  it  and  rule 
it  he  had  no  doubts  whatsoever,  for  he  was  possessed  of 
that  burning  sense  of  mission  peculiar  to  so  many  geniuses 
who  have  sprouted,  seemingly,  from  nowhere  and  from 
nothing  throughout  the  ages.  He  would  unify  a chosen 
people  who  had  never  before  been  politically  one.  He 
would  purify  their  race.  He  would  make  them  strong. 
He  would  make  them  lords  of  the  earth. 

A crude  Darwinism?  A sadistic  fancy?  An  irresponsible 
egoism?  A megalomania?  It  was  all  of  these  in  part.  But 
it  was  something  more.  For  the  mind  and  the  passion  of 
Hitler — all  the  aberrations  that  possessed  his  feverish  brain 
— had  roots  that  lay  deep  in  German  experience  and 
thought.  Nazism  and  the  Third  Reich,  in  fact,  were  but  a 
logical  continuation  of  German  history. 

THE  HISTORICAL  ROOTS  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 

In  the  delirious  days  of  the  annual  rallies  of  the  Nazi 
Party  at  Nuremberg  at  the  beginning  of  September,  I used 
to  be  accosted  by  a swarm  of  hawkers  selling  a picture 
postcard  on  which  were  shown  the  portraits  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  Bismarck,  Hindenburg  and  Hitler.  The  inscrip- 
tion read:  “What  the  King  conquered,  the  Prince  formed, 
the  Field  Marshal  defended,  the  Soldier  saved  and  uni- 
fied.” Thus  Hitler,  the  soldier,  was  portrayed  not  only  as 
the  savior  and  unifier  of  Germany  but  as  the  successor 
of  these  celebrated  figures  who  had  made  the  country 
great.  The  implication  of  the  continuity  of  German  history, 
culminating  in  Hitler’s  rule,  was  not  lost  upon  the  multi- 
tude. The  very  expression  “the  Third  Reich”  also  served 
to  strengthen  this  concept.  The  First  Reich  had  been  the 
medieval  Holy  Roman  Empire;  the  Second  Reich  had  been 
that  which  was  formed  by  Bismarck  in  1871  after  Prus- 
sia’s defeat  of  France.  Both  had  added  glory  to  the  Ger- 
man name.  The  Weimar  Republic,  as  Nazi  propaganda  had 
it,  had  dragged  that  fair  name  in  the  mud.  The  Third 


134  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Reich  restored  it,  just  as  Hitler  had  promised.  Hitler’s 
Germany,  then,  was  depicted  as  a logical  development 
from  all  that  had  gone  before — or  at  least  of  all  that  had 
been  glorious. 

But  the  onetime  Vienna  vagabond,  however  littered  his 
mind,  knew  enough  history  to  realize  that  there  had  been 
German  failures  in  the  past,  failures  that  must  be  set 
against  the  successes  of  France  and  Britain.  He  never  for- 
got that  by  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  which  had  seen 
Britain  and  France  emerge  as  unified  nations,  Germany 
remained  a crazy  patchwork  of  some  three  hundred  indi- 
vidual states.  It  was  this  lack  of  national  development 
which  largely  determined  the  course  of  German  history 
from  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  to  midway  in  the  , nine- 
teenth century  and  made  it  so  different  from  that  of  the 
other  great  nations  of  Western  Europe. 

To  the  lack  of  political  and  dynastic  unity  was  added, 
in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  the  disaster  of 
religious  differences  which  followed  the  Reformation. 
There  is  not  space  in  this  book  to  recount  adequately  the 
immense  influence  that  Martin  Luther,  the  Saxon  peasant 
who  became  an  Augustinian  monk  and  launched  the  Ger- 
man Reformation,  had  on  the  Germans  and  their  subse- 
quent history.  But  it  may  be  said,  in  passing,  that  this 
towering  but  erratic  genius,  this  savage  anti-Semite  and 
hater  of  Rome,  who  combined  in  his  tempestuous  char- 
acter so  many  of  the  best  and  the  worst  qualities  of  the 
German — the  coarseness,  the  boisterousness,  the  fanati- 
cism, the  intolerance,  the  violence,  but  also  the  honesty, 
the  simplicity,  the  self-scrutiny,  the  passion  for  learning 
and  for  music  and  for  poetry  and  for  righteousness  in 
the  eyes  of  God — left  a mark  on  the  life  of  the  Germans, 
for  both  good  and  bad,  more  indelible,  more  fateful, 
than  was  wrought  by  any  other  single  individual  before  or 
since.  Through  his  sermons  and  his  magnificent  transla- 
tion of  the  Bible,  Luther  created  the  modem  German 
language,  aroused  in  the  people  not  only  a new  Protes- 
tant vision  of  Christianity  but  a fervent  German  national- 
ism and  taught  them,  at  least  in  religion,  the  supremacy  of 
the  individual  conscience.  But  tragically  for  them,  Luther’s 
siding  with  the  princes  in  the  peasant  risings,  which  he  had 
largely  inspired,  and  his  passion  for  political  autocracy 
ensured  a mindless  and  provincial  political  absolutism 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


135 


which  reduced  the  vast  majority  of  the  German  people  to 
poverty,  to  a horrible  torpor  and  a demeaning  subser- 
vience. Even  worse  perhaps,  it  helped  to  perpetuate  and 
indeed  to  sharpen  the  hopeless  divisions  not  only  between 
classes  but  also  between  the  various  dynastic  and  political 
groupings  of  the  German  people.  It  doomed  for  centimes 
the  possibility  of  the  unification  of  Germany. 

The  Thirty  Years’  War  and  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  of 
1648,  which  ended  it,  brought  the  final  catastrophe  to 
Germany,  a blow  so  devastating  that  the  country  has 
never  fully  recovered  from  it.  This  was  the  last  of  Europe’s 
great  religious  wars,  but  before  it  was  over  it  had  de- 
generated from  a Protestant-Catholic  conflict  into  a con- 
fused dynastic  struggle  between  the  Catholic  Austrian  Haps- 
burgs  on  the  one  side  and  the  Catholic  French  Bourbons 
and  the  Swedish  Protestant  monarchy  on  the  other.  In 
the  savage  fighting,  Germany  itself  was  laid  waste,  the 
towns  and  countryside  were  devastated  and  ravished, 
the  people  decimated.  It  has  been  estimated  that  one 
third  of  the  German  people  perished  in  this  barbarous 
war. 

The  Peace  of  Westphalia  was  almost  as  disastrous  to 
the  future  of  Germany  as  the  war  had  been.  The  German 
princes,  who  had  sided  with  France  and  Sweden,  were 
confirmed  as  absolute  rulers  of  their  little  domains,  some 
350  of  them,  the  Emperor  remaining  merely  as  a figure- 
head so  far  as  the  German  lands  were  concerned. 
The  surge  of  reform  and  enlightenment  which  had 
swept  Germany  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  and  the  beginning 
of  the  sixteenth  centuries  was  smothered.  In  that  period 
the  great  free  cities  had  enjoyed  virtual  independence; 
feudalism  was  gone  in  them,  the  arts  and  commerce 
thrived.  Even  in  the  countryside  the  German  peasant 
had  secured  liberties  far  greater  than  those  enjoyed  in 
England  and  France.  Indeed,  at  the  beginning  of  the  six- 
teenth century  Germany  could  be  said  to  be  one  of  the 
fountains  of  European  civilization. 

Now,  after  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  it  was  reduced  to 
the  barbarism  of  Muscovy.  Serfdom  was  reimposed,  even 
introduced  in  areas  where  it  had  been  unknown.  The 
towns  lost  their  self-government.  The  peasants,  the  labor- 
ers, even  the  middle-class  burghers,  were  exploited  to  the 
limit  by  the  princes,  who  held  them  down  in  a degrading 


136 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

state  of  servitude.  The  pursuit  of  learning  and  the  arts 
all  but  ceased.  The  greedy  rulers  had  no  feeling  for 
German  nationalism  and  patriotism  and  stamped  out  any 
manifestations  of  them  in  their  subjects.  Civilization  came 
to  a standstill  in  Germany.  The  Reich,  as  one  historian  has 
put  it,  “was  artificially  stabilized  at  a medieval  level  of 
confusion  and  weakness.”  22 

Germany  never  recovered  from  this  setback.  Acceptance 
of  autocracy,  of  blind  obedience  to  the  petty  tyrants  who 
ruled  as  princes,  became  ingrained  in  the  German  mind 
The  idea  of  democracy,  of  rule  by  parliament,  which  made 
such  a rapid  headway  in  England  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centimes,  and  which  exploded  in  France  in 
1789,  did  not  sprout  in  Germany.  This  political  backward- 
ness of  the  Germans,  divided  as  they  were  into  so  many 
petty  states  and  isolated  in  them  from  the  surging  currents 
of  European  thought  and  development,  set  Germany 
apart  from  and  behind  the  other  countries  of  the  West. 
There  was  no  natural  growth  of  a nation.  This  has  to 
be  borne  in  mind  if  one  is  to  comprehend  the  disastrous 
road  this  people  subsequently  took  and  the  warped  state 
of  mind  which  settled  over  it.  In  the  end  the  German 
nation  was  forged  by  naked  force  and  held  together  by 
naked  aggression. 

Beyond  the  Elbe  to  the  east  lay  Prussia.  As  the  nine- 
teenth century  waned,  this  century  which  had  seen  the 
sorry  failure  of  the  confused  and  timid  liberals  at  Frank- 
furt in  1848—49  to  create  a somewhat  democratic,  unified 
Gennany,  Prussia  took  over  the  German  destiny.  For  cen- 
turies this  Germanic  state  had  lain  outside  the  main  stream 
of  German  historical  development  and  culture.  It  seemed 
almost  as  if  it  were  a freak  of  history.  Prussia  had  begun 
as  the  remote  frontier  state  of  Brandenburg  on  the  sandy 
wastes  east  of  the  Elbe  which,  beginning  with  the  elev- 
enth century,  had  been  slowly  conquered  from  the  Slavs. 
Under  Brandenburg’s  ruling  princes,  the  Hohenzollems, 
who  were  little  more  than  military  adventurers,  the  Slavs, 
mostly  Poles,  were  gradually  pushed  back  along  the 
Baltic.  Those  who  resisted  were  either  exterminated  or 
made  landless  serfs.  The  imperial  law  of  the  German 
Empire  forbade  the  princes  from  assuming  royal  titles, 
but  in  1701  the  Emperor  acquiesced  in  the  Elector  Fred- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


137 


erick  Ill’s  being  crowned  King  in  Prussia  at  Koenigsberg. 

By  this  time  Prussia  had  pulled  itself  up  by  its  own 
bootstraps  to  be  one  of  the  ranking  military  powers  of 
Europe.  It  had  none  of  the  resources  of  the  others.  Its 
land  was  barren  and  bereft  of  minerals.  The  population 
was  small.  There  were  no  large  towns,  no  industry  and 
little  culture.  Even  the  nobility  was  poor,  and  the  landless 
peasants  lived  like  cattle.  Yet  by  a supreme  act  of  will 
and  a genius  for  organization  the  Hohenzollems  managed 
to  create  a Spartan  military  state  whose  well-drilled  Army 
won  one  victory  after  another  and  whose  Machiavellian 
diplomacy  of  temporary  alliances  with  whatever  power 
seemed  the  strongest  brought  constant  additions  to  its 
territory. 

There  thus  arose  quite  artificially  a state  bom  of  no 
popular  force  nor  even  of  an  idea  except  that  of  conquest, 
and  held  together  by  the  absolute  power  of  the  ruler, 
by  a narrow-minded  bureaucracy  which  did  his  bidding 
and  by  a ruthlessly  disciplined  army.  Two  thirds  and  some- 
times as  much  as  five  sixths  of  the  annual  state  revenue 
was  expended  on  the  Army,  which  became,  under  the 
King,  the  state  itself.  “Prussia,”  remarked  Mirabeau,  “is 
not  a state  with  an  army,  but  an  army  with  a state.”  And 
the  state,  which  was  run  with  the  efficiency  and  soulless- 
ness of  a factory,  became  all;  the  people  were  little  more 
than  cogs  in  the  machinery.  Individuals  were  taught  not 
only  by  the  kings  and  the  drill  sergeants  but  by  the 
philosophers  that  their  role  in  life  was  one  of  obedience, 
work,  sacrifice  and  duty.  Even  Kant  preached  that  duty 
demands  the  suppression  of  human  feeling,  and  the  Prus- 
sian poet  Willibald  Alexis  gloried  in  the  enslavement  of 
the  people  under  the  Hohenzollems.  To  Lessing,  who  did 
not  like  it,  “Prussia  was  the  most  slavish  country  of 
Europe.” 

The  Junkers,  who  were  to  play  such  a vital  role  in 
modem  Germany,  were  also  a unique  product  of  Prussia. 
They  were,  as  they  said,  a master  race.  It  was  they  who 
occupied  the  land  conquered  from  the  Slavs  and  who 
farmed  it  on  large  estates  worked  by  these  Slavs,  who 
became  landless  serfs  quite  different  from  those  in  the 
West.  There  was  an  essential  difference  between  the  agra- 
rian system  in  Prussia  and  that  of  western  Germany  and 
Western  Europe.  In  the  latter,  the  nobles,  who  owned  most 


138  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  the  land,  received  rents  or  feudal  dues  from  the  peas- 
ants, who  though  often  kept  in  a state  of  serfdom  had 
certain  rights  and  privileges  and  could,  and  did,  gradual- 
ly acquire  their  own  land  and  civic  freedom.  In  the  West, 
the  peasants  formed  a solid  part  of  the  community;  the 
landlords,  for  all  their  drawbacks,  developed  in  their  lei- 
sure a cultivation  which  led  to,  among  other  things,  a 
civilized  quality  of  life  that  could  be  seen  in  the  refine- 
ment of  manners,  of  thought  and  of  the  arts. 

The  Prussian  Junker  was  not  a man  of  leisure.  He 
worked  hard  at  managing  his  large  estate,  much  as  a 
factory  manager  does  today.  His  landless  laborers  were 
treated  as  virtual  slaves.  On  his  large  properties  he  was  the 
absolute  lord.  There  were  no  large  towns  nor  any 
substantial  middle  class,  as  there  were  in  the  West,  whose 
civilizing  influence  might  rub  against  him.  In  contrast  to 
the  cultivated  grand  seigneur  in  the  West,  the  Junker 
developed  into  a rude,  domineering,  arrogant  type  of  man, 
without  cultivation  or  culture,  aggressive,  conceited,  ruth- 
less, narrow-minded  and  given  to  a petty  profit-seeking 
that  some  German  historians  noted  in  the  private  life  of 
Otto  von  Bismarck,  the  most  successful  of  die  Junkers. 

It  was  this  political  genius,  this  apostle  of  “blood  and 
iron,”  who  between  1866  and  1871  brought  an  end  to  a 
divided  Germany  which  had  existed  for  nearly  a thousand 
years  and,  by  force,  replaced  it  with  Greater  Prussia,  or 
what  might  be  called  Prussian  Germany.  Bismarck’s  unique 
creation  is  the  Germany  we  have  known  in  our  time,  a 
problem  child  of  Europe  and  the  world  for  nearly  a cen- 
tury, a nation  of  gifted,  vigorous  people  in  which  first 
this  remarkable  man  and  then  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  and 
finally  Hitler,  aided  by  a military  caste  and  by  many  a 
strange  intellectual,  succeeded  in  inculcating  a lust  for 
power  and  domination,  a passion  for  unbridled  militarism, 
a contempt  for  democracy  and  individual  freedom  and  a 
longing  for  authority,  for  authoritarianism.  Under  such  a 
spell,  this  nation  rose  to  great  heights,  fell  and  rose  again, 
until  it  was  seemingly  destroyed  with  the  end  of  Hitler 
in  the  spring  of  1945 — it  is  perhaps  too  early  to  speak 
of  that  with  any  certainty. 

"The  great  questions  of  the  day,”  Bismarck  declared  on 
becoming  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  in  1862,  “will  not 
be  settled  by  resolutions  and  majority  votes — that  was  the 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


139 


mistake  of  the  men  of  1848  and  1849 — but  by  blood  and 
iron.”  That  was  exactly  the  way  he  proceeded  to  settle 
them,  though  it  must  be  said  that  he  added  a touch  of 
diplomatic  finesse,  often  of  the  most  deceitful  kind. 
Bismarck’s  aim  was  to  destroy  liberalism,  bolster  the 
power  of  conservatism — that  is,  of  the  Junkers,  the  Army 
and  the  crown — and  make  Prussia,  as  against  Austria,  the 
dominant  power  not  only  among  the  Germans  but,  if  pos- 
sible, in  Europe  as  well.  “Germany  looks  not  to  Prus- 
sia’s liberalism,”  he  told  the  deputies  in  the  Prussian  parlia- 
ment, “but  to  her  force.” 

Bismarck  first  built  up  the  Prussian  Army  and  when  the 
parliament  refused  to  vote  the  additional  credits  he  merely 
raised  them  on  his  own  and  finally  dissolved  the  chamber. 
With  a strengthened  Army  he  then  struck  in  three  succes- 
sive wars.  The  first,  against  Denmark  in  1864,  brought  the 
duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  under  German  rule. 
The  second,  against  Austria  in  1866,  had  far-reaching 
consequences.  Austria,  which  for  centuries  had  been  first 
among  the  German  states,  was  finally  excluded  from  Ger- 
man affairs.  It  was  not  allowed  to  join  the  North  German 
Confederation  which  Bismarck  now  proceeded  to  estab- 
lish. 

“In  1866,”  the  eminent  German  political  scientist  Wil- 
helm Roepke  once  wrote,  “Germany  ceased  to  exist.”  Prus- 
sia annexed  outright  all  the  German  states  north  of  the 
Main  which  had  fought  against  her,  except  Saxony;  these 
incude  Hanover,  Hesse,  Nassau,  Frankfurt  and  the  Elbe 
duchies.  All  the  other  states  north  of  the  Main  were 
forced  into  the  North  German  Confederation.  Prussia, 
which  now  stretched  from  the  Rhine  to  Koenigsberg,  com- 
pletely dominated  it,  and  within  five  years,  with  the  defeat 
of  Napoleon  Ill’s  France,  the  southern  German  states, 
with  the  considerable  kingdom  of  Bavaria  in  the  lead, 
would  be  drawn  into  Prussian  Germany.23 

Bismarck’s  crowning  achievement,  the  creation  of  the 
Second  Reich,  came  on  January  18,  1871,  when  King 
Wilhelm  I of  Prussia  was  proclaimed  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors  at  Versailles.  Germany  had 
been  unified  by  Prussian  armed  force.  It  was  now  the 
greatest  power  on  the  Continent;  its  only  rival  in  Europe 
was  England. 


140 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Yet  there  was  a fatal  flaw.  The  German  Empire,  as 
Treitschke  said,  was  in  reality  but  an  extension  of  Prussia. 
“Prussia,”  he  emphasized,  “is  the  dominant  factor  . , . 
The  will  of  the  Empire  can  be  nothing  but  the  will  of  the 
Prussian  state.”  This  was  true,  and  it  was  to  have  disas- 
trous consequences  for  the  Germans  themselves.  From 
1871  to  1933  and  indeed  to  Hitler’s  end  in  1945,  the 
course  of  German  history  as  a consequence  was  to  run, 
with  the  exception  of  the  interim  of  the  Weimar  Republic, 
in  a straight  line  and  with  utter  logic. 

Despite  the  democratic  fagade  put  up  by  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Reichstag,  whose  members  were  elected  by 
universal  manhood  suffrage,  the  German  Empire  was  in 
reality  a militarist  autocracy  ruled  by  the  King  of  Prussia, 
who  was  also  Emperor.  The  Reichstag  possessed  few 
powers;  it  was  little  more  than  a debating  society  where 
the  representatives  of  the  people  let  off  steam  or  bargained 
for  shoddy  benefits  for  the  classes  they  represented.  The 
throne  had  the  power — by  divine  right.  As  late  as  1910 
Wilhelm  II  could  proclaim  that  the  royal  crown  had  been 
“granted  by  God’s  Grace  alone  and  not  by  parliaments, 
popular  assemblies  and  popular  decision  . . . Considering 
myself  an  instrument  of  the  Lord,”  he  added,  “I  go  my 
way.” 

He  was  not  impeded  by  Parliament.  The  Chancellor  he 
appointed  was  responsible  to  him,  not  to  the  Reichstag. 
The  assembly  could  not  overthrow  a Chancellor  nor  keep 
him  in  office.  That  was  the  prerogative  of  the  monan-.h, 
Thus,  in  contrast  to  the  development  in  other  countries  in 
the  West,  the  idea  of  democracy,  of  the  people  sovereign, 
of  the  supremacy  of  parliament,  never  got  a foothold  in 
Germany,  even  after  the  twentieth  century  began.  To  be 
sure,  the  Social  Democrats,  after  years  of  persecution  by 
Bismarck  and  the  Emperor,  had  become  the  largest  single 
political  party  in  the  Reichstag  by  1912.  They  loudly  de- 
manded the  establishment  of  a parliamentary  democracy. 
But  they  were  ineffective.  And,  though  the  largest  party, 
they  were  still  a minority.  The  middle  classes,  grown 
prosperous  by  the  belated  but  staggering  development  of 
the  industrial  revolution  and  dazzled  by  the  success  of 
Bismarck’s  policy  of  force  and  war,  had  traded  for  mate- 
rial gain  any  aspirations  for  political  freedom  they  may 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


141 


have  had.*  They  accepted  the  Hohenzollem  autocracy. 
They  gladly  knuckled  under  to  the  Junker  bureaucracy  and 
they  fervently  embraced  Prussian  militarism.  Germany’s 
star  had  risen  and  they — almost  all  the  people — were 
eager  to  do  what  their  masters  asked  to  keep  it  high. 

At  the  very  end,  Hitler,  the  Austrian,  was  one  of  them. 
To  him  Bismarck’s  Second  Reich,  despite  its  mistakes 
and  its  “terrifying  forces  of  decay”  was  a work  of  splen- 
dor in  which  the  Germans  at  last  had  come  into  their  own. 

Was  not  Germany  above  all  other  countries  a marvelous 
example  of  an  empire  which  had  risen  from  foundations  of 
a policy  purely  of  power?  Prussia,  the  germ  cell  of  the 
Empire,  came  into  being  through  resplendent  heroism  and 
not  through  financial  operations  or  commercial  deals,  and 
the  Reich  itself  in  turn  was  only  the  glorious  reward  of  ag- 
gressive political  leadership  and  the  death-defying  courage 
of  its  soldiers  . . . 

The  very  founding  of  the  [Second]  Reich  seemed  gilded 
by  the  magic  of  an  event  which  uplifted  the  entire  nation. 
After  a series  of  incomparable  victories,  a Reich  was  bom 
for  the  sons  and  grandsons — a reward  for  immortal  heroism 
. . . This  Reich,  which  did  not  owe  its  existence  to  the 
trickery  of  parliamentary  factions,  towered  above  the  meas- 
ure of  other  states  by  the  very  exalted  manner  of  its  found- 
ing; for  not  in  the  cackling  of  a parliamentary  battle  of 
words  but  in  the  thunder  and  rumbling  of  the  front  sur- 
rounding Paris  was  the  solemn  act  performed:  a proclama- 
tion of  our  will,  declaring  that  the  Germans,  princes  and 
people,  were  resolved  in  the  future  to  constitute  a Reich 
and  once  again  to  raise  the  imperial  crown  to  symbolic 
heights  . . . No  deserters  and  slackers  were  the  founders  of 
the  Bismarckian  state,  but  the  regiments  at  the  front 

This  unique  birth  and  baptism  of  fire  in  themselves  sur- 
rounded the  Reich  with  a halo  of  historic  glory  such  as  only 
the  oldest  states — and  they  but  seldom— could  boast. 

* In  a sense  the  ^German  working  class  made  a similar  trade.  To 
combat  socialism  Bismarck  put  through  between  1883  and  1889  a pro- 
gram for  social  security  far  beyond  anything  known  in  other  countries. 
It  included  compulsory  insurance  for  workers  against  old  age,  sickness, 
accident  and  incapacity,  and  though  organized  by  the  State  it  was 
financed  by  employers  and  employees.  It  cannot  be  said  that  it  stopped 
the  rise  of  the  Social  Democrats  or  the  trade  unions,  but-  it  did  have 
a profound  influence  on  the  working  class  in  that  it  gradually  made 
them  value  security  over  political  freedom  and  caused  them  to  see 
in  the  State,  however  conservative,  a benefactor  and  a protector.  Hitler, 
as  we  shall  see,  took  full  advantage  of  this  state  of  mind.  In  this,  as 
in  other  matters,  he  learned  much  from  Bismarck.  “I  studied  Bismarck’s 
socialist  legislation,”  Hitler  remarks  in  Mein  Kampf  (p.  155),  “in  its 
intention,  struggle  and  success.” 


142 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


And  what  an  ascent  now  began! 

Freedom  on  the  outside  provided  daily  bread  within.  The 
nation  became  rich  in  numbers  and  earthly  goods.  The 
honor  of  the  state,  and  with  it  that  of  the  whole  people, 
was  protected  and  shielded  by  an  army  which  could  point 
most  visibly  to  the  difference  from  the  former  German 
Union.24 

That  was  the  Germany  which  Hitler  resolved  to  restore. 
In  Mein  Kampf  he  discourses  at  great  length  on  what  he 
believes  are  the  reasons  for  its  fall:  its  tolerance  of  Jews 
and  Marxists,  the  crass  materialism  and  selfishness  of  the 
middle  class,  the  nefarious  influence  of  the  “cringers  and 
lickspittles”  around  the  Hohenzollem  throne,  the  “catas- 
trophic German  alliance  policy”  which  linked  Germany 
to  the  degenerate  Hapsburgs  and  the  untrustworthy  Ital- 
ians instead  of  with  England,  and  the  lack  of  a funda- 
mental “social”  and  racial  policy.  These  were  failures 
which,  he  promised,  National  Socialism  would  correct. 

THE  INTELLECTUAL  ROOTS 
OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 

But  aside  from  history,  where  did  Hitler  get  his  ideas? 
Though  his  opponents  inside  and  outside  Germany  were  too 
busy,  or  too  stupid,  to  take  much  notice  of  it  until  it  was 
too  late,  he  had  somehow  absorbed,  as  had  so  many 
Germans,  a weird  mixture  of  the  irresponsible,  megalo- 
maniacal  ideas  which  erupted  from  German  thinkers  dur- 
ing the  nineteenth  century.  Hitler,  who  often  got  them 
at  second  hand  through  such  a muddled  pseudo  philos- 
opher as  Alfred  Rosenberg  or  through  his  drunken  poet 
friend  Dietrich  Eckart,  embraced  them  with  all  the  fever- 
ish enthusiasm  of  a neophyte.  What  was  worse,  he  resolved 
to  put  them  into  practice  if  the  opportunity  should  ever 
arise. 

We  have  seen  what  they  were  as  they  thrashed  about  in 
Hitler’s  mind:  the  glorification  of  war  and  conquest  and 
the  absolute  power  of  the  authoritarian  state;  the  belief  in 
the  Aryans,  or  Germans,  as  the  master  race,  and  the 
hatred  of  Jews  and  Slavs;  the  contempt  for  democracy 
and  humanism.  They  are  not  original  with  Hitler — though 
the  means  of  applying  them  later  proved  to  be.  They 
emanate  from  that  odd  assortment  of  erudite  but  un- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  143 

balanced  philosophers,  historians  and  teachers  who  cap- 
tured the  German  mind  during  the  century  before  Hitler 
with  consequences  so  disastrous,  as  it  turned  out,  not 
only  for  the  Germans  but  for  a large  portion  of  mankind. 

There  had  been  among  the  Germans,  to  be  sure,  some  of 
the  most  elevated  minds  and  spirits  of  the  Western 
world — Leibnitz,  Kant,  Herder,  Humboldt,  Lessing, 
Goethe,  Schiller,  Bach  and  Beethoven — and  they  had 
made  unique  contributions  to  the  civilization  of  the 
West.  But  the  German  culture  which  became  dominant  in 
the  nineteenth  century  and  which  coincided  with  the  rise 
of  Prussian  Germany,  continuing  from  Bismarck 
through  Hitler,  rests  primarily  on  Fichte  and  Hegel,  to 
begin  with,  and  then  on  Treitschke,  Nietzsche,  Richard 
Wagner,  and  a host  of  lesser  lights  not  the  least  of  whom, 
strangely  enough,  were  a bizarre  Frenchman  and  an  ec- 
centric Englishman.  They  succeeded  in  establishing  a 
spiritual  break  with  the  West;  the  breach  has  not  been 
healed  to  this  day. 

In  1807,  following  Prussia’s  humiliating  defeat  by 
Napoleon  at  Jena,  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte  began  his  fa- 
mous “Addresses  to  the  German  Nation”  from  the  podium 
of  the  University  of  Berlin,  where  he  held  the  chair  of 
philosophy.  They  stirred  and  rallied  a divided,  defeated  peo- 
ple and  their  resounding  echoes  could  still  be  heard  in  the 
Third  Reich.  Fichte’s  teaching  was  heady  wine  for  a 
frustrated  folk.  To  him  the  Latins,  especially  the  French, 
and  the  Jews  are  the  decadent  races.  Only  the  Germans 
possess  the  possibility  of  regeneration.  Their  language  is 
the  purest,  the  most  original.  Under  them  a new  era  in 
history  would  blossom.  It  would  reflect  the  order  of  the 
cosmos.  It  would  be  led  by  a small  elite  which  would  be 
free  of  any  moral  restraints  of  a “private”  nature.  These 
are  some  of  the  ideas  we  have  seen  Hitler  putting  down  in 
Mein  Kampf. 

On  Fichte’s  death  in  1814,  he  was  succeeded  by 
Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  at  the  University  of 
Berlin.  This  is  the  subtle  and  penetrating  mind  whose 
dialectics  inspired  Marx  and  Lenin  and  thus  contributed  to 
the  founding  of  Communism  and  whose  ringing  glorifica- 
tion of  the  State  as  supreme  in  human  life  paved  the  way 
for  the  Second  and  Third  Reichs  of  Bismarck  and  Hitler. 
To  Hegel  the  State  is  all,  or  almost  all.  Among  other 


144 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


things,  he  says,  it  is  the  highest  revelation  of  the  “world 
spirit”;  it  is  the  “moral  universe”;  it  is  “the  actuality  of  the 
ethical  idea  . . . ethical  mind  . . . knowing  and  thinking 
itself”;  the  State  “has  the  supreme  right  against  the  in- 
dividual, whose  supreme  duty  is  to  be  a member  of  the 
State  . . . for  the  right  of  the  world  spirit  is  above  all 
special  privileges  ...” 

And  the  happiness  of  the  individual  on  earth?  Hegel 
replies  that  “world  history  is  no  empire  of  happiness. 
The  periods  of  happiness,”  he  declares,  “are  the  empty 
pages  of  history  because  they  are  the  periods  of  agree- 
ment, without  conflict.”  War  is  the  great  purifier.  In 
Hegel’s  view,  it  makes  for  “the  ethical  health  of  peoples 
corrupted  by  a long  peace,  as  the  blowing  of  the  winds 
preserves  the  sea  from  the  foulness  which  would  be  the 
result  of  a prolonged  calm.” 

No  traditional  conception  of  morals  and  ethics  must 
disturb  either  the  supreme  State  or  the  “heroes”  who  lead 
it.  “World  history  occupies  a higher  ground  ...  Moral 
claims  which  are  irrelevant  must  not  be  brought  into  colli- 
sion with  world-historical  deeds  and  their  accomplish- 
ments. The  litany  of  private  virtues — modesty,  humility, 
philanthropy  and  forbearance — must  not  be  raised  against 
them  ...  So  mighty  a form  [the  State]  must  trample 
down  many  an  innocent  flower — crush  to  pieces  many 
an  object  in  its  path.” 

Hegel  foresees  such  a State  for  Germany  when  she  has 
recovered  her  God-given  genius.  He  predicts  that  “Ger- 
many’s hour”  will  come  and  that  its  mission  will  be  to 
regenerate  the  world.  As  one  reads  Hegel  one  realizes 
how  much  inspiration  Hitler,  like  Marx,  drew  from  him, 
even  if  it  was  at  second  hand.  Above  all  else,  Hegel  in  his 
theory  of  “heroes,”  those  great  agents  who  are  fated  by  a 
mysterious  Providence  to  carry  out  “the  will  of  the 
world  spirit,”  seems  to  have  inspired  Hitler,  as  we  shall 
see  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  with  his  own  overpowering 
sense  of  mission. 

Heinrich  von  Treitschke  came  later  to  the  University  of 
Berlin.  From  1874  until  his  death  in  1896  he  was  a pro- 
fessor of  history  there  and  a popular  one,  his  lectures 
being  attended  by  large  and  enthusiastic  gatherings  which 
included  not  only  students  but  General  Staff  officers  and 
officials  of  the  Junker  bureaucracy.  His  influence  on  Ger- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


145 

man  thought  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  century  was 
enormous  and  it  continued  through  Wilhelm  II’s  day  and 
indeed  Hitler’s.  Though  he  was  a Saxon,  he  became  the 
great  Prussianizer;  he  was  more  Prussian  than  the  Prus- 
sians. Like  Hegel  he  glorifies  the  State  and  conceives  of  it 
as  supreme,  but  his  attitude  is  more  brutish:  the  people,  the 
subjects,  are  to  be  little  more  than  slaves  in  the  nation. 
“It  does  not  matter  what  you  think,”  he  exclaims,  “so  long 
as  you  obey.” 

And  Treitschke  outdoes  Hegel  in  proclaiming  war  as 
the  highest  expression  of  man.  To  him  “martial  glory  is 
the  basis  of  all  the  political  virtues;  in  the  rich  treasure 
of  Germany’s  glories  the  Prussian  military  glory  is  a 
jewel  as  precious  as  the  masterpieces  of  our  poets  and 
thinkers.”  He  holds  that  “to  play  blindly  with  peace  . . . 
has  become  the  shame  of  the  thought  and  morality  of  our 
age.” 

War  is  not  only  a practical  necessity,  it  is  also  a theoreti- 
cal necessity,  an  exigency  of  logic.  The  concept  of  the  State 
implies  the  concept  of  war,  for  the  essence  of  the  State  is 
power  . . . That  war  should  ever  be  banished  from  the 
world  is  a hope  not  only  absurd,  but  profoundly  immoral. 
It  would  involve  the  atrophy  of  many  of  the  essential  and 
sublime  forces  of  the  human  soul  ...  A people  which  be- 
come attached  to  the  chimerical  hope  of  perpetual  peace 
finishes  irremediably  by  decaying  in  its  proud  isolation  . . .” 

Nietzsche,  like  Goethe,  held  no  high  opinion  of  the 
German  people,*  and  in  other  ways,  too,  the  outpour- 
ings of  this  megalomaniacal  genius  differ  from  those 
of  the  chauvinistic  German  thinkers  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  Indeed,  he  regarded  most  German  philosophers, 
including  Fichte  and  Hegel,  as  “unconscious  swindlers.” 
He  poked  fun  at  the  “Tartuffery  of  old  Kant.”  The 
Germans,  he  wrote  in  Ecce  Homo,  “have  no  conception 
how  vile  they  are,”  and  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
“wheresoever  Germany  penetrated,  she  ruins  culture.”  He 
thought  that  Christians,  as  much  as  Jews,  were  responsible 

* “I  have  often  felt,”  Goethe  once  said,  ‘‘a  bitter  sorrow  at  the  thought 
of  the  German  people,  which  is  so  estimable  in  the  individual  and  so 
wretched  in  the  generality.  A comparison  of  the  German  people  with 
other  peoples  arouses  a painful  feeling,  which  I try  to  overcome  in 
every  possible  way.”  (Conversation  with  H.  Luden  on  December  13, 
1813,  in  Goethes  Gespraeche , Auswahl  Biedermann;  quoted  by  Wilhelm 
Roepke  in  The  Solution  of  the  German  Problem,  p.  131.) 


146 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


for  the  “slave  morality”  prevalent  in  the  world;  he  was 
never  an  anti-Semite.  He  was  sometimes  fearful  of  Prus- 
sia’s future,  and  in  his  last  years,  before  insanity  closed 
down  his  mind,  he  even  toyed  with  the  idea  of  European 
union  and  world  government. 

Yet  I think  no  one  who  lived  in  the  Third  Reich  could 
have  failed  to  be  impressed  by  Nietzsche’s  influence  on  it. 
His  books  might  be  full,  as  Santayana  said,  of  “genial 
imbecility”  and  “boyish  blasphemies.”  Yet  Nazi  scribblers 
never  tired  of  extolling  him.  Hitler  often  visited  the 
Nietzsche  museum  in  Weimar  and  publicized  his  venera- 
tion for  the  philosopher  by  posing  for  photographs  of  him- 
self staring  in  rapture  at  the  bust  of  the  great  man. 

There  was  some  ground  for  this  appropriation  of 
Nietzsche  as  one  of  the  originators  of  the  Nazi  Weltan- 
schauung. Had  not  the  philosopher  thundered  against  de- 
mocracy and  parliaments,  preached  the  will  to  power, 
praised  war  and  proclaimed  the  coming  of  the  master 
race  and  the  superman — and  in  the  most  telling  aphorisms? 
A Nazi  could  proudly  quote  him  on  almost  every  con- 
ceivable subject,  and  did.  On  Christianity:  “the  one  great 
curse,  the  one  enormous  and  innermost  perversion  ...  I 
call  it  the  one  immortal  blemish  of  mankind  . . . This 
Christianity  is  no  more  than  the  typical  teaching  of  the 
Socialists.”  On  the  State,  power  and  the  jungle  world  of 
man:  “Society  has  never  regarded  virtue  as  anything  else 
than  as  a means  to  strength,  power  and  order.  The  State 
[is]  unmorality  organized  . . . the  will  to  war,  to  con- 
quest and  revenge  . . . Society  is  not  entitled  to  exist  for 
its  own  sake  but  only  as  a substructure  and  scaffolding,  by 
means  of  which  a select  race  of  beings  may  elevate  them- 
selves to  their  higher  duties  . . . There  is  no  such  thing 
as  the  right  to  live,  the  right  to  work,  or  the  right  to  be 
happy:  in  this  respect  man  is  no  different  from  the  meanest 
worm.”  * And  he  exalted  the  superman  as  the  beast  of 

* Women,  whom  Nietzsche  never  had,  he  consigned  to  a distinctly 
inferior  status,  as  did  the  Nazis,  who  decreed  that  their  place  was 
in  the  kitchen  and  their  chief  role  in  life  to  beget  children  for  German 
warriors.  Nietzsche  put  the  idea  this  way:  “Man  shall  be  trained  for 
war  and  woman  for  the  procreation  of  the  warrior.  All  else  is  folly." 
He  went  further.  In  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra  he  exclaims:  “Thou  goest 
to  woman?  Do  not  forget  thy  whip!" — which  prompted  Bertrand  Russell 
to  quip,  “Nine  women  out  of  ten  would  have  got  the  whip  away  from 
him,  and  he  knew  it,  so  he  kept  away  from  women  , , 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  147 

prey,  “the  magnificent  blond  brute,  avidly  rampant  for 
spoil  and  victory.” 

And  war?  Here  Nietzsche  took  the  view  of  most  of  the 
other  nineteenth-century  German  thinkers.  In  the  thunder- 
ing Old  Testament  language  in  which  Thus  Spake  Zara- 
thustra  is  written,  the  philosopher  cries  out:  “Ye  shall  love 
peace  as  a means  to  new  war,  and  the  short  peace  more 
than  the  long.  You  I advise  not  to  work,  but  to  fight. 
You  I advise  not  to  peace  but  to  victory  ...  Ye  say  it  is 
the  good  cause  which  halloweth  even  war?  I say  unto 
you:  it  is  the  good  war  which  halloweth  every  cause.  War 
and  courage  have  done  more  great  things  than  charity.” 

Finally  there  was  Nietzsche’s  prophecy  of  the  coming 
elite  who  would  rule  the  world  and  from  whom  the  super- 
man would  spring.  In  The  Will  to  Power  he  exclaims: 
“A  daring  and  ruler  race  is  building  itself  up  . . . The 
aim  should  be  to  prepare  a transvaluation  of  values  for  a 
particularly  strong  kind  of  man,  most  highly  gifted  in  in- 
tellect and  will.  This  man  and  the  elite  around  him  will 
become  the  “lords  of  the  earth.” 

Such  rantings  from  one  of  Germany’s  most  original 
minds  must  have  struck  a responsive  chord  in  Hitler’s 
littered  mind.  At  any  rate  he  appropriated  them  for  his 
own — not  only  the  thoughts  but  the  philosopher’s  pen- 
chant for  grotesque  exaggeration,  and  often  his  very 
words.  “Lords  of  the  Earth”  is  a familiar  expression  in 
Mein  Kampf.  That  in  the  end  Hitler  considered  himself 
the  superman  of  Nietzsche’s  prophecy  can  not  be  doubted. 

“Whoever  wants  to  understand  National  Socialist  Ger- 
many must  know  Wagner,”  Hitler  used  to  say.*  This  may 
have  been  based  on  a partial  misconception  of  the  great 
composer,  for  though  Richard  Wagner  harbored  a fanati- 
cal hatred,  as  Hitler  did,  for  the  Jews,  who  he  was  con- 
vinced were  out  to  dominate  the  world  with  their  money, 
and  though  he  scorned  parliaments  and  democracy  and 
the  materialism  and  mediocrity  of  the  bourgeoisie,  he 
also  fervently  hoped  that  the  Germans,  “with  their  spe- 
cial gifts,”  would  “become  not  rulers,  but  erinoblers  of 
the  world.” 

It  was  not  his  political  writings,  however,  but  his  tow- 


* My  own  recollection  is  confirmed  by  Otto  Tolischus  in  his  They  Wanted 
War,  p.  11. 


148  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ering  operas,  recalling  so  vividly  the  world  of  German 
antiquity  with  its  heroic  myths,  its  fighting  pagan  gods 
and  heroes,  its  demons  and  dragons,  its  blood  feuds  and 
primitive  tribal  codes,  its  sense  of  destiny,  of  the  splen- 
dor of  love  and  life  and  the  nobility  of  death,  which  in- 
spired the  myths  of  modern  Germany  and  gave  it  a Ger- 
manic Weltanschauung  which  Hitler  and  the  Nazis,  with 
some  justification,  took  over  as  their  own. 

From  his  earliest  days  Hitler  worshiped  Wagner,  and 
even  as  his  life  neared  a close,  in  the  damp  and  dreary 
bunker  at  Army  headquarters  on  the  Russian  front,  with 
his  world  and  his  dreams  beginning  to  crack  and  crum- 
ble, he  loved  to  reminisce  about  all  the  times  he  had  heard 
the  great  Wagnerian  works,  of  what  they  had  meant  to 
him  and  of  the  inspiration  he  had  derived  from  the  Bay- 
reuth Festival  and  from  his  countless  visits  to  Haus 
Wahnfried,  the  composer’s  home,  where  Siegfried  Wag- 
ner, the  composer’s  son,  still  lived  with  his  English-bom 
wife,  Winifred,  who  for  a while  was  one  of  his  revered 
friends. 

“What  joy  each  of  Wagner’s  works  has  given  me!”  Hit- 
ler exclaims  on  the  evening  of  January  24—25,  1942,  soon 
after  the  first  disastrous  German  defeats  in  Russia,  as  he 
discourses  to  his  generals  and  party  cronies,  Himmler 
among  them,  in  the  depths  of  the  underground  shelter  of 
Wolfsschanze  at  Rastenburg  in  East  Prussia.  Outside 
there  is  snow  and  an  arctic  cold,  the  elements  which  he 
so  hated  and  feared  and  which  had  contributed  to  the 
first  German  military  setback  of  the  war.  But  in  the 
warmth  of  the  bunker  his  thoughts  on  this  night,  at  least, 
are  on  one  of  the  great  inspirations  of  his  life.  “I  remem- 
ber,” he  says,  “my  emotion  the  first  time  I entered  Wahn- 
fried. To  say  I was  moved  is  an  understatement!  At  my 
worst  moments,  they  never  ceased  to  sustain  me,  even 
Siegfried  Wagner.  I was  on  Christian-name  terms  with 
them.  I loved  them  all,  and  I also  love  Wahnfried  . . . 
The  ten  days  of  the  Bayreuth  season  were  always  one  of 
the  blessed  seasons  of  my  existence.  And  I rejoice  at  the 
idea  that  one  day  I shall  be  able  to  resume  the  pilgrimage! 
. . . On  the  day  following  the  end  of  the  Bayreuth  Festi- 
val . . . I’m  gripped  by  a great  sadness — as  when  one 
strips  the  Christmas  tree  of  its  ornaments.” 25 

Though  Hitler  reiterated  in  his  monologue  that  winter 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


149 


evening  that  to  him  Tristan  und  Isolde  was  “Wagner’s 
masterpiece,”  it  is  the  stupendous  Nibelungen  Ring,  a 
series  of  four  operas  which  was  inspired  by  the  great 
German  epic  myth,  Nibelungenlied,  and  on  which  the 
composer  worked  for  the  better  part  of  twenty-five  years, 
that  gave  Germany  and  especially  the  Third  Reich  so 
much  of  its  primitive  Germanic  mythos.  Often  a people’s 
myths  are  the  highest  and  truest  expression  of  its  spirit 
and  culture,  and  nowhere  is  this  more  true  than  in  Ger- 
many. Schelling  even  argued  that  “a  nation  comes  into 
existence  with  its  mythology  . . . The  unity  of  its  thinking, 
which  means  a collective  philosophy,  [is]  presented  in 
its  mythology;  therefore  its  mythology  contains  the  fate 
of  the  nation.”  And  Max  Mell,  a contemporary  poet,  who 
wrote  a modern  version  of  the  Song  of  the  Nibelungs,  de- 
clared, “Today  only  little  has  remained  of  the  Greek  gods 
that  humanism  wanted  to  implant  so  deeply  into  our  cul- 
ture . . . But  Siegfried  and  Kriemhild  were  always  in  the 
people’s  soul!” 

Siegfried  and  Kriemhild,  Brunhild  and  Hagen — these 
are  the  ancient  heroes  and  heroines  with  whom  so  many 
modem  Germans  liked  to  identify  themselves.  With  them, 
and  with  the  world  of  the  barbaric,  pagan  Nibelungs — an 
irrational,  heroic,  mystic  world,  beset  by  treachery,  over- 
whelmed by  violence,  drowned  in  blood,  and  culminating 
in  the  Goetterdaemmerung,  the  twilight  of  the  gods,  as 
Valhalla,  set  on  fire  by  Wotan  after  all  his  vicissitudes, 
goes  up  in  flames  in  an  orgy  of  self-willed  annihilation 
which  has  always  fascinated  the  German  mind  and  an- 
swered some  terrible  longing  in  the  German  soul.  These 
heroes,  this  primitive,  demonic  world,  were  always,  in 
Mell’s  words,  “in  the  people’s  soul.”  In  that  German  soul 
could  be  felt  the  struggle  between  the  spirit  of  civiliza- 
tion and  the  spirit  of  the  Nibelungs,  and  in  the  time  with 
which  this  history  is  concerned  the  latter  seemed  to  gain 
the  upper  hand.  It  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  Hitler  tried 
to  emulate  Wotan  when  in  1945  he  willed  the  destruction 
of  Germany  so  that  it  might  go  down  in  flames  with  him. 

Wagner,  a man  of  staggering  genius,  an  artist  of  in- 
credible magnitude,  stood  for  much  more  than  has  been 
set  down  here.  The  conflict  in  the  Ring  operas  often  re- 
volves around  the  theme  of  greed  for  gold,  which  the 
composer  equated  with  the  “tragedy  of  modern  capital- 


150  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ism,”  and  which  he  saw,  with  horror,  wiping  out  the  old 
virtues  which  had  come  down  from  an  earlier  day.  De- 
spite all  his  pagan  heroes  he  did  not  entirely  despair  of 
Christianity,  as  Nietzsche  did.  And  he  had  great  compas- 
sion for  the  erring,  warring  human  race.  But  Hitler  was 
not  entirely  wrong  in  saying  that  to  understand  Nazism 
one  must  first  know  Wagner. 

Wagner  had  known,  and  been  influenced  by,  first 
Schopenhauer  and  then  Nietzsche,  though  the  latter  quar- 
reled with  him  because  he  thought  his  operas,  especially 
Parsifal,  showed  too  much  Christian  renunciation.  In  the 
course  of  his  long  and  stormy  life,  Wagner  came  into 
contact  with  two  other  men,  one  a Frenchman,  the  other 
an  Englishman,  who  are  important  to  this  history  not  so 
much  for  the  impression  they  made  on  him,  though  in 
one  case  it  was  considerable,  as  for  their  effect  on  the 
German  mind,  which  they  helped  to  direct  toward  the 
coming  of  the  Third  Reich. 

These  individuals  were  Count  Joseph  Arthur  de  Gobi- 
neau,  a French  diplomat  and  man  of  letters,  and  Houston 
Stewart  Chamberlain,  one  of  the  strangest  Englishmen 
who  ever  lived. 

Neither  man,  be  it  said  at  once,  was  a mountebank. 
Both  were  men  of  immense  erudition,  deep  culture  and 
wide  experience  of  travel.  Yet  both  concocted  racial  doc- 
trines so  spurious  that  no  people,  not  even  their  own, 
took  them  seriously  with  the  single  exception  of  the  Ger- 
mans. To  the  Nazis  their  questionable  theories  became 
gospel.  It  is  probably  no  exaggeration  to  say,  as  I have 
heard  more  than  one  follower  of  Hitler  say,  that  Cham- 
berlain was  the  spiritual  founder  of  the  Third  Reich.  This 
singular  Englishman,  who  came  to  see  in  the  Germans 
the  master  race,  the  hope  of  the  future,  worshiped  Rich- 
ard Wagner,  one  of  whose  daughters  he  eventually  mar- 
ried; he  venerated  first  Wilhelm  II  and  finally  Hitler  and 
was  the  mentor  of  both.  At  the  end  of  a fantastic  life  he 
could  hail  the  Austrian  corporal — and  this  long  before 
Hitler  came  to  power  or  had  any  prospect  of  it — as  a 
being  sent  by  God  to  lead  the  German  people  out  of  the 
wilderness.  Hitler,  not  unnaturally,  regarded  Chamberlain 
as  a prophet,  as  indeed  he  turned  out  to  be. 

What  was  it  in  the  teaching  of  these  two  men  that  inoc- 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  151 

ulated  the  Germans  with  a madness  on  the  question  of 
race  and  German  destiny? 

Gobineau’s  chief  contribution  was  a four-volume  work 
which  was  published  in  Paris  between  1853  and  1855,  en- 
titled Essai  sur  Vlnegalite  des  Races  Humaines  (Essay 
on  the  Inequality  of  the  Human  Races) . Ironically  enough, 
this  French  aristocrat,  after  serving  as  an  officer  in  the 
Royal  Guard,  had  started  his  public  career  as  chef  de  cabi- 
net to  Alexis  de  Tocqueville  when  the  distinguished  au- 
thor of  Democracy  in  America  served  a brief  term  of 
office  in  1848.  He  had  then  gone  to  Hanover  and  Frank- 
furt as  a diplomat  and  it  was  from  his  contact  with  the 
Germans,  rather  than  with  De  Tocqueville,  that  he  de- 
rived his  theories  on  racial  inequalities,  though  he  once 
confessed  that  he  wrote  the  volumes  partly  to  prove  the 
superiority  of  his  own  aristocratic  ancestry. 

To  Gobineau,  as  he  stated  in  his  dedication  of  the  work 
to  the  King  of  Hanover,  the  key  to  history  and  civiliza- 
tion was  race.  “The  racial  question  dominates  all  the  other 
problems  of  history  . . . the  inequality  of  races  suffices  to 
explain  the  whole  unfolding  of  the  destiny  of  peoples.” 
There  were  three  principal  races,  white,  yellow  and  black, 
and  the  white  was  the  superior.  “History,”  he  contended, 
“shows  that  all  civilization  flows  from  the  white  race, 
that  no  civilization  can  exist  without  the  co-operation  of 
this  race.”  The  jewel  of  the  white  race  was  the  Aryan, 
“this  illustrious  human  family,  the  noblest  among  the 
white  race,”  whose  origins  he  traced  back  to  Central  Asia. 
Unfortunately,  Gobineau  says,  the  contemporary  Aryan 
suffered  from  intermixture  with  inferior  races,  as  one 
could  see  in  the  southern  Europe  of  his  time.  However, 
in  the  northwest,  above  a line  running  roughly  along  the 
Seine  and  east  to  Switzerland,  the  Aryans,  though  far 
from  simon-pure,  still  survived  as  a superior  race.  This 
took  in  some  of  the  French,  all  of  the  English  and  the 
Irish,  the  people  of  the  Low  Countries  and  the  Rhine  and 
Hanover,  and  the  Scandinavians.  Gobineau  seemingly  ex- 
cluded the  bulk  of  the  Germans,  who  lived  to  the  east 
and  southeast  of  his  line — a fact  which  the  Nazis  glossed 
over  when  they  embraced  his  teachings. 

Still,  to  Gobineau’s  mind  the  Germans,  or  at  least  the 
West  Germans,  were  probably  the  best  of  all  the  Aryans, 
and  this  discovery  the  Nazis  did  not  gloss  over.  Wherever 


152 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

they  went,  the  Germans,  he  found,  brought  improvement. 
This  was  true  even  in  the  Roman  Empire.  The  so-called 
barbaric  German  tribes  who  conquered  the  Romans  and 
broke  up  their  empire  did  a distinct  service  to  civilization, 
for  the  Romans,  by  the  time  of  the  fourth  century,  were 
little  better  than  degenerate  mongrels,  while  the  Germans 
were  relatively  pure  Aryans.  “The  Aryan  German,”  he  de- 
clared, “is  a powerful  creature  . . . Everything  he  thinks, 
says  and  does  is  thus  of  major  importance.” 

Gobineau’s  ideas  were  quickly  taken  up  in  Germany. 
Wagner,  whom  the  Frenchman  met  in  1876  toward  the 
close  of  his  life  (he  died  in  1882)  espoused  them  with 
enthusiasm,  and  soon  Gobineau  societies  sprang  up  all 
over  Germany.* 

THE  STRANGE  LIFE  AND  WORKS  OF 
H.  S.  CHAMBERLAIN 

Among  the  zealous  members  of  the  Gobineau  Society 
in  Germany  was  Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain,  whose 
life  and  works  constitute  one  of  the  most  fascinating 
ironies  in  the  inexorable  course  of  history  which  led  to 
the  rise  and  fall  of  the  Third  Reich. 

This  son  of  an  English  admiral,  nephew  of  a British 
field  marshal,  Sir  Neville  Chamberlain,  and  of  two  British 
generals,  and  eventually  son-in-law  of  Richard  Wagner, 
was  born  at  Portsmouth  in  1855.  He  was  destined  for  the 
British  Army  or  Navy,  but  his  delicate  health  made  such 
a calling  out  of  the  question  and  he  was  educated  in  France 
and  Geneva,  where  French  became  his  first  language.  Be- 
tween the  ages  of  fifteen  and  nineteen  fate  brought  him 
into  touch  with  two  Germans  and  thereafter  he  was  drawn 
irresistibly  toward  Germany,  of  which  he  ultimately  be- 
came a citizen  and  one  of  the  foremost  thinkers  and  in 
whose  language  he  wrote  all  of  his  many  books,  several 
of  which  had  an  almost  blinding  influence  on  Wilhelm  II, 
Adolf  Hitler  and  countless  lesser  Germans. 

In  1870,  when  he  was  fifteen,  Chamberlain  landed  in  the 
hands  of  a remarkable  tutor,  Otto  Kuntze,  a Prussian  of 
the  Prussians,  who  for  four  years  imprinted  on  his  re- 
ceptive mind  and  sensitive  soul  the  glories  of  militant, 
conquering  Prussia  and  also— apparently  unmindful  of  the 


Though  not  in  France. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


153 


contrasts — of  such  artists  and  poets  as  Beethoven,  Goethe, 
Schiller  and  Wagner.  At  nineteen  Chamberlian  fell  madly 
in  love  with  Anna  Horst,  also  a Prussian,  ten  years  his 
senior  and,  like  him,  highly  neurotic.  In  1882,  at  the  age  of 
twenty-seven,  he  journeyed  from  Geneva,  where  he  had 
been  immersed  for  three  years  in  studies  of  philosophy, 
natural  history,  physics,  chemistry  and  medicine,  to 
Bayreuth.  There  he  met  Wagner  who,  as  he  says,  became 
the  sun  of  his  life,  and  Cosima,  the  composer’s  wife,  to 
whom  he  would  remain  passionately  and  slavishly  devoted 
all  the  rest  of  his  days.  From  1885,  when  he  went  with 
Anna  Horst,  who  had  become  his  wife,  to  live  for  four 
years  in  Dresden,  he  became  a German  in  thought  and  in 
language,  moving  on  to  Vienna  in  1889  for  a decade  and 
finally  in  1909  to  Bayreuth,  where  he  dwelt  until  his 
death  in  1927.  He  divorced  his  idolized  Prussian  wife  in 
1905,  when  she  was  sixty  and  even  more  mentally  and 
physically  ill  than  he  (the  separation  was  so  painful  that 
he  said  it  almost  drove  him  mad)  and  three  years  later  he 
married  Eva  Wagner  and  settled  down  near  Wahnfried, 
where  he  could  be  near  his  wife’s  mother,  the  revered, 
strong-willed  Cosima. 

Hypersensitive  and  neurotic  and  subject  to  frequent 
nervous  breakdowns,  Chamberlain  was  given  to  seeing 
demons  who,  by  his  own  account,  drove  him  on  relent- 
lessly to  seek  new  fields  of  study  and  get  on  with  his 
prodigious  writings.  One  vision  after  another  forced  him 
to  change  from  biology  to  botany  to  the  fine  arts,  to  music, 
to  philosophy,  to  biography  to  history.  Once,  in  1896, 
when  he  was  returning  from  Italy,  the  presence  of  a demon 
became  so  forceful  that  he  got  off  the  train  at  Gardone, 
shut  himself  up  in  a hotel  room  for  eight  days  and,  aban- 
doning some  work  on  music  that  he  had  comtemplated, 
wrote  feverishly  on  a biological  thesis  until  he  had  the 
germ  of  the  theme  that  would  dominate  all  of  his  later 
works:  race  and  history. 

Whatever  its  blemishes,  his  mind  had  a vast  sweep 
ranging  over  the  fields  of  literature,  music,  biology,  botany, 
religion,  history  and  politics.  There  was,  as  Jean  Real26 
has  pointed  out,  a profound  unity  of  inspiration  in  all  his 
published  works  and  they  had  a remarkable  coherence. 
Since  he  felt  himself  goaded  on  by  demons,  his  books 
(on  Wagner,  Goethe,  Kant,  Christianity  and  race)  were 


154 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

written  in  the  grip  of  a terrible  fever,  a veritable  trance, 
a state  of  self-induced  intoxication,  so  that,  as  he  says  in 
his  autobiography,  Lebenswege,  he  was  often  unable  to 
recognize  them  as  his  own  work,  because  they  surpassed 
his  expectations.  Minds  more  balanced  than  his  have  sub- 
sequently demolished  his  theories  of  race  and  much  of  his 
history,  and  to  such  a French  scholar  of  Germanism  as 
Edmond  Vermeil  Chamberlain’s  ideas  were  essentially 
“shoddy.”  Yet  to  the  anti-Nazi  German  biographer  of 
Hitler,  Konrad  Heiden,  who  deplored  the  influence  of  his 
racial  teachings,  Chamberlain  “was  one  of  the  most  as- 
tonishing talents  in  the  history  of  the  German  mind,  a 
mine  of  knowledge  and  profound  ideas.” 

The  book  which  most  profoundly  influenced  that  mind, 
which  sent  Wilhelm  II  into  ecstasies  and  provided  the 
Nazis  with  their  racial  aberrations,  was  Foundations  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century  ( Grundlagen  des  Neunzehnten  Jahr- 
hunderts),  a work  of  some  twelve  hundred  pages  which 
Chamberlain,  again  possessed  of  one  of  his  “demons,” 
wrote  in  nineteen  months  between  April  1,  1897,  and 
October  31,  1898,  in  Vienna,  and  which  was  published  in 
1899. 

As  with  Gobineau,  whom  he  admired,  Chamberlain 
found  the  key  to  history,  indeed  the  basis  of  civilization, 
to  be  race.  To  explain  the  nineteenth  century,  that  is,  the 
contemporary  world,  one  had  to  consider  first  what  it 
had  been  bequeathed  from  ancient  times.  Three  things, 
said  Chamberlain:  Greek  philosophy  and  art,  Roman 
law  and  the  personality  of  Christ.  There  were  also  three 
legatees:  the  Jews  and  the  Germans,  the  “two  pure  races,” 
and  the  half-breed  Latins  of  the  Mediterranean — “a  chaos 
of  peoples,”  he  called  them.  The  Germans  alone  deserved 
such  a splendid  heritage.  They  had,  it  is  true,  come  into 
history  late,  not  until  the  thirteenth  century.  But  even  be- 
fore that,  in  destroying  the  Roman  Empire,  they  had 
proved  their  worth.  “It  is  not  true,”  he  says,  “that  the 
Teutonic  barbarian  conjured  up  the  so-called  ‘Night  of  the 
Middle  Ages’;  this  night  followed  rather  upon  the  intel- 
lectual and  moral  bankruptcy  of  the  raceless  chaos  of 
humanity  which  the  dying  Roman  Empire  had  nurtured; 
but  for  the  Teuton,  everlasting  night  would  have  settled 
upon  the  world.”  At  the  time  he  was  writing  he  saw  in  the 
Teuton  the  only  hope  of  the  world. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


155 

Chamberlain  included  among  the  “Teutons”  the  Celts 
and  the  Slavs,  though  the  Teutons  were  the  most  important 
element.  However,  he  is  quite  woolly  in  his  definitions 
and  at  one  point  declares  that  “whoever  behaves  as  a 
Teuton  is  a Teuton  whatever  his  racial  origin.”  Perhaps 
here  he  was  thinking  of  his  own  non-German  origin. 
Whatever  he  was,  the  Teuton,  according  to  Chamberlain, 
was  “The  soul  of  our  culture.  The  importance  of  each 
nation  as  a living  power  today  is  dependent  upon  the 
proportion  of  genuinely  Teutonic  blood  in  its  population 
. . . True  history  begins  at  the  moment  when  the  Teuton, 
with  his  masterful  hand,  lays  his  grip  upon  the  legacy  of 
antiquity.” 

And  the  Jews?  The  longest  chapter  in  Foundations 
is  devoted  to  them.  As  we  have  seen,  Chamberlain  claimed 
that  the  Jews  and  the  Teutons  were  the  only  pure  races 
left  in  the  West.  And  in  this  chapter  he  condemns  “stupid 
and  revolting  anti-Semitism.”  The  Jews,  he  says,  are  not 
“inferior”  to  the  Teuton,  merely  “different.”  They  have 
their  own  grandeur;  they  realize  the  “sacred  duty”  of  man 
to  guard  the  purity  of  race.  And  yet  as  he  proceeds  to 
analyze  the  Jews,  Chamberlain  slips  into  the  very  vulgar 
anti-Semitism  which  he  condemns  in  others  and  which 
leads,  in  the  end,  to  the  obscenities  of  Julius  Streicher’s 
caricatures  of  the  Jews  in  Der  Stuermer  in  Hitler’s  time. 
Indeed  a good  deal  of  the  “philosophical”  basis  of  Nazi 
anti-Semitism  stems  from  this  chapter. 

The  preposterousness  of  Chamberlain’s  views  is  quickly 
evident.  He  has  declared  that  the  personality  of  Christ 
is  one  of  the  three  great  bequests  of  antiquity  to  modern 
civilization.  He  then  sets  out  to  “prove”  that  Jesus  was  not 
a Jew.  His  Galilean  origins,  his  inability  to  utter  correctly 
the  Aramaic  gutturals,  are  to  Chamberlain  “clear  signs” 
that  Jesus  had  “a  large  proportion  of  non-Semitic  blood.” 
He  then  makes  a typically  flat  statement:  “Whoever 
claimed  that  Jesus  was  a Jew  was  either  being  stupid  or 
telling  a lie.  . . . Jesus  was  not  a Jew.” 

What  was  he  then?  Chamberlain  answers:  Probably  an 
Aryan!  If  not  entirely  by  blood,  then  unmistakably  by 
reason  of  his  moral  and  religious  teaching,  so  opposed  to 
the  “materialism  and  abstract  formalism”  of  the  Jewish 
religion.  It  was  natural  then — or  at  least  it  was  to  Cham- 


156  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

berlain — that  Christ  should  become  “the  God  of  the 
young  Indo-European  peoples  overflowing  with  life,”  and 
above  all  the  God  of  the  Teuton,  because  “no  other  people 
was  so  well  equipped  as  the  Teutonic  to  hear  this  divine 
voice.” 

There  follows  what  purports  to  be  a detailed  history 
of  the  Jewish  race  from  the  time  of  the  mixture  of  the 
Semite  or  Bedouin  of  the  desert  with  the  roundheaded 
Hittite,  who  had  a “Jewish  nose,”  and  finally  with  the 
Amorites,  who  were  Aryans.  Unfortunately  the  Aryan 
mixture — the  Amorites,  he  says,  were  tall,  blond,  magnifi- 
cent— came  too  late  to  really  improve  the  “corrupt”  He- 
brew strain.  From  then  on  the  Englishman,  contradict- 
ing his  whole  theory  of  the  purity  of  the  Jewish  race, 
finds  the  Jews  becoming  a “negative”  race,  “a  bastardy,” 
so  that  the  Aryans  were  justified  in  “denying”  Israel.  In 
fact,  he  condemns  the  Aryans  for  giving  the  Jews  “a  halo 
of  false  glory.”  He  then  finds  the  Jews  “lamentably  lacking 
in  true  religion.” 

Finally,  for  Chamberlain  the  way  of  salvation  lies  in 
the  Teutons  and  their  culture,  and  of  the  Teutons  the 
Germans  are  the  highest-endowed,  for  they  have  inherited 
the  best  qualities  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Indo-Aryans. 
This  gives  them  the  right  to  be  masters  of  the  world.  “God 
builds  today  upon  the  Germans  alone,”  he  wrote  in  an- 
other place.  “This  is  the  knowledge,  the  certain  truth,  that 
has  filled  my  soul  for  years.” 

Publication  of  Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth  Century 
created  something  of  a sensation  and  brought  this  strange 
Englishman  sudden  fame  in  Germany.  Despite  its  frequent 
eloquence  and  its  distinguished  style — for  Chamberlain 
was  a dedicated  artist — the  book  was  not  easy  reading. 
But  it  was  soon  taken  up  by  the  upper  classes,  who  seem 
to  have  found  in  it  just  what  they  wanted  to  believe. 
Within  ten  years  it  had  gone  through  eight  editions  and 
sold  60,000  copies  and  by  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of 
the  First  World  War  in  1914  it  had  reached  a sale  of 
100,000.  It  flourished  again  in  the  Nazi  time  and  I re- 
member an  announcement  of  its  twenty-fourth  edition  in 
1938,  by  which  time  it  had  sold  more  than  a quarter  of 
a million  copies. 

Among  its  first  and  most  enthusiastic  readers  was  Kaiser 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


157 


Wilhelm  II.  He  invited  Chamberlain  to  his  palace  at  Pots- 
dam and  on  their  very  first  meeting  a friendship  was 
formed  that  lasted  to  the  end  of  the  author’s  life  in  1927. 
An  extensive  correspondence  between  the  two  followed. 
Some  of  the  forty-three  letters  which  Chamberlain  ad- 
dressed to  the  Emperor  (Wilhelm  answered  twenty-three 
of  them)  were  lengthy  essays  which  the  ruler  used  in 
several  of  his  bombastic  speeches  and  statements.  “It  was 
God  who  sent  your  book  to  the  German  people,  and  you 
personally  to  me,”  the  Kaiser  wrote  in  one  of  his  first 
letters.  Chamberlain’s  obsequiousness,  his  exaggerated 
flattery,  in  these  letters  can  be  nauseating.  “Your  Majesty 
and  your  subjects,”  he  wrote,  “have  been  bom  in  a holy 
shrine,”  and  he  informed  Wilhelm  that  he  had  placed  his 
portrait  in  his  study  opposite  one  of  Christ  by  Leonardo 
so  that  while  he  worked  he  often  paced  up  and  down 
between  the  countenance  of  his  Savior  and  his  sovereign. 

His  servility  did  not  prevent  Chamberlain  from  contin- 
ually proffering  advice  to  the  headstrong,  flamboyant  mon- 
arch. In  1908  the  popular  opposition  to  Wilhelm  had 
reached  such  a climax  that  the  Reichstag  censored  him 
for  his  disastrous  intervention  in  foreign  affairs.  But 
Chamberlain  advised  the  Emperor  that  public  opinion  was 
made  by  idiots  and  traitors  and  not  to  mind  it,  whereupon 
Wilhelm  replied  that  the  two  of  them  would  stand  to- 
gether— “You  wield  your  pen;  I my  tongue  (and)  my  broad 
/sword.” 

And  always  the  Englishman  reminded  the  Emperor  of 
Germany’s  mission  and  its  destiny.  “Once  Germany  has 
achieved  the  power,”  he  wrote  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
First  World  War,  “ — and  we  may  confidently  expect  her 
to  achieve  it — she  must  immediately  begin  to  carry  out  a 
scientific  policy  of  genius.  Augustus  undertook  a systematic 
transformation  of  the  world,  and  Germany  must  do  the 
same  . . . Equipped  with  offensive  and  defensive  weapons, 
organized  as  firmly  and  flawlessly  as  the  Army,  superior  to 
all  in  art,  science,  technology,  industry,  commerce,  finance, 
in  every  field,  in  short;  teacher,  helmsman,  and  pioneer  of 
the  world,  every  man  at  his  post,  every  man  giving  his 
utmost  for  the  holy  cause — thus  Germany  . . . will  con- 
quer the  world  by  inner  superiority.” 

For  preaching  such  a glorious  mission  for  his  adopted 
country  (he  became  a naturalized  German  citizen  in  1916, 


158 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


halfway  through  the  war)  Chamberlain  received  from  the 
Kaiser  the  Iron  Cross. 

But  it  was  on  the  Third  Reich,  which  did  not  arrive 
until  six  years  after  his  death  but  whose  coming  he  foresaw, 
that  this  Englishman’s  influence  was  the  greatest.  His  racial 
theories  and  his  burning  sense  of  the  destiny  of  the  Ger- 
mans and  Germany  were  taken  over  by  the  Nazis,  who 
acclaimed  him  as  one  of  their  prophets.  During  the  Hitler 
regime  books,  pamphlets  and  articles  poured  from  the 
presses  extolling  the  “spiritual  founder”  of  National  So- 
cialist Germany.  Rosenberg,  as  one  of  Hitler’s  mentors, 
often  tried  to  impart  his  enthusiasm  for  the  English  phi- 
losopher to  the  Fuehrer.  It  is  likely  that  Hitler  first  learned 
of  Chamberlain’s  writings  before  he  left  Vienna,  for  they 
were  popular  among  the  Pan-German  and  anti-Semitic 
groups  whose  literature  he  devoured  so  avidly  in  those 
early  days.  Probably  too  he  read  some  of  Chamberlain’s 
chauvinistic  articles  during  the  war.  In  Mein  Kampf  he 
expresses  the  regret  that  Chamberlain’s  observations  were 
not  more  heeded  during  the  Second  Reich. 

Chamberlain  was  one  of  the  first  intellectuals  in  Ger- 
many to  see  a great  future  for  Hitler — and  new  opportuni- 
ties for  the  Germans  if  they  followed  him.  Hitler  had  met 
him  in  Bayreuth  in  1923,  and  though  ill,  half  paralyzed, 
and  disillusioned  by  Germany’s  defeat  and  the  fall  of  the 
Hohenzollem  Empire — the  collapse  of  all  his  hopes  and 
prophecies! — Chamberlain  was  swept  off  his  feet  by  the 
eloquent  young  Austrian.  “You  have  mighty  things  to  do,” 
he  wrote  Hitler  on  the  following  day,  “.  . . My  faith  in 
Germanism  had  not  wavered  an  instant,  though  my  hope 
— I confess — was  at  a low  ebb.  With  one  stroke  you  have 
transformed  the  state  of  my  soul.  That  in  the  hour  of  her 
deepest  need  Germany  gives  birth  to  a Hitler  proves  her 
vitality;  as  do  the  influences  that  emanate  from  him;  for 
these  two  things — personality  and  influence — belong  to- 
gether . . . May  God  protect  you!” 

This  was  at  a time  when  Adolf  Hitler,  with  his  Charlie 
Chaplin  mustache,  his  rowdy  manners  and  his  violent, 
outlandish  extremism,  was  still  considered  a joke  by 
most  Germans.  He  had  few  followers  then.  But  the 
hypnotic  magnetism  of  his  personality  worked  like  a charm 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler 


159 


on  the  aging,  ill  philosopher  and  renewed  his  faith  in  the 
people  he  had  chosen  to  join  and  exalt.  Chamberlain 
became  a member  of  the  budding  Nazi  Party  and  so  far  as 
his  health  would  permit  began  to  write  for  its  obscure 
publications.  One  of  his  articles,  published  in  1924,  hailed 
Hitler,  who  was  then  in  jail,  as  destined  by  God  to  lead 
the  German  people.  Destiny  had  beckoned  Wilhelm  II, 
but  he  had  failed;  now  there  was  Adolf  Hitler.  This  remark- 
able Englishman’s  seventieth  birthday,  on  September  5, 
1925,  was  celebrated  with  five  columns  of  encomiums  in 
the  Nazi  V oelkischer  Beobachter,  which  hailed  his  Foun- 
dations as  the  “gospel  of  the  Nazi  movement,”  and  he 
went  to  his  grave  sixteen  months  later — on  January  11, 
1927 — with  high  hope  that  all  he  had  preached  and  proph- 
esied would  yet  come  true  under  the  divine  guidance  of 
this  new  German  Messiah. 

Aside  from  a prince  representing  Wilhelm  II,  who 
could  not  return  to  German  soil,  Hitler  was  the  only 
public  figure  at  Chamberlain’s  funeral.  In  reporting  the 
death  of  the  Englishman  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter  said 
that  the  German  people  had  lost  “one  of  the  great  armorers 
whose  weapons  have  not  yet  found  in  our  day  their  fullest 
use.”  Not  the  half-paralyzed  old  man,  dying,  not  even 
Hitler,  nor  anyone  else  in  Germany,  could  have  foreseen 
in  that  bleak  January  month  of  1927,  when  the  fortunes  of 
the  Nazi  Party  were  at  their  lowest  ebb,  how  soon,  how 
very  soon,  those  weapons  which  the  transplanted  Eng- 
lishman had  forged  would  be  put  to  their  fullest  use, 
and  with  what  fearful  consequences.27 

Yet  Adolf  Hitler  had  a mystical  sense  of  his  personal 
mission  on  earth  in  those  days,  and  even  before.  “From 
millions  of  men  . . . one  man  must  step  forward,”  he 
wrote  in  Mein  Kampf  (the  italics  are  his),  “who  with 
apodictic  force  will  form  granite  principles  from  the 
wavering  idea-world  of  the  broad  masses  and  take  up  the 
struggle  for  their  sole  correctness,  until  from  the  shifting 
waves  of  a free  thought-world  there  will  arise  a brazen 
cliff  of  solid  unity  in  faith  and  will.”  28 

He  left  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  readers  that  he  already 
considered  himself  that  one  man.  Mein  Kampf  is  sprinkled 
with  little  essays  on  the  role  of  the  genius  who  is  picked 


160 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


by  Providence  to  lead  a great  people,  even  though  they 
may  not  at  first  understand  him  or  recognize  his  worth, 
out  of  their  troubles  to  further  greatness.  The  reader  is 
aware  that  Hitler  is  referring  to  himself  and  his  present 
situation.  He  is  not  yet  recognized  by  the  world  for  what 
he  is  sure  he  is,  but  that  has  always  been  the  fate  of 
geniuses — in  the  beginning.  “It  nearly  always  takes  some 
stimulus  to  bring  the  genius  on  the  scene,”  he  remarks. 
“The  world  then  resists  and  does  not  want  to  believe  that 
the  type,  which  apparently  is  identical  with  it,  is  suddenly 
a very  different  being;  a process  which  is  repeated  with 
every  eminent  son  of  man  . . . The  spark  of  a genius,” 
he  declares,  “exists  in  the  brain  of  the  truly  creative  man 
from  the  hour  of  his  birth.  True  genius  is  always  in- 
born and  never  cultivated,  let  alone  learned.” 29 

Specifically,  he  thought,  the  great  men  who  shaped  his- 
tory were  a blend  of  the  practical  politician  and  the 
thinker.  “At  long  intervals  in  human  history  it  may  oc- 
casionally happen  that  the  politician  is  wedded  to  the 
theoretician.  The  more  profound  this  fusion,  the  greater 
are  the  obstacles  opposing  the  work  of  the  politician. 
He  no  longer  works  for  necessities  which  will  be  under- 
stood by  the  first  good  shopkeeper,  but  for  aims  which 
only  the  fewest  comprehend.  Therefore  his  life  is  tom 
between  love  and  hate.  The  protest  of  the  present,  which 
does  not  understand  him,  struggles  with  the  recognition 
of  posterity — for  which  he  also  works.  For  the  greater  a 
man’s  works  are  for  the  future,  the  less  the  present  can 
comprehend  them;  the  harder  his  fight  . . .”so 

These  lines  were  written  in  1924,  when  few  understood 
what  this  man,  then  in  prison  and  discredited  by  the  fail- 
ure of  his  comic-opera  putsch,  had  in  mind  to  do.  But 
Hitler  had  no  doubts  himself.  Whether  he  actually  read 
Hegel  or  not  is  a matter  of  dispute.  But  it  is  clear  from 
his  writings  and  speeches  that  he  had  some  acquaintance 
with  the  philosopher’s  ideas,  if  only  through  discussions 
with  his  early  mentors  Rosenberg,  Eckart  and  Hess.  One 
way  or  another  Hegel’s  famous  lectures  at  the  University 
of  Berlin  must  have  caught  his  attention,  as  did  numerous 
dictums  of  Nietzsche.  We  have  seen  briefly  * that  Hegel 
developed  a theory  of  “heroes”  which  had  great  appeal  to 


See  above,  p.  144. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  jgj 

the  German  mind.  In  one  of  the  Berlin  lectures  he  dis- 
cussed how  the  “will  of  the  world  spirit”  is  carried 
out  by  “world-historical  individuals.” 

They  may  be  called  Heroes,  inasmuch  as  they  have  de- 
rived their  purposes  and  their  vocation,  not  from  the 
calm  regular  course  of  things,  sanctioned  by  the  existing 
order;  but  from  a concealed  front,  from  that  inner  Spirit, 
still  hidden  beneath  the  surface,  which  impinges  on  the 
outer  world  as  on  a shell  and  bursts  it  into  pieces.  Such 
were  Alexander,  Caesar,  Napoleon.  They  were  practical, 
political  men.  But  at  the  same  time  they  were  thinking  men, 
who  had  an  insight  into  the  requirements  of  the  time — what 
was  ripe  for  development.  This  was  the  very  Truth  for  their 
age,  for  their  world  ...  It  was  theirs  to  know  this  nascent 
principle,  the  necessary,  directly  sequent  step  in  progress, 
which  their  world  was  to  take;  to  make  this  their  aim,  and 
to  expend  their  energy  in  promoting  it.  World-historical  men 
—the  Heroes  of  an  epoch — must  therefore  be  recognized 
as  its  clear-sighted  ones;  their  deeds,  their  words  are  the 
best  of  their  time.31 

Note  the  similarities  between  this  and  the  above  quo- 
tation from  Mein  Kampf.  The  fusion  of  the  politician  and 
the  thinker — that  is  what  produces  a hero,  a “world- 
historical  figure,”  an  Alexander,  a Caesar,  a Napoleon.  If 
there  was  in  him,  as  Hitler  had  now  come  to  believe,  the 
same  fusion,  might  he  not  aspire  to  their  ranks? 

In  Hitler’s  utterances  there  runs  the  theme  that  the 
supreme  leader  is  above  the  morals  of  ordinary  man. 
Hegel  and  Nietzsche  thought  so  too.  We  have  seen  Hegel’s 
argument  that  “the  private  virtues”  and  “irrelevant 
moral  claims”  must  not  stand  in  the  way  of  the  great 
rulers,  nor  must  one  be  squeamish  if  the  heroes,  in  ful- 
filling their  destiny,  trample  or  “crush  to  pieces”  many 
an  innocent  flower.  Nietzsche,  with  his  grotesque  exag- 
geration, goes  much  further. 

The  strong  men,  the  masters,  regain  the  pure  conscience 
of  a beast  of  prey;  monsters  filled  with  joy,  they  can  re- 
turn from  a fearful  succession  of  murder,  arson,  rape  and 
torture  with  the  same  joy  in  their  hearts,  the  same  content- 
ment in  their  souls  as  if  they  had  indulged  in  some  stu- 
dent s rag  . . . When  a man  is  capable  of  commanding, 
when  he  is  by  nature  a “Master,”  when  he  is  violent  in  act 
and  gesture,  of  what  importance  are  treaties  to  him?  . . . 


162 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


To  judge  morality  properly,  it  must  be  replaced  by  two 
concepts  borrowed  from  zoology:  the  taming  of  a beast 
and  the  breeding  of  a specific  species.32 

Such  teachings,  carried  to  their  extremity  by  Nietzsche 
and  applauded  by  a host  of  lesser  Germans,  seem  to  have 
exerted  a strong  appeal  on  Hitler.*  A genius  with  a mis- 
sion was  above  the  law;  he  could  not  be  bound  by  “bour- 
geois” morals.  Thus,  when  his  time  for  action  came, 
Hitler  could  justify  the  most  ruthless  and  cold-blooded 
deeds,  the  suppression  of  personal  freedom,  the  brutal 
practice  of  slave  labor,  the  depravities  of  the  concen- 
tration camp,  the  massacre  of  his  own  followers  in  June 
1934,  the  killing  of  war  prisoners  and  the  mass  slaughter 
of  the  Jews. 


When  Hitler  emerged  from  Landsberg  prison  five  days 
before  Christmas,  1924,  he  found  a situation  which  would 
have  led  almost  any  other  man  to  retire  from  public  life. 
The  Nazi  Party  and  its  press  were  banned;  the  former 
leaders  were  feuding  and  falling  away.  He  himself  was 
forbidden  to  speak  in  public.  What  was  worse,  he  faced 
deportation  to  his  native  Austria;  the  Bavarian  state  po- 
lice had  strongly  recommended  it  in  a report  to  the  Min- 
istry of  the  Interior.  Even  many  of  his  old  comrades 
agreed  with  the  general  opinion  that  Hitler  was  finished, 
that  now  he  would  fade  away  into  oblivion  as  had  so 
many  other  provincial  politicians  who  had  enjoyed  a brief 
moment  of  notoriety  during  the  strife-ridden  years  when  it 
seemed  that  the  Republic  would  totter,  f 
But  the  Republic  had  weathered  the  storms.  It  was  be- 
ginning to  thrive.  While  Hitler  was  in  prison  a financial 
wizard  by  the  name  of  Dr.  Hjalmar  Horace  Greeley 
Schacht  had  been  called  in  to  stabilize  the  currency, 
and  he  had  succeeded.  The  ruinous  inflation  was  over. 
The  burden  of  reparations  was  eased  by  the  Dawes  Plan 
Capital  began  to  flow  in  from  America.  The  economy 
was  rapidly  recovering.  Stresemann  was  succeeding  in  his 


* See  above,  pp.  128-29,  for  quotations  from  Mein  Kampf. 
tAs  late  ,as  1929 ’ Professor  M.  A.  Gerothwohl,  the  editor  of  Lord 
U Abernon  s dianes,  wrote  a footnote  to  the  ambassador’s  account  of  the 
Ueer  Hall  Putsch  in  which,  after  mention  of  Hitler’s  being  sentenced  to 
prison,  he  added : He  was  finally  released  after  six  months  and  bound  over 
tor  the  rest  of  his  sentence,  thereafter  fading  into  oblivion."  Lord  D’Abemon 
was  the  British  ambassador  in  Berlin  from  1920  to  1926  and  worked  with 
great  skill  to  strengthen  the  Weimar  Republic. 


The  Rise  of  Adolf  Hitler  163 

policy  of  reconciliation  with  the  Allies.  The  French  were 
getting  out  of  the  Ruhr.  A security  pack  was  being  dis- 
cussed which  would  pave  the  way  for  a general  Euro- 
pean settlement  (Locarno)  and  bring  Germany  into  the 
League  of  Nations.  For  the  first  time  since  the  defeat, 
after  six  years  of  tension,  turmoil  and  depression,  the 
German  people  were  beginning  to  have  a normal  life.  Two 
weeks  before  Hitler  was  released  from  Landsberg,  the 
Social  Democrats — the  “November  criminals,”  as  he  called 
them — had  increased  their  vote  by  30  per  cent  (to  nearly 
eight  million)  in  a general  election  in  which  they  had 
championed  the  Republic.  The  Nazis,  in  league  with  north- 
ern racial  groups  under  the  name  of  the  National  Socialist 
German  Freedom  movement,  had  seen  their  vote  fall  from 
nearly  two  million  in  May  1924  to  less  than  a million  in 
December.  Nazism  appeared  to  be  a dying  cause.  It  had 
mushroomed  on  the  country’s  misfortunes;  now  that  the 
nation’s  outlook  was  suddenly  bright  it  was  rapidly  with- 
ering away.  Or  so  most  Germans  and  foreign  observers 
believed. 

But  not  Adolf  Hitler.  He  was  not  easily  discouraged. 
And  he  knew  how  to  wait.  As  he  picked  up  the  threads  of 
his  life  in  the  little  two-room  apartment  on  the  top  floor 
of  41  Thierschstrasse  in  Munich  during  the  winter  months 
of  1925  and  then,  when  summer  came,  in  various  inns  on 
the  Obersalzberg  above  Berchtesgaden,  the  contemplation 
of  the  misfortunes  of  the  immediate  past  and  the  eclipse 
of  the  present,  served  only  to  strengthen  his  resolve.  Be- 
hind the  prison  gates  he  had  had  time  to  range  over  in 
his  mind  not  only  his  own  past  and  its  triumphs  and  mis- 
takes, but  the  tumultuous  past  of  his  German  people  and 
its  triumphs  and  errors.  He  saw  both  more  clearly  now. 
And  there  was  bom  in  him  anew  a burning  sense  of 
mission — for  himself  and  for  Germany — from  which  all 
doubts  were  excluded.  In  this  exalted  spirit  he  finished 
dictating  the  torrent  of  words  that  would  go  into  Volume 
One  of  Mein  Kampf  and  went  on  immediately  to  Volume 
Two.  The  blueprint  of  what  the  Almighty  had  called  upon 
him  to  do  in  this  cataclysmic  world  and  the  philosophy, 
the  Weltanschauung,  that  would  sustain  it  were  set  down 
in  cold  print  for  all  to  ponder.  That  philosophy,  however 
demented,  had  roots,  as  we  have  seen,  deep  in  German  life. 


164 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  blueprint  may  have  seemed  preposterous  to  most 
twentieth-century  minds,  even  in  Germany.  But  it  too  pos- 
sessed a certain  logic.  It  held  forth  a vision.  It  offered, 
though  few  saw  this  at  the  time,  a continuation  of  Ger- 
man history.  It  pointed  the  way  toward  a glorious  German 
destiny. 


Booh  Two 


* * * 


TRIUMPH 

AND 

CONSOLIDATION 


s 


THE  ROAD  TO  POWER:  1925-31 


the  years  from  1925  until  the  coming  of  the  depression 
in  1929  were  lean  years  for  Adolf  Hitler  and  the  Nazi 
movement,  but  it  is  a measure  of  the  man  that  he  per- 
severed and  never  lost  hope  or  confidence.  Despite  the 
excitability  of  his  nature,  which  often  led  to  outbursts  of 
hysteria,  he  had  the  patience  to  wait  and  the  shrewdness 
to  realize  that  the  climate  of  material  prosperity  and  of  a 
feeling  of  relaxation  which  settled  over  Germany  in  those 
years  was  not  propitious  for  his  purposes. 

He  was  confident  that  the  good  times  would  not  last. 
So  far  as  Germany  was  concerned,  he  said,  they  depended 
not  on  her  own  strength  but  on  that  of  others — of  Ameri- 
ca above  all,  from  whose  swollen  coffers  loans  were  pour- 
ing in  to  make  and  keep  Germany  prosperous.  Between 
1924  and  1930  German  borrowing  amounted  to  some 
seven  billion  dollars  and  most  of  it  came  from  American 
investors,  who  gave  little  thought  to  how  the  Germans 
might  make  eventual  repayment.  The  Germans  gave  even 
less  thought  to  it. 

The  Republic  borrowed  to  pay  its  reparations  and  to 
increase  its  vast  social  services,  which  were  the  model  of 
the  world.  The  states,  cities  and  municipalities  borrowed 
to  finance  not  only  needed  improvements  but  building  of 
airfields,  theaters,  sport  stadiums  and  fancy  swimming 
pools.  Industry,  which  had  wiped  out  its  debts  in  the 
inflation,  borrowed  billions  to  retool  and  to  rationalize  its 
productive  processes.  Its  output,  which  in  1923  had 
dropped  to  55  per  cent  of  that  in  1913,  rose,  to  122  per 
cent  by  1927.  For  the  first  time  since  the  war  unemploy- 
ment fell  below  a million— to  650,000— in  1928.  That 
year  retail  sales  were  up  20  per  cent  over  1925  and  the 
next  year  real  wages  reached  a figure  10  per  cent  higher 

167 


168 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

than  four  years  before.  The  lower  middle  classes,  all  the 
millions  of  shopkeepers  and  small-salaried  folk  on  whom 
Hitler  had  to  draw  for  his  mass  support,  shared  in  the 
general  prosperity. 

My  own  acquaintance  with  Germany  began  in  those 
days.  I was  stationed  in  Paris  and  occasionally  in  London 
at  that  time,  and  fascinating  though  those  capitals  were 
to  a young  American  happy  to  have  escaped  from  the 
incredible  smugness  and  emptiness  of  the  Calvin  Coolidge 
era,  they  paled  a little  when  one  came  to  Berlin  and 
Munich.  A wonderful  ferment  was  working  in  Germany. 
Life  seemed  more  free,  more  modern,  more  exciting  than 
in  any  place  I had  ever  seen.  Nowhere  else  did  the  arts  or 
the  intellectual  life  seem  so  lively.  In  contemporary  writ- 
ing, painting,  architecture,  in  music  and  drama,  there  were 
new  currents  and  fine  talents.  And  everywhere  there  was 
an  accent  on  youth.  One  sat  up  with  the  young  people  all 
night  in  the  sidewalk  cafes,  the  plush  bars,  the  summer 
camps,  on  a Rhineland  steamer  or  in  a smoke-filled  art- 
ist’s studio  and  talked  endlessly  about  life.  They  were  a 
healthy,  carefree,  sun-worshiping  lot,  and  they  were  filled 
with  an  enormous  zest  for  living  to  the  full  and  in  com- 
plete freedom.  The  old  oppressive  Prussian  spirit  seemed 
to  be  dead  and  buried.  Most  Germans  one  met — politi- 
cians, writers,  editors,  artists,  professors,  students,  business- 
men, labor  leaders — struck  you  as  being  democratic,  liber- 
al, even  pacifist. 

One  scarcely  heard  of  Hitler  or  the  Nazis  except  as 
butts  of  jokes — usually  in  connection  with  the  Beer  Hall 
Putsch,  as  it  came  to  be  known.  In  the  elections  of  May 
20,  1928,  the  Nazi  Party  polled  only  810,000  votes  out 
of  a total  of  thirty-one  million  cast  and  had  but  a dozen 
of  the  Reichstag’s  491  members.  The  conservative  Na- 
tionalists also  lost  heavily,  their  vote  falling  from  six 
million  in  1924  to  four  million,  and  their  seats  in  Parlia- 
ment diminished  from  103  to  73.  In  contrast,  the  Social 
Democrats  gained  a million  and  a quarter  votes  in  the 
1928  elections,  and  their  total  poll  of  more  than  nine 
million,  with  153  seats  in  the  Reichstag,  made  them  easily 
the  largest  political  party  in  Germany.  Ten  years  after 
the  end  of  the  war  the  German  Republic  seemed  at  last 
to  have  found  its  feet. 

The  membership  of  the  National  Socialist  Party  in  that 


169 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

anniversay  year — 1928 — was  108,000.  Small  as  the  figure 
was,  it  was  slowly  growing.  A fortnight  after  leaving  pris- 
on at  the  end  of  1924,  Hitler  had  hurried  to  see  Dr. 
Heinrich  Held,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Bavaria  and  the 
head  of  the  Catholic  Bavarian  People’s  Party.  On  the 
strength  of  his  promise  of  good  behavior  (Hitler  was  still 
on  parole)  Held  had  lifted  the  ban  on  the  Nazi  Party 
and  its  newspaper.  “The  wild  beast  is  checked,”  Held 
told  his  Minister  of  Justice,  Guertner.  “We  can  afford 
to  loosen  the  chain.”  The  Bavarian  Premier  was  one  of 
the  first,  but  by  no  means  the  last,  of  Germany’s  politi- 
cians to  fall  into  this  fatal  error  of  judgment. 

The  Voelkischer  Beobachter  reappeared  on  February  26, 
1925,  with  a long  editorial  written  by  Hitler,  entitled 
“A  New  Beginning.”  The  next  day  he  spoke  at  the  first 
mass  meeting  of  the  ressurected  Nazi  Party  in  the 
Buergerbraukeller,  which  he  and  his  faithful  followers 
had  last  seen  on  the  morning  of  November  9,  a year  and 
a half  before,  when  they  set  out  on  their  ill-fated  march. 
Many  of  the  faithful  were  absent.  Eckart  and  Scheubner- 
Richter  were  dead.  Goering  was  in  exile.  Ludendorff  and 
Roehm  had  broken  with  the  leader.  Rosenberg,  feuding 
with  Streicher  and  Esser,  was  sulking  and  stayed  away. 
So  did  Gregor  Strasser,  who  with  Ludendorff  had  led  the 
National  Socialist  German  Freedom  movement  while  Hit- 
ler was  behind  bars  and  the  Nazi  Party  itself  banned. 
When  Hitler  asked  Anton  Drexler  to  preside  at  the  meet- 
ing the  old  locksmith  and  founder  of  the  party  told  him 
to  go  to  the  devil.  Nevertheless  some  four  thousand  fol- 
lowers gathered  in  the  beer  hall  to  hear  Hitler  once 
again  and  he  did  not  disappoint  them.  His  eloquence  was 
as  moving  as  ever.  At  the  end  of  a two-hour  harangue, 
the  crowd  roared  with  applause.  Despite  the  many  deser- 
tions and  the  bleak  prospects,  Hitler  made  it  clear  that  he 
still  considered  himself  the  dictatorial  leader  of  the  party. 
“I  alone  lead  the  movement,  and  no  one  can  impose  con- 
ditions on  me  so  long  as  I personally  bear  the  responsi- 
bility,” he  declared,  and  added,  “Once  more  I bear  the 
whole  responsibility  for  everything  that  occurs  in  the  move- 
ment.” 

Hitler  had  gone  to  the  meeting  with  his  mind  made 
up  on  two  objectives  which  he  intended  henceforth  to 
pursue.  One  was  to  concentrate  all  power  in  his  own 


170  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

hands.  The  other  was  to  re-establish  the  Nazi  Party  as 
a political  organization  which  would  seek  power  exclusive- 
ly through  constitutional  means.  He  had  explained  the 
new  tactics  to  one  of  his  henchmen,  Karl  Ludecke,  while 
still  in  prison:  “When  I resume  active  work  it  will  be 
necessary  to  pursue  a new  policy.  Instead  of  working  to 
achieve  power  by  armed  coup,  we  shall  have  to  hold  our 
noses  and  enter  the  Reichstag  against  the  Catholic  and 
Marxist  deputies.  If  outvoting  them  takes  longer  than  out- 
shooting  them,  at  least  the  result  will  be  guaranteed  by 
their  own  constitution.  Any  lawful  process  is  slow  . . , 
Sooner  or  later  we  shall  have  a majority — and  after  that, 
Germany.” 1 On  his  release  from  Landsberg,  he  had  as- 
sured the  Bavarian  Premifer  that  the  Nazi  Party  would 
henceforth  act  within  the  framework  of  the  constitution. 

But  he  allowed  himself  to  be  carried  away  by  the  en- 
thusiasm of  the  crowd  in  his  reappearance  at  the  Buerger- 
braukeller  on  February  27.  His  threats  against  the  State 
were  scarcely  veiled.  The  republican  regime,  as  well  as 
the  Marxists  and  the  Jews,  was  “the  enemy.”  And  in  his 
peroration  he  had  shouted,  “To  this  struggle  of  ours  there 
are  only  two  possible  issues:  either  the  enemy  passes  over 
our  bodies  or  we  pass  over  theirs!” 

The  “wild  beast,”  in  this,  his  first  public  appearance 
after  his  imprisonment,  did  not  seem  “checked”  at  all. 
He  was  again  threatening  the  State  with  violence,  despite 
his  promise  of  good  behavior.  The  government  of  Bavaria 
promptly  forbade  him  to  speak  again  in  public — a ban 
that  was  to  last  two  years.  The  other  states  followed  suit. 
This  was  a heavy  blow  to  a man  whose  oratory  had 
brought  him  so  far.  A silenced  Hitler  was  a defeated 
Hitler,  as  ineffective  as  a handcuffed  pugilist  in  a ring. 
Or  so  most  people  thought. 

But  again  they  were  wrong.  They  forgot  that  Hitler 
was  an  organizer  as  well  as  a spellbinder.  Curbing  his 
ire  at  being  forbidden  to  speak  in  public,  he  set  to  work 
with  furious  intent  to  rebuild  the  National  Socialist  Ger- 
man Workers’  Party  and  to  make  of  it  an  organization 
such  as  Germany  had  never  seen  before.  He  meant  to 
make  it  like  the  Army — a state  within  a state.  The  first 
job  was  to  attract  dues-paying  members.  By  the  end  of 
1925  they  numbered  just  27,000.  The  going  was  slow,  but 
each  year  some  progress  was  made:  49,000  members  in 


171 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

1926;  72,000  in  1927;  108,000  in  1928;  178,000  in  1929. 

More  important  was  the  building  up  of  an  intricate 
party  structure  which  corresponded  to  the  organization  of 
the  German  government  and  indeed  of  German  society. 
The  country  was  divided  into  districts,  or  Gaue,  which 
corresponded  roughly  with  the  thirty-four  Reichstag  elec- 
toral districts  and  at  the  head  of  which  was  a gauleiter 
appointed  by  Hitler.  There  were  an  additional  seven  Gaue 
for  Austria,  Danzig,  the  Saar  and  the  Sudetenland  in 
Czechoslovakia.  A Gau  was  divided  into  Kreise — circles 
— and  presided  over  by  a Kreisleiter.  The  next  smallest 
party  unit  was  an  Ortsgruppe — a local  group — and  in  the 
cities  these  were  further  subdivided  into  street  cells  and 
blocks. 

The  political  organization  of  the  Nazi  Party  was  divided 
into  two  groups:  P.O.  I,  as  it  was  known,  designed  to  at- 
tack and  undermine  the  government,  and  P.O.  II  to  es- 
tablish a state  within  a state.  Thus  the  second  group  had 
departments  of  agriculture,  justice,  national  economy,  in- 
terior and  labor — and,  with  an  eye  to  the  future,  of  race 
and  culture,  and  of  engineering.  P.O.  I had  departments 
of  foreign  affairs  and  of  labor  unions  and  a Reich  Press 
Office.  The  Propaganda  Division  was  a separate  and  elab- 
orate office. 

Though  some  of  the  party  roughnecks,  veterans  of  street 
fighting  and  beerhouse  brawls,  opposed  bringing  women 
and  children  into  the  Nazi  Party,  Hitler  soon  provided 
organizations  for  them  too.  The  Hitler  Youth  took  in 
youngsters  from  fifteen  to  eighteen  who  had  their  own 
departments  of  culture,  schools,  press,  propaganda,  “de- 
fense sports,”  etc.,  and  those  from  ten  to  fifteen  were 
enrolled  in  the  Deutsches  Jungvolk.  For  the  girls  there 
was  the  Bund  Deutscher  Maedel  and  for  the  women  the 
N.  S.  Frauenschaften.  Students,  teachers,  civil  servants, 
doctors,  lawyers,  jurists — all  had  their  separate  organiza- 
tions, and  there  was  a Nazi  Kulturbund  to  attract  the 
intellectuals  and  artists. 

After  considerable  difficulties  the  S.A.  was  reorganized 
into  an  armed  band  of  several  hundred  thousand  men 
to  protect  Nazi  meetings,  to  break  up  the  meetings  of 
others  and  to  generally  terrorize  those  who  opposed  Hit- 
ler. Some  of  its  leaders  also  hoped  to  see  the  S.A.  supplant 
the  Regular  Army  when  Hitler  came  to  power.  To  pre- 


172  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pare  for  this  a special  office  under  General  Franz  Ritter 
von  Epp  was  set  up,  called  the  Wehrpolitische  Amt.  Its 
five  divisions  concerned  themselves  with  such  problems 
as  external  and  internal  defense  policy,  defense  forces, 
popular  defense  potential,  and  so  on.  But  the  brown-shirted 
S.A.  never  became  much  more  than  a motley  mob  of 
brawlers.  Many  of  its  top  leaders,  beginning  with  its 
chief,  Roehm,  were  notorious  homosexual  perverts.  Lieu- 
tenant Edmund  Heines,  who  led  the  Munich  S.A.,  was  not 
only  a homosexual  but  a convicted  murderer.  These  two 
and  dozens  of  others  quarreled  and  feuded  as  only  men 
of  unnatural  sexual  inclinations,  with  their  peculiar  jeal- 
ousies, can. 

To  have  at  hand  a more  dependable  band  Hitler  created 
the  S.S. — Schutzstaffel — put  their  members  in  black  uni- 
forms similar  to  those  worn  by  the  Italian  Fascisti  and 
made  them  swear  a special  oath  of  loyalty  to  him  per- 
sonally. At  first  the  S.S.  was  little  more  than  a bodyguard 
for  the  Fuehrer.  Its  first  leader  was  a newspaperman 
named  Berchtold.  As  he  preferred  the  relative  quiet  of 
the  newsroom  of  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter  to  playing 
at  cop  and  soldier,  he  was  replaced  by  one  Erhard 
Heiden,  a former  police  stool  pigeon  of  unsavory  reputa- 
tion. It  was  not  until  1929  that  Hitler  found  the  man  he 
was  looking  for  as  the  ideal  leader  of  the  S.S.,  in  the  per- 
son of  a chicken  farmer  in  the  village  of  Waldtrudering, 
near  Munich,  a mild-mannered  fellow  whom  people  mis- 
took (as  did  this  author  when  he  first  met  him)  for  a 
small-town  schoolmaster  and  whose  name  was  Heinrich 
Himmler.  When  Himmler  took  over  the  S.S.  it  numbered 
some  two  hundred  men.  By  the  time  he  finished  his  job 
with  it,  the  S.S.  dominated  Germany  and  was  a name 
that  struck  terror  throughout  occupied  Europe. 

At  the  top  of  the  pyramid  of  the  intricate  party  or- 
ganization stood  Adolf  Hitler  with  the  highfalutin  title 
of  Partei-und-Oberster-S.A. -Fuehrer,  Vorsitzender  der 
N.S.D.A.V. — which  may  be  translated  as  “Supreme  Lead- 
er of  the  Party  and  the  S.A.,  Chairman  of  the  National 
Socialist  German  Labor  Organization.”  Directly  attached 
to  his  office  was  the  Reich  Directorate  (Reichsleitung) 
which  was  made  up  of  the  top  bosses  of  the  party  and 
such  useful  officials  as  the  “Reich  Treasurer”  and  the 
“Reich  Business  Manager.”  Visiting  the  palatial  Brown 


173 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

House  in  Munich,  the  national  headquarters  of  the  party, 
during  the  last  years  of  the  Republic,  one  got  the  impres- 
sion that  here  indeed  were  the  offices  of  a state  within  a 
state.  That,  no  doubt,  was  the  impression  Hitler  wished  to 
convey,  for  it  helped  to  undermine  confidence,  both 
domestic  and  foreign,  in  the  actual  German  State,  which 
he  was  trying  to  overthrow. 

But  Hitler  was  intent  on  something  more  important  than 
making  an  impression.  Three  years  after  he  came  to  power, 
in  a speech  to  the  “old  fighters”  at  the  Buergerbrau  on 
the  anniversary  evening  of  November  9,  1936,  he  ex- 
plained one  of  the  objectives  he  had  had  in  building  the 
party  up  into  such  a formidable  and  all-embracing  or- 
ganization. “We  recognized,”  he  said,  in  recalling  the  days 
when  the  party  was  being  reformed  after  the  putsch, 
“that  it  is  not  enough  to  overthrow  the  old  State,  but  that 
the  new  State  must  previously  have  been  built  up  and 
be  practically  ready  to  one’s  hand.  ...  In  1933  it  was  no 
longer  a question  of  overthrowing  a state  by  an  act  of 
violence;  meanwhile  the  new  State  had  been  built  up  and 
all  that  there  remained  to  do  was  to  destroy  the  last 
remnants  of  the  old  State — and  that  took  but  a few 
hours.”  2 

An  organization,  however  streamlined  and  efficient,  is 
made  up  of  erring  human  beings,  and  in  those  years 
when  Hitler  was  shaping  his  party  to  take  over  Germany’s 
destiny  he  had  his  fill  of  troubles  with  his  chief  lieu- 
tenants, who  constantly  quarreled,  not  only  among  them- 
selves but  with  him.  He,  who  was  so  monumentally  in- 
tolerant by  his  very  nature,  was  strangely  tolerant  of  one 
human  condition — a man’s  morals.  No  other  party  in 
Germany  came  near  to  attracting  so  many  shady  char- 
acters. As  we  have  seen,  a conglomeration  of  pimps,  mur- 
derers, homosexuals,  alcoholics  and  blackmailers  flocked 
to  the  party  as  if  to  a natural  haven.  Hitler  did  not  care, 
as  long  as  they  were  useful  to  him.  When  he  emerged 
from  prison  he  found  not  only  that  they  were  at  each 
other’s  throats  but  that  there  was  a demand  from  the 
more  prim  and  respectable  leaders  such  as  Rosenberg  and 
Ludendorff  that  the  criminals  and  especially  the  perverts 
be  expelled  from  the  movement.  This  Hitler  frankly  re- 
fused to  do.  “I  do  not  consider  it  to  be  the  task  of  a 


174 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


political  leader,”  he  wrote  in  his  editorial,  “A  New  Be- 
ginning,” in  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter  of  February  26, 
1925,  “to  attempt  to  improve  upon,  or  even  to  fuse  to- 
gether, the  human  material  lying  ready  to  his  hand.” 

By  1926,  however,  the  charges  and  countercharges 
hurled  by  the  Nazi  chieftains  at  one  another  became  so 
embarrassing  that  Hitler  set  up  a party  court  to  settle 
them  and  to  prevent  his  comrades  from  washing  their 
dirty  linen  in  public.  This  was  known  as  the  USCHLA, 
from  U tersuchung-und-Schlichtungs- Ausschuss — Commit- 
tee for  Investigation  and  Settlement.  Its  first  head  was  a 
former  general,  Heinemann,  but  he  was  unable  to  grasp  the 
real  purpose  of  the  court,  which  was  not  to  pronounce 
judgment  on  those  accused  of  common  crimes  but  to  hush 
them  up  and  see  that  they  did  not  disturb  party  discipline 
or  the  authority  of  the  Leader.  So  the  General  was  re- 
placed by  a more  understanding  ex-officer,  Major  Walther 
Buch,  who  was  given  two  assistants.  One  was  Ulrich 
Graf,  the  former  butcher  who  had  been  Hitler’s  body- 
guard; the  other  was  Hans  Frank,  a young  Nazi  lawyer, 
of  whom  more  will  be  heard  later  when  it  comes  time 
to  recount  his  bloodthirstiness  as  Governor  General  of  oc- 
cupied Poland,  for  which  he  paid  on  the  gallows  at  Nurem- 
berg. This  fine  judicial  triumvirate  performed  to  the  com- 
plete satisfaction  of  the  Fuehrer.  A party  leader  might 
be  accused  of  the  most  nefarious  crime.  Buch’s  answer 
invariably  was,  “Well,  what  of  it?”  What  he  wanted  to 
know  was  whether  it  hurt  party  discipline  or  offended 
the  Fuehrer. 

It  took  more  than  this  party  court,  effective  though  it 
was  in  thousands  of  instances,  to  keep  the  ambitious, 
throat-cutting,  big  Nazi  fry  in  line.  Often  Hitler  had  to 
intervene  personally  not  only  to  keep  a semblance  of  har- 
mony but  to  prevent  his  own  throat  from  being  cut. 

While  he  had  languished  at  Landsberg,  a young  man 
by  the  name  of  Gregor  Strasser  had  suddenly  risen  in 
the  Nazi  movement.  A druggist  by  profession  and  a Ba- 
varian by  birth,  he  was  three  years  younger  than  Hit- 
ler; like  him,  he  had  won  the  Iron  Cross,  First  Class,  and 
during  the  war  he  had  risen  from  the  ranks  to  be  a 
lieutenant.  He  had  become  a Nazi  in  1920  and  soon  be- 
came the  district  leader  in  Lower  Bavaria.  A big,  stocky 
man,  somewhat  of  a bon  vivant,  bursting  with  energy, 


175 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

he  developed  into  an  effective  public  speaker  more  by  the 
force  of  his  personality  than  by  the  oratorical  gifts  with 
which  Hitler  was  endowed.  Moreover,  he  was  a bom  or- 
ganizer. Fiercely  independent  in  spirit  and  mind,  Strasser 
refused  to  kowtow  to  Hitler  or  to  take  very  seriously 
the  Austrian’s  claims  to  be  absolute  dictator  of  the  Nazi 
movement.  This  was  to  prove,  in  the  long  run,  a fatal 
handicap,  as  was  his  sincere  enthusiasm  for  the  “social- 
ism” in  National  Socialism. 

Over  the  opposition  of  the  imprisoned  Hitler,  Strasser 
joined  Ludendorff  and  Rosenberg  in  organizing  a Nazi 
Voelkisch  movement  to  contest  the  state  and  national  elec- 
tions in  the  spring  of  1924.  In  Bavaria  the  bloc  polled 
enough  votes  to  make  it  the  second  largest  party;  in  Ger- 
many, as  we  have  seen,  under  the  name  of  the  National 
Socialist  German  Freedom  movement  it  won  two  million 
votes  and  obtained  thirty-two  seats  in  the  Reichstag,  one 
of  which  went  to  Strasser.  Hitler  took  a dark  view  of  the 
young  man’s  activities  and  an  even  darker  one  of  his  suc- 
cesses. Strasser,  for  his  part,  was  not  disposed  to  accept 
Hitler  as  the  Lord,  and  he  pointedly  stayed  away  from 
the  big  rally  in  Munich  on  February  27,  1925,  which  re- 
launched the  Nazi  Party. 

If  the  movement  was  to  become  truly  national,  Hitler 
realized,  it  must  get  a footing  in  the  north,  in  Prussia,  and 
above  all  in  the  citadel  of  the  enemy,  Berlin.  In  the  elec- 
tion of  1924  Strasser  had  campaigned  in  the  north  and 
made  alliances  with  ultranational  groups  there  led  by 
Albrecht  von  Graefe  and  Count  Ernst  zu  Reventlow.  He 
thus  had  personal  contacts  and  a certain  following  in  this 
area  and  he  was  the  only  Nazi  leader  who  had.  Two 
weeks  after  the  February  27  meeting,  Hitler  swallowed 
his  personal  pique,  sent  for  Strasser,  induced  him  to  come 
back  to  the  fold  and  proposed  that  he  organize  the  Nazi 
Party  in  the  north.  Strasser  accepted.  Here  was  an  op- 
portunity to  exercise  his  talents  without  the  jealous,  ar- 
rogant Leader  being  in  a position  to  breathe  down  his 
neck. 

Within  a few  months  he  had  founded  a newspaper  in 
the  capital,  the  Berliner  Arbeiterzeitung,  edited  by  his 
brother,  Otto  Strasser,  and  a fortnightly  newsletter,  the 
N.  S.  Briefe,  which  kept  the  party  officials  informed  of 
the  party  line.  And  he  had  laid  the  foundations  for  a 


176 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

political  organization  that  stretched  through  Prussia, 
Saxony,  Hanover  and  the  industrial  Rhineland.  A veritable 
dynamo,  Strasser  traveled  all  over  the  north,  addressing 
meetings,  appointing  district  leaders  and  setting  up  a party 
apparatus.  Being  a Reichstag  deputy  gave  him  two  im- 
mediate advantages  over  Hitler:  he  had  a free  pass  on  the 
railroads,  so  travel  was  no  expense  to  him  or  the  party; 
and  he  enjoyed  parliamentary  immunity.  No  authority 
could  ban  him  from  public  speaking;  no  court  could  try 
him  for  slandering  anyone  or  anything  he  wanted  to.  As 
Heiden  wrote  sardonically,  “Free  travel  and  free  slander — 
Strasser  had  a big  head  start  over  his  Fuehrer.” 

As  his  secretary  and  editor  of  the  N.  S.  Briefe  Gregor 
Strasser  took  on  a twenty-eight-year-old  Rhinelander 
named  Paul  Joseph  Goebbels. 

THE  EMERGENCE  OF  PAUL  JOSEPH  GOEBBELS 

This  swarthy,  dwarfish  young  man,  with  a crippled  foot, 
a nimble  mind  and  a complicated  and  neurotic  personal- 
ity, was  not  a stranger  to  the  Nazi  movement.  He  had  dis- 
covered it  in  1922  when  he  first  heard  Hitler  speak  in 
Munich,  was  converted,  and  became  a member  of  the 
party.  But  the  movement  did  not  really  discover  him  until 
three  years  later,  when  Gregor  Strasser,  hearing  him 
speak,  decided  that  he  could  use  a young  man  of  such 
obvious  talents.  Goebbels  at  twenty-eight  was  already  an 
impassioned  orator,  a fanatical  nationalist  and,  as  Strasser 
knew,  possessed  of  a vituperative  pen  and,  rare  for  Nazi 
leaders,  a sound  university  education.  Heinrich  Himmler 
had  just  resigned  as  Strasser’s  secretary  to  devote  more 
of  his  time  to  raising  chickens.  Strasser  appointed  Goebbels 
in  his  place.  It  was  to  prove  a fateful  choice. 

Paul  Joseph  Goebbels  was  bom  on  October  29,  1897,  in 
Rheydt,  a textile  center  of  some  thirty  thousand  people  in 
the  Rhineland.  His  father,  Fritz  Goebbels,  was  a foreman 
in  a local  textile  plant.  His  mother,  Maria  Katharina 
Odenhausen,  was  the  daughter  of  a blacksmith.  Both  par- 
ents were  pious  Catholics. 

Through  the  Catholics,  Joseph  Goebbels  received  most 
of  his  education.  He  attended  a Catholic  parochial  grade 
school  and  then  the  Gymnasium  in  Rheydt.  A scholarship 
from  the  Catholic  Albert  Magnus  Society  enabled  him  to  go 


177 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

on  to  the  university — in  fact,  to  eight  universities.  Before 
he  received  his  Ph.D.  from  Heidelberg  in  1921  at  the  age 
of  twenty-four,  he  had  studied  at  the  universities  of  Bonn, 
Freiburg,  Wuerzburg,  Cologne,  Frankfurt,  Munich  and 
Berlin.  In  these  illustrious  institutions — the  flower  of  Ger- 
man higher  learning — Goebbels  had  concentrated  on  the 
study  of  philosophy,  history,  literature  and  art  and  had 
continued  his  work  in  Latin  and  Greek. 

He  intended  to  become  a writer.  The  year  he  received 
his  doctorate  he  wrote  an  autobiographical  novel,  Michael, 
which  no  publisher  would  take  at  the  time,  and  in  the  next 
couple  of  years  he  finished  two  plays,  The  Wanderer 
(about  Jesus  Christ)  and  The  Lonesome  Guest,  both  in 
verse,  which  no  producer  would  stage.*  He  had  no  better 
luck  in  journalism.  The  great  liberal  daily,  Berliner 
Tageblatt,  turned  down  the  dozens  of  articles  he  submitted 
and  his  application  for  a reporter’s  job. 

His  personal  life  also  was  full  of  frustrations  in  the 
early  days.  Because  he  was  a cripple  he  could  not  serve 
in  the  war  and  thus  was  cheated  of  the  experience  which 
seemed,  at  least  in  the  beginning,  so  glorious  for  the  young 
men  of  his  generation  and  which  was  a requisite  for 
leadership  in  the  Nazi  Party.  Goebbels  was  not,  as  most 
people  believed,  born  with  a club  foot.  At  the  age  of 
seven  he  had  suffered  an  attack  of  osteomyelitis,  an  in- 
flammation of  the  bone  marrow.  An  operation  on  his  left 
thigh  was  not  successful  and  the  left  leg  remained  shorter 
than  the  right  and  somewhat  withered.  This  handicap, 
which  forced  him  to  walk  with  a noticeable  limp,  riled 
him  all  the  days  of  his  life  and  was  one  of  the  causes  of 
his  early  embitterment.  In  desperation,  during  his  uni- 
versity days  and  during  the  brief  period  when  he  was  an 
agitator  against  the  French  in  the  Ruhr,  he  often  passed 
himself  off  as  a wounded  war  veteran. 

Nor  was  he  lucky  in  love,  though  all  his  life  he  mis- 
took his  philanderings,  which  became  notorious  in  his 
years  of  power,  for  great  amours.  His  diaries  for 
1925-26,  when  he  was  twenty-eight  and  twenty-nine  and 
just  being  launched  into  Nazi  politics  by  Strasser,  are  full 

* Michael  was  finally  published  in  1929,  after  Goebbels  had  become  nationally 
known  as  a Nazi  leader.  The  Wanderer  reached  the  stage  after  Goebbels 
became  Propaganda  Minister  and  the  boss  of  the  German  theater.  It  had  a 
short  run. 


178  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  moonings  over  loved  ones — of  whom  he  had  several  at 
a time.*  Thus: 

August  14,  1925:  Alma  wrote  me  a postcard  from  Bad  Harz- 
burg.  The  first  sign  of  her  since  that  night.  This  teasing, 
charming  Alma! 

Received  first  letter  from  Else  in  Switzerland.  Only  Else 
dear  can  write  like  that  . . . Soon  I am  going  to  the  Rhine 
for  a week  to  be  quite  alone.  Then  Else  will  come  . . . 
How  happy  I am  in  anticipation! 

August  15:  In  these  days  I must  think  so  often  of  Anke 
. . . How  wonderful  it  was  to  travel  with  her.  This  wonder- 
ful wench! 

I am  yearning  for  Else.  When  shall  I have  her  in  my 
arms  again? 

Else  dear,  when  shall  I see  you  again? 

Alma,  you  dear  featherweight! 

Anke,  never  can  I forget  you! 

August  27:  Three  days  on  the  Rhine  . . . Not  a word  from 
Else  ...  Is  she  angry  with  me?  How  I pine  for  her!  I am 
living  in  the  same  room  as  I did  with  her  last  Whitsuntide. 
What  thoughts!  What  feeling!  Why  doesn’t  she  come? 

September  3:  Else  is  here!  On  Tuesday  she  returned  from 
Switzerland — fat,  buxom,  healthy,  gay,  only  slightly  tanned. 
She  is  very  happy  and  in  the  best  of  spirits.  She  is  good  to 
me,  and  gives  me  much  joy. 

October  14:  Why  did  Anke  have  to  leave  me?  ...  I just 
mustn’t  think  of  these  things. 

December  21:  There  is  a curse  on  me  and  the  women.  Woe 
to  those  who  love  me! 

December  29:  To  Krefeld  last  night  with  Hess.  Christmas 
celebration.  A delightful,  beautiful  girl  from  Franconia. 
She’s  my  type.  Home  with  her  through  rain  and  shine.  Au 
revoir! 

Else  arrived. 

February  6,  1926:  I yearn  for  a sweet  woman!  Oh,  torturing 
pain! 

Goebbels  never  forgot  “Anke” — Anke  Helhom,  his  first 
love,  whom  he  had  met  during  his  second  semester  at 
Freiburg.  His  diary  is  full  of  ravings  about  her  dark-blond 


* These  early  diaries,  unearthed  by  Allied  intelligence  agents  after  the  war, 
are  a rich  source  of  information  for  this  period  of  Goebbel’s  life. 


179 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

beauty  and  his  subsequent  disillusionment  when  she  left 
him.  Later,  when  he  became  Propaganda  Minister,  he  re- 
vealed to  friends,  with  typical  vanity  and  cynicism,  why 
she  had  left  him.  “She  betrayed  me  because  the  other  guy 
had  more  money  and  could  afford  to  take  her  out  to  din- 
ner and  to  shows.  How  foolish  of  her!  . . . Today  she 
might  be  the  wife  of  the  Minister  of  Propaganda!  How 
frustrated  she  must  feel!”  Anke  married  and  divorced  “the 
other  guy”  and  in  1934  came  to  Berlin,  where  Goebbels 
got  her  a job  on  a magazine.3 

It  was  Strasser’s  radicalism,  his  belief  in  the  “social- 
ism” of  National  Socialism,  which  attracted  the  young 
Goebbels.  Both  wanted  to  build  the  party  on  the  pro- 
letariat. The  diary  of  Goebbels  is  full  of  expressions  of 
sympathy  for  Communism  at  this  time.  “In  the  final 
analysis,”  he  wrote  on  October  23,  1925,  “it  would  be 
better  for  us  to  end  our  existence  under  Bolshevism  than 
to  endure  slavery  under  capitalism.”  On  January  31,  1926, 
he  told  himself  in  his  diary:  “I  think  it  is  terrible  that  we 
[the  Nazis]  and  the  Communists  are  bashing  in  each 
other’s  heads  . . . Where  can  we  get  together  sometime 
with  the  leading  Communists?”  It  was  at  this  time  that 
he  published  an  open  letter  to  a Communist  leader  as- 
suring him  that  Nazism  and  Communism  were  really  the 
same  thing.  “You  and  I,”  he  declared,  “are  fighting  one 
another,  but  we  are  not  really  enemies.” 

To  Adolf  Hitler  this  was  rank  heresy,  and  he  watched 
with  increasing  uneasiness  the  success  of  the  Strasser 
brothers  and  Goebbels  in  building  up  a vigorous,  radical, 
proletarian  wing  of  the  party  in  the  north.  If  left  to  them- 
selves these  men  might  capture  the  party,  and  for  ob- 
jectives which  Hitler  violently  opposed.  The  inevitable 
showdown  came  in  the  fall  of  1925  and  in  February  of 
the  following  year. 

It  was  forced  by  Gregor  Strasser  and  Goebbels  over  an 
issue  which  aroused  a good  deal  of  feeling  in  Germany 
at  that  time.  This  was  the  proposal  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crats and  the  Communists  that  the  extensive  estates  and 
fortunes  of  the  deposed  royal  and  princely  families  be 
expropriated  and  taken  over  by  the  Republic.  The  ques- 
tion was  to  be  settled  by  a plebiscite  of  the  people,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  Weimar  Constitution.  Strasser  and 


180  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Goebbels  proposed  that  the  Nazi  Party  jump  into  the 
fray  with  the  Communists  and  the  Socialists  and  support 
the  campaign  to  expropriate  the  nobles. 

Hitler  was  furious.  Several  of  these  former  rulers  had 
kicked  in  with  contributions  to  the  party.  Moreover,  a 
number  of  big  industrialists  were  beginning  to  become  fi- 
nancially interested  in  Hitler’s  reborn  movement  precisely 
because  it  promised  to  be  effective  in  combating  the  Com- 
munists, the  Socialists  and  the  trade  unions.  If  Strasser 
and  Goebbels  got  away  with  their  plans,  Hitler’s  sources 
of  income  would  immediately  dry  up. 

Before  the  Fuehrer  could  act,  however,  Strasser  called 
a meeting  of  the  northern  district  party  leaders  in  Hanover 
on  November  22,  1925.  Its  purpose  was  not  only  to  put 
the  northern  branch  of  the  Nazi  Party  behind  the  ex- 
propriation drive  but  to  launch  a new  economic  program 
which  would  do  away  with  the  “reactionary”  twenty-five 
points  that  had  been  adopted  back  in  1920.  The  Strassers 
and  Goebbels  wanted  to  nationalize  the  big  industries  and 
the  big  estates  and  substitute  a chamber  of  corporations 
on  fascist  lines  for  the  Reichstag.  Hitler  declined  to  attend 
the  meeting,  but  sent  his  faithful  Gottfried  Feder  to  rep- 
resent him  and  to  squelch  the  rebels.  Goebbels  demanded 
that  Feder  be  thrown  out — “We  don’t  want  any  stool 
pigeons!”  he  cried.  Several  leaders  who  would  later  make 
their  mark  in  the  Third  Reich  were  present — Bernhard 
Rust,  Erich  Koch,  Hans  Kerri  and  Robert  Ley — but  only 
Ley,  the  alcoholic  chemist  who  was  leader  of  the  Cologne 
district,  supported  Hitler.  When  Dr.  Ley  and  Feder  ar- 
gued that  the  meeting  was  out  of  order,  that  nothing 
could  be  done  without  Hitler,  the  Supreme  Leader,  Goeb- 
bels shouted  (according  to  Otto  Strasser,  who  was  present), 
“I  demand  that  the  petty  bourgeois  Adolf  Hitler  be  ex- 
pelled from  the  Nazi  Party!” 

The  vituperative  young  Goebbels  had  come  a long  way 
since  he  had  first  fallen  under  Hitler’s  spell  three  years 
before — or  so  it  must  have  seemed  to  Gregor  Strasser. 

“At  that  moment  I was  reborn!”  Goebbels  exclaimed  in 
recording  his  impressions  of  the  first  time  he  heard  Hitler 
speak,  in  the  Circus  Krone  in  Munich  in  June  1922.  “Now 
I knew  which  road  to  take  . . . This  was  a command!” 
He  was  even  more  ecstatic  over  Hitler’s  behavior  during 


181 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

the  trial  of  the  Munich  putschists.  After  the  verdicts  were 
in,  Goebbels  wrote  the  Fuehrer: 

Like  a rising  star  you  appeared  before  our  wondering 
eyes,  you  performed  miracles  to  clear  our  minds  and,  in  a 
world  of  skepticism  and  desperation,  gave  us  faith.  You 
towered  above  the  masses,  full  of  faith  and  certain  of  the 
future,  and  possessed  by  the  will  to  free  those  masses  with 
your  unlimited  love  for  all  those  who  believe  in  the  new 
Reich.  For  the  first  time  we  saw  with  shining  eyes  a man 
who  tore  off  the  mask  from  the  faces  distorted  by  greed, 
the  faces  of  mediocre  parliamentary  busybodies  . . . 

In  the  Munich  court  you  grew  before  us  to  the  greatness 
of  the  Fuehrer.  What  you  said  are  the  greatest  words  spoken 
in  Germany  since  Bismarck.  You  expressed  more  than  your 
own  pain  . . . You  named  the  need  of  a whole  generation, 
searching  in  confused  longing  for  men  and  task.  What  you 
said  is  the  catechism  of  the  new  political  belief,  bom  out  of 
the  despair  of  a collapsing,  Godless  world  . . . We  thank  you. 
One  day,  Germany  will  thank  you  . . . 

But  now,  a year  and  a half  later,  Goebbels’  idol  had 
fallen.  He  had  become  a “petty  bourgeois”  who  deserved 
being  booted  out  of  the  party.  With  only  Ley  and  Feder 
dissenting,  the  Hanover  meeting  adopted  Strasser’s  new 
party  program  and  approved  the  decision  to  join  the 
Marxists  in  the  plebiscite  campaign  to  deprive  the  former 
kings  and  princes  of  their  possessions. 

Hitler  bided  his  time  and  then  on  February  14,  1926, 
struck  back.  He  called  a meeting  at  Bamberg,  in  southern 
Germany,  shrewdly  picking  a weekday,  when  it  was  dif- 
ficult for  the  northern  leaders  to  get  away  from  their  jobs. 
In  fact,  only  Gregor  Strasser  and  Goebbels  were  able  to 
attend.  They  were  greatly  outnumbered  by  Hitler’s  hand- 
picked leaders  in  the  south.  And  at  the  Fuehrer’s  insistence 
they  were  forced  to  capitulate  and  abandon  their  program. 
Such  German  historians  of  Nazism  as  Heiden  and  Olden, 
and  the  non-German  writers  who  have  been  guided  by 
them,  have  recounted  that  at  the  Bamberg  meeting  Goeb- 
bels openly  deserted  Strasser  and  went  over  to  Hitler.  But 
the  Goebbels  diaries,  discovered  after  Heiden  and  Olden 
wrote  their  books,  reveal  that  he  did  not  betray  Strasser 
quite  so  abruptly.  They  show  that  Goebbels,  though  he 
joined  Strasser  in  surrendering  to  Hitler,  thought  the 
Fuehrer  was  utterly  wrong,  and  that,  for  the  moment  at 


182 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


least,  he  had  no  intention  whatever  of  going  over  to  him. 
On  February  15,  the  day  after  the  Bamberg  meeting,  he 
confided  to  his  diary: 

Hitler  talks  for  two  hours.  I feel  as  though  someone  had 
beaten  me.  What  sort  of  Hitler  is  this?  A reactionary? 
Extremely  awkward  and  unsteady.  Completely  wrong  on  the 
Russian  question.  Italy  and  England  are  our  natural  allies! 
Horrible!  . . . We  must  annihilate  Russia!  . . . The  ques- 
tion of  the  private  property  of  the  nobility  must  not  even  be 
touched  upon.  Terrible!  ...  I cannot  utter  a word.  I feel 
as  though  I’ve  been  hit  over  the  head  . . . 

Certainly  one  of  the  great  disappointments  of  my  life.  I 
no  longer  have  complete  faith  in  Hitler.  That  is  the  terrible 
thing:  my  props  have  been  taken  from  under  me. 

To  show  where  his  loyalties  stood,  Goebbels  went  to 
the  station  with  Strasser  and  tried  to  console  him.  A week 
later,  on  February  23,  he  records:  “Long  conference  with 
Strasser.  Result:  we  must  not  begrudge  the  Munich  crowd 
their  Pyrrhic  victory.  We  must  begin  again  our  fight  for 
socialism.” 

But  Hitler  had  sized  up  the  flamboyant  young  Rhine- 
lander better  than  Strasser.  On  March  29  Goebbels  noted: 
“This  morning  a letter  from  Hitler.  I shall  make  a speech 
on  April  8 at  Munich.”  He  arrived  there  on  April  7. 
“Hitler’s  car  is  waiting,”  he  recorded.  “What  a royal  re- 
ception! I will  speak  at  the  historic  Buergerbrau.”  The 
next  day  he  did,  from  the  same  platform  as  the  Leader. 
He  wrote  it  all  down  in  his  diary  entry  of  April  8: 

Hitler  phones  . . . His  kindness  in  spite  of  Bamberg  makes 
us  feel  ashamed  ...  At  2 o’clock  we  drive  to  the  Buerger- 
brau. Hitler  is  already  there.  My  heart  is  beating  so  wildly 
it  is  about  to  burst.  I enter  the  hall.  Roaring  welcome 
. . . And  then  I speak  for  two  and  a half  hours  . . . Peo- 
ple roar  and  shout.  At  the  end  Hitler  embraces  me.  I feel 
happy  . . . Hitler  is  always  at  my  side. 

A few  days  later  Goebbels  surrendered  completely. 
"April  13:  Hitler  spoke  for  three  hours.  Brilliantly.  He 
can  make  you  doubt  your  own  views.  Italy  and  England 
our  allies.  Russia  wants  to  devour  us  ...  I love  him  . . . 
He  has  thought  everything  through.  His  ideal:  a just  col- 
lectivism and  individualism.  As  to  soil — everything  be- 
longs to  the  people.  Production  to  be  creative  and  in- 


183 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

dividualistic.  Trusts,  transport,  etc.,  to  be  socialized  ...  I 
am  now  at  ease  about  him  ...  I bow  to  the  greater  man, 
to  the  political  genius.” 

When  Goebbels  left  Munich  on  April  17  he  was  Hitler’s 
man  and  was  to  remain  his  most  loyal  follower  to  his 
dying  breath.  On  April  20  he  wrote  the  Fuehrer  a birth- 
day note:  “Dear  and  revered  Adolf  Hitler!  I have  learned 
so  much  from  you  ...  You  have  finally  made  me  see  the 
light  . . .”  And  that  night  in  his  diary:  “He  is  thirty-seven 
years  old.  Adolf  Hitler,  I love  you  because  you  are  both 
great  and  simple.  These  are  the  characteristics  of  the 
genius.” 

Goebbels  spent  a good  part  of  the  summer  with  Hitler 
at  Berchtesgaden,  and  his  diary  is  full  of  further  encomi- 
ums to  the  Leader.  In  August  he  publicly  broke  with 
Strasser  in  an  article  in  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter. 

Only  now  do  I recognize  you  for  what  you  are:  revolu- 
tionaries in  speech  but  not  in  deed  [he  told  the  Strassers 
and  their  followers]  . . . Don’t  talk  so  much  about  ideals 
and  don’t  fool  yourselves  into  believing  that  you  are  the 
inventors  and  protectors  of  these  ideals  . . . We  are  not 
doing  penance  by  standing  solidly  behind  the  Fuehrer.  We 
. . . bow  to  him  . . . with  the  manly,  unbroken  pride  of 
the  ancient  Norsemen  who  stand  upright  before  their  Ger- 
manic feudal  lord.  We  feel  that  he  is  greater  than  all  of  us, 
greater  than  you  and  I.  He  is  the  instrument  of  the  Divine 
Will  that  shapes  history  with  fresh,  creative  passion. 

Late  in  October  1926  Hitler  made  Goebbels  Gauleiter 
of  Berlin.  He  instructed  him  to  clean  out  the  quarreling 
Brownshirt  rowdies  who  had  been  hampering  the  growth 
of  the  movement  there  and  conquer  the  capital  of  Ger- 
many for  National  Socialism.  Berlin  was  “red.”  The  ma- 
jority of  its  voters  were  Socialists  and  Communists.  Un- 
daunted, Goebbels,  who  had  just  turned  twenty-nine,  and 
who  in  a little  more  than  a year’s  time  had  risen  from 
nothing  to  be  one  of  the  leading  lights  of  the  Nazi  Party, 
set  out  to  fulfill  his  assignment  in  the  great  Babylonian 
city. 

AN  INTERLUDE  OF  REST  AND  ROMANCE 
FOR  ADOLF  HITLER 

The  politically  lean  years  for  Adolf  Hitler  were,  as  he 


184  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

later  said,  the  best  years  of  his  personal  life.  Forbidden  to 
speak  in  public  until  1927,  intent  on  finishing  Mein  Kampf 
and  plotting  in  his  mind  the  future  of  the  Nazi  Party 
and  of  himself,  he  spent  most  of  his  time  on  the  Obersalz- 
berg  above  the  market  village  of  Berchtesgaden  in  the 
Bavarian  Alps.  It  was  a haven  for  rest  and  relaxation. 

Hitler’s  monologues  at  his  headquarters  at  the  front 
during  the  war,  when  late  at  night  he  would  relax  with  the 
old  party  comrades  and  his  faithful  women  secretaries  and 
reminisce  about  past  times,  are  full  of  nostalgic  talk  about 
what  this  mountain  retreat,  where  he  established  the  only 
home  he  ever  owned,  meant  to  him.  “Yes,”  he  exclaimed 
during  one  of  these  sessions  on  the  night  of  January  16-17, 
1942,  “there  are  so  many  links  between  Obersalzberg  and 
me.  So  many  things  were  born  there  ...  I spent  there  the 
finest  hours  of  my  life  ...  It  is  there  that  all  my  great 
projects  were  conceived  and  ripened.  I had  hours  of 
leisure  in  those  days,  and  how  many  charming  friends!” 

During  the  first  three  years  after  his  release  from  prison 
Hitler  lived  in  various  inns  on  the  Obersalzberg  and  in 
that  winter  reminiscence  in  1942  he  talked  for  an  hour 
about  them.  He  finally  settled  down  in  the  Deutsche  Haus, 
where  he  spent  the  best  part  of  two  years  and  in  which  he 
finished  dictating  Mein  Kampf.  He  and  his  party  cronies, 
he  says,  were  “very  fond  of  visiting  the  Dreimaederlhaus, 
where  there  were  always  pretty  girls.  This,”  he  adds,  “was 
a great  treat  for  me.  There  was  one  of  them,  especially, 
who  was  a real  beauty.” 

That  evening  in  the  headquarters  bunker  on  the  Russian 
front,  Hitler  made  a remark  to  his  listeners  that  recalls 
two  preoccupations  he  had  during  the  pleasant  years  at 
Berchtesgaden. 

At  this  period  [on  the  Obersalzberg]  I knew  a lot  of 
women.  Several  of  them  became  attached  to  me.  Why,  then, 
didn’t  I marry?  To  leave  a wife  behind  me?  At  the  slightest 
imprudence,  I ran  the  risk  of  going  back  to  prison  for  six 
years.  So  there  could  be  no  question  of  marriage  for  me. 
I therefore  had  to  renounce  certain  opportunities  that  of- 
fered themselves.4 

Hitler’s  fear  in  the  mid-Twenties  of  being  sent  back  to 
prison  or  of  being  deported  was  not  without  some  founda- 
tion. He  was  still  on  parole.  Had  he  openly  evaded  the  ban 


185 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

against  his  speaking  in  public  the  Bavarian  government 
might  well  have  clapped  him  behind  the  bars  again  or  sent 
him  back  over  the  border  to  his  native  Austria.  One  reason 
that  he  had  chosen  the  Obersalzberg  as  a refuge  was  its 
proximity  to  the  Austrian  frontier;  on  a moment’s  notice  he 
could  have  slipped  over  the  line  and  evaded  arrest  by  the 
German  police.  But  to  have  returned  to  Austria,  voluntarily 
or  by  force,  would  have  ruined  his  prospects.  To  lessen  the 
risk  of  deportation,  Hitler  formally  renounced  his  Austrian 
citizenship  on  April  7,  1925 — a step  that  was  promptly  ac- 
cepted by  the  Austrian  government.  This,  however,  left 
him  staatenlos,  a man  without  a country.  He  gave  up  his 
Austrian  citizenship  but  he  did  not  become  a citizen  of 
Germany.  This  was  a considerable  handicap  for  a politi- 
cian in  the  Reich.  For  one  thing,  he  could  not  be  elected 
to  office.  He  had  publicly  declared  that  he  would  never 
beg  the  republican  government  for  a citizenship  which  he 
felt  should  have  been  his  because  of  his  services  to  Im- 
perial Germany  in  the  war.  But  all  through  the  last  half 
of  the  1920s,  he  secretly  sought  to  have  the  Bavarian 
government  make  him  a German  national.  His  efforts 
failed. 

As  to  women  and  marriage,  there  was  also  some  truth 
in  what  Hitler  related  that  evening  of  1942.  Contrary  to 
the  general  opinion,  he  liked  the  company  of  women, 
especially  if  they  were  beautiful.  He  returns  to  the  subject 
time  and  again  in  his  table  talk  at  Supreme  Headquarters 
during  the  war.  “What  lovely  women  there  are  in  the 
world!”  he  exclaims  to  his  cronies  on  the  night  of  Jan- 
uary 25-26,  1942,  and  he  gives  several  examples  in  his 
personal  experience,  adding  the  boast,  “In  my  youth  in 
Vienna,  I knew  a lot  of  lovely  women!”  Heiden  has  re- 
counted some  of  his  romantic  yearnings  of  the  early  days: 
for  a Jenny  Haug,  whose  brother  was  Hitler’s  chauffeur 
and  who  passed  as  his  sweetheart  in  1923;  for  the  tall 
and  stately  Erna  Hanfstaengl,  sister  of  Putzi;  for  Winifred 
Wagner,  daughter-in-law  of  Richard  Wagner.  But  it  was 
with  his  niece  that  Adolf  Hitler  had,  so  far  as  is  known, 
the  only  deep  love  affair  of  his  life. 

In  the  summer  of  1928  Hitler  rented  the  villa  Wachen- 
feld  on  the  Obersalzberg  above  Berchtesgaden  for  a hun- 
dred marks  a month  ($25)  from  the  widow  of  a Hamburg 
industrialist  and  induced  his  widowed  half-sister,  Angela 


186 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Raubal,  to  come  from  Vienna  to  keep  house  for  him  in 
the  first  home  which  he  could  call  his  own.*  Frau  Raubal 
brought  along  her  two  daughters,  GeU  and  Friedl.  Geli 
was  twenty,  with  flowing  blond  hair,  handsome  features,  a 
pleasant  voice  and  a sunny  disposition  which  made  her 
attractive  to  men.5 

Hitler  soon  fell  in  love  with  her.  He  took  her  every- 
where, to  meetings  and  conferences,  on  long  walks  in  the 
mountains  and  to  the  cafes  and  theaters  in  Munich. 
When  in  1929  he  rented  a luxurious  nine-room  apartment 
in  the  Prinzregentenstrasse,  one  of  the  most  fashionable 
thoroughfares  in  Munich,  Geli  was  given  her  own  room 
in  it.  Gossip  about  the  party  leader  and  his  beautiful 
blond  niece  was  inevitable  in  Munich  and  throughout  Nazi 
circles  in  southern  Germany.  Some  of  the  more  prim — or 
envious — leaders  suggested  that  Hitler  cease  showing  off 
his  youthful  sweetheart  in  public,  or  that  he  marry  her. 
Hitler  was  furious  at  such  talk  and  in  one  quarrel  over 
the  matter  he  fired  the  Gauleiter  of  Wuerttemberg. 

It  is  probable  that  Hitler  intended  to  marry  his  niece. 
Early  party  comrades  who  were  close  to  him  at  that  time 
subsequently  told  this  author  that  a marraige  seemed  in- 
evitable. That  Hitler  was  deeply  in  love  with  her  they 
had  no  doubt.  Her  own  feelings  are  a matter  of  con- 
jecture. That  she  was  flattered  by  the  attentions  of  a man 
now  becoming  famous,  and  indeed  enjoyed  them,  is 
obvious.  Whether  she  reciprocated  her  uncle’s  love  is  not 
known;  probably  not,  and  in  the  end  certainly  not.  Some 
deep  rift  whose  origins  and  nature  have  never  been  fully 
ascertained  grew  between  them.  There  has  been  much 
speculation  but  little  evidence.  Each  was  apparently  jealous 
of  the  other.  She  resented  his  attentions  to  other  women — 
to  Winifred  Wagner,  among  others.  He  suspected  that  she 
had  had  a clandestine  affair  with  Emil  Maurice,  the  ex- 
convict who  had  been  his  bodyguard.  She  objected  too  to 
her  uncle’s  tyranny  over  her.  He  did  not  want  her  to  be 
seen  in  the  company  of  any  man  but  himself.  He  forbade 
her  to  go  to  Vienna  to  continue  her  singing  lessons, 
squelching  her  ambition  for  a career  on  the  operatic 
stage.  He  wanted  her  for  himself  alone. 

There  are  dark  hints  too  that  she  was  repelled  by  the 


* Later  he  bought  it  and,  after  becoming  Chancellor,  rebuilt  it  on  a vast  and 
lavish  scale,  changing  the  name  from  Haus  Wachenfeld  to  Berghof. 


187 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

masochistic  inclinations  of  her  lover,  that  this  brutal  tyrant 
in  politics  yearned  to  be  enslaved  by  the  woman  he  loved — 
a not  uncommon  urge  in  such  men,  according  to  the  sex- 
ologists. Heiden  tells  of  a letter  which  Hitler  wrote  to 
his  niece  in  1929  confessing  his  deepest  feelings  in  this 
regard.  It  fell  into  the  hands  of  his  landlady’s  son — with 
consequences  which  were  tragic  to  more  than  one  life.6 

Whatever  it  was  that  darkened  the  love  between  the 
uncle  and  his  niece,  their  quarrels  became  more  violent 
and  at  the  end  of  the  summer  of  1931  Geli  announced 
that  she  was  returning  to  Vienna  to  resume  her  voice 
studies.  Hitler  forbade  her  to  go.  There  was  a scene  be- 
tween the  two,  witnessed  by  neighbors,  when  Hitler  left 
his  Munich  apartment  to  go  to  Hamburg  on  September  17, 
1931.  The  young  girl  was  heard  to  cry  to  him  from  the 
window  as  her  uncle  was  getting  into  his  car,  “Then  you 
won’t  let  me  go  to  Vienna?”  and  he  was  heard  to  respond, 
“No!” 

The  next  morning  Geli  Raubal  was  found  shot  dead  in 
her  room.  The  state’s  attorney,  after  a thorough  investiga- 
tion, found  that  it  was  a suicide.  The  coroner  reported 
that  a bullet  had  gone  through  her  chest  below  the  left 
shoulder  and  penetrated  the  heart;  it  seemed  beyond  doubt 
that  the  shot  was  self-inflicted. 

Yet  for  years  afterward  in  Munich  there  was  murky 
gossip  that  Geli  Raubal  had  been  murdered — by  Hitler  in 
a rage,  by  Himmler  to  eliminate  a situation  that  had  be- 
come embarrassing  to  the  party.  But  no  credible  evidence 
ever  turned  up  to  substantiate  such  rumors. 

Hitler  himself  was  struck  down  by  grief.  Gregor  Strasser 
later  recounted  that  he  had  had  to  remain  for  the  following 
two  days  and  nights  at  Hitler’s  side  to  prevent  him  from 
taking  his  own  life.  A week  after  Geli’s  burial  in  Vienna, 
Hitler  obtained  special  permission  from  the  Austrian  gov- 
ernment to  go  there;  he  spent  an  evening  weeping  at  the 
grave.  For  months  he  was  inconsolable. 

Three  weeks  after  the  death  of  Geli,  Hitler  had  his  first 
interview  with  Hindenburg.  It  was  his  first  bid  for  the  big 
stakes,  for  the  chancellorship  of  the  Reich.  His  distraction 
on  this  momentous  occasion — some  of  his  friends  said  he 
did  not  seem  to  be  in  full  possession  of  his  faculties  dur- 
ing the  conversation,  which  went  badly  for  the  Nazi  leader 


188  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

— was  put  down  by  those  who  knew  him  as  due  to  the 
shock  of  the  loss  of  his  beloved  niece. 

From  this  personal  blow  stemmed,  I believe,  an  act 
of  renunciation,  his  decision  to  abstain  from  meat;  at 
least,  some  of  his  closest  henchmen  seemed  to  think  so. 
To  them  he  declared  forever  afterward  that  Geli  Raubal 
was  the  only  woman  he  ever  loved,  and  he  always  spoke  of 
her  with  the  deepest  reverence — and  often  in  tears.  Serv- 
ants said  that  her  room  in  the  villa  at  Obersalzberg,  even 
after  it  was  rebuilt  and  enlarged  in  the  days  of  Hitler’s 
chancellorship,  remained  as  she  had  left  it.  In  his  own 
room  there,  and  in  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin,  portraits* 
of  the  young  woman  always  hung  and  when  the  anniver- 
saries of  her  birth  and  death  came  around  each  year  flowers 
were  placed  around  them. 

For  a brutal,  cynical  man  who  always  seemed  to  be  in- 
capable of  love  of  any  other  human  being,  this  passion 
of  Hitler’s  for  the  youthful  Geli  Raubal  stands  out  as  one 
of  the  mysteries  of  his  strange  life.  As  with  all  mys- 
teries, it  cannot,  be  rationally  explained,  merely  re- 
counted. Thereafter,  it  is  almost  certain,  Adolf  Hitler  never 
seriously  contemplated  marriage  until  the  day  before  he 
took  his  own  life  fourteen  years  later. 

The  compromising  letter  from  Hitler  to  his  niece  was 
retrieved  from  the  landlord’s  son  through  the  efforts  of 
Father  Bernhard  Stempfle,  the  Hieronymite  Catholic  priest 
and  anti-Semitic  journalist  who  had  helped  the  Nazi  leader 
in  tidying  up  Mein  Kampf  for  publication.  The  money 
for  its  purchase,  according  to  Heiden,  was  supplied  by 
Franz  Xavier  Schwarz,  the  party  treasurer.  Thus  Father 
Stempfle  was  one  of  the  few  persons  who  knew  something 
of  the  secrets  of  Hitler’s  love  for  Geli  Raubal.  Apparently 
he  did  not  keep  his  knowledge  of  the  affair  entirely  to 
himself.  He  was  to  pay  for  this  lapse  with  his  life  when 
the  author  of  Mein  Kampf  became  dictator  of  Germany 
and  one  day  settled  accounts  with  some  of  his  old  friends. 

The  source  of  Hitler’s  income  during  those  personally 
comfortable  years  when  he  acquired  a villa  at  Obersalz- 
berg and  a luxurious  apartment  in  Munich  and  drove  about 
in  a flashy,  chauffeured  automobile,  for  which  he  paid 

* Painted  after  her  death  by  Adolf  Ziegler,  Hitler’s  favorite  painter. 


189 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

20,000  marks  ($5,000),  has  never  been  established.  But 
his  income  tax  files,  which  turned  up  after  the  war,  shed 
some  light  on  the  subject.7  Until  he  became  Chancellor 
and  had  himself  declared  exempt  from  taxation,  he  was 
in  continual  conflict  with  the  tax  authorities,  and  a con- 
siderable file  accumulated  in  the  Munich  Finance  Office 
between  1925  and  1933. 

That  office  notified  him  on  May  1,  1925,  that  he  had 
failed  to  file  a return  for  1924  or  for  the  first  quarter  of 
1925.  Hitler  replied,  “I  had  no  income  in  1924  [when 
he  was  in  prison],  or  in  the  first  quarter  of  1925.  I have 
covered  my  living  expenses  by  raising  a bank  loan.”  What 
about  that  $5,000  automobile?  the  tax  collector  shot  back. 
Hitler  answered  that  he  had  raised  a bank  loan  for  that 
too.  In  all  his  tax  returns,  Hitler  listed  his  profession  as 
“writer”  and,  as  such,  attempted  to  justify  a high  propor- 
tion of  his  income  as  deductible  expenses — he  doubtless 
was  aware  of  the  practice  of  writers  everywhere.  His  first 
income  tax  declaration,  for  the  third  quarter  of  1925, 
listed  a gross  income  of  11,231  R.M.,  deductible  profes- 
sional expenses  of  6,540  R.M.  and  interest  payments  on 
loans  of  2,245  R.M.,  which  left  a net  taxable  income  of 
2,446  R.M. 

In  a three-page  typewritten  explanation  Hitler  defended 
his  large  deductions  for  professional  expenses,  arguing  that 
though  a large  part  of  them  appeared  to  be  due  to  his 
political  activities,  such  work  provided  him  with  the  ma- 
terial he  needed  as  a political  writer  and  also  helped 
increase  the  sales  of  his  book. 

Without  my  political  activity  my  name  would  be  un- 
known, and  I would  be  lacking  materials  for  the  publication 
of  a political  work  . . . Accordingly  in  my  case  as  a political 
writer,  the  expenses  of  my  political  activity,  which  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  my  professional  writing  as  well  as  its 
assurance  of  financial  success,  cannot  be  regarded  as  subject 
to  taxation. . . . 

The  Finance  Office  can  see  that  out  of  the  income  from 
my  book,  for  this  period,  only  a very  small  fraction  was 
expended  for  myself;  nowhere  do  I possess  property  or  other 
capital  assets  that  1 can  call  my  own.*  I restrict  of  ne- 
cessity my  personal  wants  so  far  that  I am  a complete 
abstainer  from  alcohol  and  tobacco,  take  my  meals  in  most 


The  italics  in  this  declaration  are  Hitler's. 


190 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


modest  restaurants,  and  aside  from  my  minimal  apartment 
rent  make  no  expenditures  that  are  not  charageable  to  my 
expenses  as  a political  writer  . . . Also  the  automobile  is 
for  me  but  a means  to  an  end.  It  alone  makes  it  possible 
for  me  to  accomplish  my  daily  work ,s 

The  Finance  Office  allowed  but  one  half  of  the  deduc- 
tions, and  when  Hitler  appealed  to  the  Review  Board  it 
upheld  the  original  assessment.  Thereafter  only  one  half 
of  his  expense  deductions  were  allowed  by  the  tax  au- 
thorities. He  protested  but  paid. 

The  Nazi  leader’s  reported  gross  income  in  his  tax  re- 
turns correspond  pretty  accurately  to  his  royalties  from 
Mein  Kampf:  19,843  R.M.  in  1925,  15,903  R.M.  in  1926, 
11,494  R.M.  in  1927,  11,818  R.M.  in  1928  and  15,448 
R.M.  in  1929.  Since  publishers’  books  were  subject  to  in- 
spection by  the  tax  office,  Hitler  could  not  safely  report 
an  income  less  than  his  royalties.  But  what  about  other 
sources  of  income?  These  were  never  reported.  It  was 
known  that  he  demanded,  and  received,  a high  fee  for 
the  many  articles  which  he  wrote  in  those  days  for  the 
impoverished  Nazi  press.  There  was  much  grumbling  in 
party  circles  over  the  high  cost  of  Hitler.  These  items  are 
absent  from  his  tax  declarations.  As  the  Twenties  neared 
their  end,  money  started  to  flow  into  the  Nazi  Party  from 
a few  of  the  big  Bavarian  and  Rhineland  industrialists  who 
were  attracted  by  Hitler’s  opposition  to  the  Marxists  and 
the  trade  unions.  Fritz  Thyssen,  head  of  the  German  steel 
trust,  the  Vereinigte  Stahlwerke  (United  Steel  Works),  and 
Emil  Kirdorf,  the  Ruhr  coal  king,  contributed  sizable 
sums.  Often  the  money  was  handed  over  directly  to 
Hitler.  How  much  he  kept  for  himself  will  probably  never 
be  known.  But  his  scale  of  living  in  the  last  few  years 
before  he  became  Chancellor  indicates  that  not  all  of 
the  money  he  received  from  his  backers  was  turned  over 
to  the  party  treasury. 

To  be  sure,  from  1925  to  1928  he  complained  of  diffi- 
culty in  meeting  his  income  tax  payments;  he  was  con- 
stantly in  arrears  and  invariably  asking  for  further 
postponements.  In  September  of  1926  he  wrote  the  Finance 
Office:  “At  the  moment  I am  not  in  a position  to  pay  the 
taxes;  to  cover  my  living  expenses  I have  had  to  raise  a 
loan.”  Later  he  claimed  of  that  period  that  “for  years  I 
lived  on  Tyrolean  apples.  It’s  unbelievable  what  economies 


191 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

we  had  to  make.  Every  mark  saved  was  for  the  party.”  And 
between  1925  and  1928  he  contended,  to  the  tax  collector, 
that  he  was  going  ever  deeper  in  debt.  In  1926  he  reported 
expenditures  of  31,209  R.M.  against  an  income  of  15,903 
R.M.  and  stated  the  deficit  had  been  made  up  by  further 
“bank  loans.” 

Then,  miraculously,  in  1929,  though  his  declared  in- 
come was  considerably  less  than  in  1925,  the  item  of 
interest  on  or  repayment  of  loans  disappears  from  his  tax 
declaration — and  never  reappears.  As  Professor  Hale,  on 
whose  studies  the  foregoing  is  based,  remarked,  “a  financial 
miracle  had  been  wrought  and  he  had  liquidated  his  in- 
debtedness.” 9 

Hitler,  it  must  be  said  in  fairness,  never  seemed  to  care 
much  about  money — if  he  had  enough  to  live  on  com- 
fortably and  if  he  did  not  have  to  toil  for  it  in  wages  or  a 
salary.  At  any  rate,  beginning  with  1930,  when  his  book 
royalties  suddenly  tripled  from  the  previous  year  to  some 
$12,000  and  money  started  pouring  in  from  big  business, 
any  personal  financial  worries  he  may  have  had  were  over 
for  good.  He  could  now  devote  his  fierce  energies  and  all 
his  talents  to  the  task  of  fulfilling  his  destiny.  The  time  for 
his  final  drive  for  power,  for  the  dictatorship  of  a great 
nation,  had  arrived. 

THE  OPPORTUNITIES  OF  THE  DEPRESSION 

The  depression  which  spread  over  the  world  like  a 
great  conflagration  toward  the  end  of  1929  gave  Adolf 
Hitler  his  opportunity,  and  he  made  the  most  of  it.  Like 
most  great  revolutionaries  he  could  thrive  only  in  evil 
times,  at  first  when  the  masses  were  unemployed,  hungry 
and  desperate,  and  later  when  they  were  intoxicated  by 
war.  Yet  in  one  respect  he  was  unique  among  history’s 
revolutionaries:  He  intended  to  make  his  revolution  after 
achieving  political  power.  There  was  to  be  no  revolution 
to  gain  control  of  the  State.  That  goal  was  to  be  reached 
by  mandate  of  the  voters  or  by  the  consent  of  the  rulers  of 
the  nation — in  short,  by  constitutional  means.  To  get  the 
votes  Hitler  had  only  to  take  advantage  of  the  times, 
which  once  more,  as  the  Thirties  began,  saw  the  German 
people  plunged  into  despair;  to  obtain  the  support  of  those 
in  power  he  had  to  convince  them  that  only  he  could 


192 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


rescue  Germany  from  its  disastrous  predicament.  In  the 
turbulent  years  from  1930  to  1933  the  shrewd  and  daring 
Nazi  leader  set  out  with  renewed  energy  to  obtain  these 
twin  objectives.  In  retrospect  it  can  be  seen  that  events 
themselves  and  the  weakness  and  confusion  of  the  handful 
of  men  who  were  bound  by  their  oath  to  loyally  defend 
the  democratic  Republic  which  they  governed  played  into 
Hitler’s  hands.  But  this  was  by  no  means  foreseeable  at 
the  beginning  of  1930. 

Gustav  Stresemann  died  on  October  3,  1929.  He  had 
exhausted  himself  by  his  strenuous  labors,  as  Foreign 
Minister  over  the  preceding  six  years,  to  restore  defeated 
Germany  to  the  ranks  of  the  big  powers  and  to  guide  the 
German  people  toward  political  and  economic  stability.  His 
successes  had  been  prodigious.  He  had  brought  Germany 
into  the  League  of  Nations,  negotiated  the  Dawes  Plan  and 
the  Young  Plan  which  reduced  reparations  to  a level 
which  Germany  could  easily  pay,  and  in  1925  had  been 
one  of  the  chief  architects  of  the  Pact  of  Locarno  which 
brought  Western  Europe  the  first  tranquillity  its  war-weary, 
strife-ridden  people  had  known  in  a generation. 

Three  weeks  after  Stresemann’s  death,  on  October  24, 
the  stock  market  in  Wall  Street  crashed.  The  results  in 
Germany  were  soon  felt — and  disastrously.  The  cornerstone 
of  German  prosperity  had  been  loans  from  abroad,  prin- 
cipally from  America,  and  world  trade.  When  the  flow  of 
loans  dried  up  and  repayment  on  the  old  ones  became  due 
the  German  financial  structure  was  unable  to  stand  the 
strain.  When  world  trade  sagged  following  the  general 
slump  Germany  was  unable  to  export  enough  to  pay  for 
essential  import  of  the  raw  materials  and  food  which  she 
needed.  Without  exports,  German  industry  could  not  keep 
its  plants  going,  and  its  production  fell  by  almost  half 
from  1929  to  1932.  Millions  were  thrown  out  of  work. 
Thousands  of  small  business  enterprises  went  under.  In 
May  of  1931  Austria’s  biggest  bank,  the  Kreditanstalt,  col- 
lapsed, and  this  was  followed  on  July  13  by  the' failure  of 
one  of  Germany’s  principal  banks,  the  Darmstaedter  und 
Nationalbank,  which  forced  the  government  in  Berlin  to 
close  down  all  banks  temporarily.  Not  even  President 
Hoover’s  initiative  in  establishing  a moratorium  on  all  war 
debts,  including  German  reparations,  which  became  ef- 
fective on  July  6,  could  stem  the  tide.  The  whole  Western 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  193 

world  was  stricken  by  forces  which  its  leaders  did  not 
understand  and  which  they  felt  were  beyond  man’s  con- 
trol. How  was  it  possible  that  suddenly  there  could  be  so 
much  poverty,  so  much  human  suffering,  in  the  midst  of 
so  much  plenty? 

Hitler  had  predicted  the  catastrophe,  but  no  more  than 
any  other  politician  did  he  understand  what  had  brought 
it  about;  perhaps  he  had  less  understanding  than  most, 
since  he  was  both  ignorant  of  and  uninterested  in  eco- 
nomics. But  he  was  not  uninterested  in  or  ignorant  of  the 
opportunities  which  the  depression  suddenly  gave  him.  The 
misery  of  the  German  people,  their  lives  still  scarred  by 
disastrous  experience  of  the  collapse  of  the  mark  less  than 
ten  years  before,  did  not  arouse  his  compassion.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  darkest  days  of  that  period,  when  the 
factories  were  silent,  when  the  registered  unemployed 
numbered  over  six  million  and  bread  lines  stretched  for 
blocks  in  every  city  in  the  land,  he  could  write  in  the 
Nazi  press:  “Never  in  my  life  have  I been  so  well  disposed 
and  inwardly  contented  as  in  these  days.  For  hard  reality 
has  opened  the  eyes  of  millions  of  Germans  to  the  un- 
precedented swindles,  lies  and  betrayals  of  the  Marxist 
deceivers  of  the  people.” 10  The  suffering  of  his  fellow 
Germans  was  not  something  to  waste  time  sympathizing 
with,  but  rather  to  transform,  cold-bloodedly  and  imme- 
diately, into  political  support  for  his  own  ambitions.  This 
he  proceeded  to  do  in  the  late  summer  of  1930. 

s 

Hermann  Mueller,  the  last  Social  Democrat  Chancellor 
of  Germany  and  the  head  of  the  last  government  based  oh 
a coalition  of  the  democratic  parties  which  had  sustained 
the  Weimar  Republic,  had  resigned  in  March  1930  because 
of  a dispute  among  the  parties  over  the  unemployment 
insurance  fund.  He  had  been  replaced  by  Heinrich  Bruen- 
ing,  the  parliamentary  leader  of  the  Catholic  Center  Party, 
who  had  won  the  Iron  Cross  as  a captain  of  a machine 
gun  company  during  the  war  and  whose  sober,  conserva- 
tive views  in  the  Reichstag  had  attracted  the  favorable 
attention  of  the  Army  and  in  particular  of  a general  by 
the  name  of  Kurt  von  Schleicher,  who  was  then  quite  un- 
known to  the  German  public.  Schleicher,  a vain,  able,  am- 
bitious “desk  officer, ” already  acknowledged  in  military 
circles  as  a talented  and  unscrupulous  intriguer,  had  sug- 


194 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


gested  Bruening’s  name  to  President  von  Hindenburg.  The 
new  Chancellor,  though  he  may  not  have  realized  it  fully, 
was  the  Army’s  candidate.  A man  of  sterling  personal 
character,  unselfish,  modest,  honest,  dedicated,  somewhat 
austere  in  nature,  Bruening  hoped  to  restore  stable  par- 
liamentary government  in  Germany  and  rescue  the  country 
from  the  growing  slump  and  political  chaos.  It  was  the 
tragedy  of  this  well-meaning  and  democratically  minded 
patriot  that,  in  trying  to  do  so,  he  unwittingly  dug  the 
grave  for  German  democracy  and  thus,  unintentionally, 
paved  the  way  for  the  coming  of  Adolf  Hitler. 

Bruening  was  unable  to  induce  a majority  of  the  Reich- 
stag to  approve  certain  measures  in  his  financial  program. 
He  thereupon  asked  Hindenburg  to  invoke  Article  48  of 
the  constitution  and  under  its  emergency  powers  approve 
his  financial  bill  by  presidential  decree.  The  chamber 
responded  by  voting  a demand  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
decree.  Parliamentary  government  was  breaking  down  at 
a moment  when  the  economic  crisis  made  strong  govern- 
ment imperative.  In  an  effort  to  find  a way  out  of  the  im- 
passe, Bruening  requested  the  President  in  July  1930  to 
dissolve  the  Reichstag.  New  elections  were  called  for  Sep- 
tember 14.  How  Bruening  expected  to  get  a stable  par- 
liamentary majority  in  a new  election  is  a question  that 
was  never  answered.  But  Hitler  realized  that  his  own  op- 
portunity had  come  sooner  than  he  expected. 

The  hard-pressed  people  were  demanding  a way  out  of 
their  sorry  predicament.  The  millions  of  unemployed 
wanted  jobs.  The  shopkeepers  wanted  help.  Some  four  mil- 
lion youths  who  had  come  of  voting  age  since  the  last 
election  wanted  some  prospect  of  a future  that  would  at 
least  give  them  a living.  To  all  the  millions  of  discontented 
Hitler  in  a whirlwind  campaign  offered  what  seemed  to 
them,  in  their  misery,  some  measure  of  hope.  He  would 
make  Germany  strong  again,  refuse  to  pay  reparations, 
repudiate  the  Versailles  Treaty,  stamp  out  corruption,  bring 
the  money  barons  to  heel  (especially  if  they  were  Jews) 
and  see  to  it  that  every  German  had  a job  and  bread. 
To  hopeless,  hungry  men  seeking  not  only  relief  but  new 
faith  and  new  gods,  the  appeal  was  not  without  effect. 

Thotigh  his  hopes  were  high,  Hitler  was  surprised  on 
the  night  of  September  14,  1930,  when  the  election  returns 
came  in.  Two  years  before,  his  party  had  polled  810,000 


195 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

votes  and  elected  12  members  to  the  Reichstag.  This  time 
he  had  counted  on  quadrupling  the  Nazi  vote  and  securing 
perhaps  50  seats  in  Parliament.  But  on  this  day  the  vote  of 
the  N.S.D.A.P.  rose  to  6,409,600,  entitling  the  party  to  107 
seats  in  the  Reichstag  and  propelling  it  from  the  ninth  and 
smallest  party  in  Parliament  to  the  second  largest. 

At  the  other  extreme,  the  Communists  had  also  gained, 
from  3,265,000  votes  in  1928  to  4,592,000,  with  their  rep- 
resentation in  the  Reichstag  increased  from  54  to  77.  The 
moderate  middle-class  parties,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Catholic  Center,  lost  over  a million  votes,  as  did  the 
Social  Democrats,  despite  the  addition  of  four  million 
new  voters  at  the  polls.  The  vote  of  the  right-wing  Na- 
tionalists of  Hugenberg  dropped  from  four  to  two  million. 
It  was  clear  that  the  Nazis  had  captured  millions  of  ad- 
herents from  the  other  middle-class  parties.  It  was  also 
clear  that  henceforth  it  would  be  more  difficult  than  ever 
for  Bruening — or  for  anyone  else — to  command  a stable 
majority  in  the  Reichstag.  Without  such  a majority  how 
could  the  Republic  survive? 

This  was  a question  which  on  the  morrow  of  the  1930 
elections  became  of  increased  interest  to  two  pillars  of 
the  nation  whose  leaders  had  never  really  accepted  the 
Republic  except  as  a passing  misfortune  in  German  his- 
tory: the  Army  and  the  world  of  the  big  industrialists  and 
financiers.  Flushed  by  his  success  at  the  polls,  Hitler  now 
turned  his  attention  toward  winning  over  these  two  power- 
ful groups.  Long  ago  in  Vienna,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had 
learned  from  the  tactics  of  Mayor  Karl  Lueger  the  impor- 
tance of  bringing  “powerful  existing  institutions”  over  to 
one’s  side. 

A year  before,  on  March  15,  1929,  Hitler  had  made  a 
speech  in  Munich  in  which  he  appealed  to  the  Army  to 
reconsider  its  enmity  toward  National  Socialism  and  its 
support  of  the  Republic. 

The  future  does  not  lie  with  the  parties  of  destruction, 
but  rather  with  the  parties  who  carry  in  themselves  the 
strength  of  the  people,  who  are  prepared  and  who  wish  to 
bind  themselves  to  this  Army  in  order  to  aid  the  Army  some- 
day in  defending  the  interests  of  the  people.  In  contrast 
we  still  see  the  officers  of  our  Army  belatedly  tormenting 
themselves  with  the  question  as  to  how  far  one  can  go  along 


196 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

with  Social  Democracy.  But,  my  dear  sirs,  do  you  really 
believe  that  you  have  anything  in  common  with  an  ideology 
which  stipulates  the  dissolution  of  all  that  which  is  the 
basis  of  the  existence  of  an  army? 

This  was  a skillful  bid  for  the  support  of  the  officers  of 
the  Army  which,  as  most  of  them  believed  and  as  Hitler 
now  repeated  for  the  hundredth  time,  had  been  stabbed 
in  the  back  and  betrayed  by  the  very  Republic  which  they 
were  now  supporting  and  which,  moreover,  had  no  love  for 
the  military  caste  and  all  that  if  stood  for.  And  then  in 
words  which  were  prophetic  of  what  he  himself  one  day 
would  do,  he  warned  the  officers  of  what  would  happen  to 
them  if  the  Marxists  triumphed  over  the  Nazis.  Should 
that  happen,  he  said, 

You  may  write  over  the  German  Army:  “The  end  of  the 
German  Army.”  For  then,  gentlemen,  you  must  definitely 
become  political.  . . . You  may  then  become  hangmen  of 
the  regime  and  political  commissars,  and  if  you  do  not  be- 
have your  wife  and  child  will  be  put  behind  locked  doors. 
And  if  you  still  do  not  behave,  you  will  be  thrown  out  and 
perhaps  stood  up  against  a wall  ... 11 

Relatively  few  persons  heard  the  speech,  but  in  order  to 
propagate  it  in  Army  circles  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter 
published  it  verbatim  in  a special  Army  edition  and  it  was 
discussed  at  length  in  the  columns  of  a Nazi  monthly 
magazine,  Deutscher  Wehrgeist,  a periodical  devoted  to 
military  affairs  which  had  recently  appeared. 

In  1927  the  Army  had  forbidden  the  recruitment  of 
Nazis  in  the  100,000-man  Reichswehr  and  even  banned 
their  employment  as  civilians  in  the  arsenals  and  supply 
depots.  But  by  the  beginning  of  1930  it  became  obvious 
that  Nazi  propaganda  was  making  headway  in  the  Army, 
especially  among  the  younger  officers,  many  of  whom  were 
attracted  not  only  by  Hitler’s  fanatical  nationalism  but  by 
the  prospects  he  held  out  for  an  Army  restored  to  its  old 
glory  and  size  in  which  there  would  be  opportunities,  now 
denied  them  in  such  a small  military  force,  to  advance  to 
higher  rank. 

The  Nazi  infiltration  into  the  armed  services  became 
serious  enough  to  compel  General  Groener.  now  the  Min- 
ister of  Defense,  to  issue  an  order  of  the  day  on  January 
22,  1930,  which  recalled  a similar  warning  to  the  Army  by 


197 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

General  von  Seeckt  on  the  eve  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch 
seven  years  before.  The  Nazis,  he  declared,  were  greedy 
for  power.  “They  therefore  woo  the  Wehrmacht.  In  order 
to  use  it  for  the  political  aims  of  their  party,  they  attempt 
to  dazzle  us  [into  believing]  that  the  National  Socialists 
alone  represent  the  truly  national  power.”  He  requested 
the  soldiers  to  refrain  from  politics  and  to  “serve  the 
state”  aloof  from  all  party  strife. 

That  some  of  the  young  Reichswehr  officers  were  not 
refraining  from  politics,  or  at  least  not  from  Nazi  politics, 
came  to  light  shortly  afterward  and  aroused  a furor  in 
Germany,  dissension  in  the  highest  echelons  of  the 
officer  corps,  and  delight  in  the  Nazi  camp.  In  the  spring 
of  1930  three  young  lieutenants,  Ludin,  Scheringer  and 
Wendt,  of  the  garrison  at  Ulm,  were  arrested  for  spreading 
Nazi  doctrines  in  the  Army  and  for  trying  to  induce  their 
fellow  officers  to  agree  that  in  the  case  of  an  armed  Nazi 
revolt  they  would  not  fire  on  the  rebels.  This  last  was  high 
treason,  but  General  Groener,  not  wishing  to  publicize 
the  fact  that  treason  existed  in  the  Army,  attempted  to 
hush  up  the  affair  by  arranging  for  the  accused  to  be  tried 
before  a court-martial  for  a simple  breach  of  discipline. 
The  defiance  of  Lieutenant  Scheringer,  who  smuggled 
out  an  inflammatory  article  for  the  V oelkischer  Beobachter, 
made  this  impossible.  A week  after  the  Nazi  successes  in 
the  September  elections  of  1930,  the  three  subalterns 
were  arraigned  before  the  Supreme  Court  at  Leipzig  on 
charges  of  high  treason.  Among  their  defenders  were  two 
rising  Nazi  lawyers,  Hans  Frank  and  Dr.  Carl  Sack.* 

But  it  was  neither  the  lawyers  nor  the  accused  who  oc- 
cupied the  limelight  at  the  trial,  but  Adolf  Hitler.  He  was 
called  by  Frank  as  a witness.  His  appearance  represented 
a calculated  risk.  It  would  be  embarrassing  to  disown  the 
three  lieutenants,  whose  activities  were  proof  of  the  growth 
of  Nazi  sentiment  in  the  Army,  which  he  did  not  want  to 
discourage.  It  was  embarrassing  that  Nazi  efforts  to  subvert 
the  Army  had  been  uncovered.  And  it  was  not  helpful  to 
his  present  tactics  that  the  prosecution  had  charged  the 
Nazi  Party  with  being  a revolutionary  organization  intent 
on  overthrowing  the  government  by  force.  To  deny  that 

* .Both  of  whom  would  end  their  lives  on  the  gallows,  Sack  for  his  part  in 
the  conspiracy  against  Hitler  on  July  20,  1944,  and  Frank  for  what  he  did 
on  behalf  of  Hitler  in  Poland. 


198  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

last  charge,  Hitler  arranged  with  Frank  to  testify  for  the 
defense.  But  in  reality  the  Fuehrer  had  a much  more  im- 
portant objective.  That  was,  as  leader  of  a movement 
which  had  just  scored  a stunning  popular  triumph  at  the 
polls,  to  assure  the  Army  and  especially  its  leading  officers 
that  National  Socialism,  far  from  posing  a threat  to  the 
Reichswehr,  as  the  case  of  the  Nazi  subalterns  implied,  was 
really  its  salvation  and  the  salvation  of  Germany. 

From  this  national  forum  which  the  witness  box  afforded. 
Hitler  made  good  use  of  all  his  forensic  talents  and  his 
subtle  sense  of  political  strategy,  and  if  his  masterly  display 
was  full  of  deceit,  as  it  was,  few  in  Germany,  even 
among  the  generals,  seemed  to  be  aware  of  it.  Blandly 
Hitler  assured  the  court  (and  the  Army  officers)  that 
neither  the  S.A.  nor  the  party  was  fighting  the  Army.  “I 
have  always  held  the  view,”  he  declared,  “that  any  attempt 
to  replace  the  Army  was  madness.  None  of  us  have  any 
interest  in  replacing  the  Army  . . . We  will  see  to  it,  when 
we  have  come  to  power,  that  out  of  the  present  Reichswehr 
a great  Army  of  the  German  people  shall  arise.” 

And  he  reiterated  to  the  court  (and  the  generals)  that 
the  Nazi  Party  was  seeking  to  capture  power  only  by  con- 
stitutional means  and  that  the  young  officers  were  mis- 
taken if  they  anticipated  an  armed  revolt. 

Our  movement  has  no  need  of  force.  The  time  will  come 
when  the  German  nation  will  get  to  know  of  our  ideas; 
then  thirty-five  million  Germans  will  stand  behind  me  . . . 
When  we  do  possess  constitutional  rights,  then  we  will  form 
the  State  in  the  manner  which  we  consider  to  be  the  right 
one. 

The  president  of  the  court:  This,  too,  by  constitutional 
means? 

Hitler:  Yes. 

But  Hitler,  though  he  was  addressing  mainly  the  Army 
and  the  other  conservative  elements  in  Germany,  had  to 
consider  the  revolutionary  fervor  of  his  own  party  fol- 
lowers. He  could  not  let  them  down,  as  he  had  the 
three  accused.  He  therefore  seized  on  the  opportunity 
presented  when  the  president  of  the  court  recalled  a state- 
ment of  his  in  1923,  a month  before  his  unsuccessful 
putsch,  that  “heads  will  roll  in  the  sand.”  Did  the  Nazi 
leader  repudiate  that  utterance  today? 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  199 

I can  assure  you  [Hitler  replied]  that  when  the  Na- 
tional Socialist  movement  is  victorious  in  this  struggle,  then 
there  will  be  a National  Socialist  Court  of  Justice  too.  Then 
the  November  1918  revolution  will  be  avenged  and  heads 
will  roll! 12 

No  one  can  say  that  Hitler  did  not  give  warning  of  what 
he  would  do  if  he  came  to  power,  but  the  audience  in  the 
courtroom  apparently  welcomed  it,  for  they  applauded  the 
threat  loudly  and  long,  and  though  the  presiding  judge 
took  exception  to  the  interruption  neither  he  nor  the 
public  prosecutor  made  objection  to  the  remark.  It  made 
a sensational  headline  in  newspapers  throughout  Germany 
and  in  many  outside.  Lost  in  the  excitement  of  Hitler’s 
utterances  was  the  actual  case  in  hand.  The  three  young 
officers,  their  zeal  for  National  Socialism  disavowed  by 
the  Supreme  Leader  of  National  Socialism  himself,  were 
found  guilty  of  conspiracy  to  commit  high  treason  and 
given  the  mild  sentence  of  eighteen  months  of  fortress 
detention — in  republican  Germany  the  severe  sentences 
on  this  charge  were  served  for  those  who  supported  the 
Republic.* 

The  month  of  September  1930  marked  a turning  point 
in  the  road  that  was  leading  the  Germans  inexorably  to- 
ward the  Third  Reich.  The  surprising  success  of  the  Nazi 
Party  in  the  national  elections  convinced  not  only  mil- 
lions of  ordinary  people  but  many  leaders  in  business  and 
in  the  Army  that  perhaps  here  was  an  upsurge  that  could 
not  be  stopped.  They  might  not  like  the  party’s  demagoguery 
and  its  vulgarity,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  was  arousing 
the  old  feelings  of  German  patriotism  and  nationalism 
which  had  been  so  muted  during  the  first  ten  years  of 
the  Republic.  It  promised  to  lead  the  German  people 
away  from  communism,  socialism,  trade-unionism  and  the 
futilities  of  democracy.  Above  all,  it  had  caught  fire 
throughout  the  Reich.  It  was  a success. 

Because  of  this  and  of  Hitler’s  public  assurances  to  the 
Army  at  the  Leipzig  trial,  some  of  the  generals  began  to 

* Lieutenant  Scheringer,  embittered  by  what  he  considered  Hitler’s  betrayal, 
renounced  the  Nazi  Party  while  in  prison  and  became  a fanatical  Communist. 
He  was  marked — as  were  so  many  who  crossed  Hitler — for  liquidation  in 
the  June  30,  1934,  purge,  but  somehow  escaped  and  lived  to  see  the  end  of 
Hitler.  Lieutenant  Ludin  remained  an  enthusiastic  Nazi,  was  elected  to  the 
Reichstag  in  1932,  became  a high  officer  in  the  S.A.  and  the  S.S.,  and  served 
as  German  minister  to  the  puppet  state  of  Slovakia,  where  he  was  arrested 
at  the  time  of  the  liberation  and  executed  by  the  Czechoslovaks. 


200 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ponder  whether  National  Socialism  might  not  be  just 
what  was  needed  to  unify  the  people,  restore  the  old 
Germany,,  make  the  Army  big  and  great  once  more  and 
enable  the  nation  to  shake  off  the  shackles  of  the  humil- 
iating Treaty  of  Versailles.  They  had  been  pleased  with 
Hitler’s  retort  to  the  presiding  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
who  had  asked  him  what  he  meant  when  he  kept  talking 
about  the  “German  National  Revolution.” 

“This  means,”  Hitler  had  said,  “exclusively  the  rescue 
of  the  enslaved  German  nation  we  have  today.  Germany  is 
bound  hand  and  foot  by  the  peace  treaties  . . . The  Na- 
tional Socialists  do  not  regard  these  treaties  as  law,  but  as 
something  imposed  upon  Germany  by  constraint.  We  do 
not  admit  that  future  generations,  who  are  completely  in- 
nocent, should  be  burdened  by  them.  If  we  protest 
against  them  with  every  means  in  our  power,  then  we  find 
ourselves  on  the  path  of  revolution.” 

That  was  the  view  of  the  officer  corps  too.  Some  of  its 
leading  members  had  bitterly  criticized  General  Groener, 
the  Minister  of  Defense,  for  allowing  the  three  subalterns 
to  be  tried  by  the  Supreme  Court.  General  Hans  von 
Seeckt,  the  recently  deposed  Commander  in  Chief  and 
generally  acknowledged  as  the  postwar  genius  of  the  Ger- 
man Army,  the  worthy  successor  of  Scharnhorst  and  Gnei- 
senau,  complained  to  Groener  that  it  had  weakened  the 
spirit  of  solidarity  within  the  officer  corps.  Colonel  Ludwig 
Beck,  who  was  soon  to  become  Chief  of  Staff  and  later 
an  even  more  important  figure  in  this  history  but  who  in 
1930  was  the  commander  of  the  5th  Artillery  Regiment  at 
Ulm  from  which  the  three  lieutenants  had  come,  not  only 
protested  vehemently  to  his  superiors  against  their  arrest 
but  testified  in  their  defense  at  Leipzig. 

Now  that  the  trial  was  over  and  Hitler  had  spoken,  the 
generals  felt  better  disposed  toward  a movement  which 
they  had  previously  regarded  as  a threat  to  the  Army. 
General  Alfred  Jodi,  Chief  of  Operations  of  the  Armed 
Forces  High  Command  during  World  War  II,  told  the 
military  tribunal  at  Nuremberg  just  what  the  Nazi  leader’s 
statement  at  Leipzig  had  meant  to  the  officer  corps.  Until 
that  time,  he  said,  the  senior  officers  had  believed  Hitler 
was  trying  to  undermine  the  Army;  now  they  were  re- 
assured. General  von  Seeckt  himself,  after  his  election  to 
the  Reichstag  in  1930,  openly  allied  himself  with  Hitler 


201 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

for  a while  and  in  1932  urged  his  sister  to  vote  for  Hitler 
— instead  of  for  his  old  chief,  Hindenburg — in  the  presi- 
dential elections. 

The  political  blindness  of  the  German  Army  officers, 
which  was  to  prove  so  fatal  to  them  in  the  end,  had  begun 
to  grow  and  to  show. 

The  political  ineptitude  of  the  magnates  of  industry  and 
finance  was  no  less  than  that  of  the  generals  and  led  to 
the  mistaken  belief  that  if  they  coughed  up  large  enough 
sums  for  Hitler  he  would  be  beholden  to  them  and,  if  he  ever 
came  to  power,  do  their  bidding.  That  the  Austrian  up- 
start, as  many  of  them  had  regarded  him  in  the  Twenties, 
might  well  take  over  the  control  of  Germany  began  to 
dawn  on  the  business  leaders  after  the  sensational  Nazi 
gains  in  the  September  elections  of  1930. 

By  1931,  Walther  Funk  testified  at  Nuremberg,  “my  in- 
dustrial friends  and  I were  convinced  that  the  Nazi 
Party  would  come  to  power  in  the  not  too  distant  future.” 

In  the  summer  of  that  year  Funk,  a greasy,  shifty-eyed, 
paunchy  little  man  whose  face  always  reminded  this  writer 
of  a frog,  gave  up  a lucrative  job  as  editor  of  a leading 
German  financial  newspaper,  the  Berliner  Boersenzeitung, 
joined  the  Nazi  Party  and  became  a contact  man  between 
the  party  and  a number  of  important  business  leaders. 
He  explained  at  Nuremberg  that  several  of  his  industrialist 
friends,  especially  those  prominent  in  the  big  Rhineland 
mining  concerns,  had  urged  him  to  join  the  Nazi  move- 
ment “in  order  to  persuade  the  party  to  follow  the  course 
of  private  enterprise.” 

At  that  time  the  leadership  of  the  party  held  completely 
contradictory  and  confused  views  on  economic  policy.  I 
tried  to  accomplish  my  mission  by  personally  impressing 
on  the  Fuehrer  and  the  party  that  private  initiative,  self- 
reliance  of  the  businessman,  the  creative  powers  of  free  en- 
terprise, et  cetera,  be  recognized  as  the  basic  economic 
policy  of  the  party.  The  Fuehrer  personally  stressed  time 
and  again  during  talks  with  me  and  industrial  leaders  to 
whom  I had  introduced  him,  that  he  was  an  enemy  of  state 
economy  and  of  so-calletL  “planned  economy”  and  that  he 
considered  free  enterprise  and  competition  as  absolutely 
necessary  in  order  to  gain  the  highest  possible  production.13 

Hitler,  then,  as  his  future  Reichsbank  president  and 


202  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Minister  of  Economics  says,  was  beginning  to  see  the  men 
in  Germany  who  had  the  money,  and  he  was  telling  them 
more  or  less  what  they  wanted  to  hear.  The  party  needed 
large  sums  to  finance  election  campaigns,  pay  the  bill  for 
its  widespread  and  intensified  propaganda,  meet  the  pay- 
roll of  hundreds  of  full-time  officials  and  maintain  the 
private  armies  of  the  S.A.  and  the  S.S.,  which  by  the  end 
of  1930  numbered  more  than  100,000  men — a larger  force 
than  the  Reichswehr.  The  businessmen  and  the  bankers 
were  not  the  only  financial  sources — the  party  raised 
sizable  sums  from  dues,  assessments,  collections  and  the 
sale  of  party  newspapers,  books  and  periodicals — but  they 
were  the  largest.  And  the  more  money  they  gave  the  Nazis, 
the  less  they  would  have  for  the  other  conservative  parties 
which  they  had  been  supporting  hitherto. 

“In  the  summer  of  1931,”  Otto  Dietrich,  Hitler’s  press 
chief  first  for  the  party  and  later  for  the  Reich,  relates, 
“the  Fuehrer  suddenly  decided  to  concentrate  systemati- 
cally on  cultivating  the  influential  industrial  magnates.”  14 

What  magnates  were  they? 

Their  identity  was  a secret  which  was  kept  from  all  but 
the  inner  circle  around  the  Leader.  The  party  had  to  play 
both  sides  of  the  tracks.  It  had  to  allow  Strasser,  Goebbels 
and  the  crank  Feder  to  beguile  the  masses  with  the  cry 
that  the  National  Socialists  were  truly  “socialists”  and 
against  the  money  barons.  On  the  other  hand,  money  to 
keep  the  party  going  had  to  be  wheedled  out  of  those  who 
had  an  ample  supply  of  it.  Throughout  the  latter  half  of 
1931,  says  Dietrich,  Hitler  “traversed  Germany  from  end 
to  end,  holding  private  interviews  with  prominent  [busi- 
ness] personalities.”  So  hush-hush  were  some  of  these 
meetings  that  they  had  to  be  held  “in  some  lonely  forest 
glade.  Privacy,”  explains  Dietrich,  “was  absolutely  impera- 
tive; the  press  must,  have  no  chance  of  doing  mischief. 
Success  was  the  consequence.” 

So  was  an  almost  comical  zigzag  in  Nazi  politics.  Once  in 
the  fall  of  1930  Strasser,  Feder  and  Frick  introduced  a 
bill  in  the  Reichstag  on  behalf  of  the  Nazi  Party  calling 
for  a ceiling  of  4 per  cent  on  all  interest  rates,  the  ex- 
propriation of  the  holdings  of  “the  bank  and  stock  ex- 
change magnates”  and  of  all  “Eastern  Jews”  without  com- 
pensation, and  the  nationalization  of  the  big  banks.  Hitler 
was  horrified;  this  was  not  only  Bolshevism,  it  was  finan- 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  203 

cial  suicide  for  the  party.  He  peremptorily  ordered  the 
party  to  withdraw  the  measure.  Thereupon  the  Commu- 
nists reintroduced  it,  word  for  word.  Hitler  bade  his  party 
vote  against  it. 

We  know  from  the  interrogations  of  Funk  in  the  Nurem- 
berg jail  after  the  war  who  some,  at  least,  of  the  “in- 
fluential industrial  magnates”  whom  Hitler  sought  out 
were.  Emil  Kirdorf,  the  union-hating  coal  baron  who  pre- 
sided over  a political  slush  fund  known  as  the  “Ruhr 
Treasury”  which  was  raised  by  the  West  German  mining 
interests,  had  been  seduced  by  Hitler  at  the  party  con- 
gress in  1929.  Fritz  Thyssen,  the  head  of  the  steel  trust, 
who  lived  to  regret  his  folly  and  to  write  about  it  in  a 
book  called  I Paid  Hitler,  was  an  even  earlier  contributor. 
He  had  met  the  Nazi  leader  in  Munich  in  1923,  been  car- 
ried away  by  his  eloquence  and  forthwith  made,  through 
Ludendorff,  an  initial  gift  of  100,000  gold  marks  ($25,- 
000)  to  the  then  obscure  Nazi  Party.  Joining  Thyssen  was 
Albert  Voegler,  also  a power  in  the  United  Steel  Works. 
In  fact  the  coal  and  steel  interests  were  the  principal 
sources  of  the  funds  that  came  from  the  industrialists  to 
help  Hitler  over  his  last  hurdles  to  power  in  the  period 
between  1930  and  1933. 

But  Funk  named  other  industries  and  concerns  whose 
directors  did  not  want  to  be  left  out  in  the  cold  should  Hit- 
ler make  it  in  the  end.  The  list  is  a long  one,  though  far 
from  complete,  for  Funk  had  a wretched  memory  by  the 
time  he  arrived  for  trial  at  Nuremberg.  It  included  Georg 
von  Schnitzler,  a leading  director  of  I.  G.  Farben,  the  giant 
chemical  cartel;  August  Rosterg  and  August  Diehn  of  the 
potash  industry  (Funk  speaks  of  this  industry’s  “positive 
attitude  toward  the  Fuehrer”);  Cuno  of  the  Hamburg- 
Amerika  line;  the  brown-coal  industry  of  central  Germany; 
the  Conti  rubber  interests;  Otto  Wolf,  the  powerful 
Cologne  industrialist;  Baron  Kurt  von  Schroeder,  the  Co- 
logne banker,  who  was  to  play  a pivotal  role  in  the  final 
maneuver  which  hoisted  Hitler  to  power;  several  leading 
banks,  among  which  were  the  Deutsche  Bank,  the  Com- 
merz  und  Privat  Bank,  the  Dresdener  Bank,  the  Deutsche 
Kredit  Gesellschaft;  and  Germany’s  largest  insurance  con- 
cern, the  Allianz. 

Wilhelm  Keppler,  one  of  Hitler’s  economic  advisers, 
brought  in  a number  of  South  German  industrialists  and 


204  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

also  formed  a peculiar  society  of  businessmen  devoted  to 
the  S.S.  Chief,  Himmler,  called  the  Circle  of  Friends  of  the 
Economy  (Freundeskreis  der  Wirtschaft),  which  later  be- 
came known  as  the  Circle  of  Friends  of  the  Reichsfuehrer 
S.S.,  who  was  Himmler,  and  which  raised  millions  of 
marks  for  this  particular  gangster  to  pursue  his  “researches” 
into  Aryan  origins.  From  the  very  beginning  of  his  political 
career  Hitler  had  been  helped  financially — and  socially — 
by  Hugo  Bruckman,  the  wealthy  Munich  publisher,  and 
by  Carl  Bechstein,  the  piano  manufacturer,  both  of  whose 
wives  developed  a touching  fondness  for  the  rising  young 
Nazi  leader.  It  was  in  the  Bechstein  mansion  in  Berlin 
that  Hitler  first  met  many  of  the  business  and  Army 
leaders  and  it  was  there  that  some  of  the  decisive  secret 
meetings  took  place  which  led  him  finally  to  the  chan- 
cellorship. 

Not  all  German  businessmen  jumped  on  the  Hitler 
bandwagon  after  the  Nazi  election  showing  in  1930.  Funk 
mentions  that  the  big  electric  corporations  Siemens  and 
A.E.G.  stood  aloof,  as  did  the  king  of  the  munition 
makers,  Krupp  von  Bohlen  und  Halbach.  Fritz  Thyssen  in 
his  confessions  declares  that  Krupp  was  a “violent  oppo- 
nent” of  Hitler  and  that  as  late  as  the  day  before  Hinden- 
burg  appointed  him  Chancellor  Krupp  urgently  warned 
the  old  Field  Marshal  against  such  a folly.  However, 
Krupp  soon  saw  the  light  and  quickly  became,  in  the  words 
of  the  repentant  Thyssen,  “a  super  Nazi.”  15 

It  is  obvious,  then,  that  in  his  final  drive  for  power 
Hitler  had  considerable  financial  backing  from  a fairly 
large  chunk  of  the  German  business  world.  How  much  the 
bankers  and  businessmen  actually  contributed  to  the  Nazi 
Party  in  those  last  three  years  before  January  1933  has 
never  been  established.  Funk  says  it  probably  amounted 
to  no  more  than  “a  couple  of  million  marks.”  Thyssen 
estimates  it  at  two  millions  a year;  he  says  he  himself 
personally  gave  one  million  marks.  But  judged  by  the 
large  sums  which  the  party  had  at  its  disposal  in  those 
days,  though  Goebbels  complained  it  was  never  enough, 
the  total  gifts  from  business  were  certainly  larger  than 
these  estimates  by  many  times.  What  good  they  eventually 
did  these  politically  childish  men  of  the  business  world 
will  be  seen  later  in  this  narrative.  One  of  the  most  en- 
thusiastic of  them  at  this  time — as  he  was  one  of  the 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  205 

most  bitterly  disillusioned  of  them  afterward — was  Dr. 
Schacht,  who  resigned  his  presidency  of  the  Reichsbank 
in  1930  because  of  his  opposition  to  the  Young  Plan,  met 
Goering  in  that  year  and  Hitler  in  1931  and  for  the  next 
two  years  devoted  all  of  his  considerable  abilities  to 
bringing  the  Fuehrer  closer  to  his  banker  and  industrialist 
friends  and  ever  closer  to  the  great  goal  of  the  Chancel- 
lor’s seat.  By  1932  this  economic  wizard,  whose  respon- 
sibility for  the  coming  of  the  Third  Reich  and  for  its 
early  successes  proved  to  be  so  immeasurably  great,  was 
writing  Hitler:  “I  have  no  doubt  that  the  present  develop- 
ment of  things  can  only  lead  to  your  becoming  Chancel- 
lor ..  . Your  movement  is  carried  internally  by  so  strong 
a truth  and  necessity  that  victory  cannot  elude  you  long 
. •.  . No  matter  where  my  work  may  take  me  in  the  near 
future,  even  if  someday  you  should  see  me  imprisoned  in 
a fortress,  you  can  always  count  on  me  as  your  loyal  sup- 
porter.” One  of  the  two  letters  from  which  these  words 
are  taken  was  signed:  “With  a vigorous  ‘Heil.’  ” 16 

One  “so  strong  a truth”  of  the  Nazi  movement,  which 
Hitler  had  never  made  any  secret  of,  was  that  if  the 
party  ever  took  over  Germany  it  would  stamp  out  a 
German’s  personal  freedom,  including  that  of  Dr.  Schacht 
and  his  business  friends.  It  would  be  some  time  before 
the  genial  Reichsbank  president,  as  he  would  again  become 
under  Hitler,  and  his  associates  in  industry  and  finance 
would  wake  up  to  this.  And  since  this  history,  like  all 
history,  is  full  of  sublime  irony,  it  would  not  be  too  long  a 
time  before  Dr.  Schacht  proved  himself  to  be  a good 
prophet  not  only  about  Hitler’s  chancellorship  but  about 
the  Fuehrer’s  seeing  him  imprisoned,  if  not  in  a fortress 
then  in  a concentration  camp,  which  was  worse,  and  not 
as  Hitler’s  “loyal  supporter” — here  he  was  wrong — but 
in  an  opposite  capacity. 

Hitler  had  now,  by  the  start  of  1931,  gathered  around 
him  in  the  party  the  little  band  of  fanatical,  ruthless  men 
who  would  help  him  in  his  final  drive  to  power  and  who, 
with  one  exception,  would  be  at  his  side  to  help  him  sustain 
that  power  during  the  years  of  the  Third  Reich,  though 
another  of  them,  who  was  closest  of  all  to  him  and  per- 
haps the  ablest  and  most  brutish  of  the  lot,  would  not 
survive,  even  with  his  life,  the  second  year  of  Nazi  govern- 


206 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ment.  There  were  five  who  stood  above  the  other  fol- 
lowers at  this  time.  These  were  Gregor  Strasser,  Roehm, 
Goering,  Goebbels  and  Frick. 

Goering  had  returned  to  Germany  at  the  end  of  1927, 
following  a general  political  amnesty  which  the  Com- 
munists had  helped  the  parties  of  the  Right  put  through 
the  Reichstag.  In  Sweden,  where  he  had  spent  most  of  his 
exile  since  the  1923  putsch,  he  had  been  cured  of  ad- 
diction to  narcotics  at  the  Langbro  Asylum  and  when  he 
was  well  had  earned  his  living  with  a Swedish  aircraft 
company.  The  dashing,  handsome  World  War  ace  had  now 
grown  corpulent  but  had  lost  none  of  his  energy  or  his 
zest  for  life.  He  settled  down  in  a small  but  luxurious 
bachelor’s  flat  in  the  Badischestrasse  in  Berlin  (his  epi- 
leptic wife,  whom  he  deeply  loved,  had  contracted  tuber- 
culosis and  remained,  an  invalid,  in  Sweden),  earned  his 
living  as  adviser  to  aircraft  companies  and  the  German 
airline,  Lufthansa,  and  cultivated  his  social  contacts. 
These  contacts  were  considerable  and  ranged  from  the 
former  Crown  Prince  and  Prince  Philip  of  Hesse,  who  had 
married  Princess  Mafalda,  the  daughter  of  the  King  of 
Italy,  to  Fritz  Thyssen  and  other  barons  of  the  business 
world,  as  well  as  to  a number  of  prominent  officers  of 
the  Army. 

These  were  the  very  connections  which  Hitler  lacked 
but  needed,  and  Goering  soon  became  active  in  introduc- 
ing the  Nazi  leader  to  his  friends  and  in  counteracting  in 
upper-class  circles  the  bad  odor  which  some  of  the  Brown- 
shirt  ruffians  exuded.  In  1928  Hitler  chose  Goering  as  one 
of  the  twelve  Nazi  deputies  to  represent  the  party  in  the 
Reichstag,  of  which  he  became  President  when  the  Nazis 
became  the  largest  party  in  1932.  It  was  in  the  official 
residence  of  the  Reichstag  President  that  many  of  the  meet- 
ings were  held  and  intrigues  hatched  which  led  to  the 
party’s  ultimate  triumph,  and  it  was  here — to  jump  ahead 
in  time  a little — that  a plan  was  connived  that  helped 
Hitler  to  stay  in  power  after  he  became  Chancellor:  to 
set  the  Reichstag  on  fire. 

Ernst  Roehm  had  broken  with  Hitler  in  1925  and  not 
long  afterward  gone  off  to  join  the  Bolivian  Army  as 
a lieutenant  colonel.  Toward  the  end  of  1930  Hitler  ap- 
pealed to  him  to  return  and  take  over  again  the  leader- 
ship of  the  S.A.,  which  was  getting  out  of  hand.  Its 


207 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

members,  even  its  leaders,  apparently  believed  in  a com- 
ing Nazi  revolution  by  violence,  and  with  increasing  fre- 
quency they  were  taking  to  the  streets  to  molest  and 
murder  their  political  opponents.  No  election,  national, 
provincial  or  municipal,  took  place  without  savage  battles 
in  the  gutters. 

Passing  notice  must  here  be  taken  of  one  of  these  en- 
counters, for  it  provided  National  Socialism  with  its  great- 
est martyr.  One  of  the  neighborhood  leaders  of  the  S.A. 
in  Berlin  was  Horst  Wessel,  son  of  a Protestant  chaplain, 
who  had  forsaken  his  family  and  his  studies  and  gone 
to  live  in  a slum  with  a former  prostitute  and  devote  his 
life  to  fighting  for  Nazism.  Many  anti-Nazis  always  held 
that  the  youth  earned  his  living  as  a pimp,  though  this 
charge  may  have  been  exaggerated.  Certainly  he  consorted 
with  pimps  and  prostitutes.  He  was  murdered  by  some 
Communists  in  February  1930  and  would  have  passed 
into  oblivion  along  with  hundreds  of  other  victims  of  both 
sides  in  the  street  wars  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that 
he  left  behind  a song  whose  words  and  tune  he  had  com- 
posed. This  was  the  Horst  Wessel  song,  which  soon 
became  the  official  song  of  the  Nazi  Party  and  later  the 
second  official  anthem — after  “Deutschland  ueber  Alles” 
— of  the  Third  Reich.  Horst  Wessel  himself,  thanks  to 
Dr.  Goebbels’  skillful  propaganda,  became  one  of  the 
great  hero  legends  of  the  movement,  hailed  as  a pure 
idealist  who  had  given  his  life  for  the  cause. 

At  the  time  Roehm  took  over  the  S.A.,  Gregor  Strasser 
was  undoubtedly  the  Number  Two  man  in  the  Nazi  Party. 
A forceful  speaker  and  a brilliant  organizer,  he  was  the 
head  of  the  party’s  most  important  office,  the  Political 
Organization,  a post  which  gave  him  great  influence  among 
the  provincial  and  local  leaders  whose  labors  he  super- 
vised. With  his  genial  Bavarian  nature,  he  was  the  most 
popular  leader  in  the  party  next  to  Hitler,  and,  unlike  the 
Fuehrer  he  enjoyed  the  personal  trust  and  even  liking  of 
most  of  his  political  opponents.  There  were  a good  many 
at  that  time,  within  and  without  the  party,  who  believed 
that  Strasser  might  well  supplant  the  moody,  incalculable 
Austrian  leader.  This  view  was  especially  strong  in  the 
Reichswehr  and  in  the  President’s  Palace. 

Otto,  Gregor  Strasser’s  brother,  had  fallen  by  the  way- 
side.  Unfortunately  for  him,  he  had  taken  seriously  not 


208  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

only  the  word  “socialist”  but  the  word  “workers”  in  the 
party  s official  name  of  National  Socialist  German  Workers’ 
Party.  He  had  supported  certain  strikes  of  the  socialist 
trade  unions  and  demanded  that  the  party  come  out  for 
nationalization  of  industry.  This  of  course  was  heresy 
to  Hitler,  who  accused  Otto  Strasser  of  professing  the 
cardinal  sins  of  “democracy  and  liberalism.”  On  May 
21  and  22,  1930,  the  Fuehrer  had  a showdown  with  his  re- 
bellious subordinate  and  demanded  complete  submission. 
When  Otto  refused,  he  was  booted  out  of  the  party.  He 
tried  to  form  a truly  national  “socialist”  movement,  the 
Union  of  Revolutionary  National  Socialists,  which  became 
known  only  as  the  Black  Front,  but  in  the  September  elec- 
tions it  failed  completely  to  win  any  sizable  number  of  Nazi 
votes  away  from  Hitler. 

Goebbels,  the  fourth  member  of  the  Big  Five  around 
Hitler,  had  remained  an  enemy  and  rival  of  Gregor  Stras- 
ser ever  since  their  break  in  1926.  Two  years  after  that 
he  had  succeeded  Strasser  as  propaganda  chief  of  the 
party  when  the  latter  was  moved  up  to  head  the  Politi- 
cal Organization.  He  had  remained  as  Gauleiter  of  Ber- 
lin, and  his  achievements  in  reorganizing  the  party  there 
as  well  as  his  talents  for  propaganda  had  favorably  im- 
pressed the  Fuehrer.  His  glib  but  biting  tongue  and  his 
nimble  mind  had  not  endeared  him  to  Hitler’s  other 
chief  lieutenants,  who  distrusted  him.  But  the  Nazi  leader 
was  quite  content  to  see  strife  among  his  principal  sub- 
ordinates, if  only  because  it  was  a safeguard  against  their 
conspiring  together  against  his  leadership.  He  never  fully 
trusted  Strasser,  but  in  the  loyalty  of  Goebbels  he  had 
complete  confidence;  moreover,  the  lame  little  fanatic  was 
bubbling  with  ideas  which  were  useful  to  him.  Finally, 
Goebbels’  talents  as  a rowdy  journalist — he  now  had  a 
Berlin  newspaper  of  his  own,  Der  Angriff , to  spout  off 
in — and  as  a rabble-rousing  orator  were  invaluable  to  the 
party. 

Wilhelm  Frick,  the  fifth  and  last  member  of  the  group, 
was  the  only  colorless  personality  in  it.  He  was  a typi- 
cal German  civil  servant.  As  a young  police  officer  in 
Munich  before  1923  he  had  served  as  one  of  Hitler’s 
spies  at  police  headquarters,  and  the  Fuehrer  always 
felt  grateful  to  him.  Often  he  had  taken  on  the  thankless 
tasks.  On  Hitler’s  instigation  he  had  become  the  first  Nazi 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  209 

to  hold  provincial  office— in  Thuringia— and  later  he  be- 
came the  leader  of  the  Nazi  Party  in  the  Reichstag.  He 
was  doggedly  loyal,  efficient  and,  because  of  the  facade 
of  his  retiring  nature  and  suave  manners,  useful  in  con- 
tacts with  wavering  officials  in  the  republican  government. 

Some  of  the  lesser  men  in  the  party  in  the  early  Thir- 
ties would  subsequently  gain  notoriety  and  frightening 
personal  power  in  the  Third  Reich.  Heinrich  Himmler, 
the  poultry  farmer,  who,  with  his  pince-nez,  might  be  mis- 
taken for  a mild,  mediocre  schoolmaster — he  had  a de- 
gree in  agronomy  from  the  Munich  Technische  Hoch- 
schule — was  gradually  building  up  Hitler’s  praetorian  guard, 
the  black-coated  S.S.  But  he  worked  under  the  shadow 
of  Roehm,  who  was  commander  of  both  the  S.A.  and 
the  S.S.,  and  he  was  little  known,  even  in  party  circles 
outside  his  native  Bavaria.  There  was  Dr.  Robert  Ley,  a 
chemist  by  profession  and  a habitual  drunkard,  who  was 
the  Gauleiter  of  Cologne,  and  Hans  Frank,  the  bright 
young  lawyer  and  leader  of  the  party’s  legal  division. 
There  was  Walther  Darre,  bom  in  1895  in  the  Argen- 
tine, an  able  agronomist  who  was  won  over  to  National 
Socialism  by  Hess  and  whose  book  The  Peasantry  as 
the  Life  Source  of  the  Nordic  Race  brought  him  fo  Hit- 
lers attention  and  to  a job  as  head  of  the  Agricultural 
epartment  of  the  party.  Rudolf  Hess  himself,  personally 
unambitious  and  doggedly  loyal  to  the  Leader,  held  only 
the  title  of  private  secretary  to  the  Fuehrer.  The  second 
private  secretary  was  one  Martin  Bormann,  a molelike 
man  who  preferred  to  burrow  in  the  dark  recesses  of 
party  life  to  further  his  intrigues  and  who  once  had 
served  a year  in  prison  for  complicity  in  a political  mur- 
der. The  Reich  Youth  Leader  was  Baldur  von  Schirach, 
a romantically  minded  young  man  and  an  energetic  or- 
ganizer, whose  mother  was  an  American  and  whose  great- 
grandfather, a Union  officer,  had  lost  a leg  at  Bull  Run; 
he  told  his  American  jailers  at  Nuremberg  that  he  had 
become  an  anti-Semite  at  the  age  of  seventeen  after  read- 
ing a book  called  Eternal  Jew,  by  Henry  Ford. 

There  was  also  Alfred  Rosenberg,  the  ponderous,  dim- 
witted  Baltic  pseudo  philosopher  who,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  one  of  Hitler’s  earliest  mentors  and  who  since  the 
putsch  of  1923  had  poured  out  a stream  of  books  and 
pamphlets  of  the  most  muddled  content  and  style  cul- 


210  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

minating  in  a 700-page  work  entitled  The  Myth  of  the 
Twentieth  Century.  This  was  a ludicrous  concoction  of 
his  half-baked  ideas  on  Nordic  supremity  palmed  off  as 
the  fruit  of  what  passed  for  erudition  in  Nazi  circles — 
a book  which  Hitler  often  said  jokingly  he  had  tried  un- 
successfully to  read  and  which  prompted  Schirach,  who 
fancied  himself  as  a writer,  to  remark  once  that  Rosen- 
berg was  “a  man  who  sold  more  copies  of  a book  no  one 
ever  read  than  any  other  author,”  for  in  the  first  ten  years 
after  its  publication  in  1930  it  sold  more  than  half  a 
million  copies.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  Hitler  al- 
ways had  a warm  spot  in  his  heart  for  this  dull,  stupid, 
fumbling  man,  rewarding  him  with  various  party  jobs  such 
as  editor  of  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter  and  other  Nazi 
publications  and  naming  him  as  one  of  the  party’s  depu- 
ties in  the  Reichstag  in  1930,  where  he  represented  the 
movement  in  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee. 

Such  was  the  conglomeration  of  men  around  the  leader 
of  the  National  Socialists.  In  a normal  society  they 
surely  would  have  stood  out  as  a grotesque  assortment 
of  misfits.  But  in  the  last  chaotic  days  of  the  Republic 
they  began  to  appear  to  millions  of  befuddled  Germans 
as  saviors.  And  they  had  two  advantages  over  their  op- 
ponents: They  were  led  by  a man  who  knew  exactly 
what  he  wanted  and  they  were  ruthless  enough,  and  op- 
portunist enough,  to  go  to  any  lengths  to  help  him  get 
it. 

As  the  year  of  1931  ran  its  uneasy  course,  with  five 
million  wage  earners  out  of  work,  the  middle  classes  fac- 
ing ruin,  the  farmers  unable  to  meet  their  mortgage  pay- 
ments, the  Parliament  paralyzed,  the  government  flounder- 
ing, the  eighty-four-year-old  President  fast  sinking  into 
the  befuddlement  of  senility,  a confidence  mounted  in  the 
breasts  of  the  Nazi  chieftains  that  they  would  not  have 
long  to  wait.  As  Gregor  Strasser  publicly  boasted,  “All  that 
serves  to  precipitate  the  catastrophe  ...  is  good,  very  good 
for  us  and  our  German  revolution.” 


6 


THE  LAST  DAYS 
OF  THE  REPUBLIC: 

1931-33 

out  of  the  turmoil  and  chaos  of  German  life  there 
now  emerged  a curious  and  devious  figure  who,  more 
than  any  other  single  individual,  was  destined  to  dig  the 
grave  of  the  Republic — one  who  would  serve  briefly  as 
its  last  Chancellor  and,  ironically,  in  one  of  the  final 
twists  of  his  astonishing  career  desperately  try  to  save  it, 
when  it  was  too  late.  This  was  Kurt  von  Schleicher, 
whose  name  in  German  means  “intriguer”  or  “sneak.” 

In  1931  he  was  a lieutenant  general  in  the  Army.* 
Bom  in  1882,  he  had  entered  military  service  at  eighteen 
as  a subaltern  in  Hindenburg’s  old  regiment,  the  3rd  Foot 
Guards,  where  he  became  a close  friend  of  Oskar  von 
Hindenburg,  the  son  of  the  Field  Marshal  and  President. 
His  second  friendship  proved  almost  as  valuable.  This 
was  with  General  Groener,  who  was  impressed  by  his 
brilliance  as  a student  at  the  War  Academy,  and  who, 
when  he  replaced  Ludendorff  at  Supreme  Headquarters 
in  1918,  brought  along  the  young  officer  as  his  adjutant. 
Primarily  a “desk  officer” — he  had  seen  but  a short  pe- 
riod of  service  on  the  Russian  front — Schleicher  remained 
thereafter  close  to  the  sources  of  power  in  the  Army  and 
in  the  Weimar  Republic,  where  his  nimble  mind,  affable 
manners  and  flair  for  politics  impressed  both  the  generals 
and  the  politicians.  Under  General  von  Seeckt  he  played 
an  increasingly  important  role  in  helping  to  organize  the 
illegal  free  corps  and  the  equally  illegal  and  highly  secret 
“Black  Reichswehr,”  and  he  was  a key  figure  in  the  con- 

* Equivalent  to  a major  general  in  the  U.S.  Army. 

211 


212  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

fidential  negotiations  with  Moscow  which  led  to  the  cam- 
ouflaged training  of  German  tank  and  air  officers  in 
Soviet  Russia  and  in  the  establishment  of  German-run 
arms  factories  there.  A gifted  manipulator,  with  a passion 
for  intrigue,  Schleicher  worked  best  under  cover  in  the 
dark.  Until  the  beginning  of  the  Thirties  his  name  was 
unknown  to  the  general  public,  but  for  some  time  pre- 
viously it  had  been  attracting  increasing  notice  in  the 
Bendlerstrasse,  where  the  War  Ministry  was,  and  in  the 
Wilhelmstrasse,  where  the  government  ministries  were  situ- 
ated. 

In  January  1928  he  had  used  his  growing  influence 
with  President  Hindenburg,  with  whom  he  had  become 
close  through  his  friendship  with  Oskar,  to  have  his  old 
chief,  General  Groener,  appointed  as  Minister  of  Defense, 
the  first  military  man  to  hold  that  post  during  the  Re- 
public. Groener  made  Schleicher  his  right-hand  man  in  the 
ministry,  putting  him  in  charge  of  a new  office,  the  Minis- 
try Bureau  (Ministeramt),  where  he  handled  the  political 
and  press  affairs  of  the  Army  and  Navy.  “My  cardinal 
in  politics,”  Groener  called  his  assistant  and  entrusted  him 
with  the  Army’s  relations  with  the  other  ministries  and 
the  political  leaders.  In  this  position  Schleicher  not  only 
was  a power  in  the  officer  corps  but  began  to  be  a power 
in  politics.  In  the  Artny  he  could  make  and  break  the 
higher  officers  and  began  to  do  so,  getting  rid  of  General 
von  Blomberg,  the  second-in-command  of  the  Army,  in 
1930  by  a piece  of  trickery  and  replacing  him  with  an 
old  friend  from  the  3rd  Foot  Guards,  General  von  Ham- 
merstein.  In  the  spring  of  the  same  year,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  made  his  first  effort  to  select  the  Chancellor  him- 
self and,  with  the  backing  of  the  Army,  talked  Hinden- 
burg into  appointing  Heinrich  Bruening  to  that  post. 

In  achieving  this  politcal  triumph  Schleicher  carried  out 
what  he  thought  would  be  the  first  step  in  a grandiose 
scheme  to  make  over  the  Republic,  an  idea  which  had 
been  forming  for  some  time  in  his  agile  mind.  He  saw 
clearly  enough — as  who  didn’t? — the  causes  of  the  weak- 
ness of  the  Weimar  regime.  There  were  too  many  political 
parties  (in  1930  ten  of  them  each  polled  over  a million 
votes)  and  they  were  too  much  at  cross-purposes,  too  ab- 
sorbed in  looking  after  the  special  economic  and  social 
interests  they  represented  to  be  able  to  bury  their  dif- 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  213 

ferences  and  form  an  enduring  majority  in  the  Reich- 
stag that  could  back  a stable  government  capable  of 
coping  with  the  major  crisis  which  confronted  the  country 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Thirties.  Parliamentary  govern- 
ment had  become  a matter  of  what  the  Germans  called 
Kuhhandel  cattle  trading — with  the  parties  bargaining 
for  special  advantages  fpr  the  groups  which  elected  them, 
and  the  national  interests  be  damned.  No  wonder  that 
when  Bruening  took  over  as  Chancellor  on  March  28, 
1930,  it  had  become  impossible  to  achieve  a majority 
in  the  Reichstag  for  any  policy — of  the  Left,  the  Center 
or  the  Right  and  that  merely  to  carry  on  the  business 
of  government  and  do  something  about  the  economic 
paralysis  he  had  to  resort  to  Article  48  of  the  constitu- 
tion, which  permitted  him  in  an  emergency,  if  the  Presi- 
dent approved,  to  govern  by  decree. 

This  was  exactly  the  way  Schleicher  wished  the  Chan- 
cellor to  govern.  It  made  for  strong  government  under 
the  forceful  hand  of  the  President,  who,  after  all 
(Schleicher  argued),  through  his  popular  election  repre- 
sented the  will  of  the  people  and  was  backed  by  the 
Army.  If  the  democratically  elected  Reichstag  couldn’t 
provide  stable  government,  then  the  democratically  elected 
President  must.  What  the  majority  of  Germans  wanted, 
Schleicher  was  sure,  was  a government  that  would  take 
a firm  stand  and  lead  them  out  of  their  hopeless  plight. 
Actually,  as  the  elections  which  Bruening  called  in  Sep- 
tember showed,  that  was  not  what  the  majority  of  Ger- 
mans wanted.  Or  at  least  they  did  not  want  to  be  led 
out  of  the  wilderness  by  the  kind  of  government  which 
Schleicher  and  his  friends  in  the  Army  and  in  the  Presi- 
dential Palace  had  chosen. 

In  truth,  Schleicher  had  committed  two  disastrous  mis- 
takes. By  putting  up  Bruening  as  Chancellor  and  encourag- 
ing him  to  rule  by  presidential  decree,  he  had  cracked 
me  foundation  of  the  Army’s  strength  in  the  nation — 
its  position  above  politics,  the  abandonment  of  which 
would  lead  to  its  own  and  Germany’s  ruin.  And  he  had 
made  a bad  miscalculation  about  the  voters.  When  six 
and  a half  million  of  them,  against  810,000  two  years  be- 
fore, voted  for  the  Nazi  Party  on  September  14,  1930  the 
political  General  realized  that  he  must  take  a’ new  tack. 
By  the  end  of  the  year  he  was  in  touch  with  Roehm,  who 


214 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

had  just  returned  from  Bolivia,  and  with  Gregor  Strasser. 
This  was  the  first  serious  contact  between  the  Nazis  and 
those  who  held  the  political  power  in  the  Republic.  In 
just  two  years  its  development  was  to  lead  Adolf  Hitler 
to  his  goal  and  General  von  Schleicher  to  his  fall  and 
ultimate  murder. 

On  October  10,  1931,  three  Weeks  after  the  suicide  of 
his  niece  and  sweetheart,  Geli  Raubal,  Hitler  was  received 
by  President  Hindenburg  for  the  first  time.  Schleicher,  busy 
weaving  a new  web  of  intrigue,  had  made  the  appoint- 
ment. Earlier  that  autumn  he  had  conferred  with  Hitler 
and  arranged  for  him  to  see  both  the  Chancellor  and  the 
President.  In  the  back  of  his  mind,  as  well  as  that  of 
Bruening,  was  the  question  of  what  to  do  when  Hinden- 
burg’s  seven-year  term  of  office  came  to  an  end  in  the 
spring  of  1932.  The  Field  Marshal  would  be  eighty-five 
then,  and  the  periods  when  his  mind  was  lucid  were 
diminishing.  Still,  as  everyone  realized,  if  he  were  not  a 
candidate  to  succeed  himself,  Hitler,  though  he  was  not 
legally  a German  citizen,  might  contrive  to  become  one, 
run  for  the  office,  win  the  election  and  become  President! 

During  the  summer  the,  scholarly  Chancellor  had  pon- 
dered long  hours  over  the  desperate  plight  of  Germany. 
He  quite  realized  that  his  government  had  become  the 
most  unpopular  one  the  Republic  had  ever  had.  To  cope 
with . the  depression  he  had  decreed  lower  wages  and 
salaries  as  well  as  lower  prices  and  had  clamped  down 
severe  restrictions  on  business,  finance  and  the  social  serv- 
ices. The  “Hunger  Chancellor”  he  had  been  called  by  both 
the  Nazis  and  the  Communists.  Yet  he  thought  he  saw  a 
way  out  that  in  the  end  would  re-establish  a stable,  free, 
prosperous  Germany.  He  would  try  to  negotiate  with  the 
Allies  a cancellation  of  reparations,  whose  payment  had 
been  temporarily  stopped  by  the  Hoover  moratorium.  In 
the  disarmament  conference  scheduled  to  begin  the  fol- 
lowing year  he  would  try  either  to  get  the  Allies  to  honor 
their  pledge  in  the  Versailles  Treaty  to  disarm  to  the  level 
of  Germany  or  to  allow  Germany  to  embark  openly  on  a 
modest  program  of  rearmament,  which  in  fact,  with  his 
connivance,  and  in  secret,  it  had  already  started  to  do. 
Thus  the  last  shackle  of  the  peace  treaty  would  be  thrown 
off  and  Germany  would  emerge  as  an  equal  among  the 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  215 

big  powers.  This  would  be  not  only  a boon  to  the  re- 
public but  might  launch,  Bruening  thought,  a new  era  of 
confidence  in  the  Western  world  that  would  put  an  end 
to  the  economic  depression  which  had  brought  the  Ger- 
man people  such  misery.  And  it  would  take  the  wind  out 
of  the  Nazi  sails. 

Bruening  planned  to  move  boldly  on  the  home  front  too 
and  to  bring  about  by  agreement  of  all  the  major  parties 
save  the  Communists  a fundamental  change  in  the  German 
constitution.  He  meant  to  restore  the  Hohenzollern  mon- 
archy. Even  if  Hindenburg  could  be  persuaded  to  run 
again,  he  could  not  be  expected  at  his  age  to  live  out 
another  full  term  of  seven  years.  Should  he  die  in  an- 
other year  or  two,  the  way  would  still  be  open  to  Hitler 
to  be  elected  President.  To  forestall  that,  to  assure  per- 
manency and  Stability  in  the  office  of  head  of  state, 
Bruening  broached  the  following  plan:  The  1932  presi- 
dential elections  would  be  called  off  and  Hindenburg’s 
term  of  office  simply  extended,  as  it  could  be,  by  a two- 
thirds  vote  in  the  two  houses  of  Parliament,  the  Reich- 
stag and  the  Reichsrat.  As  soon  as  that  was  achieved,  he 
would  propose  that  Parliament  proclaim  a monarchy  with 
the  President  as  regent.  On  his  death  one  of  the  sons  of 
the  Crown  Prince  would  be  put  on  the  Hohenzollern 
throne.  This  act  too  would  take  the  wind  out  of  the 
Nazis;  in  fact  Bruening  was  confident  that  it  would  mean 
their  end  as  a political  force. 

But  the  aged  President  was  not  interested.  He,  whose 
duty  it  had  been  as  Commander  of  the  Imperial  Army 
to  tell  the  Kaiser  on  that  dark  fall  day  of  November  1918 
at  Spa  that  he  must  go,  that  the  monarchy  was  at  an 
end,  would  not  consider  any  Hohenzollern’s  resuming  the 
throne  except  the  Emperor  himself,  who  still  lived  in  exile 
at  Doom,  in  Holland.  When  Bruening  explained  to  him 
that  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  trade  unions,  which 
with  the  greatest  reluctance  had  given  some  encourage- 
ment to  his  plan  if  only  because  it  might  afford  the  last 
desperate  chance  of  stopping  Hitler,  would  not  stand  for 
the  return  of  either  Wilhelm  II  or  his  eldest  son-  and  that 
moreover  if  the  monarchy  were  restored  it  must  be  a con- 
stitutional and  democratic  one  on  the  lines  of  the  British 
model,  the  grizzly  old  Field  Marshal  was  so  outraged  he 
summarily  dismissed  his  Chancellor  from  his  presence.  A 


216 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


week  later  he  recalled  him  to  inform  him  that  he  would 
not  stand  for  re-election. 

In  the  meantime  first  Bruening  and  then  Hindenburg 
had  had  their  first  meeting  with  Adolf  Hitler.  Both  talks 
went  badly  for  the  Nazi  leader.  He  had  not  yet  re- 
covered from  the  blow  of  Geli  Raubal’s  suicide;  his  mind 
wandered  and  he  was  unsure  of  himself.  To  Bruening’s 
request  for  Nazi  support  for  the  continuance  in  office  of 
Hindenburg  Hitler  answered  with  a long  tirade  against 
the  Republic  which  left  little  doubt  that  he  would  not 
go  along  with  the  Chancellor’s  plans.  With  Hindenburg, 
Hitler  was  ill  at  ease.  He  tried  to  impress  the  old  gentle- 
man with  a long  harangue  but  it  fell  flat.  The  President, 
at  this  first  meeting,  was  not  impressed  by  the  “Bohemian 
corporal,”  as  he  called  him,  and  told  Schleicher  that  such 
a man  might  become  Minister  of  Posts  but  never  Chan- 
cellor— words  which  the  Field  Marshal  would  later  have 
to  eat. 

Hitler,  in  a huff,  hastened  off  to  Bad  Harzburg,  where 
on  the  next  day,  October  11,  he  joined  a massive  demon- 
stration of  the  “National  Opposition”  against  the  govern- 
ments of  Germany  and  Prussia.  This  was  an  assembly 
not  so  much  of  the  radical  Right,  represented  by  the 
National  Socialists,  as  of  the  older,  conservative  forces  of 
reaction:  Hugenberg’s  German  National  Party,  the  right- 
wing  veterans’  private  army,  the  Stahlhelm,  the  so-called 
Bismarck  Youth,  the  Junkers’  Agrarian  League,  and  an 
odd  assortment  of  old  generals.  But  the  Nazi  leader  did 
not  have  his  heart  in  the  meeting.  He  despised  the  frock- 
coated,  top-hatted,  bemedaled  relics  of  the  old  regime, 
with  whom,  he  saw,  it  might  be  dangerous  to  associate  a 
“revolutionary”  movement  like  his  own  too  closely.  He 
raced  through  his  speech  in  a perfunctory  manner  and 
left  the  field  before  the  parade  of  the  Stahlhelm,  which, 
to  his  annoyance,  had  shown  up  in  larger  numbers  than 
the  S.A.  The  Harzburg  Front  which  was  formed  that 
day  and  which  represented  an  effort  of  the  old-line  con- 
servatives to  bring  the  Nazis  into  a united  front  to  begin 
a final  assault  on  the  Republic  (it  demanded  the  immediate 
resignation  of  Bruening)  was  thus  stillborn.  Hitler  had 
no  intention  of  playing  second  fiddle  to  these  gentlemen 
whose  minds,  he  thought,  were  buried  in  the  past  to 
which  he  knew  there  was  no  return.  He  might  use 


217 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

them  for  the  moment  if  they  helped  to  undermine  the 
Weimar  regime  and  made  available  to  him,  as  they  did, 
new  financial  sources.  But  he  would  not,  in  turn,  be  used 
by  them.  Within  a few  days  the  Harzburg  Front  was  fac- 
ing collapse;  the  various  elements  of  it  were  once  more 
at  each  other’s  throats. 

Except  on  one  issue.  Both  Hugenberg  and  Hitler  re- 
fused to  agree  to  Bruening’s  proposal  that  Hindenburg’s 
term  of  office  be  prolonged.  At  the  beginning  of  1932  the 
Chancellor  renewed  his  effort  to  get  them  to  change  their 
minds.  With  great  difficulty  he  had  prevailed  on  the  Presi- 
dent to  agree  to  serving  further  if  Parliament  prolonged 
his  term  and  thus  made  it  unnecessary  for  him  to  have 
to  shoulder  the  burden  of  a bitter  election  campaign.  Now 
Bruening  invited  Hitler  to  come  to  Berlin  for  fresh  dis- 
cussions. The  telegram  arrived  while  the  Fuehrer  was 
conferring  with  Hess  and  Rosenberg  in  the  editorial  of- 
fices of  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter  in  Munich.  Thrusting 
the  paper  into  their  faces,  Hitler  cried,  “Now  I have 
them  in  my  pocket!  They  have  recognized  me  as  a partner 
in  their  negotiations.”  1 

On  January  7 Hitler  conferred  with  Bruening  and 
Schleicher,  and  there  was  a further  meeting  on  January 
10.  Bruening  repeated  his  proposal  that  the  Nazi  Party 
agree  to  prolonging  Hindenburg’s  term.  If  this  were  done, 
and  as  soon  as  he  had  settled  the  problem  of  cancella- 
tion of  reparations  and  equality  of  armaments,  he  him- 
self would  retire.  According  to  some  sources — it  is  a 
disputed  point — Bruening  held  out  a further  bait:  he  of- 
fered to  suggest  Hitler’s  name  to  the  President  as  his 
successor.2 

Hitler  did  not  immediately  give  a definite  reply.  He 
adjourned  to  the  Kaiserhof  hotel  and  took  counsel  with  his 
advisers.  Gregor  Strasser  was  in  favor  of  accepting  Bruen- 
ing’s plan,  arguing  that  if  the  Nazis  forced  an  election 
Hindenburg  would  win  it.  Goebbels  and  Roehm  were  for 
an  outright  rejection.  In  his  diary  for  January  7,  Goeb- 
bels wrote;  “The  Presidency  is  not  the  issue,  Bruening 
merely  wants  to  strengthen  his  own  position  indefinitely 
. . . The  chess  game  for  power  begins.  . . . The  chief 
thing  is  that  we  remain  strong  and  make  no  compromises.” 
The  night  before,  he  had  written:  “There  is  a man  in  the 


218  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

organization  that  no  one  trusts  . . . This  is  Gregor 
Strasser.”  3 

Hitler  himself  saw  no  reason  to  strengthen  Braening’s 
hand  and  thus  give  the  Republic  a further  lease  on  life. 
But  unlike  the  thickheaded  Hugenberg,  who  rejected  the 
plan  outright  on  January  12,  Hitler  was  more  subtle.  He 
replied  not  to  the  Chancellor  but  over  his  head  to  the 
President,  declaring  that  he  regarded  Bruening’s  proposal 
as  unconstitutional  but  that  he  would  support  Hinden- 
burg’s  re-election  if  the  Field  Marshal  would  reject  Bruen- 
ing’s plan.  To  Otto  von  Meissner,  the  nimble  Secretary 
of  State  at  the  Presidential  Chancellery,  who  had  zealous- 
ly served  in  that  capacity  first  the  Socialist  Ebert  and 
then  the  conservative  Hindenburg  and  who  was  begin- 
ning to  think  of  a third  term  in  office  for  himself  with 
whoever  the  President  might  be — perhaps  even  Hitler? 
— the  Nazi  leader,  in  a secret  conversation  at  the  Kaiserhof, 
offered  to  support  Hindenburg  in  the  elections  if  he  would 
first  get  rid  of  Bruening,  name  a “National”  government 
and  decree  new  elections  for  the  Reichstag  and  the  Prus- 
sian Diet. 

To  this  Hindenburg  would  not  agree.  Nettled  by  the 
refusal  of  the  Nazis  and  the  Nationalists,  the  latter  his 
friends  and  supposed  supporters,  to  agree  to  spare  him 
the  strain  of  an  election  battle,  Hindenburg  agreed  to 
run  again.  But  to  his  resentment  against  the  nationalist 
parties  was  added  a curious  spleen  against  Bruening, 
who  he  felt  had  handled  the  whole  matter  badly  and  who 
was  now  forcing  him  into  bitter  conflict  with  the  very 
nationalist  forces  which  had  elected  him  President  in  1925 
against  the  liberal-Marxist  candidates.  Now  he  could 
win  only  with  the  support  of  the  Socialists  and  the  trade 
unions,  for  whom  he  had  always  had  an  undisguised  con- 
tempt. A marked  coolness  sprang  up  in  his  dealings  with 
his  Chancellor — “the  best,”  he  had  said  not  so  long  ago, 
“since  Bismarck.” 

A coolness  toward  Bruening  also  came  over  the  General 
who  had  propelled  him  into  the  chancellorship.  To 
Schleicher  the  austere  Catholic  leader  had  been  a dis- 
appointment after  all.  He  had  become  the  most  unpopular 
Chancellor  the  Republic  had  ever  had.  He  had  been  un- 
able to  obtain  a majority  in  the  country;  he  had  failed 
to  curb  the  Nazis  or  to  win  them  over;  he  had  bungled  the 


219 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

problem  of  keeping  Hindenburg  on.  Therefore  he  must 
go — and  perhaps  with  him  General  Groener,  Schleicher’s 
revered  chief,  who  did  not  seem  to  grasp  the  ideas  for 
the  future  which  he,  Schleicher,  had  in  mind.  The  schem- 
ing General  was  not  exactly  in  a hurry.  Bruening  and 
Groener,  the  two  strong  men  of  the  government,  must 
remain  in  power  until  Hindenburg  was  re-elected;  without 
their  support  the  old  Field  Marshal  might  not  make  it. 
After  the  elections  their  usefulness  would  be  over. 

HITLER  AGAINST  HINDENBURG 

There  were  a number  of  occasions  in  the  career  of 
Adolf  Hitler  when,  faced  with  a difficult  decision,  he  seemed 
unable  to  make  up  his  mind,  and  this  was  one  of  them. 
The  question  he  faced  in  January  1932  was:  to  run  or  not 
to  run  for  President?  Hindenburg  seemed  unbeatable.  The 
legendary  herq  would  be  supported  not  only  by  many 
elements  of  the  Right  but  by  the  democratic  parties  which 
had  been  against  him  in  the  election  of  1925  but  which 
novp  saw  him  as  the  savior  of  the  Republic.  To  run 
against  the  Field  Marshal  and  be  beaten,  as  he  almost 
certainly  would  be — was  that  not  to  risk  the  reputation 
for  invincibility  which  the  Nazis  had  been  building  up  in 
one  provincial  election  after  another  since  their  spectacu- 
lar triumph  in  the  national  poll  in  1930?  And  yet,  not  to 
run — was  that  not  a confession  of  weakness,  a demonstra- 
tion of  a lack  of  confidence  that  National  Socialism  was 
on  the  threshold  of  power?  There  was  another  considera- 
tion. Hitler  was  at  the  moment  not  even  eligible  to  run. 
He  was  not  a German  citizen. 

Joseph  Goebbels  urged  him  to  announce  his  candidacy. 
On  January  19  they  journeyed  to  Munich  together  and 
that  evening  Goebbels  recorded  in  his  diary:  “Discussed 
the  question  of  the  presidency  with  the  Fuehrer.  No  de- 
cision has  yet  been  reached.  I pleaded  strongly  for  his 
own  candidacy.”  For  the  next  month  the  diary  of  Goeb- 
bels reflected  the  ups  and  downs  in  Hitler’s  mind.  On 
January  31:  “The  Fuehrer’s  decision  will  be  made  on 
Wednesday.  It  can  no  longer  be  in  doubt.”  On  February 
2 it  seemed  that  he  had  made  it.  Goebbels  noted:  “He 
decides  to  be  a candidate  himself.”  But  Goebbels  adds 
that  the  decision  will  not  be  made  public  until  it  is  seen 


220  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

what  the  Social  Democrats  do.  Next  day  the  party  leaders 
assemble  in  Munich  to  hear  Hitler’s  decision.  “They  wait 
in  vain,”  Goebbels  grumbles.  “Everyone,”  he  adds,  “is 
nervous  and  strained.”  That  evening  the  little  propaganda 
chief  seeks  relief;  he  steals  away  to  see  Greta  Garbo  in 
a movie  and  is  “moved  and  shaken”  by  this  “greatest 
living  actress.”  Later  that  night  “a  number  of  old  party 
comrades  come  to  me.  They  are  depressed  at  the  lack  of 
a decision.  They  fear  that  the  Fuehrer  is  waiting  too  long.” 

He  may  be  waiting  too  long,  but  Hitler’s  confidence  in 
his  ultimate  triumph  does  not  weaken.  One  night  in 
Munich,  the  diary  records,  the  Fuehrer  has  a long  dis- 
cussion with  Goebbels  on  which  post  the  latter  will  have 
in  the  Third  Reich.  The  Leader  has  in  mind  for  him, 
Goebbels  says,  a “Ministry  of  Popular  Education  which 
will  deal  with  films,  radio,  art,  culture  and  propaganda.” 
On  another  evening  Hitler  has  a long  discussion  with  his 
architect,  Professor  Troost,  over  plans  for  a “grandiose 
alteration  of  the  national  capital.”  And  Goebbels  adds: 
“The  Fuehrer  has  his  plans  all  finished.  He  speaks,  acts 
and  feels  as  if  we  were  already  in  power.” 

But  he  does  not  speak  yet  as  if  he  were  anxious  to  run 
against  Hindenburg.  On  February  9,  Goebbels  records, 
“the  Fuehrer  is  back  in  Berlin.  More  debates  at  the  Kaiser- 
hof  over  the  presidential  election.  Everything  is  left  in 
suspense.”  Three  days  later  Goebbels  goes  over  his  calcu- 
lations of  votes  with  the  Fuehrer.  “It’s  a risk,”  he  says, 
“but  it  must  be  taken.”  Hitler  goes  off  to  Munich  to  think 
it  over  still  further. 

In  the  end  his  mind  is  made  up  for  him  by  Hindenburg. 
On  February  15  the  aged  President  formally  announces 
his  candidacy.  Goebbels  is  happy.  “Now  we  have  a free 
hand.  Now  we  need  no  longer  hide  our  decision.”  But 
Hitler  does  hide  it  until  February  22.  At  a meeting  that 
day  in  the  Kaiserhof  “the  Fuehrer  gives  me  permission,” 
Goebbels  rejoices,'  “to  announce  his  candidacy  at  the 
Sport  Palace  tonight.” 

It  was  a bitter  and  confusing  campaign.  In  the  Reichstag 
Goebbels  branded  Hindenburg  as  “the  candidate  of  the 
party  of  the  deserters”  and  was  expelled  from  the  chamber 
for  insulting  the  President.  In  Berlin  the  nationalist 
Deutsche  Zeitung,  which  had  backed  Hindenburg’s  elec- 
tion in  1925,  now  turned  on  him  vehemently.  “The  present 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  221 

issue,”  it  declared,  “is  whether  the  internationalist  traitors 
and  pacifist  swine,  with  the  approval  of  Hindenburg,  are 
to  bring  about  the  final  ruin  of  Germany.” 

All  the  traditional  loyalties  of  classes  and  parties  were 
upset  in  the  confusion  and  heat  of  the  electoral  battle. 
To  Hindenburg,  a Protestant,  a Prussian,  a conservative 
and  a monarchist,  went  the  support  of  the  Socialists,  the 
trade  unions,  the  Catholics  of  Bruening’s  Center  Party 
and  the  remnants  of  the  liberal,  democratic  middle-class 
parties.  To  Hitler,  a Catholic,  an  Austrian,  a former  tramp, 
a “national  socialist,”  a leader  of  the  lower-middle-class 
masses,  was  rallied,  in  addition  to  his  own  followers,  the 
support  of  the  upper-class  Protestants  of  the  north,  the 
conservative  Junker  agrarians  and  a number  of  monarch- 
ists, including,  at  the  last  minute,  the  former  Crown  Prince 
himself.  The  confusion  was  further  compounded  by  the 
entrance  of  two  other  candidates,  neither  of  whom  could 
hope  to  win  but  both  of  whom  might  poll  enough  votes 
to  prevent  either  of  the  leading  contestants  from  obtaining 
the  absolute  majority  needed  for  election.  The  Nationalists 
put  up  Theodor  Duesterberg,  second-in-command  of  the 
Stahlhelm  (of  which  Hindenburg  was  the  honorary  com- 
mander), a colorless  former  lieutenant  colonel  whom  the 
Nazis,  to  their  glee,  soon  discovered  to  be  the  great-grand- 
son of  a Jew.  The  Communists,  shouting  that  the  Social 
Democrats  were  “betraying  the  workers”  by  supporting 
Hindenburg,  ran  their  own  candidate,  Ernst  Thaelmann, 
the  party’s  leader.  It  was  not  the  first  time,  nor  the  last, 
that  the  Communists,  on  orders  from  Moscow,  risked 
playing  into  Nazi  hands. 

Before  the  campaign  was  scarcely  under  way  Hitler 
solved  the  problem  of  his  citizenship.  On  February  25 
it  was  announced  that  the  Nazi  Minister  of  the  Interior 
of  the  state  of  Brunswick  had  named  Herr  Hitler  an  at- 
tache of  the  legation  of  Brunswick  in  Berlin.  Through 
this  comic-opera  maneuver  the  Nazi  leader  became  auto- 
matically a citizen  of  Brunswick  and  hence  of  Germany 
and  was  therefore  eligible  to  run  for  President  of  the 
German  Reich.  Having  leaped  over  this  little  hurdle  with 
ease,  Hitler  threw  himself  into  the  campaign  with  furious 
energy,  crisscrossing  the  country,  addressing  large  crowds 
at  scores  of  mass  meetings  and  whipping  them  up  into  a 
state  of  frenzy.  Goebbels  and  Strasser,  the  other  two  spell- 


222 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


binders  of  the  party,  followed  a similar  schedule.  But  this 
was  not  all.  They  directed  a propaganda  campaign  such 
as  Germany  had  never  seen.  They  plastered  the  walls  of  the 
cities  and  towns  with  a million  screeching  colored  posters, 
distributed  eight  million  pamphlets  and  twelve  million  extra 
copies  of  their  party  newspapers,  staged  three  thousand 
meetings  a day  and,  for  the  first  time  in  a German  election, 
made  good  use  of  films  and  gramophone  records,  the 
latter  spouting  forth  from  loudspeakers  on  trucks. 

Bruening  also  worked  tirelessly  to  win  the  election  for 
the  aged  President.  For  once  this  fair-minded  man  was 
ruthless  enough  to  reserve  all  radio  time  on  the  govern- 
ment-controlled networks  for  his  own  side — a tactic  which 
infuriated  Hitler.  Hindenburg  spoke  only  once,  in  a 
recorded  broadcast  on  March  10,  on  the  eve  of  the  poll- 
ing. It  was  a dignified  utterance,  one  of  the  few  made 
during  the  campaign,  and  it  was  effective. 

Election  of  a party  man,  representing  one-sided  extremist 
views,  who  would  consequently  have  the  majority  of  the 
people  against  him,  would  expose  the  Fatherland  to  serious 
disturbances  whose  outcome  would  be  incalculable.  Duty 
commanded  me  to  prevent  this  ...  If  I am  defeated,  I 
shall  at  least  not  have  incurred  the  reproach  that  of  my  own 
accord  I deserted  my  post  in  an  hour  of  crisis  ...  I ask 
for  no  votes  from  those  who  do  not  wish  to  vote  for  me. 

Those  who  voted  for  him  fell  .4  per  cent  short  of  the 
needed  absolute  majority.  When  the  polls  closed  on  March 
13,  1932,  the  results  were: 

Hindenburg  18,651,497  49.6% 


Hitler 

Thaelmann 

Duesterberg 


11,339,446  30.1% 

4,983,341  13.2% 

2,557,729  6.8% 


The  figures  were  a disappointment  to  both  sides.  The 
old  President  had  led  the  Nazi  demagogue  by  over  seven 
million  votes  but  had  just  failed  to  win  the  required  ab- 
solute majority;  this  necessitated  a second  election,  in 
which  the  candidate  receiving  the  most  votes  would  be 
elected.  Hitler  had  increased  the  Nazi  vote  over  1930  by 
nearly  five  million — some  86  per  cent — but  he  had  been 
left  far  behind  Hindenburg.  Late  on  the  evening  of  the 


223 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

polling  there  was  deep  despair  at  the  Goebbels  home  in 
Berlin,  where  many  of  the  party  leaders  had  gathered  to 
listen  to  the  results  over  the  radio.  “We’re  beaten;  terrible 
outlook,”  Goebbels  wrote  in  his  diary  that  night.  “Party 
circles  badly  depressed  and  dejected  . . . We  can  save  our- 
selves only  by  a clever  stroke.” 

But  in  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter  the  next  morning 
Hitler  announced:  “The  first  election  campaign  is  over.  The 
second  has  begun  today.  I shall  lead  it.”  Indeed,  he 
campaigned  as  vigorously  as  before.  Chartering  a Junkers 
passenger  plane,  he  flew  from  one  end  of  Germany  to  the 
other — a novelty  in  electioneering  at  that  time — address- 
ing three  or  four  big  rallies  a day  in  as  many  cities. 
Shrewdly,  he  altered  his  tactics  to  attract  more  votes. 
In  the  first  campaign  he  had  harped  on  the  misery  of  the 
people,  the  impotence  of  the  Republic.  Now  he  depicted 
a happy  future  for  all  Germans  if  he  were  elected:  jobs 
for  the  workers,  higher  prices  for  the  farmers,  more  busi- 
ness for  the  businessmen,  a big  Army  for  the  militarists, 
and  once  in  a speech  at  the  Lustgarten  in  Berlin  he  prom- 
ised, “In  the  Third  Reich  every  German  girl  will  find  a 
husband!” 

The  Nationalists  withdrew  Duesterberg  from  the  race 
and  appealed  to  their  followers  to  vote  for  Hitler.  Again 
even  the  dissolute  former  Crown  Prince,  Friedrich  Wil- 
helm, fell  into  line.  “I  shall  vote  for  Hitler,”  he  announced. 

April  10,  1932,  the  day  of  the  second  election,  was 
dark  and  rainy,  and  a million  fewer  citizens  cast  their 
votes.  The  results  announced  late  that  night  were: 

Hindenburg  19,359,983  53% 

Hitler  13,418,547  36.8% 

Thaelmann  3,706,759  10.2% 

Though  Hitler  had  increased  his  total  vote  by  two  mil- 
lion and  Hindenburg  had  gained  only  one  million,  the 
President  was  in  by  a clear,  absolute  majority.  More  than 
half  the  German  people  had  thus  given  expression  to  their 
belief  in  the  democratic  Republic;  they  had  decisively 
rejected  the  extremists  of  both  Right  and  Left.  Or  so  they 
thought. 

Hitler  himself  had  much  to  ponder.  He  had  made  an 
impressive  showing.  He  had  doubled  the  Nazi  vote  in  two 


224  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

years.  And  yet  a majority  still  eluded  him — and  with  it 
the  political  power  he  sought.  Had  he  reached  the  end  of 
this  particular  road?  In  the  party  discussions  that  followed 
the  April  10  poll,  Strasser  frankly  argued  that  this  was 
indeed  Hitler’s  position.  Strasser  urged  a deal  with  those 
in  power:  with  the  President,  with  the  government  of 
Bruening  and  General  Groener,  with  the  Army.  Hitler 
distrusted  his  chief  lieutenant  but  he  did  not  dismiss  his 
idea.  He  had  not  forgotten  one  of  the  lessons  of  his  Vienna 
days,  that  to  attain  power  one  must  win  the  support  of 
some  of  the  existing  “powerful  institutions.” 

Before  he  could  make  up  his  mind  as  to  the  next  step, 
one  of  these  “powerful  institutions,”  the  government  of  the 
Republic,  struck  him  a blow. 

For  more  than  a year  the  Reich  government  and  various 
state  governments  had  been  coming  into  possession  of 
documents  which  showed  that  a number  of  high  Nazi 
leaders,  especially  in  the  S.A.,  were  preparing  to  take  over 
Germany  by  force  and  institute  a reign  of  terror.  On  the 
eve  of  the  first  presidential  elections  the  S.A.,  now  400,000 
strong,  had  been  fully  mobilized  and  had  thrown  a cordon 
around  Berlin.  Though  Captain  Roehm,  the  S.A.  chief, 
assured  General  von  Schleicher  that  the  measure  was 
merely  precautionary,”  the  Prussian  police  had  seized 
documents  at  Nazi  headquarters  in  Berlin  which  made 
it  pretty  clear  that  the  S.A.  meant  to  carry  out  a coup 
d’etat  on  the  following  evening  should  Hitler  be  elected 
President — such  was  Roehm’s  hurry.  Goebbels  in  a diary 
notation  on  the  night  of  March  1 1 had  confirmed  that 
something  was  afoot.  “Talked  over  instructions  with  the 
S.A.  and  S.S.  commanders.  Deep  uneasiness  is  rife  every- 
where. The  word  Putsch  haunts  the  air.” 

Both  the  national  and  the  state  governments  were 
alarmed.  On  April  5 representatives  of  several  of  the  states, 
led  by  Prussia  and  Bavaria,  the  two  largest,  had  demanded 
that  the  central  government  suppress  the  S.A.  or  else 
they  would  do  it  themselves  in  their  respective  territories. 
Chancellor  Bruening  was  away  from  Berlin  electioneering, 
but  Groener,  who  received  the  delegates  in  his  capacity 
of  Minister  of  the  Interior  and  of  Defense,  promised  action 
as  soon  as  Bruening  returned,  which  was  on  April  10,  the 
day  of  the  second  election.  Bruening  and  Groener  thought 


225 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

they  had  good  reasons  for  stamping  out  the  S.A.  It  would 
end  the  threat  of  civil  war  and  might  be  a prelude  to  the 
end  of  Hitler  as  a major  factor  in  German  politics.  Certain 
of  Hindenburg’s  re-election  by  an  absolute  majority,  they 
felt  that  the  voters  were  giving  them  a mandate  to  protect 
the  Republic  against  the  threats  of  the  Nazis  to  forcibly 
overthrow  it.  The  time  had  come  to  use  force  against 
force.  Also,  unless  they  acted  vigorously,  the  government 
would  lose  the  support  of  the  Social  Democrats  and  the 
trade  unions,  which  were  providing  most  of  the  votes  for 
Hindenburg  and  the  chief  backing  for  the  continuance  of 
Bruening’s  government. 

The  cabinet  met  on  April  10,  in  the  midst  of  the  polling, 
and  decided  to  immediately  suppress  Hitler’s  private 
armies.  There  was  some  difficulty  in  getting  Hindenburg 
to  sign  the  decree — Schleicher,  who  had  first  approved  it, 
began  to  whisper  objections  in  the  President’s  ear — but  he 
finally  did  so  on  April  13  and  it  was  promulgated  on 
April  14. 

This  was  a stunning  blow  to  the  Nazis.  Roehm  and  some 
of  the  hotheads  in  the  party  urged  resistance  to  the  order. 
But  Hitler,  shrewder  than  his  lieutenants,  ruled  that  it  must 
be  obeyed.  This  was  no  moment  for  armed  rebellion. 
Besides,  there  was  interesting  news  about  Schleicher. 
Goebbels  noted  it  in  his  diary  on  that  very  day,  April  14: 
“We  are  informed  that  Schleicher  does  not  approve  Groe- 
ner’s  action  . . .”  And  later  that  day:  “.  . . a telephone 
call  from  a well-known  lady  who  is  a close  friend  of 
General  Schleicher.  She  says  the  General  wants  to  re- 
sign.” * 

Goebbels  was  interested  but  skeptical.  “Perhaps,”  he 
added,  “it  is  only  a maneuver.”  Neither  he  nor  Hitler 
nor  anyone  else,  certainly  not  Bruening  and  most  cer- 
tainly not  Groener,  to  whom  Schleicher  owed  his  rapid 
rise  in  the  Army  and  in  the  councils  of  government,  had 
as  yet  surmised  the  infinite  capacity  for  treachery  of  the 
scheming  political  General.  But  they  were  soon  to  learn. 

Even  before  the  ban  on  the  S.A.  was  promulgated, 
Schleicher,  who  had  won  over  the  weak-minded  com- 
mander of  the  Reichswehr,  General  von  Hammerstein,  con- 
fidentially informed  the  commanders  of  the  seven  mili- 
tary districts  that  the  Army  opposed  the  move.  Next  he 
persuaded  Hindenburg  to  write  a cantankerous  letter  to 


226 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

nGarre,r;  °n  Aprfl-  16’  asking  whV  the  Reichsbanner  the 
paramilitary  organization  of  the  Social  Democrats,  had  not 
been  suppressed  along  with  the  S.A.  Schleicher  took  a fur- 

P t0  undermine  hls  ch>ef’s  position.  He  inspired 
a mahdous  smear  campaign  against  General  Groener 

hJhlTh  M that  he  was  to°  iU  to  remain  in  office,  that 
he  bad  become  a convert  to  Marxism  and  even  to  pacifism 

thf  procla™lng  ‘hat  the  Defense  Minister  had  disgraced 
the  Army  by  having  a child  born  five  months  after  his 
recent  marriage— the  baby,  he  told  Hindenburg,  had  been 
nicknamed  Nurmi”  in  Army  circles,  after  the  fleet  Fin- 
nish runner  of  Olympic  fame. 

♦JVa6  “^hme,  Schleicher  renewed  his  contacts  with 
the  S LA.  He  held  talks  with  both  Roehm,  the  S.A  chief 

Anndri|C^ntrV0KKH,elId0rf’  the  SA-  leader  of  Berlin.  On 
Ap™  2.6>  Goebbels  noted  that  Schleicher  had  informed 

»eIId0^,he . wanted  to  change  his  course.”  Two  days 

“d  «■-** <£ 

Evfn.  at  this  sta8e  °f  the  game  it  is  evident  that  with 
regard  to  one  question  Roehm  and  Schleicher  were  con- 
spiring behind  Hitler’s  back.  Both  men  wanted  the  SA 
mcorporated  into  the  Army  as  a militia,  a step  to  which 
the  Fuehrer  was  unalterably  opposed.  This  was  a matter 
over  which  Hitler  had  often  quarreled  with  his  S.A.  chief 

^ the  *torm  troopers  as  a potential  military 
force  to  strengthen  the  country,  whereas  Hitler  regarded 
them  as  purely  a political  force,  a band  to  strike  terror  in 
the  streets  against  his  political  opponents  and  to  keep  up 
political  enthusiasm  in  the  Nazi  ranks.  But  in  his  con- 
versations  with  the  Nazi  leaders,  Schleicher  had  another 
objective  m mind.  He  wanted  the  S.A.  attached  to  the 
Army  where  he  could  control  it;  but  he  also  wanted  Hit- 
er,  the  only  conservative  nationalist  with  any  mass  fol- 
lowmg  in  the  government— where  he  could  control  him. 
The  Verbot  of  the  S.A  hindered  progress  toward  both 
objectives. 

By  the  end  of  the  first  week  of  May  1932,  Schleicher’s 
‘nntrlgues  reached  one  of  their  climaxes.  Goebbels  notes 
on  May  4 that  Hitler’s  mines  are  beginning  to  go  off. 
Fu-st  Groener  and  then  Bruening  must  go.”  On  May  8, 
Goebbels  reported  in  his  diary,  Hitler  had  a “decisive 
conference  with  General  Schleicher  and  with  some  gentle- 


227 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

men  close  to  the  President.  Everything  goes  well.  Bruening 
will  fall  in  a few  days.  The  President  will  withdraw  his 
confidence  in  him.”  He  then  outlines  the  plan  which  Schlei- 
cher and  the  President’s  camarilla  had  hatched  with  Hitler: 
The  Reichstag  will  be  dissolved,  a presidential  cabinet  will 
be  installed  and  all  prohibitions  against  the  S.A.  and  the 
Nazi  Party  lifted.  To  avoid  arousing  Bruening’s  suspicion 
of  what  is  up,  Goebbels  adds,  Hitler  will  keep  away  from 
Berlin.  Late  that  evening  he  spirits  his  chief  away  to 
Mecklenburg  and  into  virtual  hiding. 

For  the  Nazis,  the  presidential  cabinet  is  regarded, 
Goebbels  notes  the  next  day,  as  merely  an  “interim”  affair. 
Such  a “colorless”  transitional  government,  he  says,  “will 
clear  the  way  for  us.  The  weaker  it  is  the  easier  we  can 
do  away  with  it.”  This,  of  course,  is  not  the  view  of 
Schleicher,  who  already  is  dreaming  of  a new  government 
which  will  dispense  with  Parliament  until  the  constitution 
can  be  changed  and  which  he  will  dominate.  Already,  it 
is  clear,  he  and  Hitler  believe  they  can  each  get  the  best 
of  the  other.  But  for  the  moment  he  has  an  ace  to  play. 
He  can  assure  the  tired  old  President  that  he  can  offer 
what  Bruening  could  not:  a government  supported  by 
Hitler  and  yet  without  the  inconvenience  of  having  the 
fanatical  demagogue  in  it. 

So  all  was  ready,  and  on  May  10,  two  days  after  his 
meeting  with  Hitler  and  the  men  around  Hindenburg, 
Schleicher  struck.  The  blow  was  delivered  at  the  Reichstag. 
General  Groener  rose  to  defend  the  banning  of  the  S.A. 
and  was  violently  attacked  by  Goering.  Ill  with  diabetes 
and  sick  at  heart  at  the  treachery  already  wrought  by 
Schleicher,  the  Defense  Minister  tried  to  defend  himself  as 
best  he  could  but  he  was  overwhelmed  by  a torrent  of 
abuse  from  the  Nazi  benches.  Exhausted  and  humiliated, 
he  started  to  leave  the  chamber,  only  to  run  into  General 
von  Schleicher,  who  informed  him  coldly  that  he  “no 
longer  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Army  and  must 
resign.”  Groener  appealed  to  Hindenburg,  for  whom  he  had 
loyally  fronted — and  taken  the  blame — when  the  crucial 
moment  had  come,  first,  in  1918,  to  tell  the  Kaiser  to  go, 
and  then,  in  1919,  to  advise  the  republican  government  to 
sign  the  Versailles  Treaty.  But  the  old  Field  Marshal,  who 
had  never  ceased  resenting  his  obligation  to  the  younger 
officer,  replied  that  he  “regretted”  he  could  do  nothing 


228  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

in  the  matter.  On  May  13,  bitter  and  disillusioned  * 
Groener  resigned.  That  evening  Goebbels  recorded  in  his 
diary:  We  have  news  from  General  Schleicher.  Every- 
thing is  going  according  to  plan.” 

The  plan  called  for  Bruening’s  head  next,  and  it  was 
not  long  before  the  conniving  General  was  able  to  slip  it 
on  the  block.  Groener’s  fall  had  been  a grave  setback  for 
the  tottering  Republic;  almost  alone  among  the  military 
men  he  had  served  it  ably  and  devotedly,  and  there  was 
no  one  else  in  the  Army  of  his  stature  and  loyalty  to  re- 
place him.  But  the  stubborn,  hard-working  Bruening  was 
still  a power.  He  had  secured  the  backing  of  the  majority 
of  Germans  for  Hindenburg’s  re-election  and,  as  he  be- 
lieved, for  the  continuance  of  the  Republic.  He  seemed 
to  be  on  the  eve  of  sensational  successes  in  foreign  policy 
with  regard  to  both  the  cancellation  of  reparations  and 
equality  of  armament  for  the  Reich.  But  the  aging  Presi- 
dent, as  we  have  seen,  had  rewarded  with  a remarkable 
coolness  the  Chancellor’s  superhuman  efforts  in  winning 
mm  a further  term  of  office.  His  attitude  became  more 
tngid  when  Bruening  proposed  that  the  State  take  over  a 
number  of  bankrupt  Junker  estates  in  East  Prussia,  after 
generous  compensation,  and  give  them  to  the  landless 
peasants.  When  Hindenburg  went  off  for  the  Easter  holi- 
days at  the  middle  of  May  to  Neudeck,  the  East  Prussian 
estate  which  the  Junkers,  with  the  financial  help  of  the 
industrialists,  had  given  him  as  a present  on  his  eightieth 
birthday,  he  got  an  earful  from  his  aristocratic  neighbors 
who  clamored  for  the  dismissal  of  a Chancellor  whom 
they  now  called  “an  agrarian  Bolshevist.” 

The  Nazis,  undoubtedly  through  Schleicher,  learned  be- 
fore  Bruening  that  the  Chancellor  was  on  his  way,  out. 
On  May  18  Goebbels  returned  from  Munich  to  Berlin 
and,  noting  that  the  “Easter  spirit”  was  still  lingering, 
wrote  in  his  diary:  “For  Bruening  alone  winter  seems  to 
have  set  in.  The  funny  thing  is  he  doesn’t  realize  it.  He 
can  t find  men  for  his  cabinet.  The  rats  are  leaving  the 
sinking  ship.  ’ It  might  have  been  more  accurate  to  say 
that  the  leading  rat,  far  from  leaving  the  sinking  ship  of 

r ''S™v  and  rage  boil  within  me,”  Groener  wrote  Schleicher  a few  months 
later  (November  -9),  because  I have  been  deceived  in  you  my  old  friend 
disciple,  adopted  son.”  (See  Gordon  A.  Craig,  “Reichswehr  and  Nat  onai 
jSne  mil)  P°liCy  °f  Wi'helm  Groener / Political  Spence  Quarler^] 


229 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

state,  was  merely  making  ready  to  put  in  a new  captain. 
The  next  day  Goebbels  recorded:  “General  Schleicher  has 
refused  to  take  over  the  Ministry  of  Defense.”  This  was 
true  but  also  not  quite  accurate.  Bruening  had  indeed  made 
the  request  of  Schleicher  after  upbraiding  him  for  un- 
dermining Groener.  “I  will,”  Schleicher  had  replied,  “but 
not  in  your  government.”  5 

On  May  19  Goebbels’  diary  recorded:  “Message  from 
Schleicher.  The  list  of  ministers  is  ready.  For  the  transition 
period  it  is  not  so  important.”  Thus  at  least  a week  in 
advance  of  Bruening  the  Nazis  knew  his  goose  was  cooked. 
On  Sunday,  May  29,  Hindenburg  summoned  Bruening  to 
his  presence  and  abruptly  asked  for  his  resignation,  and  on 
the  following  day  it  was  given  him. 

Schleicher  had  triumphed.  But  not  only  Bruening  had 
fallen;  the  democratic  Republic  went  down  with  him, 
though  its  death  agonies  would  continue  for  another  eight 
months  before  the  final  coup  de  grdce  was  administered. 
Bruening’s  responsibility  for  its  demise  was  not  small. 
Though  democratic  at  heart,  he  had  allowed  himself  to  be 
maneuvered  into  a position  where  he  had  perforce  to 
rule  much  of  the  time  by  presidential  decree  without  the 
consent  of  Parliament.  The  provocation  to  take  such  a 
step  admittedly  had  been  great;  the  politicians  in  their 
blindness  had  made  it  all  but  inevitable.  As  recently  as 
May  12,  though,  he  had  been  able  to  win  a vote  of  con- 
fidence in  the  Reichstag  for  his  finance  bill.  But  where 
Parliament  could  not  agree  he  had  relied  on  the  authority 
of  the  President  to  govern.  Now  that  authority  had  been 
withdrawn.  From  now  on,  from  June  1932  to  January 
1933,  it  would  be  granted  to  two  lesser  men  who,  though 
not  Nazis,  felt  no  urge  to  uphold  a democratic  Republic, 
at  least  as  it  was  presently  constituted. 

The  political  power  in  Germany  no  longer  resided,  as  it 
had  since  the  birth  of  the  Republic,  in  the  people  and  in 
the  body  which  expressed  the  people’s  will,  the  Reichstag. 
It  was  now  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a senile,  eighty- 
five-year-old  President  and  in  those  of  a few  shallow  ambi- 
tious men  around  him  who  shaped  his  weary,  wandering 
mind.  Hitler  saw  this  very  clearly,  and  it  suited  his  pur- 
poses. It  seemed  most  unlikely  that  he  would  ever  win  a 
majority  in  Parliament.  Hindenburg’s  new  course  offered 


230 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

him  the  only  opportunity  that  was  left  of  coming  to 
power.  Not  at  the  moment,  to  be  sure,  but  soon. 

He  hurried  back  to  Berlin  from  Oldenburg,  where  on 
May.  29  the  Nazis  had  won  an  absolute  majority  in  the 
election  for  the  local  diet.  The  next  day  he  was  received 
by  Hindenburg,  who  confirmed  the  points  of  the  deal  which 
the  Nazi  leader  had  secretly  worked  out  with  Schleicher 
on  May  8:  the  lifting  of  the  ban  on  the  S.A.,  a presi- 
dential cabinet  of  Hindenburg’s  own  choosing,  dissolution 
of  the  Reichstag.  Would  Hitler  support  the  new  govern- 
ment?  Hindenburg  asked.  Hitler  replied  that  he  would. 
That  evening  of  May  30,  the  Goebbels*  diary  was  brought 
up  to  date.:  Hitler’s  talk  with  the  President  went  well 
V-  Papen  is  spoken  of  as  Chancellor.  But  that  interests  us 
httle.  The  important  thing  is  that  the  Reichstag  is  dis- 
solved. Elections!  Elections!  Direct  to  the  people!  We  are 
all  very  happy.”  6 

FIASCO  OF  FRANZ  VON  PAPEN 

There  now  appeared  briefly  on  the  center  of  the  stage  an 
unexpected  and  ludicrous  figure.  The  man  whom  General 
von  Schleicher  foisted  upon  the  octogenarian  President  and 
who  on  June  1,  1932,  was  named  Chancellor  of  Germany 
was  the  fifty-three-year-old  Franz  von  Papen,  scion  of  an 
impoverished  family  of  the  Westphalian  nobility,  a former 
General  Staff  officer,  a crack  gentleman  rider,  an  un- 
successful and  amateurish  Catholic  Centrist  politician  a 
wealthy  industrialist  by  marriage  and  little  known  to  the 
public  except  as  a former  military  attache  in  Washington 
who  had  been  expelled  during  the  war  for  complicity  in 
the  planning  of  such  sabotage  as  blowing  up  bridges  and 
railroad  lines  while  the  United  States  was  neutral. 

“The  President’s  choice  met  with  incredulity,”  wrote  the 
French  ambassador  in  Berlin.  “No  one  but  smiled  or 
tittered  or  laughed  because  Papen  enjoyed  the  peculiarity 
of  being  taken  seriously  by  neither  his  friends  nor  his 
enemies  . . . He  was  reputed  to  be  superficial,  blunder- 
mg,  untrue,  ambitious,  vain,  crafty  and  an  intriguer.” 7 
To  such  a man — and  M.  Fran?ois-Poncet  was  not  exag- 
gerating Hindenburg,  at  Schleicher’s  prompting,  had  en- 
trusted the  fate  of  the  floundering  Republic. 

Papen  had  no  political  backing  whatsoever.  He  was  not 


231 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

even  a member  of  the  Reichstag.  The  furthest  he  had  got 
in  politics  was  a seat  in  the  Prussian  Landtag.  On  his  ap- 
pointment as  Chancellor  his  own  Center  Party,  indignant 
at  the  treachery  of  Papen  toward  its  leader,  Bruening, 
unanimously  expelled  him  from  the  party.  But  the  Presi- 
dent had  told  him  to  form  a government  above  parties,  and 
this  he  was  able  to  do  at  once  because  Schleicher  already 
had  a list  of  ministers  at  hand.  It  comprised  what  became 
known  as  the  “barons’  cabinet.”  Five  members  were  of  the 
nobility,  two  were  corporation  directors,  and  one,  Franz 
Guertner,  named  Minister  of  Justice,  had  been  Hitler’s 
protector  in  the  Bavarian  government  during  the  troubled 
days  before  and  after  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch.  General  von 
Schleicher  was  smoked  out  by  Hindenburg  from  his  pre- 
ferred position  behind  the  scenes  and  made  Minister  of 
Defense.  The  “barons’  cabinet”  was  received  by  much  of 
the  country  as  a joke,  though  the  stamina  of  a number 
of  its  members,  Baron  von  Neurath,  Baron  von  Eltz-Ru- 
benach,  Count  Schwerin  von  Krosigk  and  Dr.  Guertner, 
was  such  that  they  lingered  on  at  their  posts  far  into  the 
era  of  the  Third  Reich. 

Papen’s  first  act  was  to  honor  Schleicher’s  pact  with 
Hitler.  On  June  4 he  dissolved  the  Reichstag  and  con- 
voked new  elections  for  July  31,  and  after  some  prodding 
from  the  suspicious  Nazis,  he  lifted  the  ban  on  the  S.A. 
on  June  15.  A wave  of  political  violence  and  murder  such 
as  even  Germany  had  not  previously  seen  immediately 
followed.  The  storm  troopers  swarmed  the  streets  seeking 
battle  and  blood  and  their  challenge  was  often  met,  es- 
pecially by  the  Communists.  In  Prussia  alone  between 
June  1 and  20  there  were  461  pitched  battles  in  the  streets 
which  cost  eighty-two  lives  and  seriously  wounded  four 
hundred  men.  In  July,  thirty-eight  Nazis  and  thirty  Com- 
munists were  listed  among  the  eighty-six  persons  killed 
in  riots.  On  Sunday,  July  10,  eighteen  persons  were  done 
to  death  in  the  streets,  and  on  the  following  Sunday,  when 
the  Nazis,  under  police  escort,  staged  a march  through 
Altona,  a working-class  suburb  of  Hamburg,  nineteen  per- 
sons were  shot  dead  and  285  wounded.  The  civil  war 
which  the  barons’  cabinet  had  been  called  in  to  halt  was 
growing  steadily  worse.  All  the  parties  save  the  Nazis  and 
the  Communists  demanded  that  the  government  take  ac- 
tion to  restore  order. 


232 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Papen  responded  by  doing  two  things.  He  banned  all 
political  parades  for  the  fortnight  prior  to  the  July  31  elec- 
tions. And  he  took  a step  which  was  aimed  not  only  at 
placating  the  Nazis  but  at  destroying  one  of  the  few  re- 
maining pillars  of  the  democratic  Republic.  On  July  20 
he  deposed  the  Prussian  government  and  appointed  him- 
self Reich  Commissioner  for  Prussia.  This  was  a daring 
move  toward  the  kind  of  authoritarian  government  he  was 
seeking  for  the  whole  of  Germany.  Papen’s  excuse  was 
that  the  Altona  riots  had  shown  the  Prussian  government 
could  not  maintain  law  and  order.  He  also  charged  on 
“evidence”  hastily  produced  by  Schleicher,  that  the  Prus- 
sian authorities  were  in  cahoots  with  the  Communists. 
When  the  Socialist  ministers  refused  to  be  deposed  except 
by  force,  Papen  obligingly  supplied  it. 

Martial  law  was  proclaimed  in  Berlin  and  General  von 
Rundstedt,  the  local  Reichswehr  commander,  sent  a 
lieutenant  and  a dozen  men  to  make  the  necessary  arrests. 
This  was  a development  which  was  not  lost  on  the  men 
of  the  Right  who  had  taken  over  the  federal  power,  nor 
did  it  escape  Hitler  s notice.  There  was  no  need  to  worry 
any  longer  that  the  forces  of  the  Left  or  even  of  the 
democratic  center  would  put  up  serious  resistance  to  the 
overthrow  of  the  democratic  system.  In  1920  a general 
strike  had  saved  the  Republic  from  being  overthrown.  Such 
a measure  was  debated  now  among  the  trade-union  leaders 
and  the  Socialists  and  rejected  as  too  dangerous.  Thus  by 
deposing  the  constitutional  Prussian  government  Papen 
had  driven  another  nail  into  the  coffin  of  the  Weimar  Re- 
public. It  had  taken,  as  he  boasted,  only  a squad  of  soldiers 
to  do  it. 

For  their  part.  Hitler  and  his  lieutenants  were  deter- 
mined to  bring  down  not  only  the  Republic  but  Papen 
and  his  barons  too.  Goebbels  expressed  the  aim  in  his 
diary  on  June  5:  “We  must  disassociate  ourselves  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  from  this  transitional  bourgeois 
cabinet.”  When  Papen  saw  Hitler  for  the  first  time  on 
June  9,  the  Nazi  leader  told  him,  “I  regard  your  cabinet 
only  as  a temporary  solution  and  will  continue  my  efforts 
to  make  my  party  the  strongest  in  the  country.  The 
chancellorship  will  then  devolve  on  me.”8 

The  Reichstag  elections  of  July  31  were  the  third  na- 


233 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

tional  elections  held  in  Germany  within  five  months,  but, 
far  from  being  weary  from  so  much  electioneering,  the 
Nazis  threw  themselves  into  the  campaign  with  more  fa- 
naticism and  force  than  ever  before.  Despite  Hitler’s 
promise  to  Hindenburg  that  the  Nazis  would  support  the 
Papen  government,  Goebbels  unleashed  bitter  attacks  on 
the  Minister  of  the  Interior  and  as  early  as  July  9 Hitler 
went  to  Schleicher  and  complained  bitterly  of  the  govern- 
ment’s policies.  From  the  size  of  the  crowds  that  turned 
out  to  see  Hitler  it  was  evident  that  the  Nazis  were  gain- 
ing ground.  In  one  day,  July  27,  he  spoke  to  60,000  per- 
sons in  Brandenburg,  to  nearly  as  many  in  Potsdam,  and 
that  evening  to  120,000  massed  in  the  giant  Grunewald 
Stadium  in  Berlin  while  outside  an  additional  100,000 
heard  his  voice  by  loudspeaker. 

The  polling  on  July  31  brought  a resounding  victory  for 
the  National  Socialist  Patty.  With  13,745,000  votes,  the 
Nazis  won  230  seats  in  the  Reichstag,  making  them  easily 
the  largest  party  in  Parliament  though  still  far  short  of  a 
majority  in  a house  of  608  members.  The  Social  Demo- 
crats, no  doubt  because  of  the  timidity  shown  by  their 
leaders  in  Prussia,  lost  ten  seats  and  were  reduced  to  133. 
The  working  class  was  swinging  over  to  the  Communists, 
who  gained  12  seats  and  became  the  third  largest  party, 
with  89  members  in  the  Reichstag.  The  Catholic  Center 
increased  its  strength  somewhat,  from  68  to  73  seats, 
but  the  other  middle-class  parties  and  even  Hugenberg’s 
German  National  Party,  the  only  one  which  had  supported 
Papen  in  the  election,  were  overwhelmed.  Except  for  the 
Catholics,  the  middle  and  upper  classes,  it  was  evident, 
had  gone  over  to  the  Nazis. 

On  August  2 Hitler  took  stock  on  his  triumph  at 
Tegernsee,  near  Munich,  where  he  conferred  with  his 
party  leaders.  Since  the  last  Reichstag  elections  two  years 
before,  the  National  Socialists  had  gained  over  seven  mil- 
lion votes  and  increased  their  representation  in  Parliament 
from  107  to  230.  In  the  four  years  since  the  1928  elec- 
tions, the  Nazis  had  won  some  thirteen  million  new  votes. 
Yet  the  majority  which  would  sweep  the  party  into  power 
still  eluded  Hitler.  He  had  won  only  37  per  cent  of  the 
total  vote.  The  majority  of  Germans  was  still  against  him. 

Far  into  the  night  he  deliberated  with  his  lieutenants. 
Goebbels  recorded  the  results  in  his  diary  entry  of  August 


234 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

2:  “The  Fuehrer  faces  difficult  decisions.  Legal?  With 
the  Center?  ’ With  the  Center  the  Nazis  could  form  a 
majority  in  the  Reichstag.  But  to  Goebbels  this  is  “un- 
thinkable. Still,  he  notes,  “the  Fuehrer  comes  to  no 
final  decision.  The  situation  will  take  a little  time  to  ripen.” 

But  not  much.  Hitler,  flushed  with  his  victory,  though 
it  was  less  than  decisive,  was  impatient.  On  August  4 he 
hurried  to  Berlin  to  see  not  Chancellor  von  Papen  but 
General  von  Schleicher,  and,  as  Goebbels  noted,  “to’  pre- 
sent his  demands.  They  will  not  be  too  moderate,”  he 
added.  On  August  5,  at  the  Fuerstenberg  barracks  near 
Berlin,  Hitler  outlined  his  terms  to  General  von  Schleicher 
the  chancellorship  for  himself;  and  for  his  party,  the 
premiership  of  Prussia,  the  Reich  and  Prussian  Ministries 
of  Interior,  the  Reich  Ministries  of  Justice,  Economy,  and 
Aviation,  and  a new  ministry  for  Goebbels,  that  of  Popular 
Enlightenment  and  Propaganda.  As  a sop  to  Schleicher, 
Hitler  promised  him  the  Defense  Ministry.  Furthermore, 
Hitler  said  he  would  demand  an  enabling  act  from  the 
Reichstag  authorizing  him  to  rule  by  decree  for  a specified 
period;  if  it  were  refused,  the  Reichstag  would  be  “sent 
home.” 

Hitler  left  the  meeting  convinced  that  he  had  won  over 
Schleicher  to  his  program  and  hurried  south  in  good  spirits 
to  his  mountain  retreat  on  the  Obersalzberg.  Goebbels,  al- 
ways cynical  in  regard  to  the  opposition  and  always  dis- 
trustful of  the  political  General,  was  not  so  sure.  “It  is 
well  to  be  skeptical  about  further  developments,”  he  con- 
fided to  his  diary  on  August  6 after  he  had  listened  to 
the  Leader’s  optimistic  report  of  his  meeting  with 
Schleicher.  Goebbels  was  sure  of  one  thing,  though: 
“Once  we  have  the  power  we  will  never  give  it  up.  They 
will  have  to  carry  our  dead  bodies  out  of  the  ministries.” 

All  was  not  as  well  as  Hitler  seemed  to  think.  On  Au- 
gust 8 Goebbels  wrote:  “Telephone  call  from  Berlin.  It  is 
full  of  rumors.  The  whole  party  is  ready  to  take  over 
power.  The  S.A.  men  are  leaving  their  places  of  work  in 
order  to  make  themselves  ready.  The  party  leaders  are 
preparing  for  the  great  hour.  If  all  goes  well,  fine.  If 
things  go  badly  there  will  be  a terrible  setback.”  The  next 
day  Strasser,  Frick  and  Funk  arrived  at  Obersalzberg  with 
news  that  was  not  exactly  encouraging.  Schleicher  was 
turning  again,  like  a worm.  He  was  now  insisting  that  if 


235 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

Hitler  got  the  chancellorship  he  must  rule  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  Reichstag.  Funk  reported  that  his  business 
friends  were  worried  about  the  prospects  of  a Nazi  govern- 
ment. He  had  a message  from  Schacht  confirming  it.  Fi- 
nally, the  Wilhelmstrasse,  the  trio  told  Hitler,  was  wor- 
ried about  a Nazi  putsch. 

This  worry  was  not  without  foundation.  Next  day,  Au- 
gust 10,  Goebbels  learned  that  in  Berlin  the  S.A.  was  “in 
a state  of  armed  readiness  . . . The  S.A.  is  throwing  an 
ever  stronger  ring  around  Berlin  . . . The  Wilhelmstrasse 
is  very  nervous  about  it.  But  that  is  the  point  of  our 
mobilization.”  On  the  following  day  the  Fuehrer  could 
stand  the  waiting  no  longer.  He  set  out  by  motorcar  for 
Berlin.  He  would  make  himself  “scarce”  there,  Goebbels 
says,  but  on  the  other  hand  he  would  be  ready  when  he 
was  called.  When  the  call  did  not  come  he  himself  re- 
quested to  see  the  President.  But  first  he  had  to  see 
Schleicher  and  Papen. 

This  interview  took  place  at  noon  on  August  13.  It  was 
a stormy  one.  Schleicher  had  slid  away  from  his  position 
of  a week  before.  He  supported  Papen  in  insisting  that  the 
most  Hitler  could  hope  for  was  the  vice-chancellorship. 
Hitler  was  outraged.  He  must  be  Chancellor  or  nothing. 
Papen  terminated  the  interview  by  saying  he  would  leave 
the  “final  decision”  up  to  Hindenburg.* 

Hitler  retired  in  a huff  to  the  nearby  Kaiserhof.  There 
at  3 p.m.  a phone  call  came  from  the  President’s  office. 
Someone — probably  Goebbels,  judging  from  his  diary — 
asked,  “Has  a decision  already  been  made?  If  so,  there  is 
no  point  in  Hitler’s  coming  over.”  The  President,  the 
Nazis  were  told,  “wishes  first  to  speak  to  Hitler.” 

The  aging  Field  Marshal  received  the  Nazi  leader  stand- 
ing up  and  leaning  on  his  cane  in  his  study,  thus  setting 
the  icy  tone  for  the  interview.  For  a man  in  his  eighty- 
fifth  year  who  only  ten  months  before  had  suffered  a com- 
plete mental  relapse  lasting  more  than  a week,  Hindenburg 
was  in  a surprisingly  lucid  frame  of  mind.  He  listened 
patiently  while  Hitler  reiterated  his  demand  for  the 
chancellorship  and  full  power.  Otto  von  Meissner,  chief 
of  the  Presidential  Chancellery,  and  Goering,  who  had 


* Papen,  in  his  memoirs,  does  not  mention  Schleicher's  presence  at  this  meet- 
ing, but  it  is  clear  from  other  sources  that  he  was  there.  It  is  an  important 
point,  in  view  of  subsequent  events. 


236 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

accompanied  Hitler,  were  the  only  witnesses  to  the  con- 
versation, and  though  Meissner  is  not  a completely  de- 
pendable source,  his  affidavit  at  Nuremberg  is  the  only 
firsthand  testimony  in  existence  of  what  followed.  It  has 
a ring  of  truth. 

Hindenburg  replied  that  because  of  the  tense  situation  he 
could  not  in  good  conscience  risk  transferring  the  power  of 
government  to  a new  party  such  as  the  National  Socialists, 
which  did  not  command  a majority  and  which  was  in- 
tolerant, noisy  and  undisciplined. 

At  this  point,  Hindenburg,  with  a certain  show  of  excite- 
ment, referred  to  several  recent  occurrences — clashes  be- 
tween the  Nazis  and  the  police,  acts  of  violence  committed 
by  Hitler’s  followers  against  those  who  were  of  a different 
opinion,  excesses  against  Jews  and  other  illegal  acts.  All 
these  incidents  had  strengthened  him  in  his  conviction  that 
there  were  numerous  wild  elements  in  the  Party  beyond  con- 
trol . . . After  extended  discussion  Hindenburg  proposed  to 
Hitler  that  he  should  declare  himself  ready  to  co-operate 
with  the  other  parties,  in  particular  with  the  Right  and 
Center,  and  that  he  should  give  up  the  one-sided  idea  that 
he  must  have  complete  power.  In  co-operating  with  other 
parties,  Hindenburg  declared,  he  would  be  able  to  show 
what  he  could  achieve  and  improve  upon.  If  he  could  show 
positive  results,  he  would  acquire  increasing  and  even 
dominating  influence  even  in  a coalition  government.  Hin- 
denburg stated  that  this  also  would  be  the  best  way  to  elimi- 
nate the  widespread  fear  that  a National  Socialist  govern- 
ment would  make  ill  use  of  its  power  and  would  suppress 
all  other  viewpoints  and  gradually  eliminate  them.  Hinden- 
burg stated  that  he  was  ready  to  accept  Hitler  and  the 
representatives  of  his  movement  in  a coalition  government, 
the  precise  combination  to  be  a matter  of  negotiation,  but 
that  he  could  not  take  the  responsibility  of  giving  exclusive 
power  to  Hitler  alone  . . Hitler  was  adamant,  however,  in 

refusing  to  put  himself  in  the  position  of  bargaining  with 
the  leaders  of  the  other  parties  and  in  such  manner  to  form 
a coalition  government.9 

The  discussion,  then,  ended  without  agreement,  but  not 
before  the  old  President,  still  standing,  had  delivered  a 
stern  lecture^  to  the  Nazi  leader.  In  the  words  of  the  official 
communique  issued  immediately  afterward,  Hindenburg 
regretted  that  Herr  Hitler  did  not  see  himself  in  a position 
to  support  a national  government  appointed  with  the  con- 


237 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

fidence  of  the  Reich  President,  as  he  had  agreed  to  do 
before  the  Reichstag  elections.”  In  the  view  of  the  ven- 
erable President,  Hitler  had  broken  his  word,  but  let  him 
beware  of  the  future.  “The  President,”  the  communique 
stated  further,  “gravely  exhorted  Herr  Hitler  to  conduct 
the  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  N.S.  Party  in  a chivalrous 
manner  and  to  bear  in  mind  his  responsibility  to  the 
Fatherland  and  to  the  German  people.” 

The  communique  giving  Hindenburg’s  version  of  the 
meeting  and  insisting  that  Hitler  had  demanded  “com- 
plete control  of  the  State”  was  published  in  such  a hurry 
that  it  caught  Goebbels’  propaganda  machine  napping  and 
did  much  harm  to  Hitler’s  cause,  not  only  among  the 
general  public  but  among  the  Nazis  themselves.  In  vain 
did  Hitler  respond  that  he  had  not  asked  for  “complete 
power”  but  only  for  the  chancellorship  and  a few  minis- 
tries. Hindenburg’s  word  was  generally  accepted, 

In  the  meantime,  the  mobilized  storm  troopers  were 
chafing  at  the  bit.  Hitler  called  in  their  leaders  and  spoke 
to  them  that  same  evening.  “It’s  a difficult  task,”  Goeb- 
bels noted.  “Who  knows  if  their  formations  can  be  held 
together?  Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to  tell  victory- 
flushed  troops  that  victory  has  been  snatched  out  of  their 
hand.”  Late  that  night  the  little  Doktor  sought  consolation 
in  the  reading  of  the  letters  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Next 
day  he  raced  off  for  a vacation  on  the  beaches  of  the 
Baltic.  “Great  hopelessness  reigns  among  the  party  com- 
rades,” he  wrote.  He  declined  to  leave  his  room  even  to 
speak  with  them.  “I  don’t  want  to  hear  about  politics  for  at 
least  a week.  I want  only  sun,  light,  air  and  peace.” 

Hitler  retired  to  the  Obersalzberg  to  imbibe  the  same 
elements  and  ponder  the  immediate  future.  As  Goebbels 
said,  “the  first  big  chance  has  been  missed.”  Hermann 
Rauschning,  the  then  Nazi  leader  in  Danzig,  found  the 
Fuehrer  brooding  sullenly  on  his  mountaintop.  “We  must 
be  ruthless,”  Hitler  told  him,  and  launched  into  a tirade 
against  Papen.  But  he  had  not  lost  hope.  At  times  he  spoke 
as  if  he  were  already  Chancellor.  “My  task  is  more  dif- 
ficult thaa  Bismarck’s,”  he  said.  “I  must  first  create 
the  nation  before  even  beginning  to  tackle  the  national 
tasks  before  us.”  But  supposing  the  Nazis  were  suppressed 
by  a military  dictatorship  under  Papen  and  Schleicher? 
Hitler  abruptly  asked  Rauschning  whether  Danzig,  an  in- 


238 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

dependent  city-state  then  under  the  protection  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  had  an  extradition  agreement  with  Ger- 
many. Rauschning  did  not  at  first  understand  the  question, 
but  it  later  became  evident  that  Hitler  was  looking  for  a 
place  that  might  serve  as  an  asylum.12  In  his  diary  Goeb- 
bels  noted  “rumors  that  the  Fuehrer  is  to  be  arrested.” 
Yet  even  now,  after  his  rebuff  by  the  Reich  President 
and  the  government  of  Papen  and  Schleicher,  and  despite 
his  fears  that  his  party  might  be  outlawed,  he  was  deter- 
mined to  stick  to  his  path  of  “legality.”  He  squelched  all 
talk  of  a putsch  by  the  S.A.  Except  for  occasional  spells 
of  depression  he  remained  confident  that  he  would  achieve 
his  goal — not  by  force  and  scarcely  by  winning  a parlia- 
mentary majority,  but  by  the  means  which  had  carried 
Schleicher  and  Papen  to  the  top:  by  backstairs  intrigue,  a 
game  that  two  could  play. 

It  was  not  long  before  he  gave  an  example.  On  August 
25  Goebbels  conferred  with  Hitler  at  Berchtesgaden  and 
noted:  “We  have  got  into  touch  with  the  Center  Party,  if 
only  to  bring  pressure  on  our  opponents.”  Next  day  Goeb- 
bels was  back  in  Berlin,  where  he  found  that  Schleicher 
had  already  found  out  “about  our  feelers  to  the  Center.” 
On  the  following  day  he  went  to  see  the  General  just  to 
make  sure.  He  thought  Schleicher  appeared  worried  at  the 
prospect  of  Hitler  and  the  Catholic  Center  getting  to- 
gether, for  between  them  they  commanded  an  absolute 
majority  in  the  Reichstag.  As  to  Schleicher,  Goebbels 
wrote:  “I  don’t  know  what  is  genuine  or  false  in  him.” 

The  contacts  with  the  Center  Party,  though  never  in- 
tended, as  Goebbels  said,  to  be  much  more  than  a means 
of  applying  pressure  on  the  Papen  government,  paid  off 
in  a farcical  event  which  now  occurred  in  the  Reichstag 
and  which  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  the  cav- 
alryman Chancellor.  When  the  chamber  convened  on  Au- 
gust .30  the  Centrists  joined  the  Nazis  in  electing  Goering 
President  of  the  Reichstag.  For  the  first  time,  then,  a Na- 
tional Socialist  was  in  the  chair  when  the  Reichstag  re- 
convened on  September  12  to  begin  its  working  session. 
Goering  made  the  most  of  his  opportunity.  Chancellor  von 
Papen  had  obtained  in  advance  from  the  President  a 
decree  for  the  dissolution  of  the  chamber — the  first  time 
that  the  death  warrant  of  the  Reichstag  had  been  signed 
before  it  met  to  transact  business.  But  for  this  first  work- 


239 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

ing  session  he  neglected  to  bring  it  along.  He  had  with 
him  instead  a speech  outlining  the  program  of  his  govern- 
ment, having  been  assured  that  one  of  the  Nationalist 
deputies,  in  agreement  with  most  of  the  other  parties, 
would  object  to  a vote  on  the  expected  Communist  motion 
for  censure  of  the  government.  In  this  case  a single  ob- 
jection from  any  one  of  the  600-odd  members  was  enough 
to  postpone  a vote. 

When  Ernst  Torgler,  the  Communist  leader,  introduced 
his  motion  as  an  amendment  to  the  order  of  the  day,  how- 
ever, neither  a Nationalist  deputy  nor  any  other  rose  to 
object.  Finally  Frick  asked  for  a half  hour’s  adjournment 
on  behalf  of  the  Nazis. 

“The  situation  was  now  serious,”  Papen  says  in  his 
memoirs,  “and  I had  been  caught  unawares.”  He  sent 
a messenger  posthaste  to  the  Chancellery  to  fetch  the  dis- 
solution order. 

In  the  meantime  Hitler  conferred  with  his  parliamentary 
party  group  in  the  Reichstag  President’s  Palace  across  the 
street.  The  Nazis  were  in  a dilemma,  and  they  were  em- 
barrassed. The  Nationalists,  they  felt,  had  double-crossed 
them  by  not  moving  to  postpone  the  vote.  Now  Hitler’s 
party,  in  order  to  bring  down  the  Papen  government, 
would  have  to  vote-with  the  Communists  on  a Communist 
motion.  Hitler  decided  to  swallow  the  pill  of  such  an  un- 
savory association.  He  ordered  his  deputies  ta  vote  for 
the  Communist  amendment  and  overthrow  Papen  before 
the  Chancellor  could  dissolve  the  Reichstag.  To  accom- 
plish this,  of  course,  Goering,  as  presiding  officer,  would 
have  to  pull  some  fast  and  neat  tricks  of  parliamentary 
procedure.  The  former  air  ace,  a man  of  daring  and  of 
many  abilities,  as  he  was  to  prove  on  a larger  stage  later, 
was  equal  to  the  occasion. 

When  the  session  reconvened  Papen  appeared  with  the 
familiar  red  dispatch  case  which,  by  tradition,  carried  the 
dissolution  order  he  had  so  hastily  retrieved.  But  when 
he  requested  the  floor  to  read  it,  the  President  of  the 
Reichstag  managed  not  to  see  him,  though  Papen,  by  now 
red-faced,  was  on  his  feet  brandishing  the  paper  for  all  in 
the  assembly  to  see.  All  but  Goering.  His  smiling  face  was 
turned  the  other  way.  He  called  for  an  immediate  vote. 
By  now  Papen’s  countenance,  according  to  eyewitnesses, 
had  turned  from  red  to  white  with  anger.  He  strode  up 


240  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  the  President’s  rostrum  and  plunked  the  dissolution 
order  on  his  desk.  Goering  took  no  notice  of  it  and  ordered 
the  vote  to  proceed.  Papen,  followed  by  his  ministers,  none 
of  whom  were  members  of  the  chamber,  stalked  out.  The 
deputies  voted:  513  to  32  against  the  government.  Only 
then  did  Goering  notice  the  piece  of  paper  which  had 
been  thrust  so  angrily  on  his  desk.  He  read  it  to  the  as- 
sembly and  ruled  that  since  it  had  been  countersigned  by 
a Chancellor  who  already  had  been  voted  out  of  office  by 
a constitutional  majority  it  had  no  validity. 

Which  elements  in  Germany  gained  and  which  lost  by 
this  farcical  incident,  and  how  much,  was  not  immediately 
clear.  That  the  dandy,  Papen,  had  been  made  a joke  of 
there  was  no  doubt;  but  then  he  had  always  been  some- 
what of  a joke,  even,  as  Ambassador  Fran?ois-Poncet  said, 
to  his  friends.  That  the  Reichstag  had  shown  that  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  Germans  opposed  Hindenburg’s 
hand-picked  presidential  government  was  clear  enough. 
But  in  the  process  had  it  not  further  sapped  public  con- 
fidence in  the  parliamentary  system?  As  for  the  Nazis, 
had  they  not  again  shown  themselves  to  be  not  only  ir- 
responsible but  ready  to  connive  even  with  the  Communists 
to  achieve  their  ends?  Moreover,  were  the  citizens  not 
weary  of  elections  and  did  the  Nazis  not  face  losing 
votes  in  the  inevitable  new  election,  the  fourth  within  the 
year?  Gregor  Strasser  and  even  Frick  thought  that  they 
did,  and  that  such  a loss  might  be  disastrous  to  the  party. 
( Hitler,  however,  Goebbels  reported  that  same  evening, 
“was  beside  himself  with  joy.  Again  he  has  made  a clear, 
unmistakable  decision.” 

The  Reichstag  quickly  recognized  its  dissolution,  and 
new  elections  were  set  for  November  6.  For  the  Nazis  they 
presented  certain  difficulties.  For  one  thing,  as  Goebbels 
noted,  the  people  were  tired  of  political  speeches  and 
propaganda.  Even  the  party  workers,  as  he  admitted  in 
his  diary  of  October  15,  had  “become  very  nervous  as 
the  result  of  these  everlasting  elections.  They  are  over- 
worked . . Also  there  were  financial  difficulties.  Big 
business  and  big  finance  were  swinging  behind  Papen, 
who  had  given  them  certain  concessions.  They  were  be- 
coming increasingly  distrustful,  as  Funk  had  warned,  of 
Hitler’s  refusal  to  co-operate  with  Hindenburg  and  with 


241 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

what  seemed  to  them  his  growing  radicalism  and  his 
tendency  to  work  even  with  the  Communists,  as  the 
Reichstag  episode  had  shown.  Goebbels  took  notice  of  this 
in  his  diary  of  October  15:  “Money  is  extraordinarily  hard 
to  obtain.  All  the  gentlemen  of  ‘Property  and  Education’ 
are  standing  by  the  government.” 

A few  days  before  the  election  the  Nazis  had  joined  the 
Communists  in  staging  a strike  of  the  transport  workers 
in  Berlin,  a strike  disavowed  by  the  trade  unions  and  the 
Socialists.  This  brought  a further  drying  up  of  financial 
sources  among  the  businessmen  just  when  the  Nazi  Party 
needed  funds  most  to  make  a whirlwind  finish  in  the 
campaign.  Goebbels  noted  lugubriously  on  November  1 : 
“Scarcity  of  money  has  become  a chronic  illness  with  us. 
We  lack  enough  to  really  carry  out  a big  campaign.  Many 
bourgeois  circles  have  been  frightened  off  by  our  participa- 
tion in  the  strike.  Even  many  of  our  party  comrades  are 
beginning  to  have  their  doubts.”  On  November  5,  the 
eve  of  the  elections:  “Last  attack.  Desperate  drive  of  the 
party  against  defeat.  We  succeed  in  getting  10,000  marks 
at  the  last  minute.  This  will  be  thrown  into  the  campaign 
Saturday  afternoon.  We  have  done  everything  that  could 
be  done.  Now  let  fate  decide.” 

Fate,  and  the  German  electorate,  decided  on  November 
6 a number  of  things,  none  of  them  conclusive  for  the 
future  of  the  crumbling  Republic.  The  Nazis  lost  two  mil- 
lion votes  and  34  seats  in  the  Reichstag,  reducing  them 
to  196  deputies.  The  Communists  gained  three  quarters  of 
a million  votes  and  the  Social  Democrats  lost  the  same 
number,  with  the  result  that  the  Communist  seats  rose 
from  89  to  100  and  the  Socialist  seats  dropped  from  133 
to  121.  The  German  National  Party,  the  sole  one  which 
had  backed  the  government,  won  nearly  a million  addi- 
tional votes — obviously  from  the  Nazis — and  now  had  52 
seats  instead  of  37.  Though  the  National  Socialists  were 
still  the  largest  party  in  the  country,  the  loss  of  two  mil- 
lion votes  was  a severe  setback.  For  the  first  time  the 
great  Nazi  tide  was  ebbing,  and  from  a point  far  short 
of  a majority.  The  legend  of  invincibility  had  been  shat- 
tered. Hitler  was  in  a weaker  position  to  bargain  for  power 
than  he  had  been  since  July. 

Realizing  this,  Papen  put  aside  what  he  calls  his  “per- 
sonal distaste”  for  Hitler  and  wrote  him  a letter  on  No- 


242 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

vember  13  inviting  him  to  “discuss  the  situation.”  But 
Hitier  made  so  many  conditions  in  his  reply  that  Papen 
abandoned  all  hope  of  obtaining  an  understanding  with 
him.  The  Nazi  leader’s  intransigence  did  not  surprise  the 
breezy,  incompetent  Chancellor,  but  a new  course  which 
his  friend  and  mentor,  Schleicher,  now  proposed  did  sur- 
prise him.  For  the  slippery  kingmaker  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  Papen’s  usefulness,  like  that  of  Bruening 
before  him,  had  come  to  an  end.  New  plans  were  sprout- 
ing in  his  fertile  mind.  His  good  friend  Papen  must  go. 
The  President  must  be  left  completely  free  to  deal  with 
the  political  parties,  especially  with  the  largest.  He  urged 
Papen’s  resignation,  and  on  November  17  Papen  and  his 
cabinet  resigned.  Hindenburg  sent  immediately  for  Hitler. 

Their  meeting  on  November  19  was  less  frigid  than  that 
of  August  13.  This  time  the  President  offered  chairs  and 
allowed  his  caller  to  remain  for  over  an  hour.  Hindenburg 
presented  Hitler  with  two  choices:  the  chancellorship  if 
he  could  secure  a workable  majority  in  the  Reichstag  for 
a definite  program,  or  the  vice-chancellorship  under  Papen 
in  another  presidential  cabinet  that  would  rule  by  emer- 
gency decrees.  Hitler  saw  the  President  again  on  the 
twenty-first  and  he  also  exchanged  several  letters  with 
Meissner.  But  there  was  no  agreement.  Hitler  could  not 
get  a workable  majority  in  Parliament.  Though  the  Center 
Party  agreed  to  support  him  on  condition  that  he  would 
not  aspire  to  dictatorship,  Hugenberg  withheld  the  co- 
operation of  the  Nationalists.  Hitler  therefore  resumed  his 
demand  for  the  chancellorship  of  a presidential  govern- 
ment, but  this  the  President  would  not  give  him.  If  there 
was  to  be  a cabinet  governing  by  decree  Hindenburg  pre- 
ferred his  friend  Papen  to  head  it.  Hitler,  he  said  in  a 
letter  on  his  behalf  dispatched  by  Meissner,  could  not 
be  given  such  a post  “because  such  a cabinet  is  bound  to 
develop  into  a party  dictatorship.  . . . f cannot  take  the 
responsibility  for  this  before  my  oath  and  my  con- 
science.” 11 

The  old  Field  Marshal  was  more  prophetic  on  the  first 
point  than  on  the  second.  As  for  Hitler,  once  more  he 
had  knocked  on  the  door  of  the  Chancellery,  had  seen  it 
open  a crack  only  to  be  slammed  shut  in  his  face. 

This  was  just  what  Papen  had  expected,  and  when  he 
and  Schleicher  went  to  see  Hindenburg  on  the  evening  of 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  243 

December  1 he  was  sure  that  he  would  be  reappointed 
Chancellor.  Little  did  he  suspect  what  the  scheming 
General  had  been  up  to.  Schleicher  had  been  in  touch 
with  Strasser  and  had  suggested  that  if  the  Nazis  would 
not  come  into  a Papen  government  perhaps  they  would 
join  a cabinet  in  which  he  himself  were  Chancellor.  Hitler 
was  asked  to  come  to  Berlin  for  consultations  with  the 
General,  and  according  to  one  version  widely  publicized 
in  the  German  press  and  later  accepted  by  most  his- 
torians, the  Fuehrer  actually  took  the  night  train  to  Berlin 
from  Munich  but  was  hauled  off  in  the  dead  of  the  night 
by  Goering  at  Jena  and  spirited  away  to  Weimar  for  a 
meeting  of  the  top  Nazi  leaders.  Actually  the  Nazi  version 
of  this  incident  is,  surprisingly,  probably  the  more  ac- 
curate. Goebbels’  diary  for  November  30  recounts  that  a 
telegram  came  for  Hitler  asking  him  to  hurry  to  Berlin, 
but  that  he  decided  to  let  Schleicher  wait  while  he  con- 
ferred with  his  comrades  at  Weimar,  where  he  was  sched- 
uled to  open  the  campaign  for  the  Thuringian  elections. 
At  this  conference,  attended  by  the  Big  Five  leaders, 
Goering,  Goebbels,  Strasser,  Frick  and  Hitler,  on  Decem- 
ber 1,  there  was  considerable  disagreement.  Strasser,  sup- 
ported by  Frick,  urged  at  least  Nazi  toleration  of  a 
Schleicher  government,  though  he  himself  preferred  join- 
ing it.  Goering  and  Goebbels  argued  strenuously  against 
such  a course  and  Hitler  sided  with  them.  Next  day  Hitler 
advised  a certain  Major  Ott,  whom  Schleicher  had  sent  to 
him,  to  counsel  the  General  not  to  take  the  chancellorship, 
but  it  was  too  late. 

Papen  had  been  blandly  unaware  of  the  intrigue  which 
Schleicher  was  weaving  behind  his  back.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  meeting  with  the  President  on  December  1 he  had 
confidently  outlined  his  plans  for  the  future.  He  should 
continue  as  Chancellor,  rule  by  decree  and  let  the  Reich- 
stag go  hang  for  a while  until  he  could  “amend  the  con- 
stitution.” In  effect,  Papen  wanted  “amendments”  which 
would  take  the  country  back  to  the  days  of  the  empire 
and  re-establish  the  rule  of  the  conservative  classes.  At 
his  Nuremberg  trial  and  in  his  memoirs  he  admitted,  as 
indeed  he  did  to  the  Field  Marshal,  that  his  proposals 
involved  “a  breach  of  the  present  constitution  by  the 
President,”  but  he  assured  Hindenburg  that  “he  might  be 
justified  in  placing  the  welfare  of  the  nation  above  his 


244 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

oath  to  the  constitution,”  as,  he  added,  Bismarck  once 
had  done  “for  the  sake  of  the  country.” 13 

To  Papen’s  great  surprise,  Schleicher  broke  in  to  object. 
He  played  upon  the  aged  President’s  obvious  reluctance 
to  violate  his  oath  to  uphold  the  constitution,  if  it  could 
be  avoided — and  the  General  thought  it  could  He  be- 
heved  a government  which  could  command  a majority  in 
the  Reichstag  was  possible  if  he  himself  headed  it.  He 
was  sure  he  could  detach  Strasser  and  at  least  sixty  Nazi 
deputies  from  Hitler.  To  this  Nazi  fraction  he  could  add 
the  middle-class  parties  and  the  Social  Democrats.  He  even 
thought  the  trade  unions  would  support  him. 

Hindenburg  was  shocked  at  such  an  idea  and,  turning 
to  Papen,  asked  him  then  and  there  to  go  ahead  with  the 
forming  of  a new  government.  “Schleicher,”  says  Papen 
appeared  dumfounded.”  They  had  a long  argument  after 
they  had  left  the  President  but  could  reach  no  agreement. 
As  they  parted,  Schleicher,  in  the  famous  words  addressed 
to  Luther  as  he  set  out  for  the  fateful  Diet  of  Worms,  said 
to  Papen,  Little  Monk,  you  have  chosen  a difficult  path  ” 
How  difficult  it  was  Papen  learned  the  next  morning 
at  nine  o’clock  at  a cabinet  meeting  which  he  had  called. 

Schleicher  rose  [Papen  says]  and  declared  that  there 
was  no  possibility  of  carrying  out  the  directive  that  the 
President  had  given  me.  Any  attempt  to  do  so  would  re- 
duce the  country  to  chaos.  The  police  and  the  armed  serv- 
ices could  not  guarantee  to  maintain  transport  and  supply 
services  in  the  event  of  a general  strike,  nor  would  they  be 
able  to  ensure  law  and  order  in  the  event  of  a civil  war. 
The  General  Staff  had  made  a study  in  this  respect  and  he 
had  arranged  for  Major  Ott  [its  author]  to  place  himself 
at  the  Cabinet’s  disposal  and  present  a report.13 

Whereupon  the  General  produced  the  major.  If 
Schleicher  s remarks  had  shaken  Papen,  the  conveniently 
timed , report  of  Major  Eugen  Ott  (who  would  later  be 
Hitler  s ambassador  to  Tokyo)  demolished  him.  Ott 
simply  stated  that  “the  defense  of  the  frontiers  and  the 
maintenance  of  order  against  both  Nazis  and  Communists 
was  beyond  the  strength  of  the  forces  at  the  disposal  of 
the  federal  and  state  governments.  It  is  therefore  recom- 
mended that  the  Reich  government  should  abstain  from 
declaring  a state  of  emergency.”  14 


245 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

To  Papen’s  pained  surprise,  the  German  Army  which 
had  once  sent  the  Kaiser  packing  and  which  more  re- 
cently, at  Schleicher’s  instigation,  had  eliminated  General 
Groener  and  Chancellor  Bruening,  was  now  cashiering 
him.  He  went  immediately  to  Hindenburg  with  the  news, 
hoping  that  the  President  would  fire  Schleicher  as  Min- 
ister of  Defense  and  retain  Chancellor  Papen — and  in- 
deed proposing  that  he  do  so. 

“My  dear  Papen,”  the  stout  old  President  replied,  “you 
will  not  think  much  of  me  if  I change  my  mind.  But  1 
am  too  old  and  have  been  through  too  much  to  accept 
the  responsibility  for  a civil  war.  Our  only  hope  is  to  let 
Schleicher  try  his  luck.” 

“Two  great  tears,”  Papen  swears,  rolled  down  Hinden- 
burg’s  cheeks.  A few  hours  later,  as  the  deposed  Chancellor 
was  clearing  his  desk,  a photograph  of  the  President  ar- 
rived for  him  with  the  inscription,  "Ich  hatt’  einen 
Kameraden!”  The  next  day  the  President  wrote  him  in  his 
own  handwriting  of  the  “heavy  heart”  he  felt  in  relieving 
him  of  his  post  and  reiterating  that  his  confidence  in  him 
“remains  unshaken.”  That  was  true  and  would  shortly  be 
proved. 

On  December  2 Kurt  von  Schleicher  became  Chancel- 
lor, the  first  general  to  occupy  that  post  since  General 
Count  Georg  Leo  von  Caprivi  de  Caprara  de  Montecuc- 
coli,  who  had  succeeded  Bismarck  in  1890.  Schleicher’s 
tortuous  intrigues  had  at  last  brought  him  to  the  highest 
office  at  a moment  when  the  depression,  which  he  little 
understood,  was  at  its  height;  when  the  Weimar  Republic, 
which  he  had  done  so  much  to  undermine,  was  already 
crumbling;  when  no  one  any  longer  trusted  him,  not  even 
the  President,  whom  he  had  manipulated  so  long.  His  days 
on  the  heights,  it  seemed  obvious  to  almost  everyone  but 
himself,  were  strictly  numbered.  The  Nazis  were  sure  of  it. 
Goebbels’  diary  for  December  2 included  this  entry: 
“Schleicher  is  named  Chancellor.  He  won’t  last  long.” 

Papen  thought  so  too.  He  was  smarting  from  wounded 
vanity  and  thirsting  for  revenge  against  his  “friend  and 
successor,”  as  he  calls  him  in  his  memoirs.  To  get  Papen 
out  of  the  way  Schleicher  offered  him  the  Paris  embassy, 
but  he  declined.  The  President,  Papen  says,  wanted  him 
to  remain  in  Berlin  “within  reach.”  That  was  the  most 
strategic  place  to  weave  his  own  web  of  intrigues  against 


246 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  archintriguer.  Busy  and  agile  as  a spider,  Papen  set 
to  work.  As  the  strife-ridden  year  of  1932  approached  its 
end,  Berlin  was  full  of  cabals,  and  of  cabals  within 
cabals.  Besides  those  of  Papen  and  Schleicher,  there  was 
one  at  the  President’s  Palace,  where  Hindenburg’s  son, 
Oskar,  and  his  State  Secretary,  Meissner,  held  sway  be- 
hind  the  throne.  There  was  one  at  the  Kaiserhof  hotel, 
where  Hitler  and  the  men  around  him  were  plotting  not 
only  for  power  but  against  each  other.  Soon  the  webs  of 
intrigue  became  so  enmeshed  that  by  New  Year’s,  1933, 
none  of  the  cabalists  was  sure  who  was  double-crossing 
whom.  But  it  would  not  take  long  for  them  to  find  out. 

SCHLEICHER:  THE  LAST  CHANCELLOR  OF 
THE  REPUBLIC 

“I  stayed  in  power  only  fifty-seven  days,”  Schleicher 
remarked  once  in  the  hearing  of  the  attentive  French  am- 
bassador “and  on  each  and  every  one  of  them  I was  be- 
trayed fifty-seven  times.  Don’t  ever  speak  to  me  of  ‘Ger- 
man loyalty’!”  16  His  own  career  and  doings  had  certainly 
made  him  an  authority  on  the  subject. 

He  began  his  chancellorship  by  making  Gregor  Strasser 
an  offer  to  become  Vice-Chancellor  of  Germany  and  Pre- 
mier of  Prussia.  Having  failed  to  get  Hitler  to  join  his 
government,  Schleicher  now  tried  to  split  the  Nazis  by  this 
bait  to  Strasser.  There  was  some  reason  to  believe  he 
might  succeed.  Strasser  was  the  Number  Two  man  in  the 
party,  and  among  the  left-wing  element,  which  really  be- 
lieved in  a national  socialism,  he  was  more  popular  than 
Hitler.  As  leader  of  the  Party  Organization  he  was  in 
direct  touch  with  all  the  provincial  and  local  leaders  and 
seemingly  had  earned  their  loyalty.  He  was  now  convinced 
that  Hitler  had  brought  the  movement  to  a dead  end.  The 
more  radical  followers  were  going  over  to  the  Communists. 
The  party  itself  was  financially  bankrupt.  In  November 
Fritz  Thyssen  had  warned  that  he  could  make  no  further 
contributions  to  the  movement.  There  were  simply  no 
funds  to  meet  the  payroll  of  thousands  of  party  function- 
aries or  to  maintain  the  S.A.,  which  alone  cost  two  and  a 
half  million  marks  a week.  The  printers  of  the  extensive 
Nazi  press  were  threatening  to  stop  the  presses  unless  they 
received  payment  on  overdue  bills.  Goebbels  had  touched 


247 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

on  this  in  his  diary  on  November  11:  “The  financial  situa- 
tion of  the  Berlin  organization  is  hopeless.  Nothing  but 
debts  and  obligations.”  And  in  December  he  was  regretting 
that  party  salaries  would  have  to  be  cut.  Finally,  the  pro- 
vincial elections  in  Thuringia  on  December  3,  the  day 
Schleicher  called  in  Strasser,  revealed  a loss  of  40  per  cent 
in  the  Nazi  vote.  It  had  become  obvious,  at  least  to  Stras- 
ser, that  the  Nazis  would  never  obtain  office  through  the 
ballot. 

He  therefore  urged  Hitler  to  abandon  his  “all  or  noth- 
ing” policy  and  take  what  power  he  could  by  joining  in  a 
coalition  with  Schleicher.  Otherwise,  he  feared,  the  party 
would  fall  to  pieces.  He  had  been  pressing  this  line  for 
some  months,  and  Goebbels’  diary  from  midsummer  to 
December  is  full  of  bitter  references  to  Strasser’s  “dis- 
loyalty” to  Hitler. 

The  showdown  came  on  December  5 at  a meeting  of 
the  party  leaders  at  the  Kaiserhof  in  Berlin.  Strasser  de- 
manded that  the  Nazis  at  least  “tolerate”  the  Schleicher 
government,  and  he  was  backed  by  Frick,  who  headed  the 
Nazi  bloc  in  the  Reichstag,  many  of  whose  members 
feared  losing  their  seats  and  their  deputy’s  salary  if  Hitler 
provoked  any  more  elections.  Goering  and  Goebbels 
strenuously  opposed  Strasser  and  won  Hitler  to  their  side. 
Hitler  would  not  “tolerate”  the  Schleicher  regime,  but,  it 
developed,  he  was  still  ready  to  “negotiate”  with  it.  For 
this  task,  however,  he  appointed  Goering — he  had  already 
heard,  Goebbels  reveals,  of  Strasser’s  private  talk  with  the 
Chancellor  two  days  before.  On  the  seventh,  Hitler  and 
Strasser  had  a conversation  at  the  Kaiserhof  that  degen- 
erated into  a bitter  quarrel.  Hitler  accused  his  chief 
lieutenant  of  trying  to  stab  him  in  the  back,  oust  him  from 
his  leadership  of  the  party  and  break  up  the  Nazi  move- 
ment. Strasser  heatedly  denied  this,  swore  that  he  had 
been  loyal  but  accused  Hitler  of  leading  the  party  to  de- 
struction. Apparently  he  left  unsaid  a number  of  things 
that  had  been  swelling  within  him  since  1925.  Back  at 
his  room  in  the  Excelsior  Hotel  he  put  them  all  in  writ- 
ing in  a letter  to  Hitler  which  ended  with  his  resignation  of 
all  his  offices  in  the  party. 

The  letter,  which  reached  Hitler  on  the  eighth,  fell, 
as  Goebbels’  diary  says,  “like  a bombshell.”  The  atmos- 
phere in  the  Kaiserhof  was  that  of  a graveyard.  “We 


248 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

are  all  dejected  and  depressed,”  Goebbels  noted.  It  was 
the  greatest  blow  Hitler  had  suffered  since  he  rebuilt  the 
Payt^  1925.  Now,  on  the  threshold  of  power,  his  princi- 
pai  follower  had  deserted  him  and  threatened  to  smash 
all  he  had  built  up  in  seven  years. 

In  the  evening  [Goebbels  wrote],  the  Fuehrer  comes 
to  our  home.  It  is  difficult  to  be  cheerful.  We  are  all  de- 
pressed, above  all  because  of  the  danger  of  the  whole  party 
falling  apart,  and  all  our  work  having  been  in  vain 
Telephone  call  from  Dr.  Ley.  The  situation  in  the  party 
worsens  from  hour  to  hour.  The  Fuehrer  must  return  im- 
mediately to  the  Kaiserhof. 

Goebbels  was  called  to  join  him  there  at  two  o’clock 
in  the  mormng.  Strasser  had  given  his  story  to  the  morning 
newspapers,  which  were  just  then  appearing  on  the  streets. 
Hitlers  reaction  was  described  by  Goebbels: 

Treason!  Treason!  Treason! 

For  hours  the  Fuehrer  paces  up  and  down  in  the  hotel 
room.  He  is  embittered  and  deeply  wounded  by  this  treach- 
ery. Finally  he  stops  and  says:  If  the  party  once  falls  to 
pieces  1 11  put  an  end  to  it  all  in  three  minutes  with  a 
pistol  shot. 

did  not  /all  apart  and  Hitler  did  not  shoot 
lmself.  Strasser  might  have  achieved  both  these  ends, 
which  would  have  radically  altered  the  course  of  history, 
.*  aL. , e , crucial  moment  he  himself  gave  up.  Frick, 
wi  h Hitler  s permission,  had  been  searching  all  Berlin 
for  him,  it  having  been  agreed  that  the  quarrel  must 
somehow  be  patched  over  to  rescue  the  party  from  dis- 
aster But  Strasser,  fed  up  with  it  all,  had  taken  a train 
south  for  a vacation  in  sunny  Italy.  Hitler,  always  at 
his  best  when  he  detected  weakness  in  an  opponent,  struck 
swiftly  and  hard.  The  Political  Organization  which 
Strasser  had  built  up  was  taken  over  by  the  Fuehrer  him- 

Wi!thf  Der;  Ley’.  the  Gauleiter  from  Cologne,  as  his 
staff  chief.  Strasser  s friends  were  purged  and  all  party 
eaders  convoked  to  Berlin  to  sign  a new  declaration  of 
loyalty  to  Adolf  Hitler,  which  they  did. 

The  wily  Austrian  had  once  more  extricated  himself 
rom  a tight  fix  that  might  easily  have  proved  disastrous. 
Gregor  Strasser,  whom  so  many  had  thought  to  be  a 
greater  man  than  Hitler,  was  quickly  destroyed.  “A  dead 


249 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

man,”  Goebbels  called  him  in  his  diary  notation  of  De- 
cember 9.  This  was  to  become  literally  true  within  two 
years  when  Hitler  decided  to  settle  accounts. 

On  December  10,  a week  after  he  had  been  tripped  by 
General  von  Schleicher,  Franz  von  Papen  began  to  spin 
his  own  web  of  intrigues.  Following  a speech  that  evening 
to  the  exclusive  Herrenklub,  from  whose  aristocratic  and 
wealthy  members  he  had  recruited  his  short-lived  cabinet, 
he  had  a private  talk  with  Baron  Kurt  von  Schroeder,  the 
Cologne  banker  who  had  contributed  funds  to  the  Na- 
tional Socialist  Party.  He  suggested  that  the  financier 
arrange  for  him  to  see  Hitler  on  the  sly.  In  his  memoirs 
Papen  claims  that  it  was  Schroeder  who  made  the  sug- 
gestion but  admits  that  he  agreed.  By  a strange  coin- 
cidence, Wilhelm  Keppler,  Hitler’s  economic  adviser  and 
one  of  his  contact  men  with  business  circles,  made  the 
same  suggestion  on  behalf  of  the  Nazi  leader. 

The  two  men,  who  had  been  at  such  odds  only  a few 
weeks  before,  met  in  what  they  hoped  was  the  greatest 
of  secrecy  at  the  home  of  Schroeder  in  Cologne  on  the 
morning  of  January  4.  Papen  was  surprised  when  a photog- 
rapher snapped  him  at  the  entrance,  but  gave  it  little 
thought  until  the  next  day.  Hitler  was  accompanied  by 
Hess,  Himmler  and  Keppler,  but  he  left  his  aides  in  the 
parlor  and  retired  to  Schroeder’s  study,  where  he  was 
closeted  for  two  hours  with  Papen  and  their  host.  Though 
the  conversation  started  badly,  with  Hitler  complaining 
bitterly  of  the  way  Papen  had  treated  the  Nazis  while 
Chancellor,  it  soon  developed  to  a point  that  was  to  prove 
fateful  for  both  men  and  their  country.  This  was  a crucial 
moment  for  the  Nazi  chief.  By  a superhuman  effort  he 
had  kept  the  party  intact  after  Strasser’s  defection.  He 
had  traveled  up  and  down  the  country  addressing  three 
and  four  meetings  a day,  exhorting  the  party  leaders  to 
keep  together  behind  him.  But  Nazi  spirits  remained  at  a 
low  ebb,  and  the  party  was  financially  bankrupt.  Many 
were  saying  it  was  finished.  Goebbels  had  reflected  the 
general  feeling  in  his  diary  the  last  week  of  the  year: 
“1932  has  brought  us  eternal  bad  luck  . . . The  past  was 
difficult  and  the  future  looks  dark  and  gloomy;  all  pros- 
pects and  hopes  have  quite  disappeared.” 

Hitler  therefore  was  not  nearly  in  so  favorable  a posi- 


250 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tion  to  bargain  for  power  as  he  had  been  during  the  pre- 
ious  summer  and  autumn.  But  neither  was  Papen;  he  was 
L°f  111  their  adversity,  their  minds  met. 

t u-e  on  they  met  are  a matter  of  dispute. 

In  his  trial  at  Nuremberg  and  in  his  memoirs  Papen 
b andiy  maintained  that,  ever  loyal  to  Schleicher,  he  mere- 
ly suggested  to  Hitler  that  he  join  the  General’s  govern- 
ment. In  view,  however,  of  Papen’s  long  record  of  deceit, 
t his  quite  natural  desire  to  present  himself  in  the  most 
favorable  light  at  Nuremberg  and  in  his  book,  and  of  sub- 
sequent events,  it  seems  certain  that  Schroeder’s  quite 

25™.  ^i°.unt’  whli,h  was  Siven  at  Nuremberg,  is  the 
more  truthful  one.  The  banker  maintained  that  what 
Papen  suggested  was  the  replacement  of  the  Schleicher 
government  by  a Hitler-Papen  government  in  which  the 
two  of  them  would  be  coequal.  But: 

Hitler  . . . said  if  he  were  made  Chancellor  it  would  be 
necessary  for  him  to  be  the  head  of  the  government  but 
that  supporters  of  Papen  could  go  into  his  government  as 
ministers  when  they  were  willing  to  go  along  with  him  in 
his  pokey  of  changing  many  things.  These  changes  in- 
eluded  elimination  of  Social  Democrats,  Communists  and 
Jews  from  leading  positions  in  Germany  and  the  restoration 
of  order  m public  life.  Von  Papen  and  Hitler  reached 
agreement  m principle  . . . They  agreed  that  further  details 
would  have  to  be  worked  out  and  that  this  could  be  done  in 
Berlin  or  some  other  convenient  place.18 

And  in  the  greatest  secrecy,  of  course.  But,  to  the 
consternation  of  Papen  and  Hitler,  the  newspapers  in 
Berlin  came  out  with  flaming  headlines  on  the  morning 
of  January  5 over  accounts  of  the  Cologne  meeting,  ac- 
companied by  editorial  blasts  against  Papen  for  his  dis- 
loyalty to  Schleicher.  The  wily  General  had  placed  his 
spies  with  his  usual  acumen;  one  of  them,  Papen  later 
learned,  had  been  that  photographer  who  had  snapped 
his  picture  as  he  entered  Schroeder’s  home 

Besides  his  deal  with  Papen,  Hitler  got  two' other  things 
out  of  the  Cologne  meeting  which  were  of  great  value 
to  him.  He  learned  from  the  ex-Chancellor  that  Hinden- 

*g  jj?*?  n0t  given  Schleicher  power  to  dissolve  the  Reich- 
stag. This  meant  that  the  Nazis,  with  the  help  of  the  Com- 
mumstS’  could  overthrow  the  General  any  time  they 
wished.  Secondly,  out  of  the  meeting  came  an  understand- 


251 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

ing  that  West  German  business  interests  would  take  over 
the  debtvof  the  Nazi  Party.  Two  days  after  the  Cologne 
talks  Goebbels  noted  “pleasing  progress  in  political- de- 
velopments” but  still  complained  of  the  “bad  financial 
situation.”  Ten  days  later,  on  January  16,  he  reported  that 
the  financial  position  of  the  party  had  “fundamentally 
improved  overnight.” 

In  the  meantime  Chancellor  Schleicher  went  about — 
with  an  optimism  that  was  myopic,  to  say  the  least — 
trying  to  establish  a stable  government.  On  December  15 
he  made  a fireside  broadcast  to  the  nation  begging  his 
listeners  to  forget  that  he  was  a general  and  assuring 
them  that  he  was  a supporter  “neither  of  capitalism  nor  of 
socialism”  and  that  to  him  “concepts  such  as  private 
economy  or  planned  economy  have  lost  their  terrors.” 
His  principal  task,  he  said,  was  to  provide  work  for  the 
unemployed  and  get  the  country  back  on  its  economic 
feet.  There  would  be  no  tax  increase,  no  more  wage  cuts. 
In  fact,  he  was  canceling  the  last  cut  in  wages  and  relief 
which  Papen  had  made.  Furthermore,  he  was  ending 
the  agricultural  quotas  which  Papen  had  established  for 
the  benefit  of  the  large  landowners  and  instead  was  launch- 
ing a scheme  to  take  800,000  acres  from  the  bankrupt 
Junker  estates  in  the  East  and  give  them  to  25,000  peasant 
families.  Also  prices  of  such  essentials  as  coal  and  meat 
would  be  kept  down  by  rigid  control. 

This  was  a bid  for  the  support  of  the  very  masses 
which  he  had  hitherto  opposed  or  disregarded,  and  Schlei- 
cher followed  it  up  with  conversations  with  the  trade 
unions,  to  whose  leaders  he  gave  the  impression  that  he 
envisaged  a future  in  which  organized  labor  and  the 
Army  would  be  twin  pillars  of  the  nation.  But  labor  was 
not  to  be  taken  in  by  a man  whom  it  profoundly  mis- 
trusted, and  it  declined  its  co-operation. 

The  industrialists  and  the  big  landowners,  on  the  other 
hand,  rose  up  in  arms  against  the  new  Chancellor’s  pro- 
gram, which  they  clamored  was  nothing  less  than 
Bolshevism.  The  businessmen  were  aghast  at  Schleicher’s 
sudden  friendliness  to  the  unions.  The  owners  of  large 
estates  were  infuriated  at  his  reduction  of  agricultural 
protection  and  livid  at  the  prospect  of  his  breaking  up 
the  bankrupt  estates  in  the  East.  On  January  12  the  Land- 


252 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

blind  the  association  of  the  larger  fanners,  bitterly  at- 
tacked the  government,  and  its  leaders,  two  of  whom 
were  Nazis,  called  on  the  President  with  their  protests. 
Hindenburg,  now  a Junker  landowner  himself,  called  his 
Chancellor  to  account.  Schleicher’s  answer  was  to  threaten 
to  publish  a secret  Reichstag  report  on  the  Osthilfe  (East- 
ern Relief)  loans — a scandal  which,  as  everyone  knew, 
implicated  hundreds  of  the  oldest  Junker  families,  who 
had  waxed  fat  on  unredeemed  government  “loans,”  and 
which  indirectly  involved  even  the  President  himself, 
since  the  East  Prussian  estate  which  had  been  presented 
to  him  had  been  illegally  deeded  to  his  son  to  escape 
inheritance  taxes. 

Despite  the  uproar  among  the  industrialists  and  land- 
owners  and  the  coolness  of  the  trade  unions,  Schleicher 
remained  unaccountably  confident  that  all  was  going  well. 
On  New  Year’s  Day,  1933,  he  and  his  cabinet  called  on 
the  aged  President,  who  proceeded  to  express  his  grati- 
tude that  “the  gravest  hardships  are  overcome  and  the 
upward  path  is  now  open  to  us.”  On  January  4,  the  day 
Papen  and  Hitler  were  conferring  in  Cologne,  the  Chan- 
cellor arranged  for  Strasser,  who  had  returned  from  his 
holiday  in  the  Italian  sun,  to  see  Hindenburg.  The  former 
Number  Two  Nazi,  when  he  saw  the  President  a few  days 
later,  expressed  willingness  to  join  the  Schleicher  cabinet. 
This  move  threw  consternation  into  the  Nazi  camp,  which 
at  the  moment  was  pitched  in  the  tiny  state  of  Lippe, 
where  Hitler  and  all  his  principal  aides  were  fighting  fu- 
nously  to  score  a local  election  success  in  order  to  improve 
the  Fuehrer’s  bargaining  position  with  Papen.  Goebbels 
recounts  the  arrival  of  Goering  at  midnight  of  January 
13  with  the  bad  news  of  Strasser  and  of  how  the  party 
chiefs  had  sat  up  all  night  discussing  it,  agreeing  that  if 
he  took  office  it  would  be  a grave  setback  to  the  party. 

Schleicher  thought  so  too,  and  on  January  15  when 
Kurt  von  Schuschnigg,  then  the  Austrian  Minister  of  Jus- 
tice, visited  him  he  assured  him  that  “Herr  Hitler  was 
no  longer  a problem,  his  movement  had  ceased  to  be  a 
political  danger,  and  the  whole  problem  had  been  solved, 
it  was  a thing  of  the  past.”  17 

But  Strasser  did  not  come  into  the  cabinet,  nor  did 
the  leader  of  the  Nationalist  Party,  Hugenberg,  who  on  the 
day  before,  the  fourteenth,  had  assured  Hindenburg  that 


253 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

he  would.  Both  men  soon  turned  to  Hitler,  Strasser  to 
be  turned  down  cold  and  Hugenberg  with  more  success. 
On  January  15,  at  the  very  moment  when  Schleicher  was 
gloating  to  Schuschnigg  about  the  end  of  Hitler,  the  Nazis 
scored  a local  success  in  the  elections  of  little  Lippe.  It 
was  not  much  of  an  achievement.  The  total  vote  was 
only  90,000,  of  which  the  Nazis  obtained  38,000,,  or  39 
per  cent,  an  increase  of  some  17  per  cent  over  their 
previous  poll.  But,  led  by  Goebbels,  the  Nazi  leaders  beat 
the  drums  over  their  “victory,”  and  strangely  enough  it 
seems  to  have  impressed  a number  of  conservatives,  in- 
cluding the  men  behind  Hindenburg,  of  whom  the  princi- 
pal ones  were  State  Secretary  Meissner  and  the  Presi- 
dent’s son,  Oskar. 

On  the  evening  of  January  22,  these  two  gentlemen  stole 
out  of  the  presidential  quarters,  grabbed  a taxi,  as  Meissner 
says,  to  avoid  being  noticed  and  drove  to  the  suburban 
home  of  a hitherto  unknown  Nazi  by  the  name  of  Joachim 
von  Ribbentrop,  who  was  a friend  of  Papen — they  had 
served  together  on  the  Turkish  front  during  the  war.  There 
they  met  Papen,  Hitler,  Goering  and  Frick.  According  to 
Meissner,  Oskar  von  Hindenburg  had  been  opposed  to  any 
truck  with  the  Nazis  up  to  this  fateful  evening.  Hitler 
may  have  known  this;  at  any  rate  he  insisted  on  having 
a talk  with  him  “under  four  eyes,”  and  to  Meissner’s 
astonishment  young  Hindenburg  assented  and  withdrew 
with  Hitler  to  another  room,  where  they  were  closeted 
together  for  an  hour.  What  Hitler  said  to  the  President’s 
son,  who  was  not  noted  for  a brilliant  mind  or  a strong 
character,  has  never  been  revealed.  It  was  generally  be- 
lieved in  Nazi  circles  that  Hitler  made  both  offers  and 
threats,  the  latter  consisting  of  hints  to  disclose  to  the 
public  Oskar’s  involvement  in  the  Osthilfe  scandal  and 
the  tax  evasion  on  the  Hindenburg  estate.  One  can  only 
judge  the  offers  by  the  fact  that  a few  months  later  five 
thousand  tax-free  acres  were  added  to  the  Hindenburg 
family  property  at  Neudeck  and  that  in  August  1934 
Oskar  was  jumped  from  colonel  to  major  general  in  the 
Army. 

At  any  rate  there  is  no  doubt  that  Hitler  made  a strong 
impression  on  the  President’s  son.  “In  the  taxi  on  the 
way  back,”  Meissner  later  recounted  in  his  affidavit  at 
Nuremberg,  “Oskar  von  Hindenburg  was  extremely  silent, 


254 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


and  the  only  remark  which  he  made  was  that  it  could 
not  be  helped — the  Nazis  had  to  be  taken  into  the  govern- 
ment. My  impression  was  that  Hitler  had  succeeded  in 
getting  him  under  his  spell.” 

It  only  remained  for  Hitler  to  cast  the  spell  over  the 
father.  This  admittedly  was  more  difficult,  for  whatever 
the  old  Field  Marshal’s  deficiencies  of  mind,  age  had  not 
softened  his  granite  character.  More  difficult,  but  not  im- 
possible. Papen,  busy  as  a beaver,  was  working  daily  on 
the  old  man.  And  it  was  easy  to  see  that,  for  all  his  cun- 
ning, Schleicher  was  fast  stumbling  to  a fall.  He  had 
failed  to  win  over  the  Nazis  or  to  split  them.  He  could  get 
no  backing  from  the  Nationalists,  the  Center  or  the  Social 
Democrats. 


On  January  23,  therefore,  Schleicher  went  to  see  Hinden- 
burg,  admitted  that  he  could  not  find  a majority  in  the 
Reichstag  and  demanded  its  dissolution  and  emergency 
powers  to  rule  by  decree  under  Article  48  of  the  con- 
stitution. According  to  Meissner,  the  General  also  asked 
for  the  ‘temporary  elimination”  of  the  Reichstag  and  frank- 
ly acknowledged  that  he  would  have  to  transform  his 
government  into  “a  military  dictatorship.” 18  Despite  all 
his  devious  plotting,  Schleicher  was  back  where  Papen 
had  been  early  in  December,  but  their  roles  were  now  re- 
-sed  Then  Papen  had  demanded  emergency  powers  and 
Schleicher  had  opposed  him  and  proposed  that  he  him- 
self form  a majority  government  with  the  backing  of  the 
Nazis  Now  the  General  was  insisting  on  dictatorial  rule, 
and  the  sly  fox  Papen  was  assuring  the  Field  Marshal 
that  he  himself  could  corral  Hitler  for  a government 
that  would  have  a majority  in  the  Reichstag.  Such  are 
the  ups  and  downs  of  rogues  and  intriguers! 

Hindenburg,  reminding  Schleicher  of  the  reasons  he  had 
given  on  December  2 for  upsetting  Papen,  informed 
him  that  they  still  held  good.  He  bade  him  return  to  his 
task  of  finding  a Reichstag  majority.  Schleicher  was  fin- 
ished, and  he  knew  it.  So  did  everyone  else  who  was  in 
on  the  secret.  Goebbels,  one  of  the  few  in  on  it  com- 
mented the  next  day:  “Schleicher  will  fall  any  moment, 
ne  who  brought  down  so  many  others.” 

His  end  came  finally  and  officially  on  January  28 
when  he  called  on  the  President  and  tendered  the  resigna- 
tion of  his  government.  “I  have  already  one  foot  in  the 


255 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

grave,  and  I am  not  sure  that  I shall  not  regret  this  action 
in  heaven  later  on,”  Hindenburg  told  the  disillusioned 
General.  “After  this  breach  of  trust,  sir,  I am  not  sure 
that  you  will  go  to  heaven,”  Schleicher  replied,  and 
quickly  faded  out  of  German  history.19 

At  noon  of  the  same  day  Papen  was  entrusted  by  the 
President  to  explore  the  possibilities  of  forming  a govern- 
ment under  Hitler  “within  the  terms  of  the  constitution.” 
For  a week  this  sly,  ambitious  man  had  been  flirting 
with  the  idea  of  double-crossing  Hitler  after  all  and  be- 
coming Chancellor  again  of  a presidential  government 
backed  by  Hugenberg.  On  January  27  Goebbels  noted: 
“There  is  still  the  possibility  that  Papen  will  again  be 
made  Chancellor.”  The  day  before,  Schleicher  had  sent 
the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army,  General  von  Ham- 
merstein,  to  the  President  to  warn  him  against  selecting 
Papen.  In  the  maze  of  intrigues  with  which  Berlin  was 
filled,  Schleicher  was  at  the  last  minute  plumping  for  Hit- 
ler to  replace  him.  Hindenburg  assured  the  Army  com- 
mander he  had  no  intention  of  appointing  “that  Austrian 
corporal.” 

The  next  day,  Sunday,  January  29,  was  a crucial  one, 
with  the  conspirators  playing  their  last  desperate  hands 
and  filling  the  capital  with  the  most  alarming  and  con- 
flicting rumors,  not  all  of  them  groundless  by  any  means. 
Once  more  Schleicher  dispatched  the  faithful  Hammer- 
stein  to  stir  up  the  brew.  The  Army  chief  sought  out 
Hitler  to  warn  him  once  again  that  Papen  might  leave 
him  out  in  the  cold  and  that  it  might  be  wise  for  the 
Nazi  leader  to  ally  himself  with  the  fallen  Chancellor 
and  the  Army.  Hitler  was  not  much  interested.  He  re- 
turned to  the  Kaiserhof  to  have  cakes  and  coffee  with 
his  aides  and  it  was  at  this  repast  that  Goering  appeared 
with  the  tidings  that  the  Fuehrer  would  be  named  Chan- 
cellor on  the  morrow. 

That  night  the  Nazi  chieftains  were  celebrating  the  mo- 
mentous news  at  Goebbels’  home  on  the  Reichskanzler- 
platz  when  another  emissary  from  Schleicher  arrived  with 
startling  news.  This  was  Werner  von  Alvensleben,  a man 
so  given  to  conspiracy  that  when  one  did  not  exist  he 
invented  one.  He  informed  the  jubilant  party  that  Schlei- 
cher and  Hammerstein  had  put  the  Potsdam  garrison  on 
an  alarm  footing  and  were  preparing  to  bundle  the  old 


256 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

President  off  to  Neudeck  and  establish  a military  dictator- 
ship. This  was  a gross  exaggeration.  It  is  possible  that 
the  two  generals  were  playing  with  the  idea  but  most 
certain  that  they  had  not  taken  any  action.  The  Nazis 
however,  became  hysterical  with  alarm.  Goering  hastened 
as  fast  as  his  bulk  allowed  across  the  square  to  alert 
the  President  and  Papen.  What  Hitler  did  he  later  de- 
scribed himself. 

My  immediate  counteraction  to  this  planned  [military! 
putsch  was  to  send  for  the  Commander  of  the  Berlin  S.A. 
Count  toh  Helldorf,  and  through  him  to  alert  the  whole 
5>.A.  of  Berlm.  At  the  same  time  I instructed  Major  Wecke 
of  the  Police,  whom  I knew  I could  trust,  to  prepare  for  a 
sudden  seizure  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  by  six  police  bat- 
talions ..  Finally  I instructed  General  von  Blomberg 
(who  had  been  selected  as  Reichswehr  Minister-elect  to 
proceed  at  once,  on  arrival  in  Berlin  at  8 a.m.  on  January 
30  direct  to  the  Old  Gentleman  to  be  sworn  in,  and  thus 
to  be  m a position,  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Reichs- 
wehr, to  suppress  any  possible  attempts  at  a coup  d’etat.20 

Behind  the  backs  of  Schleicher  and  the  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Army-r-every thing  in  this  frenzied  period  was 
being  done  behind  someone’s  back— General  Werner  von 
Blomberg  had  been  summoned,  not  by  Hitler,  who  was 
not  yet  in  power,  but  by  Hindenburg  and  Papen  from 
Geneva,  where  he  was  representing  Germany  at  the  Dis- 
armament Conference,  to  become  the  new  Minister  of  De- 
fense  in  the  Hitler-Papen  cabinet.  He  was  a man  who, 
^ ™~er  la*er  said,  already  enjoyed  his  confidence  and 
who  had  come  under  the  spell  of  his  chief  of  staff  in 
East  Prussia,  Colonel  Walter  von  Reichenau,  an  outspoken 
Nazi  sympathizer.  When  Blomberg  arrived  in  Berlin,  early 
on  the  morning  of  January  30,  he  was  met  at  the  station 
by  two  Army  officers  with  conflicting  orders  for  him.  A 
Major  von  Kuntzen,  Hammerstein’s  adjutant,  commanded 
him  to  report  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army. 
Colonel  Oskar  von  Hindenburg,  adjutant  to  his  father, 
ordered  the  bewildered  Blomberg  to  report  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic.  Blomberg  went  to  the  President,  was 
immediately  sworn  in  as  Defense  Minister,  and  thus  was 
given  the  authority  not  only  to  put  down  any  attempted 
coup  by  the  Army  but  to  see  that  the  military  supported 
the  new  government,  which  a few  hours  latef  would  be 


257 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

named.  Hitler  was  always  grateful  to  the  Army  for  ac- 
cepting him  at  that  crucial  moment.  Not  long  afterward 
he  told  a party  rally,  “If  in  the  days  of  our  revolution 
the  Army  had  not  stood  on  our  side,  then  we  would  not 
be  standing  here  today.”  It  was  a responsibility  which 
would  weigh  heavily  on  the  officer  corps  in  the  days  to 
come  and  which,  in  the  end,  they  would  more  than  regret. 

On  this  wintry  morning  of  January  30,  1933,  the  tragedy 
of  the  Weimar  Republic,  of  the  bungling  attempt  for  four- 
teen frustrating  years  of  the  Germans  to  make  democracy 
work,  had  come  to  an  end — but  not  before,  at  the  very 
last  moment,  as  the  final  curtain  fell,  a minor  farce  took 
place  among  the  motley  group  of  conspirators  gathered 
to  bury  the  republican  regime.  Papen  later  described  it. 

At  about  half-past  ten  the  members  of  the  proposed 
Cabinet  met  in  my  house  and  walked  across  the  garden  to 
the  Presidential  palace,  where  we  waited  in  Meissner’s 
office.  Hitler  immediately  renewed  his  complaints  about  not 
being  appointed  Commissioner  for  Prussia.  He  felt  that  this 
severely  restricted  his  power.  I told  him  . . . the  Prussian 
appointment  could  be  left  until  later.  To  this,  Hitler  replied 
that  if  his  powers  were  to  be  thus  limited,  he  must  insist 
on  new  Reichstag  elections. 

This  produced  a completely  new  situation  and  the  debate 
became  heated.  Hugenberg,  in  particular,  objected  to  the 
idea,  and  Hitler  tried  to  pacify  him  by  stating  that  he 
would  make  no  changes  in  the  Cabinet,  whatever  the 
result  might  be  ...  By  this  time  it  was  long  past  eleven 
o’clock,  the  time  that  had  been  appointed  for  our  interview 
with  the  President,  and  Meissner  asked  me  to  end  our  dis- 
cussion, as  Hindenburg  was  not  prepared  to  wait  any  longer. 

We  had  had  such  a sudden  clash  of  opinions  that  I was 
afraid  our  new  coalition  would  break  up  before  it  was  born 
...  At  last  we  were  shown  in  to  the  President  and  I made 
the  necessary  formal  introductions.  Hindenburg  made  a 
short  speech  about  the  necessity  of  full  co-operation  in  the 
interests  of  the  nation,  and  we  were  then  sworn  in.  The 
Hitler  cabinet  had  been  formed.  21 

In  this  way,  by  way  of  the  back  door,  by  means  of  a 
shabby  political  deal  with  the  old-school  reactionaries  he 
privately  detested,  the  former  tramp  from  Vienna,  the 
derelict  of  the  First  World  War,  the  violent  revolutionary, 
became  Chancellor  of  the  great  nation. 


258  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

To  be  sure,  the  National  Socialists  were  in  a decided 
minority  in  the  government;  they  had  only  three  of  the 
eleven  posts  in  the  cabinet  and  except  for  the  chancellor- 
ship these  were  not  key  positions.  Frick  was  Minister  of 
the  Interior  but  he  did  not  control  the  police  as  this  minis- 
ter did  in  most  European  countries — the  police  in  Ger- 
many were  in  the  hands  of  the  individual  states.  The 
third  Nazi  cabinet  member  was  Goering,  but  no  specific 
office  could  be  found  for  him;  he  was  named  Minister 
without  Portfolio,  with  the  understanding  that  he  would 
become  Minister  of  Aviation  as  soon  as  Germany  had 
an  air  force.  Little  noticed  was  the  naming  of  Goering 
to  be  also  Minister  of  the  Interior  of  Prussia,  an  office 
that  controlled  the  Prussian  police;  for  the  moment  pub- 
lic attention  was  focused  on  the  Reich  cabinet.  Goebbels’ 
name,  to  the  surprise  of  many,  did  not  appear  in  it;  mo- 
mentarily he  was  left  out  in  the  cold. 

The  important  ministries  went  to  the  conservatives,  who 
were  sure  they  had  lassoed  the  Nazis  for  their  own  ends: 
Neurath  continued  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  Blom- 
berg  was  Minister  of  Defense;  Hugenberg  took  over  the 
combined  Ministries  of  Economy  and  Agriculture;  Seldte, 
the  Stahlhelm  leader,  was  made  Minister  of  Labor;  the 
other  ministries  were  left  in  the  hands  of  nonparty  “ex- 
perts” whom  Papen  had  appointed  eight  months  before. 
Papen  himself  was  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  Reich  and  Pre- 
mier of  Prussia,  and  Hindenburg  had  promised  him  that 
he  would  not  receive  the  Chancellor  except  in  the  com- 
pany of  the  Vice-Chancellor.  This  unique  position,  he 
was  sure,  would  enable  him  to  put  a brake  on  the  radical 
Nazi  leader.  But  even  more:  This  government  was  Papen’s 
conception,  his  creation,  and  he  was  confident  that  with 
the  help  of  the  staunch  old  President,  who  was  his  friend, 
admirer  and  protector,  and  with  the  knowing  support  of 
his  conservative  colleagues,  who  outnumbered  the  obstrep- 
erous Nazis  eight  to  three,  he  would  dominate  it. 

But  this  frivolous,  conniving  politician  did  not  know 
Hitler — no  one  really  knew  Hitler — nor  did  he  compre- 
hend the  strength  of  the  forces  which  had  spewed  him 
up.  Nor  did  Papen,  or  anyone  else  except  Hitler,  quite 
realize  the  inexplicable  weakness,  that  now  bordered  on 
paralysis,  of  existing  institutions — the  Army,  the  churches, 
the  trade  unions,  the  political  parties — or  of  the  vast 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  259 

non-Nazi  middle  class  and  the  highly  organized  proletariat 
all  of  which,  as  Papen  mournfully  observed  much  later, 
would  “give  up  without  a fight.” 

No  class  or  group  or  party  in  Germany  could  escape 
its  share  of  responsibility  for  the  abandonment  of  the 
democratic  Republic  and  the  advent  of  Adolf  Hitler. 
The  cardinal  error  of  the  Germans  who  opposed  Nazism 
was  their  failure  to  unite  against  it.  At  the  crest  of  their 
popular  strength,  in  July  1932,  the  National  Socialists  had 
attained  but  37  per  cent  of  the  vote.  But  the  63  per  cent 
of  the  German  people  who  expressed  their  opposition  to 
Hitler  were  much  too  divided  and  shortsighted  to  combine 
against  a common  danger  which  they  must  have  known 
would  overwhelm  them  unless  they  united,  however  tem- 
porarily, to  stamp  it  out.  The  Communists,  at  the  behest 
of  Moscow,  were  committed  to  the  last  to  the  silly  idea 
of  first  destroying  the  Social  Democrats,  the  Socialist  trade 
unions  and  what  middle-class  democratic  forces  there 
were,  on  the  dubious  theory  that  although  this  would  lead 
to  a Nazi  regime  it  would  be  only  temporary  and  would 
bring  inevitably  the  collapse  of  capitalism,  after  which 
the  Communists  would  take  over  and  establish  the  dictator- 
ship of  the  proletariat.  Fascism,  in  the  Bolshevik  Marxist 
view,  represented  the  last  stage  of  a dying  capitalism; 
after  that,  the  Communist  deluge! 

Fourteen  years  of  sharing  political  power  in  the  Re- 
public, of  making  all  the  compromises  that  were  necessary 
to  maintain  coalition  governments,  had  sapped  the  strength 
and  the  zeal  of  the  Social  Democrats  until  their  party 
had  become  little  more  than  an  opportunist  pressure  or- 
ganization, determined  to  bargain  for  concessions  for  the 
trade  unions  on  which  their  strength  largely  rested.  It 
might  be  true,  as  some  Socialists  said,  that  fortune  had 
not  smiled  on  them:  the  Communists,  unscrupulous  and 
undemocratic,  had  split  the  working  class;  the  depression 
had  further  hurt  the  Social  Democrats,  weakening  the 
trade  unions  and  losing  the  party  the  support  of  millions 
of  unemployed,  who  in  their  desperation  turned  either  to 
the  Communists  or  the  Nazis.  But  the  tragedy  of  the 
Social  Democrats  could  not  be  explained  fully  by  bad 
luck.  They  had  had  their  chance  to  take  over  Germany 
in  November  1918  and  to  found  a state  based  on  what 
they  had  always  preached:  social  democracy.  But  they 


260  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

lacked  the  decisiveness  to  do  so.  Now  at  the  dawn  of  the 
third  decade  they  were  a tired,  defeatist  party,  dominated 
by  old,  well-meaning  but  mostly  mediocre  men.  Loyal  to 
the  Republic  they  were  to  the  last,  but  in  the  end  too 
confused,  too  timid  to  take  the  great  risks  which  alone 
could  have  preserved  it,  as  they  had  shown  by  their 
failure  to  act  when  Papen  turned  out  a squad  of  soldiers 
to  destroy  constitutional  government  in  Prussia. 

Between  the  Left  and  the  Right,  Germany  lacked  a 
politically  powerful  middle  class,  which  in  other  countries 
— in  France,  in  England,  in  the  United  States — had  proved 
to  be  the  backbone  of  democracy.  In  the  first  year  of  the 
Republic  the  middle-class  parties,  the  Democrats,  the 
People’s  Party,  the  Center,  had  polled  a total  of  twelve 
million  votes,  only  two  million  less  than  the  two  Socialist 
groups.  But  thereafter  their  strength  had  waned  as  their 
supporters  gravitated  toward  Hitler  and  the  Nationalists. 
In  1919,  the  Democrats  had  elected  74  members  to  the 
Reichstag;  by  1932  they  held  just  2 seats.  The  strength 
of  the  People’s  Party  fell  from  62  seats  in  1920  to  11 
seats  in  1932.  Only  the  Catholic  Center  retained  its  voting 
strength  to  the  end.  In  the  first  republican  elections  in 
1919  the  Center  had  71  deputies  in  the  Reichstag;  in 
1932  it  had  70.  But  even  more  than  the  Social  Demo- 
crats, the  Center  Party  since  Bismarck’s  time  had  been 
largely  opportunist,  supporting  whatever  government  made 
concessions  to  its  special  interests.  And  though  it  seemed 
to  be  loyal  to  the  Republic  and  to  subscribe  to  its  democ- 
racy, its  leaders,  as  we  have  seen,  were  negotiating  with 
the  Nazis  to  give  Hitler  the  chancellorship  before  they 
were  outbid  by  Papen  and  the  Nationalists. 

If  the  German  Republic  was  bereft  of  a middle-of- 
the-road  political  class,  it  also  lacked  that  stability  pro- 
vided in  many  other  countries  by  a truly  conservative 
party.  The  German  Nationalists  at  their  peak  in  1924 
had  polled  six  million  votes  and  sent  103  deputies  to  the 
Reichstag,  in  which  they  formed  the  second  largest  party. 
But  then,  as  at  almost  all  times  during  the  Weimar  re- 
gime, they  refused  to  take  a responsible  position  either 
in  the  government  or  in  opposition,  the  only  exception 
being  their  participation  in  two  short-lived  cabinets  in 


261 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

the  Twenties.  What  the  German  Right,  whose  vote  went 
largely  to  the  Nationalists,  wanted  was  an  end  to  the 
Republic  and  a return  to  an  imperialist  Germany  in  which 
all  of  their  old  privileges  would  be  restored.  Actually  the 
Republic  had  treated  the  Right  both  as  individuals  and 
as  classes  with  the  utmost  generosity  and,  considering 
their  aim,  with  exceptional  tolerance.  It  had,  as  we  have 
seen,  allowed  the  Army  to  maintain  a state  within  a state, 
the  businessmen  and  bankers  to  make  large  profits,  the 
Junkers  to  keep  their  uneconomic  estates  by  means  of 
government  loans  that  were  never  repaid  and  seldom  used 
to  improve  their  land.  Yet  this  generosity  had  won  neither 
their  gratitude  nor  their  loyalty  to  the  Republic.  With  a 
narrowness,  a prejudice,  a blindness  which  in  retrospect 
seem  inconceivable  to  this  chronicler,  they  hammered 
away  at  the  foundations  of  the  Republic  until,  in  alliance 
with  Hitler,  they  brought  it  down. 

In  the  former  Austrian  vagabond  the  conservative 
classes  thought  they  had  found  a man  who,  while  re- 
maining their  prisoner,  would  help  them  attain  their 
goals.  The  destruction  of  the  Republic  was  only  the  first 
step.  What  they  then  wanted  was  an  authoritarian  Ger- 
many which  at  home  would  put  an  end  to  democratic 
“nonsense”  and  the  power  of  the  trade  unions  and  in 
foreign  affairs  undo  the  verdict  of  1918,  tear  off  the 
shackles  of  Versailles,  rebuild  a great  Army  and  with 
its  military  power  restore  the  country  to  its  place  in  the 
sun.  These  were  Hitler’s  aims  too.  And  though  he  brought 
what  the  conservatives  had  lacked,  a mass  following,  the 
Right  was  sure  that  he  would  remain  in  its  pocket — 
was  he  not  outnumbered  eight  to  three  in  the  Reich  cabi- 
net? Such  a commanding  position  also  would  allow 
the  conservatives,  or  so  they  thought,  to  achieve  their 
ends  without  the  barbarism  of  unadulterated  Nazism.  Ad- 
mittedly they  were  decent,  God-fearing  men,  according 
to  their  lights. 

The  Hohenzollem  Empire  had  been  built  on  the  armed 
triumphs  of  Prussia,  the  German  Republic  on  the  defeat 
by  the  Allies  after  a great  war.  But  the  Third  Reich  owed 
nothing  to  the  fortunes  of  war  or  to  foreign  influence.  It 
was  inaugurated  in  peacetime,  and  peacefully,  by  the 
Germans  themselves,  out  of  both  their  weaknesses  and 
their  strengths.  The  Germans  imposed  the  Nazi  tyranny 


262 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

on  themselves.  Many  of  them,  perhaps  a majority,  did  not 
quite  realize  it  at  that  noon  hour  of  January  30,  i9_>3, 
when  President  Hindenburg,  acting  in  a perfectly  con- 
stitutional manner,  entrusted  the  chancellorship  to  Adolf 
Hitler. 

But  they  were  soon  to  learn. 


7 

THE  NAZIFICATIOW  OF  GERMANY: 
1933-34 

the  theory  which  hitler  had  evolved  in  his  vagabond 
days  in  Vienna  and  never  forgotten — that  the  way  to  power 
for  a revolutionary  movement  was  to  ally  itself  with  some 
of  the  powerful  institutions  in  the  State — had  now  worked 
out  in  practice  pretty  much  as  he  had  calculated.  The 
President,  backed  by  the  Army  and  the  conservatives, 
had  made  him  Chancellor.  His  political  power,  though 
great,  was,  however,  not  complete.  It  was  shared  with  these 
three  sources  of  authority,  which  had  put  him  into  office 
and  which  were  outside  and,  to  some  extent,  distrustful 
of  the  National  Socialist  movement. 

Hitler’s  immediate  task,  therefore,  was  to  quickly  elim- 
inate them  from  the  driver’s  seat,  make  his  party  the  ex- 
clusive master  of  the  State  and  then  with  the  power  of  an 
authoritarian  government  and  its  police  carry  out  the  Nazi 
revolution.  He  had  been  in  office  scarcely  twenty-four 
hours  when  he  made  his  first  decisive  move,  springing 
a trap  on  his  gullible  conservative  “captors”  and  setting 
in  motion  a chain  of  events  which  he  either  originated  or 
controlled  and  which  at  the  end  of  six  months  would  bring 
the  complete  Nazification  of  Germany  and  his  own  eleva- 
tion to  dictator  of  the  Reich,  unified  and  defederalized 
for  the  first  time  in  German  history. 

Five  hours  after  being  sworn  in,  at  5 p.m.  on  January 
30,  1933,  Hitler  held  his  first  cabinet  meeting.  The  min- 
utes of  the  session,  which  turned  up  at  Nuremberg  among 
the  hundreds  of  tons  of  captured  secret  documents,  reveal 
how  quickly  and  adroitly  Hitler,  aided  by  the  crafty  Goer- 

263 


264 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ing,  began  to  take  his  conservative  colleagues  for  a ride.*  1 
Hindenburg  had  named  Hitler  to  head  not  a presidential 
cabinet  but  one  based  on  a majority  in  the  Reichstag.  How- 
ever. the  Nazis  and  the  Nationalists,  the  only  two  parties 
represented  in  the  government,  had  only  247  seats  out  of 
583  in  Parliament  and  thus  lacked  a majority.  To  attain 
it  they  needed  the  backing  of  the  Center  Party  with  its 
70  seats.  In  the  very  first  hours  of  the  new  government 
Hitler  had  dispatched  Goering  to  talk  with  the  Centrist 
leaders,  and  now  he  reported  to  the  cabinet  that  the 
Center  was  demanding  “certain  concessions.”  Goering 
therefore  proposed  that  the  Reichstag  be  dissolved  and  new 
elections  held,  and  Hitler  agreed.  Hugenberg,  a man  of 
wooden  mind  for  all  his  success  in  business,  objected  to 
taking  the  Center  into  the  government  but  on  the  other 
hand  opposed  new  elections,  well  knowing  that  the  Nazis, 
with  the  resources  of  the  State  behind  them,  might  win 
an' absolute  majority  at  the  polls  and  thus  be  in  a position 
to  dispense  with  his  own  services  and  those  of  his  con- 
servative friends.  He  proposed  simply  suppressing  the 
Communist  Party;  with  its  100  seats  eliminated,  the  Nazis 
and  the  Nationalists  would  have  a majority.  But  Hitler 
would  not  go  so  far  at  the  moment,  and  it  was  finally 
agreed  that  the  Chancellor  himself  would  confer  with  the 
Center  Party  leaders  on  the  following  morning  and  that 
if  the  talks  were  fruitless  the  cabinet  would  then  ask  for 
new  elections. 


Hitler  easily  made  them  fruitless.  At  his  request  the 
Center  leader,  Monsignor  Kaas,  submitted  as  a basis  for 
discussion  a list  of  questions  which  added  up  to  a demand 
that  Hitler  promise  to  govern  constitutionally.  But  Hitler, 
tricking  both  Kaas  and  his  cabinet  members,  reported  to 
the  latter  that  the  Center  had  made  impossible  demands 


This  cabinet  meeting,  of  course,  was  private,  and,  like  most  of  the  other 
conferences,  many  of  them  taking  place  in  the  strictest  secrecy,  held  by 
Hitler  and  his  political  and  military  aides  during  the  Third  Reich,  its  pro- 
ceedings and  decisions  were  not  accessible  to  the  public  until  the  captured 
Herman  documents  Were  first  perused  during  the  Nuremberg  trial. 

A great  many  of  these  highly  confidential  discussions  and  the  decisions 
emanating  from  them — all  regarded  as  state  secrets — will  henceforth  be 
chronicled  in  this  book,  which,  from  here  to  the  end,  largely  rests  on  the 
documents  which  recorded  them  at  the  time.  At  the  risk  of  somewhat  clutter- 
ing the  pages  with  numbers  indicating  notes,  these  sources  will  be  indicated. 
INo  other  history  of  a nation  over  a specific  epoch  has  been  so  fully  docu- 
mented, I believe,  as  that  of  the  Third  Reich,  and  to  have  left  out  reference 
to  the  documents, _ it  seemed  to  the  author,  would  have  greatly  weakened 
whatever  value  this  book  may  have  as  an  authentic  historical  record. 


265 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

and  that  there  was  no  chance  of  agreement.  He  therefore 
proposed  that  the  President  be  asked  to  dissolve  the  Reich- 
stag and  call  new  elections.  Hugenberg  and  Papen  were 
trapped,  but  after  a solemn  assurance  from  the  Nazi  leader 
that  the  cabinet  would  remain  unchanged  however  the 
elections  turned  out,  they  agreed  to  go  along  with  him. 
New  elections  were  set  for  March  5. 

For  the  first  time — in  the  last  relatively  free  election 
Germany  was  to  have — the  Nazi  Party  now  could  employ 
all  the  vast  resources  of  the  government  to  win  votes. 
Goebbels  was  jubilant.  “Now  it  will  be  easy,”  he  wrote  in  his 
diary  on  February  3,  “to  carry  on  the  fight,  for  we  can  call 
on  all  the  resources  of  the  State.  Radio  and  press  are  at 
our  disposal.  We  shall  stage  a masterpiece  of  propaganda. 
And  this  time,  naturally,  there  is  no  lack  of  money.”  2 

The  big  businessmen,  pleased  with  the  new  government 
that  was  going  to  put  the  organized  workers  in  their  place 
and  leave  management  to  run  its  businesses  as  it  wished, 
were  asked  to  cough  up.  This  they  agreed  to  do  at  a 
meeting  on  February  20  at  Goering’s  Reichstag  Presi- 
dent’s Palace,  at  which  Dr.  Schacht  acted  as  host  and 
Goering  and  Hitler  laid  down  the  line  to  a couple  of 
dozen  of  Germany’s  leading  magnates,  including  Krupp 
von  Bohlen,  who  had  become  an  enthusiastic  Nazi  over- 
night, Bosch  and  Schnitzler  of  I.  G.  Farben,  and  Voegler, 
head  of  the  United  Steel  Works.  The  record  of  this  secret 
meeting  has  been  preserved. 

Hitler  began  a long  speech  with  a sop  to  the  industrial- 
ists. “Private  enterprise,”  he  said,  “cannot  be  maintained 
in  the  age  of  democracy;  it  is  conceivable  only  if  the 
people  have  a sound  idea  of  authority  and  personality  . . . 
All  the  worldly  goods  we  possess  we  owe  to  the  stmggle 
of  the  chosen  . . . We  must  not  forget  that  all  the 
benefits  of  culture  must  be  introduced  more  or  less  with 
an  iron  fist.”  He  promised  the  businessmen  that  he  would 
“eliminate”  the  Marxists  and  restore  the  Wehrmacht  (the 
latter  was  of  special  interest  to  such  industries  as  Rrupp, 
United  Steel  and  I.  G Farben,  which  stood  to  gain  the 
most  from  rearmament).  “Now  we  stand  before  the  last 
election,”  Hitler  concluded,  and  he  promised  his  listeners 
that  “regardless  of  the  outcome,  there  will  be  no  retreat.” 
If  he  did  not  win,  he  would  stay  in  power  “by  the  other 
means  . . . with  other  weapons.”  Goering,  talking  more  to 


266  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  immediate  point,  stressed  the  necessity  of  “financial 
sacrifices”  which  “surely  would  be  much  easier  for  industry 
to  bear  if  it  realized  that  the  election  of  March  fifth  will 
surely  be  the  last  one  for  the  next  ten  years,  probably  even 
for  the  next  hundred  years.” 

All  this  was  made  clear  enough  to  the  assembled  in- 
dustrialists and  they  responded  with  enthusiasm  to  the 
promise  of  the  end  of  the  infernal  elections,  of  democracy 
and  disarmament.  Krupp,  the  munitions  king,  who,  ac- 
cording to  Thyssen,  had  urged  Hindenburg  on  January  29 
not  to  appoint  Hilter,  jumped  up  and  expressed  to  the 
Chancellor  the  “gratitude”  of  the  businessmen  “for  having 
given  us  such  a clear  picture.”  Dr.  Schacht  then  passed  the 
hat.  “I  collected  three  million  marks,”  he  recalled  at 
Nuremberg.3 

On  January  31,  1933,  the  day  after  Hitler  was  named 
Chancellor,  Goebbels  wrote  in  his  diary:  “In  a conference 
with  the  Fuehrer  we  lay  down  the  line  for  the  fight  against 
the  Red  terror.  For  the  moment  we  shall  abstain  from 
direct  countermeasures.  The  Bolshevik  attempt  at  revolu- 
tion must  first  burst  into  flame.  At  the  proper  moment  we 
shall  strike.” 

Despite  increasing  provocation  by  the  Nazi  authorities 
there  was  no  sign  of  a revolution.  Communist  or  So- 
cialist, bursting  into  flames  as  the  electoral  campaign  got 
under  way.  By  the  beginning  of  February  the  Hilter  gov- 
ernment had  banned  all  Communist  meetings  and  shut 
down  the  Communist  press.  Social  Democrat  rallies  were 
either  forbidden  or  broken  up  by  the  S.A.  rowdies,  and 
the  leading  Socialist  newspapers  were  continually  sus- 
pended. Even  the  Catholic  Center  Party  did  not  escape 
the  Nazi  terror.  Stegerwald,  the  leader  of  the  Catholic 
Trade  Unions,  was  beaten  by  Brownshirts  when  he  at- 
tempted to  address  a meeting,  and  Bruening  was  obliged 
to  seek  police  protection  at  another  rally  after  S.A.  troopers 
had  wounded  a number  of  his  followers.  Altogether  fifty- 
one  anti-Nazis  were  listed  as  murdered  during  the  electoral 
campaign,  and  the  Nazis  claimed  that  eighteen  of  their 
own  number  had  been  done  to  death. 

Goering’s  key  position  as  Minister  of  the  Interior  of 
Prussia  now  began  to  be  noticed.  Ignoring  the  restraining 
hand  of  Papen,  who  as  Premier  of  Prussia  was  supposedly 


267 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

above  him,  Goering  removed  hundreds  of  republican 
officials  and  replaced  them  with  Nazis,  mostly  S.A.  and  S.S. 
officers.  He  ordered  the  police  to  avoid  “at  all  costs” 
hostility  to  the  S.A.,  the  S.S.  and  the  Stahlhelm  but  on  the 
other  hand  to  show  no  mercy  to  those  who  were  “hostile 
to  the  State.”  He  urged  the  police  “to  make  use  of  firearms” 
and  warned  that  those  who  didn’t  would  be  punished.  This 
was  an  outright  call  for  the  shooting  down  of  all  who 
opposed  Hitler  by  the  police  of  a state  (Prussia)  which 
controlled  two  thirds  of  Germany.  Just  to  make  sure  that 
the  job  would  be  ruthlessly  done,  Goering  on  February  22 
established  an  auxiliary  police  force  of  50,000  men,  of 
whom  40,000  were  drawn  from  the  ranks  of  the  S.A.  and 
the  S.S.  and  the  rest  from  the  Stahlhelm.  Police  power 
in  Prussa  was  thus  largely  carried  out  by  Nazi  thugs. 
It  was  a rash  German  who  appealed  to  such  a “police”  for 
protection  against  the  Nazi  terrorists. 

And  yet  despite  all  the  terror  the  “Bolshevik  revolution” 
which  Goebbels,  Hitler  and  Goering  were  looking  for 
failed  to  “burst  into  flames.”  If  it  could  not  be  provoked, 
might  it  not  have  to  be  invented? 

On  February  24,  Goering’s  police  raided  the  Karl  Lieb- 
knecht  Haus,  the  Communist  headquarters  in  Berlin.  It 
had  been  abandoned  some  weeks  before  by  the  Communist 
leaders,  a number  of  whom  had  already  gone  underground 
or  quietly  slipped  off  to  Russia.  But  piles  of  propaganda 
pamphlets  had  been  left  in  the  cellar  and  these  were 
enough  to  enable  Goering  to  announce  in  an  official  com- 
munique that  the  seized  “documents”  proved  that  the 
Communists  were  about  to  launch  the  revolution.  The 
reaction  of  the  public  and  even  of  some  of  the  conserva- 
tives in  the  government  was  one  of  skepticism.  It  was 
obvious  that  something  more  sensational  must  be  found 
to  stampede  the  public  before  the  election  took  place  on 
March  5. 

THE  REICHSTTAG  FIRE 

On  the  evening  of  February  27,  four  of  the  most  power- 
ful men  in  Germany  were  gathered  at  two  separate  dinners 
in  Berlin.  In  the  exclusive  Herrenklub  in  the  Vosstrasse, 
Vice-Chancellor  von  Papen  was  entertaining  President  von 
Hindenburg.  Out  at  Goebbels’  home,  Chancellor  Hitler 


268  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

had  arrived  to  dine  en  famille.  According  to  Goebbels, 
they  were  relaxing,  playing  music  on  the  gramophone 
and  telling  stories.  “Suddenly,”  he  recountered  later  in 
his  diary,  “a  telephone  call  from  Dr.  Hanfstaengl:  ‘The 
Reichstag  is  on  fire!’  I am  sure  he  is  telling  a tall  tale  and 
decline  even  to  mention  it  to  the  Fuehrer.” 4 

But  the  diners  at  the  Herrenklub  were  just  around  the 
corner  from  the  Reichstag. 

Suddenly  [Papen  later  wrote]  we  noticed  a red  glow 
through  the  windows  and  heard  sounds  of  shouting  in  the 
street.  One  of  the  servants  came  hurrying  up  to  me  and 
whispered:  “The  Reichstag  is  on  fire!”  which  I repeated  to 
the  President.  He  got  up  and  from  the  window  we  could 
see  the  dome  of  the  Reichstag  looking  as  though  it  were 
illuminated  by  searchlights.  Every  now  and  again  a burst  of 
flame  and  a swirl  of  smoke  blurred  the  outline.® 

The  Vice-Chancellor  packed  the  aged  President  home 
in  his  own  car  and  hurried  off  to  the  burning  building. 
In  the  meantime  Goebbels,  according  to  his  account,  had 
had  second  thoughts  about  Putzi  Hanfstaengl’s  “tall  tale,” 
had  made  some  telephone  calls  and  learned  that  the 
Reichstag  was  in  flames.  Within  a few  seconds  he  and  his 
Fuehrer  were  racing  “at  sixty  miles  an  hour  down  the 
Charlottenburger  Chaussee  toward  the  scene  of  the  crime.” 

That  it  was  a crime,  a Communist  crime,  they  pro- 
claimed at  once  on  arrival  at  the  fire.  Goering,  sweating  and 
puffing  and  quite  beside  himself  with  excitement,  was  al- 
ready there  ahead  of  them  declaiming  to  heaven,  as  Papen 
later  recalled,  that  “this  is  a Communist  crime  against  the 
new  government.”  To  the  new  Gestapo  chief,  Rudolf  Diels, 
Goering  shouted,  “This  is  the  beginning  of  the  Communist 
revolution!  We  must  not  wait  a minute.  We  will  show  no 
mercy.  Every  Communist  official  must  be  shot,  where 
he  is  found.  Every  Communist  deputy  must  this  very 
night  be  strung  up.”  6 

The  whole  truth  about  the  Reichstag  fire  will  probably 
never  be  known.  Nearly  all  those  who  knew  it  are  now 
dead,  most  of  them  slain  by  Hitler  in  the  months  that 
followed.  Even  at  Nuremberg  the  mystery  could  not  be 
entirely  unraveled,  though  there  is  enough  evidence  to 
establish  beyond  a reasonable  doubt  that  it  was  the  Nazis 
who  planned  the  arson  and  carried  it  out  for  their  own 
political  ends. 


269 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

From  Goering’s  Reichstag  President’s  Palace  an  under- 
ground passage,  built  to  carry  the  central  heating  system, 
ran  to  the  Reichstag  building.  Through  this  tunnel  Karl 
Ernst,  a former  hotel  bellhop  who  had  become  the  Berlin 
S.A.  leader,  led  a small  detachment  of  storm  troopers  on 
the  night  of  February  27  to  the  Reichstag,  where  they 
scattered  gasoline  and  self-igniting  chemicals  and  then 
made  their  way  quickly  back  to  the  palace  the  way  they 
had  come.  At  the  same  time  a half-witted  Dutch  Com- 
munist with  a passion  for  arson,  Marinus  van  der  Lubhe, 
had  made  his  way  into  the  huge,  darkened  and  to  him  un- 
familiar building  and  set  some  small  fires  of  his  own.  This 
feeble-minded  pyromaniac  was  a godsend  to  the  Nazis. 
He  had  been  picked  up  by  the  S.A.  a few  days  before  after 
having  been  overheard  in  a bar  boasting  that  he  had 
attempted  to  set  fire  to  several  public  buildings  and  that 
he  was  going  to  try  the  Reichstag  next. 

The  coincidence  that  the  Nazis  had  found  a demented 
Communist  arsonist  who  was  out  to  do  exactly  what  they 
themselves  had  determined  to  do  seems  incredible  but  is 
nevertheless  supported  by  the  evidence.  The  idea  for  the 
fire  almost  certainly  originated  with  Goebbels  and  Goering. 
Hans  Gisevius,  an  official  in  the  Prussian  Ministry  of 
the  Interior  at  the  time,  testified  at  Nuremberg  that  “it 
was  Goebbels  who  first  thought  of  setting  the  Reichstag 
on  fire,”  and  Rudolf  Diels,  the  Gestapo  chief,  added  in  an 
affidavit  that  “Goering  knew  exactly  how  the  fire  was  to 
be  started”  and  had  ordered  him  “to  prepare,  prior  to  the 
fire,  a list  of  people  who  were  to  be  arrested  immediately 
after  it.”  General  Franz  Haider,  Chief  of  the  German 
General  Staff  during  the  early  part  of  World  War  II,  re- 
called at  Nuremberg  how  on  one  occasion  Goering  had 
boasted  of  his  deed. 

At  a luncheon  on  the  birthday  of  the  Fuehrer  in  1942 
the  conversation  turned  to  the  topic  of  the  Reichstag  build- 
ing and  its  artistic  value.  I heard  with  my  own  ears  when 
Goering  interrupted  the  conversation  and  shouted:  “The  only 
one  who  really  knows  about  the  Reichstag  is  I,  because  I set 
it  on  fire!”  With  that  he  slapped  his  thigh  with  the  flat  of 
his  hand.* 

Van  der  Lubbe,  it  seems  clear,  was  a dupe  of  the  Nazis. 


* Both  in  his  interrogations  and  at  his  trial  at  Nuremberg,  Goering  denied 
to  the  last  that  he  had  had  any  part  in  setting  fire  to  the  Reichstag. 


270 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

He  was  encouraged  to  try  to  set  the  Reichstag  on  fire.  But 
the  main  job  was  to  be  done — without  his  knowledge,  of 
course — by  the  storm  troopers.  Indeed,  it  was  established 
at  the  subsequent  trial  at  Leipzig  that  the  Dutch  half-wit 
did  not  possess  the  means  to  set  so  vast  a building  on  fire 
so  quickly.  Two  and  a half  minutes  after  he  entered,  the 
great  central  hall  was  fiercely  burning.  He  had  only  his 
shirt  for  tinder.  The  main  fires,  according  to  the  testimony 
of  experts  at  the  trial,  had  been  set  with  considerable 
quantities  of  chemicals  and  gasoline.  It  was  obvious  that 
one  man  could  not  have  carried  them  into  the  building, 
nor  would  it  have  been  possible  for  him  to  start  so  many 
fires  in  so  many  scattered  places  in  so  short  a time. 

Van  der  Lubbe  was  arrested  on  the  spot  and  Goering, 
as  he  afterward  told  the  court,  wanted  to  hang  him  at  once. 
The  next  day  Ernst  Torgler,  parliamentary  leader  of  the 
Communists,  gave  himself  up  to  the  police  when  he  heard 
that  Goering  had  implicated  him,  and  a few  days  later 
Georgi  Dimitroff,  a Bulgarian  Communist  who  later  be- 
came Prime  Minister  of  Bulgaria,  and  two  other  Bul- 
garian Communists,  Popov  and  Tanev,  were  apprehended 
by  the  police.  Their  subsequent  trial  before  the  Supreme 
Court  at  Leipzig  turned  into  something  of  a fiasco  for  the 
Nazis  and  especially  for  Goering,  whom  Dimitroff,  acting 
as  his  own  lawyer,  easily  provoked  into  making  a fool 
of  himself  in  a series  of  stinging  cross-examinations.  At 
one  point,  according  to  the  court  record,  Goering 
screamed  at  the  Bulgarian,  “Out  with  you,  you  scoundrel!” 

Judge  [to  the  police  officer]:  Take  him  away. 

Dimitroff  [being  led  away  by  the  police]:  Are  you 
afraid  of  my  questions,  Herr  Ministerpraesident? 

Goering:  You  wait  until  we  get  you  outside  this  court, 
you  scoundrel! 

Torgler  and  the  three  Bulgarians  were  acquitted,  though 
the  German  Communist  leader  was  immediately  taken 
into  “protective  custody,”  where  he  remained  until  his 
death  during  the  second  war.  Van  der  Lubbe  was  found 
guilty  and  decapitated.7 

The  trial,  despite  the  subserviency  of  the  court  to  the 
Nazi  authorities,  cast  a great  deal  of  suspicion  on  Goering 
and  the  Nazis,  but  it  came  too  late  to  have  any  practical 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  271 

effect.  For  Hitler  had  lost  no  time  in  exploiting  the 
Reichstag  fire  to  the  limit. 

On  the  day  following  the  fire,  February  28,  he  prevailed 
on  President  Hindenburg  to  sign  a decree  “For  the  Pro- 
tection of  the  People  and  the  State”  suspending  the  seven 
sections  of  the  constitution  which  guaranteed  individual 
and  civil  liberties.  Described  as  a “defensive  measure 
against  Communist  acts  of  violence  endangering  the  state,” 
the  decree  laid  down  that: 

Restrictions  on  personal  liberty,  on  the  right  of  free  ex- 
pression of  opinion,  including  freedom  of  the  press;  on  the 
rights  of  assembly  and  association;  and  violations  of  the 
privacy  of  postal,  telegraphic  and  telephonic  communica- 
tions; and  warrants  for  house  searchers,  orders  for  con- 
fiscations as  well  as  restrictions  on  property,  are  also  per- 
missible beyond  the  legal  limits  otherwise  prescribed. 

In  addition,  the  decree  authorized  the  Reich  govern- 
ment to  take  over  complete  power  in  the  federal  states 
when  necessary  and  imposed  the  death  sentence  for 
a number  of  crimes,  including  “serious  disturbances  of 
the  peace”  by  armed  persons.8 

Thus  with  one  stroke  Hitler  was  able  not  only  to  legally 
gag  his  opponents  and  arrest  them  at  his  will  but,  by 
making  the  trumped-up  Communist  threat  “official,”  as  it 
were,  to  throw  millions  of  the  middle  class  and  the  peas- 
antry into  a frenzy  of  fear  that  unless  they  voted  for 
National  Socialism  at  the  elections  a week  hence,  the 
Bolsheviks  might  take  over.  Some  four  thoussand  Com- 
munist officials  and  a great  many  Social  Democrat  and 
liberal  leaders  were  arrested,  including  members  of  the 
Reichstag,  who,  according  to  the  law,  were  immune  from 
arrest.  This  was  the  first  experience  Germans  had  had  with 
Nazi  terror  backed  up  by  the  government.  Truckloads 
of  storm  troopers  roared  through  the  streets  all  over  Ger- 
many, breaking  into  homes,  rounding  up  victims  and  cart- 
ing them  off  to  S.A.  barracks,  where  they  were  tortured 
and  beaten.  The  Communist  press  and  political  meetings 
were  suppressed;  the  Social  Democrat  newspapers  and 
many  liberal  journals  were  suspended  and  the  meetings  of 
the  democratic  parties  either  banned  or  broken  up.  Only 
the  Nazis  and  their  Nationalist  allies  were  permitted  to 
campaign  unmolested. 


272 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

With  all  the  resources  of  the  national  and  Prussian  gover- 
ments  at  their  disposal  and  with  plenty  of  money  from  big 
business  in  their  coffers,  the  Nazis  carried  on  an  election 
propaganda  such  as  Germany  had  never  seen  before.  For 
the  first  time  the  State-run  radio  carried  the  voices  of 
Hitler,  Goering  and  Goebbels  to  every  corner  of  the  land. 
The  streets,  bedecked  with  swastika  flags,  echoed  to  the 
tramp  of  the  storm  troopers.  There  were  mass  rallies, 
torchlight  parades,  the  din  of  loudspeakers  in  the  squares. 
The  billboards  were  plastered  with  flamboyant  Nazi  post- 
ers and  at  night  bonfires  lit  up  the  hills.  The  electorate  was 
in  turn  cajoled  with  promises  of  a German  paradise,  in- 
timidated by  the  brown  terror  in  the  streets  and  frightened 
by  “revelations”  about  the  Communist  “revolution.”  The 
day  after  the  Reichstag  fire  the  Prussian  government  issued 
a long  statement  declaring  that  it  had  found  Communist 
“documents”  proving: 

Government  buildings,  museums,  mansions  and  essential 
plants  were  to  be  burned  down  . . . Women  and  children 
were  to  be  sent  in  front  of  terrorist  groups  . . . The  burning 
of  the  Reichstag  was  to  be  the  signal  for  a bloody  insurrec- 
tion and  civil  war  ...  It  has  been  ascertained  that  today 
was  to  have  seen  throughout  Germany  terrorist  acts  against 
individual  persons,  against  private  property,  and  against  the 
life  and  limb  of  the  peaceful  population,  and  also  the 
beginning  of  general  civil  war. 

Publication  of  the  “documents  proving  the  Communist 
conspiracy”  was  promised,  but  never  made.  The  fact,  how- 
ever, that  the  Prussian  government  itself  vouched  for  their 
authenticity  impressed  many  Germans. 

The  waverers  were  also  impressed  perhaps  by  Goering’s 
threats.  At  Frankfurt  on  March  3,  on  the  eve  of  the 
elections,  he  shouted: 

Fellow  Germans,  my  measures  will  not  be  crippled  by 
any  judicial  thinking  ...  I don’t  have  to  worry  about  justice; 
my  mission  is  only  to  destroy  and  exterminate,  nothing 
more!  . . . Certainly,  I shall  use  the  power  of  the  State 
and  the  police  to  the  utmost,  my  dear  Communists,  so 
don’t  draw  any  false  conclusions;  but  the  struggle  to  the 
death,  in  which  my  fist  will  grasp  your  necks,  I shall  lead 
with  those  down  there — the  Brownshirts.9 

Almost  unheard  was  the  voice  of  former  Chancellor 


273 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

Bruening,  who  also  spoke  out  that  day,  proclaiming  that 
his  Center  Party  would  resist  any  overthrow  of  the  con- 
stitution, demanding  an  investigation  of  the  suspicious 
Reichstag  fire  and  calling  on  President  Hindenburg  “to 
protect  the  oppressed  against  their  oppressors.”  Vain  ap- 
peal! The  aged  President  kept  his  silence.  It  was  now  time 
for  the  people,  in  their  convulsion,  to  speak. 

On  March  5,  1933,  the  day  of  the  last  democratic  elec- 
tions they  were  to  know  during  Hitler’s  life,  they  spoke 
with  their  ballots.  Despite  all  the  terror  and  intimidation, 
the  majority  of  them  rejected  Hitler.  The  Nazis  led  the 
polling  with  17,277,180  votes — an  increase  of  some  five 
and  a half  million,  but  it  comprised  only  44  per  cent  of  the 
total  vote.  A clear  majority  still  eluded  Hitler.  All  the 
persecution  and  suppression  of  the  previous  weeks  did  not 
prevent  the  Center  Party  from  actually  increasing  its  vote 
from  4,230,600  to  4,424,900;  with  its  ally,  the  Catholic 
Bavarian  People’s  Party,  it  obtained  a total  of  five  and  a 
half  million  votes.  Even  the  Social  Democrats  held  their 
position  as  the  second  largest  party,  polling  7,181,629 
votes,  a drop  of  only  70,000.  The  Communists  lost  a mil- 
lion supporters  but  still  polled  4,848,058  votes.  The  Nation- 
alists, led  by  Papen  and  Hugenberg,  were  bitterly  disap- 
pointed with  their  own  showing,  a vote  of  3,136,760,  a 
mere  8 per  cent  of  the  votes  cast  and  a gain  of  less  than 
200,000. 

Still,  the  Nationalists’  52  seats,  added  to  the  288  of  the 
Nazis,  gave  the  government  a majority  of  16  in  the  Reichs- 
tag. This  was  enough,  perhaps,  to  carry  on  the  day-to-day 
business  of  government  but  it  was  far  short  of  the  two- 
thirds  majority  which  Hitler  needed  to  carry  out  a new, 
bold  plan  to  establish  his  dictatorship  by  consent  of  Par- 
liament. 

GLEICHSCHA  LTUNG:  THE  “CO-ORDINATION” 
OF  THE  REICH 

The  plan  was  deceptively  simple  and  had  the  advantage 
of  cloaking  the  seizure  of  absolute  power  in  legality. 
The  Reichstag  would  be  asked  to  pass  an  “enabling  act” 
conferring  on  Hitler’s  cabinet  exclusive  legislative  powers 
for  four  years.  Put  even  more  simply,  the  German  Parlia- 
ment would  be  requested  to  turn  over  its  constitutional 


274 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

functions  to  Hilter  and  take  a long  vacation.  But  since 
this  necessitated  a change  in  the  constitution,  a two-thirds 
majority  was  needed  to  approve  it. 

How  to  obtain  that  majority  was  the  main  order  of  busi- 
ness at  a cabinet  meeting  on  March  15,  1933,  the  minutes 
of  which  were  produced  at  Nuremberg.10  Part  of  the  prob- 
lem would  be  solved  by  the  “absence”  of  the  eighty-one 
Communist  members  of  the  Reichstag.  Goering  felt  sure 
that  the  rest  of  the  problem  could  be  easily  disposed  of 
“by  refusing  admittance  to  a few  Social  Democrats.”  Hitler 
was  in  a breezy,  confident  mood.  After  all,  by  the  decree 
of  February  28,  which  he  had  induced  Hindenburg  to  sign 
the  day  after  the  Reichstag  fire,  he  could  arrest  as  many 
opposition  deputies  as  was  necessary  to  assure  his  two- 
thirds  majority.  There  was  some  question  about  the  Cath- 
olic Center,  which  was  demanding  guarantees,  but  the 
Chancellor  was  certain  that  this  party  would  go  along  with 
him.  Hugenberg,  the  Nationalist  leader,  who  had  no  desire 
to  put  all  the  power  in  Hilter’s  hands,  demanded  that  the 
President  be  authorized  to  participate  in  preparing  laws 
decreed  by  the  cabinet  under  the  enabling  act.  Dr.  Meiss- 
ner, the  State  Secretary  in  the  Presidential  Chancellery, 
who  had  already  committed  his  future  to  the  Nazis,  replied 
that  “the  collaboration  of  the  Reich  President  would  not 
be  necessary.”  He  was  quick  to  realize  that  Hitler  had  no 
wish  to  be  tied  down  by  the  stubborn  old  President,  as 
the  republican  chancellors  had  been. 

But  Hitler  wished,  at  this  stage,  to  make  a grandiose 
gesture  to  the  aged  Field  Marshal  and  to  the  Army  and 
the  nationalist  conservatives  as  well,  and  in  so  doing  link 
his  rowdy,  revolutionary  regime  with  Hindenburg’s  ven- 
erable name  and  with  all  the  past  military  glories  of 
Prussia.  To  accomplish  this  he  and  Goebbels,  who  on 
March  13  became  Minister  of  Propaganda,  conceived  a 
master  stroke.  Hitler  would  open  the  new  Reichstag,  which 
he  was  about  to  destroy,  in  the  Garrison  Church  at 
Potsdam,  the  great  shrine  of  Prussianism,  which  aroused 
in  so  many  Germans  memories  of  imperial  glories  and 
grandeur,  for  here  lay  buried  the  bones  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  here  the  Hohenzollern  kings  had  worshiped,  here 
Hindenburg  had  first  come  in  1866  on  a pilgrimage  when 
he  returned  as  a young  Guards  officer  from  the  Austro- 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  275 

Prussian  War,  a war  which  had  given  Germany  its  first 
unification. 

The  date  chosen  for  the  ceremonial  opening  of  the  first 
Reichstag  of  the  Third  Reich,  March  21,  was  significant 
too,  for  it  fell  on  the  anniversary  of  the  day  on  which 
Bismarck  had  opened  the  first  Reichstag  of  the  Second  Reich 
m 1871.  As  the  old  field  marshals,  generals  and  admirals 
from  imperial  times  gathered  in  their  resplendent  uni- 
forms in  the  Garrison  Church,  led  by  the  former  Crown 
Prince  and  Field  Marshal  von  Mackensen  in  the  imposing 
dress  and  headgear  of  the  Death’s-Head  Hussars,  the 
shades  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  Iron  Chancellor 
hovered  over  the  assembly. 

Hindenburg  was  visibly  moved,  and  at  one  point  in  the 
ceremony  Goebbels,  who  was  staging  the  performance 
and  directing  the  broadcasting  of  it  to  the  nation,  ob- 
served— and  noted  in  his  diary — that  the  old  Field  Mar- 
shal had  tears  in  his  eyes.  Flanked  by  Hitler,  who  appeared 
ill  at  ease  in  his  formal  cutaway  morning  coat,  the  Presi- 
dent, attired  in  field-gray  uniform  with  the  grand  cordon 
of  the  Black  Eagle,  and  carrying  a spiked  helmet  in  one 
hand  and  his  marshal  s baton  in  the  other,  had  marched 
slowly  down  the  aisle,  paused  to  salute  the  empty  seat  of 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  in  the  imperial  gallery,  and  then  in 
front  of  the  altar  had  read  a brief  speech  giving  his 
blessings  to  the  new  Hitler  government. 

May  the  old  spirit  of  this  celebrated  shrine  permeate  the 
generation  of  today,  may  it  liberate  us  from  selfishness  and 
party  strife  and  bring  us  together  in  national  self-con- 
sciousness to  bless  a proud  and  free  Germany,  united  in  her- 
self. 

Hitler’s  reply  was  shrewdly  designed  to  play  on  the  sym- 
pathies and  enlist  the  confidence  of  the  Old  Order  so  glit- 
teringly  represented. 

Neither  the  Kaiser  nor  the  government  nor  the  nation 
wanted  the  war.  It  was  only  the  collapse  of  the  nation 
which  compelled  a weakened  race  to  take  upon  itself,  against 
its  most  sacred  convictions,  the  guilt  for  this  war. 

And  then,  turning  to  Hindenburg,  who  sat  stiffly  in  his 
chair  a few  feet  in  front  of  him: 

By  a unique  upheaval  in  the  last  few  weeks  our  national 


276  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

honor  has  been  restored  and,  thanks  to  your  understanding, 
Herr  Generalfeldmarschall,  the  union  between  the  symbols 
of  the  old  greatness  and  the  new  strength  has  been  cele- 
brated. We  pay  you  homage.  A protective  Providence  places 
you  over  the  new  forces  of  our  nation.11 

Hitler,  with  a show  of  deep  humility  toward  the  Presi- 
dent he  intended  to  rob  of  his  political  power  before  the 
week  was  up,  stepped  down,  bowed  low  to  Hindenburg 
and  gripped  his  hand.  There  in  the  flashing  lights  of 
camera  bulbs  and  amid  the  clicking  of  movie  cameras, 
which  Goebbels  had  placed  along  with  microphones  at 
strategic  spots,  was  recorded  for  the  nation  and  the  world 
to  see,  and  to  hear  described,  the  solemn  handclasp  of  the 
German  Field  Marshal  and  the  Austrian  corporal  uniting 
the  new  Germany  with  the  old. 

“After  the  dazzling  pledge  made  by  Hitler  at  Potsdam,” 
the  French  ambassador,  who  was  present  at  the  scene, 
later  wrote,  “how  could  such  men — Hindenburg  and  his 
friends,  the  Junkers  and  monarchist  barons,  Hugenberg 
and  his  German  Nationalists,  the  officers  of  the  Reichs- 
wfhr  how  could  they  fail  to  dismiss  the  apprehension 
with  which  they  had  begun  to  view  the  excesses  and 
abuses  of  his  party?  Could  they  now  hesitate  to  grant 
him  their  entire  confidence,  to  meet  all  his  requests,  to 
concede  the  full  powers  he  claimed?”  12 

The  answer  was  given  two  days  later,  on  March  23,  in 
the  Kroll  Opera  House  in  Berlin,  where  the  Reichstag 
convened.  Before  the  house  was  the  so-called  Enabling 
Act — the  “Law  for  Removing  the  Distress  of  People  and 
Reich  ( Gesetz  zur  Behebung  der  Not  -von  Volk  und  Reich), 
as  it  was  officially  called.  Its  five  brief  paragraphs  took 
the  power  of  legislation,  including  control  of  the  Reich 
budget,  approval  of  treaties  with  foreign  states  and  the 
initiating  of  constitutional  amendments,  away  from  Parlia- 
ment and  handed  it  over  to  the  Reich  cabinet  for  a 
period  of  four  years.  Moreover,  the  act  stipulated  that  the 
laws  enacted  by  the  cabinet  were  to  be  drafted  by  the 
Chancellor  and  “might  deviate  from  the  constitution.”  No 
laws  were  to  “affect  the  position  of  the  Reichstag” — surely 
the  crudest  joke  of  all — and  the  powers  of  the  President 
remained  “undisturbed.”  13 

Hitler  reiterated  these  last  two  points  in  a speech  of 


277 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

unexpected  restraint  to  the  deputies  assembled  in  the  or- 
nate opera  house,  which  had  long  specialized  in  the  lighter 
operatic  works  and  whose  aisles  were  now  lined  with 
brown-shirted  storm  troopers,  whose  scarred  bully  faces 
indicated  that  no  nonsense  would  be  tolerated  from  the 
representatives  of  the  people. 

The  government  [Hitler  promised]  will  make  use  of 
these  powers  only  insofar  as  they  are  essential  for  carrying 
out  vitally  necessary  measures.  Neither  the  existence  of  the 
Reichstag  nor  that  of  the  Reichsrat  is  menaced.  The  posi- 
tion and  rights  of  the  President  remain  unaltered  . . . The 
separate  existence  of  the  federal  states  will  not  be  done 
away  with.  The  rights  of  the  churches  will  not  be  dimin- 
ished and  their  relationship  to  the  State  will  not  be  modified. 
The  number  of  cases  in  which  an  internal  necessity  exists 
for  having  recourse  to  such  a law  is  in  itself  a limited  one. 

The  fiery  Nazi  leader  sounded  quite  moderate  and  al- 
most modest;  it  was  too  early  in  the  life  of  the  Third 
Reich  for  even  the  opposition  members  to  know  full  well 
the  value  of  Hitler’s  promises.  Yet  one  of  them,  Otto 
Wells,  leader  of  the  Social  Democrats,  a dozen  of  whose 
deputies  had  been  “detained”  by  the  police,  rose — amid 
the  roar  of  the  storm  troopers  outside  yelling,  “Full 
powers,  or  else!” — to  defy  the  would-be  dictator.  Speaking 
quietly  and  with  great  dignity.  Wells  declared  that  the 
government  might  strip  the  Socialists  of  their  power  but 
it  could  never  strip  them  of  their  honor. 

We  German  Social  Democrats  pledge  ourselves  solemnly  in 
this  historic  hour  to  the  principles  of  humanity  and  justice, 
of  freedom  and  socialism.  No  enabling  act  can  give  you  the 
power  to  destroy  ideas  which  are  eternal  and  indestructible. 

Furious,  Hitler  jumped  to  his  feet,  and  now  the  as- 
sembly received  a real  taste  of  the  man. 

You  come  late,  but  yet  you  come!  [he  shouted]  . . . 
You  are  no  longer  needed  . . . The  star  of  Germany  will  rise 
and  yours  will  sink.  Your  death  knell  has  sounded.  ...  I 
do  not  want  your  votes.  Germany  will  be  free,  but  not 
through  you!  [Stormy  applause.] 

The  Social  Democrats,  who  bore  a heavy  responsibility 
for  the  weakening  of  the  Republic,  would  at  least  stick 
to  their  principles  and  go  down — this  one  time — defiantly. 


278  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

But  not  the  Center  Party,  which  once  had  successfully  de- 
fied the  Iron  Chancellor  in  the  Kulturkampf.  Monsignor 
Kaas,  the  party  leader,  had  demanded  a written  promise 
from  Hitler  that  he  would  respect  the  President’s  power 
of  veto.  But  though  promised  before  the  voting,  it  was 
never  given.  Nevertheless  the  Center  leader  rose  to  an- 
nounce that  his  party  would  vote  for  the  bill.  Bruening 
remained  silent.  The  vote  was  soon  taken:  441  for,  and 
84  (all  Social  Democrats)  against.  The  Nazi  deputies  sprang 
to  their  feet  shouting  and  stamping  deliriously  and  then, 
joined  by  the  storm  troopers,  burst  into  the  Horst  Wessel 
song,  which  soon  would  take  its  place  alongside 
“Deutschland  ueber  Alles”  as  one  of  the  two  national 
anthems: 

Raise  high  the  flags!  Stand  rank  on  rank  together. 

Storm  troopers  march  with  steady,  quiet  tread.  . . . 

Thus  was  parliamentary  democracy  finally  interred  in 
Germany.  Except  for  the  arrests  of  the  Communists  and 
some  of  the  Social  Democratic  deputies,  it  was  all  done 
quite  legally,  though  accompanied  by  terror.  Parliament 
had  turned  over  its  constitutional  authority  to  Hitler  and 
thereby  committed  suicide,  though  its  body  lingered  on  in 
an  embalmed  state  to  the  very  end  of  the  Third  Reich, 
serving  infrequently  as  a sounding  board  for  some  of 
Hitler’s  thunderous  pronunciamentos,  its  members  hence- 
forth hand-picked  by  the  Nazi  Party,  for  there  were  to  be 
no  more  real  elections.  It  was  this  Enabling  Act  alone 
which  formed  the  legal  basis  for  Hitler’s  dictatorship. 
From  March  23,  1933,  on,  Hitler  was  the  dictator  of  the 
Reich,  freed  of  any  restraint  by  Parliament  or,  for  all 
practical  purposes,  by  the  weary  old  President.  To  be 
sure,  much  remained  to  be  done  to  bring  the  entire  nation 
and  all  its  institutions  completely  under  the  Nazi  heel, 
though,  as  we  shall  see,  this  also  was  accomplished  with 
breathless  speed  and  with  crudeness,  trickery  and  bru- 
tality. 

“The  street  gangs,”  in  the  words  of  Alan  Bullock,  “had 
seized  control  of  the  resources  of  a great  modern  State, 
the  gutter  had  come  to  power.”  But — as  Hitler  never  ceased 
to  boast — “legally,”  by  an  overwhelming  vote  of  Parlia- 
ment. The  Germans  had  no  one  to  blame  but  themselves. 

One  by  one,  Germany’s  most  powerful  institutions  now 


279 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

began  to  surrender  to  Hitler  and  to  pass  quietly,  un- 
protestingly  out  of  existence. 

The  states,  which  had  stubbornly  maintained  their 
separate  powers  throughout  German  history,  were  the 
first  to  fall.  On  the  evening  of  March  9,  two  weeks  before 
the  passage  of  the  Enabling  Act,  General  von  Epp,  on 
orders  from  Hitler  and  Frick  and  with  the  help  of  a few 
storm  troopers,  turned  out  the  government  of  Bavaria  and 
set  up  a Nazi  regime.  Within  a week  Reich  Commissars 
were  appointed  to  take  over  in  the  other  states,  with  the 
exception  of  Prussia,  where  Goering  was  already  firmly  in 
the  saddle.  On  March  31,  Hitler  and  Frick,  using  the 
Enabling  Act  for  the  first  time,  promulgated  a law  dis- 
solving the  diets  of  all  states  except  Prussia  and  ordering 
them  reconstituted  on  the  basis  of  the  votes  cast  in  the  last 
Reichstag  election.  Communist  seats  were  not  to  be  filled. 
But  this  solution  lasted  only  a week.  The  Chancellor, 
working  at  feverish  haste,  issued  a new  law  on  April  7, 
appointing  Reich  Governors  ( Reichsstaathaelter ) in  all  the 
states  and  empowering  them  to  appoint  and  remove  local 
governments,  dissolve  the  diets,  and  appoint  and  dismiss 
state  officials  and  judges.  Each  of  the  new  governors  was 
a Nazi  and  they  were  “required”  to  carry  out  “the  general 
policy  laid  down  by  the  Reich  Chancellor.” 

Thus,  within  a fortnight  of  receiving  full  powers  from 
the  Reichstag,  Hitler  had  achieved  what  Bismarck,  Wil- 
helm II  and  the  Weimar  Republic  had  never  dared  to  at- 
tempt: he  had  abolished  the  separate  powers  of  the  historic 
states  and  made  them  subject  to  the  central  authority  of 
the  Reich,  which  was  in  his  hands.  He  had,  for  the  first 
time  in  German  history,  really  unified  the  Reich  by 
destroying  its  age-old  federal  character.  On  January  30, 
1934,  the  first  anniversary  of  his  becoming  Chancellor, 
Hitler  would  formally  complete  the  task  by  means  of  a 
Law  for  the  Reconstruction  of  the  Reich.  “Popular  as- 
semblies” of  the  states  were  abolished,  the  sovereign  pow- 
ers of  the  states  were  transferred  to  the  Reich,  all  state 
governments  were  placed  under  the  Reich  government 
and  the  state  governors  put  under  the  administration  of 
the  Reich  Minister  of  the  Interior.14  As  this  Minister, 
Frick,  explained  it,  “The  state  governments  from  now  on 
are  merely  administrative  bodies  of  the  Reich.” 

The  preamble  to  the  law  of  January  30,  1934,  pro- 


280  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

claimed  that  it  was  “promulgated  with  the  unanimous  vote 
of  the  Reichstag.”  This  was  true,  for  by  this  time  all 
the  political  parties  of  Germany  except  the  Nazis  had  been 
quickly  eliminated. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  they  went  down  fighting.  On  May 
19,  1933,  the  Social  Democrats — those  who  were  not  in 
jail  or  in  exile — voted  in  the  Reichstag  without  a dissenting 
voice  to  approve  Hitler’s  foreign  policy.  Nine  days  before, 
Goering’s  police  had  seized  the  party’s  buildings  and  news- 
papers and  confiscated  its  property.  Nevertheless,  the 
Socialists  still  tried  to  appease  Hitler.  They  denounced 
their  comrades  abroad . who  were  attacking  the  Fuehrer. 
On  June  19  they  elected  a new  party  committee,  but  three 
days  later  Frick  put  an  end  to  their  attempts  to  com- 
promise by  dissolving  the  Social  Democratic  Party,  as  “sub- 
versive and  inimical  to  the  State.”  Paul  Lobe,  the  sur- 
viving leader,  and  several  of  his  party  members  in  the 
Reichstag  were  arrested.  The  Communists,  of  course,  had 
already  been  suppressed. 

This  left  the  middle-class  parties,  but  not  for  long.  The 
Catholic  Bavarian  People’s  Party,  whose  government  had 
been  kicked  out  of  office  by  the  Nazi  coup  on  March  9, 
announced  its  own  dissolution  on  July  4,  and  its  ally,  the 
Center  Party,  which  had  defied  Bismarck  so  strenuously 
and  been  a bulwark  of  the  Republic,  followed  suit  the 
next  day,  leaving  Germany  for  the  first  time  in  the  modem 
era  without  a Catholic  political  party — a fact  which  did 
not  discourage  the  Vatican  from  signing  a concordat  with 
Hitler’s  government  a fortnight  later.  Stresemann’s  old 
party,  the  People’s  Party,  committed  hara-kiri  on  the 
Fourth  of  July;  the  Democrats  ( Staatspartei ) had  already 
done  so  a week  before. 

And  what  of  Hitler’s  partner  in  government,  the  German 
National  Party,  without  whose  support  the  former  Austrian 
corporal  could  never  have  come  legally  to  power?  Despite 
its  closeness  to  Hindenburg,  the  Army,  the  Junkers  and 
big  business  and  the  debt  owed  to  it  by  Hitler,  it  went  the 
way  of  all  other  parties  and  with  the  same  meekness.  On 
June  21  the  police  and  the  storm  troopers  took  over  its 
offices  throughout  the  country,  and  on  June  29  Hugen- 
berg,  the  bristling  party  leader,  who  had  helped  boost 
Hitler  into  the  Chancellery  but  six  months  before,  re- 


281 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

signed  from  the  government  and  his  aides  “voluntarily” 
dissolved  the  party. 

The  Nazi  Party  alone  remained,  and  on  July  14  a law 
decreed: 

The  National  Socialist  German  Workers’  Party  constitutes 
the  only  political  party  in  Germany. 

Whoever  undertakes  to  maintain  the  organizational  struc- 
ture of  another  political  party  or  to  form  a new  political 
party  will  be  punished  with  penal  servitude  up  to  three  years 
or  with  imprisonment  of  from  six  months  to  three  years,  if 
the  deed  is  not  subject  to  a greater  penalty  according  to 
other  regulations.15 

The  one-party  totalitarian  State  had  been  achieved  with 
scarcely  a ripple  of  opposition  or  defiance,  and  within 
four  months  after  the  Reichstag  had  abdicated  its  demo- 
cratic responsibilities. 

The  free  trade  unions,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  once 
had  crushed  the  fascist  Kapp  putsch  by  the  simple  means 
of  declaring  a general  strike,  were  disposed  of  as  easily 
as  the  political  parties  and  the  states — though  not  until 
an  elaborate  piece  of  trickery  had  been  practiced  on  them. 
For  half  a century  May  Day  had  been  the  traditional  day 
of  celebration  for  the  German- — and  European— worker. 
To  lull  the  workers  and  their  leaders  before  it  struck,  the 
Nazi  government  proclaimed  May  Day,  1933,  as  a national 
holiday,  officially  named  it  the  “Day  of  National  Labor” 
and  prepared  to  celebrate  it  as  it  had  never  been  celebrated 
before.  The  trade-union  leaders  were  taken  in  by  this  sur- 
prising display  of  friendliness  toward  the  working  class 
by  the  Nazis  and  enthusiastically  co-operated  with  the 
government  and  the  party  in  making  the  day  a success. 
Labor  leaders  were  flown  to  Berlin  from  all  parts  of  Ger- 
many, thousands  of  banners  were  unfurled  acclaiming 
the  Nazi  regime’s  solidarity  with  the  worker,  and  out  at 
Tempelhof  Field  Goebbels  prepared  to  stage  the  greatest 
mass  demonstration  Germany  had  ever  seen.  Before  the 
massive  rally.  Hitler  himself  received  the  workers’  dele- 
gates, declaring,  “You  will  see  how  untrue  and  unjust  is 
the  statement  that  the  revolution  is  directed  against  the 
German  workers.  On  the  contrary.”  Later  in  his  speech  to 
more  than  100,000  workers  at  the  airfield  Hi.ler  pro- 
nounced the  motto,  “Honor  work  and  respect  the  worker!” 


282 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Mid  promised  that  May  Day  would  be  celebrated  in  honor 
ot  Oerman  labor  “throughout  the  centuries.’* 

Late  that  night  Goebbels,  after  describing  in  his  most 
purple  prose  the  tremendous  enthusiasm  of  the  workers 
tor  this  May  Day  celebration  which  he  had  so  brilliantly 
staged,  added  a curious  sentence  in  his  diary:  “Tomorrow 
we  shall  occupy  the  trade-union  buildings.  There  will  be 
little  resistance.”  * 16 

That  is  what  happened.  On  May  2 the  trade-union  head- 
quarters throughout  the  country  were  occupied,  union 
funds  confiscated,  the  unions  dissolved  and  the  leaders  ar- 
rested. Many  were  beaten  and  lodged  in  concentration 
camps.  Theodor  Leipart  and  Peter  Grassmann,  the  chair- 
men of  the  Trade  Union  Confederation,  had  openly 
pledged  themselves  to  co-operate  with  the  Nazi  regime  No 
matter,  they  were  arrested.  “The  Leiparts  and  Grassmanns,” 
said  Dr.  Robert  Ley,  the  alcoholic  Cologne  party  boss 
who  was  assigned  by  Hitler  to  take  over  the  unions  and 
establish  the  German  Labor  Front,  “may  hypocritically 
declare  their  devotion  to  the  Fuehrer  as  much  as  they  like 

but  it  is  better  that  they  should  be  in  prison.”  And  that  is 
where  they  were  put. 

At  first,  though,  both  Hitler  and  Ley  tried  to  assure  the 
workers  that  their  rights  would  be  protected.  Said  Ley  in 
his  first  proclamation:  “Workers!  Your  institutions  are 
sacred  to  us  National  Socialists.  I myself  am  a poor  peas- 
ant’s son  and  understand  poverty  ...  I know  the  exploita- 
tion of  anonymous  capitalism.  Workersl  I swear  to  you, 
we  will  not  only  keep  everything  that  exists,  we  will  build 
up  the  protection  and  the  rights  of  the  workers  still 
further.” 

Within  three  weeks  the  hollowness  of  another  Nazi 
promise  was  exposed  when  Hitler  decreed  a law  bringing 
an  end  to  collective  bargaining  and  providing  that  hence- 
forth “labor  trustees,”  appointed  by  him,  would  “regulate 
labor  contracts”  and  maintain  “labor  peace.”  18  Since  the 
decisions  of  the  trustees  were  to  be  legally  binding,  the 


'?hlch  cam®. t0  light  at  Nuremberg  shows  that  the  Nazis  had 
dated  PAnri  1 ?l  f°r  .S0I7le  ‘'ra'  lo  destroy  the  trade  unions.  A secret  order 
?i  d sl?ned  hi-  ,9r-  Ley  contained  detailed  instructions  for 
ra-ordmatmg  the  unions  on  May  2.  S.A.  and  S.S.  troops  were  to  carry 
*ie,,  occupation  of  trade-union  properties”  and  to  “take  into  protective 
.alirun!onTTlei'ders.  Union  funds  were  to  be  seized.”  The  Christian 
June24  5 Trade  Umons  were  not  molested  on  May  2.  Their  end  came  on 


283 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

law,  in  effect,  outlawed  strikes.  Ley  promised  “to  restore 
absolute  leadership  to  the  natural  leader  of  a factory — that 
is,  the  employer  . . . Only  the  employer  can  decide.  Many 
employers  have  for  years  had  to  call  for  the  ‘master  in 
the  house.’  Now  they  are  once  again  to  be  the  ‘master  in 
the  house.’  ” 

For  the  time  being,  business  management  was  pleased. 
The  generous  contributions  which  so  many  employers 
had  made  to  the  National  Socialist  German  Workers’  Party 
were  paying  off.  Yet  for  business  to  prosper  a certain 
stability  of  society  is  necessary,  and  all  through  the 
spring  and  early  summer  law  and  order  were  crumbling 
in  Germany  as  the  frenzied  brown-shirted  gangs  roamed 
the  streets,  arresting  and  beating  up  and  sometimes  mur- 
dering whomever  they  pleased  while  the  police  looked  on 
without  lifting  a nightstick.  The  terror  in  the  streets  was 
not  the  result  of  the  breakdown  of  the  State’s  authority,  as 
it  had  been  in  the  French  Revolution,  but  on  the  contrary 
was  carried  out  with  the  encouragement  and  often  on  the 
orders  of  the  State,  whose  authority  in  Germany  had  never 
been  greater  or  more  concentrated.  Judges  were  intimi- 
dated; they  were  afraid  for  their  lives  if  they  convicted  and 
sentenced  a storm  trooper  even  for  cold-blooded  murder. 
Hitler  was  now  the  law,  as  Goering  said,  and  as  late  as 
May  and  June  1933  the  Fuehrer  was  declaiming  that  “the 
National  Socialist  Revolution  has  not  yet  run  its  course” 
and  that  “it  will  be  victoriously  completed  only  if  a new 
German  people  is  educated.”  In  Nazi  parlance,  “educated” 
meant  “intimidated” — to  a point  where  all  would  accept 
docilely  the  Nazi  dictatorship  and  its  barbarism.  To  Hitler, 
as  he  had  publicly  declared  a thousand  times,  the  Jews 
were  not  Germans,  and  though  he  did  not  exterminate 
them  at  once  (only  a relative  few — a few  thousand,  that 
is — were  robbed,  beaten  or  murdered  during  the  first 
months),  he  issued  laws  excluding  them  from  public  serv- 
ice, the  universities  and  the  professions.  And  on  April  1, 
1933,  he  proclaimed  a national  boycott  of  Jewish  shops. 

The  businessmen,  who  had  been  so  enthusiastic  over  the 
smashing  of  the  troublesome  labor  unions,  now  found  that 
left-wing  Nazis,  who  really  beiieved  in  the  party’s  social- 
ism, were  trying  to  take  over  the  employers’  associati  ms, 
destroy  the  big  department  stores  and  nationalize  industry. 
Thousands  of  ragged  Nazi  Party  officials  descended  on  the 


284  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

business  houses  of  those  who  had  not  supported  Hitler, 
threatening  to  seize  them  in  some  cases,  and  in  others 
demanding  well-paying  jobs  in  the  management.  Dr.  Gott- 
fried Feder,  the  economic  crank,  now  insisted  that  the 
party  program  be  carried  out — nationalization  of  big 
business,  profit  sharing  and  the  abolition  of  unearned  in- 
comes and  “interest  slavery.”  As  if  this  were  not  enough 
to  frighten  the  businessmen,  Walther  Darre,  who  had  just 
been  named  Minister  of  Agriculture,  threw  the  bankers 
into  jitters  by  promising  a big  reduction  in  the  capital 
debts  of  the  farmers  and  a cut  in  the  interest  rate  on  what 
remained  to  2 per  cent. 

Why  not?  Hitler  was,  by  midsummer  of  1933,  the  master 
of  Germany.  He  could  now  carry  out  his  program  Papen, 
for  all  his  cunning,  had  been  left  high  and  dry,  and  all 
his  calculations  that  he  and  Hugenberg  and  the  other  de- 
fenders of  the  Old  Order,  with  their  8-to-3  majority  in 
the  cabinet  against  the  Nazis,  could  control  Hitler  and 
indeed  use  him  for  their  own  conservative  ends,  had  ex- 
ploded in  his  face.  He  himself  had  been  booted  out  of  his 
post  as  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  and  replaced  by  Goering. 
Papen  remained  Vice-Chancellor  in  the  Reich  cabinet 
but,  as  he  ruefully  admitted  later,  “this  position  turned 
out  to  be  anomalous.”  Hugenberg,  the  apostle  of  business 
and  finance,  was  gone,  his  party  dissolved.  Goebbels, 
the  third  most  important  man  in  the  Nazi  Party,  had  been 
brought  into  the  cabinet  on  March  13  as  Minister  of  Popu- 
lar Enlightenment  and  Propaganda.  Darre,  regarded  as  a 
radical,  as  was  Goebbels,  was  Minister  of  Agriculture. 

Dr.  Hans  Luther,  the  conservative  president  of  the 
Reichsbank,  the  key  post  in  the  German  economic  system, 
was  fired  by  Hitler  and  packed  off  to  Washington  as  am- 
bassador. Into  his  place,  on  March  17,  1933,  stepped  the 
jaunty  Dr.  Schacht,  the  former  head  of  the  Reichsbank  and 
devoted  follower  of  Hitler,  who  had  seen  the  “truth  and 
necessity”  of  Nazism.  No  single  man  in  all  of  Germany 
would  be  more  helpful  to  Hitler  in  building  up  the  eco- 
nomic strength  of  the  Third  Reich  and  in  furthering  its 
rearmament  for  the  Second  World  War  than  Schacht,  who 
later  became  also  Minister  of  Economics  and  Plenipo- 
tentiary-General for  War  Economy.  It  is  true  that  shortly 
before  the  second  war  began  he  turned  against  his  idol, 
eventually  relinquished  or  was  fired  from  all  his  offices 


285 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

and  even  joined  those  who  were  conspiring  to  assassinate 
Hitler.  But  by  then  it  was  too  late  to  stay  the  course  of 
the  Nazi  leader  to  whom  he  had  for  so  long  given  his 
loyalty  and  lent  his  prestige  and  his  manifest  talents. 

“NO  SECOND  REVOLUTION!” 

Hitler  had  conquered  Germany  with  the  greatest  of 
ease,  but  a number  of  problems  remained  to  be  faced  as 
summer  came  in  1933.  There  were  at  least  five  major  ones: 
preventing  a second  revolution;  settling  the  uneasy  relations 
between  the  S.A.  and  the  Army;  getting  the  country  out  of 
its  economic  morass  and  finding  jobs  for  the  six  million 
unemployed;  achieving  equality  of  armaments  for  Ger- 
many at  the  Disarmament  Conference  in  Geneva  and 
accelerating  the  Reich’s  secret  rearming,  which  had  begun 
during  the  last  years  of  the  Republic;  and  deciding  who 
should  succeed  the  ailing  Hindenburg  when  he  died. 

It  was  Roehm,  chief  of  the  S.A.,  who  coined  the  phrase 
“the  second  revolution,”  and  who  insisted  that  it  be  carried 
through.  He  was  joined  by  Goebbels,  who  in  his  diary 
of  April  18,  1933,  wrote,  “Everyone  among  the  people  is 
talking  of  a second  revolution  which  must  come.  That 
means  that  the  first  revolution  is  not  at  an  end.  Now  we 
shall  settle  with  the  Reaktion.  The  revolution  must  no- 
where come  to  a halt.”  19 

The  Nazis  had  destroyed  the  Left,  but  the  Right  re- 
mained: big  business  and  finance,  the  aristocracy,  the 
Junker  landlords  and  the  Prussian  generals,  who  kept 
tight  rein  over  the  Army.  Roehm,  Goebbels  and  the 
other  “radicals”  in  the  movement  wanted  to  liquidate 
them  too.  Roehm,  whose  storm  troopers  now  numbered 
some  two  million — twenty  times  as  many  as  the  troops 
in  the  Army — sounded  the  warning  in  June: 

One  victory  on  the  road  of  German  revolution  has  been 
won  . . . The  S.A.  and  S.S.,  who  bear  the  great  responsi- 
bility of  having  set  the  German  revolution  rolling,  will  not 
allow  it  to  be  betrayed  at  the  halfway  mark  ...  If  the  Philis- 
tines believe  that  the  national  revolution  has  lasted  too  long 
• . • it  is  indeed  high  time  that  the  national  revolution 
should  end  and  become  a National  Socialist  one  . . . We 
shall  continue  our  fight — with  them  or  without  them.  And, 
if  necessary,  against  them  ...  We  are  the  incorruptible 
guarantors  of  the  fulfillment  of  the  German  revolution.20 


286 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

And  in  August  he  added,  in  a speech,  “There  are  still 
men  in  official  positions  today  who  have  not  the  least 
idea  of  the  spirit  of  the  revolution.  We  shall  ruthlessly 
get  rid  of  them  if  they  dare  to  put  their  reactionary  ideas 
into  practice.” 

But  Hitler  had  contrary  thoughts.  For  him  the  Nazi  so- 
cialist slogans  had  been  merely  propaganda,  means  of 
winning  over  the  masses  on  his  way  to  power.  Now  that  he 
had  the  power  he  was  uninterested  in  them.  He  needed 
time  to  consolidate  his  position  and  that  of  the  country. 
For  the  moment  at  least  the  Right — business,  the  Army, 
the  President — must  be  appeased.  He  did  not  intend  to 
bankrupt  Germany  and  thus  risk  the  very  existence  of 
his  regime.  There  must  be  no  second  revolution. 

This  he  made  plain  to  the  S.A.  and  S.S.  leaders  them- 
selves in  a speech  to  them  on  July  1.  What  was  needed 
now  in  Germany,  he  said,  was  order.  “I  will  suppress 
every  attempt  to  disturb  the  existing  order  as  ruthlessly 
as  I will  deal  with  the  so-called  second  revolution,  which 
would  lead  only  to  chaos.”  He  repeated  the  warning  to 
the  Nazi  state  governors  gathered  in  the  Chancellery  on 
July  6: 

The  revolution  is  not  a permanent  state  of  affairs,  and  it 
must  not  be  allowed  to  develop  into  such  a state.  The  stream 
of  revolution  released  must  be  guided  into  the  safe  channel 
of  evolution  . . . We  must  therefore  not  dismiss  a business- 
man if  he  is  a good  businessman,  even  if  he  is  not  yet  a 
National  Socialist,  and  especially  not  if  the  National  Socialist 
who  is  to  take  his  place  knows  nothing  about  business.  In 
business,  ability  must  be  the  only  standard  . . . 

History  will  not  judge  us  according  to  whether  we  have 
removed  and  imprisoned  the  largest  number  of  economists, 
but  according  to  whether  we  have  succeeded  in  providing 
work  . . . The  ideas  of  the  program  do  not  oblige  us  to 
act  like  fools  and  upset  everything,  but  to  realize  our  trains 
of  thought  wisely  and  carefully.  In  the  long  run  our  po- 
litical power  will  be  all  the  more  secure,  the  more  we  suc- 
ceed in  underpinning  it  economically.  The  state  governors 
must  therefore  see  to  it  that  no  party  organizations  assume 
the  functions  of  government,  dismiss  individuals  and  make 
appointments  to  offices,  to  do  which  the  Reich  govern- 
ment— and  in  regard  to  business,  the  Reich  Minister  of  Eco- 
nomics— is  competent. . . 


287 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

No  more  authoritative  statement  was  ever  made  that  the 
Nazi  revolution  was  political,  not  economic.  To  back  up 
his  words,  Hitler  dismissed  a number  of  Nazi  “radicals” 
who  had  tried  to  seize  control  of  the  employers’  asso- 
ciations. He  restored  Krupp  von  Bohlen  and  Fritz  Thyssen 
to  their  positions  of  leadership  in  them,  dissolved  the  Com- 
bat League  of  Middle-Class  Tradespeople,  which  had  an- 
noyed the  big  department  stores,  and  in  place  of  Hugen- 
berg  named  Dr.  Karl  Schmitt  as  Minister  of  Economics. 
Schmitt  was  the  most  orthodox  of  businessmen,  director 
general  of  Allianz,  Germany’s  largest  insurance  company, 
and  he  lost  no  time  in  putting  an  end  to  the  schemes  of 
the  National  Socialists  who  had  been  naive  enough  to 
take  their  party  program  seriously. 

The  disillusion  among  the  rank-and-file  Nazis,  especially 
among  the  S.A.  storm  troopers,  who  formed  the  large 
core  of  Hitler’s  mass  movement,  was  great.  Most  of  them 
had  belonged  to  the  ragged  army  of  the  dispossessed  and 
the  unsatisfied.  They  were  anticapitalist  through  experience 
and  they  believed  that  the  revolution  which  they  had 
fought  by  brawling  in  the  streets  would  bring  them  loot 
and  good  jobs,  either  in  business  or  in  the  government. 
Now  their  hopes,  after  the  heady  excesses  of  the  spring, 
were  dashed.  The  old  gang,  whether  they  were  party 
members  or  not,  were  to  keep  the  jobs  and  to  keep  con- 
trol of  jobs.  But  this  development  was  not  the  only  reason 
for  unrest  in  the  S.A. 

The  old  quarrel  between  Hitler  and  Roehm  about  the 
position  and  purpose  of  the  S.A.  cropped  up  again.  From 
the  earliest  days  of  the  Nazi  movement  Hitler  had  insisted 
that  the  storm  troopers  were  to  be  a political  and  not  a 
military  force;  they  were  to  furnish  the  physical  violence, 
the  terror,  by  which  the  party  could  bludgeon  its  way  to 
political  power.  To  Roehm,  the  S.A.  had  been  not  only 
the  backbone  of  the  Nazi  revolution  but  the  nucleus  of  the 
future  revolutionary  army  which  would  be  for  Hitler  what 
the  French  conscript  armies  were  to  Napoleon  after  the 
French  Revolution.  It  was  time  to  sweep  away  the  re- 
actionary Prussian  generals — those  “old  clods,”  as  he  con- 
temptuously called  them — and  form  a revolutionary  fight- 
ing force,  a people’s  army,  led  by  himself  and  his  tough 
aides  who  had  conquered  the  streets  of  Germany. 

Nothing  could  be  further  from  Hitler’s  thoughts.  He 


288  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

realized  more  clearly  than  Roehm  or  any  other  Nazi  that 
he  could  not  have  come  to  power  without  the  support 
or  at  least  the  toleration  of  the  Army  generals  and  that, 
for  the  time  being  at  least,  his  very  survival  at  the  helm 
depended  in  part  on  their  continued  backing,  since  they 
still  retained  the  physical  power  to  remove  him  if  they 
were  so  minded.  Also  Hitler  foresaw  that  the  Army’s 
loyalty  to  him  personally  would  be  needed  at  that  crucial 
moment,  which  could  not  be  far  off,  when  the  eighty-six- 
year-old  Hindenburg,  the  Commander  in  Chief,  would 
pass  on.  Furthermore,  the  Nazi  leader  was  certain  that  only 
the  officer  corps,  with  all  its  martial  traditions  and  abili- 
ties, could  achieve  his  goal  of  building  up  in  a short  space 
of  time  a strong,  disciplined  armed  force.  The  S.A.  was 
but  a mob — good  enough  for  street  fighting  but  of  little 
worth  as  a modem  army.  Moreover,  its  purpose  had  now 
been  served  and  from  now  on  it  must  be  eased  tactfully 
out  of  the  picture.  The  views  of  Hitler  and  Roehm  were  ir- 
reconcilable, and  from  the  summer  of  1933  to  June  30  of 
the  following  year  a struggle  literally  to  the  death  was  to 
be  fought  between  these  two  veterans  of  the  Nazi  move- 
ment who  were  also  close  friends  (Ernst  Roehm  was  the 
only  man  whom  Hitler  addressed  by  the  familiar  personal 
pronoun  du). 

Roehm  expressed  the  deep  sense  of  frustration  in  the 
ranks  of  the  storm  troopers  in  a speech  to  fifteen  thousand 
S.A.  officers  in  the  Sportpalast  in  Berlin  on  November  5, 
1933.  “One  often  hears  . . . that  the  S.A.  had  lost  any 
reason  for  existence,”  he  said,  warning  that  it  had  not. 
But  Hitler  was  adamant.  “The  relation  of  the  S.A.  to  the 
Army,”  he  had  warned  at  Bad  Godesberg  on  August  19, 
“must  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  political  leadership.” 
And  on  September  23  at  Nuremberg  he  spoke  out  even 
more  clearly: 

On  this  day  we  should  particularly  remember  the  part 
played  by  our  Army,  for  we  all  know  well  that  if,  in  the 
days  of  our  revolution,  the  Army  had  not  stood  on  our 
side,  then  we  should  not  be  standing  here  today.  We  can 
assure  the  Army  that  we  shall  never  forget  this,  that  we  see 
in  them  the  bearers  of  the  tradition  of  our  glorious  old 
Army,  and  that  with  all  our  heart  and  all  our  powers  we 
will  support  the  spirit  of  this  Army. 

Some  time  before  this,  Hitler  had  secretly  given  the 


289 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

armed  forces  assurances  which  had  brought  many  of  the 
higher  officers  to  his  side.  On  February  2,  1933,  three 
days  after  assuming  office,  he  had  made  a two-hour  ad- 
dress to  the  top  generals  and  admirals  at  the  home  of 
General  von  Hammerstein,  the  Army  Commander  in  Chief. 
Admiral  Erich  Raeder  revealed  at  Nuremberg  the  tenor  of 
this  first  meeting  of  the  Nazi  Chancellor  with  the  officer 
corps.22  Hitler,  he  said,  freed  the  military  elite  from  its 
fears  that  the  armed  services  might  be  called  upon  to 
take  part  in  a civil  war  and  promised  that  the  Army  and 
Navy  could  now  devote  themselves  unhindered  to  the  main 
task  of  quickly  rearming  the  new  Germany.  Admiral  Rae- 
der admitted  that  he  was  highly  pleased  at  the  prospect  of 
a new  Navy,  and  General  von  Blomberg,  whose  hasty  as- 
sumption of  the  office  of  Minster  of  Defense  on  January 
30,  1933,  had  stamped  out  any  temptation  on  the  part  of 
the  Army  to  revolt  against  Hitler’s  becoming  Chancellor, 
declared  later  in  his  unpublished  memoirs  that  the  Fueh- 
rer opened  up  “a  field  of  activites  holding  great  possibili- 
ties for  the  future.” 

Further  to  augment  the  enthusiasm  of  the  military 
leaders  Hitler  created,  as  early  as  April  4,  the  Reich  De- 
fense Council  to  spur  a new  and  secret  rearmament  pro- 
gram. Three  months  later,  on  July  20,  the  Chancellor 
promulgated  a new  Army  law,  abolishing  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  civil  courts  over  the  military  and  doing  away  with 
the  elected  representation  of  the  rank  and  file,  thus 
restoring  to  the  officer  corps  its  ancient  military  preroga- 
tives. A good  many  generals  and  admirals  began  to  see  the 
Nazi  revolution  in  a different  and  more  favorable  light. 

As  a sop  to  Roehm,  Hitler  named  him — along  with 
Rudolf  Hess,  the  deputy  leader  of  the  party — a member  of 
the  cabinet  on  December  1 and  on  New  Year’s  Day, 
1934,  addressed  to  the  S.A.  chief  a warm  and  friendly 
letter.  While  reiterating  that  “the  Army  has  to  guarantee 
the  protection  of  the  nation  against  the  world  beyond  our 
frontiers,”  he  acknowledged  that  “the  task  of  the  S.A.  is 
to  secure  the  victory  of  the  National  Socialist  Revolution 
and  the  Existence  of  the  National  Socialist  State”  and  that 
the  success  of  the  S.A.  had  been  “primarily  due”  to  Roehm. 
The  letter  concluded: 

At  the  close  of  the  year  of  the  National  Socialist  Revolu- 
tion, therefore,  I feel  compelled  to  thank  you,  my  dear 


290  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Ernst  Roehm,  for  the  imperishable  services  which  you  have 
rendered  to  the  National  Socialist  movement  and  the  Ger- 
man people,  and  to  assure  you  how  very  grateful  I am  to  fate 
that  I am  able  to  call  such  men  as  you  my  friends  and 
fellow  combatants. 

In  true  friendship  and  grateful  regard, 
Your  Adolf  Hitler  23 

The  letter,  employing  the  familiar  du,  was  published  in 
the  chief  Nazi  daily'  paper,  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter, 
on  January  2,  1934,  and  did  much  to  ease  for  the  moment 
the  feelings  of  resentment  in  the  S.A.  In  the  atmosphere 
of  good  feeling  that  prevailed  over  the  Christmas  and 
New  Year  holidays,  the  rivalry  between  the  S.A.  and  the 
Army  and  the  clamor  of  the  radical  Nazis  for  the  “second 
revolution”  was  temporarily  stilled. 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  NAZI  FOREIGN  POLICY 

“It  is  no  victory,  for  the  enemies  were  lacking,”  ob- 
served Oswald  Spengler  in  commenting  on  how  easily 
Hitler  had  conquered  and  Nazified  Germany  in  1933.  “This 
seizure  of  power—”  the  author  of  The  Decline  of  the  West 
wrote  early  in  the  year,  “it  is  with  misgiving  that  I see  it 
celebrated  each  day  with  so  much  noise.  It  would  be 
better  to  save  that  for  a day  of  real  and  definitive  suc- 
cesses, that  is,  in  the  foreign  field.  There  are  no  others.”  24 

The  philosopher-historian,  who  for  a brief  moment  was 
an  idol  of  the  Nazis  until  a mutual  disenchantment  set  in, 
was  unduly  impatient.  Hitler  had  to  conquer  Germany  be- 
fore he  could  set  out  to  conquer  the  world.  But  once  his 
German  opponents  were  liquidated — or  had  liquidated 
themselves — he  lost  no  time  in  turning  to  what  had  always 
interested  him  the  most:  foreign  affairs. 

Germany’s  position  in  the  world  in  the  spring  of  1933 
could  hardly  have  been  worse.  The  Third  Reich  was  dip- 
lomatically isolated  and  militarily  impotent.  The  whole 
world  had  been  revolted  by  Nazi  excesses,  especially 
the  persecution  of  the  Jews.  Germany’s  neighbors,  in  par- 
ticular France  and  Poland,  were  hostile  and  suspicious, 
and  as  early  as  March  1933,  following  a Polish  military 
demonstration  in  Danzig,  Marshal  Pilsudski  suggested 
to  the  French  the  desirability  of  a joint  preventive  war 
against  Germany.  Even  Mussolini,  for  all  his  outward  pose 
of  welcoming  the  advent  of  a second  fascist  power,  had 


291 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

not  in  fact  been  enthusiastic  about  Hitler’s  coming  to 
power.  The  Fuehrer  of  a country  potentially  so  much 
stronger  than  Italy  might  soon  put  the  Duce  in  the  shade. 
A rabidly  Pan-German  Reich  would  have  designs  on 
Austria  and  the  Balkans,  where  the  Italian  dictator  had 
already  staked  out  his  claims.  The  hostility  toward  Nazi 
Germany  of  the  Soviet  Union,  which  had  been  republican 
Germany’s  one  friend  in  the  years  since  1921,  was  ob- 
vious. The  Third  Reich  was  indeed  friendless  in  a hostile 
world.  And  it  was  disarmed,  or  relatively  so  in  compari- 
son with  its  highly  armed  neighbors. 

The  immediate  strategy  and  tactics  of  Hitler’s  foreign 
policy  therefore  were  dictated  by  the  hard  realities  of  Ger- 
many’s weak  and  isolated  position.  But,  ironically,  this 
situation  also  provided  natural  goals  which  corresponded 
to  his  own  deepest  desires  and  those  of  the  vast  majority 
of  the  German  people:  to  get  rid  of  the  shackles  of  Ver- 
sailles without  provoking  sanctions,  to  rearm  without  risk- 
ing war.  Only  when  he  had  achieved  these  dual  short- 
term goals  would  he  have  the  freedom  and  the  military 
power  to  pursue  the  long-term  diplomacy  whose  aims  and 
methods  he  had  set  down  so  frankly  and  in  such  detail 
in  Mein  Kampf. 

The  first  thing  to  do,  obviously,  was  to  confound  Ger- 
many’s adversaries  in  Europe  by  preaching  disarmament 
and  peace  and  to  keep  a sharp  eye  for  a weakness  in  their 
collective  armor.  On  May  17,  1933,  before  the  Reichstag, 
Hitler  delivered  his  “Peace  Speech,”  one  of  the  greatest  of 
his  career,  a masterpiece  of  deceptive  propaganda  that 
deeply  moved  the  German  people  and  unified  them  behind 
him  and  which  made  a profound  and  favorable  impression 
on  the  outside  world.  The  day  before,  President  Roose- 
velt had  sent  a ringing  message  to  the  chiefs  of  state  of 
forty-four  nations  outlining  the  plans  and  hopes  of  the 
United  States  for  disarmament  and  peace  and  calling  for 
the  abolition  of  all  offensive  weapons — bombers,  tanks  and 
mobile  heavy  artillery.  Hitler  was  quick  to  take  up  the 
President’s  challenge  and  to  make  the  most  of  it. 

The  proposal  made  by  President  Roosevelt,  of  which  I 
learned  last  night,  has  earned  the  warmest  thanks  of  the 
German  government.  It  is  prepared  to  agree  to  this  method 
of  overcoming  the  international  crisis  . . . The  President’s 
proposal  is  a ray  of  comfort  for  all  who  wish  to  co-operate 


292  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

in  the  maintenance  of  peace  . . . Germany  is  entirely  ready 
to  renounce  all  offensive  weapons  if  the  armed  nations,  on 
their  side,  will  destroy  their  offensive  weapons  . . . Germany 
would  also  be  perfectly  ready  to  disband  her  entire  military 
establishment  and  destroy  the  small  amount  of  arms  re- 
maining to  her,  if  the  neighboring  countries  will  do  the 
same  . . . Germany  is  prepared  to  agree  to  any  solemn  pact 
of  nonaggression,  because  she  does  not  think  of  attacking 
but  only  of  acquiring  security. 

There  was  much  else  in  the  speech,  whose  moderateness 
and  profession  of  love  for  peace  pleasantly  surprised  an 
uneasy  world.  Germany  did  not  want  war.  War  was  “un- 
limited madness.”  It  would  “cause  the  collapse  of  the 
present  social  and  political  order.”  Nazi  Germany  had  no 
wish  to  “Germanize”  other  peoples.  “The  mentality 
of  the  last  century,  which  led  people  to  think  that  they 
would  make  Germans  out  of  Poles  and  Frenchmen,  is 
alien  to  us  . . . Frenchmen.  Poles  and  others  are  our 
neighbors,  and  we  know  that  no  event  that  is  historically 
conceivable  can  change  this  reality.” 

There  was  one  warning.  Germany  demanded  equality 
of  treatment  with  all  other  nations,  especially  in  arma- 
ments. If  this  was  not  to  be  obtained,  Germany  would 
prefer  to  withdraw  from  both  the  Disarmament  Confer- 
ence and  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  warning  was  forgotten  amid  the  general  rejoicing 
throughout  the  Western  world  at  Hitler’s  unexpected  rea- 
sonableness. The  Times  of  London  agreed  that  Hitler’s 
claim  for  equality  was  “irrefutable.”  The  Daily  Herald  of 
London,  official  organ  of  the  Labor  Party,  demanded  that 
Hitler  be  taken  at  his  word.  The  conservative  weekly 
Spectator  of  London  concluded  that  Hitler  had  grasped 
the  hand  of  Roosevelt  and  that  this  gesture  provided  new 
hope  for  a tormented  world.  In  Washington  the  President’s 
secretary  was  quoted  by  the  official  German  news  bureau 
as  saying,  “The  President  was  enthusiastic  at  Hitler’s  ac- 
ceptance of  his  proposals.” 

From  the  Nazi  firebrand  dictator  had  come  not  brutal 
threats,  as  so  many  had  expected,  but  sweetness  and 
light.  The  world  was  enchanted.  And  in  the  Reichstag  even 
the  Socialists’  deputies,  those  who  were  not  in  jail  or  in 
exile,  voted  without  dissent  to  make  the  assembly’s  ap- 
proval of  Hitler’s  foreign  policy  declaration  unanimous. 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  293 

But  Hitler’s  warning  was  not  an  empty  one,  and  when  it 
became  clear  early  in  October  that  the  Allies  would  insist 
on  an  interval  of  eight  years  to  bring  their  armaments 
down  to  Germany’s  level,  he  abruptly  announced  on  Oc- 
tober 14  that,  denied  equality  of  rights  by  the  other  powers 
at  Geneva,  Germany  was  immediately  withdrawing  from 
the  Disarmament  Conference  and  from  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. At  the  same  time  he  took  three  other  steps:  He  dis- 
solved the  Reichstag,  announced  that  he  would  submit 
his  decision  to  leave  Geneva  to  a national  plebiscite  and 
ordered  General  von  Blomberg,  the  Minister  of  Defense, 
to  issue  secret  directives  to  the  armed  forces  to  resist  an 
armed  attack  should  the  League  resort  to  sanctions.25 

This  precipitate  action  revealed  the  hollowness  of  the 
Hitler  conciliatory  speech  in  the  spring.  It  was  Hitler’s 
first  open  gamble  in  foreign  affairs.  It  meant  that  from 
now  on  Nazi  Germany  intended  to  rearm  itself  in  defiance 
of  any  disarmament  agreement  and  of  Versailles.  This 
was  a calculated  risk — also  the  first  of  many — and  Blom- 
berg’s  secret  directive  to  the  Army  and  Navy,  which  came 
to  light  at  Nuremberg,  reveals  not  only  that  Hitler  gam- 
bled with  the  possibility  of  sanctions  but  that  Germany’s 
position  would  have  been  hopeless  had  they  been  applied.* 
In  the  West  against  France  and  in  the  East  against  Poland 
and  Czechoslovakia,  the  directive  laid  down  definite  de- 
fense lines  which  the  German  forces  were  ordered  “to 
hold  as  long  as  possible.”  It  is  obvious  from  Blomberg’s 
orders  that  the  German  generals,  at  least,  had  no  illusions 
that  the  defenses  of  the  Reich  could  be  held  for  any  time 
at  all. 

This,  then,  was  the  first  of  many  crises  over  a period 
that  would  extend  for  three  years — until  after  the  Ger- 
mans reoccupied  the  demilitarized  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
in  1936 — when  the  Allies  could  have  applied  sanctions, 
not  for  Hitler’s  leaving  the  Disarmament  Conference  and 
the  League  but  for  violations  of  the  disarmament  provi- 
sions of  Versailles  which  had  been  going  on  in  Germany 
for  at  least  two  years,  even  before  Hitler.  That  the  Allies 
at  this  time  could  easily  have  overwhelmed  Germany  is  as 

* Some  months  previously,  on  May  11,  Lord  Hailsham,  the  British  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  had  publicly  warned  that  any  attempt  of  Germany  to 
rearm  would  be  a breach  of  the  peace  treaty  and  would  be  answered  by 
sanctions,  in  accordance  with  the  treaty.  In  Germany  it  was  thought  that 
sanctions  would  mean  armed  invasion. 


294  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

certain  as  it  is  that  such  an  action  would  have  brought 
the  end  of  the  Third  Reich  in  the  very  year  of  its  birth. 
But  part  of  the  genius  of  this  one-time  Austrian  waif  was 
that  for  a long  time  he  knew  the  mettle  of  his  foreign 
adversaries  as  expertly  and  as  uncannily  as  he  had  sized 
up  that  of  his  opponents  at  home.  In  this  crisis,  as  in  those 
greater  ones  which  were  to  follow  in  rapid  succession  up 
to  1939,  the  victorious  Allied  nations  took  no  action,  being 
too  divided,  too  torpid,  too  blind  to  grasp  the  nature  or 
the  direction  of  what  was  building  up  beyond  the  Rhine. 
On  this,  Hitler’s  calculations  were  eminently  sound,  as 
they  had  been  and  were  to  be  in  regard  to  his  own  people. 
He  knew  well  what  the  German  people  would  say  in  the 
plebiscite,  which  he  fixed — along  with  new  elections  of  a 
single-party  Nazi  slate  to  the  Reichstag — for  November  12, 
1933,  the  day  after  the  anniversary  of  the  1918  armistice, 
a black  day  that  still  rankled  in  German  memories. 

“See  to  it  that  this  day,”  he  told  an  election  rally  at 
Breslau  on  November  4,  “shall  later  be  recorded  in  the 
history  of  our  people  as  a day  of  salvation — that  the 
shall  run:  On  an  eleventh  of  November  the  German  people 
formally  lost  its  honor;  fifteen  years  later  came  a twelfth 
of  November  and  then  the  German  people  restored  its 
honor  to  itself.”  On  the  eve  of  the  polling,  November  11, 
the  venerable  Hindenburg  added  his  support  in  a broad- 
cast to  the  nation:  “Show  tomorrow  your  firm  national 
unity  and  your  solidarity  with  the  government.  Support 
with  me  and  the  Reich  Chancellor  the  principle  of  equal 
rights  and  of  peace  with  honor,  and  show  the  world  that 
we  have  recovered,  and  with  the  help  of  God  will  main- 
tain, Germany  unity!” 

The  response  of  the  German  people,  after  fifteen  years 
of  frustration  and  of  resentment  against  the  consequences 
of  a lost  war,  was  almost  unanimous.  Some  96  per  cent  of 
the  registered  voters  cast  their  ballots  and  95  per  cent  of 
these  approved  Germany’s  withdrawal  from  Geneva.  The 
vote  for  the  single  Nazi  list  for  the  Reichstag  (which  in- 
cluded Hugenberg  and  a half-dozen  other  non-Nazis)  was 
92  per  cent.  Even  at  the  Dachau  concentration  camp  2,154 
out  of  2,242  inmates  voted  for  the  government  which  had 
incarcerated  them!  It  is  true  that  in  many  communities 
threats  were  made  against  those  who  failed  to  vote  or  who 
voted  the  wrong  way;  and  in  some  cases  there  was  fear  that 


295 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

anyone  who  cast  his  vote  against  the  regime  might  be  de- 
tected and  punished.  Yet  even  with  these  reservations  the 
election,  whose  count  at  least  was  honest,  was  a staggering 
victory  for  Adolf  Hitler.  There  was  no  doubt  that  in  defying 
the  outside  world  as  he  had  done,  he  had  the  overwhelming 
support  of  the  German  people. 

Three  days  after  the  plebiscite  and  election,  Hitler  sent 
for  the  new  Polish  ambassador,  Josef  Lipski.  At  the  end  of 
their  talk  a joint  communiqu6  was  issued  which  amazed 
not  only  the  German  public  but  the  outside  world.  The 
Polish  and  German  governments  agreed  “to  deal  with  the 
questions  touching  both  countries  by  means  of  direct  ne- 
gotiations and  to  renounce  all  application  of  force  in  their 
relations  with  each  other  for  the  consolidation  of  European 
peace.” 

Even  more  than  France,  Poland  was  the  hated  and  de- 
spised enemy  in  the  minds  of  the  Germans.  To  them  the 
most  heinous  crime  of  the  Versailles  peacemakers  had 
been  to  separate  East  Prussia  from  the  Reich  by  the 
Polish  Corridor,  to  detach  Danzig  and  to  give  to  the 
Poles  the  province  of  Posen  and  part  of  Silesia,  which, 
though  predominantly  Polish  in  population,  had  been  Ger- 
man territory  since  the  days  of  the  partition  of  Poland. 
No  German  statesmen  during  the  Republic  had  been  will- 
ing to  regard  the  Polish  acquisitions  as  permanent. 
Stresemann  had  refused  even  to  consider  an  Eastern 
Locarno  pact  with  Poland  to  supplement  the  Locarno 
agreement  for  the  West.  And  General  von  Seeckt,  father 
of  the  Reichswehr  and  arbiter  of  foreign  policy  during  the 
first  years  of  the  Republic,  had  advised  the  government 
as  early  as  1922,  “Poland’s  existence  is  intolerable,  in- 
compatible with  the  essential  conditions  of  Germany’s 
life.  Poland,”  he  insisted,  “must  go  and  will  go.”  Its 
obliteration,  he  added,  “must  be  one  of  the  fundamental 
drives  of  German  policy  . . . With  the  disappearance  of 
Poland  will  fall  one  of  the  strongest  pillars  of  the  Ver- 
sailles Peace,  the  hegemony  of  France.”  26 

Before  Poland  could  be  obliterated,  Hitler  saw,  it  must 
be  separated  from  its  alliance  with  France.  The  course 
he  now  embarked  on  offered  several  immediate  advantages 
besides  the  ultimate  one.  By  renouncing  the  use  of  force 
against  Poland  he  could  strengthen  his  propaganda  for 


296 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

peace  and  allay  the  suspicions  aroused  in  both  Western 
and  Eastern  Europe  by  his  hasty  exit  from  Geneva.  By 
inducing  the  Poles  to  conduct  direct  negotiations  he  could 
bypass  the  League  of  Nations  and  then  weaken  its  au- 
thority. And  he  could  not  only  deal  a blow  to  the  League’s 
conception  of  “collective  security”  but  undermine  the 
French  alliances  in  Eastern  Europe,  of  which  Poland  was 
the  bastion.  The  German  people,  with  their  traditional 
hatred  of  the  Poles,  might  not  understand,  but  to  Hitler 
one  of  the  advantages  of  a dictatorship  over  democracy 
was  that  unpopular  policies  which  promised  significant  re- 
sults ultimately  could  be  pursued  temporarily  without  in- 
ternal rumpus. 

On  January  26,  1934,  four  days  before  Hitler  was  to 
meet  the  Reichstag  on  the  first  anniversary  of  his  acces- 
sion to  power,  announcement  was  made  of  the  signing  of  a 
ten-year  nonaggression  pact  between  Germany  and  Po- 
land. From  that  day  on,  Poland,  which  under  the  dictator- 
ship of  Marshal  Pilsudski  was  itself  just  eliminating  the 
last  vestiges  of  parliamentary  democracy,  began  gradually 
to  detach  itself  from  France,  its  protector  since  its  rebirth 
in  1919,  and  to  grow  ever  closer  to  Nazi  Germany.  It 
was  a path  that  was  to  lead  to  its  destruction  long  before 
the  treaty  of  “friendship  and  nonaggression”  ran  out. 

When  Hitler  addressed  the  Reichstag  on  January  30, 
1934,  he  could  look  back  on  a year  of  achievement  without 
parallel  in  German  history.  Within  twelve  months  he  had 
overthrown  the  Weimar  Republic,  substituted  his  per- 
sonal dictatorship  for  its  democracy,  destroyed  all  the  po- 
litical parties  but  his  own,  smashed  the  state  governments 
and  their  parliaments  and  unified  and  defederalized  the 
Reich,  wiped  out  the  labor  unions,  stamped  out  democratic 
associations  of  any  kind,  driven  the  Jews  out  of  public 
and  professional  life,  abolished  freedom  of  speech  and  of 
the  press,  stifled  the  independence  of  the  courts  and  “co- 
ordinated” under  Nazi  rule  the  political,  economic,  cul- 
tural and  social  life  of  an  ancient  and  cultivated  people. 
For  all  these  accomplishments  and  for  his  resolute  action 
in  foreign  affairs,  which  took  Germany  out  of  the  concert 
of  nations  at  Geneva,  and  proclaimed  German  insistence 
on  being  treated  as  an  equal  among  the  great  powers,  he 
was  backed,  as  the  autumn  plebiscite  and  election  had 


297 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

shown,  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  peo- 
ple. 

Yet  as  the  second  year  of  his  dictatorship  got  under 
way  clouds  gathered  on  the  Nazi  horizon. 

THE  BLOOD  PURGE  OF  JUNE  30,  1934 

The  darkening  of  the  sky  was  due  to  three  unresolved 
problems,  and  they  were  interrelated:  the  continued  clamor 
of  radical  party  and  S.A.  leaders  for  the  “second  revolu- 
tion”; the  rivalry  of  the  S.A.  and  the  Army;  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  succession  to  President  Hindenburg,  the  sands 
of  whose  life  at  last  began  to  run  out  with  the  coming 
of  spring. 

Roehm,  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  S.A.,  now  swollen  to 
two  and  a half  million  storm  troopers,  had  not  been  put 
off  by  Hitler’s  gesture  of  appointing  him  to  the  cabinet  nor 
by  the  Fuehrer’s  friendly  personal  letter  on  New  Year’s 
Day.  In  February  he  presented  to  the  cabinet  a lengthy 
memorandum  proposing  that  the  S.A.  should  be  made  the 
foundation  of  a new  People’s  Army  and  that  the  armed 
forces,  the  S.A.  and  S.S.  and  all  veterans’  groups  should  be 
placed  under  a single  Ministry  of  Defense,  over  which — 
the  implication  was  clear — he  should  preside.  No  more 
revolting  idea  could  be  imagined  by  the  officer  corps,  and 
its  senior  members  not  only  unanimously  rejected  the  pro- 
posal but  appealed  to  Hindenburg  to  support  them.  The 
whole  tradition  of  the  military  caste  would  be  destroyed 
if  the  roughneck  Roehm  and  his  brawling  Brownshirts 
should  get  control  of  the  Army.  Moreover,  the  generals 
were  shocked  by  the  tales,  now  beginning  to  receive  wide 
circulation,  of  the  corruption  and  debauchery  of  the  homo- 
sexual clique  around  the  S.A.  chief.  As  General  von 
Brauchitsch  would  later  testify,  “rearmament  was  too  se- 
rious and  difficult  a business  to  permit  the  participation  of 
peculators,  drunkards  and  homosexuals.” 

For  the  moment  Hitler  could  not  afford  to  offend  the 
Army,  and  he  gave  no  support  to  Roehm’s  proposal.  In- 
deed, on  February  21  he  secretly  told  Anthony  Eden,  who 
had  come  to  Berlin  to  discuss  the  disarmament  impasse, 
that  he  was  prepared  to  reduce  the  S.A.  by  two  thirds  and 
to  agree  to  a system  of  inspection  to  make  sure  that  the 
remainder  received  neither  military  training  nor  arms — 


298 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

an  offer  which,  when  it  leaked  out,  further  inflamed  the 
bitterness  of  Roehm  and  the  S.A.  As  the  summer  of  1934 
approached,  the  relations  between  the  S.A.  chief  of  staff 
and  the  Army  High  Command  continued  to  deteriorate 
I here  were  stormy  scenes  in  the  cabinet  between  Roehm 
and  General  von  Blomberg,  and  in  March  the  Minister  of 
Defense  protested  to  Hitler  that  the  S.A.  was  secretly 
arming  a large  force  of  special  staff  guards  with  heavy 
machine  guns— which  was  not  only  a threat  against  the 
Army  but  General  von  Blomberg  added,  an  act  done  so 
publicly  that  it  threatened  Germany’s  clandestine  re- 
armament under  the  auspices  of  the  Reichswehr. 

It  is  plain  that  at  this  juncture  Hitler,  unlike  the  head- 
strong Roehm  and  his  cronies,  was  thinking  ahead  to 
the  day  when  the  ailing  Hindenburg  would  breathe  his  last. 
He  knew  that  the  aged  President  as  well  as  the  Army  and 
other  conservative  forces  in  Germany  were  in  favor  of  a 
restoration  of  the  Hohenzollern  monarchy  as  soon  as  the 
Field  Marshal  had  passed  away.  He  himself  had  other 
plans,  and  when  early  in  April  the  news  was  secretly  but 
authoritatively  conveyed  to  him  and  Blomberg  from 
Neudeck  that  the  President’s  days  were  numbered,  he  real- 
ized that  a bold  stroke  must  soon  be  made.  To  ensure  its 
success  he  would  need  the  backing  of  the  officer  corps:  to 

length  ^ SUpP°rt  he  was  PrePared  to  go  to  almost  any 

The  occasion  for  confidential  parleys  with  the  Army 
soon  presented  itself.  On  April  11  the  Chancellor,  ac- 
companied by  General  von  Blomberg  and  the  commanders 
m chief  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  General  Freiherr  von 
Pritsch  and  Admiral  Raeder,  set  out  on  the  cruiser 
Deutschland  from  Kiel  for  Koenigsberg  to  attend  the 
spring  maneuvers  in  East  Prussia.  The  Army  and  Navy 
commanders  were  told  of  Hindenburg’s  worsening  condi- 
tion and  Hitler,  backed  by  the  compliant  Blomberg,  bluntly 
proposed  that  he  himself,  with  the  Reichswehr’s  bless- 
mg,  be  the  President’s  successor.  In  return  for  the  support 
of  the  military,  Hitler  offered  to  suppress  Roehm’s  ambi- 
tions, drastically  reduce  the  S.A.  and  guarantee  the  Army 
and  Navy  that  they  would  continue  to  be  the  sole  bearers 
of  arms  in  the  Third  Reich.  It  is  believed  that  Hitler  also 
held  out  to  Fritsch  and  Raeder  the  prospect  of  an  im- 
mense expansion  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  if  they  were  pre- 


299 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

pared  to  go  along  with  him.  With  the  fawning  Raeder 
there  was  no  question  but  that  he  would,  but  Fritsch,  a 
tougher  man,  had  first  to  consult  his  senior  generals. 

This  consultation  took  place  at  Bad  Nauheim  on  May 
16,  and  after  the  “Pact  of  the  Deutschland”  had  been  ex- 
plained to  them,  the  highest  officers  of  the  German  Army 
unanimously  endorsed  Hitler  as  the  successor  to  President 
Hindenburg.27  For  the  Army  this  political  decision  was 
to  prove  of  historic  significance.  By  voluntarily  offering  to 
put  itself  in  the  unrestrained  hands  of  a megalomaniacal 
dictator  it  was  sealing  its  own  fate.  As  for  Hitler,  the  deal 
would  make  his  dictatorship  supreme.  With  the  stubborn 
Field  Marshal  out  of  the  way,  with  the  prospect  of  the  res- 
toration of  the  Hohenzollems  snuffed  out,  with  himself  as 
head  of  state  as  well  as  of  government,  he  could  go  his 
way  alone  and  unhindered.  The  price  he  paid  for  this 
elevation  to  supreme  power  was  paltry:  the  sacrifice  of  the 
S.A.  He  did  not  need  it,  now  that  he  had  all  the  authority. 
It  was  a raucous  rabble  that  only  embarrassed  him.  Hitler’s 
contempt  for  the  narrow  minds  of  the  generals  must  have 
risen  sharply  that  spring.  They  could  be  had,  he  must 
have  thought,  for  surprisingly  little.  It  was  a judgment  that 
he  held,  unaltered,  except  for  one  bad  moment  in  June, 
to  the  end — his  end  and  theirs. 

Yet,  as  summer  came.  Hitler’s  troubles  were  far  from 
over.  An  ominous  tension  began  to  grip  Berlin.  Cries  for 
the  “second  revolution”  multiplied,  and  not  only  Roehm 
and  the  storm  troop  leaders  but  Goebbels  himself,  in 
speeches  and  in  the  press  which  he  controlled,  gave  vent 
to  them.  From  the  conservative  Right,  from  the  Junkers 
and  big  industrialists  around  Papen  and  Hindenburg, 
came  demands  that  a halt  be  called  to  the  revolution,  that 
the  arbitrary  arrests,  the  persecution  of  the  Jews,  the  at- 
tacks against  the  churches,  the  arrogant  behavior  of  the 
storm  troopers  be  curbed,  and  that  the  general  terror  or- 
ganized by  the  Nazis  come  to  an  end. 

Within  the  Nazi  Party  itself  there  was  a new  and  ruth- 
less struggle  for  power.  Roehm’s  two  most  powerful  ene- 
mies, Goering  and  Himmler,  were  uniting  against  him. 
On  April  1 Himmler,  chief  of  the  black-coated  S.S.,  which 
was  still  an  arm  of  the  S.A.  and  under  Roehm’s  command, 
was  named  by  Goering  to  be  chief  of  the  Prussian 
Gestapo,  and  he  immediately  began  to  build  up  a secret- 


300 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

police  empire  of  his  own.  Goering,  who  had  been  made  a 
General  der  Infanterie  by  Hindenburg  the  previous  Au- 
gust (though  he  was  Minister  of  Aviation),  gladly  shed  his 
shabby  brown  S.A.  uniform  for  the  more  showy  one  of 
his  new  office,  and  the  change  was  symbolic:  as  a gen- 
eral and  a member  of  a family  from  the  military  caste, 
he  quickly  sided  with  the  Army  in  its  fight  against  Roehm 
and  the  S.A.  To  protect  himself  in  the  jungle  warfare 
which  was  now  going  on,  Goering  also  recruited  his  own 
personal  police  force,  the  Landespolizeigruppe  General 
Goering,  several  thousand  men  strong,  which  he  concen- 
trated in  the  former  Cadet  School  at  Lichterfelde,  where 
he  had  first  entered  the  Army  and  which  was  strategically 
located  on  the  outskirts  of  Berlin. 

Rumors  of  plots  and  counterplots  added  to  the  tension 
in  the  capital.  General  von  Schleicher,  unable  to  bear  a 
decent  obscurity  or  to  remember  that  he  no  longer  en- 
joyed the  confidence  of  Hindenburg,  the  generals  or  the 
conservatives  and  was  therefore  powerless,  had  begun  to 
mix  again  in  politics.  He  was  in  touch  with  Roehm  and 
Gregor  Strasser  and  there  were  reports,  some  of  which 
reached  Hitler,  that  he  was  busy  trying  to  make  a deal 
whereby  he  would  become  Vice-Chancellor  in  place  of  his 
old  enemy,  Papen,  Roehm  would  become  Minister  of  De- 
fense and  the  S.A.  would  be  amalgamated  with  the  Army. 
Cabinet  “lists”  circulated  by  the  dozen  in  Berlin;  in  some 
of  them  Bruening  was  to  be  made  Foreign  Minister  and 
Strasser  Minister  of  Economics.  These  reports  had  little 
foundation  but  they  were  grist  to  the  mill  of  Goering  and 
Himmler,  who,  desirous  each  for  his  own  reasons  to  de- 
stroy Roehm  and  the  S.A.,  and  at  the  same  time  to  settle 
accounts  with  Schleicher  and  the  disgruntled  conserva- 
tives, embroidered  them  and  brought  them  to  Hitler,  who 
at  any  time  needed  little  prodding  to  have  his  suspicions 
aroused.  What  Goering  and  his  Gestapo  chief  had  in  mind 
was  not  only  to  purge  the  S.A.  but  fo  liquidate  other  op- 
ponents on  the  Left  and  Right,  including  some  who  had 
opposed  Hitler  in  the  past  and  were  no  longer  politically 
active.  At  the  end  of  May  Bruening  and  Schleicher  were 
warned  that  they  were  marked  for  murder.  The  former 
slipped  quietly  out  of  the  country  in  disguise,  the  latter 
went  off  on  a vacation  to  Bavaria  but  returned  to  Berlin 
toward  the  end  of  June. 


301 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

At  the  beginning  of  June,  Hitler  had  a showdown  with 
Roehm  which,  according  to  his  own  account  given  to  the 
Reichstag  later,  lasted  for  nearly  five  hours  and  which 
“dragged  on  until  midnight.”  It  was,  Hitler  said,  his  “last 
attempt”  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  his  closest 
friend  in  the  movement. 

I informed  him  that  I had  the  impression  from  countless 
rumors  and  numerous  declarations  of  faithful  old  party 
members  and  S.A.  leaders  that  conscienceless  elements  were 
preparing  a national  Bolshevist  action  that  could  bring  noth- 
ing but  untold  misfortune  to  Germany  ...  I implored  him 
for  the  last  time  to  voluntarily  abandon  this  madness  and 
instead  to  lend  his  authority  to  prevent  a development  that, 
in  any  event,  could  only  end  in  disaster. 

According  to  Hitler,  Roehm  left  him  with  the  “as- 
surance that  he  would  do  everything  possible  to  put  things 
right.”  Actually,  Hitler  later  claimed,  Roehm  began  “prep- 
arations to  eliminate  me  personally.” 

This  was  almost  certainly  untrue.  Though  the  whole 
story  of  the  purge,  like  that  of  the  Reichstag  fire,  will 
probably  never  be  known,  all  the  evidence  that  has  come 
to  light  indicates  that  the  S.A.  chief  never  plotted  to  put 
Hitler  out  of  the  way.  Unfortunately  the  captured  archives 
shed  no  more  light  on  the  purge  than  they  do  on  the 
Reichstag  fire;  in  both  cases  it  is  likely  that  all  the  in- 
criminating documents  were  destroyed  on  the  orders  of 
Goering. 

Whatever  was  the  real  nature  of  the  long  conversation 
between  the  two  Nazi  veterans,  a day  or  two  after  it  took 
place  Hitler  bade  the  S.A.  go  on  leave  for  the  entire 
month  of  July,  during  which  the  storm  troopers  were 
prohibited  from  wearing  uniforms  or  engaging  in  pa- 
rades or  exercises.  On  June  7,  Roehm  announced  that  he 
himself  was  going  on  sick  leave  but  at  the  same  time  he 
issued  a defiant  warning:  “If  the  enemies  of  S.A.  hope 
that  the  S.A.  will  not  be  recalled,  or  will  be  recalled  only 
in  part  after  its  leave,  we  may  permit  them  to  enjoy  this 
brief  hope.  They  will  receive  their  answer  at  such  time 
and  in  such  form  as  appears  necessary.  The  S.A.  is  and 
remains  the  destiny  of  Germany.” 

Before  he  left  Berlin  Roehm  invited  Hitler  to  confer 
with  the  S.A.  leaders  at  the  resort  town  of  Wiessee,  near 
Munich,  on  June  30.  Hitler  readily  agreed  and  indeed  kept 


302 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  appointment,  though  not  in  a manner  which  Roehm 
could  possibly  have  imagined.  Perhaps  not  in  a way, 
either,  that  Hitler  himself  at  this  moment  could  foresee. 
For,  as  he  later  admitted  to  the  Reichstag,  he  hesitated 

again  and  again  before  taking  a final  decision  ...  I still 
cherished  the  secret  hope  that  I might  be  able  to  spare 
the  movement  and  my  S.A.  the  shame  of  such  a disagree- 
ment and  that  it  might  be  possible  to  remove  the  mischief 
without  severe  conflicts.” 

“It  must  be  confessed,”  he  added,  “that  the  last  days 
of  May  continuously  brought  to  light  more  and  more  dis- 
quieting facts.”  But  did  they?  Later  Hitler  claimed  that 
Roehm  and  his  conspirators  had  made  preparations  to 
seize  Berlin  and  take  him  into  custody.  But  if  this  were 
so  why  did  all  the  S.A.  leaders  depart  from  Berlin  early 
m June,  and— even  more  important— why  did  Hitler  leave 
Germany  at  this  moment  and  thus  provide  an  opportunity 
for  the  S.A.  chiefs  to  grab  control  of  the  State  in  his 
absence? 

For  on  June  14  the  Fuehrer  flew  to  Venice  to  hold  the 
first  of  many  conversations  with  his  fellow  fascist  dic- 
tator,  Mussolini.  The  meeting,  incidentally,  did  not  go  off 
well  for  the  German  leader,  who,  in  his  soiled  raincoat 
and  battered  soft  hat,  seemed  ill  at  east  in  the  presence 
of  the  more  experienced  Duce,  resplendent  in  his  glittering, 
bemedaled  black  Fascisti  uniform  and  inclined  to  be  con- 
descending to  his  visitor.  Hitler  returned  to  Germany  in  a 
state  of  considerable  irritation  and  called  a meeting  of 
his  party  leaders  in  the  little  town  of  Gera  in  Thuringia 
for  Sunday,  June  17,  to  report  on  his  talks  with  Mus- 
solini and  to  assess  the  worsening  situation  at  home.  As 
me  would  have  it,  another  meeting  took  place  on  that 
Sunday  in  the  old  university  town  of  Marburg  which  at- 
tracted much  more  attention  in  Germany  and  indeed  in  the 
world,  and  which  helped  bring  the  critical  situation  to  a 
climax. 

The  dilettante  Papen,  who  had  been  rudely  shoved  to 
the  sidelines  by  Hitler  and  Goering  but  who  was  still 
nominafiy  Vice-Chancellor  and  still  enjoyed  the  confidence 
0t  , en“Urg’  summone<J  enough  courage  to  speak  out 
publicly  against  the  excesses  of  the  regime  which  he  had 
done  so  much  to  foist  on  Germany.  In  May  he  had  seen 
the  ailing  President  off  to  Neudeck— it  was  the  last  time 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  303 

he  was  to  see  his  protector  alive — and  the  grizzly  but  en- 
feebled old  Field  Marshal  had  said  to  him:  “Things 
are  going  badly,  Papen.  See  what  you  can  do  to  put 
them  right.” 

Thus  encouraged,  Papen  had  accepted  an  invitation  to 
make  an  address  at  the  University  of  Marburg  on  June  17. 
The  speech  was  largely  written  by  one  of  his  personal 
advisers,  Edgar  Jung,  a brilliant  Munich  lawyer  and  writer 
and  a Protestant,  though  certain  ideas  were  furnished  by 
one  of  the  Vice-Chancellor’s  secretaries,  Herbert  von  Bose, 
and  by  Erich  Klausener,  the  leader  of  Catholic  Action — 
a collaboration  that  soon  cost  all  three  of  them  their  lives. 
It  was  a courageous  utterance  and,  thanks  to  Jung, 
eloquent  in  style  and  dignified  in  tone.  It  called  for  an 
end  of  the  revolution,  for  a termination  of  the  Nazi  terror, 
for  the  restoration  of  normal  decencies  and  the  return  of 
some  measure  of  freedom,  especially  of  freedom  of  the 
press.  Addressing  Dr.  Goebbels,  the  Propaganda  Minister, 
Papen  said: 

Open  manly  discussions  would  be  of  more  service  to  the 
German  people  than,  for  instance,  the  present  state  of  the 
German  press.  The  government  [must  be]  mindful  of  the 
old  maxim,  “Only  weaklings  suffer  no  criticism”  . . . Great 
men  are  not  created  by  propaganda  ...  If  one  desires  close 
contact  and  unity  with  the  people,  one  must  not  under- 
estimate their  understanding.  One  must  not  everlastingly 
keep  them  on  leading  strings  . . . No  organization,  no 
propaganda,  however  excellent,  can  alone  maintain  confi- 
dence in  the  long  run.  It  is  not  by  incitement  . . . and  not 
by  threats  against  the  helpless  part  of  the  nation  but  only 
by  talking  things  over  with  people  that  confidence  and  de- 
votion can  be  maintained.  People  treated  as  morons,  how- 
ever, have  no  confidence  to  give  away  ...  It  is  time  to 
join  together  in  fraternal  friendship  and  respect  for  all  our 
fellow  countrymen,  to  avoid  disturbing  the  labors  of  serious 
men  and  to  silence  fanatics.28 

The  speech,  when  it  became  known,  was  widely  heralded 
in  Germany,  but  it  fell  like  a bombshell  on  the  little  group 
of  Nazi  leaders  gathered  at  Gera,  and  Goebbels  moved 
quickly  to  see  that  it  became  known  as  little  as  possible. 
He  forbade  the  broadcast  of  a recording  of  the  speech 
scheduled  for  the  same  evening  as  well  as  any  reference 
to  it  in  the  press,  and  ordered  the  police  to  seize  copies 
of  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  which  were  on  the  streets  with 


304 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

a partial  text.  But  not  even  the  absolute  powers  of  the 
Propaganda  Minister  were  sufficient  to  keep  the  German 
people  and  the  outside  world  from  learning  the  contents 
of  the  defiant  address.  The  wily  Papen  had  provided  the 
foreign  correspondents  and  diplomats  in  Berlin  with  ad- 
vance texts,  and  several  thousand  copies  were  hastily  run 
off  on  the  presses  of  Papen’s  newspaper,  Germania,  and 
secretly  distributed. 

On  learning  of  the  Marburg  speech,  Hitler  was  stung 
to  lury.  In  a speech  the  same  afternoon  at  Gera  he  de- 
nounced the  “pygmy  who  imagines  he  can  stop,  with  a 
tew  phrases,  the  gigantic  renewal  of  a people’s  life.” 
Papen  was  furious  too,  at  the  suppression  of  his  speech 
He  rushed  to  Hitler  on  June  20  and  told  him  he  could 
not  tolerate  such  a ban  “by  a junior  minister,”  insisted 
that  he  had  spoken  “as  a trustee  for  the  President,”  and 
then  and  there  submitted  his  resignation,  adding  a wam- 

J11?,  £at  he  “would  advise  Hindenburg  of  this  immediate- 
ly. 28 

This  was  a threat  that  obviously  worried  Hitler  for 
he  was  aware  of  reports  that  the  President  was  so’  dis- 
pleased with  the  situation  that  he  was  considering  declar- 
ing martial  law  and  handing  over  power  to  the  Army. 
In  order  to  size  up  the  seriousness  of  this  danger  to  the 
very  continuance  of  the  Nazi  regime,  he  flew  to  Neudeck 
on  the  following  day,  June  21,  to  see  Hindenburg.  His 
reception  could  only  have  increased  his  fears.  He  was  met 
by  General  von  Blomberg  and  quickly  saw  that  his  De- 
fense  Minister’s  usual  lackeylike  attitude  toward  him  had 
suddenly  disappeared.  Blomberg  instead  was  now  the  stem 
Prussian  general  and  he  brusquely  informed  Hitler  that 
he  was  authorized  by  the  Field  Marshal  to  tell  him  that 
unless  the  present  state  of  tension  in  Germany  was 
brought  quickly  to  an  end  the  President  would  declare 
martial  law  and  turn  over  the  control  of  the  State  to 
the  Army.  When  Hitler  was  permitted  to  see  Hindenburg 
tor  a tew  minutes  in  the  presence  of  Blomberg,  the  old 
President  confirmed  the  ultimatum. 

This  was  a disastrous  turn  of  affairs  for  the  Nazi  Chan- 
cellor. Not  only  was  his  plan  to  succeed  the  President 
m jeopardy;  if  the  Army  took  over,  that  would  be  the 
end  ot  him  and  of  Nazi  government.  Flying  back  to  Ber- 
lin the  same  day  he  must  have  reflected  that  he  had  only 


305 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

one  choice  to  make  if  he  were  to  survive.  He  must  honor 
his  pact  with  the  Army,  suppress  the  S.A.  and  halt  the 
continuance  of  the  revolution  for  which  the  storm  troop 
leaders  were  pressing.  The  Army,  backed  by  the  venerable 
President,  it  was  obvious,  would  accept  no  less. 

And  yet,  in  that  last  crucial  week  of  June,  Hitler  hesi- 
tated— as  least  as  to  how  drastic  to  be  with  the  S.A. 
chiefs  to  whom  he  owed  so  much.  But  now  Goering  and 
Himmler  helped  him  to  make  up  his  mind.  They  had  al- 
ready drawn  up  the  scores  they  wanted  to  settle,  long 
lists  of  present  and  past  enemies  they  wished  to  liquidate. 
All  they  had  to  do  was  convince  the  Fuehrer  of  the  enor- 
mity of  the  “plot”  against  him  and  of  the  necessity  for 
swift  and  ruthless  action.  According  to  the  testimony  at 
Nuremberg  of  Wilhelm  Frick,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
and  one  of  Hitler’s  most  faithful  followers,  it  was  Himm- 
ler who  finally  succeeded  in  convincing  Hitler  that 
“Roehm  wanted  to  start  a putsch.  The  Fuehrer,”  Frick 
added,  “ordered  Himmler  to  suppress  the  putsch.”  Himm- 
ler, he  explained,  was  instructed  to  put  it  down  in  Ba- 
varia, and  Goering  in  Berlin.30 

The  Army  prodded  Hitler  too  and  thereby  incurred  a 
responsibility  for  the  barbarity  which  was  soon  to  take 
place.  On  June  25  General  von  Fritsch,  the  Commander 
in  Chief,  put  the  Army  in  a state  of  alert,  canceling  all 
leaves  and  confining  the  troops  to  barracks.  On  June 
28  Roehm  was  expelled  from  the  German  Officers’  League 
— a plain  warning  that  the  S.A.  chief  of  staff  was  in  for 
trouble.  And  just  to  make  sure  that  no  one,  Roehm  above 
all,  should  have  any  illusions  about  where  the  Army  stood, 
Blomberg  took  the  unprecedented  step  of  publishing  a 
signed  article  on  June  29  in  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter, 
affirming  that  “the  Army  . . . stands  behind  Adolf  Hitler 
. . . who  remains  one  of  ours.” 

The  Army,  then,  was  pressing  for  the  purge,  but  it 
did  not  want  to  soil  its  own  hands.  That  must  be  done 
by  Hitler,  Goering  and  Himmler,  with  their  black-coated 
S.S.  and  Goering’s  special  police. 

Hitler  left  Berlin  on  Thursday,  June  28,  for  Essen  to 
attend  the  wedding  of  a local  Nazi  gauleiter,  Josef 
Terboven.  The  trip  and  its  purpose  hardly  suggest  that  he 
felt  a grave  crisis  to  be  imminent.  On  the  same  day  Goe- 
ring and  Himmler  ordered  special  detachments  of  the 


306 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

S.S.  and  the  “Goering  Police”  to  hold  themselves  in  readi- 
ness. With  Hitler  out  of  town,  they  evidently  felt  free 
to  act  on  their  own.  The  next  day,  the  twenty-ninth, 
the  Fuehrer  made  a tour  of  Labor  Service  camps  in  West- 
phalia, returning  in  the  afternoon  to  Godesberg  on  the 
Rhine,  where  he  put  up  at  a hotel  on  the  riverbank  run 
by  an  old  war  comrade,  Dreesen.  That  evening  Goebbels, 

who  seems  to  have  hesitated  as  to  which  camp  to  join 

he  had  been  secretly  in  touch  with  Roehm— arrived  in 
Godesberg,  his  mind  made  up,  and  reported  what  Hitler 
later  described  as  “threatening  intelligence”  from  Ber- 
lin. Karl  Ernst,  a former  hotel  bellhop  and  ex-bouncer 
in  a cafe  frequented  by  homosexuals,  whom  Roehm  had 
made  leader  of  the  Berlin  S.A.,  had  alerted  the  storm 
troopers.  Ernst,  a handsome  but  not  a bright  young  man, 
believed  then  and  for  the  remaining  twenty-four  hours  or 
so  of  his  life  that  he  was  faced  by  a putsch  from  the 
Right,  and  he  would  die  shouting  proudly,  “Heil  Hitler!” 

Hitler  later  claimed  that  up  to  this  moment,  June  29 
he  had  decided  merely  to  “deprive  the  chief  of  staff 
[Roehm]  of  his  office  and  for  the  time  being  keep 
him  in  custody  and  arrest  a number  of  S.A.  leaders  whose 
crimes  were  unquestioned  ...  and  in  an  earnest  appeal 
to  the  others,  I would  recall  them  to  their  duty.” 

However,  [he  told  the  Reichstag  on  July  13]  ...  at 
one  o’clock  in  the  night  I received  from  Berlin  and  Munich 
two,,  urgent  messages  concerning  alarm  summonses:  first  in 
Rerlin  an  alarm  muster  had  been  ordered  for  four  p.m. 

' i an?  at  ®ve  P M-  action  was  to  begin  with  a surprise 
attack;  the  government  buildings  were  to  be  occupied 
Second,  in  Munich  the  alarm  summons  had  already  been 
given  to  the  S.A.;  they  had  been  ordered  to  assemble  at  nine 
o clock  m the  evening  . . . That  was  mutiny!  ...  In  these 
circumstances  I could  make  but  one  decision  . . . Only  a 
ruthless  and  bloody  intervention  might  still  perhaps  stifle 
the  spread  of  the  revolt . . . 

At  two  o’clock  in  the  morning  I flew  to  Munich. 

Hitler  never  revealed  from  whom  the  “urgent  messages” 
came  but  the  implication  is  that  they  were  sent  by  Goe- 
ring and  Himmler.  What  is  certain  is  that  they  were  high- 
ly exaggerated.  In  Berlin,  S.A.  Leader  Ernst  thought  of 
nothing  more  drastic  than  to  drive  to  Bremen  that  Satur- 
ay  with  his  bride  to  take  ship  for  a honeymoon  at 


307 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

Madeira.  And  in  the  south,  where  the  S.A.  “conspirators” 
were  concentrated? 

At  the  moment  of  2 a.m.  on  June  30  when  Hitler,  with 
Goebbels  at  his  side,  was  taking  off  from  Hangelar  Air- 
field near  Bonn,  Captain  Roehm  and  his  S.A.  lieutenants 
were  peacefully  slumbering  in  their  beds  at  the  Hansl- 
bauer  Hotel  at  Wiessee  on  the  shores  of  the  Tegemsee. 
Edmund  Heines,  the  S.A.  Obergruppenfuehrer  of  Silesia, 
a convicted  murderer,  a notorious  homosexual  with  a 
girlish  face  on  the  brawny  body  of  a piano  mover,  was 
in  bed  with  a young  man.  So  far  did  the  S.A.  chiefs  seem 
from  staging  a revolt  that  Roehm  had  left  his  staff  guards 
in  Munich.  There  appeared  to  be  plenty  of  carousing 
among  the  S.A.  leaders  but  no  plotting. 

Hitler  and  his  small  party  (Otto  Dietrich,  his  press 
chief,  and  Viktor  Lutze,  the  colorless  but  loyal  S.A.  leader 
of  Hanover,  had  joined  it)  landed  in  Munich  at  4 a.m. 
on  Saturday,  June  30,  and  found  that  some  action  already 
had  been  taken.  Major  Walther  Buch,  head  of  USCHLA, 
the  party  court,  and  Adolf  Wagner,  Bavarian  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  aided  by  such  early  cronies  of  Hitler  as  Emil 
Maurice,  the  ex-convict  and  rival  for  Geli  Raubal’s  love, 
and  Christian  Weber,  the  horse  dealer  and  former  cabaret 
bouncer,  had  arrested  the  Munich  S.A.  leaders,  including 
Obergruppenfuehrer  Schneidhuber,  who  was  also  chief  of 
police  in  Munich.  Hitler,  who  was  now  working  himself 
up  to  a fine  state  of  hysteria,  found  the  prisoners  in  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior.  Striding  up  to  Schneidhuber, 
a former  Army  colonel,  he  tore  off  his  Nazi  insignia  and 
cursed  him  for  his  “treason.”  t 

Shortly  after  dawn  Hitler  and  his  party  sped  out  of 
Munich  toward  Wiessee  in  a long  column  of  cars.  They 
found  Roehm  and  his  friends  still  fast  asleep  in  the  Hansl- 
bauer  Hotel.  The  awakening  was  rude.  Heines  and  his 
young  male  companion  were  dragged  out  of  bed,  taken 
outside  the  hotel  and  summarily  shot  on  the  orders  of 
Hitler.  The  Fuehrer,  according  to  Otto  Dietrich’s  account, 
entered  Roehm’s  room  alone,  gave  him  a dressing  down 
and  ordered  him  to  be  brought  back  to  Munich  and  lodged 
in  Stadelheim  prison,  where  the  S.A.  chief  had  served 
time  after  his  participation  with  Hitler  in  the  Beer  Hall 
Putsch  in  1923.  After  fourteen  stormy  years  the  two 
friends,  who  more  than  any  others  were  responsible  for 


308 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  launching  of  the  Third  Reich,  for  its  terror  and 
its  degradation,  who  though  they  had  often  disagreed  had 
stood  together  in  the  moments  of  crisis  and  defeats  and 
disappointments,  had  come  to  a parting  of  the  ways,  and 
the  scar-faced,  brawling  battler  for  Hitler  and  Nazism 
had  come  to  the  end  of  his  violent  life. 

Hitler,  in  a final  act  of  what  he  apparently  thought  was 
grace,  gave  orders  that  a pistol  be  left  on  the  table  of  his 
old  comrade.  Roehm  refused  to  make  use  of  it.  “If  I am 
to  be  killed,  let  Adolf  do  it  himself,”  he  is  reported  to 
have  said.  Thereupon  two  S.A.  officers,  according  to  the 
testimony  of  an  eyewitness,  a police  lieutenant,  given 
twenty-three  years  later  in  a postwar  trial  at  Munich  in 
May  1957,  entered  the  cell  and  fired  their  revolvers  at 
Roehm  point-blank.  “Roehm  wanted  to  say  something,” 
said  this  witness,  “but  the  S.S.  officer  motioned  him  to 
shut  up.  Then  Roehm  stood  at  attention — he  was  stripped 
to  the  waist — with  his  face  full  of  contempt.”  * And  so 
he  died,  violently  as  he  had  lived,  contemptuous  of  the 
friend  he  had  helped  propel  to  the  heights  no  other  Ger- 
man had  ever  reached,  and  almost  certainly,  like  hun- 
dreds of  others  who  were  slaughtered  that  day — like 
Schneidhuber,  who  was  reported  to  have  cried,  “Gentle- 
men, I don’t  know  what  this  is  all  about,  but  shoot 
straight” — without  any  clear  idea  of  what  was  happening, 
or  why,  other  than  that  it  was  an  act  of  treachery  which 
he,  who  had  lived  so  long  with  treachery  and  committed 
it  so  often  himself,  had  not  expected  from  Adolf  Hitler. 

In  Berlin,  in  the  meantime,  Goering  and  Himmler  had 
been  busy.  Some  150  S.A.  leaders  were  rounded  up  and 
stood  against  a wall  of  the  Cadet  School  at  Lichterfelde 
and  shot  by  firing  squads  of  Himmler’s  S.S.  and  Goe- 
ring’s  special  police. 


The  Munich  trial  in  May  1957  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  actual  eye- 

witnesses  and  participants  in  the  June  30,  1934,  purge  talked  in  public.  Dur- 
mg  the  Third  Reich  it  would  not  have  been  possible.  Sepp  Dietrich,  whom 
this  author  recalls  personally  as  one  of  the  most  brutal  men  of  the  Third 
Ketch,  commanded  Hitler’s  S.S.  Bodyguard  in  1934  and  directed  the  execu- 
tions in  Stadelheim  prison.  Later  a colonel  general  in  the  Waffen  S.S 
during  the  war,  he  was  sentenced  to  twenty-five  years  in  prison  for  complicity 
£ ou  i i of  American  prisoners  of  war  during  the  Battle  of  the  Bulge 
e?led  ten,  years,  *>e  was  brought  to  Munich  in  1957  and 

tnnt1oiad  0n  14  e'ghteen  months  in  prison  for  his  part  in  the  June 

“■J’; ,4.-  executions.  His  sentence  and  that  of  Michael  Lippert.  who  was 
tl!^dfirStbe'n?  ?ne  t!le  two  S.S.  officers  who  actually  killed  Roehm, 
theSpurge  ^ punis^ment  8^ven  to  the  Nazi  executioners  who  took  part  in 


309 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

Among  them  was  Karl  Ernst,  whose  honeymoon  trip  was 
interrupted  by  S.S.  gunmen  as  his  car  neared  Bremen. 
His  bride  and  his  chauffeur  were  wounded;  he  himself 
was  knocked  unconscious  and  flown  back  to  Berlin  for 
his  execution. 

The  S.A.  men  were  not  the  only  ones  to  fall  on  that 
bloody  summer  weekend.  On  the  morning  of  June  30,  a 
squad  of  S.S.  men  in  mufti  rang  the  doorbell  at  General 
von  Schleicher’s  villa  on  the  outskirts  of  Berlin.  When 
the  General  opened  the  door  he  was  shot  dead  in  his 
tracks,  and  when  his  wife,  whom  he  had  married  but 
eighteen  months  before — he  had  been  a bachelor  until 
then — stepped  forward,  she  too  was  slain  on  the  spot. 
General  Kurt  von  Bredow,  a close  friend  of  Schleicher, 
met  a similar  fate  the  same  evening.  Gregor  Strasser  was 
seized  at  his  home  in  Berlin  at  noon  on  Saturday  and  dis- 
patched a few  hours  later  in  his  cell  in  the  Prinz  Al- 
brechtstrasse  Gestapo  jail  on  the  personal  orders  of  Goe- 
ring. 

Papen  was  luckier.  He  escaped  with  his  life.  But  his 
office  was  ransacked  by  an  S.S.  squad,  his  principal  secre- 
tary, Bose,  shot  down  at  his  desk,  his  confidential  col- 
laborator, Edgar  Jung,  who  had  been  arrested  a few  days 
earlier  by  the  Gestapo,  murdered  in  prison,  another  col- 
laborator, Erich  Klausener,  leader  of  Catholic  Action, 
slain  in  his  office  in  the  Ministry  of  Communications, 
and  the  rest  of  his  staff,  including  his  private  secretary, 
Baroness  Stotzingen,  carted  off  to  concentration  camp. 
When  Papen  went  to  protest  to  Goering,  the  latter,  who 
at  that  moment  had  no  time  for  idle  talk,  “more  or  less,” 
he  later  recalled,  threw  him  out,  placing  him  under  house 
arrest  at  his  villa,  which  was  surrounded  by  heavily 
armed  S.S.  men  and  where  his  telephone  was  cut  and 
he  was  forbidden  to  have  any  contact  with  the  outside 
world — an  added  humiliation  which  the  Vice-Chancellor 
of  Germany  swallowed  remarkably  well.  For  within  less 
than  a month  he  defiled  himself  by  accepting  from  the 
Nazi  murderers  of  his  friends  a new  assignment  as  German 
minister  to  Vienna,  where  the  Nazis  had  just  slain 
Chancellor  Dollfuss. 

How  many  were  slain  in  the  purge  was  never  definitely 


310  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

established.  In  his  Reichstag  speech  of  July  13,  Hitler 
announced  that  sixty-one  persons  were  shot,  including 
nineteen  “higher  S.A.  leaders,”  that  thirteen  more  died 
“resisting  arrest”  and  that  three  “committed  suicide” — 
a total  of  seventy-seven.  The  White  Book  of  the  Purge, 
published  by  emigres  in  Paris,  stated  that  401  had  been 
slain,  but  it  identified  only  116  of  them.  At  the  Munich 
trial  in  1957,  the  figure  of  “more  than  1,000”  was  given. 

Many  were  killed  out  of  pure  vengeance  for  having 
opposed  Hitler  in  the  past,  others  were  murdered  apparent- 
ly because  they  knew  too  much,  and  at  least  one  be- 
cause of  mistaken  identity.  The  body  of  Gustav  von 
Kahr,  whose  suppression  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch  in 
1923  we  have  already  recounted,  and  who  had  long  since 
retired  from  politics,  was  found  in  a swamp  near  Dachau 
hacked  to  death,  apparently  by  pickaxes.  Hitler  had 
neither  forgotten  nor  forgiven  him.  The  body  of  Father 
Bernhard  Stempfle  of  the  Hieronymite  Order,  who,  it 
will  be  remembered  from  earlier  pages,  helped  edit  Mein 
Kampf  and  later  talked  too  much,  perhaps,  about  his 
knowledge  of  why  Hitler’s  love,  Geli  Raubal,  committed 
suicide,  was  found  in  the  forest  of  Harlaching  near  Mu- 
nich, his  neck  broken  and  three  shots  in  the  heart.  Heiden 
says  the  murder  gang  that  killed  him  was  led  by  F.mil 
Maurice,  the  ex-convict  who  had  also  made  love  to  Geli 
Raubal.  Others  who  “knew  too  much”  included  three  S.A. 
men  who  were  believed  to  have  been  accomplices  of  Ernst 
in  setting  the  Reichstag  on  fire.  They  were  dispatched 
with  Ernst. 

One  other  murder  deserves  mention.  At  seven-twenty 
on  the  evening  of  June  30,  Dr.  Willi  Schmid,  the  eminent 
music  critic  of  the  Muenchener  Neueste  Nachrichlen,  a 
leading  Munich  daily  newspaper,  was  playing  the  cello 
in  his  study  while  his  wife  prepared  supper  and  their 
three  children,  aged  nine,  eight  and  two,  played  in  the 
living  room  of  their  apartment  in  the  Schackstrasse  in 
Munich.  The  doorbell  rang,  four  S.S.  men  appeared  and 
without  explanation  took  Dr.  Schmid  away.  Four  days 
later  his  body  was  returned  in  a coffin  with  orders  from 
the  Gestapo  not  to  open  it  in  any  circumstances.  Dr. 
Willi  Schmid,  who  had  never  participated  in  politics, 
had  been  mistaken  by  the  S.S.  thugs  for  Willi  Schmidt, 


311 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

a local  S.A.  leader,  who  in  the  meantime  had  been  ar- 
rested by  another  S.S.  detachment  and  shot.* 

Was  there  a plot  against  Hitler  at  all?  There  is  only 
his  word  for  it,  contained  in  the  official  communiques 
and  in  his  Reichstag  speech  of  July  13.  He  never  pre- 
sented a shred  of  evidence.  Roehm  had  made  no  secret 
of  his  ambition  to  see  the  S.A.  become  the  nucleus  of  the 
new  Army  and  to  head  it  himself.  He  had  certainly  been 
in  touch  with  Schleicher  about  the  scheme,  which  they 
had  first  discussed  when  the  General  was  Chancellor. 
Probably,  as  Hitler  stated,  Gregor  Strasser  “was  brought 
in.”  But  such  talks  certainly  did  not  constitute  treason. 
Hitler  himself  was  in  contact  with  Strasser  and  early  in 
June,  according  to  Otto  Strasser,  offered  him  the  post  of 
Minister  of  Economics. 

At  first  Hitler  accused  Roehm  and  Schleicher  of  having 
sought  the  backing  of  a “foreign  power” — obviously  France 
— and  charged  that  General  von  Bredow  was  the  inter- 
mediary in  “foreign  policy.”  This  was  part  of  the  indict- 
ment of  them  as  “traitors.”  And  though  Hitler  repeated 
the  charges  in  his  Reichstag  speech  and  spoke  sar- 
castically of  “a  foreign  diplomat  [who  could  have  been 
no  other  than  Frangois-Poncet,  the  French  ambassador] 
explaining  that  the  meeting  with  Schleicher  and  Roehm 
was  of  an  entirely  harmless  character,”  he  was  unable 
to  substantiate  his  accusations.  It  was  crime  enough,  he  said 
lamely,  for  any  responsible  German  in  the  Third  Reich 
even  to  see  foreign  diplomats  without  his  knowledge. 

When  three  traitors  in  Germany  arrange  ...  a meeting 
with  a foreign  statesman  . . . and  give  orders  that  no 
word  of  this  meeting  shall  reach  me,  then  I shall  have  such 
men  shot  dead  even  when  it  should  prove  true  that  at 
such  a consultation  which  was  thus  kept  secret  from  me  they 
talked  of  nothing  more  than  the  weather,  old  coins  and  like 
topics. 

When  Franfois-Poncet  protested  vigorously  against  the 
insinuation  that  he  had  participated  in  the  Roehm  “plot” 
the  German  Foreign  Office  officially  informed  the  French 

* Kate  Eva  Hoerlin,  former  wife  of  Willi  Schmid,  told  the  story  of  her 
husband’s  murder  in  an  affidavit  sworn  on  July  7,  1945,  at  Binghamton, 
N.Y.  She  became  an  American  citizen  in  1944.  To  hush  up  the  atrocity 
Rudolf  Hess  himself  visited  the  widow,  apologized  for  the  ‘‘mistake”  and 
secured  for  her  a pension  from  the  German  government.  The  affidavit  is 
given  in  Nurenberg  Document  L-135,  NCA,  VII,  pp.  883 — 90. 


312 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

government  that  the  accusations  were  wholly  without  foun- 
dation and  that  the  Reich  government  hoped  the  ambas- 
sador would  remain  in  his  post.  Indeed,  as  this  writer  can 
testify,  Fran^ois-Poncet  continued  to  remain  on  better 
personal  terms  with  Hitler  than  any  other  envoy  from 
a democratic  state. 

In  the  first  communiques,  especially  in  a blood-cur- 
dling eyewitness  account  given  the  public  by  Otto  Dietrich, 
the  Fuehrer’s  press  chief,  and  even  in  Hitler’s  Reichstag 
speech,  much  was  made  of  the  depraved  morals  of  Roehm 
and  the  other  S.A.  leaders  who  were  shot.  Dietrich  as- 
serted that  the  scene  of  the  arrest  of  Heines,  who  was 
caught  in  bed  at  Wiessee  with  a young  man,  “defied 
description,”  and  Hitler  in  addressing  the  surviving  storm 
troop  leaders  in  Munich  at  noon  on  June  30,  just  after  the 
first  executions,  declared  that  for  their  corrupt  morals 
alone  these  men  deserved  to  die. 

And  yet  Hitler  had  known  all  along,  from  the  earliest 
days  of  the  party,  that  a large  number  of  his  closest  and 
most  important  followers  were  sexual  perverts  and  con- 
victed murderers.  It  was  common  talk,  for  instance,  that 
Heines  used  to  send  S.A.  men  scouring  all  over  Germany 
to  find  him  suitable  male  lovers.  These  things  Hitler  had 
not  only  tolerated  but  defended;  more  than  once  he  had 
warned  his  party  comrades  against  being  too  squeamish 
about  a man’s  personal  morals  if  he  were  a fanatical 
fighter  for  the  movement.  Now,  on  June  30,  1934,  he 
professed  to  be  shocked  by  the  moral  degeneration  of 
some  of  his  oldest  lieutenants. 

Most  of  the  killing  was  over  by  Sunday  afternoon, 
July  1,  when  Hitler,  who  had  flown  back  to  Berlin  from 
Munich  the  night  before,  was  host  at  a tea  party  in  the 
gardens  of  the  Chancellery.  On  Monday  President  Hin- 
denburg  thanked  Hitler  for  his  “determined  action  and 
gallant  personal  intervention  which  have  nipped  treason 
in  the  bud  and  rescued  the  German  people  from  great 
danger.”  He  also  congratulated  Goering  for  his  “ener- 
getic and  successful  action”  in  suppressing  “high  treason.” 
On  Tuesday  General  von  Blomberg  expressed  to  the  Chan- 
cellor the  congratulations  of  the  cabinet,  which  proceeded 
to  “legalize”  the  slaughter  as  a necessary  measure  “for 
the  defense  of  the  State.”  Blomberg  also  issued  an  order 


313 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

of  the  day  to  the  Army  expressing  the  High  Command’s 
satisfaction  with  the  turn  of  events  and  promising  to  es- 
tablish “cordial  relations  with  the  new  S.A.” 

It  was  natural,  no  doubt,  that  the  Army  should  be 
pleased  with  the  elimination  of  its  rival,  the  S.A.,  but 
what  about  the  sense  of  honor,  let  alone  of  decency, 
of  an  officer  corps  which  not  only  condoned  but  openly 
praised  a government  for  carrying  out  a massacre  without 
precedent  in  German  history,  during  which  two  of  its 
leading  officers,  Generals  von  Schleicher  and  von  Bredow, 
having  been  branded  as  traitors,  were  cold-bloodedly 
murdered?  Only  the  voices  of  the  eighty-five-year-old  Field 
Marshal  von  Mackensen  and  of  General  von  Hammer- 
stein,  the  former  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army,  were 
raised  in  protest  against  the  murder  of  their  two  fellow 
officers  and  the  charges  of  treason  which  had  been  the 
excuse  for  it.*  This  behavior  of  the  corps  was  a black 
stain  on  the  honor  of  the  Army;  it  was  also  a mark  of  its 
unbelievable  shortsightedness. 

In  making  common  cause  with  the  lawlessness,  indeed 
the  gangsterism,  of  Hitler  on  June  30,  1934,  the  generals 
were  putting  themselves  in  a position  in  which  they  could 
never  oppose  future  acts  of  Nazi  terrorism  not  only  at 
home  but  even  when  they  were  aimed  across  the  frontiers, 
even  when  they  were  committed  against  their  own  mem- 
bers. For  the  Army  was  backing  Hitler’s  claim  that  he 
had  become  the  law,  or,  as  he  put  it  in  his  Reichstag 
speech  of  July  13,  “If  anyone  reproaches  me  and  asked 
why  I did  not  resort  to  the  regular  courts  of  justice,  then 
all  I can  say  is  this:  In  this  hour  I was  responsible  for 
the  fate  of  the  German  people,  and  thereby  I became 
the  supreme  judge  [oberster  Gerichtsherr ] of  the  Ger- 
man people.”  And  Hitler  added,  for  good  measure,  “Every- 
one must  know  for  all  future  time  that  if  he  raises  his 
hand  to  strike  the  State,  then  certain  death  is  his  lot.” 
This  was  a warning  that  was  to  catch  up  with  the  generals 
in  ten  years  almost  to  a day  when  at  last  the  more  des- 

* The  two  senior  officers  continued  their  efforts  to  clear  the  names  of 
Schleicher  and  Bredow,  and  succeeded  in  getting  Hitler,  at  a secret  meeting 
of  party  and  military  leaders  in  Berlin  on  January  3,  1935,  to  admit  that 
the  killing  of  the  two  generals  had  been  “in  error”  and  to  announce  that 
their  names  would  be  restored  to  the  honor  rolls  of  their  regiments.  This 
“rehabilitation”  was  never  published  in  Germany,  but  the  officer  corps  ac- 
cepted it  as  such.  (See  Wheeler-Bennett,  The  Nemesis  of  Power,  p.  337.) 


314 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

perate  of  them  dared  to  raise  their  hand  to  strike  down 
their  “supreme  judge.” 

Moreover,  the  officer  corps  only  deluded  itself  in  think- 
ing that  on  June  30  it  got  rid  forever  of  the  threat  of  the 
Nazi  movement  against  its  traditional  prerogatives  and 
power.  For  in  the  place  of  the  S.A.  came  the  S.S.  On 
July  26  the  S.S.,  as  a reward  for  carrying  out  the  execu- 
tions, was  made  independent  of  the  S.A.,  with  Himmler — 
as  its  Reichsfuehrer — responsible  only  to  Hitler.  Soon 
this  much-better-disciplined  and  loyal  force  would  become 
much  more  powerful  than  the  S.A.  had  ever  been  and  as 
a rival  to  the  Army  would  succeed  where  Roehm’s  ragged 
Brownshirts  had  failed. 

For  the  moment,  however,  the  generals  were  smugly 
confident.  As  Hitler  reiterated  in  his  Reichstag  address 
on  July  13,  the  Army  was  to  remain  “the  sole  bearer  of 
arms.”  At  the  High  Command’s  bidding,  the  Chancellor 
had  got  rid  of  the  S.A.,  which  had  dared  to  dispute  that 
dictum.  The  time  now  came  when  the  Army  had  to  carry 
out  its  part  of  the  “Pact  of  the  Deutschland .” 

THE  DEATH  OF  HINDENBURG 

All  through  the  summer  the  seemingly  indestructible 
Hindenburg  had  been  sinking  and  on  August  2,  at  nine 
in  the  morning,  he  died  in  his  eighty-seventh  year.  At 
noon,  three  hours  later,  it  was  announced  that  according 
to  a law  enacted  by  the  cabinet  on  the  preceding  day  the 
offices  of  Chancellor  and  President  had  been  combined  and 
that  Adolf  Hitler  had  taken  over  the  powers  of  the  head 
of  state  and  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces. 
The  title  of  President  was  abolished;  Hitler  would  be 
known  as  Fuehrer  and  Reich  Chancellor.  His  dictatorship 
had  become  complete.  To  leave  no  loopholes  Hitler 
exacted  from  all  officers  and  men  of  the  armed  forces  an 
oath  of  allegiance — not  to  Germany,  not  to  the  constitu- 
tion, which  he  had  violated  by  not  calling  for  the  election 
of  Hindenburg’s  successor,  but  to  himself.  It  read: 

I swear  by  God  this  sacred  oath,  that  I will  render  un- 
condmonal  obedience  to  Adolf  Hitler,  the  Fuehrer  of  the 
German  Reich  and  people.  Supreme  Commander  of  the 
Armed  Forces,  and  will  be  ready  as  a brave  soldier  to  risk 
my  life  at  any  time  for  this  oath. 


315 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

From  August  1934  on,  the  generals,  who  up  to  that 
time  could  have  overthrown  the  Nazi  regime  with  ease 
had  they  so  desired,  thus  tied  themselves  to  the  person  of 
Adolf  Hitler,  recognizing  him  as  the  highest  legitimate 
authority  in  the  land  and  binding  themselves  to  him  by 
an  oath  of  fealty  which  they  felt  honor-bound  to  obey 
in  all  circumstances  no  matter  how  degrading  to  them 
and  the  Fatherland.  It  was  an  oath  which  was  to  trouble 
the  conscience  of  quite  a few  high  officers  when  their 
acknowledged  leader  set  off  on  a path  which  they  felt 
could  only  lead  to  the  nation’s  destruction  and  which 
they  opposed.  It  was  also  a pledge  which  enabled  an  even 
greater  number  of  officers  to  excuse  themselves  from  any 
personal  responsibility  for  the  unspeakable  crimes  which 
they  carried  out  on  the  orders  of  a Supreme  Commander 
whose  true  nature  they  had  seen  for  themselves  in  the 
butchery  of  June  30.  One  of  the  appalling  aberrations  of 
the  German  officer  corps  from  this  point  on  rose  out 
of  this  conflict  of  “honor” — a word  which,  as  this  author 
can  testify  by  personal  experience,  was  often  on  their  lips 
and  of  which  they  had  such  a curious  concept.  Later 
and  often,  by  honoring  their  oath  they  dishonored  them- 
selves as  human  beings  and  trod  in  the  mud  the  moral 
code  of  their  corps. 

When  Hindenburg  died,  Dr.  Goebbels,  the  Minister  of 
Propaganda,  officially  announced  that  no  last  will  and 
testament  of  the  Field  Marshal  had  been  found  and  that 
it  must  be  presumed  there  was  none.  But  on  August  15, 
four  days  before  the  plebiscite  in  which  the  German  peo- 
ple were  asked  to  approve  Hitler’s  taking  over  the  Presi- 
dent’s office,  Hindenburg’s  political  testament  turned  up, 
delivered  to  Hitler  by  none  other  than  Papen.  Its  words 
of  praise  for  Hitler  provided  strong  ammunition  to  Goeb- 
bels in  the  final  days  of  the  plebiscite  campaign,  and  it 
was  reinforced  on  the  eve  of  the  voting  by  a broadcast  of 
Colonel  Oskar  von  Hindenburg: 

My  father  had  himself  seen  in  Adolf  Hitler  his  own  di- 
rect successor  as  head  of  the  German  State,  and  I am  acting 
according  to  my  father’s  intention  when  I call  on  all  Ger- 
man men  and  women  to  vote  for  the  handing  over  of  my 
father’s  office  to  the  Fuehrer  and  Reich  Chancellor.* 


* It  is  interesting  and  perhaps  revealing  that  Hitler  now  promoted  Oskar 
from  colonel  to  major  general.  Sec  above,  p.  181. 


316 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Almost  certainly  this  was  not  true.  For  Hindenburg, 
on  the  best  evidence  available,  had  recommended  as  his 
last  wish  a restoration  of  the  monarchy  after  his  Heath 
This  part  of  the  testament  Adolf  Hitler  suppressed. 

Some,  if  not  all,  of  the  mystery  which  cloaked  the  truth 
about  the  aged  President’s  testament  was  cleared  up  after 
tiie  war  by  Papen’s  interrogation  at  Nuremberg  and  later 
in  his  memoirs.  And  while  Papen  is  not  an  unimpeach- 
able witness  and  may  not  have  told  all  he  knew,  his 
testimony  cannot  be  ignored.  He  himself  wrote  the  initial 
draft  of  Hindenburg’s  last  will,  and,  according  to  him, 
at  the  Field  Marshal’s  request. 

My  draft  [he  says  in  his  memoirs]  recommended  that 
after  his  death  a constitutional  monarchy  should  be  adopted, 
and  I made  a point  of  the  inadvisability  of  combining  the 
office  of  President  and  Chancellor.  In  order  to  avoid  giving 
any  offense  to  Hitler,  there  were  also  certain  approving 
references  to  some  of  the  positive  accomplishments  of  the 
Nazi  regime. 

Papen  delivered  his  draft  to  Hindenburg  in  April  1934, 
he  says. 

A few  days  later  he  asked  me  to  call  on  him  again,  and 
told  me  that  he  had  decided  not  to  approve  the  document 
m the  form  I had  suggested.  He  felt  ...  that  the  nation 
as  a whole  should  make  up  its  mind  as  to  the  form  of 
State  it  desired.  He  therefore  intended  to  regard  the  ac- 
count of  his  service  as  a testament,  and  his  recommenda- 
tions concerning  the  return  of  the  monarchy  would  be  ex- 
pressed, as  his  last  wish,  in  a private  letter  to  Hitler  This 
meant,  of  course,  that  the  whole  point  of  my  original  sug- 
gestion had  been  lost,  as  the  recommendation  concerning 
me  monarchy  was  no  longer  addressed  to  the  nation-  a 
fact  of  which  Hitler  later  took  full  advantage. 

No  German  was  as  well  placed  as  Papen  to  observe  how 
Hitler  took  the  advantage. 

When  1 returned  to  Berlin  after  Hindenburg’s  funeral  at 
Tannenberg,  Hitler  rang  me  up.  He  asked  me  if  a political 
testament  by  Hindenburg  existed,  and  if  I knew  where  it 
was.  I said  that  1 would  ask  Oskar  von  Hindenburg  “I 
should  be  obliged,”  said  Hitler,  “if  you  would  ensure  that 
this  ( document  comes  into  my  possession  as  soon  as  possi- 
! therefore  told  Kageneck,  my  private  secretary,  to  go 
to  Neudeck  and  ask  Hindenburg’s  son  if  the  testament  still 
existed,  and  whether  I could  have  it  to  pass  it  on  to  Hitler. 


317 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

As  I had  not  seen  Hindenburg  after  he  left  Berlin  at  the 
end  of  May,  1 had  no  idea  whether  he  had  destroyed  the 
testament  or  not. 

Oskar,  who  had  not  been  able  to  find  the  important 
document  immediately  after  his  father’s  death,  suddenly 
found  it.  That  this  could  not  have  been  a very  difficult 
feat  was  attested  to  by  Count  von  der  Schulenburg,  Hin- 
denburg’s  adjutant,  in  his  testimony  at  Papen’s  denazifica- 
tion trial.  He  revealed  that  the  President  on  May  11 
signed  two  documents,  his  testament  and  his  last  wishes. 
The  first  was  addressed  to  “the  German  People”  and 
the  second  to  the  “Reich  Chancellor.”  When  Hindenburg 
left  Berlin  on  his  last  journey  to  Neudeck  Schulenburg 
took  the  papers  with  him.  Papen  says  he  did  not  know 
this  at  the  time.  But  in  due  course  his  secretary  returned 
from  Neudeck  bringing  two  sealed  envelopes  turned  over 
to  him  by  Oskar  von  Hindenburg. 

On  August  15  Papen  delivered  them  to  Hitler  at  Berch- 
tesgaden. 

Hitler  read  both  documents  with  great  care  and  discussed 
the  contents  with  us.  It  was  obvious  that  Hindenburg’s 
recommendations  in  the  document  expressing  his  last  wishes 
were  contrary  to  Hitler’s  intentions.  He  therefore  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  fact  that  the  envelope  bore  the  address 
“Reich  Chancellor  Adolf  Hitler.”  “These  recommendations 
of  the  late  President,”  he  said,  “are  given  to  me  personally. 
Later  I shall  decide  if  and  when  I shall  permit  their  publica- 
tion.” In  vain  I begged  him  to  publish  both  documents.  The 
only  one  handed  to  his  press  chief  for  publication  was 
Hindenburg’s  account  of  his  service,  in  which  he  included 
praise  of  Hitler.31 

What  happened  to  the  second  document  recommending 
that  not  Hitler  but  a Hohenzollem  become  head  of  state 
Papen  does  not  say  and  perhaps  does  not  know.  Since  it 
has  never  turned  up  among  the  hundreds  of  tons  of  cap- 
tured secret  Nazi  documents  it  is  likely  that  Hitler  lost  no 
time  in  destroying  it. 

Perhaps  it  would  have  made  little  difference  if  Hitler 
had  been  courageous  and  honest  enough  to  publish  it. 
Even  before  Hindenburg’s  death,  he  had  made  the  cabinet 
promulgate  a law  giving  him  the  President’s  powers.  This 
was  on  August  1,  the  day  before  the  Field  Marshal  died. 
That  the  “law”  was  illegal  also  made  little  difference  in  a 


318 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Germany  where  the  former  Austrian  corporal  had  now 
become  the  law  itself.  That  it  was  illegal  was  obvious.  On 
December  17,  1932,  during  the  Schleicher  government, 
the  Reichstag  had  passed  by  the  necessary  two-thirds  ma- 
jority an  amendment  to  the  constitution  providing  that 
the  president  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  instead  of  the 
Chancellor,  should  act  as  President  until  a new  election 
could  be  held.  And  while  the  Enabling  Act,  which 
was  the  “legal”  basis  of  Hitler’s  dictatorship,  gave  the 
Chancellor  the  right  to  make  laws  which  deviated  from 
the  constitution,  it  specifically  forbade  him  to  tamper  with 
the  institution  of  the  Presidency. 

But  what  mattered  the  law  now?  It  mattered  not  to 
Papen,  who  cheerfully  went  off  to  serve  Hitler  as  minister 
in  Vienna  and  smooth  over  the  mess  caused  by  the  murder 
of  Chancellor  Dolfuss  by  the  Nazis.  It  mattered  not  to 
the  generals,  who  went  eagerly  to  work  to  build  up  Hit- 
ler’s Army.  It  mattered  not  to  the  industrialists,  who  turned 
enthusiastically  to  the  profitable  business  of  rearmament 
Conservatives  of  the  old  school,  “decent”  Germans  like 
Baron  von  Neurath  in  the  Foreign  Office  and  Dr.  Schacht 
in  the  Reichsbank,  did  not  resign.  No  one  resigned.  In 
fact,  Dr.  Schacht  took  on  the  added  duties  of  Minister 
of  Economics  on  August  2,  the  day  Hitler  seized  the 
powers  of  the  expiring  President 

And  the  German  people?  On  August  19,  some  95  per 
cent  of  those  who  had  registered  went  to  the  polls,  and 
90  per  cent,  more  than  thirty-eight  million  of  them,  voted 
approval  of  Hitler’s  usurpation  of  complete  power.  Only 
four  and  a quarter  million  Germans  had  the  courage — or 
the  desire — to  vote  “No.” 

No  wonder  that  Hitler  was  in  a confident  mood  when 
the  Nazi  Party  Congress  assembled  in  Nuremberg  on  Sep- 
tember 4.  I watched  him  on  the  morning  of  the  next  day 
stride  like  a conquering  emperor  down  the  center  aisle 
of  the  great  flag-bedecked  Luitpold  Hall  while  the  band 
blared  forth  “The  Badenweiler  March”  and  thirty  thousand 
hands  were  raised  in  the  Nazi  salute.  A few  moments  later 
he  sat  proudly  in  the  center  of  the  vast  stage  with  folded 
arms  and  shining  eyes  as  Gauleiter  Adolf  Wanger  of  Ba- 
varia read  the  Fuehrer’s  proclamation. 

The  German  form  of  life  is  definitely  determined  for  the 
next  thousand  years.  The  Age  of  Nerves  of  the  nineteenth 


319 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

century  has  found  its  close  with  us.  There  will  be  no  other 
revolution  in  Germany  for  the  next  one  thousand  years! 

Being  mortal,  he  would  not  live  a thousand  years,  but  as 
long  as  he  lived  he  would  rule  this  great  people  as  the 
most  powerful  and  ruthless  autocrat  they  had  ever  had. 
The  vulnerable  Hindenburg  was  no  longer  there  to  dispute 
his  authority,  the  Army  was  in  his  hands,  bound  to  obedi- 
ence by  an  oath  no  German  soldier  would  lightly  break. 
Indeed,  all  Germany  and  all  the  Germans  were  in  his 
bloodstained  hands  now  that  the  last  recalcitrants  had 
been  done  away  with  or  had  disappeared  for  good. 

“It  is  wonderful!”  he  exulted  at  Nuremberg  to  the  for- 
eign correspondents  at  the  end  of  the  exhausting  week 
of  parades,  speeches,  pagan  pageantry  and  the  most  fren- 
zied adulation  for  a public  figure  this  writer  had  ever  seen. 
Adolf  Hitler  had  come  a long  way  from  the  gutters  of 
Vienna.  He  was  only  forty-five,  and  this  was  just  the 
beginning.  Even  one  returning  to  Germany  for  the  first 
time  since  the  death  of  the  Republic  could  see  that,  what- 
ever his  crimes  against  humanity,  Hitler  had  unleashed  a 
dynamic  force  of  incalculable  proportions  which  had  long 
been  pent  up  in  the  German  people.  To  what  purpose,  he 
had  already  made  clear  in  the  pages  of  Mein  Kampf  and 
in  a hundred  speeches  which  had  gone  unnoticed  or  un- 
heeded or  been  ridiculed  by  so  many — by  almost  everyone 
— within  and  especially  without  the  Third  Reich. 


8 


LIFE  IX  THE  THIRD  REICH: 

1933-37 


it  was  at  this  time,  in  the  late  summer  of  1934,  that  I 
came  to  live  and  work  in  the  Third  Reich.  There  was 
much  that  impressed,  puzzled  and  troubled  a foreign  ob- 
server about  the  new  Germany.  The  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  Germans  did  not  seem  to  mind  that  their  per- 
sonal freedom  had  been  taken  away,  that  so  much  of  their 
culture  had  been  destroyed  and  replaced  with  a mindless 
barbarism,  or  that  their  life  and  work  had  become  regi- 
mented  to  a degree  never  before  experienced  even  by  a 
people  accustomed  for  generations  to  a great  deal  of 
regimentation. 

In  the  background,  to  be  sure,  there  lurked  the  terror  of 
the  Gestapo  and  the  fear  of  the  concentration  camp  for 
those  who  got  out  of  line  or  who  had  been  Communists 
or  Socialists  or  too  liberal  or  too  pacifist,  or  who  were 
Jews.  The  Blood  Purge  of  June  30,  1934,  was  a warning 
of  how  ruthless  the  new  leaders  could  be.  Yet  the  Nazi 
terror  in  the  early  years  affected  the  lives  of  relatively 
few  Germans  and  a newly  arrived  observer  was  somewhat 
surprised  to  see  that  the  people  of  this  country  did  not 
seem  to  feel  that  they  were  being  cowed  and  held  down  by 
an  unscrupulous  and  brutal  dictatorship.  On  the  contrary, 
they  supported  it  with  genuine  enthusiasm.  Somehow  it 
imbued  them  with  a new  hope  and  a new  confidence  and  an 
astonishing  faith  in  the  future  of  their  country. 

Hitler  was  liquidating  the  past,  with  all  its  frustrations 
and  disappointments.  Step  by  step,  and  rapidly  (as  we  shall 
see  in  detail  later),  he  was  freeing  Germany  from  the 
shackles  of  Versailles,  confounding  the  victorious  Allies 
and  making  Germany  militarily  strong  again.  This  was 
what  most  Germans  wanted  and  they  were  willing  to  make 


321 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 


the  sacrifices  which  the  Leader  demanded  of  them  to  get 
it:  the  loss  of  personal  freedom,  a Spartan  diet  (“Guns  be- 
fore Butter”)  and  hard  work.  By  the  autumn  of  1936 
the  problem  of  unemployment  had  been  largely  licked, 
almost  everyone  had  a job  again*  and  one  heard  workers 
who  had  been  deprived  of  their  trade-union  rights  joking, 
over  their  full  dinner  pails,  that  at  least  under  Hitler 
there  was  no  more  freedom  to  starve.  “Gemeinnutz  vor 
Eigennutz !”  (The  Common  Interest  before  Self!)  was  a 
popular  Nazi  slogan  in  those  days,  and  though  many  a 
party  leader,  Goering  above  all,  was  secretly  enriching 
himself  and  the  profits  of  business  were  mounting,  there 
was  no  doubt  that  the  masses  were  taken  in  by  the  new 
“national  socialism”  which  ostensibly  put  the  welfare  of 
the  community  above  one’s  personal  gain. 

The  racial  laws  which  excluded  the  Jews  from  the 
German  community  seemed  to  a foreign  observer  to  be  a 
shocking  throwback  to  primitive  times,  but  since  the  Nazi 
racial  theories  exalted  the  Germans  as  the  salt  of  the 
earth  and  the  master  race  they  were  far  from  being  un- 
popular. A few  Germans  one  met — former  Socialists  or 
liberals  or  devout  Christians  from  the  old  conservative 
classes — were  disgusted  or  even  revolted  by  the  persecution 
of  the  Jews,  but  though  they  helped  to  alleviate  hardship 
in  a number  of  individual  cases  they  did  nothing  to  help 
stem  the  tide.  What  could  they  do?  They  would  often  put 
the  question  to  you,  and  it  was  not  an  easy  one  to  answer. 

The  Germans  heard  vaguely  in  their  censored  press  and 
broadcasts  of  the  revulsion  abroad  but  they  noticed  that 
it  did  not  prevent  foreigners  from  flocking  to  the  Third 
Reich  and  seemingly  enjoying  its  hospitality.  For  Nazi  Ger- 
many, much  more  than  Soviet  Russia,  was  open  for  all  the 
world  to  see.  t The  tourist  business  thrived  and  brought  in 
vast  sums  of  badly  needed  foreign  currency.  Apparently 
the  Nazi  leaders  had  nothing  to  hide.  A foreigner,  no  mat- 
ter how  anti-Nazi,  could  come  to  Germany  and  see  and 


* From  February  1933  to  the  spring  of  1937,  the  number  of  registered 
unemployed  fell  from  six  million  to  less  than  one  million. 

T Also,  m contrast  to  the  Soviet  Union,  Nazi  Germany  permitted  all 
but  a few  thousand  of  its  citizens  who  were  in  the  black  book  of  the 
secret  police  to  . travel  abroad,  though  this  was  severely  curtailed  by 
currency  restrictions  because  of  the  country’s  lack  of  foreign  exchange. 
However,  the  currency  restrictions  were  no  more  stringent  than  those 
tor  British  citizens  after  1945.  The  point  is  that  the  Nazi  rulers  did 
not  seem  to  be  worried  that  the  average  German  would  be  contaminated 
by  anti-Nazism  if  he  visited  the  democratic  countries. 


322 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


study  what  he  liked — with  the  exception  of  the  concen- 
tration camps  and,  as  in  all  countries,  the  military  in- 
stallations. And  many  did.  And  many  returned  who  if 
they  were  riot  converted  were  at  least  rendered  tolerant  of 
the  “new  Germany”  and  believed  that  they  had  seen,  as 
they  said,  “positive  achievements.”  Even  a man  as  per- 
spicacious as  Lloyd  George,  who  had  led  England  to  vic- 
tory over  Germany  in  1918,  and  who  in  that  year  had 
campaigned  with  an  election  slogan  of  “Hang  the  Kaiser” 
could  visit  Hitler  at  Obersalzberg  in  1936  and  go  away 
enchanted  with  the  Fuehrer  and  praise  him  publicly  as 
“a  great  man”  who  had  the  vision  and  the  will  to  solve 
a modem  nation’s  social  problems — above  all,  unemploy- 
ment, a sore  which  still  festered  in  England  and  in  regard 
to  which  the  great  wartime  Liberal  leader  with  his  program 
We  Can  Conquer  Unemployment  had  found  so  little  in- 
terest at  home. 

The  Olympic  games  held  in  Berlin  in  August  1936  af- 
forded the  Nazis  a golden  opportunity  to  impress  the  world 
with  the  achievements  of  the  Third  Reich,  and  they  made 
the  most  of  it.  The  signs  “Juden  unerwuenscht"  (Jews  Not 
Welcome)  were  quietly  hauled  down  from  the  shops,  hotels, 
beer  gardens  and  places  of  public  entertainment,  the  per- 
secution of  the  Jews  and  of  the  two  Christian  churches 
temporarily  halted,  and  the  country  put  on  its  best  be- 
havior. No  previous  games  had  seen  such  a spectacular 
organization  nor  such  a lavish  display  of  entertainment. 
Goering,  Ribbentrop  and  Goebbels  gave  dazzling  parties 
for  the  foreign  visitors — the  Propaganda  Minister’s  “Ital- 
ian Night”  on  the  Pfaueninsel  near  Wannsee  gathered 
more  than  a thousand  guests  at  dinner  in  a scene  that  re- 
sembled the  Arabian  Nights.  The  visitors,  especially  those 
from  England  and  America,  were  greatly  impressed  by 
what  they  saw:  apparently  a happy,  healthy,  friendly 
people  united  under  Hitler — a far  different  picture,  they 
said,  than  they  had  got  from  reading  the  newspaper  dis- 
patches from  Berlin. 

And  yet  underneath  the  surface,  hidden  from  the  tour- 
ists during  those  splendid  late-summer  Olympic  days  in 
Berlin  and  indeed  overlooked  by  most  Germans  or  ac- 
cepted by  them  with  a startling  passivity,  there  seemed  to 
be — to  a foreigner  at  least — a degrading  transformation  of 
German  life. 


323 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

There  was  nothing  hidden,  of  course,  about  the  laws 
which  Hitler  decreed  against  the  Jews  or  about  the  govern- 
ment-sponsored persecution  of  these  hapless  people.  The 
so-called  Nuremberg  Laws  of  September  15,  1935,  deprived 
the  Jews  of  German  citizenship,  confining  them  to  the 
status  of  “subjects.”  It  also  forbade  marriage  between  Jews 
and  Aryans  as  well  as  extramarital  relations  between  them, 
and  it  prohibited  Jews  from  employing  female  Aryan  serv- 
ants under  thirty-five  years  of  age.  In  the  next  few  years 
some  thirteen  decrees  supplementing  the  Nuremberg  Laws 
would  outlaw  the  Jew  completely.  But  already  by  the 
summer  of  1936,  when  the  Germany  which  was  host  to 
the  Olympic  games  was  enchanting  the  visitors  from 
the  West,  the  Jews  had  been  excluded  either  by  law  or  by 
Nazi  terror — the  latter  often  preceded  the  former — from 
public  and  private  employment  to  such  an  extent  that  at 
last  one  half  of  them  were  without  means  of  livelihood.  In 
the  first  year  of  the  Third  Reich,  1933,  they  had  been  ex- 
cluded from  public  office,  the  civil  service,  journalism, 
radio,  farming,  teaching,  the  theater,  the  films;  in  1934 
they  were  kicked  out  of  the  stock  exchanges,  and  though 
the  ban  on  their  practicing  the  professions  of  law  and 
medicine  or  engaging  in  business  did  not  come  legally 
until  1938  they  were  in  practice  removed  from  these  fields 
by  the  time  the  first  four-year  period  of  Nazi  rule  had  come 
to  an  end. 

Moreover,  they  were  denied  not  only  most  of  the 
amenities  of  life  but  often  even  the  necessities.  In  many  a 
town  the  Jew  found  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  purchase 
food.  Over  the  doors  of  the  grocery  and  butcher  shops, 
the  bakeries  and  the  dairies,  were  signs,  “Jews  Not  Ad- 
mitted.” In  many  communities  Jews  could  not  procure  milk 
even  for  their  young  children.  Pharmacies  would  not  sell 
them  drugs  or  medicine.  Hotels  would  not  give  them  a night’s 
lodging.  And  always,  wherever  they  went,  were  the  taunt- 
ing signs  “Jews  Strictly  Forbidden  in  This  Town”  or  “Jews 
Enter  This  Place  at  Their  Own  Risk.”  At  a sharp  bend  in 
the  road  near  Ludwigshafen  was  a sign,  “Drive  Carefully! 
Sharp  Curve!  Jews  75  Miles  an  Hour!”  * 

Such  was  the  plight  of  the  Jews  at  about  the  time  the 

* The  author  was  violently  attacked  in  the  German  press  and  on  the 
radio,  and  threatened  with  expulsion,  for  having  written  a dispatch 
saying  that  some  of  these  anti-Semitic  signs  were  being  removed  for 
the  duration  of  the  Olympic  games. 


324 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Festival  of  the  Olympics  was  held  in  Germany.  It  was  but 
the  beginning  of  a road  that  would  soon  lead  to  their  ex- 
tinction by  massacre. 

THE  PERSECUTION  OF  THE 
CHRISTIAN  CHURCHES 

The  Nazi  war  on  the  Christian  churches  began  more 
moderately.  Though  Hitler,  nominally  a Catholic,  had  in- 
veighed against  political  Catholicism  in  Mein  Kampf  and 
attacked  both  of  the  Christian  churches  for  their  failure 
to  recognize  the  racial  problem,  he  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
warned  in  his  book  that  “a  political  party  must  never  . . . 
lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  in  all  previous  historical  ex- 
perience a purely  political  party  has  never  succeeded  in 
producing  a religious  reformation.”  Article  24  of  the  party 
program  had  demanded  “liberty  for  all  religious  denomi- 
nations in  the  State  so  far  as  they  are  not  a danger  to  . . . 
the  moral  feelings  of  the  German  race.  The  party  stands 
for  positive  Christianity.”  In  his  speech  of  March  23,  1933, 
to  the  Reichstag  when  the  legislative  body  of  Germany 
abandoned  its  functions  to  the  dictator,  Hitler  paid  trib- 
ute to  the  Christian  faiths  as  “essential  elements  for  safe- 
guarding the  soul  of  the  German  people,”  promised  to 
respect  their  rights,  declared  that  his  government’s  “am- 
bition is  a peaceful  accord  between  Church  and  State” 
and  added — with  an  eye  to  the  votes  of  the  Catholic  Cen- 
ter Party,  which  he  received — that  “we  hope  to  improve 
our  friendly  relations  with  the  Holy  See.” 

Scarcely  four  months  later,  on  July  20,  the  Nazi  govern- 
ment concluded  a concordat  with  the  Vatican  in  which 
it  guaranteed  the  freedom  of  the  Catholic  religion  and  the 
right  of  the  Church  “to  regulate  her  own  affairs.”  The 
agreement,  signed  on  behalf  of  Germany  by  Papen  and  of 
the  Holy  See  by  the  then  Papal  Secretary  of  State,  Mon- 
signor Pacelli,  later  Pope  Pius  XII,  was  hardly  put  to 
paper  before  it  was  being  broken  by  the  Nazi  government. 
But  coming  as  it  did  at  a moment  when  the  first  ex- 
cesses of  the  new  regime  in  Germany  had  provoked  world- 
wide revulsion,  the  concordat  undoubtedly  lent  the  Hitler 
government  much  badly  needed  prestige.* 


* In  an  allocution  to  the  Sacred  College  on  June  2,  1945,  Pope  Pius  XII 
defended  the  concordat  which  he  had  signed,  but  described  National 
Socialism,  as  he  later  came  to  know  it,  as  “the  arrogant  apostasy  from 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  325 

On  July  25,  five  days  after  the  ratification  of  the  con- 
cordat, the  German  government  promulgated  a sterilization 
law,  which  particularly  offended  the  Catholic  Church.  Five 
days  later  the  first  steps  were  taken  to  dissolve  the  Catholic 
Youth  League.  During  the  next  years  thousands  of  Catholic 
priests,  nuns  and  lay  leaders  were  arrested,  many  of  them 
on  trumped-up  charges  of  “immorality”  or  of  “smuggling 
foreign  currency.”  Erich  Klausener,  leader  of  Catholic 
Action,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  murdered  in  the  June  30, 
1934,  purge.  Scores  of  Catholic  publications  were  sup- 
pressed, and  even  the  sanctity  of  the  confessional  was 
violated  by  Gestapo  agents.  By  the  spring  of  1937  the 
Catholic  hierarchy  in  Germany,  which,  like  most  of  the 
Protestant  clergy,  had  at  first  tried  to  co-operate  with  the 
new  regime,  was  thoroughly  disillusioned.  On  March  14, 
1937,  Pope  Pius  XI  issued  an  encyclical,  “Mit  Brennender 
Sorge”  (With  Burning  Sorrow),  charging  the  Nazi  gov- 
ernment with  “evasion”  and  “violation”  of  the  concordat 
and  accusing  it  of  sowing  “the  tares  of  suspicion,  discord, 
hatred,  calumny,  of  secret  and  open  fundamental  hostility 
to  Christ  and  His  Church.”  On  “the  horizon  of  Germany” 
the  Pope  saw  “the  threatening  storm  clouds  of  de- 
structive religious  wars  . . . which  have  no  other  aim  than 
...  of  extermination.” 

The  Reverend  Martin  Niemoeller  had  personally  wel- 
comed the  coming  to  power  of  the  Nazis  in  1933.  In 
that  year  his  autobiography,  From  U-Boat  to  Pulpit,  had 
been  published.  The  story  of  how  this  submarine  com- 
mander in  the  First  World  War  had  become  a prominent 
Protestant  pastor  was  singled  out  for  special  praise  in  the 
Nazi  press  and  became  a best  seller.  To  Pastor  Niemoeller, 
as  to  many  a Protestant  clergyman,  the  fourteen  years  of 
the  Republic  had  been,  as  he  said,  “years  of  darkness”  1 
and  at  the  close  of  his  autobiography  he  added  a note  of 
satisfaction  that  the  Nazi  revolution  had  finally  triumphed 
and  that  it  had  brought  about  the  “national  revival”  for 
which  he  himself  had  fought  so  long — for  a time  in  the 
free  corps,  from  which  so  many  Nazi  leaders  had  come. 

He  was  soon  to  experience  a terrible  disillusionment. 

The  Protestants  in  Germany,  as  in  the  United  States, 


Jesus  Christ,  the  denial  of  His  doctrine  and  of  His  work  of  redemption, 
the  cult  of  violence,  the  idolatry  of  race  and  blood,  the  overthrow  of 
human  liberty  and  dignity.” 


326 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


were  a divided  faith.  Only  a very  few — some  150,000 
out  of  forty-five  million  of  them — belonged  to  the  various 
Free  Churches  such  as  the  Baptists  and  Methodists.  The 
rest  belonged  to  twenty-eight  Lutheran  and  Reformed 
Churches  of  which  the  largest  was  the  Church  of  the  Old 
Prussian  Union,  with  eighteen  million  members.  With 
the  rise  of  National  Socialism  there  came  further  divisions 
among  the  Protestants.  The  more  fanatical  Nazis  among 
them  organized  in  1932  “The  German  Christians’  Faith 
Movement”  of  which  the  most  vehement  leader  was  a 
certain  Ludwig  Mueller,  army,  chaplain  of  the  East  Prus- 
sian Military  District,  a devoted  follower  of  Hitler  who  had 
first  brought  the  Fuehrer  together  with  General  von  Blom- 
berg  when  the  latter  commanded  the  district.  The  “German 
Christians”  ardently  supported  the  Nazi  doctrines  of  race 
and  the  leadership  principle  and  wanted  them  applied  to 
a Reich  Church  which  would  bring  all  Protestants  into  one 
all-embracing  body.  In  1933  the  “German  Christians”  had 
some  three  thousand  out  of  a total  of  seventeen  thousand 
pastors,  though  their  lay  followers  probably  represented 
a larger  percentage  of  churchgoers. 

Opposed  to  the  “German  Christians”  was  another  mi- 
nority group  which  called  itself  the  “Confessional  Church.” 
It  had  about  the  same  number  of  pastors  and  was  even- 
tually led  by  Niemoeller.  It  opposed  the  Nazification  of 
the  Protestant  churches,  rejected  the  Nazi  racial  theories 
and  denounced  the  anti-Christian  doctrines  of  Rosenberg 
and  other  Nazi  leaders.  In  between  lay  the  majority  of 
Protestants,  who  seemed  too  timid  to  join  either  of  the 
two  warring  groups,  who  sat  on  the  fence  and  eventually, 
for  the  most  part,  landed  in  the  arms  of  Hitler,  accepting 
his  authority  to  intervene  in  church  affairs  and  obeying 
his  commands  without  open  protest. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  behavior  of  most  Ger- 
man Protestants  in  the  first  Nazi  years  unless  one  is 
aware  of  two  things:  their  history  and  the  influence  of 
Martin  Luther.*  The  great  founder  of  Protestantism  was 
both  a passionate  anti-Semite  and  a ferocious  believer  in 
absolute  obedience  to  political  authority.  He  wanted  Ger- 
many rid  of  the  Jews  and  when  they  were  sent  away  he 
advised  that  they  be  deprived  of  “All  their  cash  and  jewels 

* To  avoid  any  misunderstanding,  it  might  be  well  to  point  out  here 
that  the  author  is  a Protestant. 


327 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

and  silver  and  gold”  and,  furthermore,  “that  their  syna- 
gogues or  schools  be  set  on  fire,  that  their  houses  be 
broken  up  and  destroyed  . . . and  they  be  put  under  a roof 
or  stable,  like  the  gypsies  ...  in  misery  and  captivity  as 
they  incessantly  lament  and  complain  to  God  about  us” 
— advice  that  was  literally  followed  four  centuries  later 
by  Hitler,  Goering  and  Himmler. 

In  what  was  perhaps  the  only  popular  revolt  in  German 
history,  the  peasant  uprising  of  1525,  Luther  advised  the 
princes  to  adopt  the  most  ruthless  measures  against  the 
“mad  dogs,”  as  he  called  the  desperate,  downtrodden  peas- 
ants. Here,  as  in  his  utterances  about  the  Jews,  Luther 
employed  a coarseness  and  brutality  of  language  une- 
qualed in  German  history  until  the  Nazi  time.  The  influence 
of  this  towering  figure  extended  down  the  generations  in 
Germany,  especially  among  the  Protestants.  Among  other 
results  was  the  ease  with  which  German  Protestantism  be- 
came the  instrument  of  royal  and  princely  absolutism  from 
the  sixteenth  century  until  the  kings  and  princes  were 
overthrown  in  1918.  The  hereditary  monarchs  and  petty 
rulers  became  the  supreme  bishops  of  the  Protestant 
Church  in  their  lands.  Thus  in  Prussia  the  Hohenzollem 
King  was  the  head  of  the  Church.  In  no  country 
with  the  exception  of  Czarist  Russia  did  the  clergy  become 
by  tradition  so  completely  servile  to  the  political  authority 
of  the  State.  Its  members,  with  few  exceptions,  stood 
solidly  behind  the  King,  the  Junkers  and  the  Army,  and 
during  the  nineteenth  century  they  dutifully  opposed  the 
rising  liberal  and  democratic  movements.  Even  the  Wei- 
mar Republic  was  anathema  to  most  Protestant  pastors,  not 
only  because  it  had  deposed  the  kings  and  princes  but 
because  it  drew  its  main  support  from  the  Catholics  and 
the  Socialists.  During  the  Reichstag  elections  one  could 
not  help  but  notice  that  the  Protestant  clergy — Niemoeller 
was  typical — quite  openly  supported  the  Nationalist  and 
even  the  Nazi  enemies  of  the  Republic.  Like  Niemoeller, 
most  of  the  pastors  welcomed  the  advent  of  Adolf  Hitler 
to  the  chancellorship  in  1933. 

They  were  soon  to  become  acquainted  with  the  very 
strong-arm  Nazi  tactics  which  had  swept  Hitler  to  political 
power.  In  July  1933  representatives  of  the  Protestant 
churches  had  written  a constitution  for  a new  “Reich 
Church,”  and  it  was  formally  recognized  by  the  Reich- 


328  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

stag  on  July  14.  Immediately  there  broke  out  a heated 
struggle  over  the  election  of  the  first  Reich  Bishop.  Hitler 
insisted  that  his  friend,  Chaplain  Mueller,  whom  he  had 
appointed  his  adviser  on  Protestant  church  affairs,  be 
given  this  highest  office.  The  leaders  of  the  Church  Fede- 
ration proposed  an  eminent  divine,  Pastor  Friedrich  von 
Bodelschwingh.  But  they  were  naive.  The  Nazi  govern- 
ment intervened,  dissolved  a number  of  provincial  church 
organizations,  suspended  from  office  several  leading  digni- 
taries, of  the  Protestant  churches,  loosed  the  S.A.  and 
the  Gestapo  on  recalcitrant  clergymen — in  fact,  terrorized 
all  who  supported  Bodelschwingh.  On  the  eve  of  the  elec- 
tions of  delegates  to  the  synod  which  would  elect  the 
Reich  Bishop,  Hitler  personally  took  to  the  radio  to  “urge” 
the  election  of  “German  Christians”  whose  candidate 
Mueller  was.  The  intimidation  was  highly  successful. 
Bodelschwingh  in  the  meantime  had  been  forced  to  with- 
draw his  candidacy,  and  the  “elections”  returned  a ma- 
jority of  “German  Christians,”  who  in  September  at  the 
synod  in  Wittenberg,  where  Luther  had  first  defied  Rome, 
elected  Mueller  Reich  Bishop. 

But  the  new  head  of  the  Church,  a heavy-handed  man, 
was  not  able  to  establish  a unified  Church  or  to  com- 
pletely Nazify  the  Protestant  congregations.  On  Nov- 
ember 13,  1933,  the  day  after  the  German  people  had 
overwhelmingly  backed  Hitler  in  a national  plebiscite,  the 
“German  Christians”  staged  a massive  rally  in  the  Sport- 
palast  in  Berlin.  A Dr.  Reinhardt  Krause,  the  Berlin  dis- 
trict leader  of  the  sect,  proposed  the  abandonment  of  the 
Old  Testament,  “with  its  tales  of  cattle  merchants  and 
pimps”  and  the  revision  of  the  New  Testament  with  the 
teaching  of  Jesus  “corresponding  entirely  with  the  demands 
of  National  Socialism.”  Resolutions  were  drawn  up  de- 
manding “One  People,  One  Reich,  One  Faith,”  requiring 
all  pastors  to  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  Hitler  and  in- 
sisting that  all  churches  institute  the  Aryan  paragraph  and 
exclude  converted  Jews.  This  was  too  much  even  for 
the  timid  Protestants  who  had  declined  to  take  any  part 
in  the  church  war,  and  Bishop  Mueller  was  forced  to 
suspend  Dr.  Krause  and  disavow  him. 

In  reality  the  struggle  between  the  Nazi  government  and 
the  churches  was  the  age-old  one  of  what  to  render  unto 
Caesar  and  what  to  God.  So  far  as  the  Protestants  were 


329 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

concerned,  Hitler  was  insistent  that  if  the  Nazi  “German 
Christians”  could  not  bring  the  evangelical  churches  into 
line  under  Reich  Bishop  Mueller  then  the  government  it- 
self would  have  to  take  over  the  direction  of  the  churches. 
He  had  always  had  a certain  contempt  for  the  Protestants, 
who,  though  a tiny  minority  in  his  native  Catholic 
Austria,  comprised  two  thirds  of  the  citizens  of  Germany. 
“You  can  do  anything  you  want  with  them,”  he  once  con- 
fided to  his  aides.  “They  will  submit  . . . they  are  in- 
significant little  people,  submissive  as  dogs,  and  they 
sweat  with  embarrassment  when  you  talk  to  them.”  3 He 
was  well  aware  that  the  resistance  to  the  Nazificatibn  of 
the  Protestant  churches  came  from  a minority  of  pastors 
and  an  even  smaller  minority  of  worshipers. 

By  the  beginning  of  1934,  the  disillusioned  Pastor 
Niemoeller  had  become  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  minority 
resistance  in  both  the  “Confessional  Church”  and  the 
Pastors’  Emergency  League.  At  the  General  Synod  in 
Barmen  in  May  1934,  and  at  a special  meeting  in  Niemoel- 
ler’s  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  at  Dahlem,  a suburb  of  Berlin, 
in  November,  the  “Confessional  Church”  declared  itself  to 
be  the  legitimate  Protestant  Church  of  Germany  and  set 
up  a provisional  church  government.  Thus  there  were  now 
two  groups — Reich  Bishop  Mueller’s  and  Niemoeller’s — 
claiming  to  legally  constitute  the  Church. 

It  was  obvious  that  the  former  army  chaplain,  despite  his 
closeness  to  Hitler,  had  failed  to  integrate  the  Protestant 
churches,  and  at  the  end  of  1935,  after  the  Gestapo  had 
arrested  seven  hundred  “Confessional  Church”  pastors, 
he  resigned  his  office  and  faded  out  of  the  picture.  Al- 
ready, in  July  1935,  Hitler  had  appointed  a Nazi  lawyer 
friend,  Dr.  Hans  Kerri,  to  be  Minister  for  Church  Affairs, 
with  instructions  to  make  a second  attempt  to  co-ordinate 
the  Protestants.  One  of  the  milder  Nazis  and  a somewhat 
cautious  man,  Kerri  at  first  had  considerable  success.  He 
succeeded  not  only  in  winning  over  the  conservative  clergy, 
which  constituted  the  majority,  but  in  setting  up  a Church 
Committee  headed  by  the  venerable  Dr.  Zoellner,  who 
was  respected  by  all  factions,  to  work  out  a general  settle- 
ment. Though  Niemoeller’s  group  co-operated  with  the 
committee,  it  still  maintained  that  it  was  the  only  legitimate 
Church.  When,  in  May  1936,  it  addressed  a courteous  but 
firm  memorandum  to  Hitler  protesting  against  the  anti- 


330 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Christian  tendencies  of  the  regime,  denouncing  the  govern- 
ment’s anti-Semitism  and  demanding  an  end  to  State  in- 
terference in  the  churches,  Frick,  the  Nazi  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  responded  with  ruthless  action.  Hundreds  of 
“Confessional  Church”  pastors  were  arrested,  one  of  the 
signers  of  the  memorandum,  Dr.  Weissler,  was  murdered 
in  the  Sachsenhausen  concentration  camp,  the  funds  of  the 
“Confessional  Church”  were  confiscated  and  it  was  for- 
bidden to  make  collections. 

On  February  12,  1937,  Dr.  Zoellner  resigned  from  the 
Church  Committee — he  had  been  restrained  by  the  Ge- 
stapo from  visiting  Luebeck,  where  nine  Protestant  pas- 
tors had  been  arrested — complaining  that  his  work  had 
been  sabotaged  by  the  Church  Minister.  Dr.  Kerri  replied 
the  next  day  in  a speech  to  a group  of  submissive  church- 
men. He  accused  the  venerable  Zoellner  of  failing  to  ap- 
preciate the  Nazi  doctrine  of  Race,  Blood  and  Soil,  and 
clearly  revealed  the  government’s  hostility  to  both  Protes- 
tant and  Catholic  churches. 

The  party  [Kerri  said]  stands  on  the  basis  of  Positive 
Christianity,  and  Positive  Christianity  is  National  Socialism 
. . . National  Socialism  is  the  doing  of  God’s  will  . . . 
God’s  will  reveals  itself  in  German  blood  . . . Dr.  Zoellner 
and  Count  Galen  [the  Catholic  bishop  of  Muenster]  have 
tried  to  make  clear  to  me  that  Christianity  consists  in  faith 
in  Christ  as  the  Son  of  God.  That  makes  me  laugh  . . . No, 
Christianity  is  not  dependent  upon  the  Apostle’s  Creed  . . . 
True  Christianity  is  represented  by  the  party,  and  the  Ger- 
man people  are  now  called  by  the  party  and  especially  by 
the  Fuehrer  to  a real  Christianity  . . . The  Fuehrer  is  the 
herald  of  a new  revelation.4 

On  the  first  of  July,  1937,  Dr.  Niemoeller  was  arrested 
and  confined  to  Moabit  prison  in  Berlin.  On  June  27  he 
had  preached  to  the  congregation,  which  always  overflowed 
his  church  at  Dahlem,  what  was  to  be  his  last  sermon  in 
the  Third  Reich.  As  if  he  had  a foreboding  of  what  was 
to  come  he  said,  “We  have  no  more  thought  of  using 
our  own  powers  to  escape  the  arm  of  the  authorities  than 
had  the  Apostles  of  old.  No  more  are  we  ready  to  keep 
silent  at  man’s  behest  when  God  commands  us  to  speak. 
For  it  is,  and  must  remain,  the  case  that  we  must  obey 
God  rather  than  man.” 

After  eight  months  in  prison  he  was  tried  on  March  2, 


331 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

1938,  before  a Sondergericht,  one  of  the  “Special  Courts” 
set  up  by  the  Nazis  to  try  offenders  against  the  State,  and 
though  acquitted  of  the  main  charge  of  “underhand  at- 
tacks against  the  State”  was  fined  two  thousand  marks 
and  sentenced  to  seven  months’  imprisonment  for  “abuse 
of  the  pulpit”  and  holding  collections  in  his  church.  Since 
he  had  served  more  than  this  time,  the  court  ordered  his 
release,  but  he  was  seized  by  the  Gestapo  as  he  was  leaving 
the  courtroom,  placed  in  “protective  custody”  and  confined 
in  concentration  camps,  first  at  Sachsenhausen  and  then 
at  Dachau,  where  he  remained  for  seven  years  until  lib- 
erated by  Allied  troops. 

Some  807  other  pastors  and  leading  laymen  of  the 
“Confessional  Church”  were  arrested  in  1937,  and  hun- 
dreds more  in  the  next  couple  of  years.  If  the  resistance 
of  the  Niemoeller  wing  of  the  church  was  not  completely 
broken,  it  was  certainly  bent.  As  for  the  majority  of  Prot- 
estant pastors,  they,  like  almost  everyone  else  in  Germany, 
submitted  in  the  face  of  Nazi  terror.  By  the  end  of  1937 
the  highly  respected  Bishop  Marahrens  of  Hanover  was 
induced  by  Dr.  Kerri  to  make  a public  declaration  that 
must  have  seemed  especially  humiliating  to  tougher  men 
of  God  such  as  Niemoeller:  “The  National  Socialist  con- 
ception of  life  is  the  national  and  political  teaching  which 
determines  and  characterizes  German  manhood.  As  such, 
it  is  obligatory  upon  German  Christians  also.”  In  the 
spring  of  1938  Bishop  Marahrens  took  the  final  step  of 
ordering  all  pastors  in  his  diocese  to  swear  a personal 
oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Fuehrer.  In  a short  time  the 
vast  majority  of  Protestant  clergymen  took  the  oath,  thus 
binding  themselves  legally  and  morally  to  obey  the  com- 
mands of  the  dictator. 

It  would  be  misleading  to  give  the  impression  that  the 
persecution  of  Protestants  and  Catholics  by  the  Nazi  State 
tore  the  German  people  asunder  or  even  greatly  aroused 
the  vast  majority  of  them.  It  did  not.  A people  who  had 
so  lightly  given  up  their  political  and  cultural  and  eco- 
nomic freedoms  were  not,  except  for  a relatively  few, 
going  to  die  or  even  risk  imprisonment  to  preserve  freedom 
of  worship.  What  really  aroused  the  Germans  in  the 
Thirties  were  the  glittering  successes  of  Hitler  in  providing 
jobs,  creating  prosperity,  restoring  Germany’s  military 
might,  and  moving  from  one  triumph  to  another  in  his 


332  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

foreign  policy.  Not  many  Germans  lost  much  sleep  over 
the  arrests  of  a few  thousand  pastors  and  priests  or  over  the 
quarreling  of  the  various  Protestant  sects.  And  even  fewer 
paused  to  reflect  that  under  the  leadership  of  Rosenberg, 
Bormann  and  Himmler,  who  were  backed  by  Hitler,  the 
Nazi  regime  intended  eventually  to  destroy  Christianity 
in  Germany,  if  it  could,  and  substitute  the  old  paganism 
of  the  early  tribal  Germanic  gods  and  the  new  paganism 
of  the  Nazi  extremists.  As  Bormann,  one  of  the  men 
closest  to  Hitler,  said  publicly  in  1941,  “National  So- 
cialism and  Christianity  are  irreconcilable.” 

What  the  Hitler  government  envisioned  for  Germany 
was  clearly  set  out  in  a thirty-point  program  for  the 
“National  Reich  Church”  drawn  up  during  the  war  by 
Rosenberg,  an  outspoken  pagan,  who  among  his  other 
offices  held  that  of  “the  Fuehrer’s  Delegate  for  the  Entire 
Intellectual  and  Philosophical  Education  and  Instruction 
for  the  National  Socialist  Party.”  A few  of  its  thirty 
articles  convey  the  essentials: 

1.  The  National  Reich  Church  of  Germany  categorically 
claims  the  exclusive  right  and  the  exclusive  power  to  con- 
trol all  churches  within  the  borders  of  the  Reich:  it  declares 
these  to  be  national  churches  of  the  German  Reich. 

5.  The  National  Church  is  determined  to  exterminate 
irrevocably  . . . the  strange  and  foreign  Christian  faiths 
imported  into  Germany  in  the  ill-omened  year  800. 

7.  The  National  Church  has  no  scribes,  pastors,  chap- 
lains or  priests,  but  National  Reich  orators  are  to  speak  in 
them. 

13.  The  National  Church  demands  immediate  cessation  of 
the  publishing  and  dissemination  of  the  Bible  in  Ger- 
many . . . 

14.  The  National  Church  declares  that  to  it,  and  there- 
fore to  the  German  nation,  it  has  been  decided  that  the 
Fuehrer’s  Mein  Kampf  is  the  greatest  of  all  documents.  It 
...  not  only  contains  the  greatest  but  it  embodies  the 
purest  and  truest  ethics  for  the  present  and  future  life  of 
our  nation. 

18.  The  National  Church  will  clear  away  from  its  altars 
all  crucifixes,  Bibles  and  pictures  of  saints. 

19.  On  the  altars  there  must  be  nothing  but  Mein  Kampf 
(to  the  German  nation  and  therefore  to  God  the  most  sacred 
book)  and  to  the  left  of  the  altar  a sword. 

30.  On  the  day  of  its  foundation,  the  Christian  Cross 
must  be  removed  from  all  churches,  cathedrals  and  chapels 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  333 

. . . and  it  must  be  superseded  by  the  only  unconquerable 
symbol,  the  swastika.5 

THE  NAZIFICATION  OF  CULTURE 

On  the  evening  of  May  10,  1933,  some  four  and  a half 
months  after  Hitler  became  Chancellor,  there  occurred  in 
Berlin  a scene  which  had  not  been  witnessed  in  the  West- 
ern world  since  the  late  Middle  Ages.  At  about  midnight 
a torchlight  parade  of  thousands  of  students  ended  at  a 
square  on  Unter  den  Linden  opposite  the  University  of 
Berlin.  Torches  were  put  to  a huge  pile  of  books  that  had 
been  gathered  there,  and  as  the  flames  enveloped  them 
more  books  were  thrown  on  the  fire  until  some  twenty 
thousand  had  been  consumed.  Similar  scenes  took  place 
in  several  other  cities.  The  book  burning  had  begun. 

Many  of  the  books  tossed  into  the  flames  in  Berlin  that 
night  by  the  joyous  students  under  the  approving  eye 
of  Dr.  Goebbels  had  been  written  by  authors  of  world 
reputation.  They  included,  among  German  writers,  Thomas 
and  Heinrich  Mann,  Lion  Feuchtwanger,  Jakob  Wasser- 
mann,  Arnold  and  Stefan  Zweig,  Erich  Maria  Remarque, 
Walther  Rathenau,  Albert  Einstein,  Alfred  Kerr  and  Hugo 
Preuss,  the  last  named  being  the  scholar  who  had  drafted 
the  Weimar  Constitution.  But  not  only  the  works  of  dozens 
of  German  writers  were  burned.  A good  many  foreign 
authors  were  also  included:  Jack  London,  Upton  Sinclair, 
Helen  Keller,  Margaret  Sanger,  H.  G.  Wells,  Havelock 
Ellis,  Arthur  Schnitzler,  Freud,  Gide,  Zola,  Proust.  In 
the  words  of  a student  proclamation,  any  book  was  con- 
demned to  the  flames  “which  acts  subversively  on  our 
future  or  strikes  at  the  root  of  German  thought,  the  Ger- 
man home  and  the  driving  forces  of  our  people.” 

Dr.  Goebbels,  the  new  Propaganda  Minister,  who  from 
now  on  was  to  put  German  culture  into  a Nazi  strait 
jacket,  addressed  the  students  as  the  burning  books  turned 
to  ashes.  “The  soul  of  the  German  people  can  again  ex- 
press itself.  These  flames  not  only  illuminate  the  final  end 
of  an  old  era;  they  also  light  up  the  new.” 

The  new  Nazi  era  of  German  culture  was  illuminated  not 
only  by  the  bonfires  of  books  and  the  more  effective,  if 
less  symbolic,  measures  of  proscribing  the  sale  or  library 
circulation  of  hundreds  of  volumes  and  the  publishing  of 
many  new  ones,  but  by  the  regimentation  of  culture  on  a 


334 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

scale  which  no  modem  Western  nation  had  ever  experi- 
enced. As  early  as  September  22,  1933,  the  Reich  Chamber 
of  Culture  had  been  set  up  by  law  under  the  direction  of 
Dr.  Goebbels.  Its  purpose  was  defined,  in  the  words  of 
the  law,  as  follows:  “In  order  to  pursue  a policy  of  German 
culture,  it  is  necessary  to  gather  together  the  creative  art- 
ists in  all  spheres  into  a unified  organization  under  the 
leadership  of  the  Reich.  The  Reich  must  not  only  deter- 
mine the  lines  of  progress,  mental  and  spiritual,  but  also 
lead  and  organize  the  professions.” 

Seven  subchambers  were  established  to  guide  and  con- 
trol every  sphere  of  cultural  life:  the  Reich  chambers  of 
fine  arts,  music,  the  theater,  literature,  the  press,  radio 
and  the  films.  All  persons  engaged  in  these  fields  were 
obligated  to  join  their  respective  chambers,  whose  decisions 
and  directives  had  the  validity  of  law.  Among  other  powers, 
the  chambers  could  expel — or  refuse  to  accept — members 
for  “political  unreliability,”  which  meant  that  those  who 
were  even  lukewarm  about  National  Socialism  could  be, 
and  usually  were,  excluded  from  practicing  their  profes- 
sion or  art  and  thus  deprived  of  a livelihood. 

No  one  who  lived  in  Germany  in  the  Thirties,  and 
who  cared  about  such  matters,  can  ever  forget  the  sicken- 
ing decline  of  the  cultural  standards  of  a people  who  had 
had  such  high  ones  for  so  long  a time.  This  was  inevitable, 
of  course,  the  moment  the  Nazi  leaders  decided  that  the 
arts,  literature,  the  press,  radio  and  the  films  must  serve 
exclusively  the  propaganda  purposes  of  the  new  regime 
and  its  outlandish  philosophy.  Not  a single  living  German 
writer  of  any  importance,  with  the  exception  of  Ernst 
Juenger  and  Ernst  Wiechert  in  the  earlier  years,  was  pub- 
lished in  Germany  during  the  Nazi  time.  Almost  all  of 
them,  led  by  Thomas  Mann,  emigrated;  the  few  who  re- 
mained were  silent  or  were  silenced.  Every  manuscript 
of  a book  or  a play  had  to  be  submitted  to  the  Propaganda 
Ministry  before  it  could  be  approved  for  publication  or 
production. 

Music  fared  best,  if  only  because  it  was  the  least  polit- 
ical of  the  arts  and  because  the  Germans  had  such  a rich 
store  of  it  from  Bach  through  Beethoven  and  Mozart 
to  Brahms.  But  the  playing  of  Mendelssohn  was  banned 
because  he  was  a Jew  (the  works  of  all  Jewish  composers 
were  verboten ) as  was  the  music  of  Germany’s  leading 


335 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

modern  composer,  Paul  Hindemith.  Jews  were  quickly 
weeded  out  of  the  great  symphony  orchestras  and  the 
opera.  Unlike  the  writers,  most  of  the  great  figures  of  the 
German  music  world  chose  to  remain  in  Nazi  Germany 
and  indeed  lent  their  names  and  their  talent  to  the  New 
Order.  Wilhelm  Furtwaengler,  one  of  the  finest  conductors 
of  the  century,  remained.  He  was  out  of  favor  for  a year 
in  1934  because  of  his  defense  of  Hindemith,  but  returned 
to  activity  for  the  remaining  years  of  Hitler’s  rule.  Richard 
Strauss,  perhaps  the  world’s  leading  living  composer,  re- 
mained and  indeed  for  a time  became  president  of  the 
Reich  Music  Chamber,  lending  his  great  name  to  Goebbels’ 
prostituting  of  culture.  Walter  Gieseking,  the  eminent  pian- 
ist, spent  much  of  his  time  making  tours  in  foreign  coun- 
tries which  were  organized  or  approved  by  the  Propaganda 
Minister  to  promote  German  “culture”  abroad.  But  be- 
cause the  musicians  did  not  emigrate  and  because  of  Ger- 
many’s great  treasure  of  classical  music,  one  could  hear 
during  the  days  of  the  Third  Reich  symphony  music 
and  opera  performed  magnificently.  In  this  the  Berlin 
Philhaimonic  Orchestra  and  the  Berlin  State  Opera  was 
pre-eminent.  The  excellent  music  fare  did  much  to  make 
people  forget  the  degradation  of  the  other  arts  and  of 
so  much  of  life  under  the  Nazis. 

The  theater,  it  must  be  said,  retained  much  of  its  excel- 
lence as  long  as  it  stuck  to  classical  plays.  Max  Reinhardt, 
of  course,  was  gone,  along  with  all  other  Jewish  producers, 
directors  and  actors.  The  Nazi  playwrights  were  so  lu- 
dicrously bad  that  the  public  stayed  away  from  their 
offerings,  which  invariably  had  short  runs.  The  president  of 
the  Reich  Theater  Chamber  was  one  Hans  Johst,  an  un- 
successful playwright  who  once  had  publicly  boasted  that 
whenever  someone  mentioned  the  word  “culture”  to  him  he 
wanted  to  reach  for  his  revolver.  But  even  Johst  and  Goeb- 
bels, who  determined  what  was  played  on  the  stage  and 
who  played  and  directed  it,  were  unable  to  prevent  the 
German  theater  from  giving  commendable  and  often 
moving  performances  of  Goethe,  Schiller  and  Shakespeare. 

Strangely  enough,  some  of  Shaw’s  plays  were  permitted 
to  be  performed  in  Nazi  Germany — perhaps  because  he 
poked  fun  at  Englishmen  and  lampooned  democracy  and 
perhaps  too  because  his  wit  and  left-wing  political  views 
escaped  the  Nazi  mind. 


336  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Strangest  of  all  was  the  case  of  Germany’s  great  play- 
wright, Gerhart  Hauptmann.  Because  he  had  been  an  ardent 
Socialist  his  plays  had  been  banned  from  the  imperial 
theaters  during  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II’s  time.  During  the  Re- 
public he  had  been  the  most  popular  playwright  in  Ger- 
many, and  indeed  he  retained  that  position  in  the  Third 
Reich.  His  plays  continued  to  be  produced.  I shall 
never  forget  the  scene  at  the  close  of  the  first  night  of  his 
last  play,  The  Daughter  of  the  Cathedral,  when  Haupt- 
mann, a venerable  figure  with  his  flowing  white  hair  tum- 
bling down  over  his  black  cape,  strode  out  of  the  theater 
arm  in  arm  with  Dr.  Goebbels  and  Johst.  He,  like  so 
many  other  eminent  Germans,  had  made  his  peace  with 
Hitler,  and  Goebbels,  a shrewd  man,  had  made  much  effec- 
tive propaganda  out  of  it,  tirelessly  reminding  the  Ger- 
man people  and  the  outside  world  that  Germany’s  greatest 
living  playwright,  a former  Socialist  and  the  champion  of 
the  common  man,  had  not  only  remained  in  the  Third 
Reich  but  had  continued  to  write  and  have  his  plays 
produced. 

How  sincere  or  opportunistic  or  merely  changeable  this 
aging  playwright  was  may  be  gathered  from  what  hap- 
pened after  the  war.  The  American  authorities,  believing 
that  Hauptmann  had  served  the  Nazis  too  well,  banned 
his  plays  from  the  theaters  in  their  sector  in  West  Berlin. 
Whereupon  the  Russians  invited  him  to  Berlin,  welcomed 
him  as  a hero  and  staged  a gala  cycle  of  his  plays  in  East 
Berlin.  And  on  October  6,  1945,  Hauptmann  sent  a mes- 
sage to  the  Communist-dominated  “Kulturbund  for  the 
Democratic  Revival  of  Germany”  wishing  it  well  and  ex- 
pressing the  hope  that  it  would  succeed  in  bringing  about 
a “spiritual  rebirth”  of  the  German  people. 

The  Germany  which  had  given  the  world  a Duerer  and 
a Cranach  had  not  been  pre-eminent  in  the  fine  arts  in 
modern  times,  though  German  expressionism  in  painting 
and  the  Munich  Bauhaus  architecture  were  interesting 
and  original  movements  and  German  artists  had  partici- 
pated in  all  the  twentieth-century  evolutions  and  eruptions 
represented  by  impressionism,  cubsim  and  Dadaism. 

To  Hilter,  who  considered  himself  a genuine  artist  de- 
spite his  early  failures  as  one  in  Vienna,  all  modern  art 
was  degenerate  and  senseless.  In  Mein  Kampf  he  had 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  337 

delivered  a long  tirade  on  the  subject,  and  one  of  his  first 
acts  after  coming  to  power  was  to  “cleanse”  Germany  of 
its  “decadent”  art  and  to  attempt  to  substitute  a new 
“Germanic”  art.  Some  6,500  modern  paintings — not  only 
the  works  of  Germans  such  as  Kokoschka  and  Grosz  but 
those  of  Cezanne,  Van  Gogh,  Gauguin,  Matisse,  Picasso 
and  many  others — were  removed  from  German  museums. 

What  was  to  replace  them  was  shown  in  the  summer  of 
1937  when  Hitler  formally  opened  the  “House  of  German 
Art”  in  Munich  in  a drab,  pseudoclassic  building  which 
he  had  helped  design  and  which  he  described  as  “unpar- 
alleled and  inimitable”  in  its  architecture.  In  this  first 
exhibition  of  Nazi  art  were  crammed  some  nine  hundred 
works,  selected  from  fifteen  thousand  submitted,  of  the 
worst  junk  this  writer  has  ever  seen  in  any  country.  Hitler 
himself  made  the  final  selection  and,  according  to  some  of 
the  party  comrades  who  were  with  him  at  the  time,  had  be- 
come so  incensed  at  some  of  the  paintings  accepted  by  the 
Nazi  jury  presided  over  by  Adolf  Ziegler,  a mediocre 
painter  who  was  president  of  the  Reich  Chamber  of  Art,* 
that  he  had  not  only  ordered  them  thrown  out  but  had 
kicked  holes  with  his  jack  boot  through  several  of  them.  “I 
was  always  determined,”  he  said  in  a long  speech  inau- 
gurating the  exhibition,  “if  fate  ever  gave  us  power,  not  to 
discuss  these  matters  [of  artistic  judgment]  but  to  make 
decisions.”  And  he  had  made  them. 

In  his  speech — it  was  delivered  on  July  18,  1937 — he 
laid  down  die  Nazi  line  for  “German  art”: 

Works  of  art  that  cannot  be  understood  but  need  a 
swollen  set  of  instructions  to  prove  their  right  to  exist  and 
find  their  way  to  neurotics  who  are  receptive  to  such  stupid 
or  insolent  nonsense  will  no  longer  openly  reach  the  Ger- 
man nation.  Let  no  one  have  illusions!  National  Socialism 
has  set  out  to  purge  the  German  Reich  and  our  people  of 
all  those  influences  threatening  its  existence  and  character 
. . . With  the  opening  of  this  exhibition  has  come  the  end 
of  artistic  lunacy  and  with  it  the  artistic  pollution  of 
our  people  . . . 

And  yet  some  Germans  at  least,  especially  in  the  art 
center  of  Germany  which  Munich  was,  preferred  to  be 
artistically  polluted.  In  another  part  of  the  city  in  a ram- 

* Ziegler  owed  his  position  to  the  happy  circumstance  that  he  had 
painted  the  portrait  of  Geli  Raubal. 


338 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


shackle  gallery  that  had  to  be  reached  through  a narrow 
stairway  was  an  exhibition  of  “degenerate  art”  which  Dr. 
Goebbels  had  organized  to  show  the  people  what  Hitler 
was  rescuing  them  from.  It  contained  a splendid  selection 
of  modern  paintings — Kokoschka,  Chagall  and  expres- 
sionist and  impressionist  works.  The  day  I visited  it, 
after  panting  through  the  sprawling  House  of  German  Art, 
it  was  crammed,  with  a long  line  forming  down  the  creak- 
ing stairs  and  out  into  the  street.  In  fact,  the  crowds  be- 
sieging it  became  so  great  that  Dr.  Goebbels,  incensed 
and  embarrassed,  soon  closed  it. 

THE  CONTROL  OF  PRESS,  RADIO,  FILMS 

Every  morning  the  editors  of  the  Berlin  daily  news- 
papers and  the  correspondents  of  those  published  else- 
where in  the  Reich  gathered  at  the  Propaganda  Ministry 
to  be  told  by  Dr.  Goebbels  or  by  one  of  his  aides  what 
news  to  print  and  suppress,  how  to  write  the  news  and 
headline  it,  what  campaigns  to  call  off  or  institute  and  what 
editorials  were  desired  for  the  day.  In  case  of  any  mis- 
understanding a daily  written  directive  was  furnished  along 
with  the  oral  instructions.  For  the  smaller  out-of-town 
papers  and  the  periodicals  the  directives  were  dispatched 
by  telegram  or  by  mail. 

To  he  an  editor  in  the  Third  Reich  one  had  to  be,  in 
the  first  place,  politically  and  racially  “clean.”  The  Reich 
Press  Law  of  October  4,  1933,  which  made  journalism  a 
“public  vocation,”  regulated  by  law,  stipulated  that  all 
editors  must  possess  German  citizenship,  be  of  Aryan  de- 
scent and  not  married  to  a Jew.  Section  14  of  the  Press  Law 
ordered  editors  “to  keep  out  of  the  newspapers  anything 
which  in  any  manner  is  misleading  to  the  public,  mixes 
selfish  aims  with  community  aims,  tends  to  weaken  the 
strength  of  the  German  Reich,  outwardly  or  inwardly, 
the  common  will  of  the  German  people,  the  defense  of  Ger- 
many, its  culture  and  economy  ...  or  offends  the  honor  and 
dignity  of  Germany” — an  edict  which,  if  it  had  been  in 
effect  before  1933,  would  have  led  to  the  suppression  of 
every  Nazi  editor  and  publication  in  the  country.  It  now 
led  to  the  ousting  of  those  journals  and  journalists  who 
were  not  Nazi  or  who  declined  to  become  so. 

One  of  the  first  to  be  forced  out  of  business  was  the 


339 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

Vossische  Zeitung.  Founded  in  1704  and  numbering  among 
its  contributors  in  the  past  such  names  as  Frederick  the 
Great,  Lessing  and  Rathenau,  it  had  become  the  leading 
newspaper  of  Germany,  comparable  to  the  Times  of 
London  and  the  New  York  Times.  But  it  was  liberal  and  it 
was  owned  by  the  House  of  Ullstein,  a Jewish  firm.  It 
went  out  of  business  on  April  1,  1934,  after  230  years  of 
continuous  publication.  The  Berliner  Tageblatt,  another 
world-renowned  liberal  newspaper,  lingered  on  a little 
longer,  until  1937,  though  its  owner,  Hans  Lackmann- 
Mosse,  a Jew,  was  forced  to  surrender  his  interest  in  the 
newspaper  in  the  spring  of  1933.  Germany’s  third  great 
liberal  newspaper,  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  also  continued 
to  publish  after  divesting  itself  of  its  Jewish  proprietor  and 
editors.  Rudolf  Kircher,  its  London  correspondent,  an 
Anglophile  and  a liberal,  became  the  editor  and,  like  Karl 
Silex,  editor  of  the  conversative  Deutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeitung  of  Berlin,  who  had  also  been  a London  corre- 
spondent, a Rhodes  scholar,  a passionate  admirer  of  the 
British  and  a liberal,  served  the  Nazis  well,  often  becoming, 
as  Otto  Dietrich,  the  Reich  press  chief,  once  said  of  the 
former  “opposition  papers,”  “more  papal  than  the  Pope.” 
That  the  last  three  newspapers  survived  was  due  partly  to 
the  influence  of  the  German  Foreign  Office,  which  wanted 
these  internationally  known  journals  as  a kind  of  show- 
piece to  impress  the  outside  world.  They  gave  a respect- 
ability to  Nazi  Germany  and  at  the  same  time  peddled  its 
propaganda. 

With  all  newspapers  in  Germany  being  told  what  to 
publish  and  how  to  write  the  news  and  editorials,  it  was 
inevitable  that  a deadly  conformity  would  come  over  the 
nation’s  press.  Even  a people  so  regimented  and  so  given 
to  accepting  authority  became  bored  by  the  daily  news- 
papers. Circulation  declined  even  for  the  leading  Nazi 
daily  newspapers  such  as  the  morning  Voelkischer  Beo- 
bachter  and  the  evening  Der  Angriff.  And  the  total  cir- 
culation of  all  journals  fell  off  steeply  as  one  paper  after 
another  went  under  or  was  taken  over  by  Nazi  publishers. 
In  the  first  four  years  of  the  Third  Reich  the  number  of 
daily  newspapers  declined  from  3,607  to  2,671. 

But  the  country’s  loss  of  a free  and  varied  press  was  the 
party’s  gain — at  least  financially.  Max  Amann,  Hitler’s  top 
sergeant  during  the  First  World  War  and  head  of  the  Eher 


340 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Verlag,  the  party’s  publishing  firm,  became  the  financial 
dictator  of  the  German  press.  As  Reich  Leader  for  the 
Press  and  president  of  the  Press  Chamber,  he  had  the 
legal  right  to  suppress  any  publication  he  pleased  and  the 
consequent  power  to  buy  it  up  for  a song.  In  a short  time 
the  Eher  Verlag  became  a gigantic  publishing  empire, 
probably  the  largest  and  most  lucrative  in  the  world.*  De- 
spite the  drop  in  sales  of  many  Nazi  publications,  the  daily 
newspapers  owned  or  controlled  by  the  party  or  in- 
dividual Nazis  had  two  thirds  of  the  total  daily  circulation 
of  twenty-five  million  by  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
second  war.  In  an  affidavit  made  at  Nuremberg,  Amann 
described  how  he  operated: 

After  the  party  came  to  power  in  1933  . . . many  of  these 
concerns,  such  as  the  Ullstein  House,  which  were  owned 
or  controlled  by  Jewish  interests,  or  by  political  or  religious 
interests  hostile  to  the  Nazi  Party,  found  it  expedient  to  sell 
their  newspapers  or  assets  to  the  Eher  concern.  There  was 
no  free  market  for  the  sale  of  such  properties  and  the  Eher 
Verlag  was  generally  the  only  bidder.  In  this  matter  the  Eher 
Verlag,  together  with  publishing  concerns  owned  or  con- 
trolled by  it,  expanded  into  a monopoly  of  the  newspaper 
publishing  business  in  Germany  . . . The  party  investment 
in  these  publishing  enterprises  became  financially  very  suc- 
cessful. It  is  a true  statement  to  say  that  the  basic  purpose 
of  the  Nazi  press  program  was  to  eliminate  all  the  press 
which  was  in  opposition  to  the  party.6 

At  one  period  in  1934  both  Amann  and  Goebbels  ap- 
pealed to  the  obsequious  editors  to  make  their  papers  less 
monotonous.  Amann  said  he  deplored  “the  present  far- 
reaching  uniformity  of  the  press,  which  is  not  a product  of 
government  measures  and  does  not  conform  to  the  will  of 
the  government.”  One  rash  editor,  Ehm  Welke  of  the  weekly 
Gruene  Post,  made  the  mistake  of  taking  Amann  and 
Goebbels  seriously.  He  chided  the  Propaganda  Ministry 
for  its  red  tape  and  for  the  heavy  hand  with  which  it 
held  down  the  press  and  made  it  so  dull.  His  publication 
was  promptly  suspended  for  three  months  and  he  himself 
dismissed  by  Goebbels  and  carted  off  to  a concentration 
camp. 

* Amann’s  own  income  skyrocketed  from  108,000  marks  in  1934  to 
3,800,000  marks  in  1942.  (Letter  to  the  author  from  Professor  Oron 
J.  Hale,  who  has  made  a study  of  the  surviving  records  of  the  Nazi 
publishing  firm.) 


341 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

The  radio  and  the  motion  pictures  were  also  quickly 
harnessed  to  serve  the  propaganda  of  the  Nazi  State.  Goeb- 
bels  had  always  seen  in  radio  (television  had  not  yet  come 
in)  the  chief  instrument  of  propaganda  in  modem  society 
and  through  the  Radio  Department  of  his  ministry  and  the 
Chamber  of  Radio  he  gained  complete  control  of  broad- 
casting and  shaped  it  to  his  own  ends.  His  task  was 
made  easier  because  in  Germany,  as  in  the  other  countries 
of  Europe,  broadcasting  was  a monopoly  owned  and  op- 
erated by  the  State.  In  1933  the  Nazi  government  auto- 
matically found  itself  in  possession  of  the  Reich  Broad- 
casting Corporation. 

The  films  remained  in  the  hands  of  private  firms  but  the 
Propaganda  Ministry  and  the  Chamber  of  Films  con- 
trolled every  aspect  of  the  industry,  their  task  being — in  the 
words  of  an  official  commentary — “to  lift  the  film  industry 
out  of  the  sphere  of  liberal  economic  thoughts  . . . and  thus 
enable  it  to  receive  those  tasks  which  it  has  to  fulfill  in  the 
National  Socialist  State.” 

The  result  in  both  cases  was  to  afflict  the  German  peo- 
ple with  radio  programs  and  motion  pictures  as  inane  and 
boring  as  were  the  contents  of  their  daily  newspapers  and 
periodicals.  Even  a public  which  usually  submitted  without 
protest  to  being  told  what  was  good  for  it  revolted.  The 
customers  stayed  away  in  droves  from  the  Nazi  films  and 
jammed  the  houses  which  showed  the  few  foreign  pictures 
(mostly  B-grade  Hollywood)  which  Goebbels  permitted 
to  be  exhibited  on  German  screens.  At  one  period  in  the 
mid-Thirties  the  hissing  of  German  films  became  so  com- 
mon that  Wilhelm  Frick,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  issued 
a stern  warning  against  “treasonable  behavior  on  the  part 
of  cinema  audiences.”  Likewise  the  radio  programs  were  so 
roundly  criticized  that  the  president  of  the  Radio  Chamber, 
one  Horst  Dressler-Andress,  declared  that  such  carping 
was  “an  insult  to  German  culture”  and  would  not  be 
tolerated.  In  those  days,  in  the  Thirties,  a German  listener 
could  still  turn  his  dial  to  a score  of  foreign  radio  stations 
without,  as  happened  later  when  the  war  began,  risking 
having  his  head  chopped  off.  And  perhaps  quite  a few  did, 
though  it  was  this  observer’s  impression  that  as  the  years 
went  by.  Dr.  Goebbels  proved  himself  right,  in  that  the 
radio  became  by  far  the  regime’s  most  effective  means  of 
propaganda,  doing  more  than  any  other  single  instrument 


342  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  communication  to  shape  the  German  people  to  Hitler’s 
ends. 

I myself  was  to  experience  how  easily  one  is  taken  in  by 
a lying  and  censored  press  and  radio  in  a totalitarian 
state.  Though  unlike  most  Germans  I had  daily  access  to 
foreign  newspapers,  especially  those  of  London,  Paris  and 
Zurich,  which  arrived  the  day  after  publication,  and  though 
I listened  regularly  to  the  BBC  and  other  foreign  broad- 
casts, my  job  necessitated  the  spending  of  many  hours  a 
day  in  combing  the  German  press,  checking  the  German 
radio,  conferring  with  Nazi  officials  and  going  to  party 
meetings.  It  was  surprising  and  sometimes  consternating  to 
find  that  notwithstanding  the  opportunities  I had  to  learn 
the  facts  and  despite  one’s  inherent  distrust  of  what  one 
learned  from  Nazi  sources,  a steady  diet  over  the 
years  of  falsifications  and  distortions  made  a certain 
impression  on  one’s  mind  and  often  misled  it.  No  one  who 
has  not  lived  for  years  in  a totalitarian  land  can  possibly 
conceive  how  difficult  it  is  to  escape  the  dread  consequences 
of  a regime’s  calculated  and  incessant  propaganda.  Often 
in  a German  home  or  office  or  sometimes  in  a casual  con- 
versation with  a stranger  in  a restaurant,  a beer  hall,  a 
cafe,  I would  meet  with  the  most  outlandish  assertions 
from  seemingly  educated  and  intelligent  persons.  It  was 
obvious  that  they  were  parroting  some  piece  of  nonsense 
they  had  heard  on  the  radio  or  read  in  the  newspapers. 
Sometimes  one  was  tempted  to  say  as  much,  but  on  such 
occasions  one  was  met  with  such  a stare  of  incredulity, 
such  a shock  of  silence,  as  if  one  had  blasphemed  the  Al- 
mighty, that  one  realized  how  useless  it  was  even  to  try 
to  make  contact  with  a mind  which  had  become  warped 
and  for  whom  the  facts  of  life  had  become  what  Hitler  and 
Goebbels,  with  their  cynical  disregard  for  truth,  said  they 
were. 

EDUCATION  IN  THE  THIRD  REICH 

On  April  30,  1934,  Bernhard  Rust,  an  Obergruppen- 
fuehrer  in  the  S.A.,  onetime  Gauleiter  of  Hanover,  a Nazi 
Party  member  and  friend  of  Hitler  since  the  early  Twenties, 
was  named  Reich  Minister  of  Science,  Education  and 
Popular  Culture.  In  the  bizarre,  topsy-turvy  world  of 
National  Socialism,  Rust  was  eminently  fitted  for  his  task. 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  343 

Since  1930  he  had  been  an  unemployed  provincial 
schoolmaster,  having  been  dismissed  in  that  year  by  the 
local  republican  authorities  at  Hanover  for  certain  mani- 
festations of  instability  of  mind,  though  his  fanatical  Nazism 
may  have  been  partly  responsible  for  his  ouster.  For  Dr. 
Rust  preached  the  Nazi  gospel  with  the  zeal  of  a Goebbels 
and  the  fuzziness  of  a Rosenberg.  Named  Prussian  Min- 
ister of  Science,  Art  and  Education  in  February  1933,  he 
boasted  that  he  had  succeeded  overnight  in  “liquidating 
the  school  as  an  institution  of  intellectual  acrobatics.” 

To  such  a mindless  man  was  now  entrusted  dictatorial 
control  over  German  science,  the  public  schools,  the  in- 
stitutions of  higher  learning  and  the  youth  organizations. 
For  education  in  the  Third  Reich,  as  Hitler  envisaged  it, 
was  not  to  be  confined  to  stuffy  classrooms  but  to  be 
furthered  by  a Spartan,  political  and  martial  training  in  the 
successive  youth  groups  and  to  reach  its  climax  not  so 
much  in  the  universities  and  engineering  colleges,  which 
absorbed  but  a small  minority,  but  first,  at  the  age  of 
eighteen,  in  compulsory  labor  service  and  then  in  service, 
as  conscripts,  in  the  armed  forces. 

Hitler  s contempt  for  “professors”  and  the  intellectual 
academic  life  had  peppered  the  pages  of  Mein  Kampf,  in 
which  he  had  set  down  some  of  his  ideas  on  education. 
“The  whole  education  by  a national  state,”  he  had  writ- 
ten, “must  aim  primarily  not  at  the  stuffing  with  mere 
knowledge  but  at  building  bodies  which  are  physically 
healthy  to  the  core.”  But,  even  more  important,  he  had 
stressed  in  his  book  the  importance  of  winning  over  and 
then  training  the  youth  in  the  service  “of  a new  national 
state” — a subject  he  returned  to  often  after  he  became  the 
German  dictator.  “When  an  opponent  declares,  ‘I  will  not 
come  over  to  your  side,’  ” he  said  in  a speech  on  No- 
vember 6,  1933,  “I  calmly  say,  ‘Your  child  belongs  to  us 
already  . . . What  are  you?  You  will  pass  on.  Your 
descendants,  however,  now  stand  in  the  new  camp.  In  a 
short  time  they  will  know  nothing  else  but  this  new  com- 
munity.’ ” And  on  May  1,  1937,  he  declared,  “This  new 
Reich  will  give  its  youth  to  no  one,  but  will  itself  take 
youth  and  give  to  youth  its  own  education  and  its  own 
upbringing.”  It  was  not  an  idle  boast;  that  was  precisely 
what  was  happening. 

The  German  schools,  from  first  grade  through  the  uni- 


344  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

versities,  were  quickly  Nazified.  Textbooks  were  hastily 
rewritten,  curricula  were  changed,  Mein  Kampf  was  made 
— in  the  words  of  Der  Deutsche  Erzieher,  official  organ 
of  the  educators — “our  infallible  pedagogical  guiding  star” 
and  teachers  who  failed  to  see  the  new  light  were  cast 
out.  Most  instructors  had  been  more  or  less  Nazi  in  senti- 
ment when  not  outright  party  members.  To  strengthen 
their  ideology  they  were  dispatched  to  special  schools  for 
intensive  training  in  National  Socialist  principles,  em- 
phasis being  put  on  Hitler’s  racial  doctrines. 

Every  person  in  the  teaching  profession,  from  kinder- 
garten through  the  universities,  was  compelled  to  join  the 
National  Socialist  Teachers’  League  which,  by  law,  was 
held  “responsible  for  the  execution  of  the  ideological  and 
political  co-ordination  of  all  teachers  in  accordance  with 
the  National  Socialist  doctrine.”  The  Civil  Service  Act  of 
1937  required  teachers  to  be  “the  executors  of  the  will  of 
the  party-supported  State”  and  to  be  ready  “at  any  time 
to  defend  without  reservation  the  National  Socialist  State.” 
An  earlier  decree  had  classified  them  as  civil  servants 
and  thus  subject  to  the  racial  laws.  Jews,  of  course,  were 
forbidden  to  teach.  All  teachers  took  an  oath  to  “be  loyal 
and  obedient  to  Adolf  Hitler.”  Later,  no  man  could  teach 
who  had  not  first  served  in  the  S.A.,  the  Labor  Service 
or  the  Hitler  Youth.  Candidates  for  instructorships  in  the 
universities  had  to  attend  for  six  weeks  an  observation 
camp  where  their  views  and  character  were  studied  by 
Nazi  experts  and  reported  to  the  Ministry  of  Education, 
which  issued  licenses  to  teach  based  on  the  candidates’ 
political  “reliability.” 

Prior  to  1933,  the  German  public  schools  had  been 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  local  authorities  and  the  uni- 
versities under  that  of  the  individual  states.  Now  all  were 
brought  under  the  iron  rule  of  the  Reich  Minister  of  Edu- 
cation. It  was  he  who  also  appointed  the  rectors  and  the 
deans  of  the  universities,  who  formerly  had  been  elected 
by  the  full  professors  of  the  faculty.  He  also  appointed  the 
leaders  of  the  university  students’  union,  to  which  all 
students  had  to  belong,  and  of  the  lecturers  union,  com- 
prising all  instructors.  The  N.S.  Association  of  University 
Lecturers,  under  the  tight  leadership  of  old  Nazi  hands, 
was  given  a decisive  role  in  selecting  who  was  to  teach 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  345 

and  to  see  that  what  they  taught  was  in  accordance  with 
Nazi  theories. 

The  result  of  so  much  Nazification  was  catastrophic  for 
German  education  and  for  German  learning.  History  was 
so  falsified  in  the  new  textbooks  and  by  the  teachers  in 
their  lectures  that  it  became  ludicrous.  The  teaching  of 
the  racial  sciences,  ’ exalting  the  Germans  as  the  master 
race  and  the  Jews  as  breeders  of  almost  all  the  evil  there 
was  in  the  world,  was  even  more  so.  In  the  University  of 
Berlin  alone,  where  so  many  great  scholars  had  taught 
in  the  past,  the  new  rector,  a storm  trooper  and  by  pro- 
fession a veterinarian,  instituted  twenty-five  new  courses 
in  Rassenkunde — racial  science — and  by  the  time  he  had 
really  taken  the  university  apart  he  had  eighty-six  courses 
connected  with  his  own  profession. 

The  teaching  of  the  natural  sciences,  in  which  Germany 
had  been  so  pre-eminent  for  generations,  deteriorated  rap- 
idly. Great  teachers  such  as  Einstein  and  Franck  in 
physics,  Haber,  Willstaetter  and  Warburg  in  chemistry, 
were  fired  or  retired.  Those  who  remained,  many  of 
them,  were  bitten  by  the  Nazi  aberrations  and  attempted 
to  apply  them  to  pure  science.  They  began  to  teach  what 
they  called  German  physics,  German  chemistry,  German 
mathematics.  Indeed,  in  1937  there  appeared  a journal 
called  Deutsche  Mathematik,  and  its  first  editorial  sol- 
emnly proclaimed  that  any  idea  that  mathematics  could  be 
judged  nonracially  carried  “within  itself  the  germs  of  de- 
struction of  German  science.” 

, ,The  hallucinations  of  these  Nazi  scientists  became  un- 
believable even  to  a layman.  “German  Physics?”  asked 
Professor  Philipp  Lenard  of  Heidelberg  University,  who 
was  one  of  the  more  learned  and  internationally  re- 
spected scientists  of  the  Third  Reich.  “‘But,’  it  will  be 
replied  ‘science  is  and  remains  international.’  It  is  false. 
In  reality,  science,  like  every  other  human  product  is 
racial  and  conditioned  by  blood.”  Professor  Rudolphe 
1 omaschek,  director  of  the  Institute  of  Physics  at  Dres- 
den, went  further.  “Modern  Physics,”  he  wrote  “is  an 
instrument  of  [world]  Jewry  for  the  destruction  of 
Nordic  science  . . . True  physics  is  the  creation  of  the 
German  spirit  ...  In  fact,  all  European  science  is  the 
fruit  of  Aryan,  or,  better,  German  thought.”  Professor 
Johannes  Stark,  head  of  the  German  National  Institute  of 


346  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Physical  Science,  thought  so  too.  It  would  be  found,  he 
said,  that  the  “founders  of  research  in  physics,  and  the 
great  discoverers  from  Galileo  to  Newton  to  the  physical 
pioneers  of  our  time,  were  almost  exclusively  Aryan,  pre- 
dominantly of  the  Nordic  race.” 

There  was  also  Professor  Wilhelm  Mueller,  of  the  Tech- 
nical College  of  Aachen,  who  in  a book  entitled  Jewry 
and  Science  saw  a world-wide  Jewish  plot  to  pollute  sci- 
ence and  thereby  destroy  civilization.  To  him  Einstein, 
with  his  theory  of  relativity,  was  the  archvillain.  The  Ein- 
stein theory,  on  which  so  much  of  modem  physics  is  based, 
was  to  this  singular  Nazi  professor  “directed  from  begin- 
ning to  end  toward  the  goal  of  transforming  the  living — 
that  is,  the  non- Jewish — world  of  living  essence,  bom  from 
a mother  earth  and  bound  up  with  blood,  and  bewitch- 
ing it  into  spectral  abstraction  in  which  all  individual  dif- 
ferences of  peoples  and  nations,  and  all  inner  limits  of 
the  races,  are  lost  in  unreality,  and  in  which  only  an 
unsubstantial  diversity  of  geometric  dimensions  survives 
which  produces  all  events  out  of  the  compulsion  of  its 
godless  subjection  to  laws.”  The  world-wide  acclaim  given 
to  Einstein  on  the  publication  of  his  theory  of  relativity. 
Professor  Mueller  proclaimed,  was  really  only  a rejoicing 
over  “the  approach  of  Jewish  world  rule  which  was  to 
force  down  German  manhood  irrevocably  and  eternally 
to  the  level  of  the  lifeless  slave.” 

To  Professor  Ludwig  Bieberback,  of  the  University  of 
Berlin,  Einstein  was  “an  alien  mountebank.”  Even  to  Pro- 
fessor Lenard,  “the  Jew  conspicuously  lacks  understanding 
for  the  truth  . . . being  in  this  respect  in  contrast  to  the 
Aryan  research  scientist  with  his  careful  and  serious  will 
to  truth  . , , Jewish  physics  is  thus  a phantom  and  a 
phenomenon  of  degeneration  of  fundamental  German 
Physics.”  7 

And  yet  from  1905  to  1931  ten  German  Jews  had  been 
awarded  Nobel  Prizes  for  their  contributions  to  science. 

During  the  Second  Reich,  the  university  professors,  like 
the  Protestant  clergy,  had  given  blind  support  to  the  con- 
servative government  and  its,  expansionist  aims  and  the 
lecture  halls  had  been  breeding  grounds  of  virulent  na- 
tionalism and  anti-Semitism.  The  Weimar  Republic  had  in- 
sisted on  complete  academic  freedom,  and  one  result  had 


347 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

been  that  the  vast  majority  of  university  teachers,  anti- 
liberal, antidemocratic,  anti-Semitic  as  they  were,  had 
helped  to  undermine  the  democratic  regime.  Most  profes- 
sors were  fanatical  nationalists  who  wished  the  return  of 
a conservative,  monarchical  Germany.  And  though  to 
many  of  them,  before  1933,  the  Nazis  were  too  rowdy 
and  violent  to  attract  their  allegiance,  their  preachments 
helped  prepare  the  ground  for  the  coming  of  Nazism.  By 
1932  the  majority  of  students  appeared  to  be  enthusiastic 
for  Hitler. 

It  was  surprising  to  some  how  many  members  of  the 
university  faculties  knuckled  under  to  the  Nazification  of 
higher  learning  after  1933.  Though  official  figures  put  the 
number  of  professors  and  instructors  dismissed  during  the 
first  five  years  of  the  regime  at  2,800 — about  one  fourth 
of  the  total  number — the  proportion  of  those  who  lost 
their  posts  through  defying  National  Socialism  was,  as  Pro- 
fessor Wilhelm  Roepke,  himself  dismissed  from  the  Uni- 
versity of  Marburg  in  1933,  said,  “exceedingly  small.” 
Though  small,  there  were  names  famous  in  the  German 
academic  world:  Karl  Jaspers,  E.  I.  Gumbel,  Theodor  Litt, 
Karl  Barth,  Julius  Ebbinghaus  and  dozens  of  others.  Most 
of  them  emigrated,  first  to  Switzerland,  Holland  and  Eng- 
land and  eventually  to  America.  One  of  them,  Professor 
Theodor  Lessing,  who  had  fled  to  Czechoslovakia,  was 
tracked  down  by  Nazi  thugs  and  murdered  in  Marienbad 
on  August  31,  1933. 

A large  majority  of  professors,  however,  remained  at 
their  posts,  and  as  early  as  the  autumn  of  1933  some 
960  of  them,  led  by  such  luminaries  as  Professor  Sauer- 
bruch,  the  surgeon,  Heidegger,  the  existentialist  philoso- 
pher, and  Pinder,  the  art  historian,  took  a public  vow  to 
support  Hitler  and  the  National  Socialist  regime. 

“It  was  a scene  of  prostitution,”  Professor  Roepke  later 
wrote,  “that  has  stained  the  honorable  history  of  German 
learning.” 8 And  as  Professor  Julius  Ebbinghaus,  look- 
ing back  over  the  shambles  in  1945,  said,  “The  German 
universities  failed,  while  there  was  still  time,  to  oppose 
publicly  with  all  their  power  the  destruction  of  knowledge 
and  of  the  democratic  state.  They  failed  to  keep  the 
beacon  of  freedom  and  right  burning  during  the  night  of 
tyranny.”  9 

The  cost  of  such  failure  was  great.  After  six  years  of 


348  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Nazification  the  number  of  university  students  dropped  by 
more  than  one  half — from  127,920  to  58,325.  The  decline 
in  enrollment  at  the  institutes  of  technology,  from  which 
Germany  got  its  scientists  and  engineers,  was  even  greater 
— from  20,474  to  9,554.  Academic  standards  fell  dizzily. 
By  1937  there  was  not  only  a shortage  of  young  men  in 
the  sciences  and  engineering  but  a decline  in  their  qualifi- 
cations. Long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  chemical 
industry,  busily  helping  to  further  Nazi  rearmament,  was 
complaining  through  its  organ,  Die  Chemische  Industrie, 
that  Germany  was  losing  its  leadership  in  chemistry.  Not 
only  the  national  economy  but  national  defense  itself  was 
being  jeopardized,  it  complained,  and  it  blamed  the 
shortage  of  young  scientists  and  their  mediocre  caliber  on 
the  poor  quality  of  the  technical  colleges. 

Nazi  Germany’s  loss,  as  it  turned  out,  was  the  free 
world’s  gain,  especially  in  the  race  to  be  the  first  with  the 
atom  bomb.  The  story  of  the  successful  efforts  of  Nazi 
leaders,  led  by  Himmler,  to  hamstring  the  atomic-energy 
program  is  too  long  and  involved  to  be  recounted  here.  It 
was  one  of  the  ironies  of  fate  that  the  development  of 
the  bomb  in  the  United  States  owed  so  much  to  two  men 
who  had  been  exiled  because  of  race  from  the  Nazi  and 
Fascist  dictatorships:  Einstein  from  Germany  and  Fermi 
from  Italy. 

To  Adolf  Hitler  it  was  not  so  much  the  public  schools, 
from  which  he  himself  had  dropped  out  so  early  in  life, 
but  the  organizations  of  the  Hiller  Youth  on  which  he 
counted  to  educate  the  youth  of  Germany  for  the  ends  he 
had  in  mind.  In  the  years  of  the  Nazi  Party’s  struggle  for 
power  the  Hitler  Youth  movement  had  not  amounted  to 
much.  In  1932,  the  last  year  of  the  Republic,  its  total 
enrollment  was  only  107,956,  compared  to  some  ten  mil- 
lion youths  who  belonged  to  the  various  organizations 
united  in  the  Reich  Committee  of  German  Youth  As- 
sociations. In  no  country  in  the  world  had  there  been  a 
youth  movement  of  such  vitality  and  numbers  as  in  re- 
publican Germany.  Hitler,  realizing  this,  was  determined 
to  take  it  over  and  Nazify  it. 

His  chief  lieutenant  for  this  task  was  a handsome  young 
man  of  banal  mind  but  of  great  driving  force,  Baldur 
von  Schirach,  who,  falling  under  Hitler’s  spell,  had  joined 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  349 

the  party  in  1925  at  the  age  of  eighteen  and  in  1931  had 
been  named  Youth  Leader  of  the  Nazi  Party.  Among  the 
scarfaced,  brawling  Brownshirts,  he  had  the  curious  look 
of  an  American  college  student,  fresh  and  immature,  and 
this  perhaps  was  due  to  his  having  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
American  forebears  (including  two  signers  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence).10 

Schirach  was  named  “Youth  Leader  of  the  German 
Reich”  in  June  1933.  Aping  the  tactics  of  his  elder  party 
leaders,  his  first  action  was  to  send  an  armed  band  of 
fifty  husky  Hitler  Youth  men  to  occupy  the  national  of- 
fices of  the  Reich  Committee  of  German  Youth  Associa- 
tions, where  an  old  Prussian  Army  officer,  General  Vogt, 
head  of  the  committee,  was  put  to  rout.  Schirach  next  took 
on  one  of  the  most  celebrated  of  German  naval  heroes, 
Admiral  von  Trotha,  who  had  been  Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
High  Seas  Fleet  in  the  First  World  War  and  who  was  now 
president  of  the  Youth  Associations.  The  venerable  ad- 
miral too  was  put  to  flight  and  his  position  and  organiza- 
tion were  dissolved.  Millions  of  dollars’  worth  of  prop- 
erty, chiefly  in  hundreds  of  youth  hostels  scattered 
throughout  Germany,  was  seized. 

The  concordat  of  July  20,  1933,  had  specifically  pro- 
vided for  the  unhindered  continuance  of  the  Catholic 
Youth  Association.  On  December  1,  1936,  Hitler  decreed 
a law  outlawing  it  and  all  other  non-Nazi  organizations 
for  young  people. 

. . . All  of  the  German  youth  in  the  Reich  is  organized 
within  the  Hitler  Youth. 

The  German  youth,  besides  being  reared  within  the  family 
and  schools,  shall  be  educated  physically,  intellectually  and 
morally  in  the  spirit  of  National  Socialism  . . . through  the 
Hitler  Youth.11 

Schirach,  whose  office  had  formerly  been  subordinate 
to  the  Ministry  of  Education,  was  made  responsible  di- 
rectly to  Hitler. 

This  half-baked  young  man  of  twenty-nine,  who  wrote 
maudlin  verse  in  praise  of  Hitler  (“this  genius  grazing  the 
stars”)  and  followed  Rosenberg  in  his  weird  paganism  and 
Streicher  in  his  virulent  anti-Semitism,  had  become  the 
dictator  of  youth  in  the  Third  Reich. 

From  the  age  of  six  to  eighteen,  when  conscription  for 
the  Labor  Service  and  the  Army  began,  girls  as  well  as 


350 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

boys  were  organized  in  the  various  cadres  of  the  Hider 
Youth.  Parents  found  guilty  of  trying  to  keep  their  chil- 
dren from  joining  the  organization  were  subject  to  heavy 
prison  sentences  even  though,  as  in  some  cases,  they  merely 
objected  to  having  their  daughters  enter  some  of  the  serv- 
ices where  cases  of  pregnancy  had  reached  scandalous 
proportions. 

From  the  age  of  six  to  ten,  a boy  served  a sort  of  ap- 
prenticeship for  the  Hider  Youth  as  a Pimpf.  Each 
youngster  was  given  a performance  book  in  which  would 
be  recorded  his  progress  through  the  entire  Nazi  youth 
movement,  including  his  ideological  growth.  At  ten,  after 
passing  suitable  tests  in  athletics,  camping  and  Nazified 
history,  he  graduated  into  the  Jungvolk  (“Young  Folk”), 
where  he  took  the  following  oath: 

In  the  presence  of  this  blood  banner,  which  represents 
our  Fuehrer,  I swear  to  devote  all  my  energies  and  my 
strength  to  the  savior  of  our  country,  Adolf  Hider.  I am 
willing  and  ready  to  give  up  my  life  for  him,  so  help  me 
God. 

At  fourteen  the  boy  entered  the  Hitler  Youth  proper 
and  remained  there  until  he  was  eighteen,  when  he  passed 
into  the  Labor  Service  and  the  Army.  It  was  a vast  or- 
ganization organized  on  paramilitary  lines  similar  to  the 
S.A.  and  in  which  the  youngsters  approaching  manhood 
received  systematic  training  not  only  in  camping,  sports 
and  Nazi  ideology  but  in  soldiering.  On  many  a weekend 
in  the  environs  of  Berlin  this  writer  would  be  interrupted 
in  his  picnicking  by  Hider  Youths  scrambling  through  the 
woods  or  over  the  heath,  rifles  at  the  ready  and  heavy 
army  packs  on  their  backs. 

Sometimes  the  young  ladies  would  be  playing  at  soldier- 
ing, too,  for  the  Hider  Youth  movement  did  not  neglect 
the  maidens.  From  ten  to  fourteen,  German  girls  were  en- 
rolled as  Jungmaedel — literally,  “young  maidens” — and 
they  too  had  a uniform,  made  up  of  a white  blouse,  full 
blue  skirt,  socks  and  heavy — and  most  unfeminine — 
marching  shoes.  Their  training  was  much  like  that  of  the 
boys  of  the  same  age  and  included  long  marches  on  week- 
ends with  heavy  packs  and  the  usual  indoctrination  in  the 
Nazi  philosophy.  But  emphasis  was  put  on  the  role  of 
women  in  the  Third  Reich — to  be,  above  all,  healthy 
mothers  of  healthy  children.  This  was  stressed  even  more 


351 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

when  the  girls  became,  at  fourteen,  members  of  the 
B.D.M. — Bund  Deutscher  Maedel  (League  of  German 
Maidens). 

At  eighteen,  several  thousand  of  the  girls  in  the  B.D.M. 
(they  remained  in  it  until  21 ) did  a year’s  service  on  the 
farms — their  so-called  Land  Jahr,  which  was  equivalent  to 
the  Labor  Service  of  the  young  men.  Their  task  was  to  help 
both  in  the  house  and  in  the  fields.  The  girls  lived  some- 
times in  the  farmhouses  and  often  in  small  camps  in  rural 
districts  from  which  they  were  taken  by  truck  early  each 
morning  to  the  farms.  Moral  problems  soon  arose.  The 
presence  of  a pretty  young  city  girl  sometimes  disrupted  a 
peasant’s  household,  and  angry  complaints  from  parents 
about  their  daughters’  having  been  made  pregnant  on  the 
farms  began  to  be  heard.  But  that  .wasn’t  the  only  problem. 
Usually  a girls’  camp  was  located  near  a Labor  Service  camp 
for  young  men.  This  juxtaposition  seems  to  have  made  for 
many  pregnancies  too.  One  couplet — a take-off  on  the 
“Strength  through  Joy”  movement  of  the  Labor  Front,  but 
applied  especially  to  the  Land  Jahr  of  the  young  maidens 
— went  the  rounds  of  Germany: 

In  the  fields  and  on  the  heath 

I lose  Strength  through  Joy. 

Similar  moral  problems  also  arose  during  the  House- 
hold Year  for  Girls,  in  which  some  half  a million  Hitler 
Youth  maidens  spent  a year  at  domestic  service  in  a city 
household.  Actually,  the  more  sincere  Nazis  did  not  con- 
sider them  moral  problems  at  all.  On  more  than  one  oc- 
casion I listened  to  women  leaders  of  the  B.D.M. — they 
were  invariably  of  the  plainer  type  and  usually  unmarried 
— lecture  their  young  charges  on  the  moral  and  patriotic 
duty  of  bearing  children  for  Hitler’s  Reich — within  wedlock 
if  possible,  but  without  it  if  necessary. 

By  the  end  of  1938  the  Hitler  Youth  numbered 
7,728,259.  Large  as  this  number  was,  obviously  some  four 
million  youth  had  managed  to  stay  out  of  the  organiza- 
tion, and  in  March  1939  the  government  issued  a law 
conscripting  all  youth  into  the  Hitler  Youth  on  the  same 
basis  as  they  were  drafted  into  the  Army.  Recalcitrant 
parents  were  warned  that  their  children  would  be  taken 
away  from  them  and  put  into  orphanages  or  other  homes 
unless  they  enrolled. 


352 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


The  final  twist  to  education  in  the  Third  Reich  came  in 
the  establishment  of  three  types  of  schools  for  the  train- 
ing of  the  elite:  the  Adolf  Hitler  Schools,  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  Hitler  Youth,  the  National  Political  Institutes 
of  Education  and  the  Order  Castles — the  last  two  under  the 
aegis  of  the  party.  The  Adolf  Hitler  Schools  took  the  most 
promising  youngsters  from  the  Jungvolk  at  the  age  of 
twelve  and  gave  them  six  years  of  intensive  training  for 
leadership  in  the  party  and  in  the  public  services.  The 
pupils  lived  at  the  school  under  Spartan  discipline  and  on 
graduation  were  eligible  for  the  university.  There  were  ten 
such  schools  founded  after  1937,  the  principal  one  being 
the  Akademie  at  Brunswick. 

The  purpose  of  the  Political  Institutes  of  Education  was 
to  restore  the  type  of  education  formerly  given  in  the  old 
Prussian  military  academies.  This,  according  to  one  of- 
ficial commentary,  cultivated  “the  soldierly  spirit,  with  its 
attributes  of  courage,  sense  of  duty  and  simplicity.”  To 
this  was  added  special  training  in  Nazi  principles.  The 
schools  were  under  the  supervision  of  the  S.S.,  which 
furnished  the  headmasters  and  most  of  the  teachers.  Three 
such  schools  were  established  in  1933  and  grew  to  thirty- 
one  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  three  of  them  for 
women. 

At  the  very  top  of  the  pyramid  were  the  so-called  Order 
Castles,  the  Ordensburgen.  In  these,  with  their  atmosphere 
of  the  castles  of  the  Order  of  Teutonic  Knights  of  the 
fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  were  trained  the  elite  of 
the  Nazi  elite.  The  knightly  order  had  been  based  on  the 
principle  of  absolute  obedience  to  the  Master,  the  Ordens- 
meister,  and  devoted  to  the  German  conquest  of  the  Slavic 
lands  in  the  East  and  the  enslavement  of  the  natives.  The 
Nazi  Order  Castles  had  similar  discipline  and  purposes.  Only 
the  most  fanatical  young  National  Socialists  were  chosen, 
usually  from  the  top  ranks  of  the  graduates  of  the  Adolf 
Hitler  Schools  and  the  Political  Institutes.  There  were 
four  Castles,  and  a student  attended  successively  all  of 
them.  The  first  of  six  years  was  spent  in  one  which 
specialized  in  the  “racial  sciences”  and  other  aspects  of 
Nazi  ideology.  The  emphasis  was  on  mental  training  and 
discipline,  with  physical  training  subordinated  to  it.  This 
was  reversed  the  second  year  at  a Castle  where  athletics  and 
sports,  including  mountain  climbing  and  parachute  jump- 


353 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

ing,  came  first.  The  third  Castle,  where  the  students  spent 
the  next  year  and  a half,  offered  political  and  military 
instruction.  Finally,  in  the  fourth  and  last  stage  of  his 
education,  the  student  was  sent  for  a year  and  a half  to 
the  Ordensburg  in  Marienburg  in  East  Prussia,  near  the 
Polish  frontier.  There,  within  the  walls  of  the  very  Order 
Castle  which  had  been  a stronghold  of  the  Teutonic 
Knights  five  centuries  before,  his  political  and  military 
training  was  concentrated  on  the  Eastern  question  and 
Germany’s  need  (and  right!)  of  expanding  into  the  Slavic 
lands  in  its  eternal  search  for  Lebensraum — an  excellent 
preparation,  as  it  turned  out  and  no  doubt  was  meant  to 
turn  out,  for  the  events  of  1939  and  thereafter. 

In  such  a manner  were  the  youth  trained  for  life  and 
work  and  death  in  the  Third  Reich.  Though  their  minds 
were  deliberately  poisoned,  their  regular  schooling  inter- 
rupted, their  homes  largely  replaced  so  far  as  their  rearing 
went,  the  boys  and  the  girls,  the  young  men  and  women, 
seemed  immensely  happy,  filled  with  a zest  for  the  life  of  a 
Hitler  Youth.  And  there  was  no  doubt  that  the  practice  of 
bringing  the  children  of  all  classes  and  walks  of  life  to- 
gether, where  those  who  had  come  from  poverty  or  riches, 
from  a laborer’s  home  or  a peasant’s  or  a businessman’s,  or 
an  aristocrat’s,  shared  common  tasks,  was  good  and  healthy 
in  itself.  In  most  cases  it  did  no  harm  to  a city  boy  and 
girl  to  spend  six  months  in  the  compulsory  Labor  Serv- 
ice, where  they  lived  outdoors  and  learned  the  value  of 
manual  labor  and  of  getting  along  with  those  of  different 
backgrounds.  No  one  who  traveled  up  and  down  Germany 
in  those  days  and  talked  with  the  young  in  their  camps  and 
watched  them  work  and  play  and  sing  could  fail  to  see 
that,  however  sinister  the  teaching,  here  was  an  incredibly 
dynamic  youth  movement. 

The  young  in  the  Third  Reich  were  growing  up  to  have 
strong  and  healthy  bodies,  faith  in  the  future  of  their 
country  and  in  themselves  and  a sense  of  fellowship  and 
camaraderie  that  shattered  all  class  and  economic  and 
social  barriers.  I thought  of  that  later,  in  the  May  days  of 
1940,  when  along  the  road  between  Aachen  and  Brussels 
one  saw  the  contrast  between  the  German  soldiers,  bronzed 
and  clean-cut  from  a youth  spent  in  the  sunshine  on  an 
adequate  diet,  and  the  first  British  war  prisoners,  with  their 


354 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

hollow  chests,  round  shoulders,  pasty  complexions  and  bad 
teeth — tragic  examples  of  the  youth  that  England  had 
neglected  so  irresponsibly  in  the  years  between  the  wars. 

THE  FARMER  IN  THE  THIRD  REICH 

When  Hitler  came  to  power  in  1933  the  farmer,  as  in 
most  countries,  was  in  desperate  straits.  According  to  a 
writer  in  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  his  situation  was  worse 
than  at  any  time  since  the  disastrous  Peasants’  War  of 
1524-25  devastated  the  German  land.  Agricultural  in- 
come in  1932-33  had  fallen  to  a new  low,  more  than  a 
billion  marks  below  the  worst  postwar  year,  1924-25.  The 
farmers  were  in  debt  to  the  amount  of  twelve  billions, 
almost  all  of  it  incurred  in  the  last  eight  years.  Interest  on 
these  debts  took  some  14  per  cent  of  all  farm  income,  and 
to  this  was  added  a comparable  burden  in  taxes  and  con- 
tributions to  social  services. 

“My  party  comrades,  make  yourselves  clear  about  one 
thing:  There  is  only  one  last,  one  final  last  chance  for  the 
German  peasantry,”  Hitler  warned  at  the  outset  of  his 
chancellorship,  and  in  October  1933  he  declared  that 
“the  ruin  of  the  German  peasant  will  be  the  ruin  of  the 
German  people.” 

For  years  the  Nazi  Party  had  cultivated  the  backing  of 
the  farmers.  Point  17  of  the  “inalterable”  party  program 
promised  them  “land  reform  ...  a law  for  confiscation 
without  compensation  of  land  for  common  purposes;  ab- 
olition of  interest  on  farm  loans,  and  prevention  of  all 
speculation  in  land.”  Like  most  of  the  other  points  of  the 
program,  the  promises  to  the  farmers  were  not  kept — with 
the  exception  of  the  last  provision  against  land  speculation. 
In  1938,  after  five  years  of  Nazi  rule,  land  distribution  re- 
mained more  lopsided  than  in  any  other  country  in  the 
West.  Figures  published  that  year  in  the  official  Statistical 
Year  Book  showed  that  the  smallest  two  and  a half  mil- 
lion farms  had  less  land  than  the  top  .1  per  cent.  The 
Nazi  dictatorship,  like  the  Socialist-bourgeois  governments 
of  the  Republic,  did  not  dare  to  break  up  the  immense 
feudal  estates  of  the  Junkers,  which  lay  to  the  east  of  the 
Elbe. 

Nevertheless,  the  Nazi  regime  did  inaugurate  a sweep- 


355 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

ing  new  farm  program  accompanied  by  much  sentimental 
propaganda  about  “Blut  und  Boden”  (Blood  and  Soil)  and 
the  peasant’s  being  the  salt  of  the  earth  and  the  chief 
hope  of  the  Third  Reich.  To  carry  it  out  Hitler  ap- 
pointed Walther  Darre,  one  of  the  few  party  leaders  who, 
though  he  subscribed  to  most  of  the  Nazi  myths,  knew  his 
field  professionally  and  well.  An  outstanding  agricultural 
specialist  with  suitable  academic  training,  he  had  served  in 
the  Agriculture  Ministries  of  Prussia  and  the  Reich. 
Forced  to  leave  them  because  of  conflicts  with  his  superiors, 
he  retired  to  his  home  in  the  Rhineland  in  1929  and  wrote 
a book  entitled  The  Peasantry  as  the  Life  Source  of  the 
Nordic  Race.  Such  a title  was  bound  to  attract  the  at- 
tention of  the  Nazis.  Rudolf  Hess  brought  Darre  to  Hitler, 
who  was  so  impressed  with  him  that  he  commissioned  him 
to  draw  up  a suitable  farm  program  for  the  party. 

With  Hugenberg’s  dismissal  in  June  1933,  Darr6  be- 
came Minister  of  Food  and  Agriculture.  By  September  he 
was  ready  with  his  plans  to  make  over  German  agriculture. 
Two  basic  laws  promulgated  in  that  month  reorganized  the 
entire  structure  of  production  and  marketing,  with  a 
view  to  ensuring  higher  prices  for  farmers,  and  at  the  same 
time  put  the  German  peasant  on  a new  footing — ac- 
complishing this,  paradoxically,  by  putting  him  back  on  a 
very  old  footing  in  which  farms  were  entailed,  as  in  feudal 
days,  and  the  farmer  and  successive  inheritors  compulsorily 
attached  to  their  particular  plot  of  soil  (provided  they  were 
Aryan  Germans)  to  the  end  of  time. 

The  Hereditary  Farm  Law  of  September  29,  1933,  was  a 
remarkable  mixture  of  pushing  back  the  peasants  to 
medieval  days  and  of  protecting  them  against  the  abuses 
of  the  modem  monetary  age.  All  farms  up  to  308  acres 
(125  hectares)  which  were  capable  of  providing  a decent 
living  for  a family  were  declared  to  be  hereditary  estates 
subject  to  the  ancient  laws  of  entailment.  They  could  not 
be  sold,  divided,  mortgaged  or  foreclosed  for  debts.  Upon 
the  death  of  the  owner  they  had  to  be  passed  on  to  the 
oldest  or  youngest  son,  in  accordance  with  local  customs, 
or  to  the  nearest  male  relative,  who  was  obliged  to  provide 
a living  and  an  education  for  his  brothers  and  sisters  until 
they  were  of  age.  Only  an  Aryan  German  citizen  who 
could  prove  the  purity  of  his  blood  back  to  1800  could 


356 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

own  such  a farm.  And  only  such  a man,  the  law  stipulated, 
could  bear  the  “honored  title”  Bauer,  or  Peasant,  which  he 
forfeited  if  he  broke  the  “peasant  honor  code”  or  ceased, 
because  of  incapacity  or  otherwise,  to  actively  farm.  Thus 
the  heavily  indebted  German  farmer,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Third  Reich,  was  protected  from  losing  his  property  by 
foreclosures  or  from  seeing  it  shrink  in  size  (there  being 
no  necessity  to  sell  a piece  of  it  to  repay  a debt),  but  at 
the  same  time  he  was  bound  to  the  soil  as  irrevocably  as 
the  serfs  of  feudal  times. 

And  every  aspect  of  his  life  and  work  was  strictly  reg- 
ulated by  the  Reich  Food  Estate,  which  Darre  established 
by  a law  of  September  13,  1933,  a vast  organization  with 
authority  over  every  conceivable  branch  of  agricultural 
production,  marketing  and  processing,  and  which  he  him- 
self headed  in  his  capacity  of  Reich  Peasant  Leader.  Its 
chief  objectives  were  two:  to  obtain  stable  and  profitable 
prices  for  the  farmer  and  to  make  Germany  self-sufficient 
in  food. 

How  well  did  it  succeed?  In  the  beginning,  certainly,  the 
farmer,  who  for  so  long  had  felt  himself  neglected  in  a 
State  which  seemed  to  be  preoccupied  with  the  interests  of 
business  and  labor,  was  flattered  to  be  singled  out  for  so 
much  attention  and  proclaimed  a national  hero  and  an 
honored  citizen.  He  was  more  pleased  at  the  rise  in  prices 
which  Darre  obtained  for  him  by  simply  arbitrarily  fixing 
them  at  a profitable  level.  In  the  first  two  years  of  Nazi  rule 
wholesale  agricultural  prices  increased  by  20  per  cent  (in 
vegetables,  dairy  products  and  cattle  the  rise  was  a little 
more)  but  this  advantage  was  partially  offset  by  a similar 
rise  in  the  things  which  the  farmer  had  to  buy — above  all 
in  machinery  and  fertilizer. 

As  for  self-sufficiency  in  food,  which  was  deemed  nec- 
essary by  the  Nazi  leaders,  who  already,  as  we  shall  see, 
were  plotting  war,  the  goal  was  never  achieved,  nor — given 
the  quality  and  quantity  of  German  soil  in  relation  to  its 
population — could  it  ever  be.  The  best  the  country  could 
do,  despite  all  Nazi  efforts  in  the  much-advertised  “Battle  of 
Production,”  was  to  reach  83  per  cent  of  self-sufficiency 
and  it  was  only  by  the  conquest  of  foreign  lands  that  the 
Germans  obtained  enough  food  to  enable  them  to  hold 
out  during  the  second  war  as  long  as  they  did. 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 


357 


THE  ECONOMY  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 

The  foundation  of  Hitler’s  success  in  the  first  years 
rested  not  only  on  his  triumphs  in  foreign  affairs,  which 
brought  so  many  bloodless  conquests,  but  on  Germany’s 
economic  recovery,  which  in  party  circles  and  even  among 
some  economists  abroad  was  hailed  as  a miracle.  And  in- 
deed it  might  have  seemed  so  to  a good  many  people. 
Unemployment,  the  curse  of  the  Twenties  and  early 
Thirties,  was  reduced,  as  we  have  seen,  from  six  million  in 
1932  to  less  than  a million  four  years  later.  National  pro- 
duction rose  102  per  cent  from  1932  to  1937  and  the 
national  income  was  doubled.  To  an  observer,  Germany  in 
the  mid-Thirties  seemed  like  one  vast  beehive.  The  wheels 
of  industry  were  humming  and  everyone  was  as  busy  as  a 
bee. 

For  the  first  year  Nazi  economic  policies,  which  were 
largely  determined  by  Dr.  Schacht — for  Hitler  was  bored 
with  economics,  of  which  he  had  an  almost  total  ignor- 
ance— were  devoted  largely  to  putting  the  unemployed 
back  to  work  by  means  of  greatly  expanded  public  works 
and  the  stimulation  of  private  enterprise.  Government 
credit  was  furnished  by  the  creation  of  special  unemploy- 
ment bills,  and  tax  relief  was  generously  given  to  firms 
which  raised  their  capital  expenditures  and  increased  em- 
ployment. 

But  the  real  basis  of  Germany’s  recovery  was  rearma- 
ment, to  which  the  Nazi  regime  directed  the  energies  of 
business  and  labor — as  well  as  of  the  generals — from  1934 
on.  The  whole  German  economy  came  to  be  known  in 
Nazi  parlance  as  Wehrwirtschaft,  or  war  economy,  and 
it  was  deliberately  designed  to  function  not  only  in  time 
of  war  but  during  the  peace  that  led  to  war.  General 
Ludendorff,  in  his  book  Total  War  (Der  Totale  Krieg) 
whose  title  was  mistranslated  into  English  as  The  Nation 
at  War,  published  in  Germany  in  1935,  had  stressed  the 
necessity  of  mobilizing  the  economy  of  the  nation  on  the 
same  totalitarian  basis  as  everything  else  in  order  to  prop- 
erly prepare  for  total  war.  It  was  not  exactly  a new  idea 
among  the  Germans,  for  in  Prussia  during  the  eighteenth 
and  nineteenth  centuries  some  five  sevenths  of  the  gov- 
ernment’s revenue,  as  we  have  seen,  was  spent  on  the 


358  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Army  and  that  nation’s  whole  economy  was  always  re- 
garded as  primarily  an  instrument  not  of  the  people’s 
welfare  but,  of  military  policy. 

It  was  left  to  the  Nazi  regime  to  adapt  W ehrwirtschaft 
to  the  third  decade  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  results 
were  truthfully  summed  up  by  Major  General  Georg 
Thomas,  chief  of  the  Military  Economic  Staff:  “History 
will  know  only  a few  examples  of  cases  where  a country 
has  directed,  even  in  peacetime,  all  its  economic  forces 
deliberately  and  systematically  toward  the  requirements  of 
war,  as  Germany  was  compelled  to  do  in  the  period  be- 
tween the  two  World  Wars.”  12 

Germany,  of  course,  was  not  “compelled”  to  prepare 
on  such  a scale  for  war — that  was  a deliberate  decision 
taken  by  Hitler.  In  the  secret  Defense  Law  of  May  21, 
1935,  he  appointed  Schacht  Plenipotentiary-General  for 
War  Economy,  ordering  him  to  “begin  his  work  already 
in  peacetime”  and  giving  him  the  authority  to  “direct  the 
economic  preparations  for  war.”  The  inimitable  Dr. 
Schacht  had  not  waited  until  the  spring  of  1935  to  start 
building  up  the  German  economy  for  war.  On  September 
30,  1934,  less  than  two  months  after  he  had  become 
Minister  of  Economics,  he  submitted  a report  to  the 
Feuhrer  entitled  “Report  on  the  State  of  Work  for  War- 
Economic  Mobilization  as  of  September  30,  1934,”  in 
which  he  proudly  stressed  that  his  ministry  “has  been 
charged  with  the  economic  preparation  for  war.”  On 
May  3,  1935,  four  weeks  before  he  was  made  Plenipo- 
tentiary for  War  Economy,  Schacht  submitted  a personal 
memorandum  to  Hitler  which  began  with  the  statement 
that  “the  accomplishment  of  the  armament  program  with 
speed  and  in  quantity  is  the  [italics  his]  problem  of 
German  politics;  everything  else  therefore  should  be  sub- 
ordinate to  this  purpose  . . .”  Schacht  explained  to  Hitler 
that  since  “armament  had  to  be  camouflaged  completely 
until  March  16,  1935  [when  Hitler  announced  conscrip- 
tion for  an  army  of  thirty-six  divisions],  it  was  necessary 
to  use  the  printing  press”  to  finance  the  first  stages.  He 
also  pointed  out  with  some  glee  that  the  funds  confiscated 
from  the  enemies  of  the  State  (mostly  Jews)  and  others 
taken  from  blocked  foreign  accounts  had  helped  pay  for 
Hitler’s  guns.  “Thus,”  he  cracked,  “our  armaments  are 


359 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

partially  financed  with  the  credits  of  our  political  ene- 
mies.” 13 

Though  at  his  trial  at  Nuremberg  he  protested  in  all 
innocence  against  the  accusations  that  he  had  partici- 
pated in  the  Nazi  conspiracy  to  make  aggressive  war — 
he  had  done  just  the  contrary,  he  proclaimed — the  fact 
remains  that  no  single  person  was  as  responsible  as 
Schacht  for  Germany’s  economic  preparation  for  the  war 
which  Hitler  provoked  in  1939.  This  was  freely  acknowl- 
edged by  the  Army.  On  the  occasion  of  Schacht’s  six- 
tieth birthday  the  Army  publication  Militaer-Wochenblatt 
in  its  issue  of  January  22,  1937,  hailed  him  as  “the  man 
who  made  the  reconstruction  of  the  Wehrmacht  eco- 
nomically possible.”  And  it  added:  “The  Defense  Force 
owes  it  to  Schacht’s  skill  and  great  ability  that,  in  de- 
fiance of  all  currency  difficulties,  it  has  been  able  to  grow 
up  to  its  present  strength  from  an  army  of  100,000  men.” 

All  of  Schacht’s  admitted  wizardry  in  finance  was  put 
to  work  to  pay  for  getting  the  Third  Reich  ready  for  war. 
Printing  banknotes  was  merely  one  of  his  devices.  He 
manipulated  the  currency  with  such  legerdemain  that  at 
one  time  it  was  estimated  by  foreign  economists  to  have 
237  different  values.  He  negotiated  amazingly  profitable 
(for  Germany)  barter  deals  with  dozens  of  countries  and 
to  the  astonishment  of  orthodox  economists  successfully 
demonstrated  that  the  more  you  owed  a country  the  more 
business  you  did  with  it.  His  creation  of  credit  in  a 
country  that  had  little  liquid  capital  and  almost  no 
financial  reserves  was  the  work  of  genius,  or — as  some 
said — of  a master  manipulator.  His  invention  of  the  so- 
called  “Mefo”  bills  was  a good  example.  These  were 
simply  bills  created  by  the  Reichsbank  and  guaranteed 
by  the  State  and  used  to  pay  armament  manufacturers. 
The  bills  were  accepted  by  all  German  banks  and  ulti- 
mately discounted  by  the  Reichsbank.  Since  they  appeared 
neither  in  the  published  statements  of  the  national  bank 
nor  in  the  government’s  budget  they  helped  maintain 
secrecy  as  to  the  extent  of  Germany’s  rearmament.  From 
1935  to  1938  they  were  used  exclusively  to  finance  re- 
armament and  amounted  to  a total  of  twelve  billion 
marks.  In  explaining  them  once  to  Hitler,  Count  Schwerin 
von  Krosigk,  the  harassed  Minister  of  Finance,  remarked 
that  they  were  merely  a way  of  “printing  money.”  14 


360 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


In  September  1936,  with  the  inauguration  of  the  Four- 
Year  Plan  under  the  iron  control  of  Goering,  who  re- 
placed Schacht  as  economic  dictator  though  he  was  al- 
most as  ignorant  of  business  as  was  Hitler,  Germany  went 
over  to  a total  war  economy.  The  purpose  of  the  plan 
was  to  make  Germany  self-sufficient  in  four  years,  so 
that  a wartime  blockade  would  not  stifle  it.  Imports  were 
reduced  to  a bare  minimum,  severe  price  and  wage  con- 
trols were  introduced,  dividends  restricted  to  6 per  cent, 
great  factories  set  up  to  make  synthetic  rubber,  textiles, 
fuel  and  other  products  from  Germany’s  own  sources  of 
raw  materials,  and  a giant  Hermann  Goering  Works 
established  to  make  steel  out  of  the  local  low-grade  ore. 
In  short,  the  German  economy  was  mobilized  for  war,  and 
businessmen,  though  their  profits  soared,  became  mere 
cogs  in  a war  machine,  their  work  circumscribed  by  so 
many  restrictions,  by  so  many  forms  to  fill  out,  that  Dr. 
Funk,  who  succeeded  Schacht  in  1937  as  Minister  of 
Economics  and  in  1939  as  president  of  the  Reichsbank, 
was  forced  to  admit  ruefully  that  “official  communications 
now  make  up  more  than  one  half  of  a German  manu- 
facturer’s entire  correspondence”  and  that  “Germany’s 
export  trade  involves  40,000  separate  transactions  daily; 
yet  for  a single  transaction  as  many  as  forty  different 
forms  must  be  filled  out.” 

Buried  under  mountains  of  red  tape,  directed  by  the 
State  as  to  what  they  could  produce,  how  much  and 
at  what  price,  burdened  by  increasing  taxation  and  milked 
by  steep  and  never  ending  “special  contributions”  to  the 
party,  the  businessmen,  who  had  welcomed  Hitler’s  re- 
gime so  enthusiastically  because  they  expected  it  to  de- 
stroy organized  labor  and  allow  an  entrepreneur  to 
practice  untrammeled  free  enterprise,  became  greatly  dis- 
illusioned. One  of  them  was  Fritz  Thyssen,  one  of  the 
earliest  and  biggest  contributors  to  the  party.  Fleeing 
Germany  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  he  recognized  that 
the  “Nazi  regime  has  ruined  German  industry.”  And  to  all 
he  met  abroad  he  proclaimed,  “What  a fool  [Dumm- 
kopf]  I was!”  15 

In  the  beginning,  however,  the  businessmen  fooled 
themselves  into  believing  that  Nazi  rule  was  the  answer 
to  all  their  prayers.  To  be  sure,  the  “inalterable”  party 
program  had  sounded  ominous  to  them  with  its  promises 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  361 

of  nationalization  of  trusts,  profit  sharing  in  the  whole- 
sale trade,  “communalization  of  department  stores  and 
their  lease  at  a cheap  rate  to  small  traders”  (as  Point  16 
read),  land  reform  and  the  abolition  of  interest  on  mort- 
gages. But  the  men  of  industry  and  finance  soon 
learned  that  Hitler  had  not  the  slightest  intention  of 
honoring  a single  economic  plank  in  the  party  program 
— the  radical  promises  had  been  thrown  in  merely  to  at- 
tract votes.  For  the  first  few  months  in  1933,  a few  party 
radicals  tried  to  get  control  of  the  business  associations, 
take  over  the  department  stores  and  institute  a corporate 
state  on  lines  which  Mussolini  was  attempting  to  establish. 
But  they  were  quickly  thrown  out  by  Hitler  and  replaced 
by  conservative  businessmen.  Gottfried  Feder,  Hitler’s 
early  mentor  in  economics,  the  crank  who  wanted  to 
abolish  “interest  slavery,”  was  given  a post  as  under- 
secretary in  the  Ministry  of  Economics,  but  his  superior. 
Dr.  Karl  Schmitt,  the  insurance  magnate,  who  had  spent 
his  life  lending  money  and  collecting  interest,  gave  him 
nothing  to  do,  and  when  Schacht  took  over  the  ministry 
he  dispensed  with  Feder’s  services. 

The  little  businessmen,  who  had  been  one  of  the 
party’s  chief  supports  and  who  expected  great  things 
from  Chancellor  Hitler,  soon  found  themselves,  many  of 
them,  being  exterminated  and  forced  back  into  the  ranks 
of  wage  earners.  Laws  decreed  in  October  1937  simply 
dissolved  all  corporations  with  a capital  under  $40,000 
and  forbade  the  establishment  of  new  ones  with  a capital 
less  than  $2,000,000.  This  quickly  disposed  of  one  fifth  of 
all  small  business  firms.  On  the  other  hand  the  great 
cartels,  which  even  the  Republic  had  favored,  were  further 
strengthened  by  the  Nazis.  In  fact,  under  a law  of  July 
15,  1933,  they  were  made  compulsory.  The  Ministry  of 
Economics  was  empowered  to  organize  new  compulsory 
cartels  or  order  firms  to  join  existing  ones. 

The  system  of  myriad  business  and  trade  associations 
organized  during  the  Republic  was  maintained  by  the 
Nazis,  though  under  the  basic  law  of  February  27,  1934, 
they  were  reorganized  on  the  streamlined  leadership  prin- 
ciple and  put  under  the  control  of  the  State.  All  busi- 
nesses were  forced  to  become  members.  At  the  head  of  an 
incredibly  complex  structure  was  the  Reich  Economic 
Chamber,  whose  leader  was  appointed  by  the  State,  and 


362 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

which  controlled  seven  national  economic  groups,  twenty- 
three  economic  chambers,  one  hundred  chambers  of  in- 
dustry and  commerce  and  the  seventy  chambers  of  handi- 
crafts. Amidst  this  labyrinthine  organization  and  all  the 
multitude  of  offices  and  agencies  of  the  Ministry  of 
Economics  and  the  Four-Year  Plan  and  the  Niagara  of 
thousands  of  special  decrees  and  laws  even  the  most 
astute  businessman  was  often  lost,  and  special  lawyers 
had  to  be  employed  to  enable  a firm  to  function.  The 
graft  involved  in  finding  one’s  way  to  key  officials  who 
could  make  decisions  on  which  orders  depended  or  in 
circumventing  the  endless  rules  and  regulations  of  the 
government  and  the  trade  associations  became  in  the  late 
Thirties  astronomical.  “An  economic  necessity,”  one  busi- 
nessman termed  it  to  this  writer. 

Despite  his  harassed  life,  however,  the  businessman 
made  good  profits.  The  heavy  industries,  chief  bene- 
ficiaries of  rearmament,  increased  theirs  from  2 per  cent 
in  the  boom  year  of  1926  to  6 Vi  per  cent  in  1938,  the 
last  full  year  of  peace.  Even  the  law  limiting  dividends  to 
6 per  cent  worked  no  hardship  on  the  companies  them- 
selves. Just  the  opposite.  In  theory,  according  to  the  law, 
any  amount  above  that  had  to  be  invested  in  government 
bonds — there  was  no  thought  of  confiscation.  Actually 
most  firms  reinvested  in  their  own  businesses  the  un- 
distributed profits,  which  rose  from  175  million  marks  in 
1932  to  five  billion  marks  in  1938,  a year  in  which  the 
total  savings  in  the  savings  banks  amounted  to  only  two 
billions,  or  less  than  half  the  undistributed  profits,  and  in 
which  the  distributed  profits  in  form  of  dividends 
totaled  only  1,200,000,000  marks.  Besides  his  pleasant 
profits,  the  businessman  was  also  cheered  by  the  way  the 
workers  had  been  put  in  their  place  under  Hitler.  There 
were  no  more  unreasonable  wage  demands:  Actually, 
wages  were  reduced  a little  despite  a 25  per  cent  rise  in 
the  cost  of  living.  And  above  all,  there  were  no  costly 
strikes.  In  fact,  there  were  no  strikes  at  all.  Such  mani- 
festations of  unruliness  were  verboten  in  the  Third  Reich. 

THE  SERFDOM  OF  LABOR 

Deprived  of  his  trade  unions,  collective  bargaining  and 
the  right  to  strike,  the  German  worker  in  the  Third 


363 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

Reich  became  an  industrial  serf,  bound  to  his  master,  the 
employer,  much  as  medieval  peasants  had  been  bound  to 
the  lord  of  the  manor.  The  so-called  Labor  Front,  which 
in  theory  replaced  the  old  trade  unions,  did  not  represent 
the  worker.  According  to  the  law  of  October  24,  1934, 
which  created  it,  it  was  “the  organization  of  creative 
Germans  of  brain  and  fist.”  It  took  in  not  only  wage  and 
salary  earners  but  also  the  employers  and  members  of  the 
professions.  It  was  in  reality  a vast  propaganda  organiza- 
tion and,  as  some  workers  said,  a gigantic  fraud.  Its  aim, 
as  stated  in  the  law,  was  not  to  protect  the  worker  but 
“to  create  a true  social  and  productive  community  of  all 
Germans.  Its  task  is  to  see  that  every  single  individual 
should  be  able  ...  to  perform  the  maximum  of  work.” 
The  Labor  Front  was  not  an  independent  administrative 
organization  but,  like  almost  every  other  group  in  Nazi 
Germany  except  the  Army,  an  integral  part  of  the 
N.S.D.A.P.,  or,  as  its  leader,  Dr.  Ley — the  “stammering 
drunkard,”  to  use  Thyssen’s  phrase — said,  “an  instru- 
ment of  the  party.”  Indeed,  the  October  24  law  stipulated 
that  its  officials  should  come  from  the  ranks  of  the  party, 
the  former  Nazi  unions,  the  S.A.  and  the  S.S. — and  they 
did. 

Earlier,  the  Law  Regulating  National  Labor  of  January 
20,  1934,  known  as  the  “Charter  of  Labor,”  had  put  the 
worker  in  his  place  and  raised  the  employer  to  his  old 
position  of  absolute  master — subject,  of  course,  to  inter- 
ference by  the  all-powerful  State.  The  employer  became 
the  “leader  of  the  enterprise,”  the  employees  file  “follow- 
ing,” or  Gefolgschaft.  Paragraph  Two  of  the  law  set 
down  that  “the  leader  of  the  enterprise  makes  the  de- 
cisions for  the  employees  and  laborers  in  all  matters  con- 
cerning the  enterprise.”  And  just  as  in  ancient  times  the 
lord  was  supposed  to  be  responsible  for  the  welfare  of 
his  subjects  so,  under  the  Nazi  law,  was  the  employer 
made  “responsible  for  the  well-being  of  the  employees  and 
laborers.”  In  return,  the  law  said,  “the  employees  and 
laborers  owe  him  faithfulness” — that  is,  they  were  to  work 
hard  and  long,  and  no  back  talk  or  grumbling,  even  about 
wages. 

Wages  were  set  by  so-called  labor  trustees,  appointed 
by  the  Labor  Front.  In  practice,  they  set  the  rates  accord- 
ing to  the  wishes  of  the  employer — there  was  no  provision 


364  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

for  the  workers  even  to  be  consulted  in  such  matters — 
though  after  1936,  when  help  became  scarce  in  the  arma- 
ment industries  and  some  employers  attempted  to  raise 
wages  in  order  to  attract  men,  wage  scales  were  held 
down  by  orders  of  the  State.  Hitler  was  quite  frank  about 
keeping  wages  low.  “It  has  been  the  iron  principle  of  the 
National  Socialist  leadership,”  he  declared  early  in  the 
regime,  “not  to  permit  any  rise  in  the  hourly  wage  rates 
but  to  raise  income  solely  by  an  increase  in  perform- 
ance.”18 In  a country  where  most  wages  were  based  at 
least  partly  on  piecework,  this  meant  that  a worker  could 
hope  to  earn  more  only  by  a speed-up  and  by  longer 
hours. 

Compared  to  the  United  States,  and  after  allowances 
were  made  for  the  difference  in  the  cost  of  living  and  in 
social  services,  wages  in  Germany  had  always  been  low. 
Under  the  Nazis  they  were  slightly  lower  than  before. 
According  to  the  Reich  Statistical  Office,  they  declined 
for  skilled  workers  from  20.4  cents  an  hour  in  1932,  at 
the  height  of  the  depression,  to  19.5  cents  during  the 
middle  of  1936.  Wage  scales  for  unskilled  labor  fell  from 
16.1  cents  to  13  cents  an  hour.  At  the  party  congress  in 
Nuremberg  in  1936  Dr.  Ley  stated  that  the  average  earn- 
ings of  full-time  workers  in  the  Labor  Front  amounted  to 
$6.95  a week.  The  Reich  Statistical  Office  put  the  figure  for 
all  German  workers  at  $6.29. 

Although  millions  more  had  jobs,  the  share  of  all 
German  workers  in  the  national  income  fell  from  56.9 
per  cent  in  the  depression  year  of  1932  to  53.6  per 
cent  in  the  boom  year  of  1938.  At  the  same  time  income 
from  capital  and  business  rose  from  17.4  per  cent  of  the 
national  income  to  26.6  per  cent.  It  is  true  that  because  of 
much  greater  employment  the  total  income  from  wages 
and  salaries  grew  from  twenty-five  billion  marks  to  forty- 
two  billions,  an  increase  of  66  per  cent.  But  income  from 
capital  and  business  rose  much  more  steeply — by  146  per 
cent.  All  the  propagandists  in  the  Third  Reich  from 
Hitler  on  down  were  accustomed  to  rant  in  their  public 
speeches  against  the  bourgeois  and  the  capitalist  and  pro- 
claim their  solidarity  with  the  worker.  But  a sober  study  of 
the  official  statistics,  which  perhaps  few  Germans  bothered 
to  make,  revealed  that  the  much  maligned  capitalists,  not 
the  workers,  benefited  most  from  Nazi  policies. 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  365 

Finally,  the  take-home  pay  of  the  German  worker 
shrank.  Besides  stiff  income  taxes,  compulsory  contribu- 
tions to  sickness,  unemployment  and  disability  insurance, 
and  Labor  Front  dues,  the  manual  worker — like  everyone 
else  in  Nazi  Germany — was  constantly  pressured  to  make 
increasingly  large  gifts  to  an  assortment  of  Nazi  chari- 
ties, the  chief  of  which  was  Winterhilfe  (Winter  Relief.) 
Many  a workman  lost  his  job  because  he  failed  to  con- 
tribute to  Winterhilfe  or  because  his  contribution  was 
deemed  too  small.  Such  failure  was  termed  by  one 
labor  court,  which  upheld  the  dismissal  of  an  em- 
ployee without  notice,  “conduct  hostile  to  the  community 
of  the  people  ...  to  be  most  strongly  condemned.”  In 
the  mid-Thirties  it  was  estimated  that  taxes  and  contribu- 
tions took  from  15  to  35  per  cent  of  a worker’s  gross 
wage.  Such  a cut  out  of  $6.95  a week  did  not  leave  a 
great  deal  for  rent  and  food  and  clothing  and  recreation. 

As  with  the  medieval  serfs,  the  workers  in  Hitler’s 
Germany  found  themselves  being  more  and  more  bound 
to  their  place  of  labor,  though  here  it  was  not  the 
employer  who  bound  them  but  the  State.  We  have  seen 
how  the  peasant  in  the  Third  Reich  was  bound  to  his 
land  by  the  Hereditary  Farm  Law.  Likewise  the  agri- 
cultural laborer,  by  law,  was  attached  to  the  land  and 
forbidden  to  leave  it  for  work  in  the  city.  In  practice, 
it  must  be  said,  this  was  one  Nazi  law  which  was  not 
obeyed;  between  1933  and  1939  more  than  a million 
(1,300,000)  farm  workers  migrated  to  jobs  in  industry 
and  trade.  But  for  industrial  laborers  the  law  was  en- 
forced. Various  government  decrees  beginning  with  the 
law  of  May  15,  1934,  severely  restricted  a worker’s  free- 
dom of  movement  from  one  job  to  another.  After  June 
1935  the  state  employment  offices  were  given  exclusive 
control  of  employment;  they  determined  who  could  be 
hired  for  what  and  where. 

The  “workbook”  was  introduced  in  February  1935,  and 
eventually  no  worker  could  be  hired  unless  he  possessed 
one.  In  it  was  kept  a record  of  his  skills  and  employment. 
The  workbook  not  only  provided  the  State  and  the  em- 
ployer with  up-to-date  data  on  every  single  employee  in 
the  nation  but  was  used  to  tie  a worker  to  his  bench.  If 
he  desired  to  leave  for  other  employment  his  employer 


366 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


could  retain  his  workbook,  which  meant  that  he  could  not 
legally  be  employed  elsewhere.  Finally,  on  June  22, 
1938,  a special  decree  issued  by  the  Office  of  the  Four- 
Year  Plan  instituted  labor  conscription.  It  obliged  every 
German  to  work  where  the  State  assigned  him.  Workers 
who  absented  themselves  from  their  jobs  without  a very 
good  excuse  were  subject  to  fine  and  imprisonment.  There 
was,  it  is  obvious,  another  side  to  this  coin.  A worker 
thus  conscripted  could  not  be  fired  by  his  employer  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  government  employment  office.  He 
had  job  security,  something  he  had  rarely  known  dur- 
ing the  Republic. 

Tied  down  by  so  many  controls  at  wages  little  above 
the  subsistence  level,  the  German  workers,  like  the  Roman 
proletariat,  were  provided  with  circuses  by  their  rulers 
to  divert  attention  from  their  miserable  state.  “We  had  to 
divert  the  attention  of  the  masses  from  material  to  moral 
values,”  Dr.  Ley  once  explained.  “It  is  more  important 
to  feed  the  souls  of  men  than  their  stomachs.” 

So  he  came  up  with  an  organization  called  Kraft  durch 
Freude  (“Strength  through  Joy”).  This  provided  what  can 
only  be  called  regimented  leisure.  In  a twentieth-century 
totalitarian  dictatorship,  as  perhaps  with  older  ones,  it 
is  deemed  necessary  to  control  not  only  the  working  hours 
but  the  leisure  hours  of  the  individual.  This  was  what 
“Strength  through  Joy”  did.  In  pre-Nazi  days  Germany 
had  tens  of  thousands  of  clubs  devoted  to  everything  from 
chess  and  soccer  to  bird  watching.  Under  the  Nazis  no 
organized  social,  sport  or  recreational  group  was  allowed 
to  function  except  under  the  control  and  direction  of 
Kraft  durch  Freude. 

To  the  ordinary  German  in  the  Third  Reich  this  of- 
ficial all-embracing  recreational  organization  no  doubt 
was  better  than  nothing  at  all,  if  one  could  not  be  trusted 
to  be  left  to  one’s  own  devices.  It  provided  members 
of  the  Labor  Front,  for  instance,  with  dirt-cheap  va- 
cation trips  on  land  and  sea.  Dr.  Ley  built  two  25,000-ton 
ships,  one  of  which  he  named  after  himself,  and  chartered 
ten  others  to  handle  ocean  cruises  for  Kraft  durch 
Freude.  This  writer  once  participated  in  such  a cruise; 
though  life  aboard  was  organized  by  Nazi  leaders  to  a 
point  of  excruciation  (for  him),  the  German  workers 
seemed  to  have  a good  time.  And  at  bargain  rates!  A 


367 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

cruise  to  Madeira,  for  instance,  cost  only  $25,  including 
rail  fare  to  and  from  the  German  port,  and  other  jaunts 
were  equally  inexpensive.  Beaches  on  the  sea  and  on  lakes 
were  taken  over  for  thousands  of  summer  vacationers — 
one  at  Ruegen  on  the  Baltic,  which  was  not  completed  by 
the  time  the  war  came,  called  for  hotel  accommoda- 
tions for  twenty  thousand  persons — and  in  winter  special 
skiing  excursions  to  the  Bavarian  Alps  were  organized 
at  a cost  of  $ 1 1 a week,  including  carfare,  room  and 
board,  rental  of  skis  and  lessons  from  a ski  instructor. 

Sports,  every  branch  of  which  was  controlled  by  the 
“Strength  through  Joy,”  were  organized  on  a massive 
scale,  more  than  seven  million  persons,  according  to 
the  official  figures,  participating  in  them  annually.  The 
organization  also  made  available  at  bargain  rates  tickets 
to  the  theater,  the  opera  and  concerts,  thus  making  avail- 
able more  high-brow  entertainment  to  the  laboring  man, 
as  Nazi  officials  often  boasted.  Kraft  durch  Freude  also 
had  its  own  ninety-piece  symphony  orchestra  which  con- 
tinually toured  the  country,  often  playing  in  the  smaller 
places  where  good  music  was  not  usually  available.  Fi- 
nally, the  organization  took  over  the  200-odd  adult  ed- 
ucation institutions  which  had  flourished  during  the 
Republic — a movement  which  had  originated  in  Scandi- 
navia— and  continued  them,  though  adding  a strong  mix- 
ture of  Nazi  ideology  to  the  instruction. 

In  the  end,  of  course,  the  workers  paid  for  their  cir- 
cuses. The  annual  income  from  dues  to  the  Labor  Front 
came  to  $160,000,000  in  1937  and  passed  the  $200,000,000 
point  by  the  time  the  war  started,  according  to  Dr. 
Ley — the  accounting  was  exceedingly  vague,  being  han- 
dled, not  by  the  State  but  by  the  Finance  Office  of  the 
party,  which  never  published  its  accounts.  From  the  dues, 
10  per  cent  was  earmarked  for  Kraft  durch  Freude.  But 
the  fees  paid  by  individuals  for  vacation  trips  and  enter- 
tainment, cheap  as  they  were,  amounted  in  the  year  before 
the  war  to  $1,250,000,000.  There  was  another  heavy  cost 
to  the  wage  earner.  As  the  largest  single  party  organization 
in  the  country,  with  twenty-five  million  members,  the 
Labor  Front  became  a swollen  bureauracy,  with  tens  of 
thousands  of  full-time  employees.  In  fact,  it  was  estimated 
that  from  20  to  25  per  cent  of  its  income  was  absorbed 
by  administration  expense. 


368  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

One  particular  swindle  perpetrated  by  Hitler  on  the 
German  workers  deserves  passing  mention.  This  had  to  do 
with  the  Volkswagen  (the  “People’s  Car”) — a brainstorm 
of  the  Fuehrer  himself.  Every  German,  or  at  least  every 
German  workman,  he  said,  should  own  an  automobile, 
just  as  in  the  United  States.  Heretofore  in  this  country 
where  there  was  only  one  motorcar  for  every  fifty  per- 
sons (compared  to  one  for  every  five  in  America)  the 
workman  had  used  a bicycle  or  public  transportation  to 
get  about.  Now  Hitler  decreed  that  a car  should  be  built 
for  him  to  sell  for  only  990  marks — $396  at  the  official 
rate  of  exchange.  He  himself,  it  was  said,  took  a hand 
in  the  actual  designing  of  the  car,  which  was  done 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Austrian  automobile  engi- 
neer Dr.  Ferdinand  Porsche. 

Since  private  industry  could  not  turn  out  an  auto- 
mobile for  $396,  Hitler  ordered  the  State  to  build  it  and 
placed  the  Labor  Front  in  charge  of  the  project.  Dr. 
Ley’s  organization  promptly  set  out  in  1938  to  build  at 
Fallersleben,  near  Braunschweig,  “the  biggest  automobile 
factory  in  the  world,”  with  a capacity  for  turning  out  a 
million  and  a half  cars  a year — “more  than  Ford,”  the 
Nazi  propagandists  said.  The  Labor  Front  advanced  fifty 
million  marks  in  capital.  But  that  was  not  the  main  fi- 
nancing. Dr.  Ley’s  ingenious  plan  was  that  the  workers 
themselves  should  furnish  the  capital  by  means  of  what 
became  known  as  a “pay-before-you-get-it”  installment 
plan — five  marks  a week,  or  if  a worker  thought  he  could 
afford  it,  ten  or  fifteen  marks  a week.  When  750  marks 
had  been  paid  in,  the  buyer  received  an  order  number 
entitling  him  to  a car  as  soon  as  it  could  be  turned  out. 
Alas  for  the  worker,  not  a single  car  was  ever  turned  out 
for  any  customer  during  the  Third  Reich.  Tens  of  millions 
of  marks  were  paid  in  by  the  German  wage  earners,  not 
a pfennig  of  which  was  ever  to  be  refunded.  By  the  time 
the  war  started  the  Volkswagen  factory  turned  to  the 
manufacture  of  goods  more  useful  to  the  Army. 

Swindled  though  he  was  in  this  instance  and  in  many 
others,  reduced,  as  we  have  seen,  to  a sort  of  industrial 
serfdom  on  subsistence  wages,  and  less  prone  than  any 
other  segment  of  German  society  to  subscribe  to  Naz- 
ism or  to  be  taken  in  by  its  ceaseless  propaganda,  the 


369 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

German  worker,  it  is  only  fair  to  say,  did  not  appear 
to  resent  very  bitterly  his  inferior  status  in  the  Third 
Reich.  The  great  German  war  machine  that  hurtled  over 
the  Polish  border  at  dawn  on  September  1,  1939,  could 
never  have  been  fashioned  without  the  very  considerable 
contribution  that  the  German  workman  made  to  it.  Regi- 
mented he  was  and  sometimes  terrorized,  but  so  was 
everyone  else — and  centuries  of  regimentation  had  ac- 
customed him,  as  it  had  all  other  Germans,  to  being 
told  what  do  do.  Though  it  is  perhaps  unwise  to  attempt 
to  generalize  about  such  things,  this  writer’s  own  impres- 
sion of  the  workingman  in  Berlin  and  in  the  Ruhr  was 
that  while  he  was  somewhat  cynical  about  the  promises 
of  the  regime  he  had  no  more  hankering  for  revolt  than 
anyone  else  in  the  Third  Reich.  Unorganized  as  he  was  and 
lacking  leadership,  what  could  he  do?  A workman  often 
put  that  question  to  you. 

But  the  greatest  cause  of  his  acceptance  of  his  role  in 
Nazi  Germany  was,  without  any  doubt  at  all,  that  he  had 
a job  again  and  the  assurance  that  he  would  keep  it.  An 
observer  who  had  known  something  about  his  precarious 
predicament  during  the  Republic  could  understand  why 
he  did  not  seem  to  be  desperately  concerned  with  the  loss 
of  political  freedom  and  even  of  his  trade  unions  as 
long  as  he  was  employed  full-time.  In  the  past,  for  so 
many,  for  as  many  as  six  million  men  and  their  families, 
such  rights  of  free  men  in  Germany  had  been  overshad- 
owed, as  he  said,  by  the  freedom  to  starve.  In  taking  away 
that  last  freedom,  Hitler  assured  himself  of  the  support  of 
the  working  class,  probably  the  most  skillful  and  indus- 
trious and  disciplined  in  the  Western  world.  It  was  a 
backing  given  not  to  his  half-baked  ideology  or  to  his 
evil  intentions,  as  such,  but  to  what  counted  most:  the 
production  of  goods  for  war. 

JUSTICE  IN  THE  THIRD  REICH 

From  the  very  first  weeks  of  1933,  when  the  massive 
and  arbitrary  arrests,  beatings  and  murders  by  those  in 
power  began,  Germany  under  National  Socialism  ceased 
to  be  a society  based  on  law.  “Hitler  is  the  law!”  the  legal 
lights  of  Nazi  Germany  proudly  proclaimed,  and  Goering 
emphasized  it  when  he  told  the  Prussian  prosecutors  on 


370 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


July  12,  1934,  that  “the  law  and  the  will  of  the  Fuehrer 
are  one.”  It  was  true.  The  law  was  what  the  dictator  said 
it  was  and  in  moments  of  crisis,  as  during  the  Blood  Purge, 
he  himself,  as  we  have  seen  in  his  speech  to  the  Reichstag 
immediately  after  that  bloody  event,  proclaimed  that  he 
was  the  “supreme  judge”  of  the  German  people,  with 
power  to  do  to  death  whomever  he  pleased. 

In  the  days  of  the  Republic,  most  judges,  like  the 
majority  of  the  Protestant  clergy  and  the  university  pro- 
fessors, had  cordially  disliked  the  Weimar  regime  and 
in  their  decisions,  as  many  thought,  had  written  the  black- 
est page  in  the  life  of  the  German  Republic,  thus  contribut- 
ing to  its  fall.  But  at  least  under  the  Weimar  Constitution 
judges  were  independent,  subject  only  to  the  law,  pro- 
tected from  arbitrary  removal  and  bound  at  least  in  theory 
by  Article  109  to  safeguard  equality  before  the  law.  Most 
of  them  had  been  sympathetic  to  National  Socialism,  but 
they  were  hardly  prepared  for  the  treatment  they  soon 
received  under  its  actual  rule.  The  Civil  Service  law  of 
April  7,  1933,  was  made  applicable  to  all  magistrates  and 
quickly  rid  the  judiciary  not  only  of  Jews  but  of  those 
whose  Nazism  was  deemed  questionable,  or,  as  the  law 
stipulated,  “who  indicated  that  he  was  no  longer  prepared 
to  intercede  at  all  times  for  the  National  Socialist  State.” 
To  be  sure,  not  many  judges  were  eliminated  by  this  law, 
but  they  were  warned  where  their  duty  lay.  Just  to  make 
sure  that  they  understood.  Dr.  Hans  Frank,  Commissioner 
of  Justice  and  Reich  Law  Leader,  told  the  jurists  in  1936, 
“The  National  Socialist  ideology  is  the  foundation  of  all 
basic  laws,  especially  as  explained  in  the  party  program 
and  in  the  speeches  of  the  Fuehrer.”  Dr.  Frank  went  on 
to  explain  what  he  meant: 

There  is  no  independence  of  law  against  National  So- 
cialism. Say  to  yourselves  at  every  decision  which  you  make: 
“How  would  the  Fuehrer  decide  in  my  place?”  In  every 
decision  ask  yourselves:  “Is  this  decision  compatible  with 
the  National  Socialist  conscience  of  the  German  people?” 
Then  you  will  have  a firm  iron  foundation  which,  allied 
with  the  unity  of  the  National  Socialist  People’s  State  and 
with  your  recognition  of  the  eternal  nature  of  the  will  of 
Adolf  Hitler,  will  endow  your  own  sphere  of  decision 
with  the  authority  of  the  Third  Reich,  and  this  for  all  time.17 

That  seemed  plain  enough,  as  did  a new  Civil  Service 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  371 

law  of  the  following  year  (January  26,  1937),  which  called 
for  the  dismissal  of  all  officials,  including  judges,  for 
“political  unreliability.”  Furthermore,  all  jurists  were 
forced  to  join  the  League  of  National  Socialist  Ger- 
man Jurists,  in  which  they  were  often  lectured  on  the 
lines  of  Frank’s  talk. 

Some  judges,  however,  antirepublican  they  may  have 
been,  did  not  respond  avidly  enough  to  the  party  line. 
In  fact,  a few  of  them,  at  least,  attempted  to  base  their 
judgments  on  the  law.  One  of  the  worst  examples  of  this, 
from  the  Nazi  point  of  view,  was  the  decision  of  the 
Reichsgericht,  Germany’s  Supreme  Court,  to  acquit  on  the 
basis  of  evidence  three  of  the  four  Communist  defendants 
in  the  Reichstag  fire  trial  in  March  1934.  (Only  Van  der 
Lubbe,  the  half-witted  Dutchman,  who  confessed,  was 
found  guilty.)  This  so  incensed  Hitler  and  Goering  that 
within  a month,  on  April  24,  1934,  the  right  to  try  cases 
of  treason,  which  heretofore  had  been  under  the  exclu- 
sive juridsiction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  was  taken  away 
from  that  august  body  and  transferred  to  a new  court,  the 
Volksgerichtshof,  the  People’s  Court,  which  soon  became 
the  most  dreaded  tribunal  in  the  land.  It  consisted  of  two 
professional  judges  and  five  others  chosen  from  among 
party  ofiScials,  the  S.S.  and  the  armed  forces,  thus  giving 
the  latter  a majority  vote.  There  was  no  appeal  from  its 
decisions  or  sentences  and  usually  its  sessions  were  held 
in  camera.  Occasionally,  however,  for  propaganda  pur- 
poses when  relatively  light  sentences  were  to  be  given,  the 
foreign  correspondents  were  invited  to  attend. 

Thus  this  writer  once  observed  a case  before  the  People’s 
Court  in  1935.  It  struck  him  more  as  a drumhead  court- 
martial  than  a civil-court  trial.  The  proceedings  were  fin- 
ished in  a day,  there  was  practically  no  opportunity  to 
present  defense  witnesses  (if  any  had  dared  to  appear  in 
defense  of  one  accused  of  “treason”)  and  the  arguments 
of  the  defense  lawyers,  who  were  “qualified”  Nazis,  seemed 
weak  to  the  point  of  ludicrousness.  One  got  the  impression 
from  reading  the  newspapers,  which  merely  announced 
the  verdicts,  that  most  of  the  unfortunate  defendants 
(though  not  on  the  day  I attended)  received  a death  sen- 
tence. No  figures  were  ever  published,  though  in  December 
1940  Roland  Freisler,  the  much-feared  president  of  the 
People’s  Court  (who  was  killed  during  the  war  when  an 


372  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

American  bomb  demolished  his  courtroom  during  a trial) 
claimed  that  “only  four  per  cent  of  the  accused  were  put 
to  death.” 

Established  even  earlier  that  the  sinister  People’s  Court 
was  the  Sondergericht,  the  Special  Court,  which  took  over 
from  the  ordinary  courts  cases  of  political  crime  or,  as 
the  Law  of  March  21,  1933,  which  established  the  new 
tribunal,  put  it,  cases  of  “insidious  attacks  against  the 
government.”  The  Special  Courts  consisted  of  three  judges, 
who  invariably  had  to  be  trusted  party  members,  without 
a jury.  A Nazi  prosecutor  had  the  choice  of  bringing 
action  in  such  cases  before  either  an  ordinary  court  or 
the  Special  Court,  and  invariably  he  chose  the  latter,  for 
obvious  reasons.  Defense  lawyers  before  this  court,  as  be- 
fore the  Volksgerichtshof,  had  to  be  approved  by  Nazi 
officials.  Sometimes  even  if  they  were  approved  they  fared 
badly.  Thus  the  lawyers  who  attempted  to  represent  the 
widow  of  Dr.  Klausener,  the  Catholic  Action  leader  mur- 
dered in  the  Blood  Purge,  in  her  suit  for  damages  against 
the  State  were  whisked  off  to  Sachsenhausen  concentration 
camp,  where  they  were  kept  until  they  formally  with- 
drew the  action. 

Hitler,  and  for  some  time  Goering,  had  the  right  to 
quash  criminal  proceedings.  In  the  Nuremberg  docu- 
ments 18  a case  came  to  light  in  which  the  Minister  of 
Justice  strongly  recommended  the  prosecution  of  a high 
Gestapo  official  and  a group  of  S.A.  men  whom  the  evi- 
dence, he  thought,  plainly  proved  guilty  of  the  most 
shocking  torture  of  inmates  of  a concentration  camp.  He 
sent  the  evidence  to  Hitler.  The  Fuehrer  ordered  the  prose- 
cution dropped.  Goering  too,  in  the  beginning,  had  such 
power.  Once  in  April  1934  he  halted  criminal  proceedings 
against  a well-known  businessman.  It  soon  became  known 
that  the  defendant  paid  Goering  some  three  million  marks. 
As  Gerhard  F.  Kramer,  a prominent  lawyer  in  Berlin  at 
the  time,  later  commented,  “It  was  impossible  to  establish 
whether  Goering  blackmailed  the  industrialist  or  whether 
the  industrialist  bribed  the  Prussian  Prime  Minister.” 19 
What  was  established  was  that  Goering  quashed  the  case. 

On  the  other  hand,  Rudolf  Hess,  deputy  of  the  Fuehrer, 
was  empowered  to  take  “merciless  action”  against  defend- 
ants who  in  his  opinion  got  off  with  too  light  sentences. 
A record  of  all  court  sentences  of  those  found  guility  of 


373 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

attacking  the  party,  the  Fuehrer  or  the  State  were  for- 
warded to  Hess,  who  if  he  thought  the  punishment  too 
mild  could  take  the  “merciless”  action.  This  usually  con- 
sisted of  hauling  the  victims  off  to  a concentration  camp 
or  having  him  bumped  off. 

Sometimes,  it  must  be  said,  the  judges  of  the  Sonder- 
gericht  did  display  some  spirit  of  independence  and  even 
devotion  to  the  law.  In  such  cases  either  Hess  or  the  Ge- 
stapo stepped  in.  Thus,  as  we  have  seen,  when  Pastor 
Niemoeller  was  acquitted  by  the  Special  Court  of  the  main 
charges  against  him  and  sentenced  only  to  a short  term, 
which  he  had  already  served  while  awaiting  trial,  the  Ge- 
stapo snatched  him  as  he  was  leaving  the  courtroom  and 
carted  him  off  to  a concentration  camp. 

For  the  Gestapo,  like  Hitler,  was  also  the  law.  It  origi- 
nally was  established  for  Prussia  by  Goering  on  April 
26,  1933,  to  replace  Department  IA  of  the  old  Prussian 
political  police.  He  had  at  first  intended  to  designate  it 
merely  as  the  Secret  Police  Office  (Geheimes  Polizei  Amt) 
but  the  German  initials  GPA  sounded  too  much  like  the 
Russian  GPU.  An  obscure  post  office  employee  who  had 
been  asked  to  furnish  a franking  stamp  for  the  new  bureau 
suggested  that  it  be  called  the  Geheime  Staatspolizei,  sim- 
ply the  “Secret  State  Police” — GESTAPO  for  short — and 
thus  unwittingly  created  a name  the  very  mention  of  which 
was  to  inspire  terror  first  within  Germany  and  then  with- 
out. 

In  the  beginning  the  Gestapo  was  little  more  than  a 
personal  instrument  of  terror  employed  by  Goering  to  ar- 
rest and  murder  opponents  of  the  regime.  It  was  only  in 
April  1934,  when  Goering  appointed  Himmler  deputy  chief 
of  the  Prussian  Secret  Police,  that  the  Gestapo  began  to 
expand  as  an  arm  of  the  S.S.  and,  under  the  guiding  genius 
of  its  new  chief,  the  mild-mannered  but  sadistic  former 
chicken  farmer,  and  of  Reinhard  Heydrich,  a young  man 
of  diabolical  cast 20  who  was  head  of  the  S.S.  Security 
Service,  or  S.D.  (Sicherheitsdienst) , become  such  a scourge, 
with  the  power  of  life  and  death  over  every  German. 

As  early  as  1935  the  Prussian  Supreme  Court  of  Ad- 
ministration, under  Nazi  pressure,  had  ruled  that  the  orders 
and  actions  of  the  Gestapo  were  not  subject  to  judicial 
review.  The  basic  Gestapo  law  promulgated  by  the  govern- 


374  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ment  on  February  10,  1936,  put  the  secret  police  organi- 
zation above  the  law.  The  courts  were  not  allowed  to  inter- 
fere with  its  activities  in  any  way.  As  Dr.  Werner  Best, 
one  of  Himmler’s  right-hand  men  in  the  Gestapo,  ex- 
plained, “As  long  as  the  police  carries  out  the  will  of  the 
leadership,  it  is  acting  legally.”  21 

A cloak  of  “legality”  was  given  to  the  arbitrary  arrests 
and  the  incarceration  of  victims  in  concentration  camps. 
The  term  was  Schutzhaft,  or  “protective  custody,”  and  its 
exercise  was  based  on  the  Law  of  February  28,  1933, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  suspended  the  clauses  of  the  con- 
stitution which  guaranteed  civil  liberties.  But  protective 
custody  did  not  protect  a man  from  possible  harm,  as  it 
did  in  more  civilized  countries.  It  punished  him  by  putting 
him  behind  barbed  wire. 

The  first  concentration  camps  sprang  up  like  mushrooms 
during  Hitler’s  first  year  of  power.  By  the  end  of  1933 
there  were  some  fifty  of  them,  mainly  set  up  by  the  S.A. 
to  give  its  victims  a good  beating  and  then  ransom  them 
to  their  relatives  or  friends  for  as  much  as  the  traffic 
would  bear.  It  was  largely  a crude  form  of  blackmail. 
Sometimes,  however,  the  prisoners  were  murdered,  usually 
out  of  pure  sadism  and  brutality.  At  the  Nuremberg  trial 
four  such  cases  came  to  light  that  took  place  in  the  spring 
of  1933  at  the  S.S.  concentration  camp  at  Dachau,  near 
Munich.  In  each  instance  a prisoner  was  cold-bloodedly 
murdered,  one  by  whipping,  another  by  strangulation.  Even 
the  public  prosecutor  in  Munich  protested. 

Since  after  the  Blood  Purge  of  June  1934  there  was 
no  more  resistance  to  the  Nazi  regime,  many  Germans 
thought  that  the  mass  “protective  custody”  arrests  and  the 
confinement  of  thousands  in  the  concentration  camps 
would  cease.  On  Christmas  Eve,  1933,  Hitler  had  an- 
nounced an  amnesty  for  twenty-seven  thousand  inmates 
of  the  camps,  but  Goering  and  Himmler  got  around  his 
orders  and  only  a few  were  actually  released.  Then  Frick, 
the  rubber-stamp  bureaucrat  who  was  Minister  of  the  In- 
terior, had  tried  in  April  1934  to  reduce  the  abuses  of  the 
Nazi  thugs  by  issuing  secret  decrees  placing  restrictions  on 
the  wholesale  use  of  Schutzhaft  arrests  and  reducing  com- 
mitments to  concentration  camps,  but  Himmler  had  per- 
suaded him  to  drop  the  matter.  The  S.S.  Fuehrer  saw  more 
clearly  than  the  Minister  that  the  purpose  of  the  concen- 


Triumph  and  Consolidation  375 

tration  camps  was  not  only  to  punish  enemies  of  the  re- 
gime but  by  their  very  existence  to  terrorize  the  people  and 
deter  them  from  even  contemplating  any  resistance  to 
Nazi  rule. 

Shortly  after  the  Roehm  purge,  Hitler  turned  the  con- 
centration camps  over  to  the  control  of  the  S.S.,  which 
proceeded  to  organize  them  with  the  efficiency  and  ruth- 
lessness expected  of  this  elite  corps.  Guard  duty  was  given 
exclusively  to  the  Death’s-Head  units  ( Totenkopfverbaende ) 
whose  members  were  recruited  from  the  toughest  Nazi  ele- 
ments, served  an  enlistment  of  twelve  years  and  wore  the 
familiar  skull-and-bones  insignia  on  their  black  tunics.  The 
commander  of  the  first  Death’s-Head  detachment  and  the 
first  commander  of  the  Dachau  camp,  Theodor  Eicke,  was 
put  in  charge  of  all  the  concentration  camps.  The  fly-by- 
night  ones  were  closed  down  and  larger  ones  constructed, 
the  chief  of  which  (until  the  war  came,  when  they  were 
expanded  into  occupied  territory)  were  Dachau  near  Mun- 
ich, Buchenwald  near  Weimar,  Sachsenhausen,  which  re- 
placed the  Oranienburg  camp  of  initial  fame  near  Berlin, 
Ravensbrueck  in  Mecklenburg  (for  women)  and,  after  the 
occupation  of  Austria  in  1938,  Mauthausen  near  Linz — 
names  which,  with  Auschwitz,  Belsec  and  Treblinka,  which 
were  later  established  in  Poland,  were  to  become  all  too 
familiar  to  most  of  the  world. 

In  them,  before  the  end  mercifully  came,  millions  of 
hapless  persons  were  done  to  death  and  millions  of  others 
subjected  to  debasement  and  torture  more  revolting  than 
all  but  a few  minds  could  imagine.  But  at  the  beginning — 
in  the  Thirties — the  population  of  the  Nazi  concentration 
camps  in  Germany  probably  never  numbered  more  than 
from  twenty  to  thirty  thousand  at  any  one  time,  and  many 
of  the  horrors  later  invented  and  perpetrated  by  Himmler’s 
men  were  as  yet  unknown.  The  extermination  camps,  the 
slave  labor  camps,  the  camps  where  the  inmates  were 
used  as  guinea  pigs  for  Nazi  “medical  research,”  had  to 
wait  for  the  war. 

But  the  early  camps  were  not  exactly  humane.  I have 
before  me  a copy  of  the  regulations  drawn  up  for  Dachau 
on  November  1,  1933,  by  its  first  commander,  Theodor 
Eicke,  who  when  he  became  head  of  all  the  camps  applied 
them  throughout. 


376 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Article  11.  The  following  offenders,  considered  as  agi- 
tators, will  be  hanged:  Anyone  who  . . . politicizes,  holds 
inciting  speeches  and  meetings,  forms  cliques,  loiters  around 
with  others;  who  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  propa- 
ganda of  the  opposition  with  atrocity  stories,  collects  true  or 
false  information  about  the  concentration  camp;  receives 
such  information,  buries  it,  talks  about  it  to  others,  smuggles 
it  out  of  the  camp  into  the  hands  of  foreign  visitors,  etc. 

Article  12.  The  following  offenders,  considered  as  muti- 
neers, will  be  shot  on  the  spot  or  later  hanged:  Anyone  at- 
tacking physically  a guard  or  S.S.  man,  refusing  to  obey 
or  to  work  while  on  detail  ...  or  bawling,  shouting,  inciting 
or  holding  speeches  while  marching  or  at  work. 

Milder  sentences  of  two  weeks’  solitary  confinement  and 
twenty-five  lashings  were  given  “anyone  making  depreci- 
atory remarks  in  a letter  or  other  documents  about  Na- 
tional Socialist  leaders,  the  State  and  Government  . . . [or] 
glorifying  Marxist  or  Liberal  leaders  of  the  old  democratic 
parties.” 

Allied  with  the  Gestapo  was  the  Security  Service,  the 
Sicherheitsdienst,  or  S.D.,  which  formed  another  set  of 
initials  that  struck  fear  in  the  bosoms  of  all  Germans — 
and  later  of  the  occupied  peoples.  Originally  formed  by 
Himmler  in  1932  as  the  intelligence  branch  of  the  S.S.,  and 
placed  by  him  under  the  direction  of  Reinhard  Heydrich, 
later  internationally  renowned  as  “Hangman  Heydrich,”  its 
initial  function  had  been  to  watch  over  members  of  the 
party  and  report  any  suspicious  activity.  In  1934  it  be- 
came also  the  intelligence  unit  for  the  secret  police,  and  by 
1938  a new  law  gave  it  this  function  for  the  entire  Reich. 

Under  the  expert  hand  of  Heydrich,  a former  intelli- 
gence officer  in  the  Navy  who  had  been  cashiered  by  Ad- 
miral Raeder  in  1931  at  the  age  of  twenty-six  for  refus- 
ing to  marry  the  daughter  of  a shipbuilder  whom  he  had 
compromised,  the  S.D.  soon  spread  its  net  over  the  coun- 
try, employing  some  100,000  part-time  informers  who  were 
directed  to  snoop  on  every  citizen  in  the  land  and  report 
the  slightest  remark  or  activity  which  was  deemed  inimical 
to  Nazi  rule.  No  one — if  he  were  not  foolish — said  or  did 
anything  that  might  be  interpreted  as  “anti-Nazi”  without 
first  taking  precautions  that  it  was  not  being  recorded  by 
hidden  S.D.  microphones  or  overheard  by  an  S.D.  agent. 
Your  son  or  your  father  or  your  wife  or  your  cousin  or 
your  best  friend  or  your  boss  or  your  secretary  might  be 


377 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

an  informer  for  Heydrich’s  organization;  you  never  knew, 
and  if  you  were  wise  nothing  was  ever  taken  for  granted. 

The  full-time  sleuths  of  the  S.D.  probably  never  num- 
bered more  than  three  thousand  during  the  Thirties  and 
most  of  them  were  recruited  from  the  ranks  of  the  dis- 
placed young  intellectuals — university  graduates  who  had 
been  unable  to  find  suitable  jobs  or  any  secure  place  in 
normal  society.  Thus  among  these  professional  spies  there 
was  always  the  bizarre  atmosphere  of  pedantry.  They 
had  a grotesque  interest  in  such  side  lines  as  the  study  of 
Teutonic  archeology,  the  skulls  of  the  inferior  races  and 
the  eugenics  of  a master  race.  A foreign  observer,  how- 
ever, found  difficulty  in  making  contacts  with  these  odd 
men,  though  Heydrich  himself,  an  arrogant,  icy  and  ruth- 
less character,  might  occasionally  be  seen  at  a Berlin  night 
club  surrounded  by  some  of  his  blond  young  thugs.  They 
not  only  kept  out  of  the  spotlight  because  of  the  nature 
of  their  work  but,  in  1934  and  1935  at  least,  because  a 
number  of  them  who  had  spied  on  Roehm  and  his  confed- 
erates in  the  S.A.  were  bumped  off  by  a secret  band  that 
called  itself  “Roehm’s  Avengers”  and  took  care  to  pin  that 
label  on  the  bodies. 

One  of  the  interesting,  if  subordinate,  tasks  of  the  S.D. 
was  to  ascertain  who  voted  “No”  in  Hitler’s  plebiscites. 
Among  the  numerous  Nuremberg  documents  is  a secret 
report  of  the  S.D.  in  Kochem  on  the  plebiscite  of  April 
10,  1938: 

Copy  is  attached  enumerating  the  persons  who  cast  “No” 
votes  or  invalid  votes  at  Kappel.  The  control  was  affected  in 
the  following  way:  some  members  of  the  election  committee 
marked  all  the  ballots  with  numbers.  During  the  balloting 
a voters’  list  was  made  up.  The  ballots  were  handed  out  in 
numerical  order,  therefore  it  was  possible  afterward  ...  to 
find  out  the  persons  who  cast  “No”  votes  or  invalid 
votes.  The  marking  was  done  on  the  back  of  the  ballot  with 
skimmed  milk. 

The  ballot  cast  by  the  Protestant  parson  Alfred  Wolfers  is 
also  enclosed.22 

On  June  16,  1936,  for  the  first  time  in  German  history, 
a unified  police  was  established  for  the  whole  of  the  Reich 
— previously  the  police  had  been  organized  separately  by 
each  of  the  states — and  Himmler  was  put  in  charge  as 
Chief  of  the  German  Police.  This  was  tantamount  to  put- 


378  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ting  the  police  in  the  hands  of  the  S.S.,  which  since  its 
suppression  of  the  Roehm  “revolt”  in  1934  had  been  rap- 
idly increasing  its  power.  It  had  become  not  only  the 
praetorian  guard,  not  only  the  single  armed  branch  of  the 
party,  not  only  the  elite  from  whose  ranks  the  future  lead- 
ers of  the  new  Germany  were  being  chosen,  but  it  now 
possessed  the  police  power.  The  Third  Reich,  as  is  inevi- 
table in  the  development  of  all  totalitarian  dictatorships, 
had  become  a police  state. 

GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  THIRD  REICH 

Though  the  Weimar  Republic  was  destroyed,  the  Wei- 
mar Constitution  was  never  formally  abrogated  by  Hitler. 
Indeed — and  ironically — Hitler  based  the  “legality”  of  his 
rule  on  the  despised  republican  constitution.  Thus  thou- 
sands of  decreed  laws — there  were  no  others  in  the  Third 
Reich — were  explicitly  based  on  the  emergency  presiden- 
tial decree  of  February  28,  1933,  for  the  Protection  of  the 
People  and  the  State,  which  Hindenburg,  under  Article 
48  of  the  constitution,  had  signed.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  aged  President  was  bamboozled  into  signing  the 
decree  the  day  after  the  Reichstag  fire  when  Hitler  assured 
him  that  there  was  grave  danger  of  a Communist  revolu- 
tion. The  decree,  which  suspended  all  civil  rights,  remained 
in  force  throughout  the  time  of  the  Third  Reich,  enabling 
the  Fuehrer  to  rule  by  a sort  of  continual  martial  law. 

The  Enabling  Act  too,  which  the  Reichstag  had  voted 
on  March  24,  1933,  and  by  which  it  handed  over  its  legis- 
lative functions  to  the  Nazi  government,  was  the  second 
pillar  in  the  “constitutionality”  of  Hitler’s  rule.  Each  four 
years  thereafter  it  was  dutifully  prolonged  for  another 
four-year  period  by  a rubber-stamp  Reichstag,  for  it  never 
occurred  to  the  dictator  to  abolish  this  once  democratic 
institution  but  only  to  make  it  nondemocratic.  It  met 
only  a dozen  times  up  to  the  war,  “enacted”  only  four 
laws,*  held  no  debates  or  votes  and  never  heard  any 
speeches  except  those  made  by  Hitler. 

After  the  first  few  months  of  1933  serious  discussions 
ceased  in  the  cabinet,  its  meetings  became  more  and  more 
infrequent  after  the  death  of  Hindenburg  in  August  1934, 


* The  Reconstruction  Law  of  January  30,  1934,  and  the  three  anti-Semitic 
Nuremberg  Laws  of  September  15,  1935. 


379 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

and  after  February  1938  the  cabinet  was  never  convened. 
However,  individual  cabinet  members  held  the  considerable 
power  of  being  authorized  to  promulgate  decrees  which, 
with  the  Fuehrer’s  approval,  automatically  became  laws. 
The  Secret  Cabinet  Council  (Geheimer  Kabinettsrat),  set 
up  with  great  fanfare  in  1938,  perhaps  to  impress  Prime 
Minister  Chamberlain,  existed  only  on  paper.  It  never  met 
once.  The  Reich  Defense  Council  (Reichsverteidigungsrat), 
established  early  in  the  regime  as  a war-planning  agency 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Hitler,  met  formally  only  twice, 
though  some  of  its  working  committees  were  exceedingly 
active. 

Many  cabinet  functions  were  delegated  to  special  agen- 
cies such  as  the  Office  of  the  Deputy  of  the  Fuehrer  (Hess 
and  later  Martin  Bormann),  of  the  Plenipotentiaries  for 
War  Economy  (Schacht)  and  Administration  (Frick),  and 
of  the  Delegate  for  the  Four-Year  Plan  (Goering).  In  ad- 
dition there  were  what  was  known  as  the  “supreme  govern- 
ment agencies”  and  “national  administrative  agencies,” 
many  of  them  holdovers  from  the  Republic.  In  all,  there 
were  some  42  executive  agencies  of  the  national  govern- 
ment under  the  direct  jurisdiction  of  the  Fuehrer. 

The  diets  and  governments  of  the  separate  states  of  Ger- 
many were,  as  we  have  seen,  abolished  in  the  first  year 
of  the  Nazi  regime  when  the  country  was  unified,  and  gov- 
ernors for  the  states,  which  were  reduced  to  provinces, 
were  appointed  by  Hitler.  Local  self-government,  the  only 
field  in  which  the  Germans  had  seemed  to  be  making 
genuine  progress  toward  democracy,  was  also  wiped  out. 
A series  of  laws  decreed  between  1933  and  1935  deprived 
the  municipalities  of  their  local  autonomy  and  brought 
them  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Reich  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  who  appointed  their  mayors — if  they  had  a popu- 
lation of  over  100,000 — reorganized  them  on  the 
leadership  principle.  In  towns  under  100,000,  the  mayors 
were  named  by  the  provincial  governors.  For  Berlin,  Ham- 
burg and  Vienna  (after  1938,  when  Austria  was  occu- 
pied) Hitler  reserved  the  right  to  appoint  the  burgomas- 
ters. 

The  offices  through  which  Hitler  exercised  his  dictatorial 
powers  consisted  of  four  chancelleries:  those  of  the  Presi- 
dent (though  the  title  had  ceased  to  exist  after  1934), 
the  Chancellor  (the  title  was  abandoned  in  1939)  and  the 


380  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

party,  and  a fourth  known  as  the  Chancellery  of  the 
Fuehrer  which  looked  after  his  personal  affairs  and  carried 
out  special  tasks. 

In  truth,  Hitler  was  bored  by  the  details  of  day-to-day 
governing  and  after  he  had  consolidated  his  position  fol- 
lowing the  death  of  Hindenburg  he  left  them  largely  to 
his  aides.  Old  party  comrades  such  as  Goering,  Goebbels, 
Himmler,  Ley  and  Schirach  were  given  free  rein  to  carve 
out  their  own  empires  of  power — and  usually  profit. 
Schacht  was  given  a free  hand  at  first  to  raise  the  money 
for  expanding  government  expenditures  by  whatever 
sleight  of  hand  he  could  think  up.  Whenever  these  men 
clashed  over  the  division  of  power  or  spoils,  Hitler  inter- 
vened. He  did  not  mind  these  quarrels.  Indeed,  he  often 
encouraged  them,  because  they  added  status  to  his  position 
as  supreme  arbiter  and  prevented  any  closing  of  the  ranks 
against  him.  Thus  he  seemed  to  take  delight  at  the  spec- 
tacle of  three  men  competing  with  each  other  in  foreign 
affairs:  Neurath,  the  Foreign  Minister,  Rosenberg,  the  head 
of  the  party’s  Foreign  Affairs  Department,  and  Ribben- 
trop,  who  had  his  own  “Ribbentrop  Bureau”  which  dab- 
bled in  foreign  policy.  All  three  men  were  at  loggerheads 
with  each  other  and  Hitler  kept  them  so  by  maintaining 
their  rival  offices  until  in  the  end  he  chose  the  dull-witted 
Ribbentrop  to  become  his  Foreign  Minister  and  carry  out 
his  orders  in  foreign  affairs. 

Such  was  the  government  of  the  Third  Reich,  adminis- 
tered from  top  to  bottom  on  the  so-called  leadership  prin- 
ciple by  a vast  and  sprawling  bureaucracy,  having  little  of 
the  efficiency  usually  credited  to  the  Germans,  poisoned 
by  graft,  beset  by  constant  confusion  and  cutthroat  rival- 
ries augmented  by  the  muddling  interference  of  party 
potentates  and  often  rendered  impotent  by  the  terror  of 
the  S.S. -Gestapo. 

At  the  top  of  the  swarming  heap  stood  the  onetime 
Austrian  vagabond,  now  become,  with  the  exception  of 
Stalin,  the  most  powerful  dictator  on  earth.  As  Dr.  Hans 
Frank  reminded  a convention  of  lawyers  in  the  spring  of 
1936,  “There  is  in  Germany  today  only  one  authority,  and 
that  is  the  authority  of  the  Fuehrer.”  23 

With  that  authority  Hitler  had  quickly  destroyed  those 
who  opposed  him,  unified  and  Nazified  the  State,  regi- 
mented the  country’s  institutions  and  culture,  suppressed 


381 


Triumph  and  Consolidation 

individual  freedom,  abolished  unemployment  and  set  the 
wheels  of  industry  and  commerce  humming — no  small 
achievement  after  only  three  or  four  years  in  office.  Now 
he  turned — in  fact,  he  already  had  turned — to  the  two 
chief  passions  of  his  life:  the  shaping  of  Germany’s  foreign 
policy  toward  war  and  conquest  and  the  creation  of  a 
mighty  military  machine  which  would  enable  him  to 
achieve  his  goal. 

It  is  time  now  to  turn  to  the  story,  more  fully  docu- 
mented than  that  of  any  other  in  modem  history,  of  how 
this  extraordinary  man,  at  the  head,  of  so  great  and  power- 
ful a nation,  set  out  to  attain  his  ends. 


: • . . * •.  ■ * ' 


:it'r|  ti»K  i.,  > 'KM  ■■  ' if?'  :i  :»•••'.• 

■ ■ ' 1 • ' ■ ... 

. • 

*>>!;'  o)~  • ..  ■ . r<r.  hi  ilt 

ft:-.'  ' ■ s.i  ’ " 

•>  K,  ill1  I.  03  " 

j rr-id  ' < ’ d:v  ■ 


Booh  Three 


* * * 


THE  ROAD  TO  WAR 


11  ..W  ' »T  V.  fp® 


» 


THE  FIRST  STEPS:  1934-37 


to  talk  peace,  to  prepare  secretly  for  war  and  to  proceed 
with  enough  caution  in  foreign  policy  and  clandestine  re- 
armament to  avoid  any  preventive  military  action  against 
Germany  by  the  Versailles  powers — such  were  Hitler’s 
tactics  during  the  first  two  years. 

He  stumbled  badly  with  the  Nazi  murder  of  the  Aus- 
trian Chancellor  Dollfuss  in  Vienna  on  July  25,  1934.  At 
noon  on  that  day  154  members  of  the  S.S.  Standarte 
89,  dressed  in  Austrian  Army  uniforms,  broke  into  the 
Federal  Chancellery  and  shot  Dollfuss  in  the  throat  at  a 
range  of  two  feet.  A few  blocks  away  other  Nazis  seized 
the  radio  station  and  broadcast  the  news  that  Dollfuss  had 
resigned.  Hitler  received  the  tidings  while  listening  to  a 
performance  of  Das  Rheingold  at  the  annual  Wagner  Fes- 
tival at  Bayreuth.  They  greatly  excited  him.  Friedelind 
Wagner,  granddaughter  of  the  great  composer,  who  sat  in 
the  family  box  nearby,  was  a witness.  Two  adjutants, 
Schaub  and  Brueckner,  she  later  told,  kept  receiving  the 
news  from  Vienna  on  a telephone  in  the  anteroom  of  her 
box  and  then  whispering  it  to  Hitler. 

After  the  performance  the  Fuehrer  was  most  excited.  This 
excitement  mounted  as  he  told  us  the  horrible  news  . . . Al- 
though he  could  scarcely  wipe  the  delight  from  his  face 
Hitler  carefully  ordered  dinner  in  the  restaurant  as  usual. 

“I  must  go  across  for  an  hour  and  show  myself,”  he  said, 
“or  people  will  think  I had  something  to  do  with  this.” 1 

They  would  not  have  been  far  from  right.  In  the  first 
paragraph  of  Mein  Kampf,  it  will  be  remembered,  Hitler 
had  written  that  the  reunion  of  Austria  and  Germany  was 
a “task  to  be  furthered  with  every  means  our  lives  long.” 
Soon  after  becoming  Chancellor  he  had  appointed  a Reich- 
stag deputy,  Theodor  Habicht,  as  inspector  of  the  Austrian 

385 


386  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Nazi  Party,  and  a little  later  he  had  set  up  Alfred 
Frauenfeld,  the  self-exiled  Austrian  party  leader,  in  Mun- 
ich, whence  he  broadcast  nightly,  inciting  his  comrades  in 
Vienna  to  murder  Dollfuss.  For  months  prior  to  July  1934 
the  Austrian  Nazis,  with  weapons  and  dynamite  furnished 
by  Germany,  had  instituted  a reign  of  terror,  blowing  up 
railways,  power  stations  and  government  buildings  and 
murdering  supporters  of  the  Dollfuss  clerical-fascist  re- 
gime. Finally,  Hitler  had  approved  the  formation  of  an 
Austrian  Legion,  several  thousand  strong,  which  camped 
along  the  Austrian  border  in  Bavaria,  ready  to  cross  over 
and  occupy  the  country  at  an  opportune  moment. 

Dollfuss  died  of  his  wounds  at  about  6 p.m.,  but  the 
Nazi  putsch,  due  largely  to  the  bungling  of  the  conspira- 
tors who  had  seized  the  Chancellery,  failed.  Government 
forces,  led  by  Dr.  Kurt  von  Schuschnigg,  quickly  regained 
control,  and  the  rebels,  though  promised  safe-conduct  to 
Germany  through  the  intervention  of  the  German  minister, 
were  arrested  and  thirteen  of  them  later  hanged.  In  the 
meantime  Mussolini,  to  whom  Hitler  only  a month  before 
at  their  meeting  in  Venice  had  promised  to  leave  Austria 
alone,  caused  uneasiness  in  Berlin  by  hastily  mobilizing 
four  divisions  on  the  Brenner  Pass. 

Hitler  quickly  backed  down.  The  news  story  prepared 
for  the  press  by  the  official  German  news  agency,  D.N.B., 
rejoicing  at  the  fall  of  Dollfuss  and  proclaiming  the  Greater 
Germany  that  must  inevitably  follow,  was  hastily  withdrawn 
at  midnight  and  a new  version  substituted  expressing  re- 
gret at  the  “cruel  murder”  and  declaring  that  it  was  a 
purely  Austrian  affair.  Habicht  was  removed,  the  German 
minister  in  Vienna  recalled  and  dismissed  and  Papen,  who 
had  narrowly  escaped  Dollfuss’  fate  just  a month  before 
during  the  Roehm  purge,  was  packed  off  to  Vienna  post- 
haste to  restore,  as  Hitler  directed  him,  “normal  and 
friendly  relations.” 

Hitler’s  first  joyous  excitement  had  given  way  to  fear. 
“We  are  faced  with  a new  Sarajevo!”  Papen  says  he  shouted 
at  him  when  the  two  conferred  about  how  to  overcome 
the  crisis.2  But  the  Fuehrer  had  learned  a lesson.  The 
Nazi  putsch  in  Vienna,  like  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch  in  Mun- 
ich in  1923,  had  been  premature.  Germany  was  not  yet 
militarily  strong  enough  to  back  up  such  a venture  by 
force.  It  was  too  isolated  diplomatically.  Even  Fascist  Italy 


The  Road  to  War  387 

had  joined  Britain  and  France  in  insisting  on  Austria’s 
continued  independence.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  Union  was 
showing  interest  for  the  first  time  in  joining  the  West  in 
an  Eastern  Locarno  which  would  discourage  any  moves 
of  Germany  in  the  East.  In  the  autumn  it  joined  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  prospects  for  dividing  the  Great 
Powers  seemed  dimmer  than  ever  throughout  the  crucial 
year  of  1934.  All  that  Hitler  could  do  was  to  preach 
peace,  get  along  with  his  secret  rearmament  and  wait  and 
watch  for  opportunities. 

Besides  the  Reichstag,  Hitler  had  another  means  of  com- 
municating his  peace  propaganda  to  the  outside  world:  the 
foreign  press,  whose  correspondents,  editors  and  publish- 
ers were  constantly  seeking  interviews  with  him.  There  was 
Ward  Price,  the  monocled  Englishman,  and  his  newspaper, 
the  London  Daily  Mail,  who  were  always  ready  at  the 
drop  of  a hint  to  accommodate  the  German  dictator.  So  in 
August  1934,  in  another  one  of  the  series  of  interviews 
which  would  continue  up  to  the  eve  of  the  war,  Hitler  told 
Price — and  his  readers — that  “war  will  not  come  again,” 
that  Germany  had  “a  more  profound  impression  than  any 
other  of  the  evil  that  war  causes,”  that  “Germany’s  prob- 
lems cannot  be  settled  by  war.”  3 In  the  fall  he  repeated 
these  glowing  sentiments  to  Jean  Goy,  a French  war  veter- 
ans’ leader  and  a member  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  who 
passed  them  on  in  an  article  in  the  Paris  daily  Le  Matin* 

THE  BREACHING  OF  VERSAILLES 

In  the  meantime  Hitler  pursued  with  unflagging 
energy  his  program  of  building  up  the  armed  services  and 
procuring  arms  for  them.  The  Army  was  ordered  to  treble 
its  numerical  strength — from  100,000  to  300,000  by  Oc- 
tober 1,  1934 — and  in  April  of  that  year  General  Ludwig 
Beck,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  was  given  to  understand 
that  by  April  1 of  the  following  year  the  Fuehrer  would 
openly  decree  conscription  and  publicly  repudiate  the  mili- 
tary restrictions  of  the  Versailles  Treaty.5  Until  then  the 
utmost  secrecy  must  be  observed.  Goebbels  was  admon- 
ished never  to  allow  the  words  “General  Staff”  to  appear 
in  the  press,  since  Versailles  forbade  the  very  existence  of 
this  organization.  The  annual  official  rank  list  of  the  Ger- 
man Army  ceased  to  be  published  after  1932  so  that  its 


3S8 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

swollen  lists  of  officers  would  not  give  the  game  away  to 
foreign  intelligence.  General  Keitel,  chairman  of  the  Work- 
ing Committee  of  the  Reich  Defense  Council,  admonished 
his  aides  as  early  as  May  22,  1933,  “No  document  must 
be  lost,  since  otherwise  enemy  propaganda  will  make  use 
of  it.  Matters  communicated  orally  cannot  be  proven;  they 
can  be  denied.”  6 

The  Navy  too  was  warned  to  keep  its  mouth  shut.  In 
June  1934  Raeder  had  a long  conversation  with  Hitler 
and  noted  down: 

Fuehrer’s  instructions:  No  mention  must  be  made  of  a dis- 
placement of  25-26,000  tons,  but  only  of  improved  10,000- 
ton  ships  . . . The  Fuehrer  demands  complete  secrecy  on  the 
construction  of  the  U-boats.7 

For  the  Navy  had  commenced  the  construction  of  two 
battle  cruisers  of  26,000  tons  (16,000  tons  above  the  Ver- 
sailles limit)  which  would  eventually  be  known  as  the 
Scharnhorst  and  the  Gneisenau.  Submarines,  the  building 
of  which  Versailles  had  prohibited,  had  been  secretly  con- 
structed in  Finland,  Holland  and  Spain  during  the  German 
Republic,  and  recently  Raeder  had  stored  the  frames  and 
parts  of  a dozen  of  them  at  Kiel.  When  he  saw  Hitler  in 
November  1934  he  asked  permission  to  assemble  six  of 
them  by  “the  time  of  the  critical  situation  in  the  first  quar- 
ter of  1935”  (obviously  he  too  knew  what  Hitler  planned 
to  do  at  that  time)  but  the  Fuehrer  merely  replied  that  “he 
would  tell  me  when  the  situation  demanded  that  the  as- 
sembly should  commence.”  8 

At  this  meeting  Raeder  also  pointed  out  that  the  new 
shipbuilding  program  (not  to  mention  the  tripling  of  naval 
personnel)  would  take  more  money  than  he  had  available, 
but  Hitler  told  him  not  to  worry.  “In  case  of  need,  he 
will  get  Dr.  Ley  to  put  120-150  million  from  the  Labor 
Front  at  the  disposal  of  the  Navy,  as  the  money  would 
still  benefit  the  workers.”  8 Thus  the  dues  of  the  German 
workers  were  to  finance  the  naval  program. 

Goering  too  was  busy  those  first  two  years,  establishing 
the  Air  Force.  As  Minister  of  Aviation — supposedly  civil 
aviation — he  put  the  manufacturers  to  work  designing  war- 
planes. Training  of  military  pilots  began  immediately 
under  the  convenient  camouflage  of  the  League  for  Air 
Sports. 


The  Road  to  War 


389 


A visitor  to  the  Ruhr  and  Rhineland  industrial  areas 
in  those  days  might  have  been  struck  by  the  intense  ac- 
tivity of  the  armament  works,  especially  those  of  Krupp, 
chief  German  gunmakers  for  three  quarters  of  a century, 
and  I.  G.  Farben,  the  great  chemical  trust.  Although  Krupp 
had  been  forbidden  by  the  Allies  to  continue  in  the  arma- 
ment business  after  1919,  the  company  had  really  not  been 
idle.  As  Krupp  would  boast  in  1942,  when  the  German 
armies  occupied  most  of  Europe,  “the  basic  principle  of 
armament  and  turret  design  for  tanks  had  already  been 
worked  out  in  1926  ...  Of  the  guns  being  used  in  1939- 
41,  the  most  important  ones  were  already  fully  com- 
plete in  1933.”  Farben  scientists  had  saved  Germany  from 
early  disaster  in  the  First  World  War  by  the  invention  of 
a process  to  make  synthetic  nitrates  from  air  after  the 
country’s  normal  supply  of  nitrates  from  Chile  was  cut  off 
by  the  British  blockade.  Now  under  Hitler  the  trust  set 
out  to  make  Germany  self-sufficient  in  two  materials  with- 
out which  modern  war  could  not  be  fought:  gasoline  and 
rubber,  both  of  which  had  had  to  be  imported.  The  prob- 
lem of  making  synthetic  gasoline  from  coal  had  actually 
been  solved  by  the  company’s  scientists  in  the  mid-Twenties. 
After  1933,  the  Nazi  government  gave  I.  G.  Farben  the  go- 
ahead  with  orders  ro  raise  its  synthetic  oil  production  to 
300,000  tons  a year  by  1937.  By  that  time  the  company 
had  also  discovered  how  to  make  synthetic  rubber  from 
coal  and  other  products  of  which  Germany  had  a suffi- 
ciency, and  the  first  of  four  plants  was  set  up  at  Schkopau 
for  large-scale  production  of  buna,  as  the  artificial  rubber 
became  known.  By  the  beginning  of  1934,  plans  were  ap- 
proved by  the  Working  Committee  of  the  Reich  Defense 
Council  for  the  mobilization  of  some  240,000  plants  for 
war  orders.  By  the  end  of  that  year  rearmament,  in  all  its 
phases,  had  become  so  massive  it  was  obvious  that  it  could 
no  longer  be  concealed  from  the  suspicious  and  uneasy 
powers  of  Versailles. 

These  powers,  led  by  Great  Britain,  had  been  flirting 
with  the  idea  of  recognizing  a fait  accompli,  that  is,  Ger- 
man rearmament,  which  was  not  nearly  so  secret  as  Hitler 
supposed.  They  would  concede  Hitler  complete  arms  equal- 
ity in  return  for  Germany’s  joining  in  a general  European 
settlement  which  would  include  an  Eastern  Locarno  and 
thus  provide  the  Eastern  countries,  especially  Russia,  Po- 


390  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

land  and  Czechoslovakia,  with  the  same  security  which  the 
Western  nations  enjoyed  under  the  Locarno  Treaty — and, 
of  course,  furnish  Germany  with  the  same  guarantees  of 
security.  In  May  of  1934  Sir  John  Simon,  the  British 
Foreign  Secretary,  who  was  to  be  a good  forerunner  of 
Neville  Chamberlain  in  his  inability  to  comprehend  the 
mind  of  Adolf  Hitler,  actually  proposed  equality  of  arma- 
ments to  Germany.  The  French  sharply  rejected  such  an 
idea. 

But  the  proposals  for  a general  settlement,  including 
equality  of  armaments  and  an  Eastern  Locarno,  were  re- 
newed jointly  by  the  British  and  French  governments  early 
in  February  1935.  The  month  before,  on  January  13,  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Saar  had  voted  overwhelmingly — 
477,000  to  48,000 — to  return  their  little  coal-rich  terri- 
tory to  the  Reich  and  Hitler  had  taken  the  occasion  to 
publicly  proclaim  that  Germany  had  no  further  territorial 
claims  on  France,  which  meant  the  abandoning  of  German 
claims  on  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  In  the  atmosphere  of  op- 
timism and  good  will  which  the  peaceful  return  of  the 
Saar  and  Hitler’s  remarks  engendered,  the  Anglo-French 
proposals  were  formally  presented  to  Hitler  at  the  begin- 
ing  of  February  1935. 

Hitler’s  reply  of  February  14  was  somewhat  vague — 
and,  from  his  viewpoint,  understandably  so.  He  welcomed 
a plan  which  would  leave  Germany  free  to  rearm  in  the 
open.  But  he  was  evasive  on  Germany’s  willingness  to 
sign  an  Eastern  Locarno.  That  would  be  tying  his  hands  in 
the  main  area  where,  as  he  had  always  preached, 
Germany’s  Lebensraum  lay.  Might  not  Britain  be  de- 
tached in  this  matter  from  France,  which  with  its 
mutual-assistance  pacts  with  Poland,  Czechoslovakia  and 
Rumania,  was  more  interested  in  Eastern  security?  Hitler 
must  have  thought  so,  for  in  his  cautious  reply  he  sug- 
gested that  bilateral  discussions  precede  general  talks  and 
invited  the  British  to  come  to  Berlin  for  preliminary  dis- 
cussions. Sir  John  Simon  readily  agreed,  and  a meeting 
was  arranged  for  March  6 in  Berlin.  Two  days  before  that 
date  the  publication  of  a British  White  Paper  caused  a 
great  deal  of  simulated  anger  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  Ac- 
tually the  White  Paper  struck  most  foreign  observers  in 
Berlin  as  a sober  observation  on  Germany’s  clandestine  re- 
armament, the  acceleration  of  which  had  moved  Brit- 


The  Road  to  War  391 

ain  to  a modest  increase  of  her  own.  But  Hitler  was  report- 
ed furious  with  it.  Neurath  informed  Simon  on  the 
very  eve  of  his  departure  for  Berlin  that  the  Fuehrer  had 
a “cold”  and  the  talks  would  have  to  be  postponed. 

Whether  he  had  a cold  or  not,  Hitler  certainly  had  a 
brain  storm.  It  would  be  embarrassing  to  have  Simon  and 
Eden  around  if  he  transformed  it  into  a bold  act.  He 
thought  he  had  found  a pretext  for  dealing  the  Versailles 
Diktat  a mortal  blow.  The  French  government  had  just 
introduced  a bill  extending  military  service  from  eighteen 
months  to  two  years  because  of  the  shortage  of  youth  bom 
during  the  First  World  War.  On  March  10,  Hitler  sent 
up  a trial  balloon  to  test  the  mettle  of  the  Allies.  The 
accommodating  Ward  Price  was  called  in  and  given  an  in- 
terview with  Goering,  who  told  him  officially  what  all  the 
world  knew,  that  Germany  had  a military  Air  Force.  Hitler 
confidently  awaited  the  reaction  in  London  to  this  uni- 
lateral abrogation  of  Versailles.  It  was  just  what  he  ex- 
pected. Sir  John  Simon  told  the  Commons  that  he  still 
counted  on  going  to  Berlin. 

A SATURDAY  SURPRISE 

On  Saturday,  March  16 — most  of  Hitler’s  surprises  were 
reserved  for  Saturdays — the  Chancellor  decreed  a law  es- 
tablishing universal  military  service  and  providing  for  a 
peacetime  army  of  twelve  corps  and  thirty-six  divisions — 
roughly  half  a million  men.  That  was  the  end  of  the  mili- 
tary restrictions  of  Versailles — unless  France  and  Britain 
took  action.  As  Hitler  had  expected,  they  protested  but 
they  did  not  act.  Indeed,  the  British  government  hastened 
to  ask  whether  Hitler  would  still  receive  its  Foreign  Sec- 
retary— a query  which  the  dictator  graciously  answered 
in  the  affirmative. 

Sunday,  March  17,  was  a day  of  rejoicing  and  cele- 
bration in  Germany.  The  shackles  of  Versailles,  symbol 
of  Germany’s  defeat  and  humiliation,  had  been  torn  off. 
No  matter  how  much  a German  might  dislike  Hitler  and 
his  gangster  rule,  he  had  to  admit  that  the  Fuehrer  had 
accomplished  what  no  republican  government  had  ever 
dared  attempt.  To  most  Germans  the  nation’s  honor  had 
been  restored.  That  Sunday  was  also  Heroes’  Memorial 


392 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Day  (Heldengedenktag) . I went  to  the  ceremony  at  noon 
at  the  State  Opera  House  and  there  witnessed  a scene  which 
Germany  had  not  seen  since  1914.  The  entire  lower  floor 
was  a sea  of  military  uniforms,  the  faded  gray  uniforms 
and  spiked  helmets  of  the  old  Imperial  Army  mingling  with 
the  attire  of  the  new  Army,  including  the  sky-blue  uni- 
forms of  the  Luftwaffe,  which  few  had  seen  before.  At 
Hitler’s  side  was  Field  Marshal  von  Mackensen,  the  last 
surviving  field  marshal  of  the  Kaiser’s  Army,  colorfully 
attired  in  the  uniform  of  the  Death’s-Head  Hussars.  Strong 
lights  played  on  the  stage,  where  young  officers  stood  like 
marble  statues  holding  upright  the  nation’s  war  flags.  Be- 
hind them  on  an  enormous  curtain  hung  an  immense  silver- 
and-black  Iron  Cross.  Ostensibly  this  was  a ceremony  to 
honor  Germany’s  war  dead.  It  turned  out  to  be  a jubilant 
celebration  of  the  death  of  Versailles  and  the  rebirth  of 
the  conscript  German  Army. 

The  generals,  one  could  see  by  their  faces,  were  im- 
mensely pleased.  Like  everyone  else  they  had  been  taken 
by  surprise,  for  Hitler,  who  had  spent  the  previous  days 
at  his  mountain  retreat  at  Berchtesgaden,  had  not  both- 
ered to  apprise  them  of  his  thoughts.  According  to  Gen- 
eral von  Manstein’s  later  testimony  at  Nuremberg,  he  and 
his  commanding  officer,  of  Wehrkreis  III  (the  Third  Mili- 
tary District)  in  Berlin,  General  von  Witzleben,  first  heard 
of  Hitler’s  decision  over  the  radio  on  March  16.  The  Gen- 
eral Staff  would  have  preferred  a smaller  army  to  begin 
with. 

The  General  Staff,  had  it  been  asked  [Manstein  testified], 
would  have  proposed  twenty-one  divisions  . . . The  figure  of 
thirty-six  divisions  was  due  to  a spontaneous  decision  of 
Hitler.10 

There  now  took  place  a series  of  empty  gestures  of  warn- 
ing to  Hitler  by  the  other  powers.  The  British,  the  French 
and  the  Italians  met  at  Stresa  on  April  1 1 , condemned 
Germany’s  action  and  reiterated  their  support  of  Austria’s 
independence  and  the  Locarno  Treaty.  The  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations  at  Geneva  also  expressed  its  displeasure 
at  Hitler’s  precipitate  action  and  duly  appointed  a com- 
mittee to  suggest  steps  which  might  impede  him  the  next 
time.  France,  recognizing  that  Germany  would  never  join 
an  Eastern  Locarno,  hastily  signed  a pact  of  mutual  as- 


The  Road  to  War 


393 


sistance  with  Russia,  and  Moscow  made  a similar  treaty 
with  Czechoslovakia. 

In  the  headlines  this  closing  of  ranks  against  Germany 
sounded  somewhat  ominous  and  even  impressed  a number 
of  men  in  the  German  Foreign  Office  and  in  the  Army, 
but  apparently  not  Hitler.  After  all,  he  had  gotten  away 
with  his  gamble.  Still,  it  would  not  do  to  rest  on  his 
laurels.  It  was  time,  he  decided,  to  pull  out  the  stops 
again  on  his  love  of  peace  and  to  see  whether  the  new 
unity  of  the  powers  arrayed  against  him  might  not  be 
undermined  and  breached  after  all. 

On  the  evening  of  May  21  * he  delivered  another  “peace” 
speech  to  the  Reichstag — perhaps  the  most  eloquent  and 
certainly  one  of  the  cleverest  and  most  misleading  of  his 
Reichstag  orations  this  writer,  who  sat  through  most  of 
them,  ever  heard  him  make.  Hitler  was  in  a relaxed  mood 
and  exuded  a spirit  not  only  of  confidence  but — to  the 
surprise  of  his  listeners — of  tolerance  and  conciliation. 
There  was  no  resentment  or  defiance  toward  the  nations 
which  had  condemned  his  scrapping  of  the  military  clauses 
of  Versailles.  Instead  there  were  assurances  that  all  he 
wanted  was  peace  and  understanding  based  on  justice  for 
all.  He  rejected  the  very  idea  of  war;  it  was  senseless,  it 
was  useless,  as  well  as  a horror. 

The  blood  shed  on  the  European  continent  in  the  course 
of  the  last  three  hundred  years  bears  no  proportion  to  the 
national  result  of  the  events.  In  the  end  France  has  re- 
mained France,  Germany  Germany,  Poland  Poland,  and 
Italy  Italy.  What  dynastic  egotism,  political  passion  and 
patriotic  blindness  have  attained  in  the  way  of  apparently 
far-reaching  political  changes  by  shedding  rivers  of  blood 
has,  as  regards  national  feeling,  done  no  more  than  touched 
the  skin  of  the  nations.  It  has  not  substantially  altered 
their  fundamental  characters.  If  these  states  had  applied 

* Earlier  that  day  Hitler  had  promulgated  the  secret  Reich  Defense 
Law,  putting  Dr.  Schacht,  as  we  have  seen,  in  charge  of  war  economy 
and  thoroughly  reorganizing  the  armed  forces.  The  Reichswehr  of 
Weimar  days  became  the  Wehrmacht.  Hitler,  as  Fuehrer  and  Chancellor, 
was  Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces  (Wehrmacht)  and  Blom- 
berg,  the  Minister  of  Defense,  was  designated  as  Minister  of  War  with 
the  additional  title  of  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces — the 
only  general  in  Germany  who  ever  held  that  rank.  Each  of  the  three 
services  had  its  own  commander  in  chief  and  its  own  general  staff. 
The  camouflage  name  of  “Truppenamt”  in  the  Army  was  dropped  for 
the  real  thing  and  its  head,  General  Beck,  assumed  the  title  of  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff.  But  this  title  did  not  denote  what  it  did  in  the 
Kaiser  s _ time,,  when  the  General  Staff  Chief  was  actually  the  Com* 
mander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Army  under  the  warlord. 


394 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

merely  a fraction  of  their  sacrifices  to  wiser  purposes  the 
success  would  certainly  have  been  greater  and  more  perma- 
nent. 

Germany,  Hitler,  proclaimed,  had  not  the  slightest 
thought  of  conquering  other  peoples. 

Our  racial  theory  regards  every  war  for  the  subjection 
and  domination  of  an  alien  people  as  a proceeding  which 
sooner  or  later  changes  and  weakens  the  victor  internally, 
and  eventually  brings  about  his  defeat  ...  As  there  is  no 
longer  any  unoccupied  space  in  Europe,  every  victory  . . . 
can  at  best  result  in  a quantitative  increase  in  the  number 
of  the  inhabitants  of  a country.  But  if  the  nations  attach  so 
much  importance  to  that  they  can  achieve  it  without  tears 
in  a simpler  and  more  natural  way — [by]  a sound  social 
policy,  by  increasing  the  readiness  of  a nation  to  have 
children. 

No!  National  Socialist  Germany  wants  peace  because  of 
its  fundamental  convictions.  And  it  wants  peace  also  owing 
to  the  realization  of  the  simple  primitive  fact  that  no  war 
would  be  likely  essentially  to  alter  the  distress  in  Europe 
. . . The  principal  effect  of  every  war  is  to  destroy  the 
flower  of  the  nation  . . . 

Germany  needs  peace  and  desires  peace! 

He  kept  hammering  away  at  the  point.  At  the  end  he 
made  thirteen  specific  proposals  for  maintaining  the  peace 
which  seemed  so  admirable  that  they  created  a deep  and 
favorable  impression  not  only  in  Germany  but  in  all  of 
Europe.  He  prefaced  them  with  a reminder: 

Germany  has  solemnly  recognized  and  guaranteed  France 
her  frontiers  as  determined  after  the  Saar  plebiscite  . . . We 
thereby  finally  renounced  all  claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  a 
land  for  which  we  have  fought  two  great  wars  . . . With- 
out taking  the  past  into  account  Germany  has  concluded  a 
non-aggression  pact  with  Poland  . . . We  shall  adhere  to  it 
unconditionally.  . . . We  recognize  Poland  as  the  home  of 
a great  and  nationally  conscious  people. 

As  for  Austria: 

Germany  neither  intends  nor  -wishes  to  interfere  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Austria,  to  annex  Austria,  or  to  conclude 
an  Anschluss. 

Hitler’s  thirteen  points  were  quite  comprehensive.  Ger- 
many could  not  return  to  Geneva  until  the  League  divested 
itself  of  the  Versailles  Treaty.  When  that  was  done  and 


The  Road  to  War 


395 


full  equality  of  all  nations  recognized,  he  implied,  Ger- 
many would  rejoin  the  League.  Germany,  however,  would 
“unconditionally  respect”  the  nonmilitary  clauses  of  the 
Versailles  Treaty,  “including  the  territorial  provisions.  In 
particular  it  will  uphold  and  fulfill  all  obigations  arising 
out  of  the  Locarno  Treaty.”  Hitler  also  pledged  Germany 
to  abide  by  the  demilitarization  of  the  Rhineland.  Though 
willing  “at  any  time”  to  participate  in  a system  of  collec- 
tive security,  Germany  preferred  bilateral  agreements  and 
was  ready  to  conclude  nonaggression  pacts  with  its  neigh- 
bor states.  It  was  also  prepared  to  agree  to  British  and 
French  proposals  for  supplementing  the  Locarno  Treaty 
with  an  air  accord. 

As  for  disarmament,  Hitler  was  ready  to  go  the  limit: 

The  German  government  is  ready  to  agree  to  any  limitation 
which  leads  to  abolition  of  the  heaviest  arms,  especially 
suited  for  aggression,  such  [as]  the  heaviest  artillery  and 
the  heaviest  tanks  . . . Germany  declares  herself  ready  to 
agree  to  any  limitation  whatsoever  of  the  caliber  of  ar- 
tillery, battleships,  cruisers  and  torpedo  boats.  In  like  man- 
ner, the  German  government  is  ready  to  agree  to  the  limi- 
tation of  tonnage  for  submarines,  or  to  their  complete  aboli- 
tion . . . 

In  this  connection  Hitler  held  out  a special  bait  for 
Great  Britain.  He  was  willing  to  limit  the  new  German 
Navy  to  35  per  cent  of  the  British  naval  forces;  that,  he 
added,  would  still  leave  the  Germans  15  per  cent  below 
the  French  in  naval  tonnage.  To  the  objections  raised 
abroad  that  this  would  be  only  the  beginning  of  German 
demands,  Hitler  answered,  “For  Germany,  this  demand  is 
final  and  abiding.” 

A little  after  ten  in  the  evening,  Hitler  came  to  his 
peroration: 

Whoever  lights  the  torch  of  war  in  Europe  can  wish  for 
nothing  but  chaos.  We,  however,  live  in  the  firm  conviction 
that  in  our  time  will  be  fulfilled  not  the  decline  but  the 
renaissance  of  the  West.  That  Germany  may  make  an  im- 
perishable contribution  to  this  great  work  is  our  proud  hope 
and  our  unshakable  belief.11 

These  were  honeyed  words  of  peace,  reason  and  con- 
ciliation, and  in  the  Western  democracies  of  Europe,  where 
the  people  and  their  governments  desperately  yearned  for 
the  continuance  of  peace  on  any  reasonable  basis,  on  al- 


396 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


most  any  basis,  they  were  lapped  up.  The  most  influential 
newspaper  in  the  British  Isles,  the  Times  of  London,  wel- 
comed them  with  almost  hysterical  joy. 

. . . The  speech  turns  out  to  be  reasonable,  straightfor- 
ward and  comprehensive.  No  one  who  reads  it  with  an  im- 
partial mind  can  doubt  that  the  points  of  policy  laid  down 
by  Herr  Hitler  may  fairly  constitute  the  basis  of  a complete 
settlement  with  Germany — a free,  equal  and  strong  Ger- 
many instead  of  the  prostrate  Germany  upon  whom  peace 
was  imposed  sixteen  years  ago  . . . 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  speech  will  be  taken  everywhere 
as  a sincere  and  well-considered  utterance  meaning  pre- 
cisely what  it  says.12 

This  great  journal,  one  of  the  chief  glories  of  English 
journalism,  would  play,  like  the  Chamberlain  government, 
a dubious  role  in  the  disastrous  British  appeasement  of 
Hitler.  But  to  this  writer,  at  least,  it  had  even  less  excuse 
than  the  government,  for  in  its  Berlin  correspondent,  Nor- 
man Ebbutt,  it  had,  until  he  was  expelled  on  August  16, 
1937,  a source  of  information  about  Hitler’s  doings  and 
purposes  that  was  much  more  revealing  than  that  provided 
by  other  foreign  correspondents  or  foreign  diplomats,  in- 
cluding the  British.  Though  much  that  he  wrote  for  the 
Times  from  Berlin  in  those  days  was  not  published,*  as 
he  often  complained  to  this  writer  and  as  was  later  con- 
firmed, the  Times  editors  must  have  read  all  of  his  dis- 
patches and  have  been  in  the  position  therefore  of  knowing 
what  was  really  going  on  in  Nazi  Germany  and  how  hol- 
low Hitler’s  grandiose  promises  were. 

The  British  government,  no  less  than  the  Times,  was 
ready  and  anxious  to  accept  Hitler’s  proposals  as  “sin- 
cere” and  “well-considered” — especially  the  one  by  which 
Germany  would  agree  to  a Navy  35  per  cent  the  size 
of  Britain’s. 

Hitler  had  shrewdly  thrown  out  a hint  to  Sir  John 
Simon,  when  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  and  Eden  made 
their  postponed  visit  to  him  at  the  end  of  March,  that  a 

* “I  do  my  utmost,  night  after  night,  to  keep  out  of  the  paper  any- 
thing that  might  hurt  their  [German]  susceptibilities,”  Geoffrey  Dawson, 
the  editor  of  the  Times,  wrote  on  May  23,  1937,  to  his  Geneva  corre- 
spondent, H.  G.  Daniels,  who  had  preceded  Ebbutt  in  Berlin.  ‘‘I  can 
really  think  of  nothing  that  has  been  printed  now  for  many  months 
past  to  which  they  could  possibly  take  exception  as  unfair  comment.” 
(John  Evelyn  Wrench,  Geoffrey  Dawson  and  Our  Times.) 


The  Road  to  War 


397 

naval  agreement  might  easily  be  worked  out  between  the 
two  powers  which  would  guarantee  English  superiority. 
Now  on  May  21  he  had  made  a public  and  specific  offer — 
a German  fleet  of  only  35  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  of  the 
British — and  he  had  added  in  his  speech  some  especially 
friendly  words  for  England.  “Germany,”  he  had  said,  “has 
not  the  intention  or  the  necessity  or  the  means  to  partici- 
pate in  any  new  naval  rivalry” — an  allusion,  which  ap- 
parently was  not  lost  on  the  English,  to  the  days  before 
1914  when  Tirpitz,  enthusiastically  backed  by  Wilhelm  II, 
was  building  up  a high-seas  fleet  to  match  England’s.  “The 
German  government,”  continued  Hitler,  “recognizes  the 
overpowering  vital  importance,  and  therewith  the  justifica- 
tion, of  a dominating  protection  for  the  British  Empire 
on  the  sea  . . . The  German  government  has  the  straight- 
forward intention  to  find  and  maintain  a relationship 
with  the  British  people  and  state  which  will  prevent  for 
all  time  a repetition  of  the  only  struggle  there  has  been  be- 
tween the  two  nations.”  Hitler  had  expressed  similiar  senti- 
ments in  Mein  Kampf,  where  he  had  stressed  that  one  of 
the  Kaiser’s  greatest  mistakes  had  been  his  enmity  toward 
England  and  his  absurd  attempt  to  rival  the  British  in 
naval  power. 

With  incredible  naivete  and  speed,  the  British  gov- 
ernment fell  for  Hitler’s  bait.  Ribbentrop,  who  had  now 
become  Hitler’s  messenger  boy  for  foreign  errands,  was 
invited  to  come  to  London  in  June  for  naval  talks.  Vain 
and  tactless,  he  told  the  British  that  Hitler’s  offer  was  not 
subject  to  negotiation;  they  must  take  it  or  leave  it.  The 
British  took  it.  Without  consulting  their  allies  of  the  Stresa 
front,  France  and  Italy,  which  were  also  naval  powers 
and  much  concerned  over  German  rearmament  and  Ger- 
man flouting  of  the  military  clauses  of  Versailles,  and 
without  even  informing  the  League  of  Nations,  which  was 
supposed  to  uphold  the  1919  peace  treaties,  they  proceeded, 
for  what  they  thought  was  a private  advantage,  to  wipe 
out  the  naval  restrictions  of  Versailles. 

For  it  was  obvious  to  the  most  simple  mind  in  Berlin 
that  by  agreeing  to  Germany’s  building  a navy  a third  as 
large  as  the  British,  the  London  government  was  giving 
Hitler  free  rein  to  build  up  a navy  as  fast  as  was  physi- 
cally possible — one  that  would  tax  the  capacity  of  his 
shipyards  and  steel  mills  for  at  least  ten  years.  It  was 


398  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

thus  not  a limitation  on  German  rearmament  but  an  en- 
couragement to  expand  it,  in  the  naval  arm,  as  rapidly 
as  Germany  could  find  the  means  to  do  so. 

To  add  insult  to  the  injury  already  done  France,  the 
British  government,  in  fulfillment  of  a promise  to  Hitler, 
refused  to  tell  her  closest  ally  what  kind  of  ships  and  how 
many  Great  Britain  had  agreed  that  Germany  should 
build,  except  that  the  German  submarine  tonnage — the 
building  of  submarines  in  Germany  was  specifically  for- 
bidden by  Versailles — would  be  60  per  cent  of  Britain’s 
and,  if  exceptional  circumstances  arose,  might  be  100  per 
cent.13  Actually  the  Anglo— German  agreement  author- 
ized the  Germans  to  build  five  battleships,  whose  tonnage 
and  armament  would  be  greater  than  that  of  anything 
the  British  had  afloat,  though  the  official  figures  were 
faked  to  deceive  London — twenty-one  cruisers  and  sixty- 
four  destroyers.  Not  all  of  them  were  built  or  completed 
by  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  but  enough  of  them,  with 
the  U-boats,  were  ready  to  cause  Britain  disastrous  losses 
in  the  first  years  of  the  second  war. 

Mussolini  took  due  notice  of  the  “perfidy  of  Albion.” 
Two  could  play  at  the  game  of  appeasing  Hitler.  More- 
over, England’s  cynical  attitude  of  disregarding  the  Ver- 
sailles Treaty  encouraged  him  in  the  belief  that  London 
might  not  take  too  seriously  the  flouting  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations.  On  October  3,  1935,  in  defiance 
of  the  Covenant,  his  armies  invaded  the  ancient  mountain 
kingdom  of  Abyssinia.  The  League,  led  by  Great  Britain 
and  supported  halfheartedly  by  France,  which  saw  that 
Germany  was  the  greater  danger  in  the  long  run,  promptly 
voted  sanctions.  But  they  were  only  partial  sanctions, 
timidly  enforced.  They  did  not  prevent  Mussolini  from 
conquering  Ethiopia  but  they  did  destroy  the  friendship 
of  Fascist  Italy  with  Britain  and  France  and  bring  an  end 
to  the  Stresa  front  against  Nazi  Germany. 

Who  stood  the  most  to  gain  from  this  chain  of  events 
but  Adolf  Hitler?  On  October  4,  the  day  after  the  Italian 
invasion  began,  I spent  the  day  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  talk- 
ing with  a number  of  party  and  government  officials.  A 
diary  note  that  evening  summed  up  how  quickly  and  well 
the  Germans  had  sized  up  the  situation: 

The  Wilhelmstrasse  is  delighted.  Either  Mussolini  will 


The  Road  to  War 


399 

stumble  and  get  himself  so  heavily  involved  in  Africa  that 
he  will  be  greatly  weakened  in  Europe,  whereupon  Hitler 
can  seize  Austria,  hitherto  protected  by  the  Duce;  or  he 
will  win,  defying  France  and  Britain,  and  thereupon  be 
ripe  for  a tie-up  with  Hitler  against  the  Western  democ- 
racies. Either  way  Hitler  wins.14 

This  would  soon  be  demonstrated. 

A COUP  IN  THE  RHINELAND 

In  his  Reichstag  “peace”  speech  of  May  21,  1935,  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  had  so  impressed  the  world  and, 
above  all,  Great  Britain,  Hitler  had  mentioned  that  “an 
element  of  legal  insecurity”  had  been  brought  into  the  Locar- 
no Pact  as  a result  of  the  mutual-assistance  pact  which  had 
been  signed  between  Russia  and  France  on  March  2 in  Paris 
and  on  March  14  in  Moscow,  but  which  up  to  the  end  of  the 
year  had  not  been  ratified  by  the  French  Parliament.  The 
German  Foreign  Office  called  this  “element”  to  the  at- 
tention of  Paris  in  a formal  note  to  the  French  government. 

On  November  21,  Fran^ois-Poncet,  the  French  am- 
bassador, had  a talk  with  Hitler  in  which  the  Fuehrer 
launched  “into  a long  tirade”  against  the  Franco— Soviet 
Pact.  Fran^ois-Poncet  reported  to  Paris  he  was  convinced 
that  Hitler  intended  to  use  the  pact  as  an  excuse  to  occupy 
the  demilitarized  zone  of  the  Rhineland.  “Hitler’s  sole 
hesitancy,”  he  added,  “is  now  concerned  with  the  ap- 
propriate moment  to  act.”  1S 

Frangois-Poncet,  probably  the  best-informed  ambas- 
sador in  Berlin,  knew  what  he  was  talking  about,  though 
he  was  undoubtedly  unaware  that  as  early  as  the  pre- 
vious spring,  on  May  2,  nineteen  days  before  Hitler’s  as- 
surances in  the  Reichstag  that  he  would  respect  the 
Locarno  Pact  and  the  territorial  clauses  of  Versailles,  Gen- 
eral von  Blomberg  had  issued  his  first  directive  to  the 
three  armed  services  to  prepare  plans  for  the  reoccupa- 
tion of  the  demilitarized  Rhineland.  The  code  name 
Schulung  was  given  to  the  operation,  it  was  to  be  “exe- 
cuted by  a surprise  blow  at  lightning  speed”  and  its 
planning  was  to  be  so  secret  that  “only  the  very  smallest 
number  of  officers  should  be  informed.”  In  fact,  in  the 
interests  of  secrecy,  Blomberg  wrote  out  the  order  in 
handwriting.16 

On  June  16  further  discussion  of  the  move  into  the 


400  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Rhineland  took  place  at  the  tenth  meeting  of  the  Working 
Committee  of  the  Reich  Defense  Council,  during  which 
a Colonel  Alfred  Jodi,  who  had  just  become  head  of  the 
Home  Defense  Department,  reported  on  the  plans  and 
emphasized  the  need  for  the  strictest  secrecy.  Nothing 
should  be  committed  to  writing  that  was  not  absolutely 
necessary,  he  warned,  and  he  added  that  “without  ex- 
ception such  material  must  be  kept  in  safes.” 17 

All  through  the  winter  of  1935—36  Hitler  bided  his 
time.  France  and  Britain,  he  could  not  help  but  note,  were 
preoccupied  with  stopping  Italy’s  aggression  in  Abyssinia, 
but  Mussolini  seemed  to  be  getting  by  with  it.  Despite 
its  much-publicized  sanctions,  the  League  of  Nations  was 
proving  itself  impotent  to  halt  a determined  aggressor.  In 
Paris  the  French  Parliament  seemed  to  be  in  no  hurry  to 
ratify  the  pact  with  the  Soviet  Union;  the  growing  senti- 
ment in  the  Right  was  all  against  it.  Apparently  Hitler 
thought  there  was  a good  chance  of  the  French  Chamber 
or  Senate  rejecting  the  alliance  with  Moscow.  In  that 
case  he  would  have  to  look  for  another  excuse  for  Schu- 
lung.  But  the  pact  came  before  the  Chamber  on  February 
11  and  it  was  approved  on  the  twenty-seventh  by  a vote 
of  353  to  164.  Two  days  later,  on  March  1,  Hitler  reached 
his  decision,  somewhat  to  the  consternation  of  the  gen- 
erals, most  of  whom  were  convinced  that  the  French 
would  make  mincemeat  of  the  small  German  forces  which 
had  been  gathered  for  the  move  into  the  Rhineland. 
Nevertheless,  on  the  next  day,  March  2,  1936,  in  obedi- 
ence to  his  master’s  instructions,  Blomberg  issued  formal 
orders  for  the  occupation  of  the  Rhineland.  It  was,  he 
told  the  senior  commanders  of  the  armed  forces,  to  be  a 
“surprise  move.”  Blomberg  expected  it  to  be  a “peaceful 
operation.”  If  it  turned  out  that  it  was  not — that  is,  that 
the  French  would  fight — the  Commander  in  Chief  re- 
served the  “right  to  decide  on  any  military  counter- 
measures.” 18  Actually,  as  I learned  six  days  later  and  as 
would  be  confirmed  from  the  testimony  of  the  generals 
at  Nuremberg,  Blomberg  already  had  in  mind  what  those 
countermeasures  would  be:  a hasty  retreat  back  over  the 
Rhine! 

But  the  French,  their  nation  already  paralyzed  by  in- 
ternal strife  and  the  people  sinking  into  defeatism,  did  not 
know  this  when  a small  token  force  of  German  troops 


The  Road  to  War 


401 


paraded  across  the  Rhine  bridges  at  dawn  on  March  7 
and  entered  the  demilitarized  zone.*  At  10  a.m.  Neurath, 
the  compliant  Foreign  Minister,  called  in  the  ambassa- 
dors of  France,  Britain  and  Italy,  apprised  them  of  the 
news  from  the  Rhineland  and  handed  them  a formal  note 
denouncing  the  Locarno  Treaty,  which  Hitler  had  just 
broken — and  proposing  new  plans  for  peace!  “Hitler  struck 
his  adversary  in  the  face,”  Frangois-Poncet  wryly  ob- 
served, “and  as  he  did  so  declared:  ‘I  bring  you  proposals 
for  peace!’  ” 20 

Indeed,  two  hours  later  the  Fuehrer  was  standing  at  the 
rostrum  of  the  Reichstag  before  a delirious  audience,  ex- 
pounding on  his  desire  for  peace  and  his  latest  ideas  of 
how  to  maintain  it.  I went  over  to  the  Kroll  Opera  House 
to  see  the  spectacle,  which  I shall  never  forget,  for  it  was 
both  fascinating  and  gruesome.  After  a long  harangue 
about  the  evils  of  Versailles  and  the  threat  of  Bolshevism, 
Hitler  calmly  announced  that  France’s  pact  with  Russia 
had  invalidated  the  Locarno  Treaty,  which,  unlike  that 
of  Versailles,  Germany  had  freely  signed.  The  scene  that 
followed  I noted  down  in  my  diary  that  evening. 

“Germany  no  longer  feels  bound  by  the  Locarno  Treaty 
[Hitler  said].  In  the  interest  of  the  primitive  rights  of  its 
people  to  the  security  of  their  frontier  and  the  safeguarding 
of  their  defense,  the  German  government  has  re-established, 
as  from  today,  the  absolute  and  unrestricted  sovereignty  of 
the  Reich  in  the  demilitarized  zone!” 

Now  the  six  hundred  deputies,  personal  appointees  all  of 
Hitler,  little  men  with  big  bodies  and  bulging  necks  and 
cropped  hair  and  pouched  bellies  and  brown  uniforms  and 
heavy  boots  . . . leap  to  their  feet  like  automatons,  their 
right  arms  upstretched  in  the  Nazi  salute,  and  scream  “Heils” 

. . . Hitler  raises  his  hand  for  silence.  ...  He  says  in  a 
deep,  resonant  voice,  “Men  of  the  German  Reichstag!”  The 
silence  is  utter. 

“In  this  historic  hour,  when,  in  the  Reich’s  western  prov- 
inces, German  troops,  are  at  this  minute  marching  into  their 
future  peacetime  garrisons,  we  all  unite  in  two  sacred  vows.” 

He  can  go  no  further.  It  is  news  to  this  “parliamentary” 
mob  that  German  soldiers  are  already  on  the  move  into  the 

* According  to  Jodi’s  testimony  at  Nuremberg,  only  three  battalions 
crossed  the  Rhine,  making  for  Aachen,  Trier  and  Saarbruecken,  and 
only  one  division  was  employed  in  the  occupation  of  the  entire  territory. 
Allied  intelligence  estimates  were  considerably  larger:  35,000  men,  or 
approximately  three  divisions.  Hitler  commented  later,  “The  fact  was,  X 
had  only  four  brigades.’’  lu 


402 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Rhineland.  All  the  militarism  in  their  German  blood  surges 
to  their  heads.  They  spring,  yelling  and  crying,  to  their 
feet  . . . Their  hands  are  raised  in  slavish  salute,  their  faces 
now  contorted  with  hysteria,  their  mouths  wide  open,  shout- 
ing, shouting,  their  eyes,  burning  with  fanaticism,  glued  on 
the  new  god,  the  Messiah.  The  Messiah  plays  his  role 
superbly.  His  head  lowered  as  if  in  all  humbleness,  he 
waits  patiently  for  silence.  Then  his  voice,  still  low,  but 
choking  with  emotion,  utters  the  two  vows: 

“First,  we  swear  to  yield  to  no  force  whatever  in  restora- 
tion of  the  honor  of  our  people  . . . Secondly,  we  pledge 
that  now,  more  than  ever,  we  shall  strive  for  an  understand- 
ing between  the  European  peoples,  especially  for  one  with 
our  Western  Neighbor  nations  . . . We  have  no  territorial 
demands  to  make  in  Europe!  . . . Germany  will  never  break 
the  peace!” 

It  was  a long  time  before  the  cheering  stopped  ...  A 
few  generals  made  their  way  out.  Behind  their  smiles,  how- 
ever, you  could  not  help  detecting  a nervousness  ...  I 
ran  into  General  von  Blomberg  . . . His  face  was  white, 
his  cheeks  twitching.21 

And  with  reason.  The  Minister  of  Defense,  who  five 
days  before  had  issued  in  his  own  handwriting  the  order 
to  march,  was  losing  his  nerve.  The  next  day  I learned 
that  he  had  given  orders  for  his  troops  to  withdraw 
across  the  Rhine  should  the  French  move  to  oppose  them. 
But  the  French  never  made  the  slightest  move.  Fran<jois- 
Poncet  says  that  after  his  warning  of  the  previous  No- 
vember, the  French  High  Command  had  asked  the  govern- 
ment what  it  would  do  in  case  the  ambassador  proved 
right.  The  answer  was,  he  says,  that  the  government 
would  take  the  matter  up  with  the  League  of  Nations.22 
Actually,  when  the  blow  occurred,*  it  was  the  French 
government  which  wanted  to  act  and  the  French  Gen- 
eral Staff  which  held  back.  “General  Gamelin,”  Fran- 
gois-Poncet  declares,  “advised  that  a war  operation, 
however  limited,  entailed  unpredicatable  risks  and  could 
not  be  undertaken  without  decreeing  a general  mobiliza- 
tion.” 23  The  most  General  Gamelin,  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  would  do — and  did — was  concentrate  thir- 
teen divisions  near  the  German  frontier,  but  merely  to 
reinforce  the  Maginot  Line.  Even  this  was  enough  to  throw 

* Despite  Frangois-Poncet’s  warning  of  the  previous  fall,  Germany’s  action 
apparently  came  as  a complete  surprise  to  the  French  and  British  govern- 
ments and  their  general  staffs. 


The  Road  to  War 


403 


a scare  into  the  German  High  Command.  Blomberg, 
backed  by  Jodi  and  most  of  the  officers  at  the  top,  wanted 
to  pull  back  the  three  battalions  that  had  crossed  the 
Rhine.  As  Jodi  testified  at  Nuremberg,  “Considering 
the  situation  we  were  in,  the  French  covering  army 
could  have  blown  us  to  pieces.”  24 

It  could  have — and  had  it,  that  almost  certainly  would 
have  been  the  end  of  Hitler,  after  which  history  might 
have  taken  quite  a different  and  brighter  turn  than  it  did, 
for  the  dictator  could  never  have  survived  such  a fiasco. 
Hitler  himself  admitted  as  much.  “A  retreat  on  our  part,” 
he  conceded  later,  “would  have  spelled  collapse.” 25  It 
was  Hitler’s  iron  nerves  alone,  which  now,  as  during 
many  crises  that  lay  ahead,  saved  the  situation  and,  con- 
founding the  reluctant  generals,  brought  success.  But  it 
was  no  easy  moment  for  him. 

“The  forty-eight  hours  after  the  march  into  the  Rhine- 
land,” Paul  Schmidt,  his  interpreter,  heard  him  later  say, 
“were  the  most  nerve-racking  in  my  life.  If  the  French 
had  then  marched  into  the  Rhineland,  we  would  have  had 
to  withdraw  with  our  tails  between  our  legs,  for  the 
military  resources  at  our  disposal  would  have  been  wholly 
inadequate  for  even  a moderate  resistance.”  26 

Confident  that  the  French  would  not  march,  he  bluntly 
turned  down  all  suggestions  for  pulling  back  by  the 
wavering  High  Command.  General  Beck,  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  wanted  the  Fuehrer  to  at  least  soften  the 
blow  by  proclaiming  that  he  would  not  fortify  the  area 
west  of  the  Rhine — a suggestion,  Jodi  later  testified, 
“which  the  Fuehrer  turned  down  very  bluntly” — for 
obvious  reasons,  as  we  shall  see.27  Blomberg’s  pro- 
posal to  withdraw,  Hitler  later  told  General  von  Rund- 
stedt,  was  nothing  less  than  an  act  of  cowardice.28 

“What  would  have  happened,”  Hitler  exclaimed  in  a 
bull  session  with  his  cronies  at  headquarters  on  the  eve- 
ning of  March  27,  1942,  in  recalling  the  Rhineland 
coup,  “if  anybody  other  than  myself  had  been  at  the  head 
of  the  Reich!  Anyone  you  care  to  mention  would  have 
lost  his  nerve.  I was  obliged  to  lie,  and  what  saved  us 
was  my  unshakable  obstinacy  and  my  amazing  aplomb.”  29 
It  was  true,  but  it  must  also  be  recorded  that  he  was 
aided  not  only  by  the  hesitations  of  the  French  but  by  the 
supineness  of  their  British  allies.  The  French  Foreign 


404  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Minister,  Pierre  Etienne  Flandin,  flew  to  London  on 
March  1 1 and  begged  the  British  government  to  back 
France  in  a military  counteraction  in  the  Rhineland.  His 
pleas  were  unavailing.  Britian  would  not  risk  war  even 
though  Allied  superiority  over  the  Germans  was  over- 
whelming. As  Lord  Lothian  remarked,  “The  Germans, 
after  all,  are  only  going  into  their  own  back  garden.” 
Even  before  the  French  arrived  in  London,  Anthony 
Eden,  who  had  become  Foreign  Secretary  in  the  previous 
December,  had  told  the  House  of  Commons,  on  March 
9,  “Occupation  of  the  Rhineland  by  the  Reichswehr  deals 
a heavy  blow  to  the  principle  of  the  sanctity  of  treaties. 
Fortunately,”  he  added,  “we  have  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  Germany’s  present  action  threatens  hostilities.” 30 

And  yet  France  was  entitled,  under  the  terms  of  the 
Locarno  Treaty,  to  take  military  action  against  the  pres- 
ence of  German  troops  in  the  demilitarized  zone,  and 
Britain  was  obligated  by  that  treaty  to  back  her  with  her 
own  armed  forces.  The  abortive  London  conversations 
were  a confirmation  to  Hitler  that  he  had  gotten  away  with 
his  latest  gamble. 

The  British  not  only  shied  away  from  the  risk  of  war  but 
once  again  they  took  seriously  the  latest  installment  of 
Hitler’s  “peace”  proposals.  In  the  notes  handed  to  the 
three  ambassadors  on  March  7 and  in  his  speech  to  the 
Reichstag,  Hitler  had  offered  to  sign  a twenty-five-year 
nonagression  pact  with  Belgium  and  France,  to  be  guar- 
anteed by  Britain  and  Italy;  to  conclude  similar  nonag- 
gression pacts  with  Germany’s  neighbors  on  the  east;  to 
agree  to  the  demilitarization  of  both  sides  of  the  Franco- 
German  frontier;  and,  finally,  to  return  to  the  League  of 
Nations.  Hitler’s  sincerity  might  have  been  judged  by  his 
proposal  to  demilitarize  both  sides  of  the  Franco-German 
border,  since  it  would  have  forced  France  to  scrap  her 
Maginot  Line,  her  last  protection  against  a surprise  Ger- 
man attack. 

In  London,  the  esteemed  Times,  while  deploring 
Hitler’s  precipitate  action  in  invading  the  Rhineland, 
headed  its  leading  editorial  “A  Chance  to  Rebuild.” 

In  retrospect,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  Hitler’s  successful 
gamble  in  the  Rhineland  brought  him  a victory  more 
staggering  and  more  fatal  in  its  immense  consequences 
than  could  be  comprehended  at  the  time.  At  home  it 


The  Road  to  War 


405 


fortified  his  popularity  * and  his  power,  raising  them  to 
heights  which  no  German  ruler  of  the  past  had  ever 
enjoyed.  It  assured  his  ascendancy  over  his  generals, 
who  had  hesitated  and  weakened  at  a moment  of  crisis 
when  he  had  held  firm.  It  taught  them  that  in  foreign 
politics  and  even  in  military  affairs  his  judgment  was 
superior  to  theirs.  They  had  feared  that  the  French  would 
fight;  he  knew  better.  And  finally,  and  above  all,  the 
Rhineland  occupation,  small  as  it  was  as  a military  opera- 
tion, opened  the  way,  as  only  Hitler  (and  Churchill,  alone, 
in  England)  seemed  to  realize,  to  vast  new  opportunities 
in  a Europe  which  was  not  only  shaken  but  whose 
strategic  situation  was  irrevocably  changed  by  the  pa- 
rading of  three  German  battalions  across  the  Rhine  bridges. 

Conversely,  it  is  equally  easy  to  see,  in  retrospect,  that 
France’s  failure  to  repel  the  Wehrmacht  battalions  and 
Britain’s  failure  to  back  her  in  what  would  have  been 
nothing  more  than  a police  action  was  a disaster  for  the 
West  from  which  sprang  all  the  later  ones  of  even  greater 
magnitude.  In  March  1936  the  two  Western  democracies 
were  given  their  last  chance  to  halt,  without  the  risk  of 
a serious  war,  the  rise  of  a militarized,  aggressive,  totali- 
tarian Germany  and,  in  fact — as  we  have  seen  Hitler  ad- 
mitting— bring  the  Nazi  dictator  and  his  regime  tumbling 
down.  They  let  the  chance  slip  by. 

For  France,  it  was  the  beginning  of  the  end.  Her  allies 
in  the  East,  Russia,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  Rumania  and 
Yugoslavia,  suddenly  were  faced  with  the  fact  that  France 
would  not  fight  against  German  aggression  to  preserve  the 
security  system  which  the  French  government  itself  had 

* On  March  7 Hitler  had  dissolved  the  Reichstag  and  called  for  a 
new  “election"  and  a referendum  on  his  move  into  the  Rhineland.  Ac- 
cording to  the  official  figures  of  the  voting  on  March  29,  some  99  per 
cent  of  the  45,453,691  registered  voters  went  to  the  polls,  and  98.8 
per  cent  of  them  approved  Hitler’s  action.  Foreign  correspondents  who 
visited  the  polling  places  found  some  irregularities — especially,  open 
instead  of  secret  voting — and  there  was  no  doubt  that  some  Germans 
feared  (with  justification,  as  we  have  seen)  that  a Nein  vote  might  be 
discovered  by  the  Gestapo.  Dr.  Hugo  Eckener  told  this  writer  that 
on  his  new  Zeppelin  Hindenburg , which  Goebbels  had  ordered  to 
cruise  over  German  cities  as  a publicity  stunt,  the  Ja  vote,  which  was 
announced  by  the  Propaganda  Minister  as  forty-two,  outnumbered  the 
total  number  of  persons  aboard  by  two.  Nevertheless,  this  observer,  who 
covered  the  “election"  from  one  corner  of  the  Reich  to  the  other, 
has  no  doubt  that  the  vote  of  approval  for  Hitler’s  coup  was  over- 
whelming. And  why  not?  The  junking  of  Versailles  and  the  appearance 
of  German  soldiers  marching  again  into  what  was,  after  all,  German 
^were  flings  that  almost  all  Germans  naturally  approved.  The 


406 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


taken  the  lead  in  so  laboriously  building  up.  But  more 
than  that.  These  Eastern  allies  began  to  realize  that 
even  if  France  were  not  so  supine,  she  would  soon  not 
be  able  to  lend  them  much  assistance  because  of  Ger- 
many’s feverish  construction  of  a West  Wall  behind  the 
Franco-German  border.  The  erection  of  this  fortress  line, 
they  saw,  would  quickly  change  the  strategic  map  of  Eu- 
rope, to  their  detriment.  They  could  scarcely  expect  a 
France  which  did  not  dare,  with  her  one  hundred  divi- 
sions, to  repel  three  German  battalions,  to  bleed  her  young 
manhood  against  impregnable  German  fortifications  while 
the  Wehrmacht  attacked  in  the  East.  But  even  if  the  un- 
expected took  place,  it  would  be  futile.  Henceforth  the 
French  could  tie  down  in  the  West  only  a small  part  of 
the  growing  German  Army.  The  rest  would  be  free  for 
operations  against  Germany’s  Eastern  neighbors. 

The  value  of  the  Rhineland  fortifications  to  Hitler’s 
strategy  was  conveyed  to  William  C.  Bullitt,  the  American 
ambassador  to  France,  when  he  called  on  the  German 
Foreign  Minister  in  Berlin  on  May  18,  1936. 

Von  Neurath  said  [Bullitt  reported  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment] that  it  was  the  policy  of  the  German  Government  to 
do  nothing  active  in  foreign  affairs  until  “the  Rhineland 
had  been  digested.”  He  explained  that  he  meant  that  until 
the  German  fortifications  had  been  constructed  on  the 
French  and  Belgian  frontiers,  the  German  Government  would 
do  everything  possible  to  prevent  rather  than  encourage  an 
outbreak  by  the  Nazis  in  Austria  and  would  pursue  a quiet 
line  with  regard  to  Czechoslovakia.  “As  soon  as  our  forti- 
fications are  constructed  and  the  countries  of  Central  Europe 
realize  that  France  cannot  enter  German  territory  at  will, 
all  those  countries  will  begin  to  feel  very  differently  about 
their  foreign  policies  and  a new  constellation  will  develop,” 
he  said.31 

This  development  now  began. 

“As  I stood  at  the  grave  of  my  predecessor  [the 
murdered  Dollfus],”  Dr.  Schuschnigg  related  in  his 
memoirs,  “I  knew  that  in  order  to  save  Austrian  in- 
dependence I had  to  embark  on  a course  of  appease- 
ment . . . Everything  had  to  be  avoided  which  could 
give  Germany  a pretext  for  intervention  and  everything 
had  to  be  done  to  secure  in  some  way  Hitler’s  toleration 
of  the  status  quo.”  32 


The  Road  to  War 


407 


The  new  and  youthful  Austrian  Chancellor  had  been 
encouraged  by  Hitler’s  public  declaration  to  the  Reich- 
stag on  May  21,  1935,  that  “Germany  neither  intends  nor 
wishes  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Austria,  to 
annex  Austria  or  to  conclude  an  Anschluss”;  and  he 
had  been  reassured  by  the  reiteration  at  Stresa  by  Italy, 
France  and  Britain  of  their  determination  to  help  safe- 
guard Austria’s  independence.  Then  Mussolini,  Austria’s 
principal  protector  since  1933,  had  become  bogged  down 
in  Abyssinia  and  had  broken  with  France  and  Britain. 
When  the  Germans  marched  into  the  Rhineland  and  began 
to  fortify  it,  Dr.  Schuschnigg  realized  that  some  appease- 
ment of  Hitler  was  due.  He  began  negotiating  a new 
treaty  with  the  wily  German  minister  in  Vienna,  Papen, 
who,  though  the  Nazis  had  come  within  an  ace  of  mur- 
dering him  during  the  June  purge,  had  nevertheless  gone 
to  work  on  his  arrival  in  Austria  in  the  late  summer  of 
1934,  after  the  Nazi  assassination  of  Dollfuss,  to  under- 
mine Austria’s  independence  and  caputre  Hitler’s  native 
land  for  the  Leader.  “National  Socialism  must  and 
will  overpower  the  new  Austrian  ideology,”  he  had  writ- 
ten Hitler  on  July  27,  1935,  in  giving  an  account  of  his 
first  year  of  service  in  Vienna.33 

In  its  published  text  the  Austro-German  agreement 
signed  on  July  11,  1936,  seemed  to  show  an  unusual 
amount  of  generosity  and  tolerance  on  the  part  of  Hitler. 
Germany  reaffirmed  its  recognition  of  Austria’s  sover- 
eignty and  the  promise  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  its  neighbor.  In  return,  Austria  pledged  that  in 
its  foreign  policy  it  would  always  act  on  the  principle  that 
it  acknowledged  itself  to  be  “a  German  state.” 

But  there  were  secret  clauses  in  the  treaty,34  and  in 
them  Schuschnigg  made  concessions  which  would  lead 
him — and  his  little  country — to  their  doom.  He  agreed 
secretly  to  amnesty  Nazi  political  prisoners  in  Austria 
and  to  appoint  representatives  of  the  “so-called  ‘National 
Opposition’  ”• — a euphemism  for  Nazis  or  Nazi  sympa- 
thizers— to  positions  of  “political  responsibility.”  This  was 
equivalent  to  allowing  Hitler  to  set  up  a Trojan  horse  in 
Austria.  Into  it  would  crawl  shortly  Seyss-Inquart,  a 
Viennese  lawyer,  who  will  cut  a certain  figure  in  the 
subsequent  narrative. 

Although  Papen  had  obtained  Hitler’s  approval  of  the 


408  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

text  of  the  treaty,  making  a personal  visit  to  Berlin  for 
the  purpose  early  in  July,  the  Fuehrer  was  furious  with 
his  envoy  when  the  latter  telephoned  him  on  July  16  to 
notify  him  that  the  agreement  had  been  signed. 

Hitler’s  reaction  astonished  me  [Papen  later  wrote].  In- 
stead of  expressing  his  gratification,  he  broke  into  a flood  of 
abuse.  I had  misled  him,  he  said,  into  making  exaggerated 
concessions  . . . The  whole  thing  was  a trap.35 

As  it  turned  out,  it  was  a trap  for  Schuschnigg,  not 
for  Hitler. 

The  signing  of  the  Austro-German  treaty  was  a sign 
that  Mussolini  had  lost  his  grip  on  Austria.  It  might  have 
been  expected  that  this  would  worsen  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  fascist  dictators.  But  just  the  opposite  oc- 
curred— due  to  events  which  now,  in  1936,  played  into 
Hitler’s  hands. 

On  May  2,  1936,  Italian  forces  entered  the  Abyssinian 
capital,  Addis  Ababa,  and  on  July  4 the  League  of  Nations 
formally  capitulated  and  called  off  its  sanctions  against 
Italy.  Two  weeks  later,  on  July  16,  Franco  staged  a mili- 
tary revolt  in  Spain  and  civil  war  broke  out. 

Hitler,  as  was  his  custom  at  that  time  of  year,  was 
taking  in  the  opera  at  the  Wagner  Festival  at  Bayreuth. 
On  the  night  of  July  22,  after  he  had  returned  from  the 
theater,  a German  businessman  from  Morocco,  accom- 
panied by  the  local  Nazi  leader,  arrived  in  Bayreuth  with 
an  urgent  letter  from  Franco.  The  rebel  leader  needed 
planes  and  other  assistance.  Hitler  immediately  sum- 
moned Goering  and  General  von  Blomberg,  who  happened 
to  be  in  Bayreuth,  and  that  very  evening  the  decision 
was  taken  to  give  support  to  the  Spanish  rebellion.36 

Though  German  aid  to  Franco  never  equaled  that 
given  by  Italy,  which  dispatched  between  sixty  and  seventy 
thousand  troops  as  well  as  vast  supplies  of  arms  and 
planes,  it  was  considerable.  The  Germans  estimated  later 
that  they  spent  half  a billion  marks  on  the  venture 37 
besides  furnishing  planes,  tanks,  technicians  and  the  Con- 
dor Legion,  an  Air  Force  unit  which  distinguished  itself 
by  the  obliteration  of  the  Spanish  town  of  Guernica  and 
its  civilian  inhabitants.  Relative  to  Germany’s  own  mas- 
sive rearmament  it  was  not  much,  but  it  paid  handsome 
dividends  to  Hitler. 


The  Road  to  War 


409 


It  gave  France  a third  unfriendly  fascist  power  on  its 
borders.  It  exacerbated  the  internal  strife  in  France  be- 
tween Right  and  Left  and  thus  weakned  Germany’s 
principal  rival  in  the  West.  Above  all  it  rendered  impos- 
sible a rapprochement  of  Britain  and  France  with  Italy, 
which  the  Paris  and  London  governments  had  hoped  for 
after  the  termination  of  the  Abyssinian  War,  and  thus 
drove  Mussolini  into  the  arms  of  Hitler. 

From  the  very  beginning  the  Fuehrer’s  Spanish  policy 
was  shrewd,  calculated  and  far-seeing.  A perusal  of  the 
captured  German  documents  makes  plain  that  one  of  Hit- 
ler’s purposes  was  to  prolong  the  Spanish  Civil  War  in 
order  to  keep  the  Western  democracies  and  Italy  at  log- 
gerheads and  draw  Mussolini  toward  him.'1'  As  early  as 
December  1936,  Ulrich  von  Hassell,  the  German  ambas- 
sador in  Rome,  who  had  not  yet  achieved  that  rec- 
ognition of  Nazi  aims  and  practices  which  he  later  ob- 
tained and  which  would  cost  him  his  life,  was  reporting 
to  the  Wilhelmstrasse: 

The  role  played  by  the  Spanish  conflict  as  regards  Italy’s 
relations  with  France  and  England  could  be  similar  to  that 
of  the  Abyssinian  conflict,  bringing  out  clearly  the  actual, 
opposing  interests  of  the  powers  and  thus  preventing  Italy 
from  being  drawn  into  the  net  of  the  Western  powers  and 
used  for  their  machinations.  The  struggle  for  dominant  po- 
litical influence  in  Spain  lays  bare  the  natural  opposition 
between  Italy  and  France;  at  the  same  time  the  position  of 
Italy  as  a power  in  the  western  Mediterranean  comes  into 
competition  with  that  of  Britain.  All  the  more  clearly  will 
Italy  recognize  the  advisability  of  confronting  the  Western 
powers  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Germany.39 

It  was  these  circumstances  which  gave  birth  to  the 
Rome-Berlin  Axis.  On  October  24,  after  conferences 
with  Neurath  in  Berlin,  Count  Galeazzo  Ciano,  Mus- 
solini’s son-in-law  and  Foreign  Minister,  made  the  first 
of  his  many  pilgrimages  to  Berchtesgaden.  He  found  the 
German  dictator  in  a friendly  and  expansive  mood.  Mus- 
solini, Hitler  declared,  was  “the  leading  statesman  in  the 
world,  to  whom  none  may  even  remotely  compare  him- 

* More  than  a year  later,  on  November  5,  1937,  Hitler  would  reiterate 
his  Spanish  policy  in  a confidential  talk  with  his  generals  and  his 
Foreign  Minister.  “A  hundred  per  cent  victory  for  Franco,"  he  told 
them,  was  “not.  desirable  from  the  German  point  of  view.  Rather  we 
are  interested  in  a continuance  of  the  war  and  in  keeping  up  the 
tension  in  the  Mediterranean.”  88 


410 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


self.”  Together,  Italy  and  Germany  could  conquer  not 
only  “Bolshevism”  but  the  West.  Including  England!  The 
British,  Hitler  thought,  might  eventually  seek  an  ac- 
commodation with  a united  Italy  and  Germany.  If  not, 
the  two  powers,  acting  together,  could  easily  dispose  of 
her.  “German  and  Italian  rearmament,”  Hitler  reminded 
Ciano,  “is  proceeding  much  more  rapidly  than  rearmament 
can  in  England  ...  In  three  years  Germany  will  be 
ready  . . .”  40 

The  date  is  interesting.  Three  years  hence  would  be 
the  fall  of  1939. 

In  Berlin  on  October  21,  Ciano  and  Neurath  had  signed 
a secret  protocol  which  outlined  a common  policy  for 
Germany  and  Italy  in  foreign  affairs.  In  a speech  at 
Milan  a few  days  later  (November  1)  Mussolini  publicly 
referred  to  it  without  divulging  the  contents,  as  an  agree- 
ment which  constituted  an  “Axis” — around  which  the  other 
European  powers  “may  work  together.”  It  would  become  a 
famous — and,  for  the  Duce,  a fatal — word. 

With  Mussolini  in  the  bag,  Hitler  turned  his  attentions 
elsewhere.  In  August  1936  he  had  appointed  Ribbentrop 
as  German  ambassador  in  London  in  an  effort  to  explore 
the  possibility  of  a settlement  with  England — on  his  own 
terms.  Incompetent  and  lazy,  vain  as  a peacock,  arrogant 
and  without  humor,  Ribbentrop  was  the  worst  possible 
choice  for  such  a post,  as  Goering  realized.  “When  I 
criticized  Ribbentrop’s  qualifications  to  handle  British 
problems,”  he  later  declared,  “the  Fuehrer  pointed  out  to 
me  that  Ribbentrop  knew  ‘Lord  So  and  So’  and  ‘Minister 
So  and  So.’  To  which  I replied:  ‘Yes,  but  the  difficulty  is 
that  they  know  Ribbentrop.’  ” 41 

It  is  true  that  Ribbentrop,  unattractive  a figure  though 
he  was,  was  not  without  influential  friends  in  London. 
Mrs.  Simpson,  the  friend  of  the  King,  was  believed  in 
Berlin  to  be  one  of  these.  But  Ribbentrop’s  initial  efforts 
in  his  new  post  were  discouraging  and  in  November  he 
flew  back  to  Berlin  to  conclude  some  non-British  busi- 
ness he  had  been  dabbling  in.  On  November  25  he  signed 
the  Anti-Comintern  Pact  with  Japan,  in  which,  he  told 
the  correspondents  (of  whom  this  writer  was  one)  without 
batting  an  eye,  Germany  and  Japan  had  joined  together  to 
defend  Western  civilization.  On  the  surface  this  pact 


411 


The  Road  to  War 

seemed  to  be  nothing  more  than  a propaganda  trick  by 
which  Germany  and  Japan  could  win  world  support  by 
exploiting  the  universal  dislike  for  Communism  and  the 
general  distrust  of  the  Comintern.  But  in  this  treaty  too 
there  was  a secret  protocol,  specifically  directed  against 
Russia.  In  case  of  an  unprovoked  attack  by  the  Soviet 
Union  against  Germany  or  Japan,  the  two  nations  agreed 
to  consult  on  what  measures  to  take  “to  safeguard  their 
common  interests”  and  also  to  “take  no  measures  which 
would  tend  to  ease  the  situation  of  the  Soviet  Union.”  It 
was  also  agreed  that  neither  nation  would  make  any 
political  treaties  with  Russia  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the 
agreement  without  mutual  consent.42 

It  would  not  be  very  long  before  Germany  broke  the 
agreement  and  accused  Japan — unjustifiably — of  not  ob- 
serving it.  But  the  pact  did  serve  a certain  propanganda 
purpose  among  the  world’s  gullible  and  it  brought  to- 
gether for  the  first  time  the  three  have-not  and  aggressor 
nations.  Italy  signed  it  the  following  year. 

On  January  30,  1937,  Hitler  addressed  the  Reichstag, 
proclaiming  “the  withdrawal  of  the  German  signature” 
from  the  Versailles  Treaty,  an  empty  but  typical  gesture, 
since  the  treaty  was  by  now  dead  as  a doornail — and  re- 
viewing with  pride  the  record  of  his  four  years  in  of- 
fice. He  could  be  pardoned  for  his  pride,  for  it  was  an 
impressive  record  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  affairs. 
He  had,  as  we  have  seen,  abolished  unemployment,  created 
a boom  in  business,  built  up  a powerful  Army,  Navy  and 
Air  Force,  provided  them  with  considerable  armaments  and 
the  promise  of  more  on  a massive  scale.  He  had  single- 
handedly  broken  the  fetters  of  Versailles  and  bluffed  his 
way  into  occupying  the  Rhineland.  Completely  isolated  at 
first,  he  had  found  a loyal  ally  in  Mussolini  and  another  in 
Franco,  and  he  had  detached  Poland  from  France.  Most 
important  of  all,  perhaps,  he  had  released  the  dynamic 
energy  of  the  German  people,  reawakening  their  confidence 
in  the  nation  and  their  sense  of  its  mission  as  a great  and 
expanding  world  power. 

Everyone  could  see  the  contrast  between  this  thriving, 
martial,  boldly  led  new  Germany  and  the  decadent  de- 
mocracies in  the  West,  whose  confusions  and  vacillations 
seemed  to  increase  with  each  new  month  of  the  calendar. 


412 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Though  they  were  alarmed,  Britain  and  France  had  not 
lifted  a finger  to  prevent  Hitler  from  violating  the  peace 
treaty  by  rearming  Germany  and  by  reoccupying  the 
Rhineland;  they  had  been  unable  to  stop  Mussolini  in 
Abyssinia.  And  now,  as  the  year  1937  began,  they  were 
cutting  a sorry  figure  by  their  futile  gestures  to  prevent 
Germany  and  Italy  from  determining  the  outcome  of  the 
Spanish  Civil  War.  Everyone  knew  what  Italy  and  Germany 
were  doing  in  Spain  to  assure  Franco’s  victory.  Yet  the 
governments  of  London  and  Paris  continued  for  years  to 
engage  in  empty  diplomatic  negotiations  with  Berlin  and 
Rome  to  assure  “nonintervention”  in  Spain.  It  was  a sport 
which  seems  to  have  amused  the  German  Dictator  and 
which  certainly  increased  his  contempt  for  the  stumbling 
political  leaders  of  France  and  Britain — “Little  worms,” 
he  would  shortly  call  them  on  a historic  occasion  when  he 
again  humbled  the  two  Western  democracies  with  the 
greatest  of  ease. 

Neither  Great  Britain  and  France,  their  governments  and 
their  peoples,  nor  the  majority  of  the  German  people 
seemed  to  realize  as  1937  began  that  almost  all  that  Hitler 
had  done  in  his  first  four  years  was  a preparation  for  war. 
This  writer  can  testify  from  personal  observation  that  right 
up  to  September  1,  1939,  the  German  people  were  con- 
vinced that  Hitler  would  get  what  he  wanted — and  what 
they  wanted — without  recourse  to  war.  But  among  the  elite 
who  were  running  Germany,  or  serving  it  in  the  key  posi- 
tions, there  could  have  been  no  doubt  what  Hitler’s  ob- 
jective was.  As  the  four-year  “trial”  period  of  Nazi  rule, 
as  Hitler  called  it,  approached  an  end,  Goering,  who  in 
September  1936  had  been  put  in  charge  of  the  Four-Year 
Plan,  bluntly  stated  what  was  coming  in  a secret  speech  to 
industrialists  and  high  officials  in  Berlin. 

The  battle  we  are  now  approaching  [he  said]  demands  a 
colossal  measure  of  production  capacity.  No  limit  on  re- 
armament can  be  visualized.  The  only  alternatives  are  victory 
or  destruction  . . . We  live  in  a time  when  the  final  battle 
is  in  sight.  We  are  already  on  the  threshold  of  mobiliza- 
tion and  we  are  already  at  war.  All  that  is  lacking  is  the 
actual  shooting.43 

Goering’s  warning  was  given  on  December  17,  1936. 
Within  eleven  months,  as  we  shall  shortly  see.  Hitler  made 
his  fateful  and  inalterable  decision  to  go  to  war. 


The  Road  to  War 


413 


1937:  “NO  SURPRISES” 

In  his  address  to  the  robots  of  the  Reichstag  on  January 
30,  1937,  Hitler  proclaimed,  “The  time  of  so-called  sur- 
prises has  been  ended.” 

And  in  truth,  there  were  no  weekend  surprises  during 
1937.*  The  year  for  Germany  was  one  of  consolidation  and 
further  preparation  for  the  objectives  which  in  November 
the  Fuehrer  would  at  last  lay  down  to  a handful  of  his 
highest  officers.  It  was  a year  devoted  to  forging  armaments, 
training  troops,  trying  out  the  new  Air  Force  in  Spain, t 
developing  ersatz  gasoline  and  rubber,  cementing  the 
Rome-Berlin  Axis  and  watching  for  further  weak  spots 
in  Paris,  London  and  Vienna. 

All  through  the  first  months  of  1937,  Hitler  sent  important 
emissaries  to  Rome  to  cultivate  Mussolini.  The  Germans 
were  somewhat  uneasy  over  Italy’s  flirtation  with  Britain 
(on  January  2 Ciano  had  signed  a “gentleman’s  agreement” 
with  the  British  government  in  which  the  two  countries 
recognized  each  other’s  vital  interests  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean) and  they  realized  that  the  question  of  Austria 
was  still  a touchy  subject  in  Rome.  When  Goering  saw  the 
Duce  on  January  15  and  bluntly  spoke  of  the  inevitability 
of  the  Anschluss  with  Austria,  the  excitable  Italian  dictator, 
according  to  the  German  interpreter,  Paul  Schmidt,  shook 
his  head  violently,  and  Ambassador  von  Hassell  reported  to 
Berlin  that  Goering’s  statement  on  Austria  “had  met  with 
a cool  reception.”  In  June  Neurath  hastened  to  assure  the 
Duce  that  Germany  would  abide  by  its  July  11  pact  with 
Austria.  Only  in  the  case  of  an  attempted  restoration  of 
the  Hapsburgs  would  the  Germans  take  stem  action. 

Thus  placated  on  Austria  and  still  smarting  from  the 
oppostion  of  France  and  Britain  to  almost  all  of  his 

# Wilhelmstrasse  officials  used  to  say  jokingly  that  Hitler  pulled  his 
surprises  on  Saturdays  because  he  had  been  told  that  British  officials  took 
the  weekend  off  in  the  country. 

t In  his  testimony  at  Nuremberg  on  March  14,  1946,  Goering  spoke 
proudly  of  the  opportunities  which  the  Spanish  Civil  War  gave  for 
testing  “my  young  Luftwaffe.  With  the  permission  of  the  .Fuehrer  I 
sent  a large  part  of  my  transport  fleet  and  a number  of  experimental 
fighter  units,  bombers  and  antiaircraft  guns;  and  in  that  way  I had 
an  opportunity  to  ascertain,  under  combat  conditions,  whether  the 
material  was  equal  to  the  task.  In  order  that  the  personnel,  too,  might 
gather  a certain  experience,  I saw  to  it  that  there  was  a continuous 
flow  [so]  that  new  people  were  constantly  being  sent  and  others 
recalled.”  44 


414 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ambitions — in  Ethiopia,  in  Spain,  in  the  Mediterranean 
— Mussolini  accepted  an  invitation  from  Hitler  to  visit 
Germany,  and  on  September  25,  1937,  outfitted  in  a new 
uniform  created  especially  for  the  occasion,  he  crossed 
the  Alps  into  the  Third  Reich.  Feted  and  flattered  as  a 
conquering  hero  by  Hitler  and  his  aides,  Mussolini  could 
not  then  know  how  fateful  a journey  this  was,  the  first 
of  many  to  Hitler’s  side  which  were  to  lead  to  a progressive 
weakening  of  his  own  position  and  finally  to  a disastrous 
end.  Hitler’s  purpose  was  not  to  engage  in  further  diplo- 
matic conversations  with  his  guest  but  to  impress  him  with 
Germany’s  strength  and  thus  play  on  Mussolini’s  obsession 
to  cast  his  lot  with  the  winning  side.  The  Duce  was  rushed 
from  one  side  of  Germany  to  the  other:  to  parades  of  the 
S.S.  and  the  troops,  to  Army  maneuvers  in  Mecklenburg, 
to  the  roaring  armament  factories  in  the  Ruhr. 

His  visit  was  climaxed  by  a celebration  in  Berlin  on 
September  28  which  visibly  impressed  him.  A gigantic 
crowd  of  one  million  persons  was  gathered  on  the  Mai- 
feld  to  hear  the  two  fascist  dictators  speak  their  pieces. 
Mussolini,  orating  in  German,  was  carried  away  by  the 
deafening  applause — and  by  Hitler’s  flattering  words.  The 
Duce,  said  the  Fuehrer,  was  “one  of  those  lonely  men  of 
the  ages  on  whom  history  is  not  tested,  but  who  them- 
selves are  the  makers  of  history.”  I remember  that  a severe 
thunderstorm  broke  over  the  field  before  Mussolini  had 
finished  his  oration  and  that  in  the  confusion  of  the  scat- 
tering mob  the  S.S.  security  arrangements  broke  down  and 
the  proud  Duce,  drenched  to  the  skin  and  sorely  put,  was 
forced  to  make  his  way  back  to  his  headquarters  alone 
and  as  best  he  could.  However,  this  untoward  experience 
did  not  dampen  Mussolini’s  enthusiasm  to  be  a partner  of 
this  new,  powerful  Germany,  and  the  next  day,  after 
reviewing  a military  parade  of  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force 
detachments,  he  returned  to  Rome  convinced  that  his 
future  lay  at  the  side  of  Hitler. 

It  was  not  surprising,  then,  that  a month  later  when 
Ribbentrop  journeyed  to  Rome  to  obtain  Mussolini’s  sig- 
nature for  the  Anti-Comintern  Pact,  a ceremony  held  on 
November  6,  he  was  told  by  the  Duce  of  Italy’s  declining 
interest  in  the  independence  of  Austria.  “Let  events  [in 
Austria]  take  their  natural  course,”  Mussolini  said.  This 
was  the  go-ahead  for  which  Hitler  had  been  waiting. 


The  Road  to  War 


415 


Another  ruler  became  impressed  by  Nazi  Germany’s 
growing  power.  When  Hitler  broke  the  Locarno  Treaty  and, 
in  occupying  the  Rhineland,  placed  German  troops  on  the 
Belgian  border.  King  Leopold  withdrew  his  country  from 
the  Locarno  Pact  and  from  its  alliance  with  Britain  and 
France  and  proclaimed  that  henceforth  Beligum  would  fol- 
low a strict  course  of  neutrality.  This  was  a serious  blow  to 
the  collective  defense  of  the  West,  but  in  April  1937 
Britain  and  France  accepted  it — an  action  for  which  they, 
as  well  as  Belgium,  would  soon  pay  dearly. 

At  the  end  of  May  the  Wilhelmstrasse  had  watched  with 
interest  the  retirement  of  Stanley  Baldwin  as  Prime  Min- 
ister of  Great  Britain  and  the  accession  of  Neville  Cham- 
berlain to  that  post.  The  Germans  were  pleased  to  hear 
that  the  new  British  Prime  Minister  would  take  a more 
active  part  in  foreign  affairs  than  had  his  predecessor  and 
that  he  was  determined  to  reach,  if  possible,  an  under- 
standing with  Nazi  Germany.  What  sort  of  understanding 
would  be  acceptable  to  Hitler  was  outlined  in  a secret 
memorandum  of  November  10,  written  by  Baron  von 
Weizsaecker,  then  head  of  the  Political  Department  of 
the  German  Foreign  Office. 

From  England  we  want  colonies  and  freedom  of  action 
in  the  East  . . . The  British  need  for  tranquillity  is  great. 
It  would  be  profitable  to  find  out  what  England  would  be 
willing  to  pay  for  such  tranquillity.45 

An  occasion  for  finding  out  what  England  would  pay 
arose  in  November  when  Lord  Halifax,  with  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain’s enthusiastic  approval,  made  the  pilgrimage  to 
Berchtesgaden  to  see  Hitler.  On  November  19  they  held 
a long  conversation,  and  in  the  lengthy  secret  German 
memorandum  on  it  drawn  up  by  the  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice 46  three  points  emerge:  Chamberlain  was  most  anxious 
for  a settlement  with  Germany  and  proposed  talks  be- 
tween the  two  countries  on  a cabinet  level;  Britain  wanted 
a general  European  settlement,  in  return  for  which  she 
was  prepared  to  make  concessions  to  Hitler  as  regards 
colonies  and  Eastern  Europe;  Hitler  was  not  greatly  in- 
terested at  the  moment  in  an  Anglo— German  accord. 

In  view  of  the  rather  negative  outcome  of  the  talk,  it 
was  surprising  to  the  Germans  that  the  British  seemed  to 


416 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


be  encouraged  by  it.*  It  would  have  been  a much  greater 
surprise  to  the  British  government  had  it  known  of  a highly 
secret  meeting  which  Hitler  had  held  in  Berlin  with  his 
military  chiefs  and  his  Foreign  Minister  exactly  fourteen 
days  before  his  conversation  with  Lord  Halifax. 

THE  FATEFUL  DECISION  OF  NOVEMBER  5,  1937 

An  indication  of  things  to  come  and  of  the  preparations 
that  must  be  made  to  meet  them  had  been  given  the  com- 
manders in  chief  of  the  three  armed  forces  on  lune  24, 
1937,  by  Field  Marshal  von  Blomberg  in  a directive  marked 
“Top  Secret,”  of  which  only  four  copies  were  made.47 
“The  general  political  situation,”  the  Minister  of  War  and 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces  informed  the 
three  service  chiefs,  “justifies  the  supposition  that  Germany 
need  not  consider  an  attack  from  any  side.”  Neither  the 
Western  Powers  nor  Russia,  he  said,  had  any  desire  for 
war,  nor  were  they  prepared  for  it. 

“Nevertheless,”  the  directive  continued,  “the  politically 
fluid  world  situation,  which  does  not  preclude  surprising 
incidents,  demands  constant  preparedness  for  war  on  the 
part  of  the  German  armed  forces  ...  to  make  possible  the 
military  exploitation  of  politically  favorable  opportunities 
should  they  occur.  Preparations  of  the  armed  forces  for 
a possible  war  in  the  mobilization  period  1937-38  must 
be  made  with  this  in  mind.” 

What  possible  war,  since  Germany  need  not  fear  an 
attack  “from  any  side”?  Blomberg  was  quite  specific.  There 
were  two  eventualities  for  war  ( Kriegsfalle ) “for  which 
plans  are  being  drafted”: 

•Chamberlain  wrote  in  his  diary:  “The  German  visit  [of  Halifax] 
was  from  my  point  of  view  a great  success  because  it  achieved  its 
object,  that  of  creating  an  atmosphere  in  which  it  is  possible  to  discuss 
with  Germany  the  practical  questions  involved  in  a # European  settle- 
ment.” (Keith  Feiling,  The  Ltfe  of  Neville  Chamberlain,  p.  332.) 

Halifax  himself  seems  to  have  been  taken  in  by  Hitler.  In  a 
written  report  to  the  Foreign  Office  he  said:  “The  German  Chancellor 
and  others  gave  the  impression  that  they  were  not  likely  to  embark 
on  adventures  involving  force  or  at  least  war.”  To  Chamberlain  Halifax 
reported  orally,  says  Charles  C.  Tansill,  that  Hitler  “was  not  bent 
on  early  adventures,  partly  because  they  might  be  unprofitable,  and 
partly  because  he  was  busy  building  up  Germany  internally  . . . 
Goering  had  assured  him  that  not  one  drop  of  German  blood  would 
be  shed  in  Europe  unless  Germany  was  absolutely  forced  to  do  it. 
The  Germans  gave  him  [Halifax]  the  impression  ...  of  intending 
to  achieve  their  aims  in  orderly  fashion.”  (Tansill,  Back  Door  to  War , 
pp.  365-66.) 


The  Road  to  War 


417 


I.  War  on  two  fronts  with  the  main  struggle  in  the 
West.  (Strategic  Concentration  “Rot”) 

II.  War  on  two  fronts  with  the  main  struggle  in  the  South- 
east. (Strategic  Concentration  “Gruen") 

The  “assumption”  in  the  first  case  was  that  the  French 
might  stage  a surprise  attack  on  Germany,  in  which  case 
the  Germans  would  employ  their  main  forces  in  the  West. 
This  operation  was  given  the  code  name  “Red”  (Rot).* 

For  the  second  eventuality: 

The  war  in  the  East  can  begin  with  a surprise  German 
operation  against  Czechoslovakia  in  order  to  parry  the  im- 
minent attack  of  a superior  enemy  coalition.  The  necessary 
conditions  to  justify  such  an  action  politically  and  in  the 
eyes  of  international  law  must  be  created  beforehand 
[Emphasis  by  Blomberg.] 

Czechoslovakia,  the  directive  stressed,  must  be  “elim- 
inated from  the  very  beginning”  and  occupied. 

There  were  also  three  cases  where  “special  preparations” 
were  to  be  made: 

I.  Armed  intervention  against  Austria.  (Special  Case 
Otto.”) 

II.  Warlike  complications  with  Red  Spain.  (Special  Case 
“Richard.”) 

III.  England,  Poland,  Lithuania  take  part  in  a war  against 
us.  (Extension  of  “Red/Green.”) 

Case  Otto  is  a code  name  that  will  appear  with  some 
frequency  in  these  pages.  “Otto”  stood  for  Otto  of  Haps- 
burg,  the  young  pretender  to  the  Austrian  throne,  then 
living  in  Belgium.  In  Blomberg’s  June  directive  Case  Otto 
was  summarized  as  follows: 

The  object  of  this  operation — armed  intervention  in  Austria 
in  the  event  of  her  restoring  the  Monarchy — will  be  to 

* .T1,1 3 *s  the  first  of  many  such  code  names  for  German  military  plans 
which  we  shall  meet  in  the  ensuing  narrative.  The  Germans  used  the 
word  Fail,  literally  “Case”  ( Fall  Rot,  Fall  Gruen— Case  Red,  Case 
Green— the  code  names  for  operations  in  the  West  and  against 
Czechoslovakia,  respectively)  and  in  the  beginning,  according  to  the 
arguments  of  the  German  generals  in  Nuremberg,  it  was . merely  the 
designation  commonly  used  by  all  military  commands  for  plans  to 
CrVeii.  hypothetical  situations.  But  as  will  become  obvious  in  the  course 
of  these  pages,  the  term,  as  the  Germans  used  it,  soon  became  a 
designation  for  a plan  of  armed  aggression.  The  word  “Operation” 
would  probably  be  a more  accurate  rendering  of  Fall  than  the  word 
Case.  However,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  the  author  will  go  along 
with  the  word  “Case.” 


418  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

compel  Austria  by  armed  force  to  give  up  a restoration. 

Making  use  of  the  domestic  political  dissension  of  the 
Austrian  people,  there  will  be  a march  to  this  end  in  the 
general  direction  of  Vienna,  and  any  resistance  will  be 
broken. 

A note  of  caution,  almost  of  despair,  creeps  into  this  re- 
vealing document  at  the  end.  There  are  no  illusions  about 
Britain.  “England,”  it  warns,  “will  employ  all  her  available 
economic  and  military  resources  against  us.”  Should  she 
join  Poland  and  Lithuania,  the  directive  acknowledges, 
“our  military  position  would  be  worsened  to  an  unbearable, 
even  hopeless,  extent.  The  political  leaders  will  therefore 
do  everything  to  keep  these  countries  neutral,  above  all 
England.” 

Although  the  directive  was  signed  by  Blomberg  it  is 
obvious  that  it  came  from  his  master  in  the  Reich  Chancel- 
lery. To  that  nerve  center  of  the  Third  Reich  in  the  Wil- 
helmstrasse  in  Berlin  there  came  on  the  afternoon  of  Nov- 
ember 5,  1937,  to  receive  further  elucidation  from  the 
Fuehrer  six  individuals:  Field  Marshal  von  Blomberg,  Min- 
ister of  War  and  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces; 
Colonel  General  Baron  von  Fritsch,  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Army;  Admiral  Dr.  Raeder,  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Navy;  Colonel  General  Goering,  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Air  Force;  Baron  von  Neurath,  Foreign  Min- 
ister; and  Colonel  Hossbach,  military  adjutant  to  the  Fueh- 
rer. Hossbach  is  not  a familiar  name  in  these  pages,  nor 
will  it  become  one.  But  in  the  darkening  hours  of  that  No- 
vember day  the  young  colonel  played  an  important  role. 
He  took  notes  of  what  Hitler  said  and  five  days  later  wrote 
them  up  in  a hightly  secret  memorandum,  thus  recording 
for  history — his  account  showed  up  at  Nuremberg  among 
the  captured  documents  48 — the  decisive  turning  point  in 
the  life  of  the  Third  Reich. 

The  meeting  began  at  4:15  p.m.  and  lasted  until  8:30, 
with  Hitler  doing  most  of  the  talking.  What  he  had  to  say, 
he  began,  was  the  fruit  of  “thorough  deliberation  and  the 
experiences  of  four  and  a half  years  of  power.”  He  ex- 
plained that  he  regarded  the  remarks  he  was  about  to  make 
as  of  such  importance  that,  in  the  event  of  his  death,  they 
should  be  regarded  as  his  last  will  and  testament. 

“The  aim  of  German  policy,”  he  said,  “was  to  make 
secure  and  to  preserve  the  racial  community  and  to  enlarge 


The  Road  to  War 


419 

it.  It  was  therefore  a question  of  space  [ Lebensraum ].” 
The  Germans,  he  laid  it  down,  had  “the  right  to  a greater 
living  space  then  other  peoples  . . . Germany’s  future 
was  therefore  wholly  conditional  upon  the  solving  of  the 
need  for  space.”  * 

Where?  Not  in  some  far-off  African  or  Asian  colonies, 
but  in  the  heart  of  Europe  “in  immediate  proximity  to  the 
Reich.”  The  question  for  Germany  was,  Where  could  she 
achieve  the  greatest  gain  at  the  lowest  cost? 

The  history  of  all  ages — the  Roman  Empire  and  the 
British  Empire — had  proved  that  expansion  could  only  be 
carried  out  by  breaking  down  resistance  and  taking  risks; 
setbacks  were  inevitable.  There  had  never  . . . been  spaces 
without  a master,  and  there  were  none  today;  the  attacker 
always  comes  up  against  a possessor. 

Two  “hate-inspired”  countries.  Hitler  declared,  stood  in 
Germany’s  way:  Britain  and  France.  Both  countries  were 
opposed  “to  any  further  strengthening  of  Germany’s  posi- 
tion.” The  Fuehrer  did  not  believe  that  the  British  Empire 
was  “unshakable.”  In  fact,  he  saw  many  weaknesses  in  it, 
and  he  proceeded  to  elaborate  them:  the  troubles  with  Ire- 
land and  India,  the  rivalry  with  Japan  in  the  Far  East  and 
with  Italy  in  the  Mediterranean.  France’s  position,  he 
thought,  “was  more  favorable  than  that  of  Britain  . . . but 
France  was  going  to  be  confronted  with  internal  political 
difficulties.”  Nonetheless,  Britain,  France  and  Russia 
must  be  considered  as  “power  factors  in  our  political  cal- 
culations.” 

Therefore: 

Germany’s  problem  could  be  solved  only  by  means  of 
force,  and  this  was  never  without  attendant  risk  ...  If  one 

• From  here  on,  the  reader  will  note  that  what  obviously  is  indirect 
discourse  has  been  put  within  quotation  marks  or  in  quotations  in  the 
form  of  extracts.  Almost  all  the  German  records  of  the  remarks  of 
Hitler  and  of  others  in  private  talks  were  written  down  in  the  third 
person  as  indirect  discourse,  though  frequently  they  abruptly  slipped 
into  direct,  first-person  discourse  without  any  change  of  punctuation. 
This  question  posed  a problem  for  American  English. 

Because  I wanted  to  preserve  the  accuracy  of  the  original  document 
and  the  exact  wording  used  or  recorded,  I decided  it  was  best  to 
refrain  from.  tampering  with  these  accounts  by  rendering  them  into 
first-person  direct  discourse  or  be  excluding  them  from  within  quotation 
marks.  In  the  latter  case  it  would  have  looked  as  though  I were  in- 
dulging in  liberal  paraphrasing  when  I was  not. 

It  is  largely  a matter  in  the  German  records  of  verb  tenses  being 
changed  by  the  actual  recorders  from  present  to  past  and  of  changing 

•11  first*Person  pronoun  to  third-person.  If  this  is  borne  in  mind  there 
will  not  be,  I believe,  any  confusion. 


420 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


accepts  as  the  basis  of  the  following  exposition  the  resort 
to  force,  with  its  attendant  risks,  then  there  remain  to  be  an- 
swered the  questions  “when”  and  “where.”  There  were  three 
cases  to  be  dealt  with: 


Case  I:  Period  1943-45 

After  this  date  only  a change  for  the  worse,  from  our 
point  of  view,  could  be  expected.  The  equipment  of  the 
Army,  Navy  and  Airforce  ...  was  nearly  completed.  Equip- 
ment and  armament  were  modem;  in  further  delay  there 
lay  the  danger  of  their  obsolescence.  In  particular,  me  se- 
crecy  of  “special  weapons”  could  not  be  preserved  forever 
Our  relative  strength  would  decrease  in  relation  to  the 
rearmament  ...  by  the  rest  of  the  world  . . . Besides,  the 
world  was  expecting  our  attack  and  was  increasing  its  coun- 
termeasures from  year  to  year.  It  was  while  the  rest  of  the 
world  was  increasing  its  defenses  that  we  were  obliged  to 

take  the  offensive.  . . 

Nobody  knew  today  what  the  situation  would  be  in  me 
years  1943-45.  One  thing  only  was  certain,  that  we  could 
not  wait  longer. 

If  the  Fuehrer  was  still  living,  it  was  his  unalterable  re- 
solve to  solve  Germany’s  problem  of  space  at  the  latest  by 
1943-45.  The  necessity  for  action  before  1943-45  would 
arise  in  Cases  II  and  III. 


Case  II 

If  internal  strife  in  France  should  develop  into  such  a 
domestic  crisis  as  to  absorb  the  French  Army  completely 
and  render  it  incapable  of  use  for  war  against  Germany, 
then  the  time  for  action  against  the  Czechs  had  come. 

Case  in 

If  France  is  so  embroiled  by  a war  with  another  state 
that  she  cannot  “proceed”  against  Germany.  . . . 

Our  first  objective  . . . must  be  to  overthrow  Czechoslo- 
vakia and  Austria  simultaneously  in  order  to  remove  the 
threat  to  our  flank  in  any  possible  operation  against  the 
West  ...  If  the  Czechs  were  overthrown  and  a common 
German— Hungarian  frontier  achieved,  a neutral  attitude  on 
the  part  of  Poland  could  be  the  more  certainly  counted 
upon  in  the  event  of  a Franco-German  conflict. 

But  what  would  France,  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia  do? 
Hitler  went  into  the  answer  to  that  question  in  con- 
siderable detail.  He  believed  “that  almost  certainly  Britain, 
and  probably  France,  had  already  tacitly  written  off  the 
Czechs.  Difficulties  connected  with  the  Empire  and  the 
prospect  of  being  once  more  entangled  in  a protracted 


The  Road  to  Wap 


421 


European  war  were  decisive  considerations  for  Britain 
against  participation  in  a war  against  Germany.  Britain’s 
attitude  would  certainly  not  be  without  influence  on  that 
of  France.  An  attack  by  France  without  British  support,  and 
with  the  prospect  of  the  offensive  being  brought  to  a stand- 
still on  our  western  fortifications,  was  hardly  probable.  Nor 
was  a French  march  through  Belgium  and  Holland  without 
British  support  to  be  expected  ...  It  would  of  course  be 
necessary  to  maintain  a strong  defense  on  our  western 
frontier  during  the  prosecution  of  our  attack  on  the 
Czechs  and  Austria.” 

Hitler  then  outlined  some  of  the  advantages  of  the  “an- 
nexation of  Czechoslovakia  and  Austria”:  better  strategic 
frontiers  for  Germany,  the  freeing  of  military  forces  “for 
other  purposes,”  acquisition  of  some  twelve  million  “Ger- 
mans,” additional  foodstuffs  for  five  to  six  million  Germans 
in  the  Reich,  and  manpower  for  twelve  new  Army  divisions. 

He  had  forgotten  to  mention  what  Italy  and  Russia  might 
do,  and  he  now  returned  to  them.  He  doubted  whether 
the  Soviet  Union  would  intervene,  “in  view  of  Japan’s 
attitude.”  Italy  would  not  object  “to  the  elimination  of  the 
Czechs”  but  it  was  still  a question  as  to  her  attitude  if 
Austria  was  also  taken.  It  depended  “essentially  on 
whether  the  Duce  were  still  alive.” 

Hitler’s  supposition  for  Case  HI  was  that  France  would 
become  embroiled  in  a war  with  Italy — a conflict  that  he 
counted  upon.  That  was  the  reason,  he  explained,  for  his 
policy  in  trying  to  prolong  the  Spanish  Civil  War;  it  kept 
Italy  embroiled  with  France  and  Britain.  He  saw  a war  be- 
tween them  “coming  definitely  nearer.”  In  fact,  he  said,  he 
was  “resolved  to  take  advantage  of  it,  whenever  it  hap- 
pened, even  as  early  as  1938” — which  was  just  two 
months  away.  He  was  certain  that  Italy,  with  a little  Ger- 
man help  in  raw  materials,  could  stand  off  Britain  and 
France. 

If  Germany  made  use  of  this  war  to  settle  the  Czech  and 
Austrian  questions,  it  was  to  be  assumed  that  Britain — her- 
self at  war  with  Italy — would  decide  not  to  act  against 
Germany.  Without  British  support,  a warlike  action  by 
France  against  Germany  was  not  to  be  expected. 

The  time  for  our  attack  on  the  Czechs  and  Austria  must 
be  made  dependent  on  the  course  of  the  Anglo-French- 
Italian  war  . . , This  favorable  situation  . , . would  not 


422  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

occur  again  . . . The  descent  upon  the  Czechs  would  have 
to  be  carried  out  with  “lightning  speed.” 

Thus  as  evening  darkened  Berlin  on  that  autumn  day  of 
November  5,  1937 — the  meeting  broke  up  at  eight-fifteen 
— the  die  was  cast.  Hitler  had  communicated  his  irrevoca- 
ble decision  to  go  to  war.  To  the  handful  of  men  who 
would  have  to  direct  it  there  could  no  longer  be  any 
doubt.  The  dictator  had  said  it  all  ten  years  before  in 
Mein  Kampf,  had  said  that  Germany  must  have  Lebens- 
raum  in  the  East  and  must  be  prepared  to  use  force  to  ob- 
tain it;  but  then  he  had  been  only  an  obscure  agitator  and 
his  book,  as  Field  Marshal  von  Blomberg  later  said,  had 
been  regarded  by  the  soldiers — as  by  so  many  others — as 
“a  piece  of  propaganda”  whose  “large  circulation  was  due 
to  forced  sales.” 

But  now  the  Wehrmacht  chiefs  and  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister were  confronted  with  specific  dates  for  actual  ag- 
gression against  two  neighboring  countries — an  action 
which  they  were  sure  would  bring  on  a European  war.  They 
must  be  ready  by  the  following  year,  1938,  and  at  the 
latest  by  1943—45. 

The  realization  stunned  them.  Not,  so  far  as  the  Hoss- 
bach  records  show,  because  they  were  struck  down  by  the 
immorality  of  their  Leader’s  proposals  but  for  more  practi- 
cal reasons:  Germany  was  not  ready  for  a big  war;  to 
provoke  one  now  would  risk  disaster. 

On  those  grounds  Blomberg,  Fritsch  and  Neurath  dared 
to  speak  up  and  question  the  Fuehrer’s  pronouncement. 
Within  three  months  all  of  the  three  were  out  of  office  and 
Hitler,  relieved  of  their  opposition,  such  as  it  was — and 
it  was  the  last  he  was  to  suffer  in  his  presence  during  the 
Third  Reich — set  out  on  the  road  of  the  conqueror  to  ful- 
fill his  destiny.  In  the  beginning,  it  was  an  easier  road 
than  he — or  anyone  else — had  foreseen. 


10 


STRANGE,  FATEFUL  INTERLUDE: 
THE  FALL  OF  RLOMRERG,  FRITSCH, 
NEURATH  AND  SCHACHT 


the  decision  to  use  armed  force  against  Austria  and 
Czechoslovakia  even  if  it  involved  Germany  in  a war  with 
Great  Britain  and  France,  which  Hitler  laid  down  on  No- 
vember 5,  came  as  such  a shock  to  his  Foreign  Minister 
that  Baron  von  Neurath,  easygoing,  complacent  and  morally 
weak  though  he  was,  suffered  several  heart  attacks.1 

“I  was  extremely  upset  at  Hitler’s  speech,”  he  later  told 
the  Nuremberg  tribunal,  “because  it  knocked  the  bottom 
out  of  the  whole  foreign  policy  which  I had  consistently 
pursued.”2  In  this  frame  of  mind,  and  despite  his  heart 
attacks,  he  sought  out  General  von  Fritsch  and  General 
Beck,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  two  days  later  and  dis- 
cussed with  them  what  could  be  done  “to  get  Hitler  to 
change  his  ideas.”  The  impression  on  Beck  of  Hitler’s  ha- 
rangue, according  to  Colonel  Hossbach,  who  informed 
him  of  it,  had  been  “shattering.”  It  was  agreed  that  Fritsch 
should  again  remonstrate  with  the  Fuehrer  at  their  next 
appointment,  pointing  out  to  him  the  military  considera- 
tions which  made  his  plans  inadvisable,  while  Neurath 
would  follow  up  by  again  stressing  to  Hitler  the  political 
dangers.  As  for  Beck,  he  immediately  committed  to  paper 
a devastating  critique  of  Hitler’s  plans,  which  apparently 
he  showed  to  no  one — the  first  sign  of  a fatal  flaw  in 
the  mind  and  character  of  this  estimable  general  who  at 
first  had  welcomed  the  advent  of  Nazism  and  who,  in  the 
end,  would  give  his  life  in  an  abortive  effort  to  destroy  it. 

General  von  Fritsch  saw  Hitler  on  November  9.  There 
is  no  record  of  their  talk  but  it  may  be  presumed  that  the 

423 


424 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  repeated  his  military 
arguments  against  Hitler’s  plans  and  that  he  got  nowhere. 
The  Fuehrer  was  in  no  mood  to  brook  opposition  either 
from  the  generals  or  from  his  Foreign  Minister.  He  refused 
to  receive  Neurath  and  took  off  for  a long  rest  at  his 
mountain  retreat  at  Berchtesgaden.  It  was  not  until  the 
middle  of  January  that  the  stricken  Neurath  was  able  to 
arrange  an  appointment  with  the  Leader. 

On  that  occasion  I tried  to  show  him  [Neurath  later 
testified  at  Nuremberg]  that  his  policy  would  lead  to  a 
world  war,  and  that  I would  have  no  part  in  it  ...  1 
called  his  attention  to  the  danger  of  war  and  to  the  serious 
warnings  of  the  generals  . . . When  despite  all  my  argu- 
ments he  still  held  to  his  opinions  I told  him  that  he  would 
have  to  find  another  Foreign  Minister  . . .3 

Though  Neurath  did  not  then  know  it,  that  was  pre- 
cisely what  Hitler  had  decided  to  do.  In  a fortnight  he 
would  celebrate  the  fifth  anniversary  of  his  coining  to 
power  and  he  intended  to  mark  it  by  cleaning  house  not 
only  in  the  Foreign  Office  but  in  the  Army,  those  two  cita- 
dels of  upper-class  “reaction”  which  he  secretly  distrusted, 
which  he  felt  had  never  completely  accepted  him  nor 
really  understood  his  aims  and  which,  as  Blomberg,  Fritsch 
and  Neurath  had  shown  on  the  evening  of  November  5, 
stood  in  the  way  of  realizing  his  ambitions.  The  last  two 
gentlemen  in  particular,  and  perhaps  even  the  accommo- 
dating Blomberg,  to  whom  he  owed  so  much,  would  have 
to  follow  the  inimitable  Dr.  Schacht  into  retirement. 

For  the  crafty  financier,  the  early  enthusiast  for  Nazism 
and  backer  of  Hitler,  had  already  fallen. 

Schacht,  as  we  have  seen,  had  devoted  his  energies  and 
his  wizardry  to  financing  Hitler’s  speedy  rearmament  As 
Plenipotentiary  for  War  Economy,  as  well  as  Minister  of 
Economics,  he  had  concocted  any  number  of  fancy 
schemes,  including  the  use  of  the  printing  press,  to  raise 
the  money  for  the  new  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force  and  to 
pay  the  armament  bills.  But  there  was  a limit  beyond  which 
the  country  could  not  go  without  becoming  bankrupt,  and 
by  1936  he  believed  Germany  was  approaching  that  limit. 
He  warned  Hitler,  Goering  and  Blomberg,  but  to  little 
avail,  though  the  War  Minister  for  a time  sided  with  him. 
With  Goering’s  appointment  in  September  1936  as  Pleni- 
potentiary for  the  Four-Year  Plan,  a farfetched  scheme 


The  Road  to  War 


425 

to  make  Germany  self-sufficient  in  four  years — a goal 
which  Schacht  regarded  as  impossible — the  Luftwaffe  chief 
became,  in  fact,  the  economic  dictator  of  Germany.  To  a 
man  as  vain  and  ambitious*  and  as  contemptuous  of  Goe- 
ring’s  ignorance  of  economics  as  Schacht  was,  this  made 
his  own  position  untenable  and  after  months  of  violent  con- 
troversy between  the  two  strong-minded  men  Schacht 
asked  the  Fuehrer  to  place  the  further  direction  of  eco- 
nomic policies  solely  in  his  rival’s  hand  and  to  allow  him 
to  resign  his  post  in  the  cabinet.  To  add  to  his  discourage- 
ment had  been  the  attitude  of  many  of  the  nation’s  leading 
industrialists  and  businessmen,  who,  as  he  later  recounted, 
“crowded  into  Goering’s  anteroom  in  the  hope  of  getting 
orders  when  I was  still  trying  to  make  the  voice  of  reason 
heard.”4 

To  make  the  voice  of  reason  heard  in  the  frenzied  at- 
mosphere of  Nazi  Germany  in  1937  was  an  impossible 
task,  as  Schacht  realized,  and  after  a further  exchange  of 
blows  with  Goering  during  the  summer  in  which  he  de- 
nounced as  unsound  “your  foreign-exchange  policy,  your 
policy  regarding  production  and  your  financial  policy,”  he 
traveled  down  to  the  Obersalzberg  in  August  to  submit  his 
formal  resignation  to  Hitler.  The  Fuehrer  was  loath  to 
accept  it  in  view  of  the  unfavorable  reaction  both  at 
home  and  abroad  which  the  departure  of  Schacht  would 
almost  certainly  bring,  but  the  battered  Minister  was 
adamant  and  Hitler  finally  agreed  to  release  him  at  the 
end  of  two  months.  On  September  5 Schacht  went  on 
leave,  and  his  resignation  was  formally  accepted  on  De- 
cember 8. 

At  Hitler’s  insistence  Schacht  remained  in  the  cabinet 
as  Minister  without  Portfolio  and  retained  the  presidency 
of  the  Reichsbank,  thus  preserving  appearances  and  blunt- 
ing the  shock  to  German  and  world  opinion.  His  influence 
as  a brake  on  Hitler’s  feverish  rearmament  for  war,  how- 
ever, had  come  to  an  end,  though  by  remaining  in  the 
cabinet  and  at  the  Reichsbank  he  continued  to  lend  the 
aura  of  his  name  and  reputation  to  Hitler’s  purposes.  In- 
deed, he  would  shortly  endorse  publicly  and  enthusiasti- 
cally the  Leader’s  first  gangster  act  of  naked  aggression,  for, 

* The  astute  French  ambassador,  Frangois-Poncet,  who  knew  him  well, 
says  in  his  book  The  Fateful  Years  (p.  221)  that  at  one  time  Schacht 
had  hoped  to  succeed  Hindenburg  as  President,  and  even  Hitler,  “should 
things  go  ill  with  the  Fuehrer.” 


426  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

like  the  generals  and  the  other  conservatives  who  had 
played  such  a key  role  in  turning  over  Germany  to  the 
Nazis,  he  was  slow  to  awaken  to  the  facts  of  life. 

Goering  took  over  temporarily  the  Ministry  of  Eco- 
nomics, but  one  evening  in  mid-January  1938  Hitler  ran 
into  Walther  Funk  at  the  opera  in  Berlin  and  casually  in- 
formed him  that  he  would  be  Schacht  s successor.  The 
official  appointment  of  this  greasy,  dwarfish,  servile  nonen- 
tity who,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  played  a certain  role 
in  interesting  business  leaders  in  Hitler  in  the  early  Thirties, 
was  held  up,  however.  For  there  now  bursty  upon  the  Third 
Reich  a two-headed  crisis  in  the  Army  which  was  precipi- 
tated by,  among  all  things,  certain  matters  pertaining  to 
sex,  both  normal  and  abnormal,  and  which  played  directly 
into  the  hands  of  Hitler,  enabling  him  to  deal  a blow  to 
the  old  aristocratic  military  hierarchy  from  which  it  never 
recovered,  with  dire  consequences  not  only  for  the  Army, 
which  thereby  lost  the  last  vestiges  of  independence  which 
it  had  guarded  so  zealously  during  the  Hohenzollem  Em- 
pire and  the  Republic,  but  eventually  for  Germany  and  the 
world. 

THE  FALL  OF  FIELD  MARSHAL  VON  BLOMBERG 

“What  influence  a woman,  even  without  realizing  it,  can 
exert  on  the  history  of  a country  and  thereby  on  the 
world!”  Colonel  Alfred  Jodi  exclaimed  in  his  diary  on 
January  26,  1938.  “One  has  the  feeling  of  living  in  a fate- 
ful hour  for  the  German  people.”8 

The  woman  this  brilliant  young  staff  officer  referred  to 
was  Fraulein  Ema  Gruhn,  and  as  the  year  1937  ap- 
proached its  end  she  must  have  regarded  herself  as  the  last 
person  in  Germany  who  could  possibly  propel,  as  Jodi 
declared,  the  German  people  into  a fateful  crisis  and  exer- 
cise a profound  influence  on  their  history.  Perhaps  only  in 
the  eerie,  psychopathic  world  in  which  the  inner  circle 
of  the  Third  Reich  moved  at  this  time  with  such  frenzy 
would  it  have  been  possible. 

Fraulein  Gruhn  was  the  secretary  of  Blomberg  and 
toward  the  end  of  1937  he  felt  sufficiently  enamored  of 
her  to  suggest  marriage.  His  first  wife,  the  daughter  of  a 
retired  Army  officer,  whom  he  had  married  in  1904,  had 
died  in  1932.  His  five  children  in  the  meantime  had  grown 


The  Road  to  War 


427 

up  (his  youngest  daughter  had  married  the  oldest  son  of 
General  Keitel,  his  protege,  in  1937)  and,  tiring  of  his 
somewhat  lonely  widowerhood,  he  decided  the  time  had 
come  to  remarry.  Realizing  that  for  the  senior  officer  of 
the  Germany  Army  to  wed  a commoner  would  not  go 
down  well  with  the  haughty,  aristocratic  officer  corps,  he 
sought  out  Goering  for  advice.  Goering  could  see  no  ob- 
jection to  the  marriage — had  he  himself  not  married, 
after  the  death  of  his  first  wife,  a divorced  actress?  There 
was  no  place  in  the  Third  Reich  for  the  stodgy  social  prej- 
udices of  the  officer  corps.  Goering  not  only  approved 
what  Blomberg  had  in  mind;  he  declared  himself  ready  to 
smooth  matters  over  with  Hitler,  if  that  were  necessary, 
and  to  help  in  any  other  way.  As  it  happened,  there  was 
another  way  he  could  be  helpful.  There  was  a rival  lover 
involved,  the  Field  Marshal  confided.  To  Goering  that 
was  no  problem.  Such  nuisances  in  other  cases  had  been 
carted  off  to  concentration  camp.  Probably  out  of  consid- 
eration for  the  old-fashioned  morals  of  the  Field  Marshal, 
Goering,  however,  offered  to  ship  the  troublesome  rival  off 
to  South  America,  which  he  did. 

Still,  Blomberg  felt  troubled.  On  December  15,  1937, 
Jodi  made  a curious  entry  in  his  diary:  “The  General  Field 
Marshal  [Blomberg]  in  a high  state  of  excitement.  Rea- 
son not  known.  Apparently  a personal  matter.  He  retired 
for  eight  days  to  an  unknown  place.”6 

On  December  22  Blomberg  reappeared  to  deliver  the 
funeral  oration  for  General  Ludendorff  at  the  Feldherrn- 
halle  in  Munich.  Hitler  was  there,  but  declined  to  speak. 
The  World  War  hero  had  refused  to  have  anything  to  do 
with  him  ever  since  he  had  fled  from  in  front  of  the  Feld- 
hermhalle  after  the  volley  of  bullets  during  the  Beer  Hall 
Putsch.  After  the  funeral  Blomberg  broached  the  matter 
of  his  proposed  marriage  to  Hitler.  The  Fuehrer,  to  his 
relief,  gave  it  his  blessing. 

The  wedding  took  place  on  January  12,  1938,  and  Hitler 
and  Goering  were  present  as  the  principal  witnesses. 
Hardly  had  the  bridal  pair  taken  off  for  Italy  on  their 
honeymoon  than  the  storm  broke.  The  rigid  officer  corps 
might  have  absorbed  the  shock  of  their  Field  Marshal 
marrying  his  stenographer,  but  they  were  not  prepared  to 
accept  his  marriage  to  a woman  with  a past  such  as  now 
began  to  come  to  light  in  all  its  horrific  details. 


428  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

At  first  there  were  only  rumors.  Anonymous  telephone 
calls  began  to  be  received  by  stiff-necked  generals  from 
giggling  girls,  apparently  calling  from  unsavory  cafes  and 
night  clubs,  congratulating  the  Army  for  having  accepted 
one  of  their  number.  At  police  headquarters  in  Berlin  a 
police  inspector,  checking  on  the  rumors,  came  upon  a 
file  marked  “Ema  Gruhn.”  Horrified,  he  took  it  to  the 
police  chief,  Count  von  Helldorf. 

The  count,  a roughneck  veteran  of  the  Freikorps  and 
the  brawling  days  of  the  S.A.,  was  horrified  too.  For  the 
dossier  showed  that  the  bride  of  the  Field  Marshal  and 
Commander  in  Chief  had  a police  record  as  a prostitute 
and  had  been  convicted  of  having  posed  for  pornographic 
photographs.  The  young  Frau  Field  Marshal,  it  developed, 
had  grown  up  in  a massage  salon  run  by  her  mother  which, 
as  sometimes  happened  in  Berlin,  was  merely  a camouflage 
for  a brothel. 

It  was  obviously  Helldorf  s duty  to  pass  along  the  damag- 
ing dossier  to  his  superior,  the  chief  of  the  German 
police,  Himmler.  But  ardent  Nazi  though  he  was,  he  had 
formerly  been  a member  of  the  Army  officer  corps  himself 
and  had  absorbed  some  of  its  traditions.  He  knew  that 
Himmler,  who  had  been  feuding  with  the  Army  High 
Command  for  more  than  a year  and  was  now  coming  to 
be  regarded  by  it  as  more  of  a sinister  threat  than  Roehm 
had  been,  would  use  the  file  to  blackmail  the  Field  Mar- 
shal and  make  him  his  tool  against  the  conservative  gen- 
erals. Courageously,  Helldorf  took  the  police  papers  to 
General  Keitel  instead.  He  apparently  was  convinced  that 
Keitel,  who  owed  his  recent  rise  in  the  Army  to  Blom- 
berg,  to  whom  he  was  attached  by  family  ties,  would 
arrange  for  the  officer  corps  itself  to  handle  the  affair  and 
also  would  warn  his  chief  of  the  peril  he  was  in.  But 
Keitel,  an  arrogant  and  ambitious  man,  though  of  feeble 
mind  and  moral  character,  had  no  intention  of  risking  his 
career  by  getting  into  trouble  with  the  party  and  the  S.S. 
Instead  of  passing  on  the  papers  to  the  Army  chief,  General 
von  Fritsch,  he  gave  them  back  to  Helldorf  with  the 
suggestion  that  he  show  them  to  Goering. 

No  one  could  have  been  more  pleased  to  possess  them 
than  Goering,  for  it  was  obvious  that  Blomberg  now  would 
have  to  go  and  logical,  he  thought,  that  he  himself  should 
succeed  him  as  Commander  in  Chief  o!  the  Wehrmacht — 


The  Road  to  War 


429 

a goal  he  had  long  had  in  mind.  Blomberg  interrupted  his 
honeymoon  in  Italy  to  return  to  Germany  for  the  funeral 
of  his  mother  and  on  January  20,  still  unmindful  of  what 
was  brewing,  appeared  at  his  office  in  the  War  Ministry  to 
resume  his  duties. 

But  not  for  long.  On  January  25  Goering  brought  the 
explosive  documents  to  Hitler,  who  had  just  returned  from 
Berchtesgaden,  and  the  Fuehrer  blew  up.  His  Field  Marshal 
had  deceived  him  and  made  him,  who  was  an  official  wit- 
ness at  the  wedding,  look  like  a fool.  Goering  quickly 
agreed  with  him  and  at  noon  went  off  to  see  Blomberg 
personally  and  break  the  news  to  him.  The  Field  Marshal 
appears  to  have  been  overwhelmed  by  the  revelations  about 
his  bride  and  offered  to  divorce  her  at  once.  But  this, 
Goering  politely  explained,  would  not  be  enough.  The  Army 
Command  itself  was  demanding  his  resignation;  as  Jodi’s 
diary  of  two  days  later  reveals,  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  General  Beck,  had  informed  Keitel  that  “one  cannot 
tolerate  the  highest-ranking  soldier  marrying  a whore.”  On 
January  25,  Jodi  learned  through  Keitel  that  Hitler  had 
dismissed  his  Field  Marshal.  Two  days  later  the  sixty- 
year-old  fallen  officer  left  Berlin  for  Capri  to  resume  his 
honeymoon. 

To  this  idyllic  island  he  was  pursued  by  his  naval  ad- 
jutant, who  provided  the  final  grotesque  touch  to  this  sin- 
gular tragi-comedy.  Admiral  Raeder  had  dispatched  this 
aide,  Lieutenant  von  Wangenheim,  to  demand  of  Blom- 
berg that  for  the  sake  of  the  honor  of  the  officer  corps  he 
divorce  his  wife.  The  junior  naval  officer  was  an  arrogant 
and  extremely  zealous  young  man  and  when  he  arrived  in 
the  presence  of  the  honeymooning  Field  Marshal  he  ex- 
ceeded his  instructions.  Instead  of  asking  for  a divorce  he 
suggested  that  his  former  chief  do  the  honorable  thing, 
whereupon  he  attempted  to  thrust  a revolver  into  Blomberg’s 
hand.  Despite  his  fall,  however,  the  Field  Marshal  seemed 
to  have  retained  a zest  for  life — obviously  he  was  still 
enamored  of  his  bride  notwithstanding  all  that  had  hap- 
pened. He  declined  to  take  the  proffered  weapon,  remark- 
ing, as  he  immediately  wrote  to  Keitel,  that  he  and  the 
young  naval  officer  “apparently  had  quite  different  views 
and  standards  of  life.”  7 

After  all,  the  Fuehrer  had  held  out  to  him  the  prospect 
of  further  employment  at  the  highest  level  as  soon  as  the 


430  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

storm  blew  over.  According  to  Jodi’s  diary,  Hitler  told 
Blomberg  during  the  interview  in  which  he  dismissed  him 
that  “as  soon  as  Germany’s  hour  comes,  you  will  again 
be  by  my  side,  and  everything  that  has  happened  in  the 
past  will  be  forgotten.”  8 Indeed,  Blomberg  wrote  in  his 
unpublished  memoirs  that  Hitler,  at  their  final  meeting, 
promised  him  “with  the  greatest  emphasis”  that  he  would 
be  given  the  supreme  command  of  the  armed  forces  in  the 
event  of  war.® 

Like  so  many  other  promises  of  Hitler,  this  one  was  not 
kept.  Field  Marshal  von  Blomberg’s  name  was  stricken  for- 
ever from  the  Army  rolls,  and  not  even  when  the  war 
came  and  he  offered  his  services  was  he  restored  to  duty 
in  any  capacity.  After  their  return  to  Germany  Blomberg 
and  his  wife  settled  in  the  Bavarian  village  of  Wiessee, 
where  they  lived  in  complete  obscurity  until  the  end  of 
the  war.  As  was  the  case  of  a former  English  King  of 
the  same  era  he  remained  to  the  end  loyal  to  the  wife 
who  had  brought  his  downfall.  That  end  came  with  his 
death  on  March  13,  1946,  in  Nuremberg  jail,  where  he 
was  waiting,  a pitiful,  emaciated  man,  to  testify  in  the 
trial. 

THE  FALL  OF  GENERAL  FREIHERR  WERNER 
VON  FRITSCH 

Colonel  General  Freiherr  Werner  von  Fritsch,  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  a gifted  and  unbending 
officer  of  the  old  school  (“a  typical  General  Staff  charac- 
ter,” Admiral  Raeder  called  him)  was  the  obvious  candi- 
date to  succeed  Blomberg  as  Minister  of  War  and  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces.  But  Goering 
himself,  as  we  have  seen,  had  his  eye  on  the  top  post,  and 
there  were  some  who  believed  that  he  had  deliberately 
pushed  Blomberg  into  his  marriage  with  a woman  whose 
unfortunate  past  he  may  have  had  prior  knowledge  of, 
in  order  to  clear  the  way  for  himself.  If  this  was  true, 
Blomberg  did  not  know  it,  for  during  his  farewell  inter- 
view with  Hitler  on  January  27  he  at  first  suggested  Goe- 
ring as  his  successor.  The  Fuehrer,  however,  knew  his 
old  Nazi  henchman  better  than  anyone  else;  Goering,  he 
said,  was  too  self-indulgent  and  lacked  both  patience  and 
diligence.  Nor  did  he  favor  General  von  Fritsch,  whose 


The  Road  to  War  431 

opposition  to  his  grandiose  plans  on  November  5 he  had 
not  liked  or  forgotten.  Moreover,  Fritsch’s  hostility  to 
the  Nazi  Party  and  especially  to  the  S.S.  had  never  been 
concealed— a circumstance  which  not  only  had  attracted 
the  attention  of  the  Fuehrer  but  had  provoked  in  Hein- 
rich Himmler,  the  S.S.  leader  and  chief  of  police,  a grow- 
ing determination  to  overthrow  this  formidable  antagonist 
who  led  the  Army.* 

Himmler’s  opportunity  now  came,  or,  rather,  he  cre- 
ated it  by  setting  in  motion  a frame-up  so  outrageous  that  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  it  could  have  happened— at  least 
in  1938 — even  in  the  gangster-ridden  world  of  the  S.S. 
and  the  National  Socialist  Party,  or  that  the  German 
Army,  which  after  all  did  have  its  traditions,  would  have 
stood  for  it.  Coming  on  the  heels  of  the  Blomberg  scan- 
dal, it  set  off  a second  and  much  more  explosive  bomb 
which  rocked  the  officer  corps  to  its  foundation  and  set- 
tled its  fate. 

On  January  25,  the  day  on  which  Goering  was  showing 
Hitler  the  police  record  of  Blomberg’s  bride,  he  also  spread 
before  the  Fuehrer  an  even  more  damaging  document. 
This  had  been  conveniently  provided  by  Himmler  and  his 
principal  aide,  Heydrich,  chief  of  the  S.D.,  the  S.S.  Se- 
curity Service,  and  it  purported  to  show  that  General  von 
Fritsch  had  been  guilty  of  homosexual  offenses  under  Sec- 
tion 175  of  the  German  criminal  code  and  that  he  had 
been  paying  blackmail  to  an  ex-convict  since  1935  to  hush 
the  matter  up.  The  Gestapo  papers  seemed  so  conclusive 
that  Hitler  was  inclined  to  believe  the  charge,  and  Blom- 
berg, perhaps  venting  his  resentment  at  Fritsch  for  the 
severe  attitude  the  Army  had  taken  toward  him  because  of 
his  marriage,  did  nothing  to  dissuade  him.  Fritsch,  he 
confided,  was  not  a “woman’s  man,”  and  he  added  that  the 
General,  a lifelong  bachelor,  might  well  have  “succumbed 
to  weakness.” 

Colonel  Hossbach,  the  Fuehrer’s  adjutant,  who  was  pres- 
ent when  the  Gestapo  file  was  shown,  was  horrified  and,  in 
defiance  of  Hitler’s  orders  that  he  was  to  say  nothing  to 

* On  .March  1,  193S,  the  day  Germany  took  over  the  Saar;  I stood  next 
to  r ritsch  in  the  reviewing  stand  at  Saarbruecken  for  some  time  before 
the  parade  started.  Although  he  scarcely  knew  me,  except  as  one  of 
the  many  American  correspondents  in  Berlin,  he  poured  out  a running 
fire  of  sarcastic  remarks  about  the  S.S.,  the  party  and  various  Nazi 
leaders  from  Hitler  on  down.  He  did  not  disguise  his  contempt  for 
them  all.  See  Berlin  Diary,  p.  27. 


432 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Fritsch,  went  immediately  to  the  Army  commander’s  apart- 
ment to  inform  him  of  the  charge  and  to  warn  him  of 
the  dire  trouble  he  was  in.*  The  taciturn  Prussian  noble- 
man was  stupefied.  “A  lot  of  stinking  lies!”  he  blurted  out. 
When  he  had  calmed  down  he  assured  his  brother  officer 
on  his  word  of  honor  that  the  charges  were  utterly  base- 
less. Early  the  next  morning  Hossbach,  fearless  of  the  con- 
sequences, told  Hitler  of  his  meeting  with  Fritsch,  reported 
the  General’s  categorical  denial  of  the  accusations  and 
urged  that  the  Fuehrer  give  him  a hearing  and  the  op- 
portunity of  personally  denying  his  guilt. 

To  this  Hitler,  to  Hossbach’s  surprise,  assented,  and  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Army  was  summoned 
to  the  Chancellery  late  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day. 
He  was  there  to  undergo  an  experience  for  which  his 
long  training  as  an  aristocrat,  an  officer  and  a gentleman 
had  scarcely  prepared  him.  The  meeting  took  place  in  the 
Chancellery  library  and  this  time  Himmler  as  well  as  Goe- 
ring  was  present.  After  Hitler  had  summed  up  the  charges, 
Fritsch  gave  his  word  of  honor  as  an  officer  that  they 
were  completely  untrue.  But  such  assurances  no  longer 
had  much  value  in  the  Third  Reich  and  now  Himmler, 
who  had  been  waiting  for  three  years  for  this  moment, 
introduced  a shuffling,  degenerate-looking  figure  from  a side 
door.  He  must  have  been  one  of  the  strangest,  if  not  the 
most  disreputable,  figures  ever  let  into  the  offices  of  the 
Chancellor  of  Germany.  His  name  was  Hans  Schmidt  and 
he  had  a long  prison  record  dating  back  to  his  first  sen- 
tence to  a boy’s  reformatory.  His  chief  weakness,  it  devel- 
oped, had  been  spying  on  homosexuals  and  then  black- 
mailing them.  He  now  professed  to  recognize  General  von 
Fritsch  as  the  Army  officer  whom  he  had  caught  in  a 
homosexual  offense  in  a dark  alley  near  the  Potsdam 
railroad  station  in  Berlin  with  an  underworld  character  by 
the  name  of  “Bavarian  Joe.”  t For  years,  Schmidt  insisted 
to  the  three  most  powerful  figures  in  Germany,  this  officer 
had  paid  him  blackmail  to  keep  quiet,  the  payments  only 

* This  cost  Hossbach  his  job  two  days  later,  but  not,  as  some  feared, 
his  life.  He  was  restored  to  the  Army  General  Staff,  rose  during  the 
war  to  the  rank  of  General  of  the  Infantry  and  commanded  the  Fourth 
Army  on  the  Russian  front  until  abruptly  dismissed  by  Hitler  by 
telephone  on  January  28,  1945,  for  withdrawing  his  troops  in  defiance 
of  the  Fuehrer’s  orders. 

t The  name  is  supplied  by  Gisevius  in  To  the  Bitter  End,  p.  229. 


The  Road  to  War 


433 


ceasing  when  the  law  again  clamped  him  behind  the  bars  of 
a penitentiary. 

General  Freiherr  von  Fritsch  was  too  outraged  to  an- 
swer. The  spectacle  of  the  head  of  the  German  State,  the 
successor  of  Hindenburg  and  the  Hohenzollerns,  introduc- 
ing such  a shady  character  in  such  a place  for  such  a 
purpose  was  too  much  for  him.  His  speechlessness  only 
helped  to  convince  Hitler  that  he  was  guilty  and  the  Fueh- 
rer asked  for  his  resignation.  This  Fritsch  declined  to  give, 
demanding  in  turn  a trial  by  a military  court  of  honor. 
But  Hitler  had  no  intention  of  allowing  the  military  caste 
to  take  over  the  case,  at  least  for  the  moment.  This  was 
a heaven-sent  opportunity,  which  he  would  not  let  pass, 
to  smash  the  opposition  of  the  generals  who  would  not  bend 
to  his  will  and  genius.  He  then  and  there  ordered  Fritsch 
to  go  on  indefinite  leave,  which  was  equivalent  to  his 
suspension  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army.  The  next 
day  Hitler  conferred  with  Keitel  about  a successor  not  only 
to  Blomberg  but  to  Fritsch.  Jodi,  whose  chief  source  of 
information  was  Keitel,  began  sprinkling  his  diary  with 
entries  which  indicated  that  a drastic  shake-up  not  only  in 
the  Army  Command  but  in  the  whole  organization  of  the 
armed  forces  was  being  worked  out  which  would  at  last 
bring  the  military  to  heel. 

Would  the  senior  generals  surrender  their  power,  which 
though  by  no  means  absolute  was  the  last  that  remained 
outside  the  grip  of  Hitler?  When  Fritsch  returned  to  his 
apartment  in  the  Bendlerstrasse  from  the  ordeal  in  the 
Chancellery  library  he  conferred  with  General  Beck,  the 
Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff.  Some  English  histori- 
ans 10  have  recounted  that  Beck  urged  him  to  carry  out 
a military  putsch  at  once  against  the  Hitler  government, 
and  that  Fritsch  declined.  But  Wolfgang  Foerster,  the  Ger- 
man biographer  of  Beck,  who  had  the  General’s  personal 
papers  at  his  disposal,  states  merely  that  on  the  fateful 
evening  Beck  saw  first  Hitler,  who  apprised  him  of  the 
grave  charges,  then  Fritsch,  who  denied  them,  and  that 
finally,  late  on  the  same  evening,  he  hurried  back  to  Hit- 
ler to  demand  only  that  the  Army  commander  be  given  a 
chance  to  clear  himself  before  a military  court  of  honor. 
Beck  too,  his  biographer  makes  clear,  had  not  yet  attained 
that  understanding  of  the  rulers  of  the  Third  Reich  which 
was  later  to  come  to  him — when  it  was  too  late.  Some  days 


434  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

later,  when  it  was  also  too  late,  when  not  only  Blomberg 
and  Fritsch  were  gone  but  sixteen  of  the  senior  generals 
retired  and  forty-four  others  transferred  to  lesser  com- 
mands, Fritsch  and  his  closest  associates,  of  whom  Beck 
was  one,  did  seriously  consider  military  countermeasures. 
But  they  quickly  abandoned  such  dangerous  thoughts.  “It 
was  clear  to  these  men,”  Foerster  says,  “that  a military 
putsch  would  mean  civil  war  and  was  by  no  means  sure 
of  success.”  Then,  as  always,  the  German  generals  wanted 
to  be  sure  of  winning  before  taking  any  great  risks.  They 
feared,  as  this  German  writer  states,  that  not  only  would 
Goering’s  Air  Force  and  Admiral  Raeder’s  Navy  op- 
pose them,  since  both  commanders  were  completely  under 
the  Fuehrer’s  spell,  but  that  the  Army  itself  might  not 
fully  support  its  fallen  Commander  in  Chief.11 

However,  one  last  chance  was  given  the  ranking  Army 
officers  to  deal  a blow  in  their  turn  to  Hitler.  A prelimi- 
nary investigation  conducted  by  the  Army  in  collaboration 
with  the  Ministry  of  Justice  quickly  established  that  Gen- 
eral von  Fritsch  was  the  innocent  victim  of  a Gestapo 
frame-up  initiated  by  Himmler  and  Heydrich.  It  was  found 
that  the  ex-convict  Schmidt  had  indeed  caught  an  Army 
officer  in  an  unnatural  act  in  the  shadows  of  the  Potsdam 
Station  and  had  successfully  blackmailed  him  for  years. 
But  his  name  was  Frisch,  not  Fritsch,  and  he  was  a bed- 
ridden retired  cavalry  officer  listed  in  the  Army  rolls  as 
Rittmeister  von  Frisch.  This  the  Gestapo  had  known,  but 
it  had  arrested  Schmidt  and  threatened  him  with  death  un- 
less he  pointed  the  finger  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  Army.  The  ailing  Rittmeister  also  was  taken  into  cus- 
tody by  the  secret  police  so  as  to  prevent  him  from  talk- 
ing, but  both  he  and  Schmidt  were  eventually  wrested  from 
the  Gestapo’s  clutches  by  the  Army  and  kept  in  a safe 
place  until  they  could  testify  at  the  court-martial  of  Fritsch. 

The  old  leaders  of  the  Army  were  jubilant.  Not  only 
would  their  Commander  in  Chief  be  vindicated  and  re- 
stored to  his  leadership  of  the  Army.  The  machinations 
of  the  S.S.  and  the  Gestapo,  of  those  two  unscrupulous 
men,  Himmler  and  Heydrich,  who  held  such  unbridled 
power  in  the  country,  would  be  exposed  and  they  and  the 
S.S.  would  go  the  way  of  Roehm  and  the  S.A.  four  years 
before.  It  would  be  a blow  too  to  the  party  and  to  Hitler 
himself;  it  would  shake  the  foundations  of  the  Third  Reich 


The  Road  to  War 


435 


so  violently  that  the  Fuehrer  himself  might  topple  over.  If 
he  tried  to  cover  up  the  crime,  the  Army  itself,  with  a 
clear  conscience,  now  that  the  truth  was  known,  would 
take  matters  in  its  own  hands.  But  once  again,  as  so  often 
in  the  past  five  years,  the  generals  were  outsmarted  by 
the  former  Austrian  corporal  and  then  utterly  defeated 
by  fate,  which  the  Leader,  if  not  they,  knew  how  to  take 
advantage  of  for  his  own  ends. 

All  through  the  last  week  of  January  1938  a tension, 
reminiscent  of  that  of  late  June  1934,  gripped  Berlin.  Again 
the  capital  seethed  with  rumors.  Hitler  had  dismissed  the 
two  top  men  in  the  Army,  for  reasons  unknown.  The  gen- 
erals were  in  revolt.  They  were  plotting  a military  putsch. 
Ambassador  Fran?ois-Poncet  heard  that  Fritsch,  who  had 
invited  him  to  dinner  for  February  2 and  then  canceled 
the  invitation,  had  been  arrested.  There  were  reports  that 
the  Army  planned  to  surround  the  Reichstag,  when  it  met 
to  hear  Hitler’s  fifth-anniversary  speech  on  January  30, 
and  arrest  the  entire  Nazi  government  and  its  hand-picked 
deputies.  Credence  of  such  reports  grew  when  it  was  an- 
nounced that  the  meeting  of  the  Reichstag  had  been  in- 
definitely postponed.  The  German  dictator  was  obviously 
in  difficulties.  He  had  met  his  match  at  last  in  the  un- 
bending senior  generals  of  the  German  Army.  Or  so  the 
latter  must  have  thought,  but  they  were  in  error. 

On  February  4,  1938,  the  German  cabinet  met  for 
what  was  to  prove  the  last  time.  Whatever  difficulties 
Hitler  had  experienced,  he  now  resolved  them  in  a manner 
which  eliminated  those  who  stood  in  his  way,  not  only 
in  the  Army  but  in  the  Foreign  Office.  A decree  which  he 
hastily  put  through  the  cabinet  that  day  and  which  was 
announced  to  the  nation  and  the  world  on  the  radio  shortly 
before  midnight  began: 

“From  now  on  I take  over  personally  the  command  of 
the  whole  armed  forces.” 

As  head  of  state,  Hitler  of  course  had  been  the  Su- 
preme Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces,  but  now  he  took 
over  Blomberg’s  office  of  Commander  in  Chief  and  abol- 
ished the  War  Ministry,  over  which  the  now  moon-struck 
bridegroom  had  also  presided.  In  its  place  was  created  the 
organization  which  was  to  become  familiar  to  the  world 
during  World  War  II,  the  High  Command  of  the  Armed 
Forces  (Oberkommando  der  Wehrmacht,  or  OKW),  to 


436 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

which  the  three  fighting  services,  the  Army,  the  Navy  and 
the  Air  Force,  were  subordinated.  Hitler  was  its  Supreme 
Commander,  and  under  him  was  a chief  of  staff,  with  the 
high-sounding  title  of  “Chief  of  the  High  Command  of  the 
Armed  Forces” — a post  which  went  to  the  toady  Keitel, 
who  managed  to  keep  it  to  the  end. 

To  assuage  the  wounded  feelings  of  Goering,  who  had 
been  confident  of  succeeding  Blomberg,  Hitler  named  him 
a Field  Marshal,  which  made  him  the  ranking  officer  of  the 
Reich  and  apparently  pleased  him  no  end.  To  calm  the 
uneasiness  of  the  public,  Hitler  announced  that  Blomberg 
and  Fritsch  had  resigned  “for  reasons  of  health.”  Thus 
Fritsch  was  got  rid  of  once  and  for  all  even  before  his 
trial  by  a military  court  of  honor,  which  Hitler  knew 
would  exonerate  him.  This  seemed  particularly  outrage- 
ous to  the  senior  generals  but  there  was  nothing  they  could 
do  about  it,  for  they  were  sent  into  the  discard  in  the 
same  decree.  Sixteen  of  them,  including  Generals  von 
Rundstedt,  von  Leeb,  von  Witzleben,  von  Kluge  and  von 
Kleist,  were  relieved  of  their  commands,  and  forty-four 
others,  who  were  regarded  as  less  than  enthusiastic  in 
their  devotion  to  Nazism,  were  transferred. 

As  Fritsch’s  successor  to  command  the  Army,  Hitler, 
after  some  hesitation,  picked  General  Walther  von  Brauch- 
itsch,  who  enjoyed  a good  reputation  among  the  generals 
but  who  was  to  prove  as  weak  and  as  compliant  as  Blom- 
berg when  it  came  to  standing  up  to  the  mercurial  tempera- 
ment of  Hitler.  For  a few  days  during  the  crisis  it  ap- 
peared that  a problem  of  sex  would  prove  Brauchitsch’s 
undoing  as  it  had  that  of  Blomberg  and  Fritsch.  For  this 
officer  was  on  the  point  of  getting  a divorce,  an  action 
frowned  upon  by  the  military  aristocracy.  The  ever 
curious  Jodi  noted  the  complication  in  his  diary.  On  Sun- 
day, January  30,  he  recorded  that  Keitel  had  called  in 
Brauchitsch’s  son  “in  order  to  send  him  to  his  mother  (he 
is  to  get  her  assent  to  the  divorce),”  and  a couple  of 
days  later  he  reported  a meeting  of  Brauchitsch  and 
Keitel  with  Goering  “for  a discussion  of  the  family 
situation.”  Goering,  who  seemed  to  have  made  himself  an 
arbiter  of  the  sex  difficulties  of  the  generals,  promised  to 
look  into  the  matter.  On  the  same  day,  Jodi  further 
noted,  “the  son  of  Br.  returns  with  a very  dignified  letter 
from  his  mother.”  The  inference  was  that  she  would  not 


The  Road  to  War 


437 


stand  in  her  husband’s  way.  Nor  would  Goering  and 
Hitler  disapprove  of  a divorce,  which  the  new  commander 
of  the  Army  had  actually  obtained  a few  months  after 
assuming  his  new  post.  For  both  of  them  knew  that  Frau 
Charlotte  Schmidt,  the  woman  he  wanted  to  marry,  was, 
as  Ulrich  von  Hassel  said,  “a  two  hundred  per  cent  rabid 
Nazi.”  The  marriage  took  place  in  the  following  autumn 
and  was  to  prove,  as  Jodi  might  have  noted  again,  another 
instance  of  the  influence  of  a woman  on  history.* 

Hitler’s  house  cleaning  of  February  4 was  not  confined 
to  the  generals.  He  also  swept  Neurath  out  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  replacing  him  with  the  shallow  and  compliant  Rib- 
bentrop.f  Two  veteran  career  diplomats,  Ulrich  von 
Hassell,  the  ambassador  in  Rome,  and  Herbert  von  Dirksen, 
the  ambassador  in  Tokyo,  were  relieved,  as  was  Papen  in 
Vienna.  The  weakling  Funk  was  formally  named  as  the 
successor  of  Schacht  as  Minister  of  Economics. 

The  next  day,  February  5,  there  were  screaming  head- 
lines in  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter:  Strongest  Concen- 
tration of  All  Powers  in  the  Fuehrer’s  Hands!  For 
once,  the  leading  daily  Nazi  newspaper  did  not  exag- 
gerate. 

February  4,  1938,  is  a major  turning  point  in  the  history 
of  the  Third  Reich,  a milestone  on  its  road  to  war.  On 
that  date  the  Nazi  revolution,  it  might  be  said,  was  com- 
pleted. The  last  of  the  conservatives  who  stood  in  the  way 
of  Hitler’s  embarking  upon  the  course  which  he  had  long 

• According  to  Milton  Shulman  ( Defeat  in  the  West,  p.  10),  Hitler 
himself  intervened  with  the  first  Frau  von  Brauchitscn  in  order  to 
obtain  her  consent  to  the  divorce  and  help  provide  a financial  settlement 
for  her,  thus  putting  the  Army  Commander  in  Chief  under  personal 
obligation  to  him.  Shulman  gives  as  his  source  a Canadian  Army  in- 
telligence report. 

t To  divert  attention  from  the  military  crisis  and  to  save  something 
of  Neurath’s  prestige  both  at  home  and  abroad,  Hitler,  at  Goering’s 
suggestion,  created  the  so-called  Secret  Cabinet  Council  (Geheimer 
Kabinettsrat)  whose  purpose,  said  the  Fuehrer’s  February  4 decree, 
was  to  furnish  him  “guidance  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy.” 
Neurath  was  appointed  its  president,  and  its  members  included  Keitel 
and  the  chiefs  of  the  three  armed  services  as  well  as  the  most  im- 
portant members  of  the  ordinary  cabinet  and  of  the  party.  Goebbels’ 
propaganda  machine  gave  it  much  fanfare,  making  it  look  as  if  it 
were  a supercabinet  and  that  Neurath  actually  had  been  promoted. 
Actually  the  Secret  Cabinet  Council  was  pure  fiction.  It  never  existed. 
As  Goering  testified  at  Nuremberg,  “There  was,  to  be  sure,  no  such 
cabinet  in  existence,  but  the  expression  would  sound  quite  nice  and 
everyone  would  imagine  that  it  meant  something  ...  I declare  under 
oath  that  this  Secret  Cabinet  Council  never  met  at  all,  not  even 
for  a minute.”14 


438  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

determined  to  follow,  once  Germany  was  sufficiently  armed, 
were  swept  away.  Blomberg,  Fritsch  and  Neurath  had  been 
put  in  office  by  Hindenburg  and  the  old-school  conserva- 
tives to  act  as  a brake  upon  Nazi  excesses,  and  Schacht  had 
joined  them.  But  in  the  struggle  for  control  of  the  foreign 
and  economic  policy  and  the  military  power  of  Germany 
they  proved  to  be  no  match  for  Hitler.  They  had  neither  the 
moral  strength  nor  the  political  shrewdness  to  stand  up 
to  him,  let  alone  to  triumph  over  him.  Schacht  quit. 
Neurath  stepped  aside.  Blomberg,  under  pressure  from  his 
own  brother  generals,  resigned.  Fritsch,  though  he  was 
framed  in  gangster  fashion,  accepted  his  dismissal  with- 
out a gesture  of  defiance.  Sixteen  top  generals  meekly  ac- 
cepted theirs — and  his.  There  was  talk  in  the  officer  corps 
of  a military  putsch,  but  only  talk.  Hitler’s  contempt  for 
the  Prussian  officer  caste,  which  he  held  till  the  end  of 
his  life,  proved  quite  justified.  It  had  accepted  with 
scarcely  a murmur  the  officially  condoned  murder  of  Gen- 
erals von  Schleicher  and  von  Bredow.  It  was  swallowing 
supinely  now  the  cashiering  of  its  senior  officers.  Was  not 
Berlin  swarming  with  younger  generals  eager  to  replace 
them,  eager  to  serve  him?  Where  was  the  vaunted  soli- 
darity of  the  Army  officers?  Was  it  not  a myth? 

For  five  years  up  to  this  winter  day  of  February  4,  1938, 
the  Army  had  possessed  the  physical  power  to  over- 
throw Hitler  and  the  Third  Reich.  When  it  learned  on  Nov- 
ember 5,  1937,  where  he  was  leading  it  and  the  nation, 
why  did  it  not  attempt  to  do  so?  Fritsch  himself  gave  the 
answer  after  his  fall.  On  Sunday,  December  18,  1938,  he 
entertained  the  deposed  Ambassador  von  Hassell  at  his 
manor  house  at  Achterberg,  near  Soltau,  which  the  Army 
had  put  at  his  disposal  after  his  retirement.  Hassell  noted 
down  in  his  diary  “the  substance  of  his  views”: 

“This  man — Hitler — is  Germany’s  destiny  for  good  and 
for  evil.  If  he  now  goes  over  the  abyss — which  Fritsch  be- 
lieves he  will — he  will  drag  us  all  down  with  him.  There  is 
nothing  we  can  do.”  18 

With  foreign,  economic  and  military  policy  concentrated 
in  his  hands  and  the  armed  forces  directly  under  his  com- 
mand, Hitler  now  proceeded  on  his  way.  Having  got  rid  of 
Fritsch  without  giving  him  the  opportunity  of  clearing 
his  name,  he  belatedly  afforded  him  the  opportunity  by 


The  Road  to  War 


439 

setting  up  a military  court  of  honor  to  hear  the  case.  Field 
Marshal  Goering  presided  and  at  his  side  were  the  com- 
manders in  chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  General  von 
Brauchitsch  and  Admiral  Raeder,  and  two  professional 
judges  of  the  Supreme  War  Tribunal. 

The  trial,  from  which  the  press  and  the  public  were  ex- 
cluded, began  in  Berlin  on  March  10,  1938,  and  was  sud- 
denly suspended  before  the  day  was  over.  Late  on  the  pre- 
vious night  news  had  come  from  Austria  which  sent  the 
Fuehrer  into  one  of  his  greatest  tantrums.*  Field  Marshal 
Goering  and  General  von  Brauchitsch  were  urgently  needed 
elsewhere. 


* When  Papen  arrived  at  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  thirty-six  hours 
later  he  found  Hitler  still  “in  a state  bordering  on  hysteria.”  (Papen. 
Memoirs,  p.  428.) 


11 

ANSCHLUSS:  THE  RAPE  OF  AUSTRIA 


toward  the  end  of  1937,  due  to  a change  of  jobs  from 
newspaper  to  radio  reporting,  my  headquarters  were  trans- 
ferred from  Berlin  to  Vienna,  which  I had  come  to  know 
as  a youthful  correspondent  a decade  before.  Though  I 
would  spend  most  of  the  period  of  the  next  three  crucial 
years  in  Germany,  my  new  assignment,  which  was  to  cover 
continental  Europe,  gave  me  a certain  perspective  of  the 
Third  Reich  and,  as  it  happened,  set  me  down  in  those 
very  neighboring  countries  which  were  to  be  victims  of 
Hitler’s  aggression  just  prior  to  and  during  the  time  the 
aggression  took  place.  I roved  back  and  forth  in  those  days 
between  Germany  and  the  country  that  for  the  moment 
was  the  object  of  Hitler’s  fury  and  so  gathered  a first- 
hand experience  of  the  events  which  are  now  to  be  de- 
scribed and  which  led  inexorably  to  the  greatest  and  blood- 
iest war  in  man’s  experience.  Though  we  observed  these 
happenings  at  first  hand,  it  is  amazing  how  little  we  really 
knew  of  how  they  came  about.  The  plottings  and  maneuv- 
ers, the  treachery,  the  fateful  decisions  and  moments  of  in- 
decision, and  the  dramatic  encounters  of  the  principal 
participants  which  shaped  the  course  of  events  took  place 
in  secret  beneath  the  surface,  hidden  from  the  prying  eyes 
of  foreign  diplomats,  journalists  and  spies,  and  thus  for 
years  remained  largely  unknown  to  all  but  a few  who  took 
part  in  them. 

We  have  had  to  wait  for  the  maze  of  secret  documents 
and  the  testimony  of  the  surviving  leading  actors  in  the 
drama,  most  of  whom  were  not  free  at  the  time — many 
landed  in  Nazi  concentration  camps — to  tell  their  story. 
What  follows,  therefore,  in  the  ensuing  pages  is  based 
largely  on  the  mass  of  factual  evidence  which  has  been 
accumulated  since  1945.  But  it  was  perhaps  helpful  for  a 
440 


The  Road  to  War 


441 


narrator  of  such  a history  as  this  to  have  been  personally 
present  at  its  main  crises  and  turning  points.  Thus,  it  hap- 
pened that  I was  in  Vienna  on  the  memorable  night  of 
March  11-12,  1938,  when  Austria  ceased  to  exist. 

For  more  than  a month  the  beautiful  baroque  capital  by 
the  Danube,  whose  inhabitants  were  more  attractive, 
more  genial,  more  gifted  in  enjoying  life,  such  as  it  was, 
than  any  people  I had  ever  known,  had  been  prey  to  deep 
anxieties.  Dr.  Kurt  von  Schuschnigg,  the  Austrian  Chancel- 
lor, would  later  recall  the  period  between  February  12  and 
March  1 1 as  “The  Four  Weeks’  Agony.”  Since  the  Austro— 
German  agreement  of  July  11,  1936,  in  which  Schusch- 
nigg, in  a secret  annex  to  the  treaty,  had  made  far-reaching 
concessions  to  the  Austrian  Nazis,*  Franz  von  Papen,  Hit- 
ler’s special  ambassador  in  Vienna,  had  been  continuing 
his  labors  to  undermine  the  independence  of  Austria  and 
bring  about  its  union  with  Nazi  Germany.  In  a long  report 
to  the  Fuehrer  at  the  end  of  1936,  he  had  reported  on  his 
progress  and  a year  later  had  done  the  same,  this 
time  stressing  “that  only  by  subjecting  the  Federal  Chancel- 
lor [Schuschnigg]  to  the  strongest  possible  pressure  can 
further  progress  be  made.”  1 His  advice,  though  scarcely 
needed,  was  soon  to  be  taken  more  literally  than  ever 
he  could  conceive. 

Throughout  1937,  the  Austrian  Nazis,  financed  and  egged 
on  by  Berlin,  had  stepped  up  their  campaign  of  terror. 
Bombings  took  place  nearly  every  day  in  some  part  of  the 
country,  and  in  the  mountain  provinces  massive  and  often 
violent  Nazi  demonstrations  weakened  the  government’s 
position.  Plans  were  uncovered  disclosing  that  Nazi  thugs 
were  preparing  to  bump  off  Schuschnigg  as  they  had  his 
predecessor.  Finally  on  January  25,  1938,  Austrian  police 
raided  the  Vienna  headquarters  of  a group  called  the  Com- 
mittee of  Seven,  which  had  been  set  up  to  bring  about 
peace  between  the  Nazis  and  the  Austrian  government, 
but  which  in  reality  served  as  the  central  office  of  the  illegal 
Nazi  underground.  There  they  found  documents  initialed  by 
Rudolf  Hess,  the  Fuehrer’s  deputy,  which  made  it  clear  that 
the  Austrian  Nazis  were  to  stage  an  open  revolt  in  the 


* See  above,  p.  407. 


442  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

spring  of  1938  and  that  when  Schuschnigg  attempted  to 
put  it  down,  the  German  Army  would  enter  Austria  to 
prevent  “German  blood  from  being  shed  by  Germans.”  Ac- 
cording to  Papen,  one  of  the  documents  called  for  his  own 
murder  or  that  of  his  military  attache,  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral Muff,  by  local  Nazis  so  as  to  provide  an  excuse  for 
German  intervention.2 

If  the  debonair  Papen  was  less  than  amused  to  learn 
that  he  was  marked — for  the  second  time — for  assas- 
sination by  Nazi  roughnecks  on  orders  from  party  leaders 
in  Berlin,  he  was  also  distressed  by  a telephone  call  which 
came  to  him  at  the  German  Legation  in  Vienna  on  the 
evening  of  February  4.  State  Secretary  Hans  Lammers  was 
on  the  line  from  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  to  inform  him 
that  his  special  mission  in  Austria  had  ended.  He  had  been 
fired,  along  with  Neurath,  Fritsch  and  several  others. 

“I  was  almost  speechless  with  astonishment,”  Papen  later 
remembered.8  He  recovered  sufficiently  to  realize  that 
Hitler  evidently  had  decided  on  more  drastic  action  in 
Austria,  now  that  he  had  rid  himself  of  Neurath,  Fritsch 
and  Blomberg.  In  fact,  Papen  recovered  sufficiently  to  de- 
cide to  do  “something  unusual  for  a diplomat,”  as  he  put  it. 
He  resolved  to  deposit  copies  of  all  his  correspondence 
with  Hitler  “in  a safe  place,”  which  turned  out  to  be 
Switzerland.  “The  defamatory  campaigns  of  the  Third 
Reich,”  he  says,  “were  only  too  well  known  to  me.”  As  we 
have  seen,  they  had  almost  cost  him  his  life  in  June  1934. 

Papen’s  dismissal  was  also  a warning  to  Schuschnigg.  He 
had  not  fully  trusted  the  suave  former  cavalry  officer,  but 
he  was  quick  to  see  that  Hitler  must  have  something  worse 
in  mind  than  inflicting  on  him  the  wily  ambassador,  who  at 
least  was  a devout  Catholic,  as  was  he,  and  a gentleman. 
In  the  last  few  months  the  course  of  European  diplomacy 
had  not  favored  Austria.  Mussolini  had  drawn  closer  to 
Hitler  since  the  establishment  of  the  Rome-Berlin  Axis 
and  was  not  so  concerned  about  maintaining  the  little 
country’s  independence  as  he  had  been  at  the  time  of  the 
murder  of  Dollfuss,  when  he  had  rushed  four  divisons  to 
the  Brenner  Pass  to  frighten  the  Fuehrer.  Neither  Britain, 
freshly  embarked  under  Chamberlain  upon  a policy  of 
appeasing  Hitler,  nor  France,  beset  by  grave  internal  po- 
litical strife,  had  recently  shown  much  interest  in  defending 


The  Road  to  War 


443 


Austria’s  independence  should  Hitler  strike.  And  now, 
with  Papen,  had  gone  the  conservative  leaders  of  the  Ger- 
man Army  and  Foreign  Office,  who  had  exercised  some 
restraining  influence  on  Hitler’s  towering  ambitions. 
Schuschnigg,  who  was  a narrow-minded  man  but,  within 
his  limits,  an  intelligent  one,  and  who  was  quite  well  in- 
formed, had  few  illusions  about  his  worsening  situation. 
The  time  had  come,  as  he  felt  it  had  come  after  the  Nazis 
slew  Dollfuss,  to  further  appease  the  German  dictator. 

Papen,  discharged  from  office  though  he  was,  offered  an 
opportunity.  Never  a man  to  resent  a slap  in  the  face  if  it 
came  from  above,  he  had  hurried  to  Hitler  the  very  day 
after  his  dismissal  “to  obtain  some  picture  of  what  was 
going  on.”  At  Berchtesgaden  on  February  5,  he  found  the 
Fuehrer  “exhausted  and  distrait”  from  his  struggle  with  the 
generals.  But  Hitler’s  recuperative  powers  were  consider- 
able, and  soon  the  cashiered  envoy  was  interesting  him  in 
a proposal  that  he  had  already  broached  to  him  a fortnight 
before  when  they  had  met  in  Berlin:  Why  not  have  it  out 
with  Schuschnigg  personally?  Why  not  invite  him  to  come 
to  Berchtesgaden  for  a personal  talk?  Hitler  found  the 
idea  interesting.  Unmindful  of  the  fact  that  he  had  just 
fired  Papen,  he  ordered  him  to  return  to  Vienna  and  ar- 
range the  meeting. 

Schuschnigg  readily  assented  to  it,  but,  weak  as  his  posi- 
tion was,  laid  down  certain  conditions.  He  must  be  in- 
formed in  advance  of  the  precise  points  which  Hitler 
wanted  to  discuss,  and  he  must  be  assured  beforehand  that 
the  agreement  of  July  11,  1936,  in  which  Germany  promised 
to  respect  Austria’s  independence  and  not  to  interfere  in 
her  internal  affairs,  would  be  maintained.  Furthermore,  the 
communique  at  the  end  of  the  meeting  must  reaffirm  that 
both  countries  would  continue  to  abide  by  the  1936 
treaty.  Schuschnigg  wanted  to  take  no  chances  in  bearding 
the  lion  in  his  den.  Papen  hurried  off  to  Obersalzberg  to 
confer  with  Hitler  and  returned  with  the  Fuehrer’s  as- 
surance that  the  1936  agreement  would  remain  un- 
changed and  that  he  merely  wanted  to  discuss  “such  mis- 
understandings and  points  of  friction  as  have  persisted” 
since  it  was  signed.  This  was  not  as  precise  as  the  Austrian 
Chancellor  had  requested,  but  he  said  he  was  satisfied 
with  the  answer.  The  meeting  was  set  for  the  morning  of 


444 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


February  12,*  and  on  the  evening  of  February  1 1 Schusch- 
nigg,  accompanied  by  his  Undersecretary  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, Guidp  Schmidt,  set  off  by  special  train  in  the 
strictest  secrecy  for  Salzburg,  whence  he  would  drive  by 
car  over  the  border  to  Hitler’s  mountain  retreat  on  the 
following  morning.  It  was  to  prove  a fateful  journey. 

THE  MEETING  AT  BERCHTESGADEN : 

FEBRUARY  12,  1938 

Papen  showed  up  at  the  frontier  to  greet  his  Austrian 
visitors  and  in  the  frosty  winter  morning  air  seemed  to 
be,  Schuschnigg  thought,  “in  the  very  best  of  humor.” 
Hitler,  he  assured  his  guests,  was  in  an  excellent  mood  this 
day.  And  then  came  die  first  warning  note.  The  Fuehrer, 
Papen  said  genially,  hoped  Dr.  Schuschnigg  would  not  mind 
the  presence  at  the  Berghof  of  three  generals  who  had  ar- 
rived quite  by  chance:  Keitel,  the  new  Chief  of  OKW, 
Reichenau,  who  commanded  the  Army  forces  on  the 
Bavarian-Austrian  frontier,  and  Sperrle,  who  was  in 
charge  of  the  Air  Force  in  this  area. 

Papen  later  remembered  of  his  guests  that  this  was  “a 
piece  of  information  that  seemed  little  to  their  taste.” 
Schuschnigg  says  he  told  the  ambassador  he  would  not 
mind,  especially  since  he  had  “not  much  choice  in  the 
matter.”  A Jesuit-trained  intellectual,  he  was  getting  on  his 
guard. 

Even  so,  he  was  not  prepared  for  what  now  took  place. 
Hitler,  wearing  the  brown  tunic  of  a storm  trooper,  with 
black  trousers,  and  flanked  by  the  three  generals,  greeted 
the  Austrian  Chancellor  and  his  aide  on  the  steps  of  the 
villa.  Schuschnigg  felt  it  was  a friendly  but  formal  greet- 
ing. In  a few  moments  he  found  himself  alone  with  the 
German  dictator  in  the  spacious  second-floor  study  whose 

* Which  happened  to  be  the  fourth  anniversary  of  the  slaughter  of  the 
Austrian  Social  Democrats  by  the  Dollfuss  government,  of  which  Schusch- 
nigg was  a member.  On  February  12,  1934,  seventeen  thousand  govern- 
ment troops  and  fascist  militia  had  turned  artillery  on  the  workers’ 
flats  in  Vienna,  killing  a thousand  men,  women  and  children  and 
wounding  three  or  four  thousand  more.  Democratic  political  freedom 
was  stamped  out  and  Austria  thereafter  was  ruled  first  by  Dollfuss 
and  then  by  Schuschnigg  as  a clerical-fascist  dictatorship.  It  was  certainly 
milder  than  the  Nazi  variety,  as  those  of  us  who  worked  in  both  Berlin 
and  Vienna  in  those  days  can  testify.  Nevertheless  it  deprived  the 
Austrian  people  of  their  political  freedom  and  subjected  them  to  more  re- 
pression than  they  had  known  under  the  Hapsburgs  in  the  last  decades  of  the 
monarchy.  The  author  has  discussed  this  more  fully  in  Midcentury  Journey. 


The  Road  to  War 


445 


great  picture  windows  looked  out  upon  the  stately,  snow- 
capped Alps  and  on  Austria,  the  birthplace  of  both  these 
men,  beyond. 

Kurt  von  Schuschnigg,  forty-one  years  old,  was,  as  all 
who  have  known  him  would  agree,  a man  of  impeccable 
Old  World  Austrian  manners,  and  it  was  not  unnatural 
for  him  to  begin  the  conversation  with  a graceful  tidbit 
about  the  magnificent  view,  the  fine  weather  that  day,  and 
a flattering  word  about  this  room  having  been,  no  doubt, 
the  scene  of  many  decisive  conferences.  Adolf  Hitler  cut 
him  short:  “We  did  not  gather  here  to  speak  of  the  fine 
view  or  of  the  weather.”  Then  the  storm  broke.  As  the 
Austrian  Chancellor  later  testified,  the  ensuing  two-hour 
“conversation  was  somewhat  unilateral.”  * 

You  have  done  everything  to  avoid  a friendly  policy 
[Hitler  fumed]  . . . The  whole  history  of  Austria  is  just 
one  uninterrupted  act  of  high  treason.  That  was  so  in  the 
past  and  is  no  better  today.  This  historical  paradox  must  now 
reach  its  long-overdue  end.  And  I can  tell  you  right  now, 
Herr  Schuschnigg,  that  I am  absolutely  determined  to  make 
an  end  of  all  this.  The  German  Reich  is  one  of  the  great 
powers,  and  nobody  will  raise  his  voice  if  it  settles  its 
border  problems. 

Shocked  at  Hitler’s  outburst,  the  quiet-mannered  Aus- 
trian Chancellor  tried  to  remain  conciliatory  and  yet  stand 
his  ground.  He  said  he  differed  from  his  host  on  the 
question  of  Austria’s  role  in  German  history.  “Austria’s 
contribution  in  this  respect,”  he  maintained,  “is  con- 
siderable.” 

Hitler:  Absolutely  zero.  I am  telling  you,  absolutely 
zero.  Every  national  idea  was  sabotaged  by  Austria  through- 
out history;  and  indeed  all  this  sabotage  was  the  chief 
activity  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  Catholic  Church.f 

Schuschnigg:  All  the  same,  Herr  Reichskanzler,  many  an 
Austrian  contribution  cannot  possibly  be  separated  from  the 

* Later  Dr.  Schuschnigg  wrote  down  from  memory  an  account  of 
what  he  calls  the  “significant  passages”  of  the  one-sided  conversation, 
and  though  it  is  therefore  not  a verbatim  record  it  rings  true  to 
anyone  who  has  heard  and  studied  Hitler’s  countless  utterances  and 
its  substance  is  verified  not  only  by  all  that  happened  . subsequently 
but  by  others  who  were  present  at  the  Berghof  that  day,  notably  Papen, 
Jodi  and  Guido  Schmidt.  I have  followed  Schuschnigg’s  account  given 
in  his  book  Austrian  Requiem  and  in  his  Nuremberg  affidavit  on  the 
meeting.4 

t It  is  evident  that  Hitler's  warped  version  of  Austro-German  history, 
which,  as  we  have  seen  in  earlier  chapters,  was  picked  up  in  his 
youth  at  Linz  and  Vienna,  remained  unchanged. 


446  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

general  picture  of  German  culture.  Take  for  instance  a man  like 
Beethoven  . . . 

Hitler:  Oh — Beethoven?  Let  me  tell  you  that  Beethoven 
came  from  the  lower  Rhineland. 

Schuschnigg:  Yet  Austria  was  the  country  of  his  choice, 
as  it  was  for  so  many  others  . . . 

Hitler:  That’s  as  may  be.  I am  telling  you  once  more 
that  things  cannot  go  on  in  this  way.  I have  a historic  mis- 
sion, and  this  mission  I will  fulfill  because  Providence  has 
destined  me  to  do  so  . . . who  is  not  with  me  will  be 
crushed  ...  I have  chosen  the  most  difficult  road  that  any 
German  ever  took;  I have  made  the  greatest  achievement 
in  the  history  of  Germany,  greater  than  any  other  German. 
And  not  by  force,  mind  you.  I am  carried  along  by  the 
love  of  my  people  . . . 

Schuschnigg:  Herr  Reichskanzler,  I am  quite  willing  to 
believe  that. 

After  an  hour  of  this,  Schuschnigg  asked  his  antagonist 
to  enumerate  his  complaints.  “We  will  do  everything,” 
he  said,  “to  remove  obstacles  to  a better  understanding,  as 
far  as  it  is  possible.” 

Hitler:  That  is  what  you  say,  Herr  Schuschnigg.  But  I 
am  telling  you  that  I am  going  to  solve  the  so-called  Austrian 
problem  one  way  or  the  other. 

He  then  launched  into  a tirade  against  Austria  for  forti- 
fying its  border  against  Germany,  a charge  that  Schusch- 
nigg denied. 

Hitler:  Listen,  you  don’t  really  think  you  can  move  a 
single  stone  in  Austria  without  my  hearing  about  it  the 
next  day,  do  you?  ...  I have  only  to  give  an  order,  and  in 
one  single  night  all  your  ridiculous  defense  mechanisms 
will  be  blown  to  bits.  You  don’t  seriously  believe  that  you 
can  stop  me  for  half  an  hour,  do  you?  ...  I would  very 
much  like  to  save  Austria  from  such  a fate,  because  such 
an  action  would  mean  blood.  After  the  Army,  my  S.A. 
and  Austrian  Legion  would  move  in,  and  nobody  can  stop  their 
just  revenge — not  even  I. 

After  these  threats,  Hitler  reminded  Schuschnigg  (rudely 
addressing  him  always  by  his  name  instead  of  by  his  tide, 
as  diplomatic  courtesy  called  for)  of  Austria’s  isolation 
and  consequent  helplessness. 

Hitler:  Don’t  think  for  one  moment  that  anybody  on 
earth  is  going  to  thwart  my  decisions.  Italy?  I see  eye  to  eye 


The  Road  to  War 


447 


with  Mussolini  . . . England?  England  will  not  move  one 
finger  for  Austria  . . . And  France? 

France,  he  said,  could  have  stopped  Germany  in  the 
Rhineland  “and  then  we  would  have  had  to  retreat.  But 
now  it  is  too  late  for  France.” 

Finally: 

Hitler:  I give  you  once  more,  and  for  the  last  time,  the 
opportunity  to  come  to  terms,  Herr  Schuschnigg.  Either  we 
find  a solution  now  or  else  events  will  take  their  course  . . . 
Think  it  over,  Herr  Schuschnigg,  think  it  over  well.  I can  only 
wait  until  this  afternoon  . . . 

What  exactly  were  the  German  Chancellor’s  terms? 
Schuschnigg  asked. 

“We  can  discuss  that  this  afternoon,”  Hitler  said. 

During  lunch  Hitler  appeared  to  be,  Schuschnigg  ob- 
served somewhat  to  his  surprise,  “in  excellent  spirits.”  His 
monologue  dwelt  on  horses  and  houses.  He  was  going  to 
build  the  greatest  skyscrapers  the  world  had  ever  seen. 
“The  Americans  will  see,”  he  remarked  to  Schuschnigg, 
“that  Germany  is  building  bigger  and  better  buildings  than 
the  United  States.”  As  for  the  harried  Austrian  Chancel- 
lor, Papen  noted  that  he  appeared  “worried  and  preoc- 
cupied.” A chain  cigarette  smoker,  he  had  not  been  al- 
lowed to  smoke  in  Hitler’s  presence.  But  after  coffee  in 
an  adjoining  room.  Hitler  excused  himself  and  Schusch- 
nigg was  able  for  the  first  time  to  snatch  a smoke.  He  was 
also  able  to  tell  his  Foreign  Undersecretary,  Guido 
Schmidt,  the  bad  news.  It  was  soon  to  grow  worse. 

After  cooling  their  heels  for  two  hours  in  a small  ante- 
room, the  two  Austrians  were  ushered  into  the  presence  of 
Ribbentrop,  the  new  German  Foreign  Minister,  and  of 
Papen.  Ribbentrop  presented  them  with  a two-page  type- 
written draft  of  an  “agreement”  and  remarked  that  they 
were  Hitler’s  final  demands  and  that  the  Fuehrer  would  not 
permit  discussion  of  them.  They  must  be  signed  forth- 
with. Schuschnigg  says  he  felt  relieved  to  have  at  least 
something  definite  from  Hitler.  But  as  he  perused  the  docu- 
ment his  relief  evaporated.  For  here  was  a German 
ultimatum  calling  on  him,  in  effect,  to  turn  the  Austrian 
government  over  to  the  Nazis  within  one  week. 

The  ban  against  the  Austrian  Nazi  Party  was  to  be  lifted, 
all  Nazis  in  jail  were  to  be  amnestied  and  the  pro-Nazi 


448 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Viennese  lawyer  Dr.  Seyss-Inquart  was  to  be  made  Min- 
ister of  the  Interior,  with  authority  over  the  police  and 
security.  Another  pro-Nazi,  Glaise-Horstenau,  was  to  be 
appointed  Minister  of  War,  and  the  Austrian  and  German 
armies  were  to  establish  closer  relations  by  a number  of 
measures,  including  the  systematic  exchange  of  one  hun- 
dred officers.  “Preparations  will  be  made,”  the  final  de- 
mand read,  “for  the  assimilation  of  the  Austrian  into  the 
German  economic  system.  For  this  purpose  Dr.  Fisch- 
boeck  [a  pro-Nazi]  will  be  appointed  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance.” 6 

Schuschnigg,  as  he  later  wrote,  realized  at  once  that  to 
accept  the  ultimatum  would  mean  the  end  of  Austria’s 
independence. 

Ribbentrop  advised  me  to  accept  the  demands  at  once.  I 
protested,  and  referred  him  to  my  previous  agreement  with 
von  Papen,  made  prior  to  coming  to  Berchtesgaden,  and 
made  clear  to  Ribbentrop  that  I was  not  prepared  to  be 
confronted  with  such  unreasonable  demands  . . .6 

But  was  Schuschnigg  prepared  to  accept  them?  That  he 
was  not  prepared  to  be  confronted  with  them  was  obvious 
even  to  a dullard  such  as  Ribbentrop.  The  question  was: 
Would  he  sign  them?  In  this  difficult  and  decisive  mo- 
ment the  young  Austrian  Chancellor  began  to  weaken.  He 
inquired  lamely,  according  to  his  own  account,  “whether 
we  could  count  on  the  good  will  of  Germany,  whether  the 
Reich  government  had  at  least  the  intention  to  keep  its 
side  of  the  bargain.” 7 He  says  he  received  an  answer 
“in  the  affirmative.” 

Then  Papen  went  to  work  on  him.  The  slippery  ambas- 
sador admits  to  his  “amazement”  when  he  read  the  ulti- 
matum. It  was  an  “unwarrantable  interference  in  Austrian 
sovereignty.”  Schuschnigg  says  Papen  apologized  to  him 
and  expressed  his  “complete  surprise”  at  the  terms.  Never- 
theless, he  advised  the  Austrian  Chancellor  to  sign  them. 

He  furthermore  informed  me  that  I could  be  assured  that 
Hitler  would  take  care  that,  if  I signed,  and  acceded  to 
these  demands,  from  that  time  on  Germany  would  remain 
loyal  to  this  agreement  and  that  there  would  be  no  further 
difficulties  for  Austria.8 

Schuschnigg,  it  would  appear  from  the  above  statements, 
the  last  given  in  an  affidavit  at  Nuremberg,  was  not  only 


The  Road  to  War  449 

weakening  but  letting  his  naivete  get  the  best  of  him. 

He  had  one  last  chance  to  make  a stand.  He  was  sum- 
moned again  to  Hitler.  He  found  the  Fuehrer  pacing  ex- 
citedly up  and  down  in  his  study. 

Hitler:  Herr  Schuschnigg  . . . here  is  the  draft  of  the 
document.  There  is  nothing  to  be  discussed.  I will  not 
change  one  single  iota.  You  will  either  sign  it  as  it  is  and 
fulfill  my  demands  within  three  days,  or  I will  order  the 
march  into  Austria.8 

Schuschnigg  capitulated.  He  told  Hitler  he  was  willing  to 
sign.  But  he  reminded  him  that  under  the  Austrian  con- 
stitution only  the  President  of  the  Republic  had  the  legal 
power  to  accept  such  an  agreement  and  carry  it  out.  There- 
fore, while  he  was  willing  to  appeal  to  the  President  to 
accept  it,  he  could  give  no  guarantee. 

“You  have  to  guarantee  it!”  Hitler  shouted. 

“I  could  not  possibly,  Herr  Reichskanzler,”  Schuschnigg 
says  he  replied.10 

At  this  answer  [Schuschnigg  later  recounted]  Hitler 
seemed  to  lose  his  self-control.  He  ran  to  the  doors,  opened 
them,  and  shouted,  “General  Keitel!”  Then  turning  back 
to  me,  he  said,  “I  shall  have  you  called  later.” 11 

This  was  pure  bluff,  but  the  harassed  Austrian  Chancel- 
lor, who  had  been  made  aware  of  the  presence  of  the  gen- 
erals all  day,  did  not  perhaps  know  it.  Papen  relates  that 
Keitel  told  later  of  how  Hitler  greeted  him  with  a broad 
grin  when  he  rushed  in  and  asked  for  orders.  “There  are 
no  orders,”  Hitler  chuckled.  “I  just  wanted  to  have  you 
here.” 

But  Schuschnigg  and  Dr.  Schmidt,  waiting  outside  the 
Fuehrer’s  study,  were  impressed.  Schmidt  whispered  that 
he  would  not  be  surprised  if  the  both  of  them  were 
arrested  within  the  next  five  minutes.  Thirty  minutes 
later  Schuschnigg  was  again  ushered  into  the  presence  of 
Hitler. 

I have  decided  to  change  my  mind — for  the  first  time  in 
my  life  [Hitler  said].  But  I warn  you  this  is  your  very  last 
chance.  I have  given  you  three  additional  days  to  carry 
out  the  agreement.12 

That  was  the  extent  of  the  German  dictator’s  conces- 
sions, and  though  the  wording  of  the  final  draft  was  some- 
what softened,  the  changes,  as  Schuschnigg  later  testified, 


450 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


were  inconsequential.  Schuschnigg  signed.  It  was  Austria’s 

death  warrant.  ,.  ^ 

The  behavior  of  men  under  duress  differs  according  to 
their  character  and  is  often  puzzling.  That  Schuschnigg,  a 
veteran  despite  his  comparative  youth  of  the  rough  and 
tumble  of  politics  which  had  seen  his  predecessor  mur- 
dered by  the  Nazis,  was  a brave  man  few  would  doubt.  Yet 
his  capitulation  to  Hitler  on  February  11,  1938,  under  the 
terrible  threat  of  armed  attack  has  left  a residue  of  un- 
resolved doubts  among  his  fellow  countrymen  and  the 
observers  and  historians  of  this  fateful  period.  Was  sur- 
render necessary?  Was  there  no  alternative?  It  would  be 
a rash  man  who  would  argue  that  Britain  and  France  in 
view  of  their  subsequent  behavior  in  the  face  of  Hitler  s 
aggressions,  might  have  come  to  the  aid  of  Austria  had  Hit- 
ler then  and  there  marched  in.  But  up  to  this  moment 
Hitler  had  not  yet  broken  across  the  German  borders  nor 
had  he  prepared  his  own  people  and  the  world  for  any 
such  act  of  wanton  aggression.  The  German  Army  itself 
was  scarcely  prepared  for  a war  should  France  and 
Britain  intervene.  In  a few  weeks  Austria,  as  a result  of  the 
Berchtesgaden  “agreement,”  would  be  softened  up  by  the 
local  Nazis  and  German  machinations  to  a point  where 
Hitler  could  take  it  with  much  less  risk  of  foreign  inter- 
vention than  on  February  11.  Schuschnigg  himself,  as  he 
later  wrote,  recognized  that  acceptance  of  Hitler’s  terms 
meant  “nothing  else  but  the  complete  end  of  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Austrian  government.” 

Perhaps  he  was  in  a daze  from  his  ordeal.  After  signing 
away  his  country’s  independence  at  the  point  of  a gun  he 
indulged  in  a strange  conversation  with  Hitler  which  he 
himself  later  recorded  in  his  book.  “Does  the  Herr  Reichs- 
kanzler,”  he  asked,  “believe  that  the  various  crises  in  the 
world  today  can  be  solved  in  a peaceful  manner?”  The 
Fuehrer  answered  fatuously  that  they  could — “if  my 
advice  were  followed.”  Whereupon  Schuschnigg  said,  ap- 
parently with  no  sign  of  sarcasm,  “At  the  moment  the  state 
of  the  world  looks  rather  promising,  don’t  you  think?”  13 

Such  an  utterance  at  such  a moment  seems  incredible, 
but  that  is  what  the  beaten  Austrian  Chancellor  says  he 
said.  Hitler  had  one  more  humiliation  to  administer  to  him. 
When  Schuschnigg  suggested  that  in  the  press  release  of 
their  meeting  mention  be  made  that  their  discussion  re- 


The  Road  lo  War 


451 


affirmed  the  July  1936  agreement,  Hitler  exclaimed, 
“Oh,  no!  First  you  have  to  fulfill  the  conditions  of  our 
agreement.  This  is  what  is  going  to  the  press:  Today  the 
Fuehrer  and  Reichskanzler  conferred  with  the  Austrian 
Bundeskanzler  at  the  Berghof.’  That’s  all.” 

Declining  the  Fuehrer’s  invitation  to  stay  for  dinner, 
Schuschnigg  and  Schmidt  drove  down  from  the  mountains 
to  Salzburg.  It  was  a gray  and  foggy  winter  night.  The 
ubiquitous  Papen  accompanied  them  as  far  as  the  frontier 
and  was  somewhat  uncomfortable  in  what  he  terms 
the  “oppressive  silence.”  He  could  not  refrain  from  trying 
to  cheer  his  Austrian  friends  up. 

“Well,  now,”  he  exclaimed  to  them,  “you  have  seen  what 
the  Fuehrer  can  be  like  at  times!  But  the  next  time  I am 
sure  it  will  be  different.  You  know,  the  Fuehrer  can  be 
absolutely  charming.”  * 

THE  FOUR  WEEKS’  AGONY 
FEBRUARY  12-MARCH  11,  1938 

Hitler  had  given  Schuschnigg  four  days — until  Tuesday, 
February  15 — to  send  him  a “binding  reply”  that  he 
would  carry  out  the  ultimatum,  and  an  additional 
three  days — until  February  18 — to  fulfill  its  specific 
terms.  Schuschnigg  returned  to  Vienna  on  the  morning  of 
February  12  and  immediately  sought  out  President  Mik- 
las.  Wilhelm  Miklas  was  a plodding,  mediocre  man  of 
whom  the  Viennese  said  that  his  chief  accomplishment 
in  life  had  been  to  father  a large  brood  of  children.  But 
there  was  in  him  a certain  peasant  solidity,  and  in  this 
crisis  at  the  end  of  fifty-two  years  as  a state  official  he 
was  to  display  more  courage  than  any  other  Austrian. 
He  was  willing  to  make  certain  concessions  to  Hitler 
such  as  amnestying  the  Austrian  Nazis,  but  he  balked  at 
putting  Seyss-Inquart  in  charge  of  the  police  and  the 
Army.  Papen  duly  reported  this  to  Berlin  on  the  evening 
of  February  14.  He  said  Schuschnigg  hoped  “to  overcome 
the  resistance  of  the  President  by  tomorrow.” 

At  7:30  that  same  evening  Hitler  approved  orders 
drawn  up  by  General  Keitel  to  put  military  pressure  on 
Austria. 


* Papen’s  version  (see  his  Memoirs,  p.  420)  is  somewhat  different,  but 
that  of  Schuschnigg  rings  more  true. 


452  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Spread  false,  but  quite  credible  news,  which  may  lead  to 
the  conclusion  of  military  preparations  against  Austria.14 

As  a matter  of  fact,  Schuschnigg  had  hardly  departed 
from  Berchtesgaden  when  the  Fuehrer  began  shamming 
military  action  in  order  to  see  that  the  Austrian  Chan- 
cellor did  as  he  was  told.  Jodi  jotted  it  all  down  in  his 
diary. 

February  13.  In  the  afternoon  General  Kjeitel]  asks 
Admiral  C[anaris]  * and  myself  to  come  to  his  apartment. 
He  tells  us  that  the  Fuehrer’s  order  is  that  military  pressure 
by  shamming  military  action  should  be  kept  up  until  the 
15th.  Proposals  for  these  measures  are  drafted  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  Fuehrer  by  telephone  for  approval. 

February  14.  The  effect  is  quick  and  strong.  In  Austria 
the  impression  is  created  that  Germany  is  undertaking  seri- 
ous military  preparations.16 

General  Jodi  was  not  exaggerating.  Before  the  threat 
of  armed  invasion  President  Miklas  gave  in  and  on  the 
last  day  of  grace,  February  15,  Schuschnigg  formally 
advised  Ambassador  von  Papen  that  the  Berchtesgaden 
agreement  would  be  carried  out  before  February  18.  On 
February  16  the  Austrian  government  announced  a gen- 
eral amnesty  for  Nazis,  including  those  convicted  in  the 
murder  of  Dollfuss,  and  made  public  the  reorganized 
cabinet,  in  which  Arthur  Seyss-Inquart  was  named  Minis- 
ter of  Security.  The  next  day  this  Nazi  Minister  hurried 
off  to  Berlin  to  see  Hitler  and  receive  his  orders. 

Seyss-Inquart,  the  first  of  the  quislings,  was  a pleasant- 
mannered,  intelligent  young  Viennese  lawyer  who  since 
1918  had  been  possessed  with  a burning  desire  to  see 
Austria  joined  with  Germany.  This  was  a popular  notion 
in  the  first  years  after  the  war.  Indeed,  on  November 
12,  1918,  the  day  after  the  armistice,  the  Provisional 
National  Assembly  in  Vienna,  which  had  just  overthrown 
the  Hapsburg  monarchy  and  proclaimed  the  Austrian  Re- 
public, had  tried  to  effect  an  Anschluss  by  affirming  that 
“German  Austria  is  a component  part  of  the  German 
Republic.”  The  victorious  Allies  had  not  allowed  it  and 
by  the  time  Hitler  came  to  power  in  1933  there  was  no 
doubt  that  the  majority  of  Austrians  were  against  their 
little  country’s  joining  with  Nazi  Germany.  But  to  Seyss- 

* Wilhelm  Canaris  was  head  of  the  Intelligence  Bureau  (Abwehr)  of 
OKW. 


The  Road  to  War 

Inquart,  as  he  said  at  his  trial  in  Nuremberg,  the 
Nazis  stood  unflinchingly  for  the  Anschluss  and  for  this 
reason  he  gave  them  his  support.  He  did  not  join  the 
party  and  took  no  part  in  its  rowdy  excesses.  He  played 
the  role,  rather,  of  a respectable  front  for  the  Austrian 
Nazis,  and  after  the  July  1936  agreement,  when  he  was 
appointed  State  Councilor,  he  concentrated  his  efforts 
juded  by  Papen  and  other  German  officials  and  agents, 
in  burrowing  from  within.  Strangely,  both  Schuschnigg 
and  Mildas  seem  to  have  trusted  him  almost  to  the  end. 
Later  Miklas,  a devout  Catholic  as  was  Schuschnigg,  con- 
fessed that  he  was  favorably  impressed  by  the  fact 
that  Seyss  was  “a  diligent  churchgoer.”  The  man’s  Ca- 
tholicism and  also  the  circumstance  that  he,  like  Schusch- 
had  served  in  a Tyrolean  Kaiser  jaeger  regiment 
during  the  First  World  War,  in  which  he  was  severely 
wounded,  seems  to  have  been  the  basis  of  the  trust  which 
the  Austrian  Chancellor  had  for  him.  Schuschnigg,  un- 
fortunately, had  a fatal  inability  to  judge  a man  on 
more  substantial  grounds.  Perhaps  he  thought  he  could 
keep  his  new  Nazi  Minister  in  line  by  simple  bribes.  He 
himself  tells  in  his  book  of  the  magic  effect  of  $500 
on  Seyss-Inquart  a year  before  when  he  threatened  to 
resign  as  State  Councilor  and  then  reconsidered  on  the 
receipt  of  this  paltry  sum.  But  Hitler  had  the  bigger  prizes 
to  dazzle  before  the  ambitious  young  lawyer,  as  Schusch- 
nigg was  soon  to  learn. 

On  February  20  Hitler  made  his  long-expected  speech 
to  the  Reichstag,  which  had  been  postponed  from  Jan- 
uary 30  because  of  the  Blomberg-Fritsch  crisis  and 
his  own  machinations  against  Austria.  Though  he  spoke 
warmly  of  Schuschnigg’s  “understanding”  and  of  his 
warmhearted  willingness”  to  bring  about  a closer  un- 
derstanding between  Austria  and  Germany— a piece  of 
humbug  which  impressed  Prime  Minister  Chamberlain— 
the  Fuehrer  issued  a warning  which,  however  much  lost 
on  London,  did  not  fall  upon  deaf  ears  in  Vienna — and  in 
Prague. 

Over  ten  million  Germans  live  in  two  of  the  states  adjoin- 
mg  our  frontiers  . . . There  must  be  no  doubt  about  one 
tiling.  Political  separation  from  the  Reich  may  not  lead  to 
deprivation  of  rights — that  is,  the  general  rights  of  self- 


454  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

determination.  It  is  unbearable  for  a world  power  to  know 
there  are  racial  comrades  at  its  side  who  are  constantly  being 
afflicted  with  the  severest  suffering  for  their  sympathy  or  unity 
with  the  whole  nation,  its  destiny  and  its  Weltanschauung.  To 
the  interest  of  the  German  Reich  belong  the  protection  of  those 
German  peoples  who  are  not  in  a position  to  secure  along  our 
frontiers  their  political  and  spiritual  freedom  by  their  own 
efforts. 16 

That  was  blunt,  public  notice  that  henceforth  Hitler 
regarded  the  future  of  the  seven  million  Austrians  and  the 
three  million  Sudeten  Germans  in  Czechoslovakia  as  the 
affair  of  the  Third  Reich. 

Schuschnigg  answered  Hitler  four  days  later — on 
February  24 — in  a speech  to  the  Austrian  Bundestag, 
whose  members,  like  those  of  the  German  Reichstag,  were 
hand-picked  by  a one-party  dictatorial  regime.  Though 
conciliatory  toward  Germany,  Schuschnigg  emphasized 
that  Austria  had  gone  to  the  very  limit  of  concessions 
“where  we  must  call  a halt  and  say:  ‘Thus  far  and  no 
further.’  ” Austria,  he  said,  would  never  voluntarily  give 
up  its  independence,  and  he  ended  with  a stirring  call: 
“Red-White-Red  [the  Austrian  national  colors]  until 
we’re  dead!”  (The  expression  also  rhymes  in  German.) 

“The  twenty-fourth  of  February,”  Schuschnigg  wrote 
after  the  war,  “was  for  me  the  crucial  date.”  He  awaited 
anxiously  the  Fuehrer’s  reaction  to  his  defiant  speech. 
Papen  telegraphed  to  Berlin  the  next  day  advising  the 
Foreign  Office  that  the  speech  should  not  be  taken  too 
seriously.  Schuschnigg,  he  said,  had  expressed  his  rather 
strong  nationalist  feelings  in  order  to  retrieve  his  do- 
mestic position;  there  were  plots  in  Vienna  to  overthrow 
him  because  of  his  concessions  at  Berchtesgaden.  In  the 
meantime,  Papen  informed  Berlin,  “the  work  of  Seyss- 
Inquart  ...  is  proceeding  according  to  plan.”  7 The  next 
day  Papen,  his  long  years  of  devious  work  in  Austria  near- 
ing fruition,  took  formal  leave  of  the  Austrian  Chancellor 
and  set  off  for  Kitzbuehl  to  do  some  skiing. 

Hitler’s  speech  of  February  20,  which  had  been  broad- 
cast by  the  Austrian  radio  network,  had  set  off  a series 
of  massive  Nazi  demonstrations  throughout  Austria.  On 
February  24,  during  the  broadcast  of  Schuschnigg’s  reply, 
a wild  mob  of  twenty  thousand  Nazis  in  Graz  had  invaded 
the  town  square,  torn  down  the  loudspeakers,  hauled  down 


The  Road  to  War  455 

the  Austrian  flag  and  raised  the  swastika  banner  of  Ger- 
many. With  Seyss-Inquart  in  personal  command  of  the 
police,  no  effort  was  made  to  curb  the  Nazi  outbreaks. 
Schuschnigg’s  government  was  breaking  down.  Not  only 
political  but  economic  chaos  was  setting  in.  There  were 
large  withdrawals  of  accounts  from  the  banks  both  from 
abroad  and  by  the  local  people.  Cancellation  of  orders 
from  uneasy  foreign  firms  poured  into  Vienna.  The  foreign 
tourists,  one  of  the  main  props  of  the  Austrian  econ- 
omy, were  being  frightened  away.  Toscanini  cabled  from 
New  York  that  he  was  canceling  his  appearance  at  the 
Salzburg  Festival,  which  drew  tens  of  thousands  of  tourists 
each^  summer,  ‘ because  of  political  developments  in  Aus- 
tna.  The  situation  was  becoming  so  desperate  that  Otto 
of  Hapsburg,  the  exiled  youthful  pretender  to  the  throne, 
sent  a letter  from  his  home  in  Belgium  and,  as  Schuschnigg 
later  revealed,  implored  him  on  his  old  oath  of  allegiance 
as  a former  officer  of  the  Imperial  Army  to  appoint  him 
as  Chancellor  if  he  thought  such  a step  might  save  Austria. 

In  his  desperation  Schuschnigg  turned  to  the  Austrian 
workers  whose  free  trade  unions  and  political  party,  the 
Socisd  Democrats,  he  had  kept  suppressed  after  Dollfuss 
had  brutally  smashed  them  in  1934.  These  people  had 
represented  42  per  cent  of  the  Austrian  electorate,  and  if 
at  any  time  during  the  past  four  years  the  Chancellor  had 
been  able  to  see  beyond  the  narrow  horizons  of  his  own 
clerical-fascist  dictatorship  and  had  enlisted  their  sup- 
port  for  a moderate,  anti-Nazi  democratic  coalition  the 
Nazis,  a relatively  small  minority,  could  have  been  easily 
handled.  But  Schuschnigg  had  lacked  the  stature  to  take 
such  a step.  A decent,  upright  man  as  .a  human  being,  he 
had  become  possessed,  as  had  certain  others  in  Europe, 
with  a contempt  for  Western  democracy  and  a passion  for 
authoritarian  one-party  rule. 

Out  of  the  factories  and  the  prisons,  from  which  many 
of  them  recently  had  been  released  along  with  the  Nazis, 
the  Social  Democrats  came  in  a body  on  March  4 to 
respond  to  the  Chancellor’s  call.  Despite  all  that  had 
happened  they  said  they  were  ready  to  help  the  govern- 
ment defend  the  nation’s  independence.  All  they  asked 
was  what  the  Chancellor  had  already  conceded  to  the 
Nazis:  the  right  to  have  their  own  political  party  and 


456  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

preach  their  own  principles.  Schuschnigg  agreed,  but  it 
was  too  late. 

On  March  3 the  always  well-informed  General  Jodi 
noted  in  his  diary:  “The  Austrian  question  is  becoming 
critical.  100  officers  shall  be  dispatched  here.  The  Fuehrer 
wants  to  see  them  personally.  They  should  not  see  to  it 
that  the  Austrian  armed  forces  will  fight  better  against 
us,  but  rather  that  they  do  not  fight  at  all.” 

At  this  crucial  moment,  Schuschnigg  decided  to  make 
one  more  final,  desperate  move  which  he  had  been  mull- 
ing over  in  his  mind  since  the  last  days  of  February 
when  the  Nazis  began  to  take  over  in  the  provinces.  He 
would  hold  a plebiscite.  He  would  ask  the  Austrian  people 
whether  they  were  for  a “free,  independent,  social, 
Christian  and  united  Austria — Ja  oder  Nein?”  * 

I felt  that  the  moment  for  a clear  decision  had  come  [he 
wrote  later].  It  seemed  irresponsible  to  wait  with  fettered 
hands  until,  in  the  course  of  some  weeks,  we  should  be 
gagged  as  well.  The  gamble  now  was  for  stakes  which  de- 
manded the  ultimate  and  supreme  effort.19 

Shortly  after  his  return  from  Berchtesgaden,  Schuschnigg 
had  apprised  Mussolini,  Austria’s  protector,  of  Hitler’s 
threats  and  had  received  an  immediate  reply  from  the 
Duce  that  Italy’s  position  on  Austria  remained  unchanged. 
Now  on  March  7 he  sent  his  military  attache  in  Rome 
to  Mussolini  to  inform  him  that  in  view  of  events  he 
“was  probably  going  to  have  to  resort  to  a plebiscite.”  The 
Italian  dictator  answered  that  it  was  mistake — “C’e  un 
errore!”  He  advised  Schuschnigg  to  hold  to  his  previous 
course.  Things  were  improving;  an  impending  relaxation 
of  relations  between  Rome  and  London  would  do  much 
to  ease  the  pressure.  It  was  the  last  Schuschnigg  ever 
heard  from  Mussolini. 

On  the  evening  of  March  9,  Schuschnigg  announced  in 
a speech  at  Innsbruck  that  a plebiscite  would  be  held  in 
four  days — on  Sunday,  March  13.  The  unexpected  news 

* According  to  the  testimony  of  President  Miklas  during  a trial  of 
an  Austrian  Nazi  in  Vienna  after  the  war,  the  plebiscite  was  suggested 
to  Schuschnigg  by  France.  Papen  in  his  memoirs  suggests  that  the 
French  minister  in  Vienna,  M.  Puaux,  a close  personal  friend  of 
the  Chancellor,  was  the  “father  of  the  plebiscite  idea.”  He  concedes, 
however,  that  Schuschnigg  certainly  adopted  it  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility.18 


The  Road  to  War 


457 

sent  Adolf  Hitler  into  a fit  of  fury.  Jodi’s  diary  entry  of 
March  10  described  the  initial  reaction  in  Berlin: 

By  surprise  and  without  consulting  his  Ministers,  Schusch- 
nigg  ordered  a plebiscite  for  Sunday,  March  13  . . . 

Fuehrer  is  determined  not  to  tolerate  it.  The  same  night, 
March  9 to  10,  he  calls  for  Goering.  General  v.  Reichenau  is 
called  back  from  Cairo  Olympic  Committee.  General  v. 
Schobert  [commander  of  the  Munich  Military  District  on 
the  Austrian  border]  is  ordered  to  come,  as  well  as  [Aus- 
trian] Minister  Glaise-Horstenau,  who  is  ...  in  the 
Palatinate  . . . Ribbentrop  is  being  detained  in  London. 
Neurath  takes  over  the  Foreign  Office.20 

The  next  day,  Thursday,  March  10,  there  was  a great 
bustle  in  Berlin.  Hitler  had  decided  on  a military  occupa- 
tion of  Austria  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  his  generals 
were  taken  by  surprise.  If  Schuschnigg’s  plebiscite  on 
Sunday  were  to  be  prevented  by  force  the  Army  would 
have  to  move  into  Austria  by  Saturday,  and  there  were 
no  plans  for  such  a hasty  move.  Hitler  summoned  Keitel 
for  10  a.m.,  but  before  hurrying  to  the  Fuehrer  the  Gen- 
eral conferred  with  Jodi  and  General  Max  von  Viebahn, 
chief  of  the  Fuehrungsstab  (Operations  Staff)  of  OKW. 
The  resourceful  Jodi  remembered  Special  Case  Otto 
which  had  been  drawn  up  to  counter  an  attempt  to  place 
Otto  of  Hapsburg  on  the  Austrian  throne.  Since  it  was 
the  only  plan  that  existed  for  military  action  against  Aus- 
tria, Hitler  decided  it  would  have  to  do.  “Prepare  Case 
Otto,”  he  ordered. 

Keitel  raced  back  to  OKW  headquarters  in  the  Bend- 
lerstrasse  to  confer  with  General  Beck,  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff.  When  he  asked  for  details  of  the  Otto 
plan  Beck  replied,  “We  have  prepared  nothing,  nothing 
has  been  done,  nothing  at  all.”  Beck  in  turn  was  sum- 
moned to  the  Reich  Chancellery.  Seizing  General  von 
Manstein,  who  was  about  to  leave  Berlin  to  take  up  a 
divisional  post,  he  drove  with  him  over  to  see  Hitler,  who 
told  them  the  Army  must  be  ready  to  march  into  Aus- 
tria by  Saturday.  Neither  of  the  generals  offered  any  ob- 
jection to  this  proposal  for  armed  aggression.  They  were 
merely  concerned  with  the  difficulty  of  improvising  mili- 
tary action  on  such  short  notice.  Manstein,  returning  to 
the  Bendlerstrasse,  set  to  work  to  draft  the  necessary 
orders,  finishing  his  task  within  five  hours,  at  6 p.m. 


458 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

At  6:30  P.M.,  according  to  Jodi’s  diary,  mobilization 
orders  went  out  to  three  Army  corps  and  the  Air  Force. 
At  2 a.m.  the  next  morning,  March  11,  Hitler  issued 
Directive  Number  One  for  Operation  Otto.  Such  was  his 
haste  that  he  neglected  to  sign  it,  and  his  signature  was 
not  obtained  until  1 p.m. 

top  SECRET 

1.  If  other  measures  prove  unsuccessful,  I intend  to  in- 
vade Austria  with  armed  forces  to  establish  constitutional 
conditions  and  to  prevent  further  outrages  against  the  pro- 
German  population. 

2.  The  whole  operation  will  be  directed  by  myself.  . . . 

4.  The  forces  of  the  Army  and  Air  Force  detailed  for  this 
operation  must  be  ready  for  invasion  on  March  12,  1938, 
at  the  latest  by  12:00  hours  . . . 

5.  The  behavior  of  the  troops  must  give  the  impression 
that  we  do  not  want  to  wage  war  against  our  Austrian  broth- 
ers. . . . Therefore  any  provocation  is  to  be  avoided.  If,  how- 
ever, resistance  is  offered  it  must  be  broken  ruthlessly  by 
force  of  arms.  . . ,21 

A few  hours  later  Jodi  issued  supplemental  “top-secret” 
orders  on  behalf  of  the  Chief  of  the  Supreme  Command 
of  the  Armed  Forces: 

1.  If  Czechoslovakian  troops  or  militia  units  are  encountered 
in  Austria,  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  hostile. 

2.  The  Italians  are  everywhere  to  be  treated  as  friends,  espe- 
cially as  Mussolini  has  declared  himself  disinterested  in  the 
solution  of  the  Austrian  question.22 

Hitler  had  been  worried  about  Mussolini.  On  the  after- 
noon of  March  10,  as  soon  as  he  had  decided  on  military 
invasion,  he  had  sent  off  by  special  plane  Prince  Philip 
of  Hesse,  with  a letter  to  the  Duce  (dated  March  11)  in- 
forming him  of  the  action  he  contemplated  and  ask- 
ing for  the  Italian  dictator’s  understanding.  The  letter,  a 
tissue  of  lies  concerning  his  treatment  of  Schuschnigg 
and  conditions  in  Austria,  which  he  assured  the  Duce 
were  “approaching  a state  of  anarchy,”  began  with  such 
a fraudulent  argument  that  Hitler  had  it  omitted  when 
the  letter  was  later  published  in  Germany.*  He  stated  that 
Austria  and  Czechoslovakia  were  plotting  to  restore  the 
Hapsburgs  and  preparing  “to  throw  the  weight  of  a mass 


* The  stricken  passages  were  found  after  the  war  in  the  archives  of 
the  Italian  Foreign  Ministry. 


The  Road  to  War 


459 


of  at  least  twenty  million  men  against  Germany.”  He  then 
outlined  his  demands  to  Schuschnigg,  which,  he  assured 
Mussolini,  “were  more  than  moderate,”  told  of  Schusch- 
mgg’s  failure  to  carry  them  out  and  spoke  of  the  “mock- 
ery ’ of  “a  so-called  plebiscite.” 

In  my  responsibility  as  Fuehrer  and  Chancellor  of  the 
German  Reich  and  likewise  as  a son  of  this  soil,  I can  no 
longer  remain  passive  in  the  face  of  these  developments 

I am  now  determined  to  restore  law  and  order  in  my 
homeland  and  enable  the  people  to  decide  their  own  fate 
according  to  their  judgment  in  an  unmistakable,  clear  and 
open  manner.  . . . 

Whatever  the  manner  may  be  in  which  this  plebiscite  is  to 
be  carried  out,  I now  wish  solemnly  to  assure  Your  Excel- 
lency,  as  the  Duce  of  Fascist  Italy: 

1.  Consider  this  step  only  as  one  of  national  self-defense 
and  therefore  as  an  act  that  any  man  of  character  would  do 
m the  same  way,  were  he  in  my  position.  You  too,  Excellency 
could  not  act  differently  if  the  fate  of  Italians  were  at 

fa  ^ a,cntical  hour  for  My  I proved  to  you  the  stead- 
fastness  of  my  sympathy.  Do  not  doubt  that  in  the  future 
there  will  be  no  change  in  this  respect. 

3 Whatever  the  consequences  of  the  coming  events  may 
FVanrPhaVeHdraWn  j defimte  boundary  between  Germany  and 

*"*  “ be'W“"  I“1' 

Always  in  friendship. 

Yours, 

Adolf  Hitler  “ 

THE  COLLAPSE  OF  SCHUSCHNIGG 

• of.  1116  feverish  goings  on  over  the  border 

in  the  Third  Reich,  Dr.  Schuschnigg  went  to  bed  on  the 
evening  of  March  10  firmly  convinced,  as  he  later  testi- 
“ed;  “at  the  plebiscite  would  be  a success  for  Austria  and 
that  the  Nazis  “would  present  no  formidable  obstacle  ” f 

S80S8?W®s 

Plebiscite  had  been  "‘TutSl  £? 


460 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Indeed,  that  evening  Dr.  Seyss-Inquart  had  assured 
him  that  he  would  support  the  plebiscite  and  even  broad- 
cast a speech  in  its  favor. 

At  half  past  five  on  the  morning  of  Friday,  March 
11,  the  Austrian  Chancellor  was  wakened  by  the  ringing 
of  the  telephone  at  his  bedside.  Dr.  Skubl,  the  Austrian 
chief  of  police,  was  speaking.  The  Germans  had  closed  the 
border  at  Salzburg,  he  said.  Rail  traffic  between  the  two 
countries  had  been  halted.  German  troops  were  reported 
concentrating  on  the  Austrian  frontier. 

By  6:15  Schuschnigg  was  on  his  way  to  his  office  at  the 
Ballhausplatz,  but  he  decided  to  stop  first  at  St.  Stephen’s 
Cathedral.  There  in  the  first  dim  light  of  dawn  while  early 
mass  was  being  read  he  sat  restlessly  in  his  pew  thinking 
of  the  ominous  message  from  the  chief  of  police.  “I  was 
not  quite  sure  what  it  meant,”  he  later  recalled.  “I  only 
knew  that  it  would  bring  some  change.”  He  gazed  at  the 
candles  burning  in  front  of  the  image  of  Our  Lady  of 
Perpetual  Succor,  looked  furtively  around  and  then  made 
the  sign  of  the  cross,  as  countless  Viennese  had  done 
before  this  figure  in  past  times  of  stress. 

At  the  Chancellery  all  was  quiet;  not  even  any  disturb- 
ing dispatches  had  arrived  during  the  night  from  Aus- 
tria’s diplomats  abroad.  He  called  police  headquarters  and 
asked  that  as  a precautionary  measure  a police  cordon 
be  thrown  around  the  Inner  City  and  the  government 
buildings.  He  also  convoked  his  cabinet  colleagues.  Only 
Seyss-Inquart  failed  to  show  up.  Schuschnigg  could  not 
locate  him  anywhere.  Actually  the  Nazi  Minister  was  out 
at  the  Vienna  airport.  Papen,  summarily  summoned  to 
Berlin  the  night  before,  had  departed  by  special  plane 
at  6 a.m.  and  Seyss  had  seen  him  off.  Now  the  Number 
One  quisling  was  waiting  for  the  Number  Two — Glaise- 
Horstenau,  like  Seyss  a minister  in  Schuschnigg’s  cabi- 
net, like  him  already  deep  in  treason,  who  was  due  to 
arrive  from  Berlin  with  Hitler’s  orders  on  what  they  were 
to  do  about  the  plebiscite. 

The  orders  were  to  call  it  off,  and  these  were  duly 

campaigning  even  if  the  opposition  groups,  the  Nazis  and  the  Social 
Democrats,  had  been  free  to  do  so.  The  Social  Democrats  undoubtedly 
would  have  voted  Ja,  since  they  regarded  Schuschnigg  as  a lesser 
evil  than  Hitler  and  moreover  had  been  promised  the  restoration  of 
political  freedom.  There  is  no  question  that  their  vote  would  have 
given  Schuschnigg  a victory. 


The  Road  to  War  4gj 

presented  to  Schuschnigg  by  the  two  gentlemen  at  10 
a.m.  along  with  the  information  that  Hitler  was  furious. 
After  several  hours  of  consultations  with  President  Miklas, 
his  cabinet  colleagues  and  Dr.  Skubl,  Schuschnigg  agreed 
to  cancel  the  plebiscite.  The  police  chief  had  reluctantly 
told  him  that  the  police,  liberally  sprinkled  with  Nazis 
who  had  been  restored  to  their  posts  in  accordance  with 
the  Berchtesgaden  ultimatum,  could  no  longer  be  counted 
on  by  the  Government.  On  the  other  hand,  Schuschnigg 
felt  sure  that  the  Army  and  the  militia  of  the  Patriotic 
Front  the  official  authoritarian  party  in  Austria — would 
fight.  But  at  this  crucial  moment  Schuschnigg  decided — 
he  says,  in  fact,  that  his  mind  had  long  been  made  up  on 
the  matter — that  he  would  not  offer  resistance  to  Hitler 
if  it  meant  spilling  German  blood.  Hitler  was  quite  will- 
ing to  do  this,  but  Schuschnigg  shrank  back  from  the  very 
prospect. 

At  2 p.m.  he  called  in  Seyss-Inquart  and  told  him  that 
he  was  calling  off  the  plebiscite.  The  gentle  Judas  im- 
mediately made  for  the  telephone  to  inform  Goering  in 
erlm.  But  in  the  Nazi  scheme  of  things  one  concession 
from  a yielding  opponent  must  lead  quickly  to  another. 
Goering  and  Hitler  then  and  there  began  raising  the  ante. 
The  minute-by-minute  account  of  how  this  was  done,  of 

the  threats  and  the  swindles  employed,  was  recorded 

ironically  enough — by  Goering’s  own  Forschungsamt,  the 
Institute  for  Research,”  which  took  down  and  transcribed 
twenty-seven  telephone  conversations  from  the  Field 
Marshal’s  office  beginning  at  2:45  p.m.  on  March  11.  The 
documents  were  found  in  the  German  Air  Ministry  after 
the  war  and  constitute  an  illuminating  record  of  how 
Austria  s fate  was  settled  by  telephone  from  Berlin  dur- 
mg  the  next  few  critical  hours.24 

During  Seyss’s  first  call  to  Goering  at  2:45  p.m.  the  Field 
Marshal  told  him  that  Schuschnigg’s  cancellation  of  the 
plebiscite  was  not  enough  and  that  after  talking  with  Hitler 
he  would  call  him  back.  This  he  did  at  3:05.  Schuschnigg 
he  ordered,  must  resign,  and  Seyss-Inquart  must  be  named 
Chancellor  within  two  hours.  Goering  also  told  Seyss 
then  to  “send  the  telegram  to  the  Fuehrer,  as  agreed  upon.” 
This  is  the  first  mention  of  a telegram  that  was  to  pop 
up  throughout  the  frantic  events  of  the  next  few  hours 


462 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

and  which  would  be  used  to  perpetrate  the  swindle  by 
which  Hitler  justified  his  aggression  to  the  German  people 
and  to  the  foreign  offices  of  the  world. 

Wilhelm  Keppler,  Hitler’s  special  agent  in  Austria,  ar- 
riving in  the  afternoon  from  Berlin  to  take  charge  in  Pa- 
pen’s  absence,  had  shown  Seyss-Inquart  the  text  of  a tele- 
gram he  was  to  send  the  Fuehrer.  It  requested  the  dispatch 
of  German  troops  to  Austria  to  put  down  disorder.  In 
his  Nuremberg  affidavit,  Seyss  declared  that  he  refused  to 
send  such  a wire  since  there  were  no  disorders.  Keppler, 
insisting  that  it  would  have  to  be  done,  hurried  to  the 
Austrian  Chancellery,  where  he  was  brazen  enough  to  set 
up  an  emergency  office  along  with  Seyss  and  Glaise- 
Horstenau.  Why  Schuschnigg  allowed  such  interlopers  and 
traitors  to  establish  themselves  physically  in  the  seat  of  the 
Austrian  government  at  this  critical  hour  is  incomprehen- 
sible, but  he  did.  Later  he  remembered  the  Chancellery  as 
looking  “like  a disturbed  beehive,”  with  Seyss-Inquart 
and  Glaise-Horstenau  holding  “court”  in  one  comer  “and 
around  them  a busy  coming  and  going  of  strange-looking 
men”;  but  apparently  it  never  occurred  to  the  courteous 
but  dazed  Chancellor  to  throw  them  out. 

He  had  made  up  his  mind  to  yield  to  Hitler’s  pressure 
and  resign.  While  still  closeted  with  Seyss  he  had  put 
through  a telephone  call  to  Mussolini,  but  the  Duce  was 
not  immediately  available  and  a few  minutes  later  Schusch- 
nigg canceled  the  call.  To  ask  for  Mussolini’s  help,  he 
decided,  “would  be  a waste  of  time.”  Even  Austria’s  pomp- 
ous protector  was  deserting  her  in  the  hour  of  need.  A 
few  minutes  later,  when  Schuschnigg  was  trying  to  talk 
President  Miklas  into  accepting  his  resignation,  a message 
came  from  the  Foreign  Office:  “The  Italian  government 
declares  that  it  could  give  no  advice  .under  the  circum- 
stances, in  case  such  advice  should  be  asked  for.”25 

President  Wilhelm  Miklas  was  not  a great  man,  but 
he  was  a stubborn,  upright  one.  He  reluctantly  accepted 
Schuschnigg’s  resignation  but  he  refused  to  make  Seyss- 
Inquart  his  successor.  “That  is  quite  impossible,”  he  said. 
“We  will  not  be  coerced.”  He  instructed  Schuschnigg  to 
inform  the  Germans  that  their  ultimatum  was  refused.26 

This  was  promptly  reported  by  Seyss-Inquart  to  Goering 
at  5:30  p.m. 


The  Road  to  War  453 

r ,SeJs?-InQUart:  The  President  has  accepted  the  resignation 
[of  Schuschmgg]  ...  I suggested  he  entrust  the  Chan- 
cellorship to  me  . . . but  he  would  like  to  entrust  a man  like 
Ender  . . . 

Goering:  Well,  that  won’t  do!  Under  no  circumstances! 
Ihe  President  has  to  be  informed  immediately  that  he  has 
to  turn  the  powers  of  the  Federal  Chancellor  over  to  you 
and  to  accept  the  cabinet  as  it  was  arranged. 

There  was  an  interruption  at  this  point.  Seyss-Inquart  put 
a Dr.  Muehlmann,  a shadowy  Austrian  Nazi  whom 
Schuschnigg  had  noticed  lurking  in  the  background  at 
Berchtesgaden  and  who  was  a personal  friend  of  Goering 
on  the  line. 

Muehlmann:  The  President  still  refuses  persistently  to 
pve  his  consent.  We  three  National  Socialists  went  to  speak 
to  him  personally  ...  He  would  not  even  let  us  see  him 
So  far,  it  looks  as  if  he  were  not  willing  to  give  in. 

GoeR'ng:  Give  me  Seyss.  [To  Seyss]  Now,  remember 
the  following:  You  go  immediately  together  with  Lieutenant 
General  Muff  [the  German  military  attache]  and  tell  the 
President  that  if  the  conditions  are  not  accepted  immediate- 
ly,  the  troops  which  are  already  advancing  to  the  frontier 
will  march  in  tonight  along  the  whole  line,  and  Austria  will 
cease  to  exist  ...  Tell  him  there  is  no  time  now  for  any 
joke  The  situation  now  is  that  tonight  the  invasion  will  be- 
gin from  all  the  corners  of  Austria.  The  invasion  will  be 
stopped  and  the  troops  held  on  the  border  only  if  we  are 
informed  by  seven-thirty  that  Miklas  has  entrusted  you  with 
die  Federal  Chancellorship  . . . Then  call  out  the  National 
Socialists  all  over  the  country.  They  should  now  be  in  the 
™-,So  remember,  a report  must  be  given  by  seven-thirty. 

If  Miklas  could  not  understand  it  in  four  hours,  we  shall 
make  him  understand  it  now  in  four  minutes. 

But  still  the  resolute  President  held  out. 

At  6:30  Goering  was  back  on  the  phone  to  Keppler  and 
Seyss-Inquart.  Both  reported  that  President  Miklas  refused 
to  go  along  with  them. 

. Well>  then>  Seyss-Inquart  has  to  dismiss  him! 
go  “pstalrs.  again  and  tel1  him  plainly  that  Seyss  will 
call  on  the  National  Socialist  guards  and  in  five  minutes  the 
troops  will  march  in  on  my  order. 

A£ter.tJlis  order  General  Muff  and  Keppler  presented  to 
tne  President  a second  military  ultimatum  threatening  that 


464 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

if  he  did  not  yield  within  an  hour,  by  7 : 30,  German  troops 
would  march  into  Austria.  “I  informed  the  two  gentlemen,” 
Miklas  testified  later,  “that  I refused  the  ultimatum  . . . 
and  that  Austria  alone  determines  who  is  to  be  the  head  of 
government.” 

By  this  time  the  Austrian  Nazis  had  gained  control  of  the 
streets  as  well  as  of  the  Chancellery.  About  six  that  evening, 
returning  from  the  hospital  where  my  wife  was  fighting  for 
her  life  after  a difficult  childbirth  which  had  ended  with  a 
Caesarean  operation,  I had  emerged  from  the  subway  at 
the  Karlsplatz  to  find  myself  engulfed  in  a shouting,  hys- 
terical Nazi  mob  which  was  sweeping  toward  the  Inner 
City.  These  contorted  faces  I had  seen  before,  at  the  Nur- 
emberg party  rallies.  They  were  yelling,  “Sieg  Heil!  Sieg 
Heil!  Heil  Hitler!  Heil  Hitler!  Hang  Schuschnigg!  Hang 
Schuschnigg!”  The  police,  whom  only  a few  hours  before 
I had  seen  disperse  a small  Nazi  group  without  any  trouble, 
were  standing  by,  grinning. 

Schuschnigg  heard  the  tramp  and  the  shouts  of  the  mob, 
and  the  sounds  impressed  him.  He  hurried  to  the  President’s 
office  to  make  a final  plea.  But,  he  says: 

President  Miklas  was  adamant.  He  would  not  appoint  a 
Nazi  as  Austrian  Chancellor.  On  my  insistence  that  he 
appoint  Seyss-Inquart  he  said  again:  “You  all  desert  me 
now,  all  of  you.”  But  I saw  no  other  possibility  than  Seyss- 
Inquart.  With  the  little  hope  I had  left  I clung  to  all  the 
promises  he  had  made  me,  I clung  to  his  personal  reputation 
as  a practicing  Catholic  and  an  honest  man.27 

Schuschnigg  clung  to  his  illusions  to  the  last. 

The  fallen  Chancellor  then  proposed  that  he  make  a 
farewell  broadcast  and  explain  why  he  had  resigned.  He 
says  that  Miklas  agreed,  though  the  President  would  later 
dispute  it.  It  was  the  most  moving  broadcast  I have  ever 
heard.  The  microphone  was  set  up  some  five  paces  from 
where  Dollfuss  had  been  shot  to  death  by  the  Nazis. 

. . . The  German  government  [Schuschnigg  said]  today 
handed  to  President  Miklas  an  ultimatum,  with  a time  limit, 
ordering  him  to  nominate  as  Chancellor  a person  designated 
by  the  German  government  . . . otherwise  German  troops 
would  invade  Austria. 

I declare  before  the  world  that  the  reports  launched  in 
Germany  concerning  disorders  by  the  workers,  the  shedding 


The  Road  to  War 


465 


of  streams  of  blood  and  the  creation  of  a situation  beyond 
the  control  of  the  Austrian  government  are  lies  from  A to  Z. 
President  Miklas  has  asked  me  to  tell  the  people  of  Austria 
that  we  have  yielded  to  force  since  we  are  not  prepared  even 
in  this  terrible  hour  to  shed  blood.  We  have  decided  to  order 
the  troops  to  offer  no  resistance.* 

So  I take  leave  of  the  Austrian  people  with  a German  word 
of  farewell,  uttered  from  the  depth  of  my  heart:  God  protect 
Austria! 

The  Chancellor  might  take  leave  but  the  stubborn  Pres- 
ident was  not  yet  ready  to.  Goering  learned  this  when  he 
phoned  General  Muff  shortly  after  Schuschnigg’s  broad- 
cast. “The  best  thing  will  be  if  Miklas  resigns,”  Goering 
told  him. 


“Yes,  but  he  won’t,”  Muff  rejoined.  “It  was  very  dra- 
matic. I spoke  to  him  almost  fifteen  minutes.  He  declared 
that  under  no  circumstances  will  he  yield  to  force.” 

“So?  He  will  not  give  in  to  force?”  Goering  could  not  be- 
lieve the  words. 

“He  does  not  yield  to  force,”  the  General  repeated. 

“So  he  just  wants  to  be  kicked  out?” 

“Yes,”  said  Muff.  “He  is  staying  put.” 

“Well,  with  fourteen  children,’,’  Goering  laughed,  “a  man 
has  to  stay  put.  Anyway,  tell  Seyss  to  take  over.” 

There  was  still  the  matter  of  the  telegram  which  Hitler 
wanted  in  order  to  justify  his  invasion.  The  Fuehrer,  ac- 
cording to  Papen,  who  had  joined  him  at  the  Chancellery 
in  Berlin,  was  now  “in  a state  bordering  on  hysteria.”  The 
stubborn  Austrian  President  was  fouling  up  his  plans.  So 


In  his  p°stwar  testimony  already  referred  to.  Miklas  denied  that  he 

asked  bchuschnigg  to  say  any  such  thing  or  that  he  even  agreed  that 
the  broadcast  should  be  made.  Contrary  to  what  the  retiring  Chancellor 
said,  the  President  was  not  yet  ready  to  yield  to  force.  “Things 

have  not  gone  so  far  that  we  must  capitulate,”  he  says  he  told  Schusch- 
nl£k-  He  bad  just  turned  down  the  second  German  ultimatum.  He 
was  standing  firm  But  Schuschnigg’s  broadcast  did  help  to  undermine 
his  position  and  force  his  hand.  As  we  shall  see,  the  obstinate  old 
President  held  out  for  several  hours  more  before  capitulating.  On  March 
13,  he  refused  to  sign  the  Anschluss  law  snutfing  out  Austria’s  in- 
dependent  existence  which  Seyss-Inquart,  at  Hitler’s  insistence,  promul- 
Though  he  surrendered  the  functions  of  his  office  to  the 
Aazi  Chancellor  for  as  long  as  he  was  prevented  from  carrying 

them  out,  he  maintained  that  he  never  formally  resigned  as  Presi- 

dent. it  would  have  been  too  cowardly,”  he  later  explained  to  a 
COUrV,  Th‘sdl?,  no!,  ,prey,ent.  Seyss-Inquart  from  announcing 
officially  on  March  13  that  the  President,  upon  request  of  the  Chan- 
cellor had  resigned  from  his  office”  and  that  his  “affairs”  were  trans- 
terred  to  the  Chancellor.28 


466 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


was  Seyss-Inquart,  because  of  his  failure  to  send  the  tele- 
gram calling  on  Hitler  to  send  troops  into  Austria  to  quell 
disorder.  Exasperated  beyond  enduring,  Hitler  flashed  the 
invasion  order  at  8:45  p.m.  on  the  evening  of  March  11.* 
Three  minutes  later,  at  8:48,  Goering  was  on  the  phone  to 
Keppler  in  Vienna. 

Listen  carefully.  The  following  telegram  should  be  sent 
here  by  Seyss-Inquart.  Take  the  notes. 

“The  provisional  Austrian  Government,  which  after  the 
resignation  of  the  Schuschnigg  Government  considers  it  its 
task  to  establish  peace  and  order  in  Austria,  sends  to  the  Ger- 
man Government  the  urgent  request  to  support  it  in  the  task 
and  to  help  it  to  prevent  bloodshed.  For  this  purpose  it  asks 
the  German  Government  to  send  German  troops  as  soon  as 
possible.” 


Keppler  assured  the  Field  Marshal  he  would  show 
Seyss-Inquart  the  text  of  the  “telegram”  immediately. 

“Well,”  Goering  said,  “he  does  not  even  have  to  send 
the  telegram.  All  he  needs  to  do  is  say  ‘Agreed.’  ” 

One  hour  later  Keppler  called  back  Berlin.  ‘Tell  the 
Field  Marshal,”  he  said,  “that  Seyss-Inquart  agrees.”! 

Thus  it  was  that  when  I passed  through  Berlin  the  next 
day  I found  a screaming  headline  in  the  Voelkischer 
Beobachter:  German  Austria  saved  from  Chaos.  There 
were  incredible  stories  hatched  up  by  Goebbels  describing 
Red  disorders — fighting,  shooting,  pillaging — in  the  main 
streets  of  Vienna.  And  there  was  the  text  of  the  tele- 
gram, issued  by  D.N.B.,  the  official  German  news  agency, 
which  said  that  it  had  been  dispatched  by  Seyss-Inquart 
to  Hitler  the  night  before.  Actually  two  copies  of  the 


•Marked  “Top  Secret”  and  identified  as  Directive  No.  2 of  Operation 
Otto,  it  read  in  part:  “The  demands  of  the  German  ultimatum  to  the 
Austrian  government  have  not  been  fulfilled  ...  To  avoid  further  blood- 
shed  in  Austrian  cities,  the  entry  of  the  German  armed  forces 
1 xt0a(rAu?nfo  t 1 commence,  according  to  Directive  No.  1,  at  daybreak 
ot  March  12.  I expect  the  set  objectives  to  be  reached  by  exerting  all 
forces  to  the  full  as  quickly  as  possible.  (Signed)  Adolf  Hitler.”® 

T Actually,  Seyss-Inquart  tried  until  long  after  midnight  to  get  Hitler 
to  call  oil  the  German  invasion.  A German  Foreign  Office  memorandum 
reveals  that  at  2:10  a.m.  on  March  12  General  Muff  telephoned  Berlin 
and  stated  that  on  the  instructions  of  Chancellor  Seyss-Inquart  he  was 
requesting  that  “the  alerted  troops  should  remain  on,  but  not  cross, 
the  border.  Keppler  also  came  on  the  telephone  to  support  the  request. 
General  Muff,  a decent  man  and  an  officer  of  the  old  school,  seems 
to  have  been  embarrassed  by  his  role  in  Vienna.  When  he  was  informed 
by  -Berlin  that  Hitler  declined  to  halt  his  troops  he  replied  that  he 
regretted  this  message.”80 


The  Road  to  War 


467 

telegram,  just  as  Goering  had  dictated  it,  were  found  in 
the  German  Foreign  Office  archives  at  the  end  of  the  war. 
Papen  later  explained  how  they  got  there.  They  were  con- 
cocted, he  says,  sometime  later  by  the  German  Minister 
of  Posts  and  Telegraph  and  deposited  in  the  government 
files. 

Hitler  had  waited  anxiously  throughout  the  frenzied  after- 
noon and  evening  not  only  for  President  Miklas  to  capit- 
ulate but  for  some  word  from  Mussolini.  The  silence  of 
Austria’s  protector  was  becoming  ominous.  At  10:25  p.m. 
Prince  Philip  of  Hesse  called  the  Chancellery  from  Rome. 
Hitler  himself  grabbed  the  telephone.  Goering’s  techni- 
cians recorded  the  conversation  that  followed: 

Prince:  I have  just  come  back  from  the  Palazzo  Venezia. 
The  Duce  accepted  the  whole  thing  in  a very  friendly  manner. 
He  sends  you  his  regards.  . . . Schuschnigg  gave  him  the 
news  . . . Mussolini  said  that  Austria  would  be  immaterial 
to  him. 

Hitler  was  beside  himself  with  relief  and  joy. 

Hitler:  Then,  please  tell  Mussolini  I will  never  forget 
him  for  this! 

Prince:  Yes,  sir. 

Hitler:  Never,  never,  never,  no  matter  what  happens!  I 
am  ready  to  make  a quite  different  agreement  with  him. 

Prince:  Yes,  sir.  I told  him  that  too. 

Hitler:  As  soon  as  the  Austrian  affair  has  been  settled 

I shall  be  ready  to  go  with  him  through  thick  and  thin 

through  anything! 

Prince:  Yes,  my  Fuehrer. 

Hitler:  Listen!  I shall  make  any  agreement.  I am  no 
longer  in  fear  of  the  terrible  position  which  would  have 
existed  militarily  in  case  we  had  gotten  into  a conflict.  You 
may  tell  him  that  I do  thank  him  from  the  bottom  of  my 
heart.  Never,  never  shall  I forget  it 

Prince:  Yes,  my  Fuehrer. 

Hitler:  I shall  never  forget  him  for  this,  no  matter  what 
happens.  If  he  should  ever  need  any  help  or  be  in  any  danger, 
he  can  be  convinced  that  I shall  stick  to  him  whatever  may 
happen,  even  if  the  whole  world  gangs  up  on  him. 

Prince:  Yes,  my  Fuehrer. 

And  what  stand  were  Great  Britain  and  France  and  the 
League  of  Nations  taking  at  this  critical  moment  to  halt 


468 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Germany’s  aggression  against  a peaceful  neighboring  coun- 
try? None.  For  the  moment  France  was  again  without  a 
government.  On  Thursday,  March  10,  Premier  Chautemps 
and  his  cabinet  had  resigned.  All  through  the  crucial  day 
of  Friday,  March  11,  when  Goering  was  telephoning  his 
ultimatums  to  Vienna,  there  was  no  one  in  Paris  who  could 
act.  It  was  not  until  the  Anschluss  had  been  proclaimed  on 
the  thirteenth  that  a French  government  was  formed  under 
Leon  Blum. 

And  Britain?  On  February  20,  a week  after  Schuschnigg 
had  capitulated  at  Berchtesgaden,  Foreign  Secretary  An- 
thony Eden  had  resigned,  principally  because  of  his  oppo- 
sition to  further  appeasement  of  Mussolini  by  Prime  Minis- 
ter Chamberlain.  He  was  replaced  by  Lord  Halifax.  This 
change  was  welcomed  in  Berlin.  So  was  Chamberlain’s 
statement  to  the  Commons  after  the  Berchtesgaden  ulti- 
matum. The  German  Embassy  in  London  reported  fully 
on  it  in  a dispatch  to  Berlin  on  March  4. 31  Chamberlain 
was  quoted  as  saying  that  “what  happened  [at  Berchtes- 
gaden] was  merely  that  two  statesmen  had  agreed  upon 
certain  measures  for  the  improvement  of  relations  between 
their  two  countries  ...  It  appeared  hardly  possible  to  in- 
sist that  just  because  two  statesmen  had  agreed  on  cer- 
tain domestic  changes  in  one  of  two  countries — changes 
desirable  in  the  interest  of  relations  between  them — the  one 
country  had  renounced  its  independence  in  favor  of  the 
other.  On  the  contrary,  the  Federal  Chancellor’s  speech  of 
February  24  contained  nothing  that  might  convey  the  im- 
pression that  the  Federal  Chancellor  [Schuschnigg]  him- 
self believed  in  the  surrender  of  the  independence  of  his 
country.” 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  British  Legation  in  Vienna, 
as  I myself  learned  at  the  time,  had  provided  Chamberlain 
with  the  details  of  Hitler’s  Berchtesgaden  ultimatum  to 
Schuschnigg,  this  speech,  which  was  made  to  the  Commons 
on  March  2,  is  astounding.*  But  it  was  pleasing  to  Hitler. 
He  knew  that  he  could  march  into  Austria  without  getting 


■CSt‘™°?y  a‘  Nuremberg  Guido  Schmidt  swore  that  both  he  and 
Schuschnigg  informed  the  envoys  of  the  “Big  Powers”  of  Hitler’s 
“ detail.’ *2  Moreover,  the  Vienna  correspondents  of  the 
Timer  and  the  Daily  Telegraph  of  London,  to  my  knowledge,  also  tele- 
phoned their  respective  newspapers  a full  and  accurate  report. 


The  Road  to  War  459 

into  complications  with  Britain.  On  March  9,  Ribbentrop, 
the  new  German  Foreign  Minister,  had  arrived  in  London 
to  wind  up  his  affairs  at  the  embassy,  where  he  had  been 
ambassador.  He  had  long  talks  with  Chamberlain,  Halifax, 
the  King  and  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury.  His  impres- 
sions of  the  British  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Secretary, 
he  reported  back  to  Berlin,  were  “very  good.”  After  a long 
conference  with  Lord  Halifax,  Ribbentrop  reported  directly 
to  Hitler  on  March  10  as  to  what  Britain  would  do  “if 
the  Austrian  question  cannot  be  settled  peacefully.”  Basi- 
cally he  was  convinced  from  his  London  talks  “that  Eng- 
land will  do  nothing  in  regard  to  Austria.”33 

On  Friday,  March  11,  Ribbentrop  was  lunching  at  Down- 
ing Street  with  the  Prime  Minister  and  his  associates  when 
a Foreign  Office  messenger  broke  in  with  urgent  dispatches 
for  Chamberlain  telling  of  the  startling  news  from  Vienna. 
Only  a few  minutes  before,  Chamberlain  had  asked  Rib- 
bentrop to  inform  the  Fuehrer  “of  his  sincere  wish  and  firm 
determination  to  clear  up  German-British  relations.”  Now, 
at  the  receipt  of  the  sour  news  from  Austria,  the  states- 
men adjourned  to  the  Prime  Minister’s  study,  where  Cham- 
berlain read  to  the  uncomfortable  German  Foreign  Minis- 
ter two  telegrams  from  the  British  Legation  in  Vienna 
telling  of  Hitler’s  ultimatum.  “The  discussion,”  Ribbentrop 
reported  to  Hitler,  “took  place  in  a tense  atmosphere  and 
the  usually  calm  Lord  Halifax  was  more  excited  than 
Chamberlain,  who  outwardly  at  least  appeared  calm  and 
cool-headed.”  Ribbentrop  expressed  doubts  about  “the 
truth  of  the  reports”  and  this  seems  to  have  calmed  down 
his  British  hosts,  for  “our  leave-taking,”  he  reported,  “was 
entirely  amiable,  and  even  Halifax  was  calm  again.”  * 34 

Chamberlain’s  reaction  to  the  dispatches  from  Vienna 
was  to  instruct  Ambassador  Henderson  in  Berlin  to  pen 
a note  to  Acting  Foreign  Minister  von  Neurath  stating 
that  if  the  report  of  the  German  ultimatum  to  Austria 
was  correct,  “His  Majesty’s  Government  feel  bound  to 
register  a protest  in  the  strongest  terms.”  35  But  a formal 
diplomatic  protest  at  this  late  hour  was  the  least  of  Hit- 
ler’s worries.  The  next  day,  March  12,  while  German  troops 
were  streaming  into  Austria,  Neurath  returned  a contemp- 

cShT^sform^Z  T,V,Ting  deSCriptiM1  of  this  '“"cheon  in  The 


470 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


tuous  reply,38  declaring  that  Austro-German  relations 
were  the  exclusive  concern  of  the  German  people  and  not 
of  the  British  government,  and  repeating  the  lies  that  there 
had  been  no  German  ultimatum  to  Austria  and  that  troops 
had  been  dispatched  only  in  answer  to  “urgent”  appeals 
from  the  newly  formed  Austrian  government.  He  referred 
the  British  ambassador  to  the  telegram,  “already  published 
in  the  German  press.”  * 

Hitler’s  only  serious  worry  on  the  evening  of  March  11 
had  been  over  Mussolini’s  reaction  to  his  aggression,  t but 
there  was  some  concern  in  Berlin  too  as  to  what  Czecho- 
slovakia might  do.  However,  the  indefatigable  Goering 
quickly  cleared  this  up.  Busy  though  he  was  at  the  tele- 
phone directing  the  coup  in  Vienna,  he  managed  to  slip 
over  during  the  evening  to  the  Haus  der  Flieger,  where  he 
was  official  host  to  a thousand  high-ranking  officials  and 
diplomats,  who  were  being  entertained  at  a glittering  soi- 
ree by  the  orchestra,  the  singers  and  the  ballet  of  the  State 
Opera.  When  the  Czech  minister  in  Berlin,  Dr.  Mastny,  ar- 
rived at  the  gala  fete  he  was  immediately  taken  aside  by 
the  bemedaled  Field  Marshal,  who  told  him  on  his  word 
of  honor  that  Czechoslovakia  had  nothing  to  fear  from 
Germany,  that  the  entry  of  the  Reich’s  troops  into  Austria 
was  “nothing  more  than  a family  affair”  and  that  Hitler 
wanted  to  improve  relations  with  Prague.  In  return  he 
asked  for  assurances  that  the  Czechs  would  not  mobilize. 
Dr.  Mastny  left  the  reception,  telephoned  to  his  Foreign 
Minister  in  Prague,  and  returned  to  the  hall  to  tell  Goering 
that  his  country  was  not  mobilizing  and  that  Czechoslo- 


* The  lies  were  repeated  in  a circular  telegram  dispatched  by  Baron  von 
Weizsaecker  of  the  Foreign  Office  March  12  to  German  envoys  abroad 
for  “information  and  orientation  of  your  conversations.'’  Weizsaecker 
stated  that  Schuschnigg’s  declaration  concerning  a German  ultimatum 
was  s^eer  fabrication’  and  went  on  to  inform  his  diplomats  abroad: 
The  truth  was  that  the  question  of  sending  military  forces  . . . was 
first  raised  in  the  well-known  telegram  of  the  newly  formed  Austrian 
government.  In  view  of  the  imminent  danger  of  civil  war,  the  Reich 
government  decided  to  comply  with  this  appeal.””  Thus  the  German 
Foreign  Office  lied  not  only  to  foreign  diplomats  but  to  its  own.  In  a 
long  and  ineffectual  book  written  after  the  war  Weizsaecker,  like  so 
many  other  Germans  who  served  Hitler,  maintained  that  he  was  anti- 
Nazi  all  along. 

t In  his  testimony  at  Nuremberg  on  August  9,  1946,  Field  Marshal 
von  Manstein  emphasized  that  “at  the  time  when  Hitler  gave  us  the 
orders  for  Austria  his  chief  worry  was  not  so  much  that  there  might 
be  interference  on  the  part  of  the  Western  Powers,  but  his  only  worry 
was  as  to  how  Italy  would  behave,  because  it  appeared  that  Italy  always 
sided  with  Austria  and  the  Hapsburgs.”88 


The  Road  to  War  471 

vakia  had  no  intention  of  trying  to  interfere  with  events 
in  Austria.  Goering  was  relieved  and  repeated  his  assur- 
ances, adding  that  he  was  authorized  to  back  them  up  by 
Hitler’s  word  too. 

It  may  have  been  that  even  the  astute  Czech  President, 
Eduard  Benes,  did  not  have  time  to  realize  that  evening 
that  Austria’s  end  meant  Czechoslovakia’s  as  well.  There 
were  some  in  Europe  that  weekend  who  thought  the 
Czech  government  was  shortsighted,  who  argued  that  in 
view  of  the  disastrous  strategic  position  in  which  Czecho- 
slovakia would  be  left  by  the  Nazi  occupation  of  Austria 
— with  German  troops  surrounding  her  on  three  sides — 
and  considering  too  that  her  intervention  to  help  save 
Austria  might  have  brought  Russia,  France  and  Britain,  as 
well  as  the  League  of  Nations,  into  a conflict  with  the 
Third  Reich  which  the  Germans  were  in  no  condition 
to  meet,  the  Czechs  should  have  acted  on  the  night  of 
March  11.  But  subsequent  events,  which  shortly  will  be 
chronicled  here,  surely  demolish  any  such  argument.  A 
little  later  when  the  two  big  Western  democracies  and  the 
League  had  a better  opportunity  of  stopping  Hitler  they 
shrank  from  it.  Anyway,  at  no  time  on  the  eventful  day 
did  Schuschnigg  make  a formal  appeal  to  London,  Paris, 
Prague  or  Geneva.  Perhaps,  as  his  memoirs  indicate,  he 
thought  this  would  be  a waste  of  time.  President  Miklas, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  under  the  impression,  as  he  later 
testified,  that  the  Austrian  government,  which  immediately 
had  informed  Paris  and  London  of  the  German  ultimatum, 
was  continuing  “conversations”  with  the  French  and  Brit- 
ish governments  throughout  the  afternoon  in  order  to 
ascertain  their  “frame  of  mind.” 

When  it  became  clear  that  their  “frame  of  mind”  was 
to  do  nothing  more  than  utter  empty  protests  President 
Miklas,  a little  before  midnight,  gave  in.  He  appointed 
Seyss-Inquart  Chancellor  and  accepted  his  list  of  cabinet 
ministers.  I was  completely  abandoned  both  at  home  and 
abroad,”  he  commented  bitterly  later. 

Having  issued  a grandiose  proclamation  to  the  German 
people  in  which  he  justified  his  aggression  with  his  usual 
contempt  for  the  truth  and  promised  that  the  Austrian 
people  would  choose  their  future  in  “a  real  plebiscite” — 


472  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Goebbels  read  it  over  the  German  and  Austrian  radio 
stations  at  noon  on  March  12 — Hitler  set  off  for  his  native 
land.  He  received  a tumultuous  welcome.  At  every  village, 
hastily  decorated  in  his  honor,  there  were  cheering  crowds. 
During  the  afternoon  he  reached  his  first  goal,  Linz,  where 
he  had  spent  his  school  days.  The  reception  there  was 
delirious  and  Hitler  was  deeply  touched.  The  next  day, 
after  getting  off  a telegram  to  Mussolini — “I  shall  never 
forget  you  for  this!” — he  laid  a wreath  on  the  graves  of 
his  parents  at  Leonding  and  then  returned  to  Linz  to 
make  a speech: 

When  years  ago  I went  forth  from  this  town  I bore  with- 
in me  precisely  the  same  profession  of  faith  which  today 
fills  my  heart.  Judge  the  depth  of  my  emotion  when  after 
so  many  years  I have  been  able  to  bring  that  profession  of 
faith  to  its  fulfillment.  If  Providence  once  called  me  forth 
from  this  town  to  be  the  leader  of  the  Reich,  it  must  in  so 
doing  have  charged  me  with  a mission,  and  that  mission 
could  only  be  to  restore  my  dear  homeland  to  the  German 
Reich.  I have  believed  in  this  mission,  I have  lived  and 
fought  for  it,  and  I believe  I have  now  fulfilled  it. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  twelfth,  Seyss-Inquart,  accom- 
panied by  Himmler,  had  flown  to  Linz  to  meet  Hitler  and 
had  proudly  proclaimed  that  Article  88  of  the  Treaty  of 
St.  Germain,  which  proclaimed  Austria’s  independence  as 
inalienable  and  made  the  League  of  Nations  its  guarantor, 
had  been  voided.  To  Hitler,  carried  away  by  the  enthusi- 
asm of  the  Austrian  crowds,  this  was  not  enough.  He 
ordered  Dr.  Wilhelm  Stuckart,  an  undersecretary  in  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  who  had  been  rushed  by  his 
Minister,  Frick,  to  Vienna  to  draft  a law  making  Hitler 
President  of  Austria,  to  come  at  once  to  Linz.  Somewhat 
to  the  surprise  of  this  legal  expert,  the  Fuehrer  instructed 
him,  as  he  later  deposed  at  Nuremberg,  to  “draft  a law 
providing  for  a total  Anschluss.”  39 

This  draft  Stuckart  presented  to  the  newly  formed 
Austrian  government  in  Vienna  on  Sunday,  March  13,  the 
day  on  which  Schuschnigg’s  plebiscite  was  to  have  been 
held.  President  Miklas,  as  we  have  seen,  refused  to  sign 
it,  but  Seyss-Inquart,  who  had  taken  over  the  President’s 
powers,  did  and  late  that  evening  flew  back  to  Linz  to 
present  it  to  the  Fuehrer.  It  proclaimed  the  end  of  Austria. 


The  Road  to  War 


473 


“Austria,”  it  began,  “is  a province  of  the  German  Reich.” 
Hitler  shed  tears  of  joy,  Seyss-Inquart  later  recalled. 40 
The  so-called  Anschluss  law  was  also  promulgated  the 
same  day  at  Linz  by  the  German  government  and  signed 
by  Hitler,  Goering,  Ribbentrop,  Frick  and  Hess.  It  pro- 
vided for  “a  free  and  secret  plebiscite”  on  April  10  in 
which  the  Austrians  could  determine  “the  question  of 
reunion  with  the  German  Reich.”  The  Reich  Germans, 
Hitler  announced  on  March  18,  were  also  to  have  a plebi- 
scite on  the  Anschluss,  along  with  new  elections  to  the 
Reichstag. 

Hitler  did  not  make  his  triumphal  entry  into  Vienna, 
where  he  had  lived  so  long  as  a tramp,  until  the  afternoon 
of  Monday,  March  14.  He  was  delayed  by  two  unforeseen 
developments.  Despite  the  delirium  of  the  Austrians  at  the 
prospect  of  seeing  the  Fuehrer  in  the  capital,  Himmler 
asked  for  an  extra  day  to  perfect  security  arrangements. 
He  was  already  carrying  out  the  arrest  of  thousands  of 
unreliables  within  a few  weeks  the  number  would  reach 
79,000  in  Vienna  alone.  Also  the  vaunted  German  panzer 
units  had  broken  down  long  before  they  got  within  sight 
of  Vienna’s  hills.  According  to  Jodi,  some  70  per  cent 
of  the  armored  vehicles  were  stranded  on  the  road  from 
Salzburg  and  Passau  to  Vienna,  though  General  Guderian, 
who  commanded  the  panzer  troops,  later  contended  that 
only  30  per  cent  of  his  forces  became  stalled.  At  any  rate, 
Hitler  was  furious  at  the  delay.  He  remained  in  Vienna 
only  overnight,  putting  up  at  the  Hotel  Imperial. 

Still  this  triumphant  return  to  the  former  imperial 
capital  which  he  felt  had  rejected  him  and  condemned 
him  in  his  youth  to  a starved  and  miserable  gutter  life  and 
which  was  now  acclaiming  him  with  such  tumultuous 
jubilation  could  not  have  failed  to  revive  his  spirits  The 
ubiquitous  Papen,  rushing  by  plane  from  Berlin  to  Vienna 
to  get  in  on  the  festivities,  found  Hitler  in  the  reviewing 
stand  opposite  the  Hofburg,  the  ancient  palace  of  the 
Hapsburgs.  “I  can  only  describe  him,”  Papen  later  wrote 
as  being  in  a state  of  ecstasy.”  * 


474 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

He  remained  in  this  state  during  most  of  the  next  four 
weeks,  when  he  traversed  Germany  and  Austria  from  one 
end  to  the  other  whipping  up  public  fervor  for  a big  Ja 
vote  in  favor  of  the  Anschluss.  But  in  his  exuberant 
speeches  he  missed  no  opportunity  to  vilify  Schuschnigg 
or  to  peddle  the  by  now  shopworn  lies  about  how  the 
Anschluss  was  achieved.  In  his  address  to  the  Reichstag 
on  March  18  he  asserted  that  Schuschnigg  had  “broken 
his  word”  by  his  “election  forgery,”  adding  that  “only  a 
crazy,  blinded  man”  could  have  behaved  in  such  a manner. 
On  March  25  at  Koenigsberg  the  “election  forgery”  had 
become  in  Hitler’s  mind  “this  ridiculous  comedy.”  Letters 
had  been  found.  Hitler  claimed,  proving  that  Schuschnigg 
had  deliberately  double-crossed  him  by  seeking  delays  in 
augmenting  the  Berchtesgaden  agreement  until  “a  more 
propitious  hour  to  stir  up  foreign  countries  against  Ger- 
many.” 

In  Koenigsberg  Hitler  also  answered  the  taunts  of  the 
foreign  press  at  his  use  of  brutal  force  and  his  trickery 
in  having  proclaimed  the  Anschluss  without  even  waiting 
for  the  decision  of  the  plebiscite: 

Certain  foreign  newspapers  have  said  that  we  fell  on 
Austria  with  brutal  methods.  I can  only  say:  even  in  death 
they  cannot  stop  lying.  I have  in  the  course  of  my  political 
struggle  won  much  love  from  my  people,  but  when  I crossed 
the  former  frontier  [into  Austria]  there  met  me  such  a 
stream  of  love  as  I have  never  experienced.  Not  as  tyrants 
have  we  come,  but  as  liberators  . . . Under  the  force  of  this 

master  of  Vienna,  “Be  assured  that  this  city  is  in  my  eyes  a pearl — 
I will  bring  it  into  a setting  which  is  worthy  of  it,’*  this  was  probably 
more  electioneering  propaganda  than  an  expression  of  his  inner  feelings. 
These  feelings  were  revealed  to  Baldur  von  Schirach,  the  Nazi  Governor 
and  Gauleiter  of  Vienna  during  the  war,  at  a heated  meeting  at  the 
Berghof  in  1943.  Describing  it  during  his  testimony  at  Nuremberg,  Schirach 
said: 

Then  the  Fuehrer  began  with,  I might  say,  incredible  and  unlimited 
hatred  to  speak  against  the  people  of  Vienna.  ...  At  four  o’clock 
m the  morning  Hitler  suddenly  said  something  which  I should  now 
like  to  repeat  for  historical  reasons.  He  said:  “Vienna  should  never 
have  been  admitted  into  the  Union  of  the  Greater  Germany.’’  Hitler 
never  loved  Vienna.  He  hated  its  people.41 

Papen’s  own  festive  spirits  on  March  14  were  spoiled  that  same  day 
when  he  learned  that  Wilhelm  von  Ketteler,  his  close  friend  and  aide 
at  the  German  Legation,  had  disappeared  under  circumstances  which 
indicated  foul  play  by  the  Gestapo.  Three  years  before,  another  friend 
and  collaborator  at  the  legation,  Baron  Tschirschky,  had  fled  to  England 
to  escape  certain  death  from  the  S.S.  At  the  end  of  April  Ketteler’s 
body  was  fished  out  of  the  Danube,  where  Gestapo  thugs  in  Vienna 
had  thrown  it  after  murdering  him. 


The  Road  to  Wap 


475 


impression  I decided  not  to  wait  until  April  tenth  but  to 
effect  the  unification  forthwith  . . . 

If  this  sounded  less  than  logical — or  honest — to  for- 
eign ears,  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  made  a great  impres- 
sion on  the  Germans.  When  at  the  conclusion  of  his 
Reichstag  speech  Hitler  implored,  in  a voice  choked  with 
emotion,  “German  people,  give  me  another  four  years 
so  that  I can  now  exploit  the  accomplished  union  for  the 
benefit  of  all!”  he  received  an  ovation  so  overwhelming 
that  it  dwarfed  all  his  former  triumphs  at  this  tribune. 

The  Fuehrer  wound  up  his  election  campaign  in  Vienna 
on  April  9,  on  the  eve  of  the  polling.  The  man  who  had 
once  tramped  the  pavements  of  this  city  as  a vagabond, 
unwashed  and  empty-bellied,  who  but  four  years  before 
had  assumed  in  Germany  the  powers  of  the  Hohen- 
zollern  kings  and  had  now  taken  upon  himself  those  of 
the  Hapsburg  emperors,  was  full  of  a sense  of  God-given 
mission. 


I believe  that  it  was  God’s  will  to  send  a youth  from  here 
into  the  Reich,  to  let  him  grow  up,  to  raise  him  to  be  the 
leader  of  the  nation  so  as  to  enable  him  to  lead  back  his 
homeland  into  the  Reich. 


There  is  a higher  ordering  and  we  all  are  nothing  else 
than  its  agents.  When  on  March  9 Herr  Schuschnigg  broke  his 
agreement,  then  in  that  second  I felt  that  now  the  call  of 
Providence  had  come  to  me.  And  that  which  then  took  place 
in  three  days  was  only  conceivable  as  the  fulfillment  of  the 
wish  and  the  will  of  this  Providence. 

Li  three  days  the  Lord  has  smitten  them!  . . . And  to  me 
the  grace  was  given  on  the  day  of  the  betrayal  to  be  able 
to  unite  my  homeland  with  the  Reich! 

I would  now  give  thanks  to  Him  who 'let  me  return  to  my 
homeland  in  order  that  I might  now  lead  it  into  my  German 
Reich.  Tomorrow  may  every  German  recognize  the  hour 
and  measure  its  import  and  bow  in  humility  before  the 
Almighty,  who  in  a few  weeks  has  wrought  a miracle 
upon  us! 


That  a majority  of  Austrians,  who  undoubtedly  would 
have  said  Ja  to  Schuschnigg  on  March  13,  would  say 
t e same  to  Hitler  on  April  10  was  a foregone  conclusion. 
Many  of  them  sincerely  believed  that  ultimate  union  with 
any  kind  of  Germany,  even  a Nazi  Germany,  was  a de- 


476 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


sirable  and  inevitable  end,  that  Austria,  cut  off  from  its 
vast  Slavic  and  Hungarian  hinterland  in  1918,  could  not 
in  the  long  run  exist  decently  by  itself,  that  it  could  only 
survive  as  part  of  the  German  Reich.  In  addition  to  these 
Austrians  were  the  fanatical  Nazis  whose  ranks  were 
swelling  rapidly  with  jobseekers  and  jobholders  attracted 
by  success  and  anxious  to  improve  their  position.  Many 
Catholics  in  this  overwhelmingly  Catholic  country  were 
undoubtedly  swayed  by  a widely  publicized  statement  of 
Cardinal  Innitzer  welcoming  Nazism  to  Austria  and  urg- 
ing a Ja  vote.* 

In  a fair  and  honest  election  in  which  the  Social 
Democrats  and  Schuschnigg’s  Christian  Socials  would 
have  had  freedom  to  campaign  openly  the  plebiscite,  in 
my  opinion,  might  have  been  close.  As  it  was,  it  took  a 
very  brave  Austrian  to  vote  No.  As  in  Germany,  and 
not  without  reason,  the  voters  feared  that  their  failure 
to  cast  an  affirmative  ballot  might  be  found  out.  In  the 
polling  station  which  I visited  in  Vienna  that  Sunday  after- 
noon, wide  slits  in  the  comer  of  the  polling  booths  gave 
the  Nazi  election  committee  sitting  a few  feet  away  a 
good  view  of  how  one  voted.  In  the  country  districts 
few  bothered — or  dared — to  cast  their  ballots  in  the  se- 
crecy of  the  booth;  they  voted  openly  for  all  to  see.  I 
happened  to  broadcast  at  seven-thirty  that  evening,  a half 
hour  after  the  polls  had  closed,  when  few  votes  had  yet 
been  counted.  A Nazi  official  assured  me  before  the  broad- 
cast that  the  Austrians  were  voting  99  per  cent  Ja.  That 
was  the  figure  officially  given  later — 99.08  per  cent  in 
Greater  Germany,  99.75  in  Austria. 

And  so  Austria,  as  Austria,  passed  for  a moment  out 
of  history,  its  very  name  suppressed  by  the  revengeful 
Austrian  who  had  now  joined  it  to  Germany.  The  an- 
cient German  word  for  Austria,  Oesterreich,  was  abol- 
ished. Austria  became  the  Ostmark  and  soon  even  that 
name  was  dropped  and  Berlin  administered  the  country  by 
Gaue  (districts)  which  corresponded  roughly  to  the  his- 
toric Laender  such  as  Tyrol,  Salzburg,  Styria  and  Ca- 


JA  few  months  later,  on  October  8 the  cardinal’s  palace  opposite 
bt.  Stephen  s Cathedral  was  sacked  by  Nazi  hooligans.  Too  late  Innitzer 
nad  learned  what  National  Socialism  was,  and  had  spoken  out  in  a 
sermon  against  the  Nazi  persecution  of  his  Church. 


The  Road  to  Wap  477 

rinthia.  Vienna  became  just  another  city  of  the  Reich,  a 
provincial  district  administrative  center,  withering  away. 
The  former  Austrian  tramp  become  dictator  had  wiped  his 
native  land  off  the  map  and  deprived  its  once  glittering 
capital  of  its  last  shred  of  glory  and  importance.  Dis- 
illusionment among  the  Austrians  was  inevitable. 

For  the  first  few  weeks  the  behavior  of  the  Vienna 
Nazis  was  worse  than  anything  I had  seen  in  Germany. 
There  was  an  orgy  of  sadism.  Day  after  day  large 
numbers  of  Jewish  men  and  women  could  be  seen  scrub- 
bing Schuschnigg  signs  off  the  sidewalk  and  cleaning  the 
gutters.  While  they  worked  on  their  hands  and  knees 
with  jeering  storm  troopers  standing  over  them,  crowds 
gathered  to  taunt  them.  Hundreds  of  Jews,  men  and 
women,  were  picked  off  the  streets  and  put  to  work 
cleaning  public  latrines  and  the  toilets  of  the  barracks 
where  the  S.A.  and  the  S.S.  were  quartered.  Tens  of  thou- 
sands more  were  jailed.  Their  worldly  possessions  were 
confiscated  or  stolen.  I myself,  from  our  apartment  in 
the  Plosslgasse,  watched  squads  of  S.S.  men  carting  off 
silver,  tapestries,  paintings  and  other  loot  from  the  Roths- 
child palace  next  door.  Baron  Louis  de  Rothschild  him- 
self was  later  able  to  buy  his  way  out  of  Vienna  by  turn- 
ing over  his  steel  mills  to  the  Hermann  Goering  Works. 
Perhaps  half  of  the  city’s  180,000  Jews  managed,  by  the 
time  the  war  started,  to  purchase  their  freedom  to  emi- 
grate by  handing  over  what  they  owned  to  the  Nazis. 

This  lucrative  trade  in  human  freedom  was  handled  by 
a special  organization  set  up  under  the  S.S.  by  Heydrich, 
the  Office  for  Jewish  Emigration,”  which  became  the  sole 
Nazi  agency  authorized  to  issue  permits  to  Jews  to  leave 
the  country.  Administered  from  the  beginning  to  the  end 
by  an  Austrian  Nazi,  a native  of  Hitler’s  home  town  of 
Linz  by  the  name  of  Karl  Adolf  Eichmann,  it  was  to  be- 
come eventually  an  agency  not  of  emigration  but  of 
extermination  and  to  organize  the  slaughter  of  more  than 
four  million  persons,  mostly  Jews.  Himmler  and  Heydrich 
also  took  advantage  of  their  stay  in  Austria  during  the 
rst  weeks  of  the  Anschluss  to  set  up  a huge  concentration 
camp  at  Mauthausen,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Danube 
near  Enns.  It  was  too  much  trouble  to  continue  to  trans- 
port thousands  of  Austrians  to  the  concentration  camps 


478 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  Germany.  Austria,  Himmler  decided,  needed  one  of 
its  own.  Before  the  Third  Reich  tumbled  to  its  fall  the 
non-Austrian  prisoners  were  to  outnumber  the  local  in- 
mates and  Mauthausen  was  to  achieve  the  dubious  record 
as  the  German  concentration  camp  (the  extermination 
camps  in  the  East  were  something  else)  with  the  largest 
number  of  officially  listed  executions — 35,318  in  the  six 
and  a half  years  of  its  existence. 

Despite  the  Gestapo  terror  led  by  Himmler  and  Hey- 
drich  after  the  Anschluss  Germans  flocked  by  the  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  to  Austria,  where  they  could  pay 
with  their  marks  for  sumptuous  meals  not  available  in 
Germany  for  years  and  for  bargain-priced  vacations  amid 
Austria’s  matchless  mountains  and  lakes.  German  busi- 
nessmen and  bankers  poured  in  to  buy  up  the  con- 
cerns of  dispossessed  Jews  and  anti-Nazis  at  a fraction  of 
their  value.  Among  the  smiling  visitors  was  the  inim- 
itable Dr.  Schacht,  who,  despite  his  quarrels  with  Hit- 
ler, was  still  a minister  (without  portfolio)  in  the  Reich 
cabinet,  still  the  president  of  the  Reichsbank,  and  who 
was  overjoyed  with  the  Anschluss.  Arriving  to  take  over 
the  Austrian  National  Bank  on  behalf  of  the  Reichsbank 
even  before  the  plebiscite,  he  addressed  the  staff  of  the 
Austrian  bank  on  March  21.  Ridiculing  the  foreign  press 
for  criticizing  Hitler’s  methods  of  effecting  the  union.  Dr. 
Schacht  stoutly  defended  the  methods,  arguing  that  the 
Anschluss  was  “the  consequence  of  countless  perfidies 
and  brutal  acts  of  violence  which  foreign  countries  have 
practiced  against  us. 

“Thank  God  . . . Adolf  Hitler  has  created  a communion 
of  German  will  and  German  thought.  He  bolstered  it  up 
with  the  newly  strengthened  Wehrmacht  and  he  then  finally 
gave  the  external  form  to  the  inner  union  between  Germany 
and  Austria.  . . . 

“Not  a single  person  will  find  a future  with  us  who  is  not 
wholeheartedly  for  Adolf  Hitler  . . . The  Reichsbank  will 
always  be  nothing  but  National  Socialist  or  I shall  cease  to  be 
its  manager.” 

Whereupon  Dr.  Schacht  administered  to  the  Austrian 
staff  an  oath  to  be  “faithful  and  obedient  to  the  Fuehrer.” 

“A  scoundrel  he  who  breaks  it!”  Dr.  Schacht  cried,  and 
then  led  his  audience  in  the  bellowing  of  a triple  “Sieg 
Heil!”  « 


The  Road  to  Wap  479 

In  the  meantime  Dr.  Schuschnigg  had  been  arrested 
and  subjected  to  treatment  so  degrading  that  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  believe  that  it  was  not  prescribed  by  Hitler  himself. 
Kept  under  house  arrest  from  March  12  until  May  28, 
during  which  time  the  Gestapo  contrived  to  prevent  him 
from  getting  any  sleep  by  the  most  petty  devices,  he  was 
then  taken  to  Gestapo  headquarters  at  the  Hotel  Metro- 
pole  in  Vienna,  where  he  was  incarcerated  in  a tiny  room 
on  the  fifth  floor  for  the  next  seventeen  months.  There, 
with  the  towel  issued  to  him  for  his  personal  use,  he  was 
forced  to  clean  the  quarters,  washbasins,  slop  buckets  and 
latrines  of  the  S.S.  guards  and  perform  other  various 
menial  tasks  thought  up  by  the  Gestapo  By  March  11 
the  first  anniversary  of  his  fall,  he  had  lost  fifty-eight 
pounds,  but  the  S.S.  doctor  reported  that  his  condition  was 
excellent.  The  years  of  solitary  confinement  and  then  of 
life  ‘among  the  living  dead”  in  some  of  the  worst  of 
the  German  concentration  camps  such  as  Dachau  and  Sach- 
senhausen  that  followed  have  been  described  by  Dr. 
Schuschnigg  in  his  book.  * 

Shortly  after  his  arrest  he  was  allowed  to  marry  by 
proxy  the  former  Countess  Vera  Czemin,  whose  mar- 
riage had  been  annulled  by  an  ecclesiastical  court,  f and 
in  the  last  war  years  she  was  permitted  to  share  his  ex- 
istence m the  concentration  camps  along  with  their  child, 
who  was  bom  in  1941.  How  they  survived  the  nightmare 
of  imprisonment  is  a miracle.  Toward  the  end  they  were 
joined  by  a number  of  other  distinguished  victims  of 
Hitler  s wrath  such  as  Dr.  Schacht,  Leon  Blum,  the  former 
rrench  Premier,  and  Madame  Blum,  Pastor  Niemoeller, 
a host  of  high-ranking  generals  and  Prince  Philip  of 
Hesse,  whose  wife,  Princess  Mafalda,  the  daughter  of  the 
King  of  Italy,  had  been  done  to  death  by  the  S.S  at 
Buchenwald  in  1944  as  part  of  the  Fuehrer’s  revenge  for 
Victor  Emmanuel’s  desertion  to  the  Allied  side. 

On  May  1,  1945,  the  eminent  group  of  prisoners,  who 
had  been  hastily  evacuated  from  Dachau  and  transported 
southward  to  keep  them  from  being  liberated  by  the  Amer- 
icans advancing  from  the  West,  arrived  at  a village  high 
in  the  mountains  of  southern  Tyrol.  The  Gestapo  officers 

* Austrian  Requiem.  ~ " " 

tAt  this  time  Schuschnigg  was  a widower. 


480 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


showed  Schuschnigg  a list  of  those  who,  on  Himmler’s 
orders,  were  to  be  done  away  with  before  they  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Allies.  Schuschnigg  noted  his  own  name 
and  that  of  his  wife,  “neatly  printed.”  His  spirits  fell.  To 
have  survived  so  much  so  long — and  then  to  be  bumped 
off  at  the  last  minute! 

On  May  4,  however,  Schuschnigg  was  able  to  write  in 
his  diary: 

At  two  o’clock  this  afternoon,  alarm!  The  Americans! 

An  American  detachment  takes  over  the  hotel. 

We  are  free! 

Without  firing  a shot  and  without  interference  from 
Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  whose  military  forces 
could  have'  overwhelmed  him,  Hitler  had  added  seven 
million  subjects  to  the  Reich  and  gained  a strategic 
position  of  immense  value  to  his  future  plans.  Not  only 
did  his  armies  flank  Czechoslovakia  on  three  sides  but  he 
now  possessed  in  Vienna  the  gateway  to  Southeast  Europe. 
As  the  capital  of  the  old  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  Vienna 
had  long  stood  at  the  center  of  the  communications  and 
the  trading  systems  of  Central  and  Southeast  Europe. 
Now  that  nerve  center  was  in  German  hands. 

Perhaps  most  important  to  Hitler  Was  the  demonstra- 
tion again  that  neither  Britain  nor  France  would  lift  a 
finger  to  stop  him.  On  March  14  Chamberlain  had  ad- 
dressed the  Commons  on  Hitler’s  fait  accompli  in  Austria, 
and  the  German  Embassy  in  London  had  got  off  to  Berlin 
a succession  of  urgent  telegrams  on  the  course  of  the 
debate.  There  was  not  much  for  Hitler  to  fear.  “The  hard 
fact  is,”  Chamberlain  declared,  “that  nothing  could  have 
arrested  what  actually  has  happened  [in  Austria] — un- 
less this  country  and  other  countries  had  been  prepared 
to  use  force.” 

The  British  Prime  Minister,  it  became  clear  to  Hitler, 
was  unwilling  not  only  to  employ  force  but  even  to  con- 
cert with  the  other  Big  Powers  about  halting  Germany’s 
future  moves.  On  March  17  the  Soviet  government  had 
proposed  a conference  of  powers,  within  or  without 
the  League  of  Nations,  to  consider  means  of  seeing  that 
there  was  no  further  German  aggression.  Chamberlain 
took  a chilly  view  of  any  such  meeting  and  on  March  24, 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  publicly  rejected  it.  “The  in- 


The  Road  to  War 


481 


“wnnM  h ? quence  °f  any  such  action,”  he  said, 
Sid*bV°  a,ggravate  the  tendency  towards  the  estab- 
lishment of  exclusive  groups  of  nations  which  must  . . . 
be  rnmuca1  to  the  prospects  of  European  peace.”  Appar- 
ently he  overlooked,  or  did  not  take  seriously,  the  Rome- 
Berhn  Axis  or  the  tripartite  Anti-Comintern  Pact  of 
Germany,  Italy  and  Japan. 

hi  the  same  speech  Chamberlain  announced  a decision 
of  his  government  which  must  have  been  even  more 
pleasuig  to  Hitler.  He  bluntly  rejected  the  suggestion  not 
“ should  give  a guarantee  to  fome  to  "he 
that  Rr?^eCh0^°V,a1kja  m Case  she  were  attacked  but  also 
Sh  nnn  f011-  ?Upport  France  if  the  Frc°ch  were 
uto  ™p,ement  their  obligations  under  the 
Hifw^ZK,h  PaCt  • 11118  forthright  statement  eased 

would  akn°c  emj  u°nS1,erab’y-  He  now  that  Britain 
would  also  stand  by  when  he  took  on  his  next  victim.  If 

Britam  held  back  would  not  France  also?  As  his  secret 

Ft  And°h  next,few  months  make  clear,  he  was  sure  of 

wit^  Friri^6^  ^at’  uY  ,the  terms  of  the  Russian  pacts 
not  nhr  ^ taDd  Czechoslovakia,  the  Soviet  Union  was 
not  obliged  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Czechs  until  the 

firSt‘  SuCu  knowled§e  was  all  that  he  needed 
to  enable  him  to  go  ahead  at  once  with  his  plans. 

flftI?ti/eIUCtant  °erman  generals,  Hitler  could  assume 
SUCTref  the  Anschluss,  would  no  longer  stand 

Smo  aYu  IfuhC  had  any  doubts  at  all  on  this,  they  were 
removed  by  the  denouement  of  the  Fritsch  affair.  ^ 

As  we  have  seen,*  General  von  Fritsch’s  trial  before  a 

been  SbninT  °f  hon°r  ,on  charges  of  homosexualism  had 

when  fS  iu  SU8pf ded  ?n  its  opening  day,  March  10, 
when  Field  Marshal  Goenng  and  the  commanders  of  the 

Amy  md  Navy  were  convoked  by  Hitler  to  handle  more 
urgent  affairs  in  connection  with  Austria.  The  trial  re- 
sumed  on  March  17,  but  in  view  of  what  had  happened  in 
wpPv  h7  11  was  bound  to  be  anticlimactic.  A few 
weeks  before,  the  senior  generals  had  been  confident  that 

maFhin  ?e  mi  Uary  COurt  exP°sed  the  unbelievable 
machinations  of  Himmler  and  Heydrich  against  Fritsch 
not  only  would  their  fallen  Commander  in  Chief  be  re- 
stored  to  his  post  in  the  Army  but  the  S.S.,  perhaps  even 

* See  previous  chapter. 


482 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  Third  Reich,  possibly  even  Adolf  Hitler,  would  be 
shaken  to  a fall.  Vain  and  empty  hope!  On  February  4, 
as  has  been  recounted,  Hitler  had  smashed  the  dreams  of 
the  old  officer  corps  by  taking  over  command  of  the 
armed  forces  himself  and  cashiering  Fritsch  and  most  of 
the  high-ranking  generals  around  him.  Now  he  had  con- 
quered Austria  without  a shot.  After  this  astounding  tri- 
umph, nobody  in  Germany,  not  even  the  old  generals,  had 
much  thought  for  General  von  Fritsch. 

True,  he  was  quickly  cleared.  After  some  browbeating 
from  Goering,  who  could  now  pose  as  the  fairest  of 
judges,  the  blackmailing  ex-convict,  Schmidt,  broke  down 
in  court  and  confessed  that  the  Gestapo  had  threatened 
his  life  unless  he  implicated  General  von  Fritsch — a 
threat,  incidentally,  which  was  carried  out  anyway  a few 
days  later  and  that  the  similarity  of  names  between 
Fritsch  and  Rittmeister  von  Frisch,  whom  he  had  actually 
blackmailed  for  homosexualism,  had  led  to  the  frame-up. 
No  attempt  was  made  by  Fritsch  or  the  Army  to  expose 
the  Gestapo’s  real  role,  nor  the  personal  guilt  of  Himmler 
and  Heydrich  in  cooking  up  the  false  charges.  On  the 
second  day,  March  18,  the  trial  was  concluded  with  the 
inevitable  verdict:  “Proven  not  guilty  as  charged,  and  ac- 
quitted.” 

It  was  a personal  exoneration  for  General  von  Fritsch 
but  it  did  not  restore  him  to  his  command,  nor  the  Army 
to  its  former  position  of  some  independence  in  the  Third 
Reich.  Since  the  trial  was  held  in  camera,  the  public  knew 
nothing  of  it  or  of  the  issues  involved.  On  March  25  Hitler 
sent  a telegram  to  Fritsch  congratulating  him  on  his  “re- 
covery of  health.”  That  was  all. 

The  deposed  General,  who  had  declined  to  point  an 
accusing  finger  at  Himmler  in  court,  now  made  a final 
futile  gesture.  He  challenged  the  Gestapo  chief  to  a duel. 
The  challenge,  drawn  up  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
old  military  code  of  honor  by  General  Beck  himself, 
was  given  to  General  von  Rundstedt,  as  the  senior  rank- 
ing Army  officer,  to  deliver  to  the  head  of  the  S.S.  But 
Rundstedt  got  cold  feet,  carried  it  around  in  his  pocket 
for  weeks  and  in  the  end  forgot  it. 

General  von  Fritsch,  and  all  he  stood  for,  soon  faded 
out  of  German  life.  But  what  did  he  stand  for  in  the 


The  Road  to  War 


483 


end?  In  December  he  was  writing  his  friend  Baroness 
Margot  von  Schutzbar  a letter  which  indicated  the  pa- 
thetic confusion  into  which  he,  like  so  many  of  the  other 
generals,  had  fallen. 

“ ^e.a'ly.  stranee  that  so  many  people  should  regard  the 
future  with  increasing  fears,  in  spite  of  the  Fuehrer’s  in- 
disputable successes  during  the  past  years 

, after  to®  war  1 came  to  the  conclusion  that  we 
should  have  to  be  victorious  in  three  battles  if  Germany 
were  to  become  powerful  again:  y 

fh;*~  1116  batde  against  the  working  class— Hitler  has  won 

aga2ui^uSLontaSm“aCndChUrCh’  ^ eXpreSSed 

3.  Against  the  Jews. 

..„WT®  ar®  ^ midst  of  these  battles  and  the  one  against 
t - ^ws  *5  most  difficult.  I hope  everyone  realizes  the  in- 
tncacies  of  this  campaign.43 

,?n  ^u^st  7>  1939  > as  toe  war  clouds  darkened,  he 
wrote  the  Baroness:  ‘For  me  there  is,  neither  in  peace  nor 
m war,  any  part  in  Herr  Hitler’s  Germany.  I shall  accom- 

afhome”regiment  “ a target’  because  I cannot  stay 

That  is  what  he  did.  On  August  11,  1938,  he  had  been 
colonel  in  chief  of  his  old  regiment,  the  12th 
m1'!eoI7n\eglment’  a purely  honorary  tide.  On  September 
1939’  he  was  the  target  of  a Polish  machine  gunner 
before  beleaguered  Warsaw,  and  four  days  later  he  was 
buned  with  full  military  honors  in  Berlin  on  a cold,  rainy, 
ark  morning,  one  of  the  dreariest  days,  according  to  my 
diary,  I ever  lived  through  in  the  capital. 

With  Fritsch’s  discharge  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
German  Army  twenty  months  before,  Hitler  had  won  as 
we  have  seen,  a complete  victory  over  the  last  citadel  of 
possible  opposition  in  Germany,  the  old,  traditional 
Army  officer  caste.  Now,  in  the  spring  of  1938,  by  his 
clever  coup  in  Austria,  he  had  further  established  his 
noid  on  the  Army,  demonstrating  his  bold  leadership 
and  emphasizing  that  he  alone  would  make  the.  decisions 
m foreign  policy  and  that  it  was  the  Army’s  role  merely 
to  supply  the  force,  or  the  threat  of  force.  Moreover  he 
had  given  the  Army,  without  the  sacrifice  of  a man  a 
strategic  position  which  rendered  Czechoslovakia  nfili- 


484  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tarily  indefensible.  There  was  no  time  to  lose  in  taking 
advantage  of  it. 

On  April  21,  eleven  days  after  the  Nazi  plebiscite  on 
Austria,  Hitler  called  in  General  Keitel,  Chief  of  the  High 
Command  of  the  Armed  Forces,  to  discuss  Case  Green. 


12 

TOE  ROAD  TO  MUNICH 


case  green  was  the  code  name  of  the  plan  for  a surprise 
attack  on  Czechoslovakia.  It  had  first  been  drawn  up,  as 
we  have  seen,  on  June  24,  1937,  by  Field  Marshal  von 
Blomberg,  and  Hitler  had  elaborated  on  it  in  his  lecture 
to  the  generals  on  November  5,  admonishing  them  that 
“the  descent  upon  the  Czechs”  would  have  to  be  “car- 
ried out  with  lightning  speed”  and  that  it  might  take  place 
“as  early  as  1938.”  * 

Obviously,  the  easy  conquest  of  Austria  now  made  Case 
Green  a matter  of  some  urgency;  the  plan  must  be 
brought  up  to  date  and  preparations  for  carrying  it  out 
begun.  It  was  for  this  purpose  that  Hitler  summoned 
Keitel  on  April  21,  1938.  On  the  following  day,  Major 
Rudolf  Schmundt,  the  Fuehrer’s  new  military  aide,  pre- 
pared a summary  of  the  discussion,  which  was  divided 
into  three  parts:  “political  aspects,”  “military  conclusions” 
and  “propaganda.”  1 

Hitler  rejected  the  “idea  of  strategic  attack  out  of  the 
blue  without  cause  or  possibility  of  justification”  because 
of  “hostile  world  opinion  which  might  lead  to  a critical 
situation.”  He  thought  a second  alternative,  “action  after 
a period  of  diplomatic  discussions  which  gradually  lead 
to  a crisis  and  to  war,”  was  “undesirable  because  Czech 
(Green)  security  measures  will  have  been  taken.”  The 
Fuehrer  preferred,  at  the  moment  at  least,  a third  alterna- 
tive: “Lightning  action  based  on  an  incident  (for  example, 
the  murder  of  the  German  minister  in  the  course  of  an 
anti-German  demonstration) .”  t Such  an  “incident,”  it  will 
be  remembered,  was  at  one  time  planned  to  justify  a 
German  invasion  of  Austria,  when  Papen  was  to  have  been 


* See  above,  pp.  416-22. 
t The  parentheses  are  in  the  original. 


485 


486 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  victim.  In  Hitler’s  gangster  world  German  envoys 
abroad  were  certainly  expendable. 

The  German  warlord,  as  he  now  was — since  he  had 
taken  over  personal  command  of  the  armed  forces — em- 
phasized to  General  Keitel  the  necessity  of  speed  in  the 
operations. 

The  first  four  days  of  military  action  are,  politically 
speaking,  decisive.  In  the  absence  of  outstanding  military 
successes,  a European  crisis  is  certain  to  rise.  Fails  accomplis 
must  convince  foreign  powers  of  the  hopelessness  of  mili- 
tary intervention. 

As  for  the  propaganda  side  of  the  war,  it  was  not  yet 
time  to  call  in  Dr.  Goebbels.  Hitler  merely  discussed 
leaflets  “for  the  conduct  of  the  Germans  in  Czechoslo- 
vakia” and  those  which  would  contain  “threats  to  intimi- 
date the  Czechs.” 

The  Republic  of  Czechoslovakia,  which  Hitler  was  now 
determined  to  destroy,  was  the  creation  of  the  peace 
treaties,  so  hateful  to  the  Germans,  after  the  First  World 
War.  It  was  also  the  handiwork  of  two  remarkable  Czech 
intellectuals,  Tomas  Garrigue  Masaryk,  a self-educated 
son  of  a coachman,  who  became  a noted  savant  and  the 
country’s  first  President;  and  Eduard  BeneS,  son  of  a 
peasant,  who  worked  his  way  through  the  University  of 
Prague  and  three  French  institutions  of  higher  learning, 
and  who  after  serving  almost  continually  as  Foreign  Min- 
ister became  the  second  President  on  the  retirement  of 
Masaryk  in  1935.  Carved  out  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire, 
which  in  the  sixteenth  century  had  acquired  the  ancient 
Kingdom  of  Bohemia,  Czechoslovakia  developed  during 
the  years  that  followed  its  founding  in  1918  into  the 
most  democratic,  progressive,  enlightened  and  prosperous 
state  in  Central  Europe. 

But  by  its  very  make-up  of  several  different  nationalities 
it  was  gripped  from  the  beginning  by  a domestic  prob- 
lem which  over  twenty  years  it  had  not  been  able  entirely 
to  solve.  This  was  the  question  of  its  minorities.  Within 
the  country  lived  one  million  Hungarians,  half  a million 
Ruthenians  and  three  and  a quarter  million  Sudeten  Ger- 
mans. These  peoples  looked  longingly  toward  their 
“mother”  countries,  Hungary,  Russia,  and  Germany  re- 
spectively, though  the  Sudeteners  had  never  belonged  to 


The  Road  to  War  437 

the  German  Reich  (except  as  a part  of  the  loosely  formed 
Woly  Roman  Empire)  but  only  to  Austria.  At  the  least, 
these  minorities  desired  more  autonomy  than  they  had 
been  given. 

Even  the  Slovaks,  who  formed  a quarter  of  the  ten 
million  Czechoslovaks,  wanted  some  measure  of  au- 
tonomy. Although  racially  and  linguistically  closely  re- 
lated to  the  Czechs,  the  Slovaks  had  developed  differently 
—historically,  culturally  and  economically— largely  due 
to  their  centuries-old  domination  by  Hungary.  An  agree- 
ment between  Czech  and  Slovak  Emigres  in  America 
signed  in  Pittsburgh  on  May  30,  1918,  had  provided  for 
the  Slovaks’  having  their  own  government,  parliament  and 
courts.  But  the  government  in  Prague  had  not  felt  bound 
by  this  agreement  and  had  not  kept  it. 

To  be  sure,  compared  to  minorities  in  most  other  coun- 
tries even  in  the  West,  even  in  America,  those  in  Czecho- 
slovakia were  not  badly  off.  They  enjoyed  not  only  full 

democratic  and  civil  rights — including  the  right  to  vote 

but  to  a certain  extent  were  given  their  own  schools  and 
allowed  to  maintain  their  own  cultural  institutions.  Lead- 
ers of  the  minority  political  parties  often  served  as  min- 
isters in  the  central  government.  Nevertheless,  the  Czechs, 
not  fully  recovered  from  the  effects  of  centuries  of  oppres- 
sion by  the  Austrians,  left  a great  deal  to  be  desired  in 
solving  the  minorities  problem.  They  were  often  chau- 
vinistic and  frequently  tactless.  I recall  from  my  own 
earlier  visits  to  the  country  the  deep  resentment  in  Slovakia 
against  the  imprisonment  of  Dr.  Vojtech  Tuka,  at  that 
ume  a respected  professor,  who  had  been  sentenced  to 
fifteen  years’  confinement  “for  treason,”  though  it  was 
doubtful  that  he  was  guilty  of  more  than  working  for 
Slovak  autonomy.  Above  all,  the  minority  groups  felt  that 
the  Czechoslovak  government  had  not  honored  the  prom- 
ises made  by  Masaryk  and  BeneS  to  the  Paris  Peace  Con- 
ference in  1919  to  establish  a cantonal  system  similar  to 
that  of  Switzerland. 

Ironically  enough,  in  view  of  what  is  now  to  be  set 
down  here,  the  Sudeten  Germans  had  fared  tolerably  well 
m the  Czechoslovak  state— certainly  better  than  any  other 
minority  m the  country  and  better  than  the  German 
minorities  in  Poland  or  in  Fascist  Italy.  They  resented 
the  petty  tyrannies  of  local  Czech  officials  and  the 


488  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

discrimination  against  them  that  sometimes  occurred  in 
Prague.  They  found  it  difficult  to  adjust  to  the  loss  of 
their  former  dominance  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia  under 
the  Hapsburgs.  But  lying  in  compact  groups  along  the 
northwestern  and  southwestern  parts  of  the  new  Republic, 
where  most  of  the  industry  of  the  country  was  con- 
centrated, they  prospered  and  as  the  years  went  by  they 
gradually  reached  a state  of  relative  harmony  with  the 
Czechs,  continuing  always  to  press  for  more  autonomy 
and  more  respect  for  their  linguistic  and  cultural  rights. 
Until  the  rise  of  Hitler,  there  was  no  serious  political  move- 
ment which  asked  for  more.  The  Social  Democrats  and 
other  democratic  parties  received  most  of  the  Sudeten 
votes. 

Then  in  1933,  when  Hitler  became  Chancellor,  the  virus 
of  National  Socialism  struck  the  Sudeten  Germans.  In 
that  year  was  formed  the  Sudeten  German  Party  (S.D.P.) 
under  the  leadership  of  a mild-mannered  gymnastics 
teacher  by  the  name  of  Konrad  Henlein.  By  1935,  the 
party  was  being  secretly  subsidized  by  the  German  Foreign 
Office  to  the  amount  of  15,000  marks  a month.2  Within 
a couple  of  years  it  had  captured  the  majority  of  the 
Sudeten  Germans,  only  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  Com- 
munists remaining  outside  it.  By  the  time  of  the  Anschluss 
Henlein’s  party,  which  for  three  years  had  been  taking  its 
orders  from  Berlin,  was  ready  to  do  the  bidding  of  Adolf 
Hitler. 

To  receive  this  bidding,  Henlein  sped  to  Berlin  a fort- 
night after  the  annexation  of  Austria  and  on  March  28  was 
closeted  with  Hitler  for  three  hours,  Ribbentrop  and  Hess 
also  being  present.  Hitler’s  instructions,  as  revealed  in  a 
Foreign  Office  memorandum,  were  that  “demands  should 
be  made  by  the  Sudeten  German  Party  which  are  unac- 
ceptable to  the  Czech  government.”  As  Henlein  himself 
summarized  the  Fuehrer’s  views,  “We  must  always  de- 
mand so  much  that  we  can  never  be  satisfied.”  3 

Thus,  the  plight  of  the  German  minority  in  Czechoslo- 
vakia was  for  Hitler  merely  a pretext,  as  Danzig  was  to  be 
a year  later  in  regard  to  Poland,  for  cooking  up  a stew  in  a 
land  he  coveted,  undermining  it,  confusing  and  misleading 
its  friends  and  concealing  his  real  purpose.  What  that 
purpose  was  he  had  made  clear  in  his  November  5 harangue 
to  the  military  leaders  and  in  the  initial  directives  of 


The  Road  to  War 


489 


Case  Green:  to  destroy  the  Czechoslovak  state  and  to  grab 
its  territories  and  inhabitants  for  the  Third  Reich.  Despite 
what  had  happened  in  Austria,  the  leaders  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  did  not  grasp  this.  All  through  the  spring 
and  summer,  indeed  almost  to  the  end,  Prime  Minister 
Chamberlain  and  Premier  Daladier  apparently  sincerely 
believed,  along  with  most  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  that  all 
Hitler  wanted  was  justice  for  his  kinsfolk  in  Czechoslo- 
vakia. 

In  fact,  as  the  spring  days  grew  warmer  the  British 
and  French  governments  went  out  of  their  way  to  pressure 
the  Czech  government  to  grant  far-reaching  concessions 
to  the  Sudeten  Germans.  On  May  3 the  new  German 
ambassador  in  London,  Herbert  von  Dirksen,  was  reporting 
to  Berlin  that  Lord  Halifax  had  informed  him  of  a demarche, 
urging  the  British  government  would  shortly  make  in 
Prague  “which  would  aim  at  inducing  BeneS  to  show 
the  utmost  measure  of  accommodation  to  the  Sudeten  Ger- 
mans.”4 Four  days  later,  on  May  7,  the  British  and 
French  ministers  in  Prague  made  their  demarche,  urging 
the  Czech  government  “to  go  to  the  utmost  limit,”  as  the 
German  minister  reported  to  Berlin,  to  meet  the  Sudeten 
demands.  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  seemed  quite  pleased  to 
find  that  the  British  and  French  governments  were  so 
concerned  with  aiding  them. 

Concealment  of  German  aims,  however,  was  more  than 
ever  necessary  at  this  stage.  On  May  12  Henlein  paid  a 
secret  visit  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  in  Berlin  and  received 
instructions  from  Ribbentrop  on  how  to  bamboozle  the 
British  when  he  arrived  in  London  that  evening  to  see  Sir 
Robert  Vansittart,  chief  diplomatic  adviser  to  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  and  other  British  officials.  A memorandum  by 
Weizsaecker  laid  down  the  line  to  be  taken:  “Henlein 
will  deny  in  London  that  he  is  acting  on  instructions 
from  Berlin  . . . Finally,  Henlein  will  speak  of  the  progres- 
sive disintegration  of  the  Czech  political  structure,  in 
order  to  discourage  those  circles  which  consider  that  their 
intervention  on  behalf  of  this  structure  may  still  be  of 
use.”  6 On  the  same  day  the  German  minister  in  Prague 
was  wiring  Ribbentrop  about  the  need  of  precaution  to 
cover  his  legation  in  its  work  of  handing  over  money  and 
instructions  to  the  Sudeten  German  Party. 


490  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hugh  R.  Wilson,  the  American  ambassador  in  Berlin, 
called  on  Weizsaecker  on  May  14  to  discuss  the  Sudeten 
crisis  and  was  told  of  German  fears  that  Czech  authorities 
were  deliberately  provoking  a European  crisis  in  order  to 
try  to  prevent  the  “disintegration  of  Czechoslovakia.”  Two 
days  later,  on  May  16,  Major  Schmundt  got  off  an  urgent 
and  “most  secret”  telegram  to  OKW  headquarters  on 
behalf  of  Hitler,  who  was  resting  at  Obersalzberg,  asking 
how  many  divisions  on  the  Czech  frontier  were  “ready  to 
march  within  twelve  hours,  in  the  case  of  mobilization.” 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Zeitzler,  of  the  OKW  staff,  replied 
immediately,  “Twelve.”  This  did  not  satisfy  Hitler.  “Please 
send  the  numbers  of  the  divisions,”  he  asked.  And  the 
answer  came  back,  listing  ten  infantry  divisions  by  their 
numbers  and  adding  one  armored  and  one  mountain  divi- 
sion.6 

Hitler  was  getting  restless  for  action.  The  next  day,  the 
seventeenth,  he  was  inquiring  of  OKW  for  precise  infor- 
mation on  the  fortifications  which  the  Czechs  had  con- 
structed in  the  Sudeten  mountains  on  their  borders.  These 
were  known  as  the  Czech  Maginot  Line.  Zeitzler  replied 
from  Berlin  on  the  same  day  with  a long  and  “most  secret” 
telegram  informing  the  Fuehrer  in  considerable  detail  of 
the  Czech  defense  works.  He  made  it  clear  that  they  were 
fairly  formidable.7 

THE  FIRST  CRISIS:  MAY  1938 

The  weekend  which  began  on  Friday,  May  20,  developed 
into  a critical  one  and  would  later  be  remembered  as  the 
“May  crisis.”  During  the  ensuing  forty-eight  hours,  the 
governments  in  London,  Paris,  Prague  and  Moscow  were 
panicked  into  the  belief  that  Europe  stood  nearer  to  war 
than  it  had  at  any  time  since  the  summer  of  1914.  This 
may  have  been  largely  due  to  the  possibility  that  new 
plans  for  a German  attack  on  Czechoslovakia,  which  were 
drawn  up  for  Hitler  by  OKW  and  presented  to  him  on 
that  Friday,  leaked  out.  At  any  rate,  it  was  believed  at 
least  in  Prague  and  London  that  Hitler  was  about  to 
launch  aggression  against  Czechoslovakia.  In  this  belief 
the  Czechs  began  to  mobilize  and  Britain,  France  and 
Russia  displayed  a firmness  and  a unity  in  the  face  of 
what  their  governments  feared  to  be  an  imminent  German 


The  Road  to  War  491 

threat  which  they  were  not  to  show  again  until  a new 
world  war  had  almost  destroyed  them. 

On  Friday,  May  20,  General  Keitel  dispatched  to  Hitler 
at  the  Obersalzberg  a new  draft  of  Case  Green  which  he 
and  his  staff  had  been  working  on  since  the  Fuehrer  had 
laid  down  the  general  lines  for  it  in  their  meeting  on 
April  21.  In  an  obsequious  letter  to  the  Leader  attached  to 
the  new  plan,  Keitel  explained  that  it  took  into  account 
“the  situation  created  by  the  incorporation  of  Austria 
into  the  German  Reich”  and  that  it  would  not  be  dis- 
cussed with  the  commanders  in  chief  of  the  three  armed 
services  until  “you,  my  Fuehrer,”  approved  it  and  signed 
it. 

The  new  directive  for  “Green,”  dated  Berlin,  May  20, 
1938,  is  an  interesting  and  significant  document.  It  is  a 
model  of  the  kind  of  Nazi  planning  for  aggression  with 
which  the  world  later  became  acquainted. 

It  is  not  my  intention  [it  began]  to  smash  Czechoslo- 
vakia by  military  action  in  the  immediate  future  without 
provocation,  unless  an  unavoidable  development  . . . within 
[emphasis  in  the  original]  Czechoslovakia  forces  the  issue, 
or  political  events  in  Europe  create  a particularly  favorable 
opportunity  which  may  perhaps  never  recur.8 

Three  “political  possibilities  for  commencing  the  opera- 
tion” are  considered.  The  first,  “a  sudden  attack  without 
convenient  outward  excuse,”  is  rejected. 

Operations  preferably  will  be  launched,  either: 

(a)  after  a period  of  increasing  diplomatic  controversies 
and  tension  linked  with  military  preparations,  which  will  be 
exploited  so  as  to  shift  the  war  guilt  on  the  enemy. 

(b)  by  lightning  action  as  the  result  of  a serious  incident 
which  will  subject  Germany  to  unbearable  provocation  and 
which,  in  the  eyes  of  at  least  a part  of  world  opinion, 
affords  the  moral  justification  for  military  measures. 

Case  (b)  is  more  favorable,  both  from  a military  and  a 
political  point  of  view. 

As  for  the  military  operation  itself,  it  was  to  attain 
such  a success  within  four  days  that  it  would  “demonstrate 
to  enemy  states  which  may  wish  to  intervene  the  hopeless- 
ness of  the  Czech  military  position  and  also  provide  an 
incentive  to  those  states  which  have  territorial  claims 
upon  Czechoslovakia  to  join  in  immediately  against  her.” 
Those  states  were  Hungary  and  Poland,  and  the  plan 


492  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

counted  on  their  intervention.  Whether  France  would 
honor  its  obligations  to  the  Czechs  was  considered  doubt- 
ful, but  “attempts  by  Russia  to  give  Czechoslovakia  mili- 
tary support  are  to  be  expected.” 

The  German  High  Command,  or  at  least  Keitel  and 
Hitler,  were  so  confident  that  the  French  would  not  fight 
that  only  a “minimum  strength  is  to  be  provided  as  a rear 
cover  in  the  west”  and  it  was  emphasized  that  “the  whole 
weight  of  all  forces  must  be  employed  in  the  invasion  of 
Czechoslovakia.”  The  “task  of  the  bulk  of  the  Army,” 
aided  by  the  Luftwaffe,  was  “to  smash  the  Czechoslovak 
Army  and  to  occupy  Bohemia  and  Moravia  as  quickly  as 
possible.” 

It  was  to  be  total  war,  and  for  the  first  time  in  the 
planning  of  German  soldiers  the  value  of  what  the  direc- 
tive calls  “propaganda  warfare”  and  “economic  warfare” 
is  emphasized  and  their  employment  woven  into  the  over- 
all military  plan  of  attack. 

Propaganda  warfare  [emphasis  in  the  original]  must  on 
the  one  hand  intimidate  the  Czechs  by  means  of  threats  and 
wear  down  their  power  of  resistance;  on  the  other  hand  it 
must  give  the  national  minorities  indications  as  to  how  to 
support  our  military  operations  and  influence  the  neutrals 
in  our  favor. 

Economic  warfare  has  the  task  of  employing  all  avail- 
able economic  resources  to  hasten  the  final  collapse  of  the 
Czechs  ...  In  the  course  of  military  operations  it  is  im- 
portant to  help  to  increase  the  total  economic  war  effort 
by  rapidly  collecting  information  about  important  factories 
and  setting  them  going  again  as  soon  as  possible.  For  this 
reason  the  sparing — as  far  as  military  operations  permit — 
of  Czech  industrial  and  engineering  establishments  may  be 
of  decisive  importance  to  us. 

This  model  for  Nazi  aggression  was  to  remain  essen- 
tially unchanged  and  to  be  used  with  staggering  success 
until  an  aroused  world  much  later  woke  up  to  it. 

Shortly  after  noon  on  May  20,  the  German  minister  in 
Prague  sent  an  “urgent  and  most  secret”  wire  to  Berlin 
reporting  that  the  Czech  Foreign  Minister  had  just  in- 
formed him  by  telephone  that  his  government  was  “per- 
turbed by  reports  of  concentration  of  [German]  troops 
in  Saxony.”  He  had  replied,  he  said,  “that  there  were 
absolutely  no  grounds  for  anxiety,”  but  he  requested 


The  Road  to  Wap  493 

Berlin  to  inform  him  immediately  what,  if  anything  was 

lip. 

This  was  the  first  of  a series  of  feverish  diplomatic  ex- 
changes that  weekend  which  shook  Europe  with  a fear 
that  Hitler  was  about  to  move  again  and  that  this  time  a 
general  war  would  follow.  The  basis  for  the  information 
received  by  British  and  Czech  intelligence  that  German 
troops  were  concentrating  on  the  Czech  border  has  never, 
so  far  as  I know,  come  to  light.  To  a Europe  still  under 
the  shock  of  the  German  military  occupation  of  Austria 
there  were  several  straws  in  the  wind.  On  May  19  a news- 
paper in  Leipzig  had  published  a report  of  German  troop 
movements.  Henlein,  the  Sudeten  Fuehrer,  had  announced 
the  breaking  off  of  his  party’s  negotiations  with  the 
Czech  government  on  May  9 and  it  was  known  that  on 
his  return  from  London  on  the  fourteenth  he  had  stopped 
off  at  Berchtesgaden  to  see  Hitler  and  that  he  was  stiff 
there.  There  were  shooting  affrays  in  the  Sudetenland.  And 
all  through  May  Dr.  Goebbels’  propaganda  war — featuring 
wild  stories  of  “Czech  terror”  against  the  Sudeten  Germans 
—had  been  stepped  up.  The  tension  seemed  to  be  reach- 
ing a climax. 

Though  there  was  some  movement  of  German  troops  in 
connection  with  spring  maneuvers,  particularly  in  the 
eastern  regions,  no  evidence  was  ever  found  from  the 
captured  German  documents  indicating  any  sudden,  new 
concentration  of  armed  forces  on  the  Czech  border  at  this 
moment.  On  the  contrary,  two  German  Foreign  Office 
papers  dated  May  21  contain  confidential  assurances  to  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  from  Colonel  Jodi  of  the  OKW  that 
there  had  been  no  such  concentrations  either  in  Silesia  or 
m Lower  Austria.  There  had  been  nothing,  Jodi  asserted 
in  messages  not  intended  for  foreign  perusal,  “apart  from 
peacetime  maneuvers.” » It  was  not  that  the  Czech  border 
^fs.j.ePuded  of  German  troops.  As  we  have  seen,  on  May 
1 6 Hitler  had  been  informed  by  OKW,  in  answer  to  his 
urgent  request  for  information,  that  there  were  twelve 
German  divisions  on  the  Czech  frontier  “ready  to  march 
within  twelve  hours.” 

Could  it  have  been  that  Czech  or  British  intelligence 
got  wind  of  the  telegrams  which  exchanged  this  informa- 
tion?  And  that  they  learned  of  the  new  directive  for 
Green  which  Keitel  dispatched  for  Hitler’s  approval 


^94  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

on  May  20?  For  on  the  next  day  the  Czech  Chief  of 
Staff,  General  Krejci,  told  the  German  military  attache 
in  Prague,  Colonel  Toussaint,  that  he  had  “irrefutable 
proof  that  in  Saxony  a concentration  of  from  eight  to  ten 
[German]  divisions  had  taken  place.” 10  The  figures  on 
the  number  of  divisions  were  not  far  from  correct,  even 
if  the  information  on  the  manner  of  their  deployment 
was  somewhat  inaccurate.  At  any  rate,  on  the  afternoon 
of  May  20,  following  an  emergency  cabinet  session  at 
Hradschin  Palace  in  Prague  presided  over  by  President 
BeneS,  the  Czechs  decided  on  an  immediate  partial 
mobilization.  One  class  was  called  to  the  colors  and  cer- 
tain technical  reservists  were  mobilized.  The  Czech  gov- 
ernment, in  contrast  to  the  Austrian  two  months  before, 
did  not  intend  to  give  up  without  a fight. 

The  Czech  mobilization,  partial  though  it  was,  sent 
Adolf  Hitler  into  a fit  of  fury,  and  his  feelings  were  not 
assuaged  by  the  dispatches  that  arrived  for  him  at 
Obersalzberg  from  the  German  Foreign  Office  in  Berlin 
telling  of  continual  calls  by  the  British  and  French  am- 
bassadors warning  Germany  that  aggression  against 
Czechoslovakia  meant  a European  war. 

The  Germans  had  never  been  subjected  to  such  strenu- 
ous and  persistent  diplomatic  pressure  as  the  British  em- 
ployed on  this  weekend.  Sir  Nevile  Henderson,  the  British 
ambassador,  who  had  been  sent  to  Berlin  by  Prime  Min- 
ister Chamberlain  to  apply  his  skills  as  a professional 
diplomat  to  the  appeasement  of  Hitler  and  who  applied 
them  to  the  utmost,  called  repeatedly  at  the  German 
Foreign  Office  to  inquire  about  German  troop  movements 
and  to  advise  caution.  There  is  no  doubt  that  he  was 
egged  on  by  Lord  Halifax  and  the  British  Foreign  Office, 
for  Henderson,  a suave,  debonair  diplomat,  had  little  sym- 
pathy with  the  Czechs,  as  all  who  knew  him  in  Berlin 
were  aware.  He  saw  Ribbentrop  twice  on  May  21  and  on 
the  next  day,  though  it  was  a Sunday,  called  on  State 
Secretary  von  Weizsaecker — Ribbentrop  having  been 
hastily  convoked  to  Hitler’s  presence  at  Obersalzberg — to 
deliver  a personal  message  from  Halifax  stressing  the 
gravity  of  the  situation.  In  London,  the  British  Foreign 
Secretary  also  called  in  the  German  ambassador  on  the 
Sabbath  and  emphasized  how  grave  the  moment  was. 

In  all  these  British  communications  the  Germans  did  not 


The  Road  to  War  495 

fail  to  note,  as  Ambassador  von  Dirksen  pointed  out  in  a 
dispatch  after  seeing  Halifax,  that  the  British  government, 
while  certain  that  France  would  go  to  the  aid  of  Czecho- 
slovakia, did  not  affirm  that  Britain  would  too.  The  furthest 
the  British  would  go  was  to  warn,  as  Dirksen  says  Halifax 
did,  that  “in  the  event  of  a European  conflict  it  was  impos- 
sible to  foresee  whether  Britain  would  not  be  drawn  into 
it.”  11  As  a matter  of  fact,  this  was  as  far  as  Chamber- 
lain’s government  would  ever  go — until  it  was  too  late  to 
stop  Hitler.  It  was  this  writer’s  impression  in  Berlin 
from  that  moment  until  the  end  that  had  Chamberlain 
frankly  told  Hitler  that  Britain  would  do  what  it  ultimately 
did  in  the  face  of  Nazi  aggression,  the  Fuehrer  would 
never  have  embarked  on  the  adventures  which  brought 
on  the  Second  World  War — an  impression  which  has  been 
immensely  strengthened  by  the  study  of  the  secret  German 
documents.  This  was  the  well-meaning  Prime  Minister’s 
fatal  mistake. 

Adolf  Hitler,  brooding  fitfully  in  his  mountain  retreat 
above  Berchtesgaden,  felt  deeply  humiliated  by  the 
Czechs  and  by  the  support  given  them  in  London,  Paris 
and  even  Moscow,  and  nothing  could  have  put  the  German 
dictator  in  a blacker,  uglier  mood.  His  fury  was  all  the 
more  intense  because  he  was  accused,  prematurely,  of 
being  on  the  point  of  committing  an  aggression  which  he 
indeed  intended  to  commit.  That  very  weekend  he  had 
gone  over  the  new  plan  for  “Green”  submitted  by  Keitel. 
But  it  could  not  be  carried  out  at  once.  Swallowing 
his  pride,  he  ordered  the  Foreign  Office  in  Berlin  to  in- 
form the  Czech  envoy  on  Monday,  May  23,  that  Germany 
had  no  aggressive  intentions  toward  Czechoslovakia  and 
that  the  reports  of  German  troop  concentrations  on  her 
borders  were  without  foundation.  In  Prague,  London,  Paris 
and  Moscow  the  government  leaders  breathed  a sigh  of 
relief.  The  crisis  had  been  mastered.  Hitler  had  been  given 
a lesson.  He  must  now  know  he  could  not  get  away  with 
aggression  as  easily  as  he  had  done  in  Austria. 

Little  did  these  statesmen  know  the  Nazi  dictator. 

After  sulking  at  Obersalzberg  a few  more  days,  during 
which  there  grew  within  him  a burning  rage  to  get  even 
with  Czechoslovakia  and  particularly  with  President 


496 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Benes,  who,  he  believed,  had  deliberately  humiliated  him, 
he  suddenly  appeared  in  Berlin  on  May  28  and  convoked 
the  ranking  officers  of  the  Wehrmacht  to  the  Chancellery 
to  hear  a momentous  decision.  He  himself  told  of  it  in  a 
speech  to  the  Reichstag  eight  months  later: 

I resolved  to  solve  once  and  for  all,  and  this  radically,  the 
Sudeten  question.  On  May  28,  I ordered: 

1.  That  preparations  should  be  made  for  military  action 
against  this  state  by  October  2. 

2.  That  the  construction  of  our  western  defenses  should 
be  greatly  extended  and  speeded  up  . . . 

The  immediate  mobilization  of  96  divisions  was  planned,  to 
begin  with  . . ,12 

To  his  assembled  confederates,  Goering,  Keitel,  Brauch- 
itsch,  Beck,  Admiral  Raeder,  Ribbentrop  and  Neurath, 
he  thundered,  “It  is  my  unshakable  will  that  Czechoslo- 
vakia shall  be  wiped  off  the  map!”  13  Case  Green  was  again 
brought  out  and  again  revised. 

Jodi’s  diary  traces  what  had  been  going  on  in  Hitler’s 
feverish,  vindictive  mind. 

The  intention  of  the  Fuehrer  not  to  activate  the  Czech 
problem  as  yet  is  changed  because  of  the  Czech  strategic 
troop  concentration  of  May  21,  which  occurs  without  any  Ger- 
man threat  and  without  the  slightest  cause  for  it.  Because 
of  Germany’s  self-restraint,  its  consequences  lead  to  a loss  of 
prestige  of  the  Fuehrer,  which  he  is  not  willing  to  take 
again.  Therefore,  the  new  directive  for  “Green”  is  issued  on 
May  30.14 

The  details  of  the  new  directive  on  Case  Green  which 
Hitler  signed  on  May  30  do  not  differ  essentially  from  those 
of  the  version  submitted  to  Hitler  nine  days  before.  But 
there  are  two  significant  changes.  Instead  of  the  opening 
sentence  of  May  21,  which  read:  “It  is  not  my  intention 
to  smash  Czechoslovakia  in  the  near  future,”  the  new  di- 
rective began:  “It  is  my  unalterable  decision  to  smash 
Czechoslovakia  by  military  action  in  the  near  future.” 

What  the  “near  future”  meant  was  explained  by  Keitel 
in  a covering  letter.  “Green’s  execution,”  he  ordered,  “must 
be  assured  by  October  1,  1938,  at  the  latest.”  16 

It  was  a date  which  Hitler  would  adhere  to  through 
thick  and  thin,  through  crisis  after  crisis,  and  at  the  brink 
of  war,  without  flinching. 


The  Road  to  War 


497 


WAVERING  OF  THE  GENERALS 

After  noting  in  his  diary  on  May  30  that  Hitler  had 
signed  the  new  directive  for  “Green”  and  that  because 
of  its  demand  for  “an  immediate  breakthrough  into  Czech- 
oslovakia right  on  X Day  . . . the  previous  intentions  of 
the  Army  must  be  changed  considerably,”  Jodi  added  the 
following  sentence: 

The  whole  contrast  becomes  acute  once  more  between  the 
Fuehrer’s  intuition  that  we  must  do  it  this  year  and  the 
opinion  of  the  Army  that  we  cannot  do  it  as  yet  because 
most  certainly  the  Western  powers  will  interfere  and  we 
are  not  as  yet  equal  to  them.16 

The  perceptive  Wehrmacht  staff  officer  had  put  his 
finger  on  a new  rift  between  Hitler  and  some  of  the 
highest-ranking  generals  of  the  Army.  The  opposition  to 
the  Fuehrer’s  grandiose  plans  for  aggression  was  led  by 
General  Ludwig  Beck,  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff, 
who  henceforth  would  assume  the  leadership  of  such  re- 
sistance as  there  was  to  Hitler  in  the  Third  Reich.  Later 
this  sensitive,  intelligent,  decent  but  indecisive  general 
would  base  his  struggle  against  the  Nazi  dictator  on  broad 
grounds.  As  late  as  the  spring  of  1938,  however,  after 
more  than  four  years  of  National  Socialism,  Beck  opposed 
the  Fuehrer  only  on  the  narrower  professional  grounds 
that  Germany  was  not  yet  strong  enough  to  take  on  the 
Western  Powers  and  perhaps  Russia  as  well. 

Beck,  as  we  have  seen,  had  welcomed  Hitler’s  coming 
to  power  and  had  publicly  acclaimed  the  Fuehrer  for  re- 
establishing the  conscript  German  Army  in  defiance  of 
Versailles.  As  far  back  as  1930,  it  will  be  remembered 
from  earlier  pages,  Beck,  then  an  obscure  regimental 
commander,  had  gone  out  of  his  way  to  defend  three  of 
his  subalterns  on  a treason  charge  that  they  were  foment- 
ing Nazism  in  the  armed  forces  and,  in  fact,  had  testified 
in  their  favor  before  the  Supreme  Court  after  Hitler  had 
appeared  on  the  stand  and  warned  that  when  he  came  to 
power  “heads  would  roll.”  It  was  not  the  Fuehrer’s  ag- 
gression against  Austria — which  Beck  had  supported — but 
the  rolling  of  General  von  Fritsch’s  head  after  the  Gesta- 
po frame-up  which  seems  to  have  cleared  his  mind.  Swept 
of  its  cobwebs  it  began  to  perceive  that  Hitler’s  policy  of 


498  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

deliberately  risking  war  with  Britain,  France  and  Russia 
against  the  advice  of  the  top  generals  would,  if  carried 
out,  be  the  ruin  of  Germany. 

Beck  had  got  wind  of  Hitler’s  meeting  with  Keitel  on 
April  21  in  which  the  Wehrmacht  was  instructed  to  hasten 
plans  for  attacking  Czechoslovakia,  and  on  May  5 he 
wrote  out  the  first  of  a series  of  memoranda  for  General 
von  Brauchitsch,  the  new  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Army,  strenuously  opposing  any  such  action.17  They  are 
brilliant  papers,  blunt  as  to  unpleasant  facts  and  full  of 
solid  reasoning  and  logic.  Although  Beck  overestimated 
the  strength  of  will  of  Britain  and  France,  the  political 
shrewdness  of  their  leaders  and  the  power  of  the  French 
Army,  and  in  the  end  proved  wrong  on  the  outcome  of 
the  Czech  problem,  his  long-range  predictions  turned  out, 
so  far  as  Germany  was  concerned,  to  be  deadly  accurate. 

Beck  was  convinced,  he  wrote  in  his  May  5 memoran- 
dum, that  a German  attack  on  Czechoslovakia  would  pro- 
voke a European  war  in  which  Britain,  France  and  Russia 
would  oppose  Germany  and  in  which  the  United  States 
would  be  the  arsenal  of  the  Western  democracies.  Ger- 
many simply  could  not  win  such  a war.  Its  lack  of  raw 
materials  alone  made  victory  impossible.  In  fact,  he  con- 
tended, Germany’s  “military-economic  situation  is  worse 
than  it  was  in  1917-18,”  when  the  collapse  of  the  Kaiser’s 
armies  began. 

On  May  28,  Beck  was  among  the  generals  convoked  to 
the  Reich  Chancellery  after  the  “May  crisis”  to  hear 
Hitler  storm  that  he  intended  to  wipe  Czechoslovakia  off 
the  map  the  coming  autumn.  He  took  careful  notes  of 
the  Fuehrer’s  harangue  and  two  days  later,  on  the  very 
day  that  Hitler  was  signing  the  new  directive  for  “Green,” 
which  fixed  the  date  for  the  attack  as  October  1,  penned 
another  and  sharper  memorandum  to  Brauchitsch  criticiz- 
ing Hitler’s  program  point  by  point.  To  make  sure  that  his 
cautious  Commander  in  Chief  fully  understood  it,  Beck 
read  it  to  him  personally.  At  the  end  he  emphasized  to 
the  unhappy  and  somewhat  shallow  Brauchitsch  that  there 
was  a crisis  in  the  “top  military  hierarchy”  which  has  al- 
ready led  to  anarchy  and  that  if  it  was  not  mastered  the 
fate  of  the  Army,  indeed  of  Germany,  would  be  “black.” 
A few  days  later,  on  lune  3,  Beck  got  off  another  memo- 
randum to  Brauchitsch  in  which  he  declared  that  the  new 


The  Road  to  Wap 


499 

directive  for  “Green”  was  “militarily  unsound”  and  that 
the  Army  General  Staff  rejected  it. 

Hitler,  however,  pressed  forward  with  it.  The  captured 
“Green”  file  discloses  how  frenzied  he  grew  as  the  sum- 
mer proceeded.  The  usual  autumn  troop  maneuvers,  he 
orders,  must  be  moved  forward  so  that  the  Army  will  be 
in  trim  for  the  attack.  Special  exercises  must  be  held  “in 
the  taking  of  fortifications  by  surprise  attack.”  General 
Keitel  is  informed  that  “the  Fuehrer  repeatedly  empha- 
sized the  necessity  of  pressing  forward  more  rapidly  the 
fortification  work  in  the  west.”  On  June  9,  Hitler  asks  for 
more  information  on  Czech  armament  and  receives  im- 
mediately a detailed  report  on  every  conceivable  weapon, 
large  and  small,  used  by  the  Czechs.  On  the  same  day  he 
asks,  “Are  the  Czech  fortifications  still  occupied  in  re- 
duced strength?”  In  his  mountain  retreat,  where  he  is 
spending  the  summer,  surrounded  by  his  toadies,  his  spirits 
rise  and  fall  as  he  toys  with  war.  On  June  18  he  issues  a 
new  “General  Guiding  Directive”  to  “Green.” 

There  is  no  danger  of  a preventive  war  against  Germany 
...  I will  decide  to  take  action  against  Czechoslovakia 
only  if  I am  firmly  convinced  . . . that  France  will  not 
march  and  that  therefore  England  will  not  intervene. 

On  July  7,  however,  Hitler  is  laying  down  “considera- 
tions” of  what  to  do  if  France  and  Britain  intervene.  “The 
prime  consideration,”  he  says,  “is  to  hold  the  western 
fortifications”  until  Czechoslovakia  is  smashed  and  troops 
can  be  rushed  to  the  Western  front.  The  fact  that  there  are 
no  troops  available  to  hold  the  western  fortifications  does 
not  intrude  itself  upon  his  feverish  thinking.  He  advises 
that  “Russia  is  most  likely  to  intervene”  and  by  now  he 
is  not  so  sure  that  Poland  may  not  too.  These  eventual- 
ities must  be  met,  but  he  does  not  say  how. 

Apparently  Hitler,  somewhat  isolated  at  Obersalzberg, 
has  not  yet  heard  the  rumblings  of  dissent  in  the  upper 
echelons  of  the  Army  General  Staff.  Despite  Beck’s  pester- 
ing of  Brauchitsch  with  his  memoranda,  the  General  Staff 
Chief  began  to  realize  by  midsummer  that  his  unstable 
Commander  in  Chief  was  not  bringing  his  opinions  to  the 
notice  of  the  Fuehrer.  By  the  middle  of  July  Beck  therefore 
determined  to  make  one  last  desperate  effort  to  bring  mat- 
ters to  a head,  one  way  or  the  other.  On  July  16  he 


500  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

penned  his  last  memorandum  to  Brauchitsch.  He  demand- 
ed that  the  Army  tell  Hitler  to  halt  his  preparations  for 
war. 

In  full  consciousness  of  the  magnitude  of  such  a step  but 
also  of  my  responsibilities  I feel  it  my  duty  to  urgently  ask 
that  the  Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces  [Hitler] 
call  off  his  preparations  for  war,  and  abandon  the  intention 
of  solving  the  Czech  question  by  force  until  the  military 
situation  is  fundamentally  changed.  For  the  present  I con- 
sider it  hopeless,  and  this  view  is  shared  by  all  the  higher 
officers  of  the  General  Staff. 

Beck  took  his  memorandum  personally  to  Brauchitsch 
and  augmented  it  orally  with  further  proposals  for  unified 
action  on  the  part  of  the  Army  generals  should  Hitler  prove 
recalcitrant.  Specifically,  he  proposed  that  in  that  case  the 
ranking  generals  should  all  resign  at  once.  And  for  the 
first  time  in  the  Third  Reich,  he  raised  a question  which 
later  haunted  the  Nuremberg  trials:  Did  an  officer  have 
a higher  allegiance  than  the  one  to  the  Fuehrer?  At  Nu- 
remberg dozens  of  generals  excused  their  war  crimes  by 
answering  in  the  negative.  They  had  to  obey  orders,  they 
said.  But  Beck  on  July  16  held  a different  view,  which  he 
was  to  press,  unsuccessfully  for  the  most  part,  to  the  end. 
There  were  “limits,”  he  said,  to  one’s  allegiance  to  the 
Supreme  Commander  where  conscience,  knowledge  and 
responsibility  forbade  carrying  out  an  order.  The  generals, 
he  felt,  had  reached  those  limits.  If  Hitler  insisted  on 
war,  they  should  resign  in  a body.  In  that  case,  he 
argued,  a war  was  impossible,  since  there  would  be  no- 
body to  lead  the  armies. 

The  Chief  on  the  German  Army  General  Staff  was  now 
aroused  as  he  had  never  been  before  in  his  lifetime.  The 
scales  were  falling  from  his  eyes.  What  was  at  stake  for 
the  German  nation,  he  saw  at  last,  was  more  than  just  the 
thwarting  of  a hysterical  head  of  state  bent,  out  of  pique, 
on  attacking  a small  neighboring  nation  at  the  risk  of  a 
big  war.  The  whole  folly  of  the  Third  Reich,  its  tyranny, 
its  terror,  its  corruption,  its  contempt  for  the  old  Christian 
virtues,  suddenly  dawned  on  this  once  pro-Nazi  general. 
Three  days  later,  on  July  19,  he  went  again  to  Brauchitsch 
to  speak  of  this  revelation. 

Not  only,  he  insisted,  must  the  generals  go  on  strike  to 
prevent  Hitler  from  starting  a war,  but  they  must  help 


The  Road  to  War 


501 

clean  up  the  Third  Reich.  The  German  people  and  the 
Fuehrer  himself  must  be  freed  from  the  terror  of  the 
S.S.  and  the  Nazi  party  bosses.  A state  and  society  ruled  by 
law  must  be  restored.  Beck  summed  up  his  reform  pro- 
gram: 

For  the  Fuehrer,  against  war,  against  boss  rule,  peace 
with  the  Church,  free  expression  of  opinion,  an  end  to  the 
Cheka  terror,  restoration  of  justice,  reduction  of  contribu- 
tions. to  the  party  by  one  half,  no  more  building  of  palaces, 
housing  for  the  common  people  and  more  Prussian  probity 
and  simplicity. 

Beck  was  too  naive  politically  to  realize  that  Hitler, 
more  than  any  other  single  man,  was  responsible  for  the 
very  conditions  in  Germany  which  now  revolted  him.  How- 
ever, Beck  s immediate  task  was  to  continue  to  browbeat 
the  hesitant  Brauchitsch  into  presenting  an  ultimatum  on 
behalf  of  the  Army  to  Hitler  calling  on  him  to  stop  his 
preparations  for  war.  To  further  this  purpose  he  arranged 
a secret  meeting  of  the  commanding  generals  for  August  4. 
He  prepared  a ringing  speech  that  the  Army  Commander 
in  Chief  was  to  read,  rallying  the  senior  generals  behind 
him  in  a common  insistence  that  there  be  no  Nazi  adven- 
tures leading  to  armed  conflict.  Alas  for  Beck,  Brauchitsch 
lacked  the  courage  to  read  it.  Beck  had  to  be  content  with 
reading  his  own  memorandum  of  July  16,  which  left  a 
deep  impression  on  most  of  the  generals.  But  no  decisive 
action  was  taken  and  the  meeting  of  the  top  brass  of  the 
German  Army  broke  up  without  their  having  had  the 
courage  to  call  Hitler  to  count,  as  their  predecessors  once 
had  done  with  the  Hohenzollern  emperors  and  the  Reich 
Chancellors. 

Brauchitsch  did  summon  up  enough  courage  to  show 
Beck  s July  1 6 memorandum  to  Hitler.  Hitler’s  response 
was  to  call  in  not  the  resisting  ranking  generals,  who  were 
behind  it,  but  the  officers  just  below  them,  the  Army  and 
Air  Force  staff  chiefs  of  various  commands  who  formed 
a younger  set  on  which  he  believed  he  could  count  after 
he  had  treated  it  to  his  persuasive  oratory.  Summoned  to 
the  Berghof  on  August  10 — Hitler  had  scarcely  budged 
from  his  mountain  villa  all  summer — they  were  treated 
after  dinner  to  a speech  that,  according  to  Jodi,  who  was 
present  and  who  described  it  in  his  faithful  dairy,  lasted 
nearly  three  hours.  But  on  this  occasion  the  eloquence 


502  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  the  Fuehrer  was  not  so  persuasive  as  he  had  hoped. 
Both  Jodi  and  Manstein,  who  was  also  present,  later  told 
of  “a  most  serious  and  unpleasant  clash”  between  General 
von  Wietersheim  and  Hitler.  Wietersheim  was  the  ranking 
officer  at  the  gethering  and  as  designate  chief  of  staff  of 
the  Army  of  the  West  under  General  Wilhelm  Adam 
he  dared  to  speak  up  about  the  key  problem  which  Hitler 
and  the  OKW  were  dodging:  that  with  almost  all  of  the 
military  forces  committed  to  the  blow  against  Czecho- 
slovakia, Germany  was  defenseless  in  the  west  and  would 
be  overrun  by  the  French.  In  fact,  he  reported,  the  West 
Wall  could  not  be  held  for  more  than  three  weeks. 

The  Fuehrer  [Jodi  recounted  in  his  diary]  becomes 
furious  and  flames  up,  bursting  into  the  remark  that  in  such 
a case  the  whole  Army  would  not  be  good  for  anything.  “I 
say  to  you,  Herr  General  [Hitler  shouted  back],  the  posi- 
tion will  be  held  not  only  for  three  weeks  but  for  three 
years!”  18 

With  what,  he  did  not  say.  On  August  4,  General  Adam 
had  reported  to  the  meeting  of  senior  generals  that  in  the 
west  he  would  have  only  five  active  divisions  and  that 
they  would  be  overwhelmed  by  the  French.  Wietersheim 
presumably  gave  the  same  figure  to  Hitler,  but  the  Fuehrer 
would  not  listen.  Jodi,  keen  staff  officer  though  he  was, 
was  now  so  much  under  the  spell  of  the  Leader  that  he  left 
the  meeting  deeply  depressed  that  the  generals  did  not 
seem  to  understand  Hitler’s  genius. 

The  cause  of  this  despondent  opinion  [Wietersheim’s], 
which  unfortunately  is  held  very  widely  within  the  Army 
General  Staff,  is  based  on  various  grounds. 

First  of  all,  it  [the  General  Staff]  is  restrained  by  old 
memories  and  feels  itself  responsible  for  political  decisions 
instead  of  obeying  and  carrying  out  its  military  assignments. 
Admittedly  it  does  the  last  with  traditional  devotion  but  the 
vigor  of  the  soul  is  lacking  because  in  the  end  it  does  not 
believe  in  the  genius  of  the  Fuehrer.  And  one  does  perhaps 
compare  him  with  Charles  XII. 

And  just  as  certain  as  water  flows  downhill  there  stems 
from  this  defeatism  [Miesmacherei]  not  only  an  immense 
political  damage — for  everyone  is  talking  about  the  opposi- 
tion between  the  opinions  of  the  generals  and  those  of  the 
Fuehrer— but  a danger  for  the  morale  of  the  troops.  But  I 
have  no  doubt  that  the  Fuehrer  will  be  able  to  boost  the 
morale  of  the  people  when  the  right  moment  comes.19 


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503 


Jodi  might  have  added  that  Hitler  would  be  able,  too,  to 
quell  revolt  among  the  generals.  As  Manstein  told  the 
tribunal  at  Nuremberg  in  1946,  this  meeting  was  the  last 
at  which  Hitler  permitted  any  questions  or  discussions 
from  the  military.20  At  the  Jueterbog  military  review 
on  August  15,  Hitler  reiterated  to  the  generals  that  he 
was  determined  “to  solve  the  Czech  question  by  force” 
and  no  officer  dared — or  was  permitted — to  say  a word  to 
oppose  him. 

Beck  saw  that  he  was  defeated,  largely  by  the  spineless- 
ness of  his  own  brother  officers,  and  on  August  18  he  re- 
signed as  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff.  He  tried  to 
induce  Brauchitsch  to  follow  suit,  but  the  Army  commander 
was  now  coming  under  Hitler’s  hypnotic  power,  no  doubt 
aided  by  the  Nazi  enthusiasms  of  the  woman  who  was 
about  to  become  his  second  wife.*  As  Hassel  said  of  him, 
“Brauchitsch  hitches  his  collar  a notch  higher  and  says:  ‘I 
am  a soldier;  it  is  my  duty  to  obey.’  ” 21 

Ordinarily  the  resignation  of  a chief  of  the  Army  Gen- 
eral Staff  in  the  midst  of  a crisis,  and  especially  of  one 
so  highly  respected  as  was  General  Beck,  would  have 
caused  a storm  in  military  circles  and  even  given  rise  to 
repercussions  abroad.  But  here  again  Hitler  showed  his 
craftiness.  Though  he  accepted  Beck’s  resignation  at  once, 
and  with  great  relief,  he  forbade  any  mention  of  it  in  the 
press  or  even  in  the  official  government  and  military  ga- 
zettes and  ordered  the  retired  General  and  his  fellow 
officers  to  keep  it  to  themselves.  It  would  not  do  to  let 
the  British  and  French  governments  get  wind  of  dissen- 
sion at  the  top  of  the  German  Army  at  this  critical 
juncture  and  it  is  possible  that  Paris  and  London  did  not 
hear  of  the  matter  until  the  end  of  October,  when  it  was 
officially  announced  in  Berlin.  Had  they  heard,  one  could 
speculate,  history  might  have  taken  a different  turning; 
the  appeasement  of  the  Fuehrer  might  not  have  been 
carried  so  far. 

Beck  himself,  out  of  a sense  of  patriotism  and  loyalty 
to  the  Army,  made  no  effort  to  bring  the  news  of  his 
quitting  to  the  public’s  attention.  He  was  disillusioned, 
though,  that  not  a single  general  officer  among  those  who 
had  agreed  with  him  and  backed  him  in  his  opposition  to 


•General  von  Brauchitsch  received  his  divorce  during  the  summer  and 
on  September  24  married  Frau  Charlotte  Schmidt. 


504  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

war  felt  called  upon  to  follow  his  example  and  resign.  He 
did  not  try  to  persuade  them.  He  was,  as  Hassell  later  said 
of  him,  “pure  Clausewitz,  without  a spark  of  Bluecher 
or  Yorck”22 — a man  of  principles  and  thought,  but  not 
of  action.  He  felt  that  Brauchitsch,  as  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Army,  had  let  him  down  at  a decisive  mo- 
ment in  German  history,  and  this  embittered  him.  Beck’s 
biographer  and  friend  noted  years  later  the  General’s 
“deep  bitterness”  whenever  he  spoke  of  his  old  commander. 
On  such  occasions  he  would  shake  with  emotion  and 
mutter,  “Brauchitsch  left  me  in  the  lurch.” 23 

Beck’s  successor  as  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff 
— though  his  appointment  was  kept  a secret  by  Hitler  for 
several  weeks,  until  the  end  of  the  crisis — was  Franz 
Haider,  fifty-four  years  old,  who  came  from  an  old  Ba- 
varian military  family  and  whose  father  had  been  a gen- 
eral. Himself  trained  as  an  artilleryman  he  had  served  as  a 
young  officer  on  the  staff  of  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  in 
the  First  World  War.  Though  a friend  of  Roehm  in  the  first 
postwar  Munich  days,  which  might  have  made  him  some- 
what suspect  in  Berlin,  he  had  risen  rapidly  in  the  Army 
and  for  the  past  year  had  served  as  Beck’s  deputy.  In 
fact,  Beck  recommended  him  to  Brauchitsch  as  his  suc- 
cessor, for  he  was  certain  that  his  deputy  shared  his  views. 

Haider  became  the  first  Bavarian  and  the  first  Catholic 
ever  to  become  Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff — a se- 
vere break  with  the  old  Protestant  Prussian  tradition  of  the 
officer  corps.  A man  of  wide  intellectual  interests,  with  a 
special  bent  for  mathematics  and  botany  (my  own  first 
impression  of  him  was  that  he  looked  like  a university  pro- 
fessor of  mathematics  or  science)  and  a devout  Christian, 
there  was  no  doubt  that  he  had  the  mind  and  the  spirit  to 
be  a true  successor  to  Beck.  The  question  was  whether,  like 
his  departed  chief,  he  lacked  the  knack  of  taking  de- 
cisive action  at  the  proper  moment.  And  whether,  if  he 
did  not  lack  it,  at  that  moment  he  had  the  character  to 
disregard  his  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Fuehrer  and  move 
resolutely  against  him.  For  Haider,  like  Beck,  though 
not  at  first  a member  of  a growing  conspiracy  against 
Hitler,  knew  about  it  and  apparently,  again  like  Beck,  was 
willing  to  back  it.  As  the  new  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 


The  Road  to  War 


505 


he  became  the  key  figure  in  the  first  serious  plot  to  over- 
throw the  dictator  of  the  Third  Reich. 

BIRTH  OF  A CONSPIRACY  AGAINST  HITLER 

After  five  and  a half  years  of  National  Socialism  it 
was  evident  to  the  few  Germans  who  opposed  Hitler  that 
only  the  Army  possessed  the  physical  strength  to  overthrow 
him.  The  workers,  the  middle  and  upper  classes,  even  if 
they  had  wanted  to,  had  no  means  of  doing  it.  They 
had  no  organization  outside  of  the  Nazi  party  groups 
and  they  were,  of  course,  unarmed.  Though  much  would 
later  be  written  about  the  German  “resistance”  movement, 
it  remained  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  a small  and 
feeble  thing,  led,  to  be  sure,  by  a handful  of  courageous 
and  decent  men,  but  lacking  followers. 

The  very  maintenance  of  its  bare  existence  was,  ad- 
mittedly, difficult  in  a police  state  dominated  by  terror  and 
spying.  Moreover,  how  could  a tiny  group — or  even  a 
large  group,  had  there  been  one — rise  up  in  revolt 
against  the  machine  guns,  the  tanks,  the  flame  throwers 
of  the  S.S.? 

In  the  beginning,  what  opposition  there  was  to  Hitler 
sprang  from  among  the  civilians;  the  generals,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  only  too  pleased  with  a system  which  had  shat- 
tered the  restrictions  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  and  given 
them  the  heady  and  traditional  task  of  building  up  a 
great  army  once  again.  Ironically,  the  principal  civilians 
who  emerged  to  lead  the  opposition  had  served  the 
Fuehrer  in  important  posts,  most  of  them  with  an  initial 
enthusiasm  for  Nazism  which  dampened  only  when  it 
began  to  dawn  on  them  in  1937  that  Hitler  was  leading 
Germany  toward  a war  which  it  was  almost  sure  to  lose. 

One  of  the  earliest  of  these  to  see  the  light  was  Carl 
Goerdeler,  the  mayor  of  Leipzig,  who,  first  appointed 
Price  Controller  by  Bruening,  had  continued  in  that  job 
for  three  years  under  Hitler.  A conservative  and  a mon- 
archist at  heart,  a devout  Protestant,  able,  energetic  and 
intelligent,  but  also  indiscreet  and  headstrong,  he  broke 
with  the  Nazis  in  1936  over  their  anti-Semitism  and  their 
frenzied  rearmament  and,  resigning  both  his  posts,  went 
to  work  with  heart  and  soul  in  opposition  to  Hitler.  One 
of  his  first  acts  was  to  journey  to  France,  England  and  the 


506  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

United  States  in  1937  to  discreetly  warn  of  the  peril 
of  Nazi  Germany. 

The  light  came  a little  later  to  two  other  eventual  con- 
spirators, Johannes  Popitz,  Prussian  Minister  of  Finance, 
and  Dr.  Schacht.  Both  had  received  the  Nazi  Party’s 
highest  decoration,  the  Golden  Badge  of  Honor,  for  their 
services  in  shaping  Germany’s  economy  for  war  purposes. 
Both  had  begun  to  wake  up  to  what  Hitler’s  real  goal 
was  in  1938.  Niether  of  them  seems  to  have  been  fully 
trusted  by  the  inner  circle  of  the  opposition  because  of 
their  past  and  their  character.  Schacht  was  too  opportun- 
ist, and  Hassell  remarked  in  his  diary  that  the  Reichsbank 
president  had  a capacity  “for  talking  one  way  and  acting 
another,”  an  opinion,  he  says,  that  was  shared  by  Generals 
Beck  and  von  Fritsch.  Popitz  was  brilliant  but  unstable. 
A fine  Greek  scholar  as  well  as  eminent  economist,  he, 
along  with  General  Beck  and  Hassell,  was  a member  of 
the  Wednesday  Club,  a group  of  sixteen  intellectuals  who 
gathered  once  a week  to  discuss  philosophy,  history,  art, 
science  and  literature  and  who  as  time  went  on — or  ran 
out — formed  one  of  the  centers  of  the  opposition. 

Ulrich  von  Hassell  became  a sort  of  foreign-affairs 
adviser  to  the  resistance  leaders.  His  dispatches  as  am- 
bassador in  Rome  during  the  Abyssinian  War  and  the 
Spanish  Civil  War,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  full  of 
advice  to  Berlin  on  how  to  keep  Italy  embroiled  with  France 
and  Britain  and  therefore  on  the  side  of  Germany.  Later 
he  came  to  fear  that  war  with  France  and  Britain  would 
be  fatal  to  Germany  and  that  even  a German  alliance 
with  Italy  would  be  too.  Far  too  cultivated  to  have  any- 
thing but  contempt  for  the  vulgarism  of  National  Social- 
ism, he  did  not,  however,  voluntarily  give  up  serving 
the  regime.  He  was  kicked  out  of  the  diplomatic  service 
in  the  big  military,  political  and  Foreign  Office  shake-up 
which  Hitler  engineered  on  February  4,  1938.  A member 
of  an  old  Hanover  noble  family,  married  to  the  daughter 
of  Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  the  founder  of  the  German 
Navy,  and  a gentleman  of  the  old  school  to  his  finger 
tips,  Hassell,  like  so  many  others  of  his  class,  seems  to 
have  needed  the  shock  of  being  cast  out  by  the  Nazis 
before  he  became  much  interested  in  doing  anything  to 
bring  them  down.  Once  this  had  happened,  this  sensitive, 
intelligent,  uneasy  man  devoted  himself  to  that  task  and 


The  Road  to  Wap  507 

in  the  end,  as  we  shall  see,  sacrificed  his  life  to  it,  meeting 
a barbarous  end. 

There  were  others,  lesser  known  and  mostly  younger, 
who  had  opposed  the  Nazis  from  the  beginning  and 
who  gradually  came  together  to  form  various  resistance 
circles.  One  of  the  leading  intellects  of  one  group  was 
Ewald  von  Kleist,  a gentleman  farmer  and  a descendant 
of  the  great  poet.  He  worked  closely  with  Ernst  Niekisch,  a 
former  Social  Democrat  and  editor  of  Widerstand  (Resist- 
ance), and  with  Fabian  von  Schlabrendorff,  a young  lawyer, 
who  was  the  great-grandson  of  Queen  Victoria’s  private 
physician  and  confidential  adviser,  Baron  von  Stockmar. 
There  were  former  trade-union  leaders  such  as  Julius 
Leber,  Jakob  Kaiser  and  Wilhelm  Leuschner.  Two  Ge- 
stapo officials,  Artur  Nebe,  the  head  of  the  criminal  police, 
and  Bemd  Gisevius,  a young  career  police  officer,  became 
valuable  aides  as  the  conspiracies  developed.  The  latter 
became  the  darling  of  the  ^ American  prosecution  at 
Nuremberg  and  wrote  a book  which  sheds  much  light  on 
the  anti-Hitler  plots,  though  most  historians  take  the  book 
and  the  author  with  more  than  a grain  of  salt. 

There  were  a number  of  sons  of  venerable  families  in 
Germany:  Count  Helmuth  von  Moltke,  great-grandneph- 
ew of  the  famous  Field  Marshal,  who  later  formed  a re- 
sistance group  of  young  idealists  known  as  the  Kreisau 
Circle;  Count  Albrecht  Bernstorff,  nephew  of  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  in  Washington  during  the  First  World 
War;  Freiherr  Karl  Ludwig  von  Guttenberg,  editor  of  a 
fearless  Catholic  monthly;  and  Pastor  Dietrich  Bonhoef- 
fer,  a descendant  of  eminent  Protestant  clergymen  on 
both  sides  of  his  family,  who  regarded  Hitler  as  Antichrist 
and  who  believed  it  a Christian  duty  to  “eliminate  him.” 

Nearly  all  of  these  brave  men  would  persevere  until, 
after  being  caught  and  tortured,  they  were  executed  by 
rope  or  by  ax  or  merely  murdered  by  the  S.S. 

For  a good  long  time  this  tiny  nucleus  of  civilian  re- 
sistance had  little  success  in  interesting  the  Army  in  its 
work.  As  Field  Marshal  von  Blomberg  testified  at  Nurem- 
berg, “Before  1938-39  German  generals  did  not  oppose 
Hitler.  There  was  no  reason  to  oppose  him,  since  he  pro- 
duced the  results  they  desired.”  There  was  some  contact 
between  Goerdeler  and  General  von  Hammerstein,  but  the 
former  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Army  had 


508  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

been  in  retirement  since  1934  and  had  little  influence 
among  the  active  generals.  Early  in  the  regime  Schlabren- 
dorff  had  got  in  touch  with  Colonel  Hans  Oster,  chief 
assistant  to  Admiral  Canaris  in  the  Abwehr,  the  Intelli- 
gence Bureau  of  OKW,  and  found  him  to  be  not  only  a 
staunch  anti-Nazi  but  willing  to  try  to  bridge  the  gulf 
between  the  military  and  civilians.  However,  it  was  not 
until  the  winter  of  1937—38,  when  the  generals  were 
subjected  to  the  successive  shocks  engendered  by  Hitler’s 
decision  to  go  to  war,  his  shake-up  of  the  military  com- 
mand, which  he  himself  took  over,  and  his  shabby  treat- 
ment of  General  von  Fritsch,  that  some  of  them  became 
aware  of  the  danger  to  Germany  of  the  Nazi  dictator.  The 
resignation  of  General  Beck  toward  the  end  of  August 
1938,  as  the  Czech  crisis  grew  more  menacing,  provided 
a further  awakening,  and  though  none  of  his  fellow 
officers  followed  him  into  retirement  as  he  had  hoped,  it 
immediately  became  evidept  that  the  fallen  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  was  the  one  person  around  whom  both  the 
recalcitrant  generals  and  the  civilian  resistance  leaders 
could  rally.  Both  groups  respected  and  trusted  him. 

Another  consideration  became  evident  to  both  of  them. 
To  stop  Hitler,  force  would  now  be  necessary,  and  only 
the  Army  possessed  it.  But  who  in  the  Army  could  muster 
it?  Not  Hammerstein  and  not  even  Beck,  since  they  were 
in  retirement.  What  was  needed,  it  was  realized,  was  to 
, bring  in  generals  who  at  the  moment  had  actual  com- 
mand of  troops  in  and  around  Berlin  and  who  thus  could 
act  effectively  on  short  notice.  General  Haider,  the  new 
Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff,  had  no  actual  forces 
under  his  command.  General  von  Brauchitsch  had  the 
whole  Army,  but  he  was  not  fully  trusted.  His  authority 
would  be  useful  but  he  could  be  brought  in  only,  the 
conspirators  felt,  at  the  last  minute. 

As  it  happened,  certain  key  generals  who  were  willing 
to  help  were  quickly  discovered  and  initiated  into  the  bud- 
ding conspiracy.  Three  of  them  held  commands  which 
were  vital  to  the  success  of  the  venture:  General  Erwin 
von  Witzleben,  commander  of  the  all-important  Wehrkreis 
III,  which  comprised  Berlin  and  the  surrounding  areas; 
General  Count  Erich  von  Brockdorff-Ahlefeld,  command- 
er of  the  Potsdam  garrison,  which  was  made  up  of  the 
23rd  Infantry  Division;  and  General  Erich  Hoepner,  who 


The  Road  to  War 


509 

commanded  an  armored  division  in  Thuringia  which 
could,  if  necessary,  repulse  any  S.S.  troops  attempting 
to  relieve  Berlin  from  Munich. 

The  plan  of  the  conspirators,  as  it  developed  toward  the 
end  of  August,  was  to  seize  Hitler  as  soon  as  he  had 
issued  the  final  order  to  attack  Czechoslovakia  and  hale 
him  before  one  of  his  own  People’s  Courts  on  the  charge 
that  he  had  tried  recklessly  to  hurl  Germany  into  a Euro- 
pean war  and  was  therefore  no  longer  competent  to 
govern.  In  the  meantime,  for  a short  interim,  there  would 
be  a military  dictatorship  followed  by  a provisional  govern- 
ment presided  over  by  some  eminent  civilian.  In  due  course 
a conservative  democratic  government  would  be  formed. 

There  were  two  considerations  on  which  the  success 
of  the  coup  depended  and  which  involved  the  two  key 
conspirators.  General  Haider  and  General  Beck.  The  first 
was  timing.  Haider  had  arranged  with  OKW  that  he  per- 
sonally be  given  forty-eight  hours’  notice  of  Hitler’s  final 
order  to  attack  Czechoslovakia.  This  would  give  him  the 
time  to  put  the  plot  into  execution  before  the  troops 
could  cross  the  Czech  frontier.  Thus  he  would  be  able  not 
only  to  arrest  Hitler  but  to  prevent  the  fatal  step  that 
would  lead  to  war. 

The  second  factor  was  that  Beck  must  be  able  to  con- 
vince the  generals  beforehand  and  the  German  people 
later  (during  the  proposed  trial  of  Hitler)  that  an  attack 
on  Czechoslovakia  would  bring  in  Britain  and  France  and 
thus  precipitate  a European  war,  for  which  Germany  was 
not  prepared  and  which  it  would  certainly  lose.  This  had 
been  the  burden  of  his  memoranda  all  summer  and  it  was 
the  basis  of  all  that  he  was  now  prepared  to  do:  to 
preserve  Germany  from  a European  conflict  which  he  be- 
lieved would  destroy  her— by  overthrowing  Hitler. 

Alas  for  Beck,  and  for  the  future  of  most  of  the  world,  it 
was  Hitler  and  not  the  recently  resigned  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral  Staff  who  proved  to  have  the  shrewder  view  of  the 
possibilities  of  a big  war.  Beck,  a cultivated  European 
with  a sense  of  history,  could  not  conceive  that  Britain 
and  France  would  willfully  sacrifice  their  self-interest  by 
not  intervening  in  case  of  a German  attack  on  Czecho- 
slovakia. He  had  a sense  of  history  but  not  of  contem- 
porary politics.  Hitler  had.  For  some  time  now  he  had 
felt  himself  reinforced  in  his  judgment  that  Prime  Minis- 


510  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ter  Chamberlain  would  sacrifice  the  Czechs  rather  than 
go  to  war  and  that,  in  such  a case,  France  would  not  fulfill 
her  treaty  obligations  to  Prague. 

The  Wilhelmstrasse  had  not  failed  to  notice  dispatches 
published  in  the  New  York  newspapers  as  far  back  as 
May  14  in  which  their  London  correspondents  had  re- 
ported an  “off-the-record”  luncheon  talk  with  Chamber- 
lain  at  Lady  Astor’s.  The  British  Prime  Minister,  the 
journalists  reported,  had  said  that  neither  Britain  nor 
France  nor  probably  Russia  would  come  to  the  aid  of 
Czechoslovakia  in  the  case  of  a German  attack,  that  the 
Czech  state  could  not  exist  in  its  present  form  and  that 
Britain  favored,  in  the  interest  of  peace,  turning  over  the 
Sudetenland  to  Germany.  Despite  angry  questions  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  the  Germans  noted,  Chamberlain  had 
not  denied  the  veracity  of  the  American  disptaches. 

On  June  1,  the  Prime  Minister  had  spoken,  partly  off  the 
record,  to  British  correspondents,  and  two  days  later  the 
Times  had  published  the  first  of  its  leaders  which  were 
to  help  undermine  the  Czech  position;  it  had  urged  the 
Czech  government  to  grant  “self-determination”  to  the 
country’s  minorities  “even  if  it  should  mean  their  seces- 
sion from  Czechoslovakia”  and  for  the  first  time  it  had 
suggested  plebiscites  as  a means  of  determining  what 
the  Sudetens  and  the  others  desired.  A few  days  later 
the  German  Embassy  in  London  informed  Berlin  that  the 
Times  editorial  was  based  on  Chamberlain’s  off-the- 
record  remarks  and  that  it  reflected  his  views.  On  June  8 
Ambassador  von  Dirksen  told  the  Wilhelmstrasse  that  the 
Chamberlain  government  would  be  willing  to  see  the 
Sudeten  areas  separated  from  Czechoslovakia  providing 
it  was  done  after  a plebiscite  and  “not  interrupted  by 
forcible  measures  on  the  part  of  Germany.”  24 

All  this  must  have  been  pleasing  for  Hitler  to  hear.  The 
news  from  Moscow  also  was  not  bad.  By  the  end  of  June 
Friedrich  Werner  Count  von  der  Schulenburg,  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  to  Russia,  was  advising  Berlin  that 
the  Soviet  Union  was  “hardly  likely  to  march  in  defense 
of  a bourgeois  state,”  i.e.,  Czechoslovakia.25  By  August 
3,  Ribbentrop  was  informing  the  major  German  diplo- 
matic missions  abroad  that  there  was  little  fear  of  inter- 
vention over  Czechoslovakia  by  Britain,  France  or  Rus- 
sia.26 


The  Road  to  War 


511 

It  was  on  that  day,  August  3,  that  Chamberlain  had 
packed  off  Lord  Runciman  to  Czechoslovakia  on  a curious 
mission  to  act  as  a “mediator”  in  the  Sudeten  crisis.  I 
happened  to  be  in  Prague  the  day  of  his  arrival  and  after 
attending  his  press  conference  and  talking  with  members 
of  his  party  remarked  in  my  dairy  that  “Runciman’s  whole 
mission  smells.”  Its  very  announcement  in  the  House  of 
Commons  on  July  26  had  been  accompanied  by  a piece  . 
of  prevaricating  by  Chamberlain  himself  which  must  have 
been  unique  in  the  experience  of  the  British  Parliament.  - 
The  Prime  Minister  had  said  that  he  was  sending  Run- 
ciman “in  response  to  a request  from  the  government  of 
Czechoslovakia.”  The  truth  was  that  Runciman  had  been 
forced  down  the  throat  of  the  Czech  government  by  Cham- 
berlain. But  there  was  an  underlying  and  bigger  falsehood. 
Everyone,  including  Chamberlain,  knew  that  Runciman’s 
mission  to  “mediate”  between  the  Czech  government  and 
the  Sudeten  leaders  was  impossible  and  absurd.  They  knew 
that  Henlein,  the  Sudeten  leader,  was  not  a free  agent 
and  could  not  negotiate,  and  that  the  dispute  now  was 
between  Prague  and  Berlin.  My  diary  notes  for  the  first 
evening  and  subsequent  days  make  it  clear  that  the  Czechs 
knew  perfectly  well  that  Runciman  had  been  sent  by 
Chamberlain  to  pave  the  way  for  the  handing  over  of  the 
Sudetenland  to  Hitler.  It  was  a shabby  diplomatic  trick. 

And  now  the  summer  of  1938  was  almost  over.  Runci- 
man puttered  about  in  the  Sudetenland  and  in  Prague, 
making  ever  more  friendly  gestures  to  the  Sudeten  Ger- 
mans and  increasing  demands  on  the  Czech  government 
to  grant  them  what  they  wanted.  Hitler,  his  generals  and 
his  Foreign  Minister  were  frantically  busy.  On  August 
23,  the  Fuehrer  entertained  aboard  the  liner  Patria  in 
Kiel  Bay  during  naval  maneuvers  the  Regent  of  Hungary, 
Admiral  Horthy,  and  the  members  of  the  Hungarian 
government.  If  they  wanted  to  get  in  on  the  Czech 
feast,  Hitler  told  them,  they  must  hurry.  “He  who  wants 
to  sit  at  the  table,”  he  put  it,  “must  at  least  help  in  the 
kitchen.”  The  Italian  ambassador,  Bernardo  Attolico,  was 
also  a guest  on  the  ship.  But  when  he  pressed  Ribbentrop 
for  the  date  of  “the  German  move  against  Czechoslo- 
vakia” so  that  Mussolini  could  be  prepared,  the  German 
Foreign  Minister  gave  an  evasive  answer.  The  Germans, 


512 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

it  was  plain,  did  not  quite  trust  the  discretion  of  their 
Fascist  ally.  Of  Poland  they  were  now  sure.  All  through 
the  summer  Ambassador  von  Moltke  in  Warsaw  was  report- 
ing to  Berlin  that  not  only  would  Poland  decline  to  help 
Czechoslovakia  by  allowing  Russia  to  send  troops  and 
planes  through  or  over  her  territory  but  Colonel  Jozef 
Beck,  the  Polish  Foreign  Minister,  was  casting  covetous 
eyes  on  a slice  of  Czech  territory,  the  Teschen  area.  Beck 
already  was  exhibiting  that  fatal  short-sightedness,  so 
widely  shared  in  Europe  that  summer,  which  in  the  end 
would  prove  more  disastrous  than  he  could  possibly 
imagine. 

At  OKW  (the  High  Command  of  the  Armed  Forces) 
and  at  OKH  (the  High  Command  of  the  Army)  there 
was  incessant  activity.  Final  plans  were  being  drawn  up 
to  have  the  armed  forces  ready  for  the  push-off  into 
Czechoslovakia  by  October  1.  On  August  24,  Colonel 
Jodi  at  OKW  wrote  an  urgent  memorandum  for  Hitler 
stressing,  that  “the  fixing  of  the  exact  time  for  the 
incident’  which  will  give  Germany  provocation  for  mili- 
tary intervention  is  most  important.”  The  timing  0f  X Day, 
he  explained,  depended  on  it. 

No  advance  measures  [he  went  on]  may  be  taken  before 
X minus  1 for  which  there  is  not  an  innocent  explanation, 
as  otherwise  we  shall  appear  to  have  manufactured  the  in- 
cident.  ...  If  for  technical  reasons  the  evening  hours 
should  be  considered  desirable  for  the  incident,  then  the 
following  day  cannot  be  X Day,  but  it  must  be  the  day  after 
that  ...  It  is  the  purpose  of  these  notes  to  point  out  what 
great  interest  the  Wehrmacht  has  in  the  incident  and  that 
it  must  be  informed  of  the  Fuehrer’s  intention  in  good  time 
— insofar  as  the  Abwehr  Section  is  not  also  charged  with 
organizing  the  incident.28 

The  expert  preparations  for  the  onslaught  on  Czecho- 
slovakia were  obviously  in  fine  shape  by  the  summer’s  end. 
But  what  about  the  defense  of  the  west,  should  the  French 
honor  their  word  to  the  Czechs  and  attack?  On  August  26 
Hitler  set  off  for  a tour  of  the  western  fortifications  ac- 
companied by  Jodi,  Dr.  Todt,  the  engineer  in  charge  of 
building  the  West  Wall,  Himmler  and  various  party  officials. 
On  August  27  General  Wilhelm  Adam,  a blunt  and  able 
Bavarian  who  was  in  command  of  the  west,  joined  the 
party  and  in  the  next  couple  of  days  witnessed  how 


The  Road  to  War 


513 


intoxicated  the  Fuehrer  became  at  the  triumphal  recep- 
tion he  was  given  by  the  Rhinelanders.  Adam  himself 
was  not  impressed;  in  fact,  he  was  alarmed,  and  on  the 
twenty-ninth  in  a surprising  scene  in  Hitler’s  private  car 
he  abruptly  demanded  to  speak  with  the  Fuehrer  alone. 
Not  without  sneers,  according  to  the  General’s  later  report, 
Hitler  dismissed  Himmler  and  his  other  party  cronies. 
Adam  did  not  waste  words.  He  declared  that  despite  all 
the  fanfare  about  the  West  Wall  he  could  not  possibly  hold 
it  with  the  troops  at  his  disposal.  Hitler  became  hysterical 
and  launched  into  a long  harangue  about  how  he  had 
made  Germany  stronger  than  Britain  and  France  together. 

“The  man  who  doesn’t  hold  these  fortifications,”  Hitler 
shouted,  “is  a scoundrel!”  * 

Nevertheless  doubts  on  this  score  were  rising  in  the 
minds  of  generals  other  than  Adam.  On  September  3, 
Hitler  convoked  the  chiefs  of  OKW  and  OKH,  Keitel  and 
Brauchitsch,  to  the  Berghof.  Field  units,  it  was  agreed, 
were  to  be  moved  into  position  along  the  Czech  border  on 
Septemter  28.  But  OKW  must  know  when  X Day  was  by 
noon  on  September  27.  Hitler  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
operational  plan  for  “Green”  and  ordered  that  it  be 
changed  in  several  respects.  From  the  notes  of  this 
meeting  kept  by  Major  Schmundt  it  is  clear  that  Brauch- 
itsch at  least — for  Keitel  was  too  much  the  toady  to 
speak  up — again  raised  the  question  of  how  they  were 
going  to  hold  out  in  the  west.  Hitler  fobbed  him  off  with  the 
assurance  that  he  had  given  orders  for  speeding  up  the 
western  fortifications.30 

On  September  8 General  Heinrich  von  Stuelpnagel  saw 
Jodi  and  the  latter  noted  in  his  diary  the  General’s  pes- 
simism regarding  the  military  position  in  the  west.  It  was 
becoming  clear  to  both  of  them  that  Hitler,  his  spirits 
whipped  up  by  the  fanaticism  of  the  Nuremberg  Party 
Rally,  which  had  just  opened,  was  going  ahead  with  the 
invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  whether  France  intervened  or 
not.  “I  must  admit,”  wrote  the  usually  optimistic  Jodi, 
“that  I am  worried  too.” 

The  next  day,  September  9,  Hitler  convoked  Keitel, 
Brauchitsch  and  Haider  to  Nuremberg  for  a conference 


* Hitler,  according  to  Jodi’s  diary,  used  the  word  Hundsfott,  a stronger 
word.20  Telford  Taylor,  in  Sword  and  Swastika,  gives  a fuller  account 
based  on  General  Adam’s  unpublished  memoirs. 


514  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

which  began  at  10  p.m.,  lasted  until  4 o’clock  the  next 
morning  and,  as  Keitel  later  confided  to  Jodi,  who  in 
turn  confided  it  to  his  diary,  was  exceedingly  stormy. 
Haider  found  himself  in  the  ticklish  position — for  the 
key  man  in  the  plot  to  overthrow  Hitler  the  moment  he 
gave  the  word  to  attack — of  having  to  explain  in  great 
detail  the  General  Staff’s  plan  for  the  campaign  in 
Czechoslovakia,  and  in  the  uncomfortable  position,  as  it 
developed,  of  seeing  Hitler  tear  it  to  shreds  and  dress 
down  not  only  him  but  Brauchitsch  for  their  timidity  and 
their  military  incapabilities.31  Keitel,  Jodi  noted  on  the 
thirteenth,  was  “terribly  shaken”  by  his  experience  at 
Nuremberg  and  by  the  evidence  of  “defeatism”  at  the 
top  of  the  German  Army. 

Accusations  are  made  to  the  Fuehrer  about  the  defeatism 
m the  High  Command  of  the  Army  . . . Keitel  declares 
that  he  will  not  tolerate  any  officer  in  OKW  indulging  in 
criticism,  unsteady  thoughts  and  defeatism  . . . The  Fuehrer 
knows  that  the  Commander  of  the  Army  [Brauchitsch] 
has  asked  his  commanding  generals  to  support  him  in  order 
to  open  the  Fuehrer’s  eyes  about  the  adventure  which  he 
has  resolved  to  risk.  He  himself  [Brauchitsch]  has  no  more 
influence  with  the  Fuehrer. 

Thus  a cold  and  frosty  atmosphere  prevailed  in  Nurem- 
berg and  it  is  highly  unfortunate  that  the  Fuehrer  has  the 
whole  nation  behind  him  with  the  exception  of  the  leading 
generals  of  the  Army. 

All  of  this  greatly  saddened  the  aspiring  young  Jodi 
who  had  hitched  his  star  to  Hitler. 

Only  by  actions  can  [these  generals]  honorably  repair 
the  damage  which  they  have  caused  through  lack  of  strength 
• lack  of  obedience.  It  is  the  same  problem  as 

m 1914.  There  is  only  one  example  of  disobedience  in  the 
Army  and  that  is  of  the  generals  and  in  the  end  it  springs 
, °m  “eir  arrogance.  They  can  no  longer  believe  and  no 
longer  obey  because  they  do  not  recognize  the  Fuehrer’s 
&e.nlY!-  Many  of  them  stiH  see  in  him  the  corporal  of  the 
World  War  but  not  the  greatest  statesman  since  Bismarck.32 

In  his  talk  with  Jodi  on  September  8,  General  von 
Stuelpnagel,  who  held  the  post  of  Oberquartiermeister  I 
m the  Army  High  Command,  and  who  was  in  on  the 
Haider  conspiracy,  had  asked  for  written  assurances  from 
OKW  that  the  Army  High  Command  would  receive  notice 
of  Hitler’s  order  for  the  attack  on  Czechoslovakia  five 


The  Road  to  War 


515 

days  in  advance.  Jodi  had  answered  that  because  of  the 
uncertainties  of  the  weather  two  days’  notice  was  all  that 
could  be  guaranteed.  This,  however,  was  enough  for  the 
conspirators. 

But  they  needed  assurances  of  another  kind — whether, 
after  all,  they  had  been  right  in  their  assumption  that 
Britain  and  France  would  go  to  war  against  Germany  if 
Hitler  carried  out  his  resolve  to  attack  Czechoslovakia. 
For  this  purpose  they  had  decided  to  send  trustworthy 
agents  to  London  not  only  to  find  out  what  the  British 
government  intended  to  do  but,  if  necessary,  to  try  to 
influence  its  decision  by  informing  it  that  Hitler  had  de- 
cided to  attack  the  Czechs  on  a certain  date  in  the  fall, 
and  that  the  General  Staff,  which  knew  the  date,  op- 
posed it  and  was  prepared  to  take  the  most  decisive  action 
to  prevent  it  if  Britain  stood  firm  against  Hitler  to  the 
last. 

The  first  such  emissary  of  the  plotters,  selected  by 
Colonel  Oster  of  the  Abwehr,  was  Ewald  von  Kleist,  who 
arrived  in  London  on  August  18.  Ambassador  Henderson 
in  Berlin,  who  was  already  anxious  to  give  Hitler  what- 
ever he  wanted  in  Chechoslovakia,  advised  the  British 
Foreign  Office  that  “it  would  be  unwise  for  him  [Kleist] 
to  be  received  in  official  quarters.”  * Nevertheless  Sir 
Robert  Vansittart,  chief  diplomatic  adviser  to  the  Foreign 
Secretary  and  one  of  the  leading  opponents  in  London  of 
the  appeasement  of  Hitler,  saw  Kleist  on  the  afternoon  of 
his  arrival,  and  Winston  Churchill,  still  in  the  political 
wilderness  in  Britain,  received  him  the  next  day.  To  both 
men,  who  were  impressed  by  their  visitor’s  sobriety  and 
sincerity,  Kleist  repeated  what  he  had  been  instructed  to 
tell,  stressing  that  Hitler  had  set  a date  for  aggression 
against  the  Czechs  and  that  the  generals,  most  of  whom 
opposed  him,  would  act,  but  that  further  British  appease- 
ment of  Hitler  would  cut  the  ground  from  under  their 
feet.  If  Britain  and  France  would  declare  publicly  that 
they  would  not  stand  idly  by  while  Hitler  threw  his 
armies  into  Czechoslovakia  and  if  some  prominent  British 
statesmen  would  issue  a solemn  warning  to  Germany  of 

•According  to  a German  Foreign  Office  memorandum  of  August  6, 
Henderson,  at  a private  party,  had  remarked  to  the  Germans  present 
that  Great  Britain  would  not  think  of  risking  even  one  sailor  or 
airman  for  Czechoslovakia,  and  that  any  reasonable  solution  would  be 
agreed  to  so  long  as  it  were  not  attempted  by  force.”  83 


516 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  consequences  of  Nazi  aggression,  then  the  German 
generals,  for  their  part,  would  act  to  stop  Hitler.34 

Churchill  gave  KJeist  a ringing  letter  to  take  back  to 
Germany  to  bolster  his  colleagues: 

I am  sure  that  the  crossing  of  the  frontier  of  Czechoslo- 
vakia by  German  armies  or  aviation  in  force  will  bring 
about  renewal  of  the  World  War.  I am  as  certain  as  I was 
at  the  end  of  July,  1914,  that  England  will  march  with  France 
...  Do  not,  I pray  you,  be  misled  upon  this  point  . . .* 

Vansittart  took  Kleist’s  warning  seriously  enough  to 
submit  immediately  a report  on  it  to  both  the  British  Prime 
Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secretary,  and  though  Cham- 
berlain, writing  to  Lord  Halifax,  said  he  was  inclined 
“to  discount  a good  deal  of  what  he  [Kleist]  says,”  he 
added:  “I  don’t  feel  sure  that  we  ought  not  to  do  some- 
thing.” 36  What  he  did  was  to  summon  Ambassador 
Henderson,  in  the  wake  of  some  publicity,  to  London  on 
August  28  “for  consultations.” 

He  instructed  his  ambassador  in  Berlin  to  do  two  things: 
convey  a sober  warning  to  Hitler  and,  secondly,  prepare 
secretly  a “personal  contact”  between  himself  and  the 
Fuehrer.  According  to  his  own  story,  Henderson  per- 
suaded the  Prime  Minister  to  drop  the  first  request.37  As 
for  the  second,  Henderson  was  only  too  glad  to  try  to 
carry  it  out.  t 

This  was  the  first  step  toward  Munich  and  Hitler’s 
greatest  bloodless  victory. 


* returned  to  Berlin  on  August  23  and  showed  Churchill’s  letter 

to  Beck,  Haider,  Hammerstein,  Canaris,  Oster  and  others  in  the  plot. 
In  Nemesis  of  Power  (p.  413),  Wheeler-Bennett  writes  that,  according 
to  private  information  given  him  after  the  war  by  Fabian  von  Schlabren- 
dorff,  Canaris  made  two  copies  of  the  letter,  one  for  himself  and 
one  for  Beck,  and  Kleist  hid  the  original  in  his  country  house  at 
Schmenzin  in  Pomerania.  It  was  discovered  there  by  the  Gestapo  after 
the  July  20,  1944,  attempt  on  Hitler's  life  ^ and  contributed  to  Kleist’s 
death  sentence  before  a People’s  Court,  which  was  passed  and  carried 
out  on  April  15,  1945.  Actually  the  contents  of  Churchill's  letter  became 
known  to  the  German  authorities  much  sooner  than  the  conspirators 

could  have  imagined.  I found  it  in  a German  Foreign  Office  memo- 
randum which,  though  undated,  is  known  to  have  been  submitted  on 
beptember  6 1938.  it  is  marked:  “Extract  from  a letter  of  Winston 

Churchill  to  a German  confidant.”  35 

t “I  honestly  believe,”  the  ambassador  had  written  Lord  Halifax  from 
iierlin  on  July  18,  “the  moment  has  come  for  Prague  to  get  a real 
twist  of  the  screw  ...  If  Benes  cannot  satisfy  Henlein,  he  can 
satisfy  no  Sudeten  leader  ...  We  have  got  to  be  disagreeable  to  the 
Czechs.  ^ It  seems  inconceivable  that  even  Henderson  did  not  know 

j 1 jS  .tlm,e.  that  Penleln  was  a mere  tool  of  Hitler  and  had  been 

ordered  by  him  to  keep  increasing  his  demands  to  such  an  extent  that 

■Benes  could  not  possibly  “satisfy”  him.  See  above,  p.  488 


The  Road  to  War 


517 

Ignorant  of  this  turning  in  Chamberlain’s  course,  the 
conspirators  in  Berlin  made  further  attempts  to  warn  the 
British  government.  On  August  21,  Colonel  Oster  sent  an 
agent  to  inform  the  British  military  attache  in  Berlin 
of  Hitler’s  intention  to  invade  Czechoslovakia  at  the  end 
of  September.  “If  by  firm  action  abroad  Hitler  can  be 
forced  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  renounce  his  present  in- 
tentions, he  will  be  unable  to  survive  the  blow,”  he  told 
the  British.  “Similarly,  if  it  comes  to  war  the  immediate 
intervention  by  France  and  England  will  bring  about  the 
downfall  of  the  regime.”  Sir  Nevile  Henderson  dutifully 
forwarded  this  warning  to  London,  but  described  it  “as 
clearly  biased  and  largely  propaganda.”  The  blinkers  on 
the  eyes  of  the  debonair  British  ambassador  seemed  to 
grow  larger  and  thicker  as  the  crisis  mounted. 

General  Haider  had  a feeling  that  the  conspirators 
were  not  getting  their  message  through  effectively  enough 
to  the  British,  and  on  September  2 he  sent  his  own  emis- 
sary, a retired  Army  officer,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hans 
Boehm-Tettelbach,  to  London  to  make  contact  with  the 
British  War  Office  and  Military  Intelligence.  Though,  ac- 
cording to  his  own  story,  the  colonel  saw  several  important 
personages  in  London,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  made 
much  of  an  impression  on  them. 

Finally,  the  plotters  resorted  to  using  the  German  For- 
eign Office  and  the  embassy  in  London  in  a last  desperate 
effort  to  induce  the  British  to  remain  firm.  Counselor  of 
the  embassy  and  charge  d’affaires  was  Theodor  Kordt, 
whose  younger  brother,  Erich,  was  chief  of  Ribbentrop’s 
secretariat  in  the  German  Foreign  Office.  The  brothers 
were  proteges  of  Baron  von  Weizsaecker,  the  principal 
State  .Secretary  and  undoubtedly  the  brains  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  a man  who  after  the  war  made  a great  fuss  of  his 
alleged  anti-Nazism  but  who  served  Hitler  and  Ribben- 
trop  well  almost  to  the  end.  It  is  clear,  however,  from 
captured  Foreign  Office  documents,  that  at  this  time  he 
opposed  aggression  against  Czechoslovakia  on  the  same 
grounds  as  those  of  the  generals:  that  it  would  lead  to  a 
lost  war.  With  Weizsaecker’s  connivance,  and  after  con- 
sultations with  Beck,  Haider  and  Goerdeler,  it  was  agreed 
that  Theodor  Kordt  should  sound  a last  warning  to  Down- 
ing Street.  As  counselor  of  the  embassy  his  visits  to  the 
Birtish  authorities  would  not  be  suspect. 


518 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  information  he  brought  on  the  evening  of  Septem- 
ber 5 to  Sir  Horace  Wilson,  Chamberlain’s  confidential  ad- 
visor, seemed  so  important  and  urgent  that  this  official 
spirited  him  by  a back  way  to  Downing  Street  and  the 
chambers  of  the  British  Foreign  Secretary.  There  he  blunt- 
ly informed  Lord  Halifax  that  Hitler  was  planning  to 
order  a general  mobilization  on  September  16,  that  the 
attack  on  Czechoslovakia  had  been  fixed  for  October  1 
at  the  latest,  that  the  German  Army  was  preparing  to 
strike  against  Hitler  the  moment  the  final  order  for  attack 
was  given  and  that  it  would  succeed  if  Britain  and  France 
held  firm.  Halifax  was  also  warned  that  Hitler’s  speech 
closing  the  Nuremberg  Party  Rally  on  September  12  would 
be  explosive  and  might  precipitate  a showdown  over 
Czechoslovakia  and  that  would  be  the  moment  for  Britain 
to  stand  up  against  the  dictator.39 

Kordt,  too,  despite  his  continuous  personal  contact 
with  Downing  Street  and  his  frankness  on  this  occasion 
with  the  Foreign  Secretary,  did  not  know  what  was  in  the 
London  wind.  But  he  got  a good  idea,  as  did  everyone 
else,  two  days  later,  on  September  7,  when  the  Times  of 
London  published  a famous  leader: 

It  might  be  worth  while  for  the  Czechoslovak  Govern- 
ment to  consider  whether  they  should  exclude  altogether  the 
project,  which  has  found  favor  in  some  quarters,  of  making 
Czechoslovakia  a more  homogeneous  State  by  the  secession 
of  that  fringe  of  alien  populations  who  are  contiguous  to 
the  nation  with  which  they  are  united  by  race  . . . The  ad- 
vantages to  Czechoslovakia  of  becoming  a homogeneous 
State  might  conceivably  outweigh  the  obvious  disadvantages 
of  losing  the  Sudeten  German  district  of  the  borderland. 

There  was  no  mention  in  the  editorial  of  the  obvious 
fact  that  by  ceding  the  Sudetenland  to  Germany  the 
Czechs  would  lose  both  the  natural  mountain  defenses  of 
Bohemia  and  their  “Maginot  Line”  of  fortifications  and 
be  henceforth  defenseless  against  Nazi  Germany. 

Though  the  British  Foreign  Office  was  quick  to  deny 
that  the  Times  leader  represented  the  views  of  the  gov- 
ernment, Kordt  telegraphed  Berlin  the  next  day  that  it 
was  possible  that  “it  derived  from  a suggestion  which 
reached  the  Times  editorial  staff  from  the  Prime  Minister’s 
entourage.”  Possible  indeed  1 


The  Road  to  War 


519 


In  these  crisis-ridden  years  that  have  followed  World 
War  II  it  is  difficult  to  recall  the  dark  and  almost  unbear- 
able tension  that  gripped  the  capitals  of  Europe  as  the 
Nuremberg  Party  Rally  which  had  begun  on  September 
6,  approached  its  climax  on  September  12,  when  Hitler 
was  scheduled  to  make  his  closing  speech  and  expected  to 
proclaim  to  the  world  his  final  decision  for  peace  or  war 
with  Czechoslovakia.  I was  in  Prague,  the  focus  of  the 
crisis,  that  week,  and  it  seemed  strange  that  the  Czech 
capital,  despite  the  violence  unleashed  by  the  Germans  in 
the  Sudetenland,  the  threats  from  Berlin,  the  pressure  of 
the  British  and  French  governments  to  yield,  and  the 
fear  that  they  might  leave  Czechoslovakia  in  the  lurch, 
was  the  calmest  of  all — at  least  outwardly. 

On  September  5,  President  BeneS,  realizing  that  a de- 
cisive step  on  his  part  was  necessary  to  save  the  peace, 
convoked  the  Sudeten  leaders  Kundt  and  Sebekovsky  to 
Hradschin  Palace  and  told  them  to  write  out  their  full 
demands.  Whatever  they  were  he  would  accept  them. 
“My  God,”  exclaimed  the  deputy  Sudeten  leader,  Karl 
Hermann  Frank,  the  next  day,  “they  have  given  us  every- 
thing.” But  that  was  the  last  thing  the  Sudeten  politicians 
and  their  bosses  in  Berlin  wanted.  On  September  7 Henlein, 
on  instructions  from  Germany,  broke  off  all  negotiations 
with  the  Czech  government.  A shabby  excuse  about  alleged 
Czech  police  excesses  at  Moravska-Ostrava  was  given. 

On  September  10,  Goering  made  a bellicose  speech  at 
the  Nuremberg  Party  Rally.  “A  petty  segment  of  Europe 
is  harassing  the  human  race  . . . This  miserable  pygmy 
race  [the  Czechs]  is  oppressing  a cultured  people,  and 
behind  it  is  Moscow  and  the  eternal  mask  of  the  Jew 
devil.”  But  BeneS’  broadcast  of  the  same  day  took  no 
notice  of  Goering’s  diatribe;  it  was  a quiet  and  dignified 
appeal  for  calm,  good  will  and  mutual  trust. 

Underneath  the  surface,  though,  the  Czechs  were  tense. 
I ran  into  Dr.  BenesS  in  the  hall  of  the  Czech  Broad- 
casting House  after  his  broadcast  and  noted  that  his  face 
was  grave  and  that  he  seemed  to  be  fully  aware  of  the 
terrible  position  he  was  in.  The  Wilson  railroad  station 
and  the  airport  were  full  of  Jews  scrambling  desperately  to 
find  transportation  to  safer  parts.  That  weekend  gas 
masks  were  distributed  to  the  populace.  The  word  from 
Paris  was  that  the  French  government  was  beginning  to 


520 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

panic  at  the  prospect  of  war,  and  the  London  dispatches 
indicated  that  Chamberlain  was  contemplating  desperate 
measures  to  meet  Hitler’s  demands — at  the  expense  of  the 
Czechs,  of  course. 

And  so  all  Europe  waited  for  Hitler’s  word  on  Septem- 
ber 12  from  Nuremberg.  Though  brutal  and  bombastic, 
and  dripping  with  venom  against  the  Czech  state  and 
especially  against  the  Czech  President,  the  Fuehrer’s 
speech,  made  to  a delirious  mass  of  Nazi  fanatics  gath- 
ered in  the  huge  stadium  on  the  last  night  of  the  party 
rally,  was  not  a declaration  of  war.  He  reserved  his  deci- 
sion publicly  at  least,  for,  as  we  know  from  the  cap- 
tured German  documents,  he  had  already  set  October  1 
for  the  attack  across  the  Czech  frontier.  He  simply  de- 
manded that  the  Czech  government  give  “justice”  to  the 
Sudeten  Germans.  If  it  didn’t,  Germany  would  have  to  see 
to  it  that  it  did. 

The  repercussions  to  Hitler’s  outburst  were  consider- 
able. In  the  Sudetenland  it  inspired  a revolt  which  after 
bvo  days  of  savage  fighting  the  Czech  government  put 
down  by  rushing  in  troops  and  declaring  martial  law. 
Henlein  slipped  over  the  border  to  Germany  proclaiming 
that  the  only  solution  now  was  the  ceding  of  the  Sudeten 
areas  to  Germany. 

This  was  the  solution  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
gaining  favor  in  London,  but  before  it  could  be  furthered 
the  agreement  of  France  had  to  be  obtained.  The  day 
following  Hitler’s  speech,  September  13,  the  French  cabi- 
net sat  all  day,  remaining  hopelessly  divided  on  whether 
it  should  honor  its  obligations  to  Czechoslovakia  in  case 
of  a German  attack,  which  it  believed  imminent.  That 
evening  the  British  ambassador  in  Paris,  Sir  Eric  Phipps, 
was  fetched  from  the  Opera  Comique  for  an  urgent  con- 
ference with  Prime  Minister  Daladier.  The  latter  appealed 
to  Chamberlain  to  try  at  once  to  make  the  best  bargain  he 
could  with  the  German  dictator. 

Mr.  Chamberlain,  it  may  be  surmised,  needed  little 
urging.  At  eleven  o’clock  that  same  night  the  British  Prime 
Minister  got  off  an  urgent  message  to  Hitler: 

In  view  of  the  increasingly  critical  situation  I propose 
to  come  over  at  once  to  see  you  with  a view  to  trying  to 
nnd  a peaceful  solution.  I propose  to  come  across  by  air  and 
am  ready  to  start  tomorrow. 


The  Road  to  War 


521 


Please  indicate  earliest  time  at  which  you  can  see  me  and 
suggest  place  of  meeting.  I should  be  grateful  for  a very 
early  reply.40 

Two  hours  before,  the  German  charge  d’affaires  in 
London,  Theodor  Kordt,  had  wired  Berlin  that  Chamber- 
lain’s press  secretary  had  informed  him  that  the  Prime 
Minister  “was  prepared  to  examine  far-reaching  German 
proposals,  including  plebiscite,  to  take  part  in  carrying 
them  out,  and  to  advocate  them  in  public.” 41 

The  surrender  that  was  to  culminate  in  Munich  had  be- 
gun. 

CHAMBERLAIN  AT  BERCHTESGADEN: 

SEPTEMBER  15,  1938 

“Good  heavens!”  ( “Ich  bin  vom  Himmel  gef alien!”) 
Hitler  exclaimed  when  he  read  Chamberlain’s  message.42 
He  was  astounded  but  highly  pleased  that  the  man  who 
presided  over  the  destinies  of  the  mighty  British  Empire 
should  come  pleading  to  him,  and  flattered  that  a man  who 
was  sixty-nine  years  old  and  had  never  traveled  in  an  air- 
plane before  should  make  the  long  seven  hours’  flight  to 
Berchtesgaden  at  the  farthest  extremity  of  Germany. 
Hitler  had  not  had  even  the  grace  to  suggest  a meeting 
place  on  the  Rhine,  which  would  have  shortened  the  trip 
by  half. 

Whatever  the  enthusiasm  of  the  English,*  who  seemed 
to  believe  that  the  Prime  Minister  was  making  the  long 
journey  to  do  what  Mr.  Asquith  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  failed  to  do  in  1914 — warn  Germany  that  any  aggres- 
sion against  a small  power  would  bring  not  only  France 
but  Britain  into  war  against  it — Hitler  realized,  as  the 
confidential  German  papers  and  subsequent  events 
make  clear,  that  Chamberlain’s  action  was  a godsend  to 
him.  Already  apprised  by  the  German  Embassy  in  Lon- 
don that  the  British  leader  was  prepared  to  advocate  “far- 
reaching  German  proposals,”  the  Fuehrer  felt  fairly  cer- 
tain that  Chamberlain’s  visit  was  a further  assurance  that, 
as  he  had  believed  all  along,  Britain  and  France  would 

* Even  the  severest  critics  of  Chamberlain’s  foreign  policy  in  the  British 
press  and  in  Parliament  warmly  applauded  the  Prime  Minister  for  going 
to  Berchtesgaden.  The  Poet  Laureate,  John  Masefield,  composed  a poem, 
a paean  of  praise,  entitled  “Neville  Chamberlain,”  which  was  published 
in  the  Times  September  16.  , 


522 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


not  intervene  on  behalf  of  Czechoslovakia.  The  Prime 
Minister  had  not  been  with  him  more  than  an  hour  or  so 
before  this  estimate  of  the  situation  became  a certainty. 

In  the  beginning  there  was  a diplomatic  skirmish, 
though  Hitler,  as  was  his  custom,  did  most  of  the  talk- 
ing.43 Chamberlain  had  landed  at  the  Munich  airport  at 
noon  on  September  15,  driven  in  an  open  car  to  the  rail- 
road station  and  there  boarded  a special  train  for  the  three- 
hour  rail  journey  to  Berchtesgaden.  He  did  not  fail  to 
notice  train  after  train  of  German  troops  and  artillery 
passing  on  the  opposite  track.  Hitler  did  not  meet  his 
train  at  Berchtesgaden,  but  waited  on  the  top  steps  of  the 
Berghof  to  greet  his  distinguished  visitor.  It  had  begun  to 
rain,  Dr.  Schmidt,  the  German  interpreter,  later  remem- 
bered,  the  sky  darkened  and  clouds  hid  the  mountains.  It 
was  now  4 p.m.  and  Chamberlain  had  been  on  his  way 
since  dawn. 

After  tea  Hitler  and  Chamberlain  mounted  the  steps  to 
Hitler  s study  on  the  second  floor,  the  very  room  where 
the  dictator  had  received  Schuschnigg  seven  months  be- 
fore. At  the  urging  of  Ambassador  Henderson,  Ribben- 
trop  was  left  out  of  the  conversation,  an  exclusion  which 
so  irritated  the  vain  Foreign  Minister  that  the  next  day 
he  refused  to  give  Schmidt’s  notes  on  the  conference  to  the 
Prime  Minister — a singular  but  typical  discourtesy — and 
Chamberlain  thereafter  was  forced  to  rely  on  his  memory 
of  what  he  and  Hitler  had  said. 

Hitler  began  the  conversation,  as  he  did  his  speeches, 
with  a long  harangue  about  all  that  he  had  done  for  the 
German  people,  for  peace,  and  for  an  Anglo-German 
rapprochement.  There  was  now  one  problem  he  was  de- 
termined to  solve  “one  way  or  another.”  The  three  million 
Germans  in  Czechoslovakia  must  “return”  to  the  Reich.* 

He  did  not  wish  [as  Schmidt’s  official  account  puts  it] 
that  any  doubts  should  arise  as  to  his  absolute  determination 
“ot  to  tolerate  any  longer  that  a small,  second-rate  country 
should  treat  the  mighty  thousand-year-old  German  Reich  as 
something  inferior  ...  He  was  forty-nine  years  old,  and  if 
Germany  were  to  become  involved  in  a world  war  over 
the  Czechoslovak  question,  he  wished  to  lead  his  country 


ri?0tK„  *.n.  *1‘s  ,tal*c  Hitler  and  in  his  report  to  the  Commons 

£“traln'  Whose  knowledge  of  German  history  does  not  appear  ti 

The  sLre  Ve7  Wlde’  nacace?"id  th]s  false  use  of  the  word  “return.” 
The  Sudeten  Germans  had  belonged  to  Austria,  but  never  to  Germany. 


The  Road  to  War 


523 


through  the  crisis  in  the  full  strength  of  manhood  ...  He 
would,  of  course,  be  sorry  if  a world  war  should  result 
from  this  problem.  This  danger,  however,  was  incapable  of 
making  him  falter  in  his  determination  ...  He  would  face 
any  war,  even  a world  war,  for  this.  The  rest  of  the  world 
might  do  what  it  liked.  He  would  not  yield  one  single  step. 

Chamberlain,  who  had  scarcely  been  able  to  get  a word 
in,  was  a man  of  immense  patience,  but  there  were  limits 
to  it.  At  this  juncture  he  interrupted  to  say,  “If  the 
Fuehrer  is  determined  to  settle  this  matter  by  force  with- 
out waiting  even  for  a discussion  between  ourselves,  why 
did  he  let  me  come?  I have  wasted  my  time.” 

The  German  dictator  was  not  accustomed  to  such  an 
interruption — no  German  at  this  date  would  dare  to  make 
one — and  Chamberlain’s  retort  appears  to  have  had  its 
effect.  Hitler  calmed  down,  he  thought  they  could  go 
“into  the  question  whether  perhaps  a peaceful  settlement 
was  still  possible  after  all.”  And  then  he  sprang  his  pro- 
posal. 

Would  Britain  agree  to  a secession  of  the  Sudeten  region, 
or  would  she  not?  ...  A secession  on  the  basis  of  the  right 
of  self-determination? 

The  proposal  did  not  shock  Chamberlain.  Indeed,  he  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  that  they  “had  now  got  down  to  the 
crux  of  the  matter.”  According  to  Chamberlain’s  own 
account,  from  memory,  he  replied  that  he  could  not  com- 
mit himself  until  he  had  consulted  his  cabinet  and  the 
French.  According  to  Schmidt’s  version,  taken  from  his 
own  shorthand  notes  made  while  he  was  interpreting, 
Chamberlain  did  say  that,  but  added  that  “he  could  state 
personally  that  he  recognized  the  principle  of  the  detach- 
ment of  the  Sudeten  areas  ...  He  wished  to  return  to 
England  to  report  to  the  Government  and  secure  their 
approval  of  his  personal  attitude." 

From  this  surrender  at  Berchtesgaden,  all  else  ensued. 

That  it  came  as  no  surprise  to  the  Germans  is  obvious. 
At  the  very  moment  of  the  Berchtesgaden  meeting  Hen- 
lein  was  penning  a secret  letter  to  Hitler  from  Eger,  dated 
September  15,  just  before  he  fled  across  the  border  to 
Germany: 

My  Fuehrer: 

I informed  the  British  [Runciman]  delegation  yester- 


524 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

day  that  the  basis  for  further  negotiations  could  . . . onlv 
be  the  achievement  of  a union  with  the  Reich. 

It  is  probable  that  Chamberlain  will  propose  such  a union.** 

The  next  day,  September  16,  the  German  Foreign  Office 
sent  confidential  telegrams  to  its  embassies  in  Wash- 
ington and  several  other  capitals. 

to!d  Chamberlain  yesterday  he  was  finally  re- 
ntl,to  Put  “ end  in  on®  way  or  another  to  the  In- 
tolerable conditions  m Sudetenland  within  a very  short 

‘“eMAUi0n2my  f°r  Sudeten  Germans  is  no  longer  being 
cejslon  of  the  region  to  Germany8 

SddnebRrifkhhr  Kdl?te  /erSOnal  approval.  He  is  now  con- 
s tmg  British  Cabinet  and  is  in  communication  with  Paris 

Fud”r  "* 

Toward  the  end  of  their  conference  Chamberlain  had 
extracted  a promise  from  Hitler  that  he  would  take  no 
military  action  until  they  had  again  conferred.  In  this 
period  the  Prune  Minister  had  great  confidence  in  the 
Fuehrers  word  remarking  privately  a day  or  two  later, 
In  spite  of  the  hardness  and  ruthlessness  I thought  I 
tace’ 8ot  the  impression  that  here  was  a man 
w^®c.oud  be  rolled  upon  when  he  had  given  his  word.”  46 
While  the  British  leader  was  entertaining  these  com- 
forting  illusions  Hitler  went  ahead  with  his  military  and 
political  plans  for  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia.  Colonel 
Jodi,  on  behalf  of  OKW,  worked  out  with  the  Propaganda 
Ministry  what  he  described  in  his  diary  as  “joint  prepara- 
tions^  for  refutation  of  our  own  violations  of  international 
law.  it  was  to  be  a rough  war,  at  least  on  the  part  of  the 
Germans,  and  Dr.  Goebbels’  job  was  to  justify  Nazi  ex- 
cesses. The  plan  for  his  lies  was  worked  out  in  great 
detail  On  September  17  Hitler  assigned  an  OKW  staff 
officer  to  help  Henlein,  who  was  now  operating  from  new 
headquarters  at  a castle  at  Dondorf,  outside  Bayreuth 
to  orgamze  the  Sudeten  Free  Corps.  It  was  to  be  armed 
with  Austrian  weapons  and  its  orders  from  the  Fuehrer 
Czechs10  mamtain  “disturbances  and  clashes”  with  the 

September  18  a day  on  which  Chamberlain  occupied 
himself  with  rallying  his  cabinet  and  the  French  to  his 
policy  of  surrender,  was  a busy  one  for  Hitler  and  his 


The  Road  to  War 


525 


generals.  The  jumping-off  schedule  for  five  armies,  the 
Second,  Eighth,  Tenth,  Twelfth  and  Fourteenth,  compris- 
ing thirty-six  divisions,  including  three  armored,  was  sent 
out.  Hitler  also  confirmed  the  selection  of  the  command- 
ing officers  for  ten  armies.  General  Adam,  despite  his 
obstreperousness,  was  left  in  over-all  command  in  the 
west.  Surprisingly,  two  of  the  plotters  were  recalled  from 
retirement  and  named  to  lead  armies:  General  Beck  the 
First  Army,  and  General  von  Hammerstein  the  Fourth 
Army. 

Political  preparations  for  the  final  blow  against  Czecho- 
slovakia also  continued.  The  captured  German  Foreign 
Office  documents  abound  with  reports  of  increasing  Ger- 
man pressure  on  Hungary  and  Poland  to  get  in  on  the 
spoils.  Even  the  Slovaks  were  brought  in  to  stir  up  the 
brew.  On  September  20  Henlein  urged  them  to  formulate 
their  demands  for  autonomy  “more  sharply.”  On  the 
same  day  Hitler  received  Prime  Minister  Imredy  and  For- 
eign Minister  Kanya  of  Hungary  and  gave  them  a dress- 
ing down  for  the  hesitancy  shown  in  Budapest.  A Foreign 
Office  memorandum  gives  a lengthy  report  on  the  meet- 
ing. 

First  of  all,  the  Fuehrer  reproached  the  Hungarian  gentle- 
men for  the  undecided  attitude  of  Hungary.  He,  the  Fuehrer, 
was  determined  to  settle  the  Czech  question  even  at  the  risk 
of  a world  war  . . . He  was  convinced  [however]  that 
neither  England  nor  France  would  intervene.  It  was  Hungary’s 
last  opportunity  to  join  in.  If  she  did  not,  he  would  not  be  in 
a position  to  put  in  a word  for  Hungarian  interests.  In  his 
opinion,  the  best  thing  would  be  to  destroy  Czechoslo- 
vakia . . . 

He  presented  two  demands  to  the  Hungarians:  (1)  that 
Hungary  should  make  an  immediate  demand  for  a plebiscite 
in  the  territories  which  she  claimed,  and  (2)  that  she  should 
not  guarantee  any  proposed  new  frontiers  for  Czechoslo- 
vakia.48 

Come  what  might  with  Chamberlain,  Hitler,  as  he  made 
clear  to  the  Hungarians,  had  no  intention  of  allowing  even 
a rump  Czechoslovakia  to  long  exist.  As  to  the  British 
Prime  Minister: 

The  Fuehrer  declared  that  he  would  present  the  German 


526 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

demands  to  Chamberlain  with  brutal  frankness.  In  his  opin- 
ion, action  by  the  Army  would  provide  the  only  satisfactory 
solution.  There  was,  however,  a danger  of  the  Czechs  sub- 
mitting to  every  demand. 

It  was  a danger  that  was  to  haunt  the  dictator  in  all  the 
subsequent  meetings  with  the  unsuspecting  British  Prime 
Minister. 

Egged  on  by  Berlin,  the  Polish  government  on  Septem- 
ber 21  demanded  of  the  Czechs  a plebiscite  in  the  Teschen 
district,  where  there  was  a large  Polish  minority,  and 
moved  troops  to  the  frontier  of  the  area.  The  next  day  the 
Hungarian  government  followed  suit.  On  that  day,  too, 
September  22,  the  Sudeten  Free  Corps,  supported  by  Ger- 
man S.S.  detachments,  occupied  the  Czech  frontier  towns 
ot  Asch  and  Eger,  which  jutted  into  German  territory. 

September  22,  in  fact,  was  a tense  day  throughout 
Europe,  for  on  that  morning  Chamberlain  had  again  set 
out  for  Germany  to  confer  with  Hitler.  It  is  now  necessary 
to  glance  briefly  at  what  the  Prime  Minister  had  been  up  to 
in  London  during  the  interval  between  his  visits  to  the 
Fuehrer. 

i On  his  return  to  London  on  the  evening  of  September 
16,  Chamberlain  called  a cabinet  meeting  to  acquaint  his 
ministers  with  Hitler’s  demands.  Lord  Runciman  was 
summoned  from  Prague  to  make  his  recommendations. 
They  were  astonishing.  Runciman,  in  his  zeal  to  appease 
the  Germans,  went  further  than  Hitler.  He  advocated 
transferring  the  predominantly  Sudeten  territories  to  Ger- 
many without  bothering  about  a plebiscite.  He  strongly 
recommended  the  stifling  of  all  criticism  of  Germany  in 
Czechoslovakia  “by  parties  or  persons”  through  legal  meas- 
ures. He  demanded  that  Czechoslovakia,  even  though 
deprived  of  her  mountain  barrier  and  fortifications — and 
thus  left  helpless — should  nevertheless  “so  remodel  her 
foreign  relations  as  to  give  assurances  to  her  neighbors 
that  she  will  in  no  circumstances  attack  them  or  enter  into 
any  aggressive  action  against  them  arising  from  obligations 
to  other  States.”  For  even  Runciman  to  be  concerned  at 
this  hour  with  the  danger  of  aggression  from  a rump 
Czech  state  against  Nazi  Germany  seems  incredible,  but 
his  fantastic  recommendations  apparently  made  a deep 


The  Road  to  War 


527 


impression  on  the  British  cabinet  and  bolstered  Chamber- 
lain’s intention  to  meet  Hitler’s  demands.* 

Premier  Daladier  and  his  Foreign  Minister,  Georges 
Bonnet,  arrived  in  London  on  September  18,  for  consul- 
tations with  the  British  cabinet.  No  thought  was  given  to 
bringing  the  Czechs  in.  The  British  and  the  French, 
anxious  to  avoid  war  at  any  cost,  lost  little  time  in  agree- 
ing on  joint  proposals  which  the  Czechs  would  have  to 
accept.  All  territories  inhabited  more  than  50  per  cent  by 
Sudeten  Germans  must  be  turned  over  to  Germany  to 
assure  “the  maintenance  of  peace  and  the  safety  of  Czech- 
oslovakia’s vital  interests.”  In  return  Britain  and  France 
agreed  to  join  in  “an  international  guarantee  of  the  new 
boundaries  . . . against  unprovoked  aggression.”  Such 
a guarantee  would  supplant  the  mutual-assistance  treaties 
which  the  Czech  state  had  with  France  and  Russia.  This 
was  an  easy  way  out  for  the  French,  and  led  by  Bonnet, 
who,  as  the  course  of  events  would  show,  was  determined 
to  outdo  Chamberlain  in  the  appeasement  of  Hitler,  they 
seized  upon  it.  And  then  there  was  the  cant. 

Both  the  French  and  British  governments  [they  told  the 
Czechs  in  a formal  note]  recognize  how  great  is  the  sacri- 
fice thus  required  of  the  Czechoslovak  Government  in  the 
cause  of  peace.  But  because  that  cause  is  common  both  to 
Europe  in  general  and  in  particular  to  Czechoslovakia  her- 
self they  have  felt  it  their  duty  jointly  to  set  forth  frankly 
the  conditions  essential  to  secure  it. 

Also,  they  were  in  a hurry.  The  German  dictator  could 
not  wait. 

The  Prime  Minister  must  resume  conversation  with  Herr 
Hitler  not  later  than  Wednesday  [September  22],  and 
earlier  if  possible.  We  therefore  feel  we  must  ask  for  your 
reply  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.49 

And  so  at  noon  on  September  19  the  British  and  French 
ministers  in  Prague  jointly  presented  the  Anglo-French 

* Though  the  main  points  of  Runciman’s  recommendations  were  pre- 
sented to  the  cabinet  on  the  evening  of  September  16,  the  report  itself 
was  not  officially  made  until  the  twenty-first,  and  not  published  until 
the  twenty-eighth,  when  events  had  made  it  only  of  academic  interest 
Wheeler-Bennett  points  out  that  certain  parts  of  the  report  give 
the  impression  of  having  been  written  after  September  21.  When  Runciman 
left  Prague  on  the  morning  of  September  16,  no  one,  not  even  Hitler  or  the 
Sudeten  leaders,  had  gone  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  Sudetenland  be 
turned  over  to  Germany  without  a plebiscite.  (Wheeler-Bennett,  Munich, 
PP-  111-12.  The  text  of  the  Runciman  report  is  in  the  British  White  Paper. 
Cmd.  5847,  No.  1.) 


528 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


proposals  to  the  Czech  government.  They  were  rejected 
the  next  day  in  a dignified  note  which  explained — prophet- 
ically— that  to  accept  them  would  put  Czechoslovakia 

sooner  or  later  under  the  complete  domination  of  Ger- 
many.” After  reminding  France  of  her  treaty  obligations 
and  also  of  the  consequences  to  the  French  position  in 
Europe  should  the  Czechs  yield,  the  reply  offered  to 
submit  the  whole  Sudeten  question  to  arbitration  under 
^terms  of  the  German-Czech  treaty  of  October  16, 

But  the  British  and  French  were  in  no  mood  to  allow 
such  a matter  as  the  sanctity  of  treaties  to  interfere  with 
the  course  they  had  set.  No  sooner  was  the  note  of  rejec- 
tion received  by  the  Anglo-French  envoys  in  Prague  at 
5 p.m . on  the  twentieth  than  the  British  minister,  Sir 
Basil  Newton,  warned  the  Czech  Foreign  Minister,  Dr. 
Kamil  Krofta,  that  if  the  Czech  government  adhered  to 
it  Britain  would  disinterest  herself  in  the  fate  of  the  coun- 
ty; M.  de  Lacroix,  the  French  minister,  associated  him- 
self with  this  statement  on  behalf  of  France. 

In  London  and  Paris,  in  the  meantime,  the  Czech  note 
was  receded  with  ill  grace.  Chamberlain  called  a meeting 
ot  his  inner  cabinet  and  a telephone  link  with  Paris  was 
set  up  for  conversations  with  Daladier  and  Bonnet 
throughout  the  evening.  It  was  agreed  that  both  govern- 
ments should  subject  Prague  to  further  pressure.  The 
Czechs  must  be  told  that  if  they  held  out  they  could  ex- 
pect no  help  from  France  or  Britain. 

By  this  time  President  Benes  realized  that  he  was 
being  deserted  by  his  supposed  friends.  He  made  one  final 
effort  to  rally  at  least  France.  Shortly  after  8 p.m.  on  the 
twentieth  he  had  Dr.  Krofta  put  the  vital  question  to 
Lacroix:  Would  France  honor  her  word  to  Czechoslovakia 
ln  ®as®  of  a German  attack  or  would  she  not?  And  when 
at  2:15  on  the  morning  of  September  21  Newton  and 
Lacroix  got  Benes  out  of  bed,  bade  him  withdraw  his 
note  of  rejection  and  declared  that  unless  this  were  done 
and  the  Anglo-French  proposals  were  accepted  Czecho- 
slovakia would  have  to  fight  Germany  alone,  the  Presi- 
dent  asked  the  French  minister  to  put  it  in  writing.  Prob- 


The  Road  to  War 


529 


ably  he  had  already  given  up,  but  he  had  an  eye  on  his- 
tory.* 

All  through  the  next  day,  September  21,  Benes,  aching 
from  fatigue,  from  the  lack  of  sleep  and  from  the  con- 
templation of  treachery  and  disaster,  consulted  with  his 
cabinet,  party  leaders  and  the  Army  High  Command. 
They  had  shown  courage  in  the  face  of  enemy  threats  but 
they  began  to  crumble  at  the  desertion  of  their  friends 
and  allies.  What  about  Russia?  As  it  happened,  the  Soviet 
Foreign  Commissar,  Litvinov,  was  making  a speech  that 
very  day  at  Geneva  reiterating  that  the  Soviet  Union 
would  stand  by  its  treaty  with  Czechoslovakia.  BeneS 
called  in  the  Russian  minister  in  Prague,  who  backed  up 
what  his  Foreign  Commissar  had  said.  Alas  for  the 
Czechs,  they  realized  that  the  pact  with  Russia  called  for 
the  Soviets  to  come  to  their  aid  on  condition  that  France 
did  the  same.  And  France  had  reneged. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  September  21,  the  Czech  govern- 
ment capitulated  and  accepted  the  Anglo-French  plan. 
“We  had  no  other  choice,  because  we  were  left  alone,”  a 
government  communique  explained  bitterly.  Privately, 
Benes  put  it  more  succinctly:  “We  have  been  basely  be- 
trayed.” The  next  day  the  cabinet  resigned  and  General 
J an  Sirovy,  the  Inspector  General  of  the  Army,  became  the 
head  of  a new  “government  of  national  concentration.” 

CHAMBERLAIN  AT  GODESBERG: 

SEPTEMBER  22-23 

Though  Chamberlain  was  bringing  to  Hitler  all  that  he 
had  asked  for  at  their  Berchtesgaden  meeting,  both  men 
were  uneasy  as  they  met  at  the  little  Rhine  town  of  Godes- 
berg  on  the  afternoon  of  September  22.  The  German 
charge  d’affaires,  after  seeing  the  Prime  Minister  off  at 
the  London  airport,  had  rushed  off  a wire  to  Berlin:  “Cham- 
berlain and  his  party  have  left  under  a heavy  load  of 
anxiety  . . . Unquestionably  opposition  is  growing  to 
Chamberlain’s  policy.” 

* The  treachery  of  Bonnet  at  this  juncture  is  too  involved-  to  be  related 
in  a history  of  Germany.  Among  other  things,  he  contrived  to  con- 
vmce  the  French  and  British  cabinet  ministers  of  the  falsehood  that 
Uie  Czech  government  wanted  the  French  to  state  they  would  not 
fight  for  Czechoslovakia  so  that  it  would  have  a good  excuse  for 
capitulating  For  the  story,  see  Wheeler-Bennett’s  Munich ; Herbert  Ripka, 
Munich,  Before  and  After ; Pertinax,  The  Grave  Diggers  of  France. 


530 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Hitler  was  in  a highly  nervous  state.  On  the  morning  of 
the  twenty-second  I was  having  breakfast  on  the  terrace  of 
the  Hotel  Dreesen,  where  the  talks  were  to  take  place, 
when  Hitler  strode  past  on  his  way  down  to  the  riverbank 
to  inspect  his  yacht.  He  seemed  to  have  a peculiar  tic. 
Every  few  steps  he  cocked  his  right  shoulder  nervously, 
his  left  leg  snapping  up  as  he  did  so.  He  had  ugly,  black 
patches  under  his  eyes.  He  seemed  to  be,  as  I noted  in  my 
diary  that  evening,  on  the  edge  of  a nervous  breakdown. 
“Teppichfresser!”  muttered  my  German  companion,  an  ed- 
itor who  secretly  despised  the  Nazis.  And  he  explained 
that  Hitler  had  been  in  such  a maniacal  mood  over  the 
Czechs  the  last  few  days  that  on  more  than  one  occa- 
sion he  had  lost  control  of  himself  completely,  hurling 
himself  to  the  floor  and  chewing  the  edge  of  the  carpet. 
Hence  the  term  “carpet  eater.”  The  evening  before,  while 
talking  with  some  of  the  party  hacks  at  the  Dreesen,  I 
had  heard  the  expression  applied  to  the  Fuehrer — in  whis- 
pers, of  course.50 


Despite  his  misgivings  about  the  growing  opposition  to 
his  policies  at  home,  Mr.  Chamberlain  appeared  to  be  in 
excellent  spirits  when  he  arrived  at  Godesberg  and  drove 
through  streets  decorated  not  only  with  the  swastika  but 
with  the  Union  Jack  to  his  headquarters  at  the  Petershof, 
a castlelike  hotel  on  the  summit  of  the  Petersberg,  high 
above  the  opposite  (right)  bank  of  the  Rhine.  He  had  come 
to  fulfill  everything  that  Hitler  had  demanded  at 
Berchtesgaden,  and  even  more.  There  remained  only  the 
details  to  work  out  and  for  this  purpose  he  had  brought 
along,  in  addition  to  Sir  Horace  Wilson  and  William 
Strang  (the  latter  a Foreign  Office  expert  on  Eastern 
Europe),  the  head  of  the  drafting  and  legal  department  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  Sir  William  Malkin. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  the  Prime  Minister  crossed  the 
Rhine  by  ferry  to  the  Hotel  Dreesen  * where  Hitler  await- 
ed him.  For  once,  at  the  start  at  least,  Chamberlain  did 
all  the  talking.  For  what  must  have  been  more  than  an 
hour,  judging  by  Dr.  Schmidt’s  lengthy  notes  of  the  meet- 
ing,51  the  Prime  Minister,  after  explaining  that  following 

o/naw  f.r,01r  .v,hiSTTh0Je1’  luj  by  Herr  Dreesen-  an  early  Nazi  crony 

1,11!  the  Fuehrer  had  set  out  on  the  night  of  June  29-30,  1934 
to  kill  Roehm  and  carry  out  the  Blood  Purge.  The  Nazi  leader  had 
hNen,Stt  °Ua  the  hotel  as  a. place  of  refuge  where  he  could  collect 
ius  thoughts  and  resolve  his  hesitations. 


The  Road  to  War 


531 


“laborious  negotiations”  he  had  won  over  not  only  the 
British  and  French  cabinets  but  the  Czech  government  to 
accept  the  Fuehrer’s  demands,  proceeded  to  outline  in  great 
detail  the  means  by  which  they  could  be  implemented. 
Accepting  Runciman’s  advice,  he  was  now  prepared  to 
see  the  Sudetenland  turned  over  to  Germany  without  a 
plebiscite.  As  to  the  mixed  areas,  their  future  could  be 
determined  by  a commission  of  three  members,  a German, 
a Czech  and  one  neutral.  Furthermore,  Czechoslovakia’s 
mutual-assistance  treaties  with  France  and  Russia,  which 
were  so  distasteful  to  the  Fuehrer,  would  be  replaced  by 
an  international  guarantee  against  an  unprovoked  attack 
on  Czechoslovakia,  which  in  the  future  “would  have  to 
be  completely  neutral.” 

It  all  seemed  so  simple,  so  reasonable,  so  logical  to 
the  peace-loving  British  businessman  become  British  Prime 
Minister.  He  paused  with  evident  self-satisfaction,  as  one 
eyewitness  recorded,  for  Hitler’s  reaction. 

“Do  I understand  that  the  British,  French  and  Czech 
governments  have  agreed  to  the  transfer  of  the  Sudeten- 
land from  Czechoslovakia  to  Germany?”  Hitler  asked.* 
He  was  astounded  as  he  later  told  Chamberlain,  that  the 
concessions  to  him  had  gone  so  far  and  so  fast. 

“Yes,”  replied  the  Prime  Minister,  smiling. 

“I  am  terribly  sorry,”  Hitler  said,  “but  after  the  events 
of  the  last  few  days,  this  plan  is  no  longer  of  any  use.” 

Chamberlain,  Dr.  Schmidt  later  remembered,  sat  up 
with  a start.  His  owllike  face  flushed  with  surprise  and 
anger.  But  apparently  not  with  resentment  that  Hitler  had 
deceived  him,  that  Hitler,  like  a common  blackmailer, 
was  upping  his  demands  at  the  very  moment  they  were 
being  accepted.  The  Prime  Minister  described  his  own 
feelings  at  this  moment  in  a report  to  the  Commons  a few 
days  later: 

I do  not  want  the  House  to  think  that  Hitler  was  de- 
liberately deceiving  me— I do  not  think  so  for  one  moment 


t » 1?1?W  lhatthe  Czechs  had  accepted  the  Anglo-French  proposals. 
Jodi  noted  in  his  diary  that  at  11:30  a.m.  on  September  21,  the  day  be! 
fr^fntfe.rl^i.arrFedJln.  Godesberg,  he  had  received  a telephone 
S ad.Juta1*:  The  Fuehrer  has  received  news  five 
J?  T1!  Prague  is  said  to  have  accepted  unconditionally.”  At 
12.45  Jodi  noted.  Department  heads  are  informed  to  continue  prepara- 
tion  for  Green,  but  nevertheless,  to  get  ready  for  everything  necessary 
i°n  a Peaceful  penetration.  » It  is  possible,  however,  that  Hitler  did  not 
p"Zed  themm?o°him  AnSlo“Fren^  Plan  Prime  Minister  ex- 


532 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

— but,  for  me,  I expected  that  when  I got  back  to  Godes- 
berg  I had  only  to  discuss  quietly  with  him  the  proposals 
that  I had  brought  with  me;  and  it  was  a profound  shock  to 
me  when  I was  told  . . . that  these  proposals  were  not  ac- 
ceptable . . . 

Chamberlain  saw  the  house  of  peace  which  he  had  so 
“laboriously”  built  up  at  the  expense  of  the  Czechs  collaps- 
ing like  a stack  of  cards.  He  was,  he  told  Hitler,  “both 
disappointed  and  puzzled.  He  could  rightly  say  that  the 
Fuehrer  had  got  from  him  what  he  had  demanded.” 

In  order  to  achieve  this  he  [Chamberlain]  had  risked 
his  whole  political  career  ...  He  was  being  accused  by 
certain  circles  in  Great  Britain  of  having  sold  and  betrayed 
Czechoslovakia,  of  having  yielded  to  the  dictators,  and  on 
leaving  England  that  morning  he  actually  had  been  booed. 

But  the  Fuehrer  was  unmoved  by  the  personal  plight 
of  the  British  Prime  Minister.  The  Sudeten  area,  he  de- 
manded, must  be  occupied  by  Germany  at  once.  The  prob- 
lem “must  be  completely  and  finally  solved  by  October 
first,  at  the  latest.”  He  had  a map  handy  to  indicate  what 
territories  must  be  ceded  immediately. 

And  so,  his  mind  “full  of  foreboding,”  as  he  later  told 
the  Commons,  Chamberlain  withdrew  across  the  Rhine 
to  consider  what  I was  to  do.”  There  seemed  so  little 
hope  that  evening  that  after  he  had  consulted  with  his 
own  cabinet  colleagues  and  with  members  of  the  French 
government  by  telephone  it  was  agreed  that  London  and 
Paris  should  inform  the  Czech  government  the  next  day 
that  they  could  not  “continue  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  advising  them  not  to  mobilize.”  * 

At  7:20  that  evening  General  Keitel  telephoned  Army 
headquarters  from  Godesberg:  “Date  (of  X Day)  cannot 
yet  be  ascertained.  Continue  preparations  according  to 
plan.  If  Case  Green  occurs,  it  will  not  be  before  Septem- 
ber 30.  If  it  occurs  sooner,  it  will  probably  be  impro- 
vised.” 63 

For  Adolf  Hitler  himself  was  caught  in  a dilemma. 
Though  Chamberlain  did  not  know  it,  the  Fuehrer’s  real 
objective,  as  he  had  laid  it  down  in  his  OKW  directive 
after  the  May  crisis,  was  “to  destroy  Czechoslovakia  by 
military  action.  To  accept  the  Anglo-French  plan,  which 

* Czech  mobilization  began  at  10 :30  p.m.  on  September  23. 


The  Road  to  War 


533 

the  Czechs  already  had  agreed  to,  however  reluctantly, 
would  not  only  give  Hitler  his  Sudeten  Germans  but  would 
effectively  destroy  the  Czech  state,  since  it  would  be  left 
defenseless.  But  it  would  not  be  by  military  action,  and 
the  Fuehrer  was  determined  not  only  to  humiliate  Presi- 
dent Benes  and  the  Czech  government,  which  had  so  of- 
fended him  in  May,  but  to  expose  the  spinelessness  of  the 
Western  powers.  For  that,  at  least  a military  occupation 
was  necessary.  It  could  be  bloodless,  as  was  the  military 
occupation  of  Austria,  but  it  must  take  place.  He  must 
have  at  least  that  much  revenge  on  the  upstart  Czechs. 

There  was  no  further  contact  between  the  two  men  on 
the  evening  of  September  22.  But  after  sleeping  on  the 
problem  and  spending  the  early  morning  pacing  his  bal- 
cony overlooking  the  Rhine,  Chamberlain  sat  down  follow- 
ing breakfast  and  wrote  a letter  to  Hitler.  He  would  submit 
the  new  German  demands  to  the  Czechs  but  he  did  not 
think  they  would  be  accepted.  In  fact,  he  had  no  doubt 
that  the  Czechs  would  forcibly  resist  an  immediate  occupa- 
tion by  German  troops.  But  he  was  willing  to  suggest  to 
Prague,  since  all  parties  had  agreed  on  the  transfer  of 
the  Sudeten  area  to  Germany,  that  the  Sudeten  Germans 
themselves  maintain  law  and  order  in  their  area  until  it  * 
was  turned  over  to  the  Reich. 

To  such  a compromise  Hitler  would  not  listen.  After 
keeping  the  Prime  Minister  waiting  throughout  most  of 
the  day  he  finally  replied  by  note  with  a bitter  tirade, 
again  rehearsing  all  the  wrongs  the  Czechs  had  done  to 
Germans,  again  refusing  to  modify  his  position  and  con- 
cluding that  war  “now  appears  to  be  the  case.”  Chamber- 
lain’s answer  was  brief.  He  asked  Hitler  to  put  his  new 
demands  in  writing,  “together  with  a map,”  and  under- 
took “as  mediator”  to  send  them  to  Prague.  “I  do  not  see 
that  I can  perform  any  further  service  here,”  he  con- 
cluded. “I  propose  therefore  to  return  to  England.” 

Before  doing  so  he  came  over  once  again  to  the  Dreesen 
for  a final  meeting  with  Hitler  which  began  at  10:30  on 
the  evening  of  September  23.  Hitler  presented  his  demands 
in  the  form  of  a memorandum  with  an  accompanying  map. 
Chamberlain  found  himself  confronted  with  a new  time 
limit.  The  Czechs  were  to  begin  the  evacuation  of  the 
ceded  territory  by  8 a.m.  on  September  26 — two  days 
hence — and  complete  it  by  September  28. 


534  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“But  this  is  nothing  less  than  an  ultimatum!”  Chamber- 
lain  exclaimed. 

“Nothing  of  the  sort,”  Hitler  shot  back.  When  Chamber- 
lain  retorted  that  the  German  word  Diktat  applied  to  it, 
Hitler  answered,  “It  is  not  a Diktat  at  all.  Look,  the  docu- 
ment is  headed  by  the  word  ‘Memorandum.’  ” 

At  this  moment  an  adjutant  brought  in  an  urgent  mes- 
sage for  the  Fuehrer.  He  glanced  at  it  and  tossed  it  to 
Schmidt,  who  was  interpreting.  “Read  this  to  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain.” 

Schmidt  did.  “BeneS  has  just  announced  over  the  radio 
a general  mobilization  in  Czechoslovakia.” 

The  room,  Schmidt  recalled  afterward,  was  deadly  still. 
Then  Hitler  spoke:  “Now,  of  course,  the  whole  affair  is 
settled.  The  Czechs  will  not  dream  of  ceding  any  territory 
to  Germany.” 

Chamberlain,  according  to  the  Schmidt  minutes,  disa- 
greed. In  fact,  there  followed  a furious  argument. 

The  Czechs  had  mobilized  first  [said  Hitler].  Cham- 
berlain contradicted  this.  Germany  had  mobilized  first  . . . 
The  Fuehrer  denied  that  Germany  had  mobilized. 

And  so  the  talks  continued  into  the  early-morning  hours. 
Finally,  after  Chamberlain  had  inquired  whether  the  Ger- 
man memorandum  “was  really  his  last  word”  and  Hitler 
had  replied  that  it  was  indeed,  the  Prime  Minister  answered 
that  there  was  no  point  in  continuing  the  conversations. 
He  had  done  his  utmost;  his  efforts  had  failed.  He  was 
going  away  with  a heavy  heart,  for  the  hopes  with  which 
he  had  come  to  Germany  were  destroyed. 

The  German  dictator  did  not  want  Chamberlain  to  get  off 
the  hook.  He  responded  with  a “concession.” 

“You  are  one  of  the  few  men  for  whom  I have  ever  done 
such  a thing,”  he  said  breezily.  “I  am  prepared  to  set  one 
single  date  for  the  Czech  evacuation — October  first — if 
that  will  facilitate  your  task.”  And  so  saying,  he  took  a 
pencil  and  changed  the  dates  himself.  This,  of  course,  was 
no  concession  at  all.  October  1 had  been  X Day  all 
along.* 

* The  memorandum  called  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  Czech  armed  forces, 
including  the  police,  etc.,  by  October  1 from  large  areas  indicated  on 
a map  with  red  shading.  A plebiscite  was  to  determine  the  future  of 
further  areas  shaded  in  green.  All  military  installations  in  the  evacuated 
territories  were  to  be  left  intact.  All  commercial  and  transport  materials, 


The  Road  to  War 


535 


But  it  seems  to  have  impressed  the  Prime  Minister. 
“He  fully  appreciated,”  Schmidt  recorded  him  as  saying, 
“the  Fuehrer’s  consideration  on  the  point.”  Nevertheless, 
he  added,  he  was  not  in  a position  to  accept  or  reject  the 
proposals;  he  could  only  transmit  them. 

The  ice,  however,  had  been  broken,  and  as  the  meeting 
broke  up  at  1:30  a.m.  the  two  men  seemed,  despite  all  that 
had  happened,  to  be  closer  together  personally  than  at 
any  time  since  they  had  first  met.  I myself,  from  a vantage 
point  twenty-five  feet  away  in  the  porter’s  booth,  where  I 
had  set  up  a temporary  broadcasting  studio,  watched  them 
say  their  farewells  near  the  door  of  the  hotel.  I was  struck 
by  their  cordiality  to  each  other.  Schmidt  took  down  the 
words  which  I could  not  hear. 

Chamberlain  bid  a hearty  farewell  to  the  Fuehrer.  He 
said  he  had  the  feeling  that  a relationship  of  confidence 
had  grown  up  between  himself  and  the  Fuehrer  as  a result 
of  the  conversations  of  the  last  few  days  ...  He  did  not 
cease  to  hope  that  the  present  difficult  crisis  would  be  over- 
come, and  then  he  would  be  glad  to  discuss  other  problems 
still  outstanding  with  the  Fuehrer  in  the  same  spirit. 

The  Fuehrer  thanked  Chamberlain  for  his  words  and  told 
him  that  he  had  similar  hopes.  As  he  had  already  stated 
several  times,  the  Czech  problem  was  the  last  territorial  de- 
mand which  he  had  to  make  in  Europe. 

This  renunciation  of  further  land  grabs  seems  to  have 
impressed  the  departing  Prime  Minister  too,  for  in  his 
subsequent  report  to  the  House  of  Commons  he  stressed 
that  Hitler  had  made  it  “with  great  earnestness.” 

When  Chamberlain  arrived  at  his  hotel  toward  2 a.m. 
he  was  asked  by  a journalist,  “Is  the  position  hopeless,  sir?” 

“I  would  not  like  to  say  that,”  the  Prime  Minister  an- 
swered. “It  is  up  to  the  Czechs  now.”  65 

It  did  not  occur  to  him,  it  is  evident,  that  it  was  up  to 
the  Germans,  with  their  outrageous  demands,  too. 

In  fact,  no  sooner  had  the  Prime  Minister  returned  to 
London  on  September  24  than  he  attempted  to  do  the 
very  thing  he  had  informed  Hitler  he  would  not  do:  per- 
suade the  British  cabinet  to  accept  the  new  Nazi  demands. 

“especially  the  rolling  stock  of  the  railway  system,”  were  to  be  handed 
over  to  the  Germans  undamaged.  “Finally,  no  foodstuffs,  goods,  cattle, 
raw  material,  etc.,  are  to  be  removed.”  54  The  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Czechs  in  the  Sudetenland  were  not  to  be  allowed  to  take  with  them 
even  their  household  goods  or  the  family  cow. 


536  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

But  now  he  ran  into  unexpected  opposition.  Duff  Cooper, 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  firmly  opposed  him. 
Surprisingly,  so  did  Lord  Halifax,  though  very  re- 
luctantly. Chamberlain  could  not  carry  his  cabinet.  Nor 
could  he  persuade  the  French  government,  which  on  the 
twenty-fourth  rejected  the  Godesberg  memorandum  and 
on  the  same  day  ordered  a partial  mobilization. 

When  the  French  ministers,  headed  by  Premier  Daladier, 
arrived  in  London  on  Sunday,  September  25,  the  two  gov- 
ernments were  apprised  of  the  formal  rejection  of  the 
Godesberg  proposals  by  the  Czech  government.*  There 
was  nothing  for  the  French  to  do  but  affirm  that  they 
would  honor  their  word  and  come  to  the  aid  of  Czecho- 
slovakia if  attacked.  But  they  had  to  know  what  Britain 
would  do.  Finally  cornered,  or  so  it  seemed,  Chamber- 
lain  agreed  to  inform  Hitler  that  if  France  became  en- 
gaged in  war  with  Germany  as  a result  of  her  treaty  obli- 
gations to  the  Czechs,  Britain  would  feel  obliged  to  sup- 
port her. 

But  first  he  would  make  one  last  appeal  to  the  German 
dictator.  Hitler  was  scheduled  to  make  a speech  at  the 
Sportpalast  in  Berlin  on  September  26.  In  order  to  in- 
duce him  not  to  bum  his  bridges  Chamberlain  once  again 
dashed  off  a personal  letter  to  Hitler  and  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  twenty-sixth  rushed  it  to  Berlin  by  his  faithful 
aide,  Sir  Horace  Wilson,  who  sped  to  the  German  capital 
by  special  plane. 

On  the  departure  of  Chamberlain  from  the  Dreesen 
in  the  early-morning  hours  of  September  24,  the  Ger- 
mans had  been  plunged  into  gloom.  Now  that  war  seemed 
to  face  them,  some  of  them,  at  least,  did  not  like  it.  I lin- 
gered in  the  hotel  lobby  for  some  time  over  a late  supper. 
Goering,  Goebbels,  Ribbentrop,  General  Keitel  and  lesser 
men  stood  around  earnestly  talking.  They  seemed  dazed 
at  the  prospect  of  war. 

In  Berlin  later  that  day  I found  hopes  reviving.  In  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  the  feeling  was  that  since  Chamberlain, 
with  all  the  authority  of  the  British  Prime  Minister,  had 
agreed  to  present  Hitler’s  new  demands  to  Prague,  it 
must  be  assumed  that  the  British  leader  supported  Hitler’s 

* The  Czech  reply  is  a moving  and  prophetic  document.  The  Godesberg 
proposals,  it  said,  “deprive  us  of  every  safeguard  for  our  national 
existence.  66 


The  Road  to  War 


537 


proposals.  As  we  have  seen,  the  assumption  was  quite 
correct— so  far  as  it  went. 

Sunday,  September  25,  was  a lovely  day  of  Indian  sum- 
mer in  Berlin,  warm  and  sunny,  and  since  it  undoubtedly 
would  be  the  last  such  weekend  that  autumn,  half  of 
the  population  flocked  to  the  lakes  and  woods  that  sur- 
round the  capital.  Despite  reports  of  Hitler’s  rage  at  hear- 
ing that  the  Godesberg  ultimatum  was  being  rejected  in 
Paris,  London  and  Prague,  there  was  no  feeling  of  great 
crisis,  certainly  no  war  fever,  in  Berlin.  “Hard  to  believe 
there  will  be  war,”  I noted  in  my  diary  that  evening.* 

On  the  Monday  following  there  was  a sudden  change 
for  the  worse.  At  5 p.m.  Sir  Horace  Wilson,  accompanied 
by  Ambassador  Henderson  and  Ivone  Kirkpatrick,  First 
Secretary  of  the  British  Embassy,  arrived  at  the  Chancel- 
lery bearing  Chamberlain’s  letter.57  They  found  Hitler  in 
an  ugly  mood — probably  he  was  already  working  him- 
self down  to  a proper  level  for  his  Sportpalast  speech  three 
hours  hence. 

When  Dr.  Schmidt  began  to  translate  the  letter,  which 
stated  that  the  Czech  government  had  informed  the  Prime 
Minister  that  the  Godesberg  memorandum  was  “wholly 
unacceptable,”  just  as  he  had  warned  at  Godesberg,  Hitler, 
according  to  Schmidt,  suddenly  leaped  up,  shouting, 
“There’s  no  sense  at  all  in  negotiating  further!”  and  bound- 
ed for  the  door.58 

It  was  a painful  scene,  says  the  German  interpreter. 
“For  the  first  and  only  time  in  my  presence,  Hitler  com- 
pletely lost  his  head.”  And  according  to  the  British 
present,  the  Fuehrer,  who  soon  stamped  back  to  his 
chair,  kept  further  interrupting  the  reading  of  the  letter 
by  screaming,  “The  Germans  are  being  treated  like  niggers 
. . . On  October  first  I shall  have  Czechoslovakia  where  I 
want  her.  If  France  and  England  decide  to  strike,  let 
them  ...  I do  not  care  a pfennig.” 

Chamberlain  had  proposed  that  since  the  Czechs  were 
willing  to  give  Hitler  what  he  wanted,  the  Sudeten  areas, 
a meeting  of  Czech  and  German  representatives  be  called 
immediately  to  settle  “by  agreement  the  way  in  which  the 

* At  the  conclusion  of  the  Godesberg  talks,  the  British  and  French 
correspondents — and  the  chief  European  correspondent  of  the  New  York 
Times,  who  was  an  English  citizen — had  scurried  off  for  the  French, 
Belgian  and  Dutch  frontiers,  none  of  them  wishing  to  be  interned  in 
case  of  war. 


538  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

territory  is  to  be  handed  over.”  He  added  that  he  was 
willing  to  have  British  representatives  sit  in  at  the  meeting. 
Hitler’s  response  was  that  he  would  negotiate  details 
with  the  Czechs  if  they  accepted  in  advance  the  Godes- 
berg  memorandum  (which  they  had  just  rejected)  and 
agreed  to  a German  occupation  of  the  Sudetenland  by 
October  1.  He  must  have  an  affirmative  reply,  he  said, 
within  forty-four  hours — by  2 p.m.  on  September  28. 

That  evening  Hitler  burned  his  bridges,  or  so  it  seemed 
to  those  of  us  who  listened  in  amazement  to  his  mad  out- 
burst at  the  jammed  Sportpalast  in  Berlin.  Shouting  and 
shrieking  in  the  worst  paroxysm  I had  ever  seen  him  in, 
he  venomously  hurled  personal  insults  at  “Herr  BeneS,” 
declared  that  the  issue  of  war  or  peace  was  now  up  to  the 
Czech  President  and  that,  in  any  case,  he  would  have 
the  Sudetenland  by  October  1.  Carried  away  as  he  was 
by  his  angry  torrent  of  words  and  the  ringing  cheers  of 
the  crowd,  he  was  shrewd  enough  to  throw  a sop  to  the 
British  Prime  Minister.  He  thanked  him  for  his  efforts  for 
peace  and  reiterated  that  this  was  his  last  territorial  claim 
in  Europe.  “We  want  no  Czechs!”  he  muttered  contemp- 
tuously. 

Throughout  the  harangue  I sat  in  a balcony  just  above 
Hitler,  trying  with  no  great  success  to  broadcast  a running 
translation  of  his  words.  That  night  in  my  diary  I 
noted: 

. . . For  the  first  time  in  all  the  years  I’ve  observed  him 
he  seemed  tonight  to  have  completely  lost  control  of  himself. 
When  he  sat  down,  Goebbels  sprang  up  and  shouted  into 
the  microphone:  “One  thing  is  sure:  1918  will  never  be  re- 
peated! Hitler  looked  up  to  him,  a wild,  eager  expression  in 
his  eyes,  as  if  those  were  the  words  which  he  had  been 
searching  for  all  evening  and  hadn’t  quite  found.  He  leaped 
to  his  feet  and  with  a fanatical  fire  in  his  eyes  that  I shall 
never  forget  brought  his  right  hand,  after  a grand  sweep, 
pounding  down  on  the  table,  and  yelled  with  all  the  power 
in  his  mighty  lungs:  “Ja!”  Then  he  slumped  into  his  chair 
exhausted. 

He  was  fully  recovered  when  he  received  Sir  Horace 
Wilson  for  the  second  time  the  next  noon,  September 
27.  The  special  envoy,  a man  with  no  diplomatic  training 
but  who  was  as  anxious  as  the  Prime  Minister,  if  not 
more  so,  to  give  Hitler  the  Sudetenland  if  the  dictator 


The  Road  to  War 


539 

would  only  accept  it  peacefully,  called  Hitler’s  atten- 
tion to  a special  statement  issued  by  Chamberlain  in  Lon- 
don shortly  after  midnight  in  response  to  the  Fuehrer’s 
Sportpalast  speech.  In  view  of  the  Chancellor’s  lack  of 
faith  in  Czech  promises,  the  British  government,  Cham- 
berlain said,  would  regard  itself  “as  morally  responsible” 
for  seeing  that  the  Czech  promises  were  carried  out 
“fairly,  fully  and  with  all  reasonable  promptitude.”  He 
trusted  that  the  Chancellor  would  not  reject  this  proposal. 

But  Hitler  showed  no  interest  in  it.  He  had,  he  said,  no 
further  message  for  Mr.  Chamberlain.  It  was  now  up 
to  the  Czechs.  They  could  accept  or  reject  his  demands.  If 
they  rejected  them,  he  shouted  angrily,  “I  shall  destroy 
Czechoslovakia!”  He  kept  repeating  the  threat  with  obvi- 
ous relish. 

Apparently  that  was  too  much  even  for  the  accommo- 
dating Wilson,  who  rose  to  his  feet  and  said,  “In  that 
case,  I am  entrusted  by  the  Prime  Minister  to  make  the 
following  statement:  ‘If  France,  in  fulfillment  of  her 
treaty  obligations,  should  become  actively  engaged  in  hos- 
tilities against  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom  would  feel 
obliged  to  support  France.’  ” 

“I  can  only  take  note  of  that  position,”  Hitler  replied 
with  some  heat.  “It  means  that  if  France  elects  to  attack 
Germany,  England  will  feel  obliged  to  attack  her  also.” 

When  Sir  Horace  replied  that  he  had  not  said  that, 
that  it  was  up  to  Hitler,  after  all,  whether  there  would  be 
peace  or  war,  the  Fuehrer,  working  himself  up  by  now  to 
a fine  lather,  shouted,  “If  France  and  England  strike,  let 
them  do  so!  It’s  a matter  of  complete  indifference  to 
me.  Today  is  Tuesday;  by  next  Monday  we  shall  be  at 
war.” 

According  to  Schmidt’s  official  notes  on  the  meeting, 
Wilson  apparently  wished  to  continue  the  conversation, 
but  was  advised  by  Ambassador  Henderson  to  desist.  This 
did  not  prevent  the  inexperienced  special  envoy  from  get- 
ting in  a word  with  the  Fuehrer  alone  as  the  meeting  broke 
up.  ‘I  shall  try  to  make  these  Czechs  sensible,”  * he  as- 
sured Hitler,  and  the  latter  replied  that  he  "would  wel- 
come that.”  Perhaps,  the  Fuehrer  must  have  thought, 
Chamberlain  could  still  be  coaxed  to  go  further  in  making 


* Wilson’s  assurance  is  given  in  English  in  the  original  of  Schmidt’s 


540 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  Czechs  “sensible.”  That  evening,  in  fact,  he  sat  down 
and  dictated  to  the  Prime  Minister  a shrewdly  worded 
letter. 

There  were  well-grounded  reasons  for  writing  it.  Much 
had  happened  in  Berlin — and  elsewhere — during  that  day, 
September  27. 

At  1 p.m.,  shortly  after  Wilson’s  departure,  Hitler  is- 
sued a “most  secret”  order  directing  assault  units  compris- 
ing some  twenty-one  reinforced  regiments,  or  seven  divi- 
sions, to  move  forward  from  their  training  areas  to  the 
jumping-off  points  on  the  Czech  frontier.  “They  must  be 
ready,”  said  the  order,  “to  begin  action  against  ‘Green’ 
on  September  30,  the  decision  having  been  made  one  day 
previously  by  twelve  noon.”  A few  hours  later  a further 
concealed  mobilization  was  ordered  by  the  Fuehrer.  Among 
other  measures,  five  new  divisions  were  mobilized  for  the 
west.69 

But  even  as  Hitler  went  ahead  with  his  military  moves, 
there  were  developments  during  the  day  which  made  him 
hesitate.  In  order  to  stir  up  some  war  fever  among  the 
populace  Hitler  ordered  a parade  of  a motorized  division 
through  the  capital  at  dusk — an  hour  when  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  Berliners  would  be  pouring  out  of  their  of- 
fices onto  the  streets.  It  turned  out  to  be  a terrible  fiasco 
— at  least  for  the  Supreme  Commander.  The  good  people 
of  Berlin  simply  did  not  want  to  be  reminded  of  war.  In 
my  diary  that  night  I noted  down  the  surprising  scene. 

I went  out  to  the  comer  of  the  Linden  where  the  column 
[of  troops]  was  turning  down  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  expect- 
ing to  see  a tremendous  demonstration.  I pictured  the  scenes 
I had  read  of  in  1914  when  the  cheering  throngs  on  this 
same  street  tossed  flowers  at  the  marching  soldiers,  and  the 
girls  ran  up  and  kissed  them  . . . But  today  they  ducked 
into  the  subways,  refused  to  look  on,  and  the  handful  that 
did  stood  at  the  curb  in  utter  silence  ...  It  has  been  the 
most  striking  demonstration  against  war  I’ve  ever  seen. 

At  the  urging  of  a policeman  I walked  down  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  to  the  Reichskanzlerplatz,  where  Hitler 
stood  on  a balcony  of  the  Chancellery  reviewing  the 
troops. 

. . . There  weren’t  two  hundred  people  there.  Hitler 
looked  grim,  then  angry,  and  soon  went  inside,  leaving  his 


The  Road  to  War 


541 


troops  to  parade  by  unreviewed.  What  I’ve  seen  tonight  al- 
most rekindles  a little  faith  in  the  German  people.  They 
are  dead  set  against  war. 

Within  the  Chancellery  there  was  further  bad  news — 
this  from  abroad.  There  was  a dispatch  from  Budapest 
saying  that  Yugoslavia  and  Rumania  had  informed  the 
Hungarian  government  that  they  would  move  against  Hun- 
gary militarily  if  she  attacked  Czechoslovakia.  That 
would  spread  the  war  to  the  Balkans,  something  Hitler 
did  not  want. 

The  news  from  Paris  was  graver.  From  the  German 
military  attache  there  came  a telegram  marked  “Very 
Urgent”  and  addressed  not  only  to  the  Foreign  Ministry 
but  to  OKW  and  the  General  Staff.  It  warned  that  France’s 
partial  mobilization  was  so  much  like  a total  one  “that  I 
reckon  with  the  completion  of  the  deployment  of  the  first 
65  divisions  on  the  German  frontier  by  the  sixth  day  of 
mobilization.”  Against  such  a force  the  Germans  had,  as 
Hitler  knew,  barely  a dozen  divisions,  half  of  them  re- 
serve units  of  doubtful  value.  Furthermore,  wired  the 
German  military  attache,  “it  appears  probable  that  in  the 
event  of  belligerent  measures  by  Germany  ...  an  immedi- 
ate attack  will  take  place,  in  all  probability  from  Lower 
Alsace  and  from  Lorraine  in  the  direction  of  Mainz.” 

Finally,  this  German  officer  informed  Berlin,  the  Italians 
were  doing  absolutely  nothing  to  pin  down  French  troops 
on  the  Franco— Italian  frontier.60  Mussolini,  the  valiant 
ally,  seemed  to  be  letting  Hitler  down  in  a crucial  hour. 

And  then,  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  the 
King  of  Sweden  were  butting  in.  The  day  before,  on  the 
twenty-sixth,  Roosevelt  had  addressed  an  appeal  to 
Hitler  to  help  keep  the  peace,  and  though  Hitler  had 
answered  it  within  twenty-four  hours,  saying  that  peace 
depended  solely  on  the  Czechs,  there  came  another  mes- 
sage from  the  American  President  during  the  course  of 
this  day,  Wednesday  the  twenty-seventh,  suggesting  an 
immediate  conference  of  all  the  nations  directly  interested 
and  implying  that  if  war  broke  out  the  world  would  hold 
Hitler  responsible.61 

The  King  of  Sweden,  staunch  friend  of  Germany,  as  he 
had  proved  during  the  1914-18  war,  was  more  frank. 
During  the  afternoon  a dispatch  arrived  in  Berlin  from  the 
German  minister  in  Stockholm  saying  that  the  King  had 


542  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

hastily  summoned  him  and  told  him  that  unless  Hitler  ex- 
tended his  time  limit  of  October  1 by  ten  days  world  war 
would  inevitably  break  out,  Germany  would  be  solely  to 
blame  for  it  and  moreover  just  as  inevitably  would  lose  it 
“in  view  of  the  present  combination  of  the  Powers.”  In 
the  cool,  neutral  air  of  Stockholm,  the  shrewd  King  was 
able  to  assess  at  least  the  military  situation  more  objective- 
ly than  the  heads  of  government  in  Berlin,  London  and 
Paris. 

President  Roosevelt,  as  perhaps  was  necessary  in  view 
of  American  sentiment,  had  weakened  his  two  appeals  for 
peace  by  stressing  that  the  United  States  would  not  inter- 
vene in  a war  nor  even  assume  any  obligations  “in  the 
conduct  of  the  present  negotiations.”  The  German  ambas- 
sador in  Washington,  Hans  Dieckhoff,  therefore  thought 
it  necessary  to  get  off  a “very  urgent”  cable  to  Berlin  dur- 
ing the  day.  He  warned  that  if  Hitler  resorted  to  force 
and  was  opposed  by  Britain  he  had  reason  to  assume 
“that  the  whole  weight  of  the  United  States  [would] 
be  thrown  into  the  scale  on  the  side  of  Britain.”  And  the 
ambassador,  usually  a timid  man  when  it  came  to  standing 
up  to  the  Fuehrer,  added,  “I  consider  it  my  duty  to 
emphasize  this  very  strongly.”  He  did  not  want  the  Ger- 
man government  to  stumble  into  the  same  mistaken  as- 
sumptions it  had  made  about  America  in  1914. 

And  Prague?  Was  there  any  sign  of  weakening  there?  In 
the  evening  came  a telegram  from  Colonel  Toussaint,  the 
German  military  attache,  to  OKW:  “Calm  in  Prague.  Last 
mobilization  measures  carried  out  . . . Total  estimated 
call-up  is  1,000,000;  field  army  800,000  . . .”<>2  That 
was  as  many  trained  men  as  Germany  had  for  two 
fronts.  Together  the  Czechs  and  the  French  outnumbered 
the  Germans  by  more  than  two  to  one. 

Faced  with  these  facts  and  developments  and  no  doubt 
mindful  of  Wilson’s  parting  words  and  of  Chamberlain’s 
character  and  of  Chamberlain’s  utter  fear  of  war,  Hitler 
sat  down  early  on  that  evening  of  September  27  to 
dictate  a letter  to  the  Prime  Minister.  Dr.  Schmidt,  who 
was  called  in  to  translate  it  into  English,  got  the  feeling  that 
the  dictator  was  shrinking  back  “from  the  extreme  step.” 
Whether  Hitler  knew  that  the  order  was  going  out  that 
evening  for  the  mobilization  of  the  British  fleet  cannot 
be  established.  Admiral  Raeder  arranged  to  see  the 


The  Road  to  War 


543 

Fuehrer  at  10  p.m.,  and  it  is  possible  that  the  German  Navy 
learned  of  the  British  move,  which  was  made  at  8 p.m. 
and  publicly  announced  at  11:38  p.m.,  and  that  Raeder 
informed  Hitler  by  telephone.  At  any  rate,  when  the 
Admiral  arrived  he  appealed  to  the  Fuehrer  not  to  go  to 
war. 

What  Hitler  did  know  at  this  moment  was  that  Prague 
was  defiant,  Paris  rapidly  mobilizing,  London  stiffening, 
his  own  people  apathetic,  his  leading  generals  dead  against 
him,  and  that  his  ultimatum  on  the  Godesberg  proposals 
expired  at  2 p.m.  the  next  day. 

His  letter  was  beautifully  calculated  to  appeal  to  Cham- 
berlain. Moderate  in  tone,  it  denied  that  his  proposals 
would  “rob  Czechoslovakia  of  every  guarantee  of  its 
existence”  or  that  his  troops  would  fail  to  stop  at  the 
demarcation  lines.  He  was  ready  to  negotiate  details  with 
the  Czechs;  he  was  ready  to  “give  a formal  guarantee  for 
the  remainder  of  Czechoslovakia.”  The  Czechs  were  hold- 
ing out  simply  because  they  hoped,  with  the  help  of 
England  and  France,  to  start  a European  war.  Neverthe- 
less, he  did  not  slam  the  door  on  the  last  hopes  of  peace. 

I must  leave  it  to  your  judgment  [he  concluded]  whether, 
m view  of  these  facts,  you  consider  that  you  should  continue 
your  effort  ...  to  spoil  such  maneuvers  and  bring  the 
Government  in  Prague  to  reason  at  the  very  last  hour.63 

THE  ELEVENTH  HOUR 

Hitler’s  letter,  telegraphed  urgently  to  London,  reached 
Chamberlain  at  10:30  on  the  night  of  September  27.  It 
came  at  the  end  of  a busy  day  for  the  Prime  Minister. 

The  disquieting  news  which  Sir  Horace  Wilson,  who 
arrived  in  London  early  in  the  afternoon,  brought  from  his 
second  conference  with  Hitler  spurred  Chamberlain  and 
his  inner  cabinet  to  action.  It  was  decided  to  mobilize 
the  fleet,  call  up  the  Auxiliary  Air  Force  and  declare  a 
state  of  emergency.  Already  trenches  were  being  dug 
in  the  parks  and  squares  for  protection  against  bombing, 
and  the  evacuation  of  London’s  school  children  had  begun. 

Also,  the  Prime  Minister  promptly  sent  off  a message  to 
President  Bene§  in  Prague  warning  that  his  information 
from  Berlin  “makes  it  clear  that  the  German  Army  will 
receive  orders  to  cross  the  Czechoslovak  frontier  im- 


544 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

mediately  if  by  tomorrow  [September  28]  at  2 p.m.  the 
Czechoslovak  Government  have  not  accepted  the  German 
conditions.  But  having  honorably  warned  the  Czechs, 
Chamberlain  could  not  refrain  from  admonishing  them, 
in  the  last  part  of  his  message,  “that  Bohemia  would  be 

verrun  by  the  German  Army  and  nothing  which  another 
Power  or  Powers  could  do  would  be  able  to  save  your 
country  and  your  people  from  such  a fate.  This  remains 
true  whatever  the  result  of  a world  war  might  be.” 

Ihus  Chamberlain  was  putting  the  responsibility  for 
peace  or  war  no  longer  on  Hitler  but  on  Benes.  And 
he  was  giving  a military  opinion  which  even  the  German 
generals,  as  we  have  seen,  held  as  irresponsible.  How- 
fj®r’  he  dld  add>  at  end  of  his  message,  that  he 
would  not  assume  the  responsibility  of  telling  the  Czechs 
what  they  must  now  do.  It  was  up  to  them. 

But  was  it?  BeneS  had  not  had  time  to  reply  to  the 
telegram  when  a second  one  arrived  in  which  Cham- 
berlam  did  endeavor  to  tell  the  Czech  government  what 
to  do.  He  proposed  that  the  Czechs  accept  a limited 
German  military  occupation  on  October  1 — of  Egerland 
and  Asch,  outside  the  Czech  fortifications — and  that  a 
German-Czech-British  boundary  commission  then  quickly 
establish  the  rest  of  the  areas  to  be  turned  over  to  the 

Germans.  And  the  Prime  Minister  added  a further  warn- 
ing: 

a alte™atiye  f°  this  P,an  would  be  an  invasion  and 

val^tir  of<1the  country  by  force,  and  Czechoslo- 
^ c?n/!lct  mi8ht  which  would  lead  to 

incalculable  loss  of  life,  could  not  be  reconstituted  in  her 
frontiers  whatever  the  result  of  the  conflict  may  be.64 

The  Czechs  were  thus  warned  by  their  friends  (France 
assocmted  herself  with  these  latest  proposals)  that  even 
it  they  and  their  allies  defeated  the  Germans  in  a war, 
Czechoslovakia  would  have  to  give  up  the  Sudetenland 
to  Germany.  The  inference  was  plain:  Why  plunge  Europe 
into  a war,  since  the  Sudetenland  is  lost  to  you  anyway? 

This  business  out  of  the  way,  the  Prime  Minister 
broadcast  to  the  nation  at  8:30  p.m.: 

How  horrible,  fantastic,  incredible  it  is  that  we  should  be 
t'h^Germ^FoidgrOffi'e^jTrP  Md  w^h  ^baSSad°rt  Hfc“der*“  t0 

immediately  submitted  Vo  Hitler.  ,be  re9Uest  that  ther  «* 


The  Road  to  War  545 

digging  trenches  . . . here  because  of  a quarrel  in  a faraway 
country  between  people  of  whom  we  know  nothing! 

Hitler  had  got  the  "substance  of  what  he  wanted.” 
Britain  had  offered  to  guarantee  that  the  Czechs  would 
accept  it  and  carry  it  out. 

I would  not  hesitate  to  pay  even  a third  visit  to  Germany 
if  I thought  it  would  do  any  good  . . . 

However  much  we  may  sympathize  with  a small  nation 
confronted  by  a big  and  powerful  neighbor,  we  cannot  in 
all  circumstances  undertake  to  involve  the  whole  British  Em- 
pire in  a war  simply  on  her  account.  If  we  have  to  fight  it 
must  be  on  larger  issues  than  that  . . . 

I am  myself  a man  of  peace  to  the  very  depths  of  my 
soul.  Armed  conflict  between  nations  is  a nightmare  to  me; 
but,  if  I were  convinced  that  any  nation  had  made  up  its 
mind  to  dominate  the  world  by  fear  of  force,  I should  feel 
that  it  must  be  resisted.  Under  such  a domination,  life  for 
people  who  believe  in  liberty  would  not  be  worth  living;  hut 
war  is  a fearful  thing,  and  we  must  be  very  clear,  before 
we  embark  on  it,  that  it  is  really  the  great  issues  that  are 
at  stake. 

Wheeler-Bennett  has  recorded  that  after  listening  to 
this  broadcast  most  people  in  Britain  went  to  bed  that 
night  believing  that  Britain  and  Germany  would  be  at 
war  within  twenty-four  hours.65  But  the  good  people  did 
not  know  what  was  happening  at  Downing  Street  still 
later  that  evening. 

At  10:30  p.m.  came  Hitler’s  letter.  It  was  a straw  which 
the  Prime  Minister  eagerly  grasped.  To  the  Fuehrer  he 
replied. 

After  reading  your  letter,  I feel  certain  that  you  can  get 
all  essentials  without  war,  and  without  delay.  I am  ready  to 
come  to  Berlin  myself  at  once  to  discuss  arrangements  for 
transfer  with  you  and  representatives  of  the  Czech  Govern- 
ment, together  with  representatives  of  France  and  Italy,  if 
you  desire.  I feel  convinced  we  can  reach  agreement  in  a 
week.  I cannot  believe  that  you  will  take  responsibility  of 
starting  a world  war  which  may  end  civilization  for  the 
sake  of  a few  days  delay  in  settling  this  long-standing  prob- 
lem.66 

A telegram  also  went  out  to  Mussolini  asking  him  to 
urge  the  Fuehrer’s  acceptance  of  this  plan  and  to  agree 
to  being  represented  at  the  suggested  meeting. 


546  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  idea  of  a conference  had  been  in  the  back  of  the 
Prime  Minister’s  mind  for  some  time.  As  far  back  as  July, 
Sir  Nevile  Henderson  had  suggested  it  on  his  own  in  a 
dispatch  to  London.  He  had  proposed  that  four  powers, 
Germany,  Italy,  Britain  and  France,  settle  the  Sudeten 
problem.  But  both  the  ambassador  and  the  Prime  Minister 
had  been  reminded  by  the  British  Foreign  Office  that  it 
would  be  difficult  to  exclude  other  powers  from  partici- 
pating in  such  a conference.67  The  “other  powers”  were 
Russia,  which  had  a pact  of  mutual  assistance  with  Prague, 
and  Czechoslovakia.  Chamberlain  had  returned  from  Go- 
desberg  convinced — quite  correctly — that  Hitler  would 
never  consent  to  any  meeting  which  included  the  Soviet 
Union.  Nor  did  the  Prime  Minister  himself  desire  the 
presence  of  the  Russians.  Though  it  was  obvious  to  the 
smallest  mind  in  Britain  that  in  case  of  war  with  Ger- 
many, Soviet  participation  on  the  side  of  the  West  would 
be  of  immense  value,  as  Churchill  repeatedly  tried  to 
point  out  to  the  head  of  the  British  government,  this  was 
a view  which  seems  to  have  escaped  the  Prime  Minister. 
He  had,  as  we  have  seen,  turned  down  the  Russian  pro- 
posal for  a conference  after  the  Anschluss  to  discuss 
means  of  opposing  further  German  aggression.  Despite 
Moscow’s  guarantee  to  Czechoslovakia  and  the  fact  that 
right  up  to  this  moment  Litvinov  was  proclaiming  that 
Russia  would  honor  it,  Chamberlain  had  no  intention  of 
allowing  the  Soviets  to  interfere  with  his  resolve  to  keep 
the  peace  by  giving  Hitler  the  Sudetenland. 

But  until  Wednesday,  September  28,  he  had  not  yet  gone 
so  far  in  his  thinking  as  to  exclude  the  Czechs  from  a 
conference.  Indeed,  on  the  twenty-fifth,  after  Prague  had 
rejected  Hitler’s  Godesberg  demands,  the  Prime  Minister 
hEid  called  in  Jan  Masaryk,  the  Czech  ambassador  in 
London,  and  proposed  that  Czechoslovakia  should  agree  to 
negotiations  at  “an  international  conference  in  which 
Germany,  Czechoslovakia  and  other  powers  could  partici- 
pate.” On  the  following  day  the  Czech  government  had 
accepted  the  idea.  And,  as  we  have  just  seen,  in  his  mes- 
sage to  Hitler  late  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-seventh 
Chamberlain  had  specified  that  “representatives  of  Czecho- 
slovakia should  be  included  in  his  proposed  conference 
of  Germany,  Italy,  France  and  Great  Britain. 


The  Road  to  War 


547 


“BLACK  WEDNESDAY”  AND  THE  HALDER  PLOT 
AGAINST  HITLER 

Deep  gloom  hung  over  Berlin,  Prague,  London  and  Paris 
as  “Black  Wednesday,”  September  28,  dawned.  War  seemed 
inevitable. 

“A  Great  War  can  hardly  be  avoided  any  longer,”  Jodi 
quoted  Goering  as  saying  that  morning.  “It  may  last 
seven  years,  and  we  will  win  it.”  68 

In  London  the  digging  of  trenches,  the  evacuation  of 
school  children,  the  emptying  of  hospitals,  continued.  In 
Paris  there  was  a scramble  for  the  choked  trains  leaving 
the  city,  and  the  motor  traffic  out  of  the  capital  was 
jammed.  There  were  similar  scenes  in  western  Germany. 
Jodi  jotted  in  his  diary  that  morning  reports  of  German 
refugees  fleeing  from  the  border  regions.  At  2 p.m.  Hitler’s 
time  limit  for  Czechoslovakia’s  acceptance  of  the  Godes- 
berg  proposals  would  run  out.  There  was  no  sign  from 
Prague  that  they  would  be  accepted.  There  were,  however, 
certain  other  signs:  great  activity  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse; 
a frantic  coming  and  going  of  the  French,  British  and 
Italian  ambassadors.  But  of  these  the  general  public 
and  indeed  the  German  generals  remained  ignorant. 

To  some  of  the  generals  and  to  General  Haider,  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  above  all,  the  time  had  come  to  carry 
out  their  plot  to  remove  Hitler  and  save  the  Fatherland 
from  plunging  into  a European  war  which  they  felt  it  was 
doomed  to  lose.  All  through  September  the  conspirators, 
according  to  the  later  accounts  of  the  survivors,*  had  been 
busy  working  out  their  plans. 

General  Haider  was  in  close  touch  with  Colonel  Oster 
and  his  chief  at  the  Abwehr,  Admiral  Canaris,  who  tried 
to  keep  him  abreast  of  Hitler’s  political  moves  and  of 
foreign  intelligence.  The  plotters,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
warned  London  of  Hitler’s  resolve  to  attack  Czechoslovakia 

•These  include  firsthand  accounts  by  Haider,  Gisevius  and  Schacht.® 
Each  of  them  contains  much  that  is  confusing  and  contradictory,  and 
on  some  points  they  contradict  each  other.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
all  three  of  these  men,  who  had  begun  by  serving  the  Nazi'  regime,  were 
anxious  after  the  war  to  prove  their  opposition  to  Hitler  and  their  love 
of  peace. 

Erich  Kordt,  chief  of  Ribbentrop’s  secretariat  in  the  Foreign  Office, 
also  was  an  important  participant  in  the  plot  who  survived  the  war.  At 
Nuremberg  he  drew  up  a long  memorandum  about  events  in  September 
1938,  which  was  made  available  to  this  writer. 


548 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


by  the  end  of  September  and  had  begged  the  British 
government  to  make  clear  that  Britain,  along  with  France, 
would  answer  German  aggression  by  armed  force.  For 
some  months  General  von  Witzleben,  who  commanded 
the  Berlin  Military  District,  and  who  would  have  to  furnish 
most  of  the  troops  to  carry  out  the  coup,  had  been 
hesitant  because  he  suspected  that  London  and  Paris  had 
secretly  given  Hitler  a free  hand  in  the  East  and  would 
therefore  not  go  to  war  over  Czechoslovakia — a view 
shared  by  several  other  generals  and  one  which  Hitler 
and  Ribbentrop  had  encouraged.  If  this  were  true,  the 
plot  to  depose  Hitler,  in  the  opinion  of  generals  such  as 
Witzleben  and  Haider,  was  senseless.  For,  at  this  stage 
of  the  Third  Reich,  they  were  concerned  only  with  getting 
rid  of  the  Fuehrer  in  order  to  avert  a European  war  which 
Germany  had  no  chance  of  winning.  If  there  were  really 
no  risk  of  a big  war,  if  Chamberlain  were  going  to  give 
Hitler  what  he  wanted  in  Czechoslovakia  without  a war, 
then  they  saw  no  point  in  trying  to  carry  out  a revolt. 

To  assure  the  generals  that  Britain  and  France  meant 
business.  Colonel  Oster  and  Gisevius  arranged  for  Gen- 
eral Haider  and  General  von  Witzleben  to  meet  Schacht, 
who,  besides  having  prestige  with  the  military  hierarchy 
as  the  man  who  financed  German  rearmament  and  who 
still  was  in  the  cabinet,  was  considered  an  expert  on 
British  affairs.  Schacht  assured  them  that  the  British  would 
fight  if  Hitler  resorted  to  arms  against  the  Czechs. 

The  news  that  had  reached  Erich  Kordt,  one  of  the 
conspirators,  in  the  German  Foreign  Office  late  on  the 
night  of  September  13,  that  Chamberlain  urgently  pro- 
posed “to  come  over  at  once  by  air”  to  seek  a peaceful 
solution  of  the  Czech  crisis,  had  caused  consternation 
in  the  camp  of  the  plotters.  They  had  counted  on  Hitler’s 
returning  to  Berlin  from  the  Nuremberg  Party  Rally  on  the 
fourteenth  and,  according  to  Kordt,  had  planned  to  carry 
out  the  putsch  on  that  day  or  the  next.  But  the  Fuehrer 
didnot  return  to  the  capital.*  Instead,  he  went  to  Munich 


,Jhere  n.  considerable  confusion  among  the  historians  and  even  among 
rif  c°"sP,r®t0!'s  about  Hitlers  whereabouts  on  September  13  and  14. 
LSwh?  his  account  on  a memorandum  of  General  Haider, 
, Hitler  arrived  in  Berlin  from  Berchtesgaden  "on  the  mom- 
“deride^' cplcnhcr  14  and  that  Haider  and  Witzleben,  on  learning  of  it, 

off  LcrordfnvStrke.l,?  8 hat.  sal2e  evening.”  They  called  the  operation 
off,  according  to  this  account,  when  they  learned  at  4 p.m  that  Cham- 
berlam  was  flying  to  Berchtesgaden.  (Churchill,  The  Gathering  Storm, 


The  Road  to  War 


549 


and  on  the  fourteenth  continued  on  to  Berchtesgaden, 
where  he  awaited  the  visit  of  the  British  Prime  Minister 
the  next  day. 

There  were  double  grounds  for  the  feeling  of  utter 
frustration  among  the  plotters.  Their  plans  could  be 
carried  out  only  if  Hitler  were  in  Berlin,  and  they  had 
been  confident  that,  since  the  Nuremberg  rally  had  only 
sharpened  the  Czech  crisis,  he  would  certainly  return  im- 
mediately to  the  capital.  In  the  second  place,  although 
some  of  the  members  of  the  conspiracy  complacently  as- 
sumed, as  did  the  people  of  Britain,  that  Chamberlain 
was  flying  to  Berchtesgaden  to  warn  Hitler  not  to  make  the 
mistake  that  Wilhelm  II  had  made  in  1914  as  to  what 
Great  Britain  would  do  in  the  case  of  German  aggression, 
Kordt  knew  better.  He  had  seen  the  text  of  Chamberlain’s 
urgent  message  explaining  to  Hitler  that  he  wanted  to  see 
him  “with  a view  to  trying  to  find  a peaceful  solution.” 
Furthermore,  he  had  seen  the  telegram  from  his  brother, 
Theodor  Kordt,  counselor  of  the  German  Embassy  in  Lon- 
don, that  day,  confiding  that  the  Prime  Minister  was  pre- 
pared to  go  a long  way  to  meet  Hitler’s  demands  in  the 
Sudetenland.* * 

“The  effect  on  our  plans,”  says  Kordt,  “was  bound  to 
be  disastrous.  It  would  have  been  absurd  to  stage  a putsch 
to  overthrow  Hitler  at  a moment  when  the  British  Prime 
Minister  was  coming  to  Germany  to  discuss  with  Hitler 
‘the  peace  of  the  world.’  ” 

However,  on  the  evening  of  September  15,  according  to 
Erich  Kordt,  Dr.  Paul  Schmidt,  who  was  in  on  the  con- 
spiracy, and  who,  as  we  have  seen,  acted  as  sole  inter- 
preter— and  sole  witness — at  the  Hitler-Chamberlain 
talk,  informed  him  “by  prearranged  code”  that  the  Fueh- 
rer was  still  determined  to  conquer  the  whole  of  Czecho- 
slovakia and  that  he  had  put  forward  to  Chamberlain 
impossible  demands  “in  the  hope  that  they  would  be  re- 
fused.” This  intelligence  revived  the  spirits  of  the  con- 
spirators. Kordt  informed  Colonel  Oster  of  it  the  same 
evening  and  it  was  decided  to  go  ahead  with  the  plans 

p.  312.)  But  Haider's  memory — and  hence  Churchill’s  account — is  cer- 
tainly in  error.  Hitler’s  daily  schedule  book,  now  in  the  Library  of 
Congress,  has  several  entries  showing  that  he  spent  the  thirteenth  and 
fourteenth  in  Munich,  where,  among  other  things,  he  conferred  with 
Ribbentrop  at  Bormann’s  home  and  visited  the  Sonnenwinkel,  a cabaret, 
departing  for  the  Obersalzberg  at  the  end  of  the  day  of  the  fourteenth. 

* See  above,  p.  521. 


550  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

as  soon  as  Hitler  returned  to  Berlin.  “But  first  of  all,” 
Oster  said,  “we  must  get  the  bird  back  into  his  cage  in 
Berlin.” 

The  bird  flew  back  to  his  “cage”  from  the  Godesberg 
talks  on  the  afternoon  of  September  24.  On  the  morning 
of  “Black  Wednesday,”  the  twenty-eighth,  Hitler  had  been 
in  Berlin  for  nearly  four  days.  On  the  twenty-sixth  he 
apparently  had  burned  his  bridges  in  his  outburst  at 
the  Sportpalast.  On  the  twenty-seventh  he  had  sent  Sir 
Horace  Wilson  back  to  London  empty-handed,  and  the 
British  government’s  reaction  had  been  to  mobilize  the 
fleet  and  warn  Prague  to  expect  an  immediate  German 
attack.  During  the  day  he  had  also,  as  we  have  seen,  or- 
dered the  “assault  units”  to  take  their  combat  posi- 
tions on  the  Czech  frontier  and  be  ready  for  “action”  on 
September  30 — three  days  hence. 

What  were  the  conspirators  waiting  for?  All  the  condi- 
tions they  themselves  had  set  had  now  been  fulfilled. 
Hitler  was  in  Berlin.  He  was  determined  to  go  to  war. 
He  had  set  the  date  for  the  attack  on  Czechoslovakia  as 
September  30 — two  days  away  now.  Either  the  putsch  must 
be  made  at  once,  or  it  would  be  too  late  to  overthrow  the 
dictator  and  stop  the  war. 

Kordt  declares  that  during  the  day  of  September  27 
the  plotters  set  a definite  date  for  action:  September  29. 
Gisevius,  in  his  testimony  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg 
and  also  in  his  book,  claims  that  the  generals — Haider  and 
Witzleben — decided  to  act  immediately  on  September  28 
after  they  got  a copy  of  Hitler’s  “defiant  letter”  with  its 
“insulting  demand”  to  Chamberlain  of  the  night  before. 

Oster  received  a copy  of  this  defiant  letter  [Gisevius  says] 
late  that  night  [September  27],  and  on  the  morning  of  Sep- 
tember 28  I took  the  copy  to  Witzleben.  Witzleben  went  to 
Haider  with  it.  Now,  at  last,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
had  his  desired,  unequivocal  proof  that  Hitler  was  not 
bluffing,  that  he  wanted  war. 

Tears  of  indignation  ran  down  Haider’s  cheeks  . . . Witz- 
leben insisted  that  now  it  was  time  to  take  action.  He  per- 
suaded Haider  to  go  to  see  Brauchitsch.  After  a while  Haider 
returned  to  say  that  he  had  good  news:  Brauchitsch  was 
also  outraged  and  would  probably  take  part  in  the  Putsch.7® 

But  either  the  text  of  the  letter  had  been  altered  in  the 
copying  or  the  generals  misunderstood  it,  for,  as  we 


The  Road  to  War 


551 


have  seen,  it  was  so  moderate  in  tone,  so  full  of  promises 
to  “negotiate  details  with  the  Czechs”  and  to  “give  a for- 
mal guarantee  for  the  remainder  of  Czechoslovakia,”  so 
conciliatory  in  suggesting  to  Chamberlain  that  he  might 
continue  his  efforts,  that  the  Prime  Minister,  after  read- 
ing it,  had  immediately  telegraphed  Hitler  suggesting  a 
Big-Power  conference  to  settle  the  details  and  at  the 
same  time  wired  Mussolini  asking  his  support  for  such 
a proposal. 

Of  this  eleventh-hour  effort  at  appeasement  the  generals 
apparently  had  no  knowledge,  but  General  von  Brauchitsch, 
the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army,  may  have  had  some 
inkling.  According  to  Gisevius,  Witzleben  telephoned 
Brauchitsch  from  Haider’s  office,  told  him  that  all  was 
ready  and  pleaded  with  him  to  lead  the  revolt  himself. 
But  the  Army  commander  was  noncommittal.  He  in- 
formed Haider  and  Witzleben  that  he  would  first  have 
to  go  over  to  the  Fuehrer’s  Chancellery  to  see  for  him- 
self whether  the  generals  had  assessed  the  situation  cor- 
rectly. Gisevius  says  that  Witzleben  rushed  back  to  his 
military  headquarters. 

“Gisevius,”  he  declared  excitedly,  “the  time  has  come!” 

At  eleven  o’clock  that  morning  of  September  28  the 
phone  rang  at  Kordt’s  desk  in  the  Foreign  Office.  Ciano 
was  on  the  line  from  Rome  and  wanted  urgently  to  speak 
to  the  German  Foreign  Minister.  Ribbentrop  was  not  avail- 
able— he  was  at  the  Reich  Chancellery — so  the  Italian 
Foreign  Minister  asked  to  be  put  through  to  his  ambassa- 
dor, Bernardo  Attolico.  The  Germans  listened  in  and  re- 
corded the  call.  It  developed  that  Mussolini,  and  not  his 
son-in-law,  wanted  to  do  the  talking. 

Mussolini:  This  is  the  Duce  speaking.  Can  you  hear  me? 

Attolico:  Yes,  I hear  you. 

Mussolini:  Ask  immediately  for  an  interview  with  the 
Chancellor.  Tell  him  the  British  government  asked  me 
through  Lord  Perth  * to  mediate  in  the  Sudeten  question. 
The  point  of  difference  is  very  small.  Tell  the  Chancellor  that 
I and  Fascist  Italy  stand  behind  him.  He  must  decide.  But 
tell  him  I favor  accepting  the  suggestion.  You  hear  me? 

Attolico:  Yes,  I hear  you. 

Mussolini:  Hurry! 71 

Out  of  breath,  his  face  flushed  with  excitement  (as 

* The  British  ambassador  in  Rome. 


552 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Dr.  Schmidt,  the  interpreter,  noted).  Ambassador  Attolico 
arrived  at  the  Chancellery  to  find  that  the  French  ambas- 
sador was  already  closeted  with  Hitler.  M.  Fran9ois- 
Poncet  had  had  a hard  time  getting  there.  Very  late  the 
night  before,  Bonnet,  the  French  Foreign  Minister,  who 
was  now  intent  on  going  Chamberlain  one  better,  had 
telephoned  his  ambassador  in  Berlin  and  instructed  him 
to  see  Hitler  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  and  present 
a French  proposal  for  surrendering  the  Sudetenland  which 
went  much  further  than  the  British  plan.  Whereas  the 
Prime  Minister’s  proposal,  delivered  to  Hitler  at  11  p.m. 
on  September  27,  offered  Hitler  the  occupation  of  Zone  I 
of  the  Sudentenland  by  October  1— a mere  token  occupa- 
tion of  a tiny  enclave — the  French  now  proposed  to  hand 
oyer  three  large  zones,  which  comprised  most  of  the 
disputed  territory,  by  October  1 . 

It  was  a tempting  offer,  but  the  French  ambassador  had 
great  difficulty  in  making  it.  He  phoned  at  8 a.m.  on  Septem- 
ber 28  for  an  appointment  with  the  Chancellor  and  when 
no  response  had  been  received  by  ten  o’clock  rushed  his 
military  attache  off  to  the  Army  General  Staff  to  inform 
the  German  generals  of  the  offer  which  he  was  as  yet 
unable  to  deliver.  He  enlisted  the  aid  of  the  British 
ambassador.  Sir  Nevile  Henderson,  who  was  only  too 
ready  to  oblige  anyone  who  might  help  prevent  a war 
—at  any  cost— telephoned  Goering,  and  the  Field  Mar- 
shal said  he  would  try  to  make  the  appointment.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Henderson  was  trying  to  make  one  for 
himself,  for  he  had  been  instructed  to  present  to  Hitler 
a final  personal  message  from  the  Prime  Minister,”  the 
one  which  Chamberlain  had  drafted  late  the  night 
before,*  assuring  Hitler  that  he  could  get  everything  he 
wanted  “without  war,  and  without  delay,”  and  proposing 
a conference  of  the  powers  to  work  out  the  details.72 

Hitler  received  Fran?ois-Poncet  at  11:15  a.m.  The  am- 
bassador found  him  nervous  and  tense.  Brandishing  a 
map  which  he  had  hastily  drawn  up  and  which  showed  the 
large  chunks  of  Czech  territory  which  Czechoslovakia’s 
principal  ally  was  now  prepared  to  hand  over  to  Hitler 
on  a platter,  the  French  ambassador  urged  the  Fuehrer 
to  accept  the  French  proposals  and  spare  Europe  from 

* See  above,  p.  54 S. 


The  Road  to  War 


553 


war.  Despite  Ribbentrop’s  negative  comments,  which 
Frangois-Poncet  says  he  dealt  “roundly”  with,  Hitler  was 
impressed — especially,  as  Dr.  Schmidt  noted,  by  the  am- 
bassador’s map,  with  its  generous  markings. 

At  11:40  the  interview  was  suddenly  interrupted  by  a 
messenger  who  announced  that  Attolico  had  just  arrived 
with  an  urgent  message  for  the  Fuehrer  from  Mussolini. 
Hitler  left  the  room,  with  Schmidt,  to  greet  the  panting 
Italian  ambassador.  k 

“I  have  an  urgent  message  to  you  from  the  Duce!”  At- 
tolico, who  had  a naturally  hoarse  voice,  shouted  from 
some  distance  off.73  After  delivering  it,  he  added  that 
Mussolini  begged  the  Fuehrer  to  refrain  from  mobili- 
zation. 

It  was  at  this  moment,  says  Schmidt,  the  only  surviving 
eyewitness  of  the  scene,  that  the  decision  for  peace  was 
made.  It  was  now  just  noon,  two  hours  before  the  time 
limit  on  Hitler’s  ultimatum  to  the  Czechs  ran  out. 

“Tell  the  Duce,”  Hitler  said,  with  obvious  relief,  to 
Attolico,  “that  I accept  his  proposal.”  74 

The  rest  of  the  day  was  anticlimactic.  Ambassador 
Henderson  followed  Attolico  and  Frangois-Poncet  to  the 
Fuehrer’s  presence. 

“At  the  request  of  my  great  friend  and  ally,  Mussolini,” 
Hitler  told  Henderson,  “I  have  postponed  mobilizing  my 
troops  for  twenty-four  hours.”  * He  would  give  his  de- 
cision on  other  matters,  such  as  the  proposed  conference 
of  the  powers,  after  he  had  again  consulted  Mussolini.75 

There  followed  much  telephoning  between  Berlin  and 
Rome — Schmidt  says  the  two  fascist  dictators  talked  di- 
rectly once.  A few  minutes  before  2 p.m.  on  September  28, 
just  as  his  ultimatum  was  to  expire,  Hitler  made  up  his 
mind  and  invitations  were  hastily  issued  to  the  heads 
of  government  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy  to 
meet  the  Fuehrer  at  Munich  at  noon  on  the  following  day 
to  settle  the  Czech  question.  No  invitation  was  sent  to 
Prague  or  Moscow.  Russia,  the  coguarantor  of  Czecho- 
slovakia’s integrity  in  case  of  a German  attack,  was  not 
to  be  allowed  to  interfere.  The  Czechs  were  not  even  asked 
to  be  present  at  their  own  death  sentence. 

In  his  memoirs  Sir  Nevile  Henderson  gave  most  of  the 


* As  we  have  seen,  Hitler  already  had  mobilized  all  the  troops  available. 


554 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


credit  for  saving  the  peace  at  this  moment  to  Mussolini, 
and  in  this  he  has  been  backed  by  most  of  the  his- 
torians who  have  written  of  this  chapter  in  European 
history.*  But  surely  this  is  being  overgenerous.  Italy  was 
the  weakest  of  the  Big  Powers  in  Europe  and  her  military 
strength  was  so  negligible  that  the  German  generals,  as 
their  papers  make  clear,  treated  it  as  a joke.  Great  Britain 
and  France  were  the  only  powers  that  counted  in  German 
calculations.  And  it  was  the  British  Prime  Minister  who, 
from  the  start,  had  sought  to  convince  Hitler  that  he  could 
get  the  Sudetenland  without  a war.  Chamberlain,  not 
Mussolini,  made  Munich  possible,  and  thus  preserved  the 
peace  for  exactly  eleven  months.  The  cost  of  such  a feat 
to  his  own  country  and  to  its  allies  and  friends  will  be 
considered  later,  but  it  was,  by  any  accounting,  as  it 
turned  out,  almost  beyond  bearing. 

At  five  minutes  to  three  on  “Black  Wednesday,”  which 
now  appeared  less  dark  than  it  had  in  the  bleak  morning 
hours,  the  British  Prime  Minister  had  begun  to  address 
the  House  of  Commons  in  London,  giving  a detailed  ac- 
count of  the  Czech  crisis  and  of  the  part  which  he  and 
his  government  had  played  in  trying  to  solve  it.  The 
situation  he  depicted  was  still  uncertain,  but  it  had  im- 
proved. Mussolini,  he  said,  had  succeeded  in  getting  Hit- 
ler to  postpone  mobilization  for  twenty-four  hours.  It  was 
now  4:15,  and  Chamberlain  had  been  speaking  for  an 
hour  and  twenty  minutes  and  was  nearing  the  end  of  his 
speech.  At  this  point  he  was  interrupted.  Sir  John  Simon, 
the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  passed  him  a paper 
which  had  been  handed  down  to  the  Treasury  front  bench 
by  Lord  Halifax,  who  had  been  sitting  in  the  peers’  gallery. 

Whatever  view  honorable  members  may  have  had  about 
Signor  Mussolini  [Chamberlain  was  saying]  I believe  that 
everyone  will  welcome  his  gesture  ...  for  peace. 

The  Prime  Minister  paused,  glanced  at  the  paper,  and 
smiled. 

That  is  not  all.  I have  something  further  to  say  to  the 
House  yet.  I have  now  been  informed  by  Herr  Hitler  that  he 
invites  me  to  meet  him  at  Munich  tomorrow  morning.  He 
has  also  invited  Signor  Mussolini  and  Monsieur  Daladier.  Sig- 

* Alan  Bulloek  (Hitler— A Study  in  Tyranny,  p.  428)  says:  “Almost 

certainly  it  was  Mussolini’s  intervention  which  turned  the  scale.” 


The  Road  to  War 


555 


nor  Mussolini  has  accepted  and  I have  no  doubt  Monsieur 
Daladier  will  accept.  I need  not  say  what  my  answer  will 
be  . . . 

There  was  no  need.  The  ancient  chamber,  the  Mother 
of  Parliaments,  reacted  with  a mass  hysteria  without 
precedent  in  its  long  history.  There  was  wild  shouting  and  a 
wild  throwing  of  order  papers  into  the  air  and  many  were 
in  tears  and  one  voice  was  heard  above  the  tumult  which 
seemed  to  express  the  deep  sentiments  of  all:  “Thank  God 
for  the  Prime  Minister!” 

Jan  Masaryk,  the  Czech  minister,  the  son  of  the  found- 
ing father  of  the  Czechoslovak  Republic,  looked  on  from 
the  diplomatic  gallery,  unable  to  believe  his  eyes.  Later 
he  called  on  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary in  Downing  Street  to  find  out  whether  his  country, 
which  would  have  to  make  all  the  sacrifices,  would  be 
invited  to  Munich.  Chamberlain  and  Halifax  answered 
that  it  would  not,  that  Hitler  would  not  stand  for  it. 
Masaryk  gazed  at  the  two  God-fearing  Englishmen  and 
struggled  to  keep  control  of  himself. 

“If  you  have  sacrificed  my  nation  to  preserve  the 
peace  of  the  world,”  he  finally  said,  “I  will  be  the  first  to 
applaud  you.  But  if  not,  gentlemen,  God  help  your 
souls!”  76 

And  what  of  the  conspirators,  the  generals  and  the 
civilians,  General  Haider  and  General  von  Witzleben, 
Schacht  and  Gisevius  and  Kordt,  and  the  rest,  who 
shortly  before  noon  on  that  fateful  day  had  believed,  as 
Witzleben  said,  that  their  time  had  come?  The  answer  can 
be  given  briefly  in  their  own  words — spoken  much  later 
when  all  was  over  and  they  were  anxious  to  prove  to 
the  world  how  opposed  they  had  been  to  Hitler  and  his 
catastrophic  follies  which  had  brought  Germany  to  utter 
ruin  after  a long  and  murderous  war. 

Neville  Chamberlain,  they  all  claimed,  was  the  vil- 
lain! By  agreeing  to  come  to  Munich  he  had  forced  them 
at  the  very  last  minute  to  call  off  their  plans  to  overthrow 
Hitler  and  the  Nazi  regime! 

On  February  25,  1946,  as  the  long  Nuremberg  trial 
neared  its  end,  General  Haider  was  interrogated  privately 
by  Captain  Sam  Harris,  a young  New  York  attorney  on 
the  staff  of  the  American  prosecution. 


556  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

It  had  been  planned  [Haider  said]  to  occupy  by  military 
force  the  Reich  Chancellery  and  those  government  offices, 
particularly  ministries,  which  were  administered  by  party 
members  and  close  supporters  of  Hitler,  with  the  express  in- 
tention of  avoiding  bloodshed  and  then  trying  the  group  be- 
fore the  whole  German  nation  ...  On  the  day  [September 
28]  Witzleben  came  to  see  me  in  my  office  during  the  noon 
hour.  We  discussed  the  matter.  He  requested  that  I give  him 
the  order  of  execution.  We  discussed  other  details — how 
much  time  he  needed,  etc.  During  this  discussion,  the  news 
came  that  the  British  Prime  Minister  and  the  French  Premier 
had  agreed  to  come  to  Hitler  for  further  talks.  This  hap- 
pened in  the  presence  of  Witzleben.  I therefore  took  back  the 
order  of  execution  because,  owing  to  this  fact,  the  entire 
basis  for  the  action  had  been  taken  away 

We  were  firmly  convinced  that  we  would  be  successful. 
But  now  came  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  with  one  stroke  the 
danger  of  war  was  averted  . . . The  critical  hour  for  force 
was  avoided  . . . One  could  only  wait  in  case  a new  chance 
should  come  . . . 

“Do  I understand  you  to  say  that  if  Chamberlain  had 
not  come  to  Munich,  your  plan  would  have  been  executed, 
and  Hitler  would  have  been  deposed?”  asked  Captain 
Harris. 

“I  can  only  say  the  plan  would  have  been  executed,” 
General  Haider  replied.  “I  do  not  know  if  it  would  have 
been  successful.”  77 

Dr.  Sehacht,  who  at  Nuremberg  and  in  his  postwar 
books  clearly  exaggerated  the  importance  of  his  role  in 
the  various  conspiracies  against  Hitler,  also  blamed 
Chamberlain  for  the  failure  of  the  Germans  to  carry  out 
the  plot  on  September  28: 

It  is  quite  clear  from  the  later  course  of  history  that 
this  first  attempt  at  a coup  d’etat  by  Witzleben  and  myself 
was  the  only  one  which  could  have  brought  a real  turning 
point  in  Germany’s  fate.  It  was  the  only  attempt  which  was 
planned  and  prepared  in  good  time  ...  In  the  autumn  of 
1938  it  was  still  possible  to  count  on  bringing  Hitler  to  trial 
before  the  Supreme  Court,  but  all  subsequent  efforts  to  get 
rid  of  him  necessarily  involved  attempts  on  his  life  ...  I 
had  made  preparations  for  a coup  d’etat  in  good  time  and  I 
had  brought  them  to  within  an  ace  of  success.  History  had 
decided  against  me.  The  intervention  of  foreign  statesmen 
was  something  I could  not  possibly  have  taken  into  ac- 
count.78 


The  Road  to  War 


557 

And  Gisevius,  who  was  Schacht’s  stoutest  champion  on 
the  witness  stand  at  Nuremberg,  added: 

The  impossible  had  happened.  Chamberlain  and  Daladier 
were  flying  to  Munich.  Our  revolt  was  done  for.  For  a few 
hours  I went  on  imagining  that  we  could  revolt  anyway. 
But  Witzleben  soon  demonstrated  to  me  that  the  troops 
would  never  revolt  against  the  victorious  Fuehrer  . . . Cham- 
berlain saved  Hitler.79 

Did  he?  Or  was  this  merely  an  excuse  of  the  German 
civilians  and  generals  for  their  failure  to  act? 

In  his  interrogation  at  Nuremberg  Haider  explained  to 
Captain  Harris  that  there  were  three  conditions  for  a 
successful  “revolutionary  action”: 

The  first  condition  is  a clear  and  resolute  leadership.  The 
second  condition  is  the  readiness  of  the  masses  of  the  peo- 
ple to  follow  the  idea  of  the  revolution.  The  third  condition  is 
the  right  choice  of  time.  According  to  our  views,  the  first 
condition  of  a clear  resolute  leadership  was  there.  The  second 
condition  we  thought  fulfilled  too,  because  ...  the  German 
people  did  not  want  war.  Therefore  the  nation  was  ready  to 
consent  to  a revolutionary  act  for  fear  of  war.  The  third 
condition — the  right  choice  of  time — was  good  because  we 
had  to  expect  within  forty-eight  hours  the  order  for  carrying 
out  a military  action.  Therefore  we  were  firmly  convinced 
that  we  would  be  successful. 

But  now  came  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  with  one  stroke  the 
danger  of  war  was  avoided. 

One  can  doubt  that  General  Haider’s  first  condition  was 
ever  fulfilled,  as  he  claimed.  For  had  there  been  “clear 
and  resolute  leadership”  why  should  the  generals  have 
hesitated  for  four  days?  They  had  on  tap  the  military 
force  to  easily  sweep  Hitler  and  his  regime  aside:  Witzleben 
had  a whole  army  corps — the  Illrd — in  and  around  Ber- 
lin, Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt  had  a crack  infantry  division 
in  nearby  Potsdam,  Hoefner  had  a panzer  division  to  the 
south,  and  the  two  ranking  police  officers  in  the  capital. 
Count  von  Helldorf  and  Count  von  der  Schulenburg,  had 
a large  force  of  well-armed  police  to  help  out.  All  of 
these  officers,  according  to  the  plotters  themselves,  were 
but  waiting  for  the  word  from  Haider  to  spring  into  action 
with  overwhelming  armed  force.  And  the  population  of 
Berlin,  scared  to  death  that  Hitler  was  about  to  bring  on 
a war,  would  have — so  far  as  this  writer  could,  at 


558 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

fir?*7Jal’d’  iud8e  them — spontaneously  backed  the  coup. 

Whether  Haider  and  Witzleben  would  have  finally  acted 
had  Chamberlain  not  agreed  to  come  to  Munich  is  a ques- 
tion that  can  never  be  answered  with  any  degree  of  finality 
Given  the  peculiar  attitude  of  these  generals  at  this 
time  which  made  them  concerned  with  overthrowing  Hit- 
ler  not  in  order  to  bring  an  end  to  the  tyranny  and  terror 
f,f  his  regime  but  merely  to  avert  a lost  war,  it  is  possible 
that  they  might  have  acted  had  not  the  Munich  Confer- 
ence  been  arranged.  The  information  necessary  to  estab- 
lish how  well  the  plot  was  hatched,  how  ready  the  armed 
forces  were  to  march  and  how  near  Haider  and  Witzleben 
really  came  to  giving  the  order  to  act  has  so  far  been 
lacking.  We  have  only  the  statements  of  a handful  of 
participants  who  after  the  war  were  anxious  to  prove  their 
opposition  to  National  Socialism,  and  what  they  have  said 
and  written  in  self-defense  is  often  conflicting  and  con- 
tusing.* 

If,  as  the  conspirators  claim,  their  plans  were  on  the 
point  of  being  carried  out,  the  announcement  of  Chamber- 
lain  s trip  to  Munich  certainly  cut  the  ground  from  un- 
derneath  their  feet.  The  generals  could  scarcely  have 
arrested  Hitler  and  tried  him  as  a war  criminal  when  it 
was  obvious  that  he  was  about  to  achieve  an  important 
conquest  without  war.  1 

What  is  certain  among  all  these  uncertainties — and  here 
Dr  Schacht  must  be  conceded  his  point — is  that  such  a 
golden  opportunity  never  again  presented  itself  to  the 

t^ma^0Pi’°DSit-i0un  todisP°se  of  Hitler,  bring  a swift  end 
to  the  Third  Reich  and  save  Germany  and  the  world  from 
war.  The  Germans,  if  one  may  risk  a generalization, 
have  a weakness  for  blaming  foreigners  for  their  failures. 
Ihe  responsibility  of  Chamberlain  and  Halifax,  of  Dala- 
dier  and  Bonnet,  for  Munich  and  thus  for  all  the  disastrous 
consequences  which  ensued  is  overwhelming.  But  they 
may  be  pardoned  to  some  extent  for  not  taking  very  seri- 
lously  the  warnings  of  a “revolt”  of  a group  of  German 

December  “ *«" 


The  Road  to  War 


559 


generals  and  civilians  most  of  whom  had  served  Hitler 
with  great  ability  up  to  this  moment.  They,  or  at  least 
some  of  their  advisers  in  London  and  Paris,  may  have  re- 
called the  bleak  facts  of  recent  German  history:  that  the 
Army  had  helped  put  the  former  Austrian  corporal  into 
power,  had  been  delighted  at  the  opportunities  he  gave 
it  to  rearm,  had  apparently  not  objected  to  the  destruction 
of  individual  freedom  under  National  Socialism  or  done 
anything  about  the  murder  of  its  own  General  von  Sch- 
leicher or  the  removal,  on  a dastardly  frame-up,  of  its 
commanding  officer,  General  von  Fritsch;  and — recently 
— had  gone  along  with  the  rape  of  Austria,  indeed  had 
supplied  the  military  force  to  carry  it  out.  Whatever 
blame  may  be  heaped  on  the  archappeasers  in  London 
and  Paris,  and  great  it  undoubtedly  is,  the  fact  remains 
that  the  German  generals  themselves,  and  their  civilian 
coconspirators,  failed  at  an  opportune  moment  to  act 
on  their  own. 

THE  SURRENDER  AT  MUNICH: 

SEPTEMBER  29-30,  1938 

In  this  baroque  Bavarian  city  where  in  the  murky  back 
rooms  of  rundown  little  cafes  he  had  made  his  lowly 
start  as  a politician  and  in  whose  streets  he  had  suffered 
the  fiasco  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch,  Adolf  Hitler  greeted, 
like  a conqueror,  the  heads  of  governments  of  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Italy  at  half  past  noon  on  Septem- 
ber 29. 

Very  early  that  morning  he  had  gone  to  Kufstein  on  the 
former  Austro-German  frontier  to  meet  Mussolini  and 
set  up  a basis  for  common  action  at  the  conference.  In 
the  train  coming  up  to  Munich  Hitler  was  in  a bellicose 
mood,  explaining  to  the  Duce  over  maps  how  he  intended 
to  “liquidate”  Czechoslovakia.  Either  the  talks  begin- 
ning that  day  must  be  immediately  successful,  he  said,  or 
he  would  resort  to  arms.  “Besides,”  Ciano,  who  was 
present,  quotes  the  Fuehrer  as  adding,  “the  time  will 
come  when  we  shall  have  to  fight  side  by  side  against 
France  and  England.”  Mussolini  agreed.80 

Chamberlain  made  no  similar  effort  to  see  Daladier 
beforehand  to  work  out  a joint  strategy  for  the  two  Western 
democracies  with  which  to  confront  the  two  fascist  die- 


560 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


tators.  Indeed,  it  became  evident  to  many  of  us  in  contact 
with  the  British  and  French  delegations  in  Munich  as 
the  day  progressed  that  Chamberlain  had  come  to  Munich 
absolutely  determined  that  no  one,  certainly  not  the 
Czechs  and  not  even  the  French,  should  stand  in  the  way 
of  his  reaching  a quick  agreement  with  Hitler.*  In  the 
case  of  Daladier,  who  went  around  all  day  as  if  in  a daze, 
no  precaution  was  necessary,  but  the  determined  Prime 
Minister  took  no  risks. 

The  talks,  which  began  at  12:45  p.m.  in  the  so-called 
Fuehrerhaus  in  the  Koenigsplatz,  were  anticlimactic  and 
constituted  little  more  than  a mere  formality  of  render- 
ing to  Hitler  exactly  what  he  wanted  when  he  wanted  it. 
Dr.  Schmidt,  the  indomitable  interpreter,  who  was  called 
upon  to  function  in  three  languages,  German,  French  and 
English,  noticed  from  the  beginning  “an  atmosphere  of 
general  good  will.”  Ambassador  Henderson  later  remem- 
bered that  “at  no  stage  of  the  conversations  did  they  be- 
come heated.”  No  one  presided.  The  proceedings  unfolded 
informally,  and  judging  by  the  German  minutes  of  the 
meeting  82  which  came  to  light  after  the  war,  the  British 
Prime  Minister  and  the  French  Premier  fairly  fell  over 
themselves  to  agree  with  Hitler.  Even  when  he  made  the 
following  opening  statement: 

He  had  now  declared  in  his  speech  at  the  Sportpalast  that 
he  would  in  any  case  march  in  on  October  1.  He  had  re- 
ceived the  answer  that  this  action  would  have  the  character 
of  an  act  of  violence.  Hence  the  task  arose  to  absolve  this 
action  from  such  a character.  Action  must,  however,  be  taken 
at  once. 

The  conferees  got  down  to  business  when  Mussolini, 
speaking  third  in  turn — Daladier  was  left  to  the  last — 
said  that  “in  order  to  bring  about  a practical  solution  of 
the  problem”  he  had  brought  with  him  a definite  written 
proposal.  Its  origins  are  interesting  and  remained  un- 
known to  Chamberlain,  I believe,  to  his  death.  From  the 
memoirs  of  Fran?ois-Poncet  and  Henderson  it  is  obvious 

* At  6:45  the  evening  before,  Chamberlain  had  sent  a message  to  Presi- 
dent Benes  informing  him  officially  of  the  meeting  at  Munich  “I  shall 
have  the  interests  of  Czechoslovakia,"  he  stated,  “fully  in  mind  ...  I 
go  there  [to  Munich]  with  the  intention  of  trying  to  find  accommodation 
between  the  positions  of  the  German  and  Czechoslovak  governments.” 
Benes  had  immediately  replied,  “I  beg  that  nothing  may  be  done  at 
Munich  without  Czechoslovakia  being  heard.”  81 


The  Road  to  War 


561 


that  they  too  were  ignorant  of  them.  In  fact,  the  story 
only  became  known  long  after  the  violent  deaths  of  the 
two  dictators. 

What  the  Duce  now  fobbed  off  as  his  own  compromise 
plan  had  been  hastily  drafted  the  day  before  in  the 
German  Foreign  Office  in  Berlin  by  Goering,  Neurath 
and  Weizsaecker  behind  the  back  of  Foreign  Minister 
von  Ribbentrop,  whose  judgment  the  three  men  did  not 
trust.  Goering  took  it  to  Hitler,  who  said  it  might  do, 
and  then  it  was  hurriedly  translated  into  French  by  Dr. 
Schmidt  and  passed  along  to  the  Italian  ambassador,  At- 
tolico,  who  telephoned  the  text  of  it  to  the  Italian  dictator 
in  Rome  just  before  he  entrained  for  Munich.  Thus  it  was 
that  the  “Italian  proposals,”  which  provided  the  informal 
conference  not  only  with  its  sole  agenda  but  with  the 
basic  terms  which  eventually  became  the  Munich  Agree- 
ment, were  in  fact  German  proposals  concocted  in  Berlin.* 

This  must  have  seemed  fairly  obvious  from  the  text, 
which  closely  followed  Hitler’s  rejected  Godesberg  de- 
mands; but  it  was  not  obvious  to  Daladier  and  Chamber- 
lain  or  to  their  ambassadors  in  Berlin,  who  now  attended 
them.  The  Premier,  according  to  the  German  minutes, 
“welcomed  the  Duce’s  proposal,  which  had  been  made 
in  an  objective  and  realistic  spirit,”  and  the  Prime  Min- 
ister “also  welcomed  the  Duce’s  proposal  and  declared 
that  he  himself  had  conceived  of  a solution  on  the  lines  of 
this  proposal.”  As  for  Ambassador  Henderson,  as  he  later 
wrote,  he  thought  Mussolini  “had  tactfully  put  forward 
as  his  own  a combination  of  Hitler’s  and  the  Anglo-French 
proposals”;  while  Ambassador  Fran?ois-Poncet  got  the 
impression  that  the  conferees  were  working  on  a British 
memorandum  “drawn  up  by  Horace  Wilson.”  83  So  easily 
were  the  British  and  French  statesmen  and  diplomats, 
bent  on  appeasement  at  any  cost,  deceivedl 

* Erich  Kordt  recounted  the  German  origins  of  Mussolini’s  proposals  in 
his  testimony  before  U.S.  Military  Tribunal  IV  at  Nuremberg  on  June 
4,  1948,  in  the  case  of  U.S. A.  v.  Ernst  Weizsaecker.  Documents  on 
German  Foreign  Policy,  II,  p.  1005,  gives  a summary  from  the  official 
trial  transcript.  Kordt  also  tells  the  story  in  his  book  Wahn  und 
Wirklichkeit,  pp.  129-31.  Dr.  Schmidt  ( Hitler’s  Interpreter,  p.  Ill) 
substantiates  Kordt’s  account  and  remarks  that  translating  the  Duce’s 
proposals  “was  easy”  because  he  had  already  translated  them  the  day 
before  in  Berlin.  Ciano,  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister,  in  a dairy  entry  of 
September  29-30  from  Munich,  tells  of  Mussolini  producing  his  docu- 
ment “which  in  fact  had  been  telephoned  to  us  by  our  Embassy  the 
previous  evening,  as  expressing  the  desires  of  the  German  Government.” 
(Ciano’ s Hidden  Diary,  1937-38,  p.  167.) 


562  The  R>se  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

With  the  “Italian”  proposals  so  warmly  welcomed  by 
all  present,  there  remained  but  a few  details  to  iron  out 
Chamberlain,  as  perhaps  might  have  been  expected  from 
an  ex-businessman  and  former  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer, wanted  to  know  who  would  compensate  the  Czech 
government  for  the  public  property  which  would  pass  to 
Germany  in  the  Sudetenland.  Hitler,  who,  according  to 
FranSois-Poncet,  appeared  somewhat  pale  and  worried 

^,Man?u°ye.dnbeCaUte  he  could  not  folIow>  ^ Mussolini 
could,  the  talk  in  French  and  English,  replied  heatedly 

there  would  be  no  compensation.  When  the  Prime  Min- 
ister objected  to  the  stipulation  that  the  Czechs  moving 
°[  Sudetenland  could  not  even  take  their  cattle 
(this  had  been  one  of  the  Godesberg  demands) — exclaim- 
!ug!  l CS  thls  mean  that  the  farmers  will  be  expelled  but 

.L*  . Catt,e  wil1  be  retained?” — Hitler  exploded 

...  1S  too  valuable  to  be  wasted  on  such  trivial- 

ities! he  shouted  at  Chamberlain The  Prime  Minister 
dropped  the  matter. 

He  did  insist  at  first  that  a Czech  representative  ought 
to  be  present,  or  at  least,  as  he  put  it,  be  “available.”  His 
hercSaid’  “could  naturally  undertake  no  guarantee 
n i wthe,nSrUdetwn]  territ°ry  would  be  evacuated  by 
October  10  [as  Mussolini  had  proposed]  if  no  assurance 
ot  this  was  forthcoming  from  the  Czech  government  ” 
Oaladier  gave  him  lukewarm  support.  The  French  govern- 
ment, he  said  “would  in  no  wise  tolerate  procrastination 
m this  matter  by  the  Czech  government,”  but  he  thought 
the  presence  of  a Czech  representative,  who  could  be 
consulted,  if  necessary,  would  be  an  advantage.” 

• ^'der  was  adamant.  He  would  permit  no  Czechs 
in  his  presence.  Daladier  meekly  gave  in,  but  Chamber- 
lam  finally  won  a small  concession.  It  was  agreed  that  a 
Czech  representative  might  make  himself  available  “in 
1 a n jXt-  room’”  as.  tbe  Prime  Minister  proposed. 

And  indeed  during  the  afternoon  session  two  Czech 
representatives,  Dr  Vojtech  Mastny,  the  Czech  minister 
in  Rcrhn,  and  Dr.  Hubert  Masarik,  from  the  Prague  For- 
eign Office,  did  arrive  and  were  coolly  ushered  into 
an  adjoining  room.  There,  after  they  had  been  left  from 
1 p.m.  to  7 to  cool  their  heels,  the  roof  figuratively  fell  in 
on  them.  At  the  latter  hour  Frank  Ashton-Gwatkm,  who 
ad  been  a member  of  the  Runciman  mission  and  was  now 


The  Road  to  War 


563 


on  Chamberlain’s  staff,  came  to  break  the  bad  news  to 
them.  A general  agreement  had  been  reached,  the  de- 
tails of  which  he  could  not  yet  give  to  them;  but  it  was 
much  “harsher”  than  the  Franco-British  proposals.  When 
Masarik  asked  if  the  Czechs  couldn’t  be  heard,  the  Eng- 
lishman answered,  as  the  Czech  representative  later  re- 
ported to  his  government,  “that  I seemed  to  ignore  how 
difficult  was  the  situation  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  that 
I could  not  understand  how  hard  it  had  been  to  negotiate 
with  Hitler.” 

At  10  p.m.  the  two  unhappy  Czechs  were  taken  to  Sir 
Horace  Wilson,  the  Prime  Minister’s  faithful  adviser.  On 
behalf  of  Chamberlain,  Wilson  informed  them  of  the  main 
points  in  the  four-power  agreement  and  handed  them  a 
map  of  the  Sudeten  areas  which  were  to  be  evacuated  by 
the  Czechs  at  once.  When  the  two  envoys  attempted  to 
protest,  the  British  official  cut  them  short.  He  had  noth- 
ing more  to  say,  he  stated,  and  promptly  left  the  room. 
The  Czechs  continued  to  protest  to  Ashton-Gwatkin,  who 
had  remained  with  them,  but  to  no  avail. 

“If  you  do  not  accept,”  he  admonished  them,  as  he  pre- 
pared to  go,  “you  will  have  to  settle  your  affairs  with  the 
Germans  absolutely  alone.  Perhaps  the  French  may  tell 
you  this  more  gently,  but  you  can  believe  me  that  they 
share  our  views.  They  are  disinterested.” 

This  was  the  truth,  wretched  though  it  must  have 
sounded  to  the  two  Czech  emissaries.  Shortly  after  1 a.m. 
on  September  30  * Hitler,  Chamberlain,  Mussolini  and 
Daladier,  in  that  order,  affixed  their  signatures  to  the 
Munich  Agreement  providing  for  the  German  Army  to 
begin  its  march  into  Czechoslovakia  on  October  1,  as 
the  Fuehrer  had  always  said  it  would,  and  to  complete  the 
occupation  of  the  Sudetenland  by  October  10.  Hitler  had 
got  what  had  been  refused  him  at  Godesberg. 

* The  agreement  was  dated  September  29,  though  not  actually  signed 
until  the  early-morning  hours  of  September  30.  It  stipulated  that  the 
German  occupation  “of  the  predominantly  German  territory”  should  be 
carried  out  by  German  troops  in  four  stages,  from  October  1 through 
October  7.  The  remaining  territory,  after  being  delimited  by  the  “In- 
ternational Commission,”  would  be  occupied  “by  October  10.”  The  com- 
mission was  to  consist  of  representatives  of  the  four  Big  Powers  and 
Czechoslovakia.  Britain,  France  and  Italy  agreed  “that  the  evacuation 
of  the  territory  shall  be  completed  by  October  10,  without  any  existing 
installations  having  been  destroyed,  and  that  the  Czechoslovak  Govern- 
ment will  be  held  responsible  for  carrying  out  the  evacuation  without 
damage  to  the  said  installations.” 

Further,  the  “International  Commission"  would  arrange  for  plebiscites. 


564 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


There  remained  the  painful  matter — painful  at  least  to 
the  victims — of  informing  the  Czechs  of  what  they  had 
to  give  up  and  how  soon.  Hitler  and  Mussolini  were  not 
interested  in  this  part  of  the  ceremony  and  withdrew, 
leaving  the  task  to  the  representatives  of  Czechoslovakia’s 
ally,  France,  and  of  Great  Britain.  The  scene  was  vivid- 
ly described  by  Masarik,  in  his  official  report  to  the  Czech 
Foreign  Office. 


At  1:30  a.m.  we  were  taken  into  the  hall  where  the  con- 
ference had  been  held.  There  were  present  Mr.  Chamberlain, 
M.  Daladier,  Sir  Horace  Wilson,  M.  Leger  [secretary  gen- 
eral  of  the  French  Foreign  Office],  Mr.  Ashton-Gwatkin,  Dr. 
Mastny  and  myself.  The  atmosphere  was  oppressive;  sentence 
was  about  to  be  passed.  The  French,  obviously  nervous, 
seemed  anxious  to  preserve  the  French  prestige  before  the 
court.  Mr.  Chamberlain,  in  a long  introductory  speech,  re- 
ferred to  the  Agreement  and  gave  the  text  to  Dr.  Mastny  . . . 


The  Czechs  began  to  ask  several  questions,  but 

Mr.  Chamberlain  was  yawning  continuously,  without  making 
any  effort  to  conceal  his  yawns.  I asked  MM.  Daladier  and 
Leger  whether  they  expected  a declaration  or  answer  of 
our  Government  to  the  Agreement.  M.  Daladier  was  no- 
ticeably nervous.  M.  Leger  replied  that  the  four  statesmen 
had  not  much  time.  He  added  hurriedly  and  with  super- 
ficial casualness  that  no  answer  was  required  from  us,  that 
they  regarded  the  plan  as  accepted,  that  our  Government 
had  that  very  day,  at  the  latest  at  3 p.m.,  to  send  its  rep- 
resentative to  Berlin  to  the  sitting  of  the  Commission,  and 
finally  that  the  Czechoslovak  officer  who  was  to  be  sent 
would  have  to  be  in  Berlin  on  Saturday  in  order  to  fix  the 
details  for  the  evacuation  of  the  first  zone.  The  atmosphere, 
he  said,  was  beginning  to  become  dangerous  for  the  whole 
world. 

He  spoke  to  us  harshly  enough.  This  was  a Frenchman 
Mr.  Chamberlain  did  not  conceal  his  weariness.  They  gave 


than  the  end  . of  November,”  in  the  regions  where  the  ethno- 
graphieal  character  was  in  doubt  and  would  make  the  final  determination 
of  the  new  frontiers.  In  an  annex  to  the  accord.  Britain  and  France 
declared  that  "they  stand  by  their  offer  . . . relating  to  an  international 
guarantee  of  the  new  boundaries  of  the  Czechoslovak  State  against  un- 
provoked  aggression.  When  the  question  of  the  Polish  and  Hungarian 

Sir  n U ' ' bas„bee,n  ®ettl*<?.  Germany  and  Italy,  for  their  part,  will 

fi^ve  a guarantee  to  Czechoslovakia.  fs"’  F 

The  pledge  of  plebiscites  was  never  carried  out.  Neither  Germany  nor 
Italy  ever  gave  the  guarantee  to  Czechoslovakia  against  aggression  even 
after  the  matter  of  the  Polish  and  Hung  rian  minorities  was  settled,  and 
as  we  shall  see,  Britain  and  France  declined  to  honor  their  guarantee. 


The  Road  to  War 


56S 

us  a second  slightly  corrected  map.  Then  they  finished  with 
us,  and  we  could  go.86 

I remember  from  that  fateful  night  the  light  of  victory 
in  Hitler’s  eyes  as  he  strutted  down  the  broad  steps  of  the 
Fuehrerhaus  after  the  meeting,  the  cockiness  of  Mussolini, 
laced  in  his  special  militia  uniform,  the  yawns  of  Cham- 
berlain and  his  air  of  pleasant  sleepiness  as  he  returned  to 
the  Regina  Palace  Hotel. 

Daladier  [I  wrote  in  my  diary  that  night],  on  the  other 
hand,  looked  a completely  beaten  and  broken  man.  He 
came  over  to  the  Regina  to  say  good-bye  to  Chamberlain. 
. . . Someone  asked,  or  started  to  ask:  “Monsieur  le  resi- 
dent, are  you  satisfied  with  the  agreement?”  He  turned  as  if 
to  say  something,  but  he  was  too  tired  and  defeated  and  the 
words  did  not  come  out  and  he  stumbled  out  the  door  in 
silence.87 

Chamberlain  was  not  through  conferring  with  Hitler 
about  the  peace  of  the  world.  Early  the  next  morning, 
September  30,  refreshed  by  a few  hours  of  sleep  and 
pleased  with  his  labors  of  the  previous  day,  he  sought 
out  the  Fuehrer  at  his  private  apartment  in  Munich  to  dis- 
cuss further  the  state  of  Europe  and  to  secure  a small 
concession  which  he  apparently  thought  would  improve 
his  political  position  at  home. 

According  to  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  acted  as  interpreter 
and  who  was  the  sole  witness  of  this  unexpected  meet- 
ing, Hitler  was  pale  and  moody.  He  listened  absent- 
mindedly  as  the  exuberant  head  of  the  British  govern- 
ment expressed  his  confidence  that  Germany  would 
“adopt  a generous  attitude  in  the  implementation  of  the 
Munich  Agreement”  and  renewed  his  hope  that  the 
Czechs  would  not  be  “so  unreasonable  as  to  make  diffi- 
culties” and  that,  if  they  did  make  them,  Hitler  would 
not  bomb  Prague  “with  the  dreadful  losses  among  the 
civilian  population  which  it  would  entail.”  This  was  only 
the  beginning  of  a long  and  rambling  discourse  which 
would  seem  incredible  coming  from  a British  Prime  Min- 
ister, even  one  who  had  made  so  abject-  a surrender  to  the 
German  dictator  the  night  before,  had  it  not  been  re- 
corded by  Dr.  Schmidt  in  an  official  Foreign  Office  memo- 
randum. Even  today,  when  one  reads  this  captured  docu- 
ment, it  seems  difficult  to  believe. 

But  the  British  leader’s  opening  remarks  were  only  the 


566  Tlle  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

prelude  to  what  was  to  come.  After  what  must  have 
seemed  to  the  morose  German  dictator  an  interminable 
exposition  by  Chamberlain  in  proposing  further  coopera- 
tion in  bringing  an  end  to  the  Spanish  Civil  War  (which 
German  and  Italian  “volunteers”  were  winning  for 
Franco),  in  furthering  disarmament,  world  economic 
prosperity,  political  peace  in  Europe  and  even  a solution 
ot  the  Russian  problem,  the  Prime  Minister  drew  out  of 
his  pocket  a sheet  of  paper  on  which  he  had  written  some- 
thing which  he  hoped  they  would  both  sign  and  release 
for  immediate  publication. 

We,  die  German  Fuehrer  and  Chancellor,  and  the  British 

drean^Ter  [h  56ad]’  have  had  a further  meeting  to- 
Arfolr^r?  agreed  m recognizing  that  the  question  of 
Anglo-German  relations  is  of  the  first  importance  for  the 
two  countries  and  for  Europe. 

An^Lr^e8ard  agreement  signed  last  night  and  the 
Anglo-German  Naval  Agreement  as  symbolic  of  the  desire 
1°-  tWO  Pe°P,es  never  to  go  to  war  with  one  another 

.,  We  ar®  resolved  that  the  method  of  consultation  shall  be 
the  method  adopted  to  deal  with  any  other  questions  that 

continuT^ur  efforT^t  COUntries’  and  we  are  determined  to 
continue  our  efforts  to  remove  possible  sources  of  differ- 
ence, and  thus  to  contribute  to  assure  the  peace  of  Europe* 

t„™er,rea.d.fte  declaration  and  quickly  signed  it,  much 
to  Chamherlam  s satisfactton,  as  Dr.  Schmidt  noted  in  his 
official  report.  The  interpreter’s  impression  was  that  the 
Fuehrer  agreed  to  it  “with  a certain  reluctance  onlv 
P!eas®  Chamberlain,”  who,  he  recounts  further, 
thanked  the  Fuehrer  warmly  ...  and  underlined  the  great 
psychological  effect  which  he  expected  from  this  docu- 
ment. 

The  deluded  British  Prime  Minister  did  not  know  of 
course,  that,  as  the  secret  German  and  Italian  documents 
would  reveal  much  later,  Hitler  and  Mussolini  had  already 
agreed  at  this  very  meeting  in  Munich  that  in  time  they 
would  have  to  fight  “side  by  side”  against  Great  Britain. 
Nor  as  we  shall  shortly  see,  did  he  divine  much  else  that 
already  was  fermenting  in  Hitler’s  lugubrious  mind  88 
Chamberlain  returned  to  London— as  did  Daladier  to 
Pans— in  triumph.  Brandishing  the  declaration  which  he 
had  signed  with  Hitler,  the  jubilant  Prime  Minister  faced 


The  Road  to  War 


567 


a large  crowd  that  pressed  into  Downing  Street.  After 
listening  to  shouts  of  “Good  old  Neville!”  and  a lusty 
singing  of  “For  He’s  a Jolly  Good  Fellow,”  Chamberlain 
smilingly  spoke  a few  words  from  a second-story  window 
in  Number  10. 

“My  good  friends,”  he  said,  “this  is  the  second  time  in 
our  history  that  there  has  come  back  from  Germany  to 
Downing  Street  peace  with  honor.*  I believe  it  is  peace 
in  our  time.” 

The  Times  declared  that  “no  conqueror  returning  from 
a victory  on  the  battlefield  has  come  adorned  with  nobler 
laurels.”  There  was  a spontaneous  movement  to  raise  a 
“National  Fund  of  Thanksgiving”  in  Chamberlain’s  honor, 
which  he  graciously  turned  down.  Only  Duff  Cooper,  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  resigned  from  the  cabinet, 
and  when  in  the  ensuing  Commons  debate  Winston 
Churchill,  still  a voice  in  the  wilderness,  began  to  utter  his 
memorable  words,  “We  have  sustained  a total,  unmitigated 
defeat,”  he  was  forced  to  pause,  as  he  later  recorded, 
until  the  storm  of  protest  against  such  a remark  had  sub- 
sided. 

The  mood  in  Prague  was  naturally  quite  different.  At 
6:20  a.m.  on  September  30,  the  German  charge  d’affaires 
had  routed  the  Czech  Foreign  Minister,  Dr.  Krofta,  out  of 
bed  and  handed  him  the  text  of  the  Munich  Agreement 
together  with  a request  that  Czechoslovakia  send  two 
representatives  to  the  first  meeting  of  the  “International 
Commission,”  which  was  to  supervise  the  execution  of  the 
accord,  at  5 p.m.  in  Berlin. 

For  President  Benes,  who  conferred  all  morning  at  the 
Hradschin  Palace  with  the  political  and  military  leaders, 
there  was  no  alternative  but  to  submit.  Britain  and  France 
had  not  only  deserted  his  country  but  would  now  back 
Hitler  in  the  use  of  armed  force  should  he  turn  down  the 
terms  of  Munich.  At  ten  minutes  to  one,  Czechoslovakia 
surrendered,  “under  protest  to  the  world,”  as  the  official 
statement  put  it.  “We  were  abandoned.  We  stand  alone,” 
General  Sirovy,  the  new  Premier,  explained  bitterly  in  a 
broadcast  to  the  Czechoslovak  people  at  5 p.m. 

To  the  very  last  Britain  and  France  maintained  their 

* The  reference  is  to  Disraeli’s  return  from  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in 


568  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pressure  on  the  country  they  had  seduced  and  betrayed. 
During  the  day  the  British,  French  and  Italian  ministers 
went  to  see  Dr.  Krofta  to  make  sure  that  there  was  no 
last-minute  revolt  of  the  Czechs  against  the  surrender.  The 
Cierman  charge,  Dr.  Hencke,  in  a dispatch  to  Berlin  de- 
scribed the  scene. 


do£nLFfren?  Minister’8  attempt  to  address  words  of  con- 

remark  »w!r°  Wau  cu‘short  hy  ‘he  Foreign  Minister’s 
remark.  We  have  been  forced  into  this  situation-  now 

wmryhelnth  ISt  21  a“f  e"u;  t°day  il  is  our  turn-  tomorrow  it 
with  bH  ffih  „tUrn  of  other?'  The  British  Minister  succeeded 
with  difficulty  m saying  that  Chamberlain  had  done  his  ut- 

The ’Fnreira CeiMd -^e  Same  answer  as  the  French  Minister. 

g i MmiSter -TaS  a cor«Pletely  broken  man  and 
: ,h,,  ,be  “■'» 


President  BeneS  resigned  on  October  5 on  the  insistence 
of  Berlin  and,  when  it  became  evident  that  his  life  was  in 
danger,  flew  to  England  and  exile.  He  was  replaced  provi- 
sionally by  General  Sirovy.  On  November  30,  Dr.  Emil 
Hacha,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  a well- 
mtentioned  but  weak  and  senile  man  of  sixty-six,  was 
selected  by  the  National  Assembly  to  be  President  of  what 
remained  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  which  was  now  officially 
spelled  with  a hyphen. 

What  Chamberlain  and  Deladier  at  Munich  had  neg- 
lected to  give  Germany  in  Czechoslovakia  the  so-called 
International  Commission”  proceeded  to  hand  over.  This 
hastily  formed  body  consisted  of  the  Italian,  British  and 
rrench  ambassadors  and  the  Czech  minister  in  Berlin  and 
Baron  von  Weizsaecker,  the  State  Secretary  in  the  German 
Foreign  Office.  Every  dispute  over  additional  territory 
tor  the  Germans  was  settled  in  their  favor,  more  than  once 
under  the  threat  from  Hitler  and  OKW  to  resort  to  armed 
force.  Finally,  on  October  13,  the  commission  voted  to 
dispense  with  the  plebiscites  which  the  Munich  Agreement 
had  called  for  in  the  disputed  regions.  There  was  no  need 
for  them. 


The  Poles  and  the  Hungarians,  after  threatening  mili- 
tary action  against  the  helpless  nation,  now  swept  down, 
like  vultures,  to  get  a slice  of  Czechoslovak  territory. 
Poland,  at  the  insistence  of  Foreign  Minister  Jozef  Beck, 
who  for  the  next  twelve  months  will  be  a leading  character 


The  Road  to  War  569 

in  this  narrative,  took  some  650  square  miles  of  territory 
around  Teschen,  comprising  a population  of  228,000  in- 
habitants, of  whom  133,000  were  Czechs.  Hungary  got  a 
larger  slice  in  the  award  meted  out  on  November  2 by 
Ribbentrop  and  Ciano:  7,500  square  miles,  with  a popula- 
tion of  500,000  Magyars  and  272,000  Slovaks. 

Moreover,  the  truncated  and  now  defenseless  country 
was  forced  by  Berlin  to  install  a pro-German  government 
of  obvious  fascist  tendencies.  It  was  clear  that  from 
now  on  the  Czechoslovak  nation  existed  at  the  mercy  of 
the  Leader  of  the  Third  Reich. 

THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  MUNICH 

Under  the  terms  of  the  Munich  Agreement  Hitler  got 
substantially  what  he  had  demanded  at  Godesberg,  and 
the  “International  Commission,”  bowing  to  his  threats, 
gave  him  considerably  more.  The  final  settlement  of  No- 
vember 20,  1938,  forced  Czechoslovakia  to  cede  to  Ger- 
many 11,000  square  miles  of  territory  in  which  dwelt 
2,800,000  Sudeten  Germans  and  800,000  Czechs.  Within 
this  area  lay  all  the  vast  Czech  fortifications  which 
hitherto  had  formed  the  most  formidable  defensive  line 
in  Europe,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  Maginot  Line 
in  France. 

But  that  was  not  all.  Czechoslovakia’s  entire  system 
of  rail,  road,  telephone  and  telegraph  communications 
was  disrupted.  According  to  German  figures,  the  dismem- 
bered country  lost  66  per  cent  of  its  coal,  80  per  cent  of 
its  lignite,  86  per  cent  of  its  chemicals,  80  per  cent  of  its 
cement,  80  per  cent  of  its  textiles,  70  per  cent  of  its  iron 
and  steel,  70  per  cent  of  its  electric  power  and  40  per 
cent  of  its  timber.  A prosperous  industrial  nation  was 
split  up  and  bankrupted  overnight. 

No  wonder  that  Jodi  could  write  joyfully  in  this  diary 
on  the  night  of  Munich: 

The  Pact  of  Munich  is  signed.  Czechoslovakia  as  a power 
is  out  . . . The  genius  of  the  Fuehrer  and  his.  determina- 
tion not  to  shun  even  a World  War  have  again  won  the  vic- 
tory without  the  use  of  force.  The  hope  remains  that  the 
incredulous,  the  weak  and  the  doubtful  people  have  been 
converted,  and  will  remain  that  way.00 

Many  of  the  doubtful  were  converted  and  the  few  who 


570 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

were  not  were  plunged  into  despair.  The  generals  such  as 
Reck,  Haider,  and  Witzleben  and  their  civilian  advisers 
had  again  been  proved  wrong.  Hitler  had  got  what  he 
wanted,  had  achieved  another  great  conquest,  without 
tang  a shot.  His  prestige  soared  to  new  heights.  No  one 
who  was  in  Germany  in  the  days  after  Munich,  as  this 
writer  was,  can  forget  the  rapture  of  the  German  people. 
They  were  relieved  that  war  had  been  averted;  they  were 
elated  and  swollen  with  pride  at  Hitler’s  bloodless  vic- 
j’i?0t  °nlover  Czechoslovakia  but  over  Great  Britain 
and  France.  Within  the  short  space  of  six  months,  they 
reminded  you.  Hitler  had  conquered  Austria  and  the 
oudetenland,  adding  ten  million  inhabitants  to  the  Third 
Reich  and  a vast  strategic  territory  which  opened  the  way 
tor  German  domination  of  southeastern  Europe.  And 
without  the  loss  of  a single  German  lifel  With  the  instinct 
of  a genius  rare  in  German  history  he  had  divined  not 
only  the  weaknesses  of  the  smaller  states  in  Central 
Europe  but  those  of  the  two  principal  Western  democra- 
C1m’  a.nd  France>  and  forced  them  to  bend  to  his 

will.  He  had  mvented  and  used  with  staggering  success  a 
new  strategy  and  technique  of  political  warfare,  which 
made  actual  war  unnecessary. 

In  scarcely  four  and  a half  years  this  man  of  lowly 
origins  had  catapulted  a disarmed,  chaotic,  nearly  bank- 
rupt Germany,  the  weakest  of  the  big  powers  in  Europe 
P°fi0n^h^?  £e  was  regarded  as  the  mightiest 
nation  of  the  Old  World,  before  which  all  the  others  Brit- 
ain even  and  France,  trembled.  At  no  step  in  this ’dizzy 
ascent  had  the  victorious  powers  of  Versailles  dared  to 
try  to  stop  her,  even  when  they  had  the  power  to  do  so. 
Indeed  at  Munich,  which  registered  the  greatest  conquest 
of  all,  Britain  and  France  had  gone  out  of  their  way  to 
support  her.  And  what  must  have  amazed  Hitler  most  of 
all— it  certainly  astounded  General  Beck,  Hassell  and  oth- 
ers m their  small  circle  of  opposition— was  that  none  of 
the  men  who  dominated  the  governments  of  Britain  and 
France  ( little  worms,”  as  the  Fuehrer  contemptuously 
spoke  of  them  m private  after  Munich)  realized  the  con- 
sequences of  their  inability  to  react  with  any  force  to  one 
a”?*  * 0tiJfr  leader’s  aggressive  moves. 

Winston  Churchill,  in  England,  alone  seemed  to  under- 
stand. No  one  stated  the  consequences  of  Munich  more 


The  Road  to  War 


571 


succinctly  than  he  in  his  speech  to  the  Commons  of  Octo- 
ber 5: 

We  have  sustained  a total  and  unmitigated  defeat  . . . We 
are  in  the  midst  of  a disaster  of  the  first  magnitude.  The 
road  down  the  Danube  ...  the  road  to  the  Black  Sea  has 
been  opened  . . . All  the  countries  of  Mittel  Europa  and  the 
Danube  valley,  one  after  another,  will  be  drawn  in  the  vast 
system  of  Nazi  politics  . . . radiating  from  Berlin  . . . And 
do  not  suppose  that  this  is  the  end.  It  is  only  the  be- 
ginning . . . 

But  Churchill  was  not  in  the  government  and  his 
words  went  unheeded. 

Was  the  Franco— British  surrender  at  Munich  neces- 
sary? Was  Adolf  Hitler  not  bluffing? 

The  answer,  paradoxically,  to  both  questions,  we  now 
know,  is  No.  All  the  generals  close  to  Hitler  who  sur- 
vived the  war  agree  that  had  it  not  been  for  Munich 
Hitler  would  have  attacked  Czechoslovakia  on  October 
1,  1938,  and  they  presume  that,  whatever  momentary  hesi- 
tations there  might  have  been  in  London,  Paris  and  Mos- 
cow, in  the  end  Britain,  France  and  Russia  would  have 
been  drawn  into  the  war. 

And — what  is  most  important  to  this  history  at  this 
point — the  German  generals  agree  unanimously  that  Ger- 
many would  have  lost  the  war,  and  in  short  order.  The 
argument  of  the  supporters  of  Chamberlain  and  Daladier 
— and  they  were  in  the  great  majority  at  the  time — that 
Munich  saved  the  West  not  only  from  war  but  from  de- 
feat in  war  and,  incidentally,  preserved  London  and  Paris 
from  being  wiped  out  by  the  Luftwaffe’s  murderous  bomb- 
ing has  been  impressively  refuted,  so  far  as  concern  the 
last  two  points,  by  those  in  a position  to  know  best:  the 
German  generals,  and  especially  those  generals  who  are 
closest  to  Hitler  and  who  supported  him  from  beginning 
to  end  the  most  fanatically. 

The  leading  light  among  the  latter  was  General  Keitel, 
chief  of  OKW,  toady  to  Hitler  and  constantly  at  his  side. 
When  asked  on  the  stand  at  the  Nuremberg  trial  what  the 
reaction  of  the  German  generals  was  to  Munich  he  re- 
plied: 

We  were  extraordinarily  happy  that  it  had  not  come  to  a 
military  operation  because  ...  we  had  always  been  of  the 


572 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

|r  snssssis  s“jaa?  at  g* 

tuJf  5s  rways  bee"  turned  by  Allied  military  experts 
^ G®rmau  Army  would  have  romped  through 

S d nnThlt  hU‘  t0  I***  teStim°ny  of  Keitel  that  this 
^ been  the  ease  must  be  added  that  of 

Field  Marshal  von  Manstein,  who  became  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  of  the  German  field  commanders.  When  he  in 
hewf11’  testlfied.  f Nuremberg  (unlike  Keitel  and  Jodi 

*•  G“™» 

f UFd  d0lb h fr0Dtier  ““W^^^^be^Secfivefy  de- 
re”did  by  US’  and  there  is  no  doubt  whatsoever  that  had 

«rbvtr:(iWded  berself>  we  would  have  been  held 

break  t£u“  ^ ^ n0t  haVe  the  means  to 

th,J<5n?e-  “b^nS”  0f?KW’  Put  it  this  way  when  he  took 
the  stand  in  his  own  defense  at  Nuremberg: 

*t  was  out  of  the  question,  with  five  fighting  divisions  and 

were  nothj^hm V1S1I°nS  “ ‘he  western  fortifications,  which 
^15  euustruchon  site,  to  hold  out  against 
100  French  divisions.  That  was  militarily  impossible."® 

larVcd3!!,!11686  Gei?an  generals  concede,  Hitler’s  army 
mean?  of  penetrating  the  Czech  fortifications! 
.nd  Gei!mauy>  m the  face  of  France’s  overwhelming 
rtdmftbebWeSt’  WaS  in  a “militarily  impossible”  Sia- 
b°’  a°d  further,  since,  as  we  have  seen,  there  was  such 
grave  dissension  among  the  generals  that  the  Chief  of 

Fhehrcr^  Ge,?era  Staff  was  PreP^ed  to  overthrow  the 
Fuehrer  m order  to  avert  a hopeless  war — why  then  did 

did  th& 7FAen?b/ud  British  general  staffs  know  this?  Or 
did  they?  And  if  they  did,  how  could  the  heads  of  govern- 

rifiHn0f  Bnta‘u  and  France  be  forced  at  Munich  into  sac- 
lficing  so  much  of  their  nations’  vital  interests?  In  seeking 

.WctedHtherCzfcrfortreJs1lnePaHe  SETTm  tlds  **  had 

League  of  Nations.  High  ComSoSr  of  Danzil  ° 

we  were  in  a position  to  examine  rJL.i  ifl  wnen  after  Munich 
within,  what  we  “w of  it  grZSy  2t£rberf  ^ nul,t?r2  fro” 

danger.  The  plan  prepared  by  the  fWh  „ ’ Te  had  ^un  3 sen°us 
now  understand  why  my"  generals  generals  was  formidable.  I 

Grave  Diggers  of  Fran™/,  p S)  “ ged  restra,nt-  (Pertinax,  The 


The  Road  to  War 


573 


answers  to  such  questions  we  confront  one  of  the  myster- 
ies of  the  Munich  time  which  has  not  yet  been  cleared  up. 
Even  Churchill,  concerned  as  he  is  with  military  affairs, 
scarcely  touches  on  it  in  his  massive  memoirs. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  the  British  and  French  general 
staffs  and  the  two  governments  did  not  know  of  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  German  Army  General  Staff  to  a European 
war.  For,  as  already  noted  here,  the  conspirators  in  Berlin 
warned  the  British  of  this  through  at  least  four  channels  in 
August  and  September  and,  as  we  know,  the  matter  came 
to  the  attention  of  Chamberlain  himself.  By  early  Septem- 
ber Paris  and  London  must  have  learned  of  the  resigna- 
tion of  General  Beck  and  of  the  obvious  consequences  to 
the  German  Army  of  the  rebellion  of  its  most  eminent  and 
gifted  leader. 

It  was  generally  conceded  in  Berlin  at  this  time  that 
British  and  French  military  intelligence  was  fairly  good. 
It  is  extremely  difficult  to  believe  that  the  military  chiefs 
in  London  and  Paris  did  not  know  of  the  obvious  weak- 
nesses of  the  German  Army  and  Air  Force  and  of  their 
inability  to  fight  a two-front  war.  What  doubts  could  the 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  French  Army,  General  Gamelin,  have 
— despite  his  inbred  caution,  which  was  monumental — 
that  with  nearly  one  hundred  divisions  he  could  over- 
whelm the  five  regular  and  seven  reserve  German  divi- 
sions in  the  west  and  sweep  easily  and  swiftly  deep  into 
Germany? 

On  the  whole,  as  he  later  recounted,94  Gamelin  had  few 
doubts.  On  September  12,  the  day  on  which  Hitler  was 
thundering  his  threats  against  Czechoslovakia  at  the 
closing  session  of  the  Nuremberg  rally,  the  French  gen- 
eralissimo had  assured  Premier  Daladier  that  if  war 
came  “the  democratic  nations  would  dictate  the  peace.” 
He  says  he  backed  it  up  with  a letter  expressing  the  rea- 
sons for  his  optimism.  On  September  26,  at  the  height  of 
the  Czech  crisis  following  the  Godesberg  meeting, 
Gamelin,  who  had  accompanied  the  French  government 
leaders  to  London,  repeated  his  assurances  to  Chamber- 
lain  and  tried  to  substantiate  them  with  an  analysis  of  the 
military  situation  calculated  to  buck  up  not  only  the 
British  Prime  Minister  but  his  own  wavering  Premier.  In 
this  attempt,  apparently,  he  failed.  Finally,  just  before 
Daladier  flew  to  Munich,  Gamelin  outlined  to  him  the 


574 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Kf  tendtorial  concessions  in  the  Sudetenland  which 
could  be  made  without  endangering  French  security.  The 
main  Czech  fortifications,  as  well  as  the  rail  trunk  lines 
certain  strategic  branch  lines  and  the  principal  defense 

addedtn?h  ™st  not  be  g>ven  to  Germany.  Above  all,  he 
added,  the  Germans  must  not  be  permitted  to  cut  off  the 
Moravian  Gap  Good  advice,  if  Czechoslovakia  was  to  be 
of  any  use  to  France  in  a war  with  Germany,  but  as  we 
have  seen,  Daladier  was  not  the  man  to  act  on  it  ’ 

reaVoffor  SS  TV-  at  the  time  of  Munich  tha‘  erne 
reason  for  Chamberlain  s surrender  was  his  fear  that  Lon- 
don would  be  obliterated  by  German  bombing,  and  there 
is  no  doubt  that  the  French  were  jittery  at  the  awful 
prospect  of  their  beautiful  capital  being  destroyed  from  the 
,r'  ™ what  is  now  known  of  the  Luftwaffe’s 

MweL^M  tHheSpm°meM- thC  Londoners  and  ^e  Parisians, 
P"mVMmiSter  fnd  the  Premier>  were  urn 
dully  alarmed.  The  German  Air  Force,  like  the  Armv 

hke  rcrtrated  against  Czechoslovakia  and  therefore,’ 
like  the  Army,  was  incapable  of  serious  action  in  the 
West.  Even  if  a few  German  bombers  could  have  been 
®?arel  t0  attac*  Lc,ndon  and  Paris  it  is  highly  doubtful 

BritishL  J°pd  hr«  TChed  thdr  targets-  W®ak  as  the 

coukfnnt dh  FrCnCh  figul.r  defenses  were,  the  Germans 
thU  t,  ^ u T fV6n,  thClr  b0mbers  ®ghter  protection,  if 
they  had  had  the  planes.  Their  fighter  bases  were  too 
tar  away. 

It  has  also  been  argued— most  positively  by  Ambassa- 
dors  Fran^ois-Poncet  and  Henderson— that  Munich  gave 
ff^e  two  Western  democracies  nearly  a year  to  catch  up 
with  the  Germans  m rearmament.  The  facts  belie  such 
a"  a^gUm.e(m-  As  Churchill,  backed  up  by  every  serious 
Allied  military  historian,  has  written,  “The  year’s  breath- 
ing space  said  to  be  ‘gained’  by  Munich  left  Britain  and 
ance  in  a much  worse  position  compared  to  Hitler’s 
Germany  than  they  had  been  at  the  Munich  crisis.”  »=  As 
we  shaff  see  all  the  German  military  calculations  a year 
later  bear  this  out,  and  subsequent  events,  of  course  re- 
move any  doubts  whatsoever.  ’ 

from  lh?°!PeCftVand  Wit?  the  kn°wledge  we  now  have 
from  the  secret  German  documents  and  from  the  postwar 

testimony  of  the  Germans  themselves,  the  following  sum- 


The  Road  to  War 


575 


ming  up,  which  was  impossible  to  make  in  the  days  of 
Munich,  may  be  given: 

Germany  was  in  no  position  to  go  to  war  on  October 
1,  1938,  against  Czechoslovakia  and  France  and  Britain, 
not  to  mention  Russia.  Had  she  done  so,  she  would  have 
been  quickly  and  easily  defeated,  and  that  would  have 
been  the  end  of  Hitler  and  the  Third  Reich.  If  a European 
war  had  been  averted  at  the  last  moment  by  the  interces- 
sion of  the  German  Army,  Hitler  might  have  been  over- 
thrown by  Haider  and  Witzleben  and  their  confederates 
carrying  out  their  plan  to  arrest  him  as  soon  as  he  had 
given  the  final  order  for  the  attack  on  Czechoslovakia. 

By  publicly  boasting  that  he  would  march  into  the 
Sudetenland  by  October  1 “in  any  case,”  Hitler  had  put 
himself  far  out  on  a limb.  He  was  in  the  “untenable  posi- 
tion” which  General  Beck  had  foreseen.  Had  he,  after  all 
his  categorical  threats  and  declarations,  tried  to  crawl 
back  from  the  limb  on  his  own,  he  scarcely  could  have 
survived  for  long,  dictatorships  being  what  they  are  and 
his  dictatorship,  in  particular,  being  what  it  was.  It  would 
have  been  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  him  to 
have  backed  down,  and  had  he  tried  to  do  so  his  loss  of 
prestige  in  Europe,  among  his  own  people  and,  above  all, 
with  his  generals  would,  most  likely,  have  proved  fatal. 

Chamberlain’s  stubborn,  fanatical  insistence  on  giving 
Hitler  what  he  wanted,  his  trips  to  Berchtesgaden  and 
Godesberg  and  finally  the  fateful  journey  to  Munich 
rescued  Hitler  from  his  limb  and  strengthened  his  position 
in  Europe,  in  Germany,  in  the  Army,  beyond  anything 
that  could  have  been  imagined  a few  weeks  before.  It  also 
added  immeasurably  to  the  power  of  the  Third  Reich  vis- 
a-vis  the  Western  democracies  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

For  France,  Munich  was  a disaster,  and  it  is  beyond 
understanding  that  this  was  not  fully  realized  in  Paris. 
Her  military  position  in  Europe  was  destroyed.  Because 
her  Army,  when  the  Reich  was  fully  mobilized,  could 
never  be  much  more  than  half  the  size  of  that  of  Germany, 
which  had  nearly  twice  her  population,  and  because  her 
ability  to  produce  arms  was  also  less,  France  had  labo- 
riously built  up  her  alliances  with  the  smaller  powers  in 
the  East  on  the  other  flank  of  Germany — and  of  Italy: 
Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  Yugoslavia  and  Rumania,  which, 
together,  had  the  military  potential  of  a Big  Power.  The 


576 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

loss  now  of  thirty-five  well-trained,  well-armed  Czech 
divisions  deployed  behind  their  strong  mountain  fortifica- 
tions and  holding  down  an  even  larger  German  force,  was 
a crippling  one  to  the  French  Army.  But  that  was  not  all. 
After  Munich  how  could  France’s  remaining  allies  in 
Eastern  Europe  have  any  confidence  in  her  written  word? 
What  value  now  were  alliances  with  France?  The  answer 
m Warsaw,  Bucharest  and  Belgrade  was:  Not  much;  and 
there  was  a scramble  in  these  capitals  to  make  the  best 
deal  possible,  while  there  was  still  time,  with  the  Nazi 
conqueror. 

And  if  not  a scramble,  there  was  a stir  in  Moscow, 
though  the  Soviet  Union  was  militarily  allied  to  both 
Czechoslovakia  and  France,  the  French  government  had 
gone  along  with  Germany  and  Britain,  without  protest 
“ ending  Russia  from  Munich.  It  was  a snub  which 
btalin  did  not  forget  and  which  was  to  cost  the  two  West- 
ern democracies  dearly  in  the  months  to  come.  On  October 
3,  tour  days  after  Munich,  the  counselor  of  the  German 
Embassy  in  Moscow,  Werner  von  Tippelskirch,  reported 
to  Berhn  on  the  “consequences”  of  Munich  for  Soviet 
policy.  He  thought  Stalin  “would  draw  conclusions”-  he 
was  certain  the  Soviet  Union  would  “reconsider  her  for- 
eign policy,”  become  less  friendly  to  her  ally  France  and 
more  positive  toward  Germany.  As  a matter  of  fact,  the 
German  diplomat  thought  that  “the  present  circumstances 
otter  tavorable  opportunities  for  a new  and  wider  German 
economic  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union.”  ««  This  is  the 
first  mention  in  the  secret  German  archives  of  a change 
m the  wind  that  now  began  to  stir,  however  faintly,  over 
Berlin  and  Moscow  and  which,  within  a year,  would  have 
momentous  consequences. 

Despite  his  staggering  victory  and  the  humiliation  he 
administered  not  only  to  Czechoslovakia  but  to  the  West- 
ern  democracies,  Hitler  was  disappointed  with  the  results 
of  Munich.  “That  fellow  [Chamberlain],”  Schacht  heard 
him  exclaim  to  his  S.S.  entourage  on  his  return  to  Berlin 
has  spoiled  my  entry  into  Prague!”  « That  was  what  he 
really  had  wanted  all  along,  as  he  had  constantly  confided 
to  his  generals  since  his  lecture  to  them  on  November  5 
of  the  previous  year.  The  conquest  of  Austria  and  Czech- 
oslovakia, he  had  explained  then,  was  to  be  but  the  pre- 


The  Road  to  War 


577 


liminary  for  a major  drive  for  Lebensraum  in  the  East 
and  a military  settlement  with  France  in  the  West.  As  he 
had  told  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  on  September  20, 
the  best  thing  was  “to  destroy  Czechoslovakia.”  This,  he 
had  said,  would  “provide  the  only  satisfactory  solution.” 
He  was  only  afraid  of  the  “danger”  that  the  Czechs  might 
submit  to  all  of  his  demands.* 

Now  Mr.  Chamberlain,  grasping  his  much-publicized 
umbrella,  had  come  to  Munich  and  forced  the  Czechs  to 
submit  to  all  his  demands  and  thereby  had  deprived 
him  of  his  military  conquest.  Such,  it  is  evident  from  the 
record,  were  Hitler’s  tortuous  thoughts  after  Munich.  “It 
was  clear  to  me  from  the  first  moment,”  he  later  confided 
to  his  generals,  “that  I could  not  be  satisfied  with  the 
Sudeten-German  territory.  That  was  only  a partial  solu- 
tion.” 98 

A few  days  after  Munich  the  German  dictator  set  in 
motion  plans  to  achieve  a total  solution. 


* See  above,  p.  526. 


13 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA  CEASES  TO  EXIST 


WITHIN  TEN  DAYS  of  affixing  his  signature  to  the  Munich 
Agreement — before  even  the  peaceful  military  occupation 
of  the  Sudetenland  had  been  completed — Adolf  Hitler 
got  off  an  urgent  top-secret  message  to  General  Keitel 
Chief  of  OKW. 

1.  What  reinforcements  are  necessary  in  the  present  situa- 
tion to  break  all  Czech  resistance  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia? 

2.  How  much  time  is  required  for  the  regrouping  or  mov- 
ing up  of  new  forces? 

3.  How  much  time  will  be  required  for  the  same  purpose  if 
it  is  executed  after  the  intended  demobilization  and  return 
measures? 

4.  How  much  time  would  be  required  to  achieve  the 
state  of  readiness  of  October  1?  i 

Keitel  shot  back  to  the  Fuehrer  on  October  11a  tele- 
gram giving  detailed  answers.  Not  much  time  and  not 
very  many  reinforcements  would  be  necessary.  There 
were  already  twenty-four  divisions,  including  three 
armored  and  four  motorized,  in  the  Sudeten  area.  “OKW 
believes,”  Keitel  stated,  “that  it  would  be  possible  to  com- 
mence operations  without  reinforcements,  in  view  of  the 
present  signs  of  weakness  in  Czech  resistance.” 2 

Thus  assured,  Hitler  communicated  his  thoughts  to  his 
military  chiefs  ten  days  later. 

top  secret  Berlin,  October  21,  1938 

I he  future  tasks  for  the  armed  forces  and  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  conduct  of  war  resulting  from  these  tasks  will 
be  laid  down  by  me  in  a later  directive. 

Until  this  directive  comes  into  force  the  armed  forces 
mu'st  J?e  prepared  at  all  times  for  the  following  eventualities: 

1.  The  securing  of  the  frontiers  of  Germany. 

2.  The  liquidation  of  the  remainder  of  Czechoslovakia. 

3.  The  occupation  of  the  Memel  district. 

578 


The  Road  to  War 


579 


Memel,  a Baltic  port  of  some  forty  thousand  inhabit- 
ants, had  been  lost  by  Germany  to  Lithuania  after  Ver- 
sailles. Since  Lithuania  was  smaller  and  weaker  than  Aus- 
tria and  Czechoslovakia,  the  seizure  of  the  town  pre- 
sented no  problem  to  the  Wehrmacht  and  in  this  directive 
Hitler  merely  mentioned  that  it  would  be  “annexed.”  As 
for  Czechoslovakia: 

It  must  be  possible  to  smash  at  any  time  the  remainder  of 
Czechoslovakia  if  her  policy  should  become  hostile  toward 
Germany. 

The  preparations  to  be  made  by  the  armed  forces  for  this 
contingency  will  be  considerably  smaller  in  extent  than  those 
for  “Green”;  they  must,  however,  guarantee  a considerably 
higher  state  of  preparedness  since  planned  mobilization 
measures  have  been  dispensed  with.  The  organization,  order 
of  battle  and  state  of  readiness  of  the  units  earmarked  for 
that  purpose  are  in  peacetime  to  be  so  arranged  for  a sur- 
prise assault  that  Czechoslovakia  herself  will  be  deprived  of 
all  possibility  of  organized  resistance.  The  object  is  the  swift 
occupation  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia  and  the  cutting  off  of 
Slovakia.3 

Slovakia,  of  course,  could  be  cut  off  by  political  means, 
which  might  make  the  use  of  German  troops  unnecessary. 
For  this  purpose  the  German  Foreign  Office  was  put  to 
work.  All  through  the  first  days  of  October,  Ribbentrop 
and  his  aides  urged  the  Hungarians  to  press  for  their  share 
of  the  spoils  in  Slovakia.  But  when  Hungary,  which  hardly 
needed  German  prodding  to  whet  its  greedy  appetite,  spoke 
of  taking  Slovakia  outright,  the  Wilhelmstrasse  put  its  foot 
down.  It  had  other  plans  for  the  future  of  this  land.  The 
Prague  government  had  already,  immediately  after  Mu- 
nich, granted  Slovakia  a far-reaching  autonomy.  The  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  advised  “tolerating”  this  solution  for 
the  moment.  But  for  the  future  the  German  thinking  was 
summed  up  by  Dr.  Ernst  Woermann,  director  of  the  Po- 
litical Department  of  the  Foreign  Office,  in  a memorandum 
of  October  7.  “An  independent  Slovakia,”  he  wrote,  “would 
be  weak  constitutionally  and  would  therefore  best  further 
the  German  need  for  penetration  and  settlement  in  the 
East.”  * 

Here  is  a new  turning  point  for  the  Third  Reich.  For 
the  first  time  Hitler  is  on  the  verge  of  setting  out  to 
conquer  non-Germanic  lands.  Over  the  last  six  weeks 
he  had  been  assuring  Chamberlain,  in  private  and  in 


580 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

public,  that  the  Sudetenland  was  his  last  territorial  de- 
mand in  Europe.  And  though  the  British  Prime  Minister 
was  gullible  almost  beyond  comprehension  in  accepting 
Hitler’s  word,  there  was  some  ground  for  his  believing  that 
the  German  dictator  would  halt  when  he  had  digested  the 
Germans  who  previously  had  dwelt  outside  the  Reich’s  fron- 
tier and  were  now  within  it.  Had  not  the  Fuehrer  repeat- 
edly said  that  he  wanted  no  Czechs  in  the  Third  Reich? 
Had  he  not  in  Mein  Kampf  and  in  countless  public 
speeches  reiterated  the  Nazi  theory  that  a Germany,  to  be 
strong,  must  be  racially  pure  and  therefore  must  not  take 
in  foreign,  and  especially  Slav,  peoples?  He  had.  But  also 
— and  perhaps  this  was  forgotten  in  London — he  had 
preached  in  many  a turgid  page  in  Mein  Kampf  that  Ger- 
many’s future  lay  in  conquering  Lebensraum  in  the 
East.  For  more  than  a millennium  this  space  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Slavs. 

THE  WEEK  OF  THE  BROKEN  GLASS 

In  the  autumn  of  1938  another  turning  point  for  Nazi 
Germany  was  reached.  It  took  place  during  what  was  later 
called  in  party  circles  the  “Week  of  the  Broken  Glass.” 

On  November  7,  a seventeen-year-old  German  Jewish 
refugee  by  the  name  of  Herschel  Grynszpan  shot  and 
mortally  wounded  the  third  secretary  of  the  German  Em- 
bassy in  Paris,  Ernst  vom  Rath.  The  youth’s  father  had 
been  among  ten  thousand  Jews  deported  to  Poland  in 
boxcars  shortly  before,  and  it  was  to  revenge  this  and 
the  general  persecution  of  Jews  in  Nazi  Germany  that  he 
went  to  the  German  Embassy  intending  to  kill  the  am- 
bassador, Count  Johannes  von  Welczeck.  But  the  young 
third  secretary  was  sent  out  to  see  what  he  wanted,  and 
was  shot.  There  was  irony  in  Rath’s  death,  because  he  had 
been  shadowed  by  the  Gestapo  as  a result  of  his  anti- 
Nazi  attitude;  for  one  thing,  he  had  never  shared  the 
anti-Semitic  aberrations  of  the  rulers  of  his  country. 

On  the  night  of  November  9-10,  shortly  after  the 
party  bosses,  led  by  Hitler  and  Goering,  had  concluded  the 
annual  celebration  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch  in  Munich, 
the  worst  pogrom  that  had  yet  taken  place  in  the  Third 
Reich  occurred.  According  to  Dr.  Goebbels  and  the  Ger- 
man press,  which  he  controlled,  it  was  a “spontaneous” 


The  Road  to  War 


581 


demonstration  of  the  German  people  in  reaction  to  the 
news  of  the  murder  in  Paris.  But  after  the  war,  documents 
came  to  light  which  show  how  “spontaneous”  it  was.5 
They  are  among  the  most  illuminating — and  gruesome — 
secret  papers  of  the  prewar  Nazi  era. 

On  the  evening  of  November  9,  according  to  a secret 
report  made  by  the  chief  party  judge,  Major  Walther  Buch, 
Dr.  Goebbels  issued  instructions  that  “spontaneous  demon- 
strations” were  to  be  “organized  and  executed”  during  the 
night.  But  the  real  organizer  was  Reinhard  Heydrich,  the 
sinister  thirty-four-year-old  Number  Two  man,  after  Himm- 
ler, in  the  S.S.,  who  ran  the  Security  Service  (S.D.)  and 
the  Gestapo.  His  teletyped  orders  during  the  evening  are 
among  the  captured  German  documents. 

At  1:20  a.m.  on  November  10  he  flashed  an  urgent 
teletype  message  to  all  headquarters  and  stations  of  the 
state  police  and  the  S.D.  instructing  them  to  get  together 
with  party  and  S.S.  leaders  “to  discuss  the  organization  of 
the  demonstrations.” 

a.  Only  such  measures  should  be  taken  which  do  not 
involve  danger  to  German  life  or  property.  (For  instance 
synagogues  are  to  be  burned  down  only  when  there  is  no 
danger  of  fire  to  the  surroundings.)  * 

b.  Business  and  private  apartments  of  Jews  may  be  de- 
stroyed but  not  looted.  . . . 

d.  ...  2.  The  demonstrations  which  are  going  to  take 
place  should  not  be  hindered  by  the  police  . . . 

5.  As  many  Jews,  especially  rich  ones,  are  to  be 
arrested  as  can  be  accommodated  in  the  existing  prisons 
. . . Upon  their  arrest,  the  appropriate  concentration  camps 
should  be  contacted  immediately,  in  order  to  confine  them 
in  these  camps  as  soon  as  possible. 

It  was  a night  of  horror  throughout  Germany.  Syna- 
gogues, Jewish  homes  and  shops  went  up  in  flames  and 
several  Jews,  men,  women  and  children,  were  shot  or  other- 
wise slain  while  trying  to  escape  burning  to  death.  A pre- 
liminary confidential  report  was  made  by  Heydrich  to 
Goering  on  the  following  day,  November  11. 

The  extent  of  the  destruction  of  Jewish  shops  and  houses 
cannot  yet  be  verified  by  figures  ...  815  shops  destroyed, 
171  dwelling  houses  set  on  fire  or  destroyed  only  indicate 
a fraction  of  the  actual  damage  so  far  as  arson  is  concerned 


The  parentheses  are  in  the  original. 


582 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


v ? synagogues  were  set  on  fire,  and  another  76  com- 
pletely destroyed  . . . 20,000  Jews  were  arrested.  36  deaths 
were  reported  and  those  seriously  injured  were  also  num- 
bered  at  36.  Those  killed  and  injured  are  Jews. 


The  ultimate  number  of  murders  of  Jews  that  night  is 
believed  to  have  been  several  times  the  preliminary  fig- 
ure. Heydrich  himself  a day  after  his  preliminary  report 
gave  the  number  of  Jewish  shops  looted  as  7,500.  There 
were  also  some  cases  of  rape,  which  Major  Buch’s  party 
court,  judging  by  its  own  report,  considered  worse  than 
murder,  since  they  violated  the  Nuremberg  racial  laws 
which  forbade  sexual  intercourse  between  Gentiles  and 
Jews.  Such  offenders  were  expelled  from  the  party  and 
turned  over  to  the  civil  courts.  Party  members  who  simply 
murdered  Jews  “cannot  be  punished,”  Major  Buch  argued 
since  they  had  merely  carried  out  orders.  On  that  point 
he  was  quite  blunt.  “The  public,  down  to  the  last  man,” 
he  wrote,  “realizes  that  political  drives  like  those  of  No- 
vember 9 were  organized  and  directed  by  the  party 
whether  this  is  admitted  or  not.”  * 

Murder  and  anon  and  pillage  were  not  the  only  tribula- 
tions suffered  by  innocent  German  Jews  as  the  result  of  the 
murder  of  Rath  in  Paris.  The  Jews  had  to  pay  for  the 
destruction  of  their  own  property.  Insurance  monies  due 
them  were  confiscated  by  the  State.  Moreover,  they  were 
subjected,  collectively,  to  a fine  of  one  billion  marks  as 
punishment^  as  Goering  put  it,  “for  their  abominable 
crimes,  etc.”  These  additional  penalties  were  assessed  at  a 
grotesque  meeting  of  a dozen  German  cabinet  ministers 
and  ranking  officials  presided  over  by  the  corpulent  Field 
Marshal  on  November  12,  a partial  stenographic  record  of 
which  survives. 

A number  of  German  insurance  firms  faced  bankruptcy 
if  they  were  to  make  good  the  policies  on  gutted  buildings 
(most  of  which,  though  they  harbored  Jewish  shops,  were 
owned  by  Gentiles)  and  damaged  goods.  The  destruction 


p*feJor,TBuTh  s£  f,epo.rt  pves  an  authentic  picture  of  justice  in  the  Third 
Reich.  In  the  following  cases  of  killing  Jews,”  one  part  reads  “proceedings 
were  suspended  or  minor  punishments  were  pronounced.”  He  then  cites^a 

mufde?eUrT  “p0afr,vUMemherC  f'  Bft"g  murdeJed  and  ?he 

Wish  rminiJ  r UK  bej  Fruehhng  August,  because  of  shooting  of  the 
Jewish  couple  Goldberg  and  because  of  shooting  of  the  Jew  Sinasohn 
ofar  LMWbeT?S  Blhnng*  WMi.  and  Heike.  Josef,  because  of  the  shooting 
SrU’it  T Rosenbaum  and  the  Jewess  Zwienicki  . . . Party  Members 

IlsK.’.  "‘etc  ' and  MeCkler'  ErnSt’  bwause  of  Jew 


The  Road  to  War 


583 


in  broken  window  glass  alone  came  to  five  million  marks 
($1,250,000)  as  a Herr  Hilgard,  who  had  been  called  in  to 
speak  for  the  insurance  companies,  reminded  Goering;  and 
most  of  the  glass  replacements  would  have  to  be  imported 
from  abroad  in  foreign  exchange,  of  which  Germany 
was  very  short. 

“This  cannot  continue!”  exclaimed  Goering,  who,  among 
other  things,  was  the  czar  of  the  German  economy.  “We 
won’t  be  able  to  last,  with  all  this.  Impossible!”  And  turn- 
ing to  Heydrich,  he  shouted,  “I  wish  you  had  killed  two 
hundred  Jews  instead  of  destroying  so  many  valuables!”  * 

“Thirty-five  were  killed,”  Heydrich  answered,  in  self- 
defense. 

Not  all  the  conversation,  of  which  the  partial  steno- 
graphic record  runs  to  ten  thousand  words,  was  so  deadly 
serious.  Goering  and  Goebbels  had  a lot  of  fun  arguing 
about  subjecting  the  Jews  to  further  indignities.  The  Prop- 
aganda Minister  said  the  Jews  would  be  made  to  clean  up 
and  level  off  the  debris  of  the  synagogues;  the  sites  would 
then  be  turned  into  parking  lots.  He  insisted  that  the 
Jews  be  excluded  from  everything:  schools,  theaters, 
movies,  resorts,  public  beaches,  parks,  even  from  the  Ger- 
man forests.  He  proposed  that  there  be  special  railway 
coaches  and  compartments  for  the  Jews,  but  that  they 
be  made  available  only  after  all  Aryans  were  seated. 

“Well,  if  the  train  is  overcrowded,”  Goering  laughed, 
“we’ll  kick  the  Jew  out  and  make  him  sit  all  alone  all  the 
way  in  the  toilet.” 

When  Goebbels,  in  all  seriousness,  demanded  that  the 
Jews  be  forbidden  to  enter  the  forests,  Goering  re- 
plied, “We  shall  give  the  Jews  a certain  part  of  the  forest 
and  see  to  it  that  various  animals  that  look  damned  much 
like  Jews — the  elk  has  a crooked  nose  like  theirs — get  there 
also  and  become  acclimated.” 

In  such  talk,  and  much  more  like  it,  did  the  leaders 
of  the  Third  Reich  while  away  the  time  in  the  crucial 
year  of  1938. 

But  the  question  of  who  was  to  pay  for  the  25  million 
marks’  worth  of  damage  caused  by  a pogrom  instigated 
and  organized  by  the  State  was  a fairly  serious  one,  espe- 


* When  asked  during  cross-examination  by  Mr.  Justice  Jackson  at  Nurem- 
berg whether  he  had  actually  said  this,  Goering  replied,  “Yes,  this  was  said 
in  a moment  of  bad  temper  and  excitement ...  It  was  not  meant  seriously.”  ® 


584  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

dally  to  Goering,  who  now  had  become  responsible  for  the 
economic  well-being  of  Nazi  Germany.  Hilgard,  on  behalf 
of  the  insurance  companies,  pointed  out  that  if  their  pol- 
icies were  not  honored  to  the  Jews,  the  confidence  of  the 
people,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  in  German  insurance 
would  be  forfeited.  On  the  other  hand,  he  did  not  see 
how  many  of  the  smaller  companies  could  pay  up  without 
going  broke. 

This  problem  was  quickly  solved  by  Goering.  The  in- 
surance companies  would  pay  the  Jews  in  full,  but  the  sums 
would  be  confiscated  by  the  State  and  and  the  insurers 
reimbursed  for  a part  of  their  losses.  This  did  not 
satisfy  Herr  Hilgard,  who,  judging  by  the  record  of  the 
meeting,  must  have  felt  that  he  had  fallen  in  with  a 
bunch  of  lunatics. 

Goering:  The  Jew  shall  get  the  refund  from  the  in- 
surance company  but  the  refund  will  be  confiscated.  There 
will  remain  some  profit  for  the  insurance  companies,  since 
they  won’t  have  to  make  good  for  all  the  damage.  Herr  Hil- 
gard, you  may  consider  yourself  damned  lucky. 

Hilgard:  I have  no  reason  to.  The  fact  that  we  won’t 
have  to  pay  for  all  the  damage,  you  call  a profit! 

The  Field  Marshal  was  not  accustomed  to  such  talk  and 
he  quickly  squelched  the  bewildered  businessman. 

Goering:  Just  a moment!  If  you  are  legally  bound  to 
pay  five  millions  and  all  of  a sudden  an  angel  in  my  some- 
what corpulent  shape  appears  before  you  and  tells  you  that 
you  keep  one  million,  for  heaven’s  sake  isn’t  that  a profit? 
I should  like  to  go  fifty-fifty  with  you,  or  whatever  you 
call  it.  I have  only  to  look  at  you.  Your  whole  body  seethes 
with  satisfaction.  You  are  getting  a big  rake-off! 

The  insurance  executive  was  slow  to  see  the  point. 

Hilgard:  All  the  insurance  companies  are  the  losers.  That 
is  so,  and  remains  so.  Nobody  can  tell  me  differently. 

Goering:  Then  why  don’t  you  take  care  of  it  that  a few 
windows  less  are  being  smashed! 

The  Field  Marshal  had  had  enough  of  this  commercial- 
minded  man.  Herr  Hilgard  was  dismissed,  disappearing 
into  the  limbo  of  history. 

A representative  of  the  Foreign  Office  dared  to  suggest 
that  American  public  opinion  be  considered  in  taking 


The  Road  to  War 


585 


further  measures  against  the  Jews.*  This  inspired  an  out- 
burst from  Goering:  “That  country  of  scoundrels!  . . . That 
gangster  state!” 

After  further  lengthy  discussion  it  was  agreed  to  solve 
the  Jewish  question  in  the  following  manner:  eliminate  the 
Jews  from  the  German  economy;  transfer  all  Jewish  busi- 
ness enterprises  and  property,  including  jewelry  and  works 
of  art,  to  Aryan  hands  with  some  compensaton  in  bonds 
from  which  the  Jews  could  use  the  interest  but  not  the 
capital.  The  matter  of  excluding  Jews  from  schools,  re- 
sorts, parks,  forests,  etc.,  and  of  either  expelling  them 
after  they  had  been  deprived  of  all  their  property  or  con- 
fining them  to  German  ghettos  where  they  would  be  im- 
pressed as  forced  labor,  was  left  for  further  consideration 
by  a committee. 

As  Heydrich  put  it  toward  the  close  of  the  meeting: 
“In  spite  of  the  elimination  of  the  Jews  from  economic 
life,  the  main  problem  remains,  namely,  to  kick  the  Jew 
out  of  Germany.”  Count  Schwerin  von  Krosigk,  the  Min- 
ister of  Finance,  the  former  Rhodes  scholar  who  prided 
himself  on  representing  the  “traditional  and  decent  Ger- 
many” in  the  Nazi  government,  agreed  “that  we  will  have 
to  do  everything  to  shove  the  Jews  into  foreign  countries.” 
As  for  the  ghettos,  this  German  nobleman  said  meekly,  “I 
don’t  imagine  the  prospect  of  the  ghetto  is  very  nice.  The 
idea  of  the  ghetto  is  not  a very  agreeable  one.” 

At  2:3Q  p.m. — after  nearly  four  hours — Goering  brought 
the  meeting  to  a close. 

I shall  close  the  meeting  with  these  words:  German  Jewry 
shall,  as  punishment  for  their  abominable  crimes,  et  cetera, 
have  to  make  a contribution  for  one  billion  marks.  That  will 
work.  The  swine  won’t  commit  another  murder.  Incidentally, 
I would  like  to  say  that  I would  not  like  to  be  a Jew  in 
Germany. 

Much  worse  was  to  be  inflicted  on  the  Jews  by  this 

* The  American  ambassador  in  Berlin,  Hugh  Wilson,  was  recalled  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  on  November  14,  two  days  after  Goering’ s meeting,  “for  con- 
sultations,” and  never  returned  to  his  post.  The  German  ambassador  in 
Washington,  Hans  Dieckhoff,  who  on  that  day  reported  to  Berlin  that  “a 
hurricane  is  raging  here”  as  the  result  of  German  pogrom,  was  recalled  on 
November  18  and  likewise  never  returned.  On  November  30,  Hans  Thomsen, 
the  German  charge  d’affaires  in  Washington,  advised  Berlin  by  code  that 
“in  view  of  the  strained  relations  and  the  lack  of  security  for  secret  material” 
in  the  embassy,  the  “secret  political  files”  be  removed  to  Berlin.  “The  files,” 
he  said,  “are  so  bulky  that  they  cannot  be  destroyed  quickly  enough  should 
the  necessity  arise.”7 


586  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

man  and  this  State  and  its  Fuehrer  in  the  course  of  time, 
and  a brief  time  it  turned  out  to  be.  On  the  flaming’ 
riotous  night  of  November  9,  1938,  the  Third  Reich  had 
deliberately  turned  down  a dark  and  savage  road  from 
which  there  was  to  be  no  return.  A good  many  Jews  had 
been  murdered  and  tortured  and  robbed  before,  but  these 
crimes,  except  for  those  which  took  place  in  the  con- 
centration camps,  had  been  committed  mostly  by  brown- 
shirted  rowdies  acting  out  of  their  own  sadism  and 
greed  while  the  State  authorities  looked  on,  or  looked  the 
other  way.  Now  the  German  government  itself  had  or- 
ganized and  carried  out  a vast  pogrom.  The  killings,  the 
looting,  the  burning  of  synagogues  and  houses  and  shops 
on  the  night  of  November  9 were  its  doing.  So  were  the 
official  decrees,  duly  published  in  the  official  gazette,  the 
Reichsgesetzblatt — three  of  them  on  the  day  of  Goering's 
meeting  -which  fined  the  Jewish  community  a billion 
marks,  eliminated  them  from  the  economy,  robbed  them 
of  what  was  left  of  their  property  and  drove  them  toward 
the  ghetto — and  worse. 

World  opinion  was  shocked  and  revolted  by  such 
barbarity  in  a nation  which  boasted  a centuries-old  Chris- 
tian and  humanist  culture.  Hitler,  in  turn,  was  enraged 
by  the  world  reaction  and  convinced  himself  that  it  merely 
proved  the  power  and  scope  of  “the  Jewish  world  con- 
spiracy.” 

In  retrospect,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  horrors  inflicted 
upon  the  Jews  of  Germany  on  November  9 and  the  harsh 
and  brutal  measures  taken  against  them  immediately  aft- 
erward were  portents  of  a fatal  weakening  which  in  the 
end  would  bring  the  dictator,  his  regime  and  his  nation 
down  in  utter  ruin.  The  evidences  of  Hitler’s  megalomania 
we  have  seen  permeating  hundreds  of  pages  of  this  nar- 
rative. But  until  now  he  had  usually  been  able  to  hold  it 
in  check  at  critical  stages  in  his  rise  and  in  that  of  his 
country.  At  such  moments  his  genius  for  acting  not  only 
boldly,  but  usually  only  after  a careful  calculation  of  the 
consequences,  had  won  him  one  crashing  success  after  an- 
other. But  now,  as  November  9 and  its  aftermath  clearly 
showed,  Hitler  was  losing  his  self-control.  His  megalo- 
mania was  getting  the  upper  hand.  The  stenographic  rec- 
ord of  the  Goering  meeting  on  November  12  reveals  that 
it  was  Hitler  who,  in  the  final  analysis,  was  responsible 


The  Road  to  War 


587 


for  the  holocaust  of  that  November  evening;  it  was  he 
who  gave  the  necessary  approval  to  launch  it;  he  who 
pressed  Goering  to  go  ahead  with  the  elimination  of  the 
Jews  from  German  life.  From  now  on  the  absolute  master 
of  the  Third  Reich  would  show  little  of  that  restraint 
which  had  saved  him  so  often  before.  And  though  his 
genius  and  that  of  his  country  would  lead  to  further 
startling  conquests,  the  poisonous  seeds  of  eventual  self- 
destruction  for  the  dictator  and  his  land  had  now  been 
sown. 

Hitler’s  sickness  was  contagious;  the  nation  was  catch- 
ing it,  as  if  it  were  a virus.  Individually,  as  this  writer 
can  testify  from  personal  experience,  many  Germans  were 
as  horrified  by  the  November  9 inferno  as  were  Americans 
and  Englishmen  and  other  foreigners.  But  neither  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Christian  churches  nor  the  generals  nor  any 
other  representatives  of  the  “good”  Germany  spoke  out 
at  once  in  open  protest.  They  bowed  to  what  General  von 
Fritsch  called  “the  inevitable,”  or  “Germany’s  destiny.” 

The  atmosphere  of  Munich  soon  was  dissipated.  At 
Saarbruecken,  at  Weimar,  at  Munich,  Hitler  delivered 
petulant  speeches  that  fall  warning  the  outside  world  and 
particularly  the  British  to  mind  their  own  business  and  to 
quit  concerning  themselves  “with  the  fate  of  Germans 
within  the  frontiers  of  the  Reich.”  That  fate,  he  thundered, 
was  exclusively  Germany’s  affair.  It  could  not  be  long 
before  even  Neville  Chamberlain  would  be  awakened  to  the 
nature  of  the  German  government  which  he  had  gone  so 
far  to  appease.  Gradually,  as  the  eventful  year  of  1938 
gave  way  to  ominous  1939,  the  Prime  Minister  got  wind 
of  what  the  Fuehrer  whom  he  had  tried  so  hard  to  per- 
sonally accommodate  in  the  interest  of  European  peace 
was  up  to  behind  the  scenes.* 

Not  long  after  Munich  Ribbentrop  journeyed  to  Rome. 
His  mind  was  “fixed”  on  war,  Ciano  noted  in  his  diary  of 
October  28.9 

The  Fuehrer  [the  German  Foreign  Minister  told  Musso- 

* On  January  28,  1939,  Lord  Halifax  secretly  warned  President  Roosevelt 
that  “as  early  as  November  1938,  there  were  indications  which  gradually 
became  more  definite  that  Hitler  was  planning  a further  foreign  adventure 
for  the  spring  of  1939.”  The  British  Foreign  Secretary  said  that  “reports 
indicate  that  Hitler,  encouraged  by  Ribbentrop,  Himmler  and  others,  is  con- 
sidering an  attack  on  the  Western  Powers  as  a preliminary  to  subsequent 
action  in  the  East.”8 


588 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

lini  and  Ciano]  is  convinced  that  we  must  inevitably 
count  on  a war  with  the  Western  democracies  in  the  course 
of  a few  years,  perhaps  three  or  four  . . . The  Czech  crisis 
has  shown  our  power!  We  have  the  advantage  of  the  initia- 
tive and  are  masters  of  the  situation.  We  cannot  be  at- 
tacked. The  military  situation  is  excellent:  as  from  September 
[1939]  we  could  face  a war  with  the  great  democracies.* 

To  the  young  Italian  Foreign  Minister,  Ribbentrop  was 
“vain,  frivolous,  and  loquacious,”  and  in  so  describing  him 
in  his  diary  he  added,  “The  Duce  says  you  only  have  to 
look  at  his  head  to  see  that  he  has  a small  brain.”  The 
German  Foreign  Minister  had  come  to  Rome  to  persuade 
Mussolini  to  sign  a military  alliance  between  Germany, 
Japan  and  Italy,  a draft  of  which  had  been  given  the 
Italians  at  Munich;  but  Mussolini  stalled  for  time.  He  was 
not  yet  ready,  Ciano  noted,  to  shut  the  door  on  Britain 
and  France. 

Hitler  himself  toyed  that  autumn  with  the  idea  of  try- 
ing to  detach  France  from  her  ally  over  the  Channel. 
When  on  October  18  he  received  the  French  ambassador, 
Fran?ois-Poncet,  for  a farewell  visit  in  the  eerie  fastness 
of  Eagle’s  Nest,  high  above  Berchtesgaden  on  a mountain- 
top, t he  broke  out  into  a bitter  attack  on  Great  Britain. 
The  ambassador  found  the  Fuehrer  pale,  his  face  drawn 
with  fatigue,  but  not  too  tired  to  inveigh  against  Albion. 
Britain  re-echoed  “with  threats  and  calls  to  arms.”  She 
was  selfish  and  took  on  “superior”  airs.  It  was  the  British 
who  were  destroying  the  spirit  of  Munich.  And  so  on. 
France  was  different.  Hitler  said  he  wanted  more  friendly 
and  close  relations  with  her.  To  prove  it,  he  was  willing 
to  sign  at  once  a pact  of  friendship,  guaranteeing  their 
present  frontiers  (and  thus  again  renouncing  any  German 

* A German  version  of  Ribhentrop’s  talk  with  Ciano  in  Rome  on  October  28, 
drawn  up  by  Dr.  Schmidt,  confirms  Ribbentrop’s  bellicose  attitude  and 
quotes  him  as  saying  that  Germany  and  Italy  must  prepare  for  “armed  con- 
flict with  the  Western  democracies  . . . here  and  now.”  At  this  meeting  Rib- 
bentrop also  assured.  Ciano  that  Munich  had  revealed  the  strength  of  the 
is2i^*°”lsts  ln.  the  U.S.A.  “so  that  there  is  nothing  to  fear  from  America.”10 
' Thi!s  4,antast.lc  retreat,  built  at  great  cost  over  three  years,  was  difficult  to 
reach.  Ten  miles  of  a hairpin  road,  cut  into  the  mountainside,  led  up  to  a 
long  underground  passageway,  drilled  into  the  rock,  from  which  an  elevator 
carried  one  370  feet  to  the  cabin  perched  at  an  elevation  of  over  6,000  feet 
on  the  summit  of  a mountain..  It  afforded  a breath-taking  panorama  of  the 
Alps.  Salzburg  could  be  seen  in  the  distance.  Describing  it  later,  Francois- 
roncet  wondered,  “Was  this  edifice  the  work  of  a normal  mind  or  of  one 
tormented  by  megalomania  and  haunted  by  visions  of  domination  and 
solitude?  ' 


The  Road  to  War 


589 


claims  to  Alsace-Lorraine)  and  proposing  to  settle  any 
future  differences  by  consultation. 

The  pact  was  duly  signed  in  Paris  on  December  6,  1938, 
by  the  German  and  French  foreign  ministers.  France,  by 
that  time,  had  somewhat  recovered  from  the  defeatist 
panic  of  the  Munich  days.  The  writer  happened  to  be  in 
Paris  on  the  day  the  paper  was  signed  and  noted  the  frosty 
atmosphere.  When  Ribbentrop  drove  through  the  streets 
they  were  completely  deserted,  and  several  cabinet  min- 
isters and  other  leading  figures  in  the  French  political  and 
literary  worlds,  including  the  eminent  presidents  of  the 
Senate  and  the  Chamber,  MM.  Jeanneney  and  Herriot  re- 
spectively, refused  to  attend  the  social  functions  accorded 
the  Nazi  visitor. 

From  this  meeting  of  Bonnet  and  Ribbentrop  stemmed 
a misunderstanding  which  was  to  play  a certain  part  in 
future  events.  The  German  Foreign  Minister  claimed  that 
Bonnet  had  assured  him  that  after  Munich  France  was 
no  longer  interested  in  Eastern  Europe  and  he  subse- 
quently interpreted  this  as  meaning  that  the  French  would 
give  Germany  a free  hand  in  this  region,  especially  in 
regard  to  rump  Czechoslovakia  and  Poland.  Bonnet  de- 
nied this.  According  to  Schmidt’s  minutes  of  the  meeting, 
Bonnet  declared,  in  answer  to  Ribbentrop’s  demand  that 
Germany’s  sphere  of  influence  in  the  East  be  recognized, 
that  “conditions  had  changed  fundamentally  since  Mu- 
nich.” 11  This  ambiguous  remark  was  soon  stretched  by 
the  slippery  German  Foreign  Minister  into  the  flat  state- 
ment, which  he  passed  along  to  Hitler,  that  “at  Paris  Bonnet 
had  declared  he  was  no  longer  interested  in  questions  con- 
cerning the  East.”  France’s  swift  surrender  at  Munich  had 
already  convinced  the  Fuehrer  of  this.  It  was  not  quite 
true. 

SLOVAKIA  “WINS”  ITS  “INDEPENDENCE” 

What  had  happened  to  the  German  guarantee  of  the 
rest  of  Czechoslovakia  which  Hitler  had  solemnly  prom- 
ised at  Munich  to  give?  When  the  new  French  ambassador 
in  Berlin,  Robert  Coulondre,  inquired  of  Weizsaecker  on 
December  21,  1938,  the  State  Secretary  replied  that  the 
destiny  of  Czechoslovakia  lay  in  the  hands  of  Germany 
and  that  he  rejected  the  idea  of  a British-French  guaran- 


590 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tee.  As  far  back  as  October  14,  when  the  new  Czech 
Foreign  Minister,  FrantiSek  Chvalkovsky,  had  come  hum- 
bly begging  for  crumbs  at  the  hand  of  Hitler  in  Munich 
and  had  inquired  whether  Germany  was  going  to  join 
Britain  and  France  in  the  guarantee  of  his  country’s 
shrunken  frontiers,  the  Fuehrer  replied  sneeringly  that  “the 
British  and  French  guarantees  were  worthless  . . . and  that 
the  only  effective  guarantee  was  that  by  Germany.”  12 

Yet,  as  1939  began,  it  was  still  not  forthcoming.  The 
reason  was  simple.  The  Fuehrer  had  no  intention  of  giving 
it.  Such  a guarantee  would  have  interfered  with  the  plans 
which  he  had  begun  to  lay  immediately  after  Munich. 
Soon  there  would  be  no  Czechoslovakia  to  guarantee.  To 
start  with,  Slovakia  would  be  induced  to  break  away. 

A few  days  after  Munich,  on  October  17,  Goering  had 
received  two  Slovak  leaders,  Ferdinand  Durcansky  and 
Mach,  and  the  leader  of  the  German  minority  in 
Slovakia,  Franz  Karmasin.  Durcansky,  who  was  Deputy 
Prime  Minister  of  the  newly  appointed  autonomous  Slo- 
vakia, assured  the  Field  Marshal  that  what  the  Slovaks 
really  wanted  was  “complete  independence,  with  very  close 
political,  economic  and  military  ties  with  Germany.”  In  a 
secret  Foreign  Office  memorandum  of  the  same  date  it 
was  noted  that  Goering  had  decided  that  independence  for 
Slovakia  must  be  supported.  “A  Czech  State  minus  Slo- 
vakia is  even  more  completely  at  our  mercy.  Air  base  in 
Slovakia  for  operation  against  the  East  very  important.”  13 
Such  were  Goering’s  thoughts  on  the  matter  in  mid- 
October. 

We  must  here  attempt  to  follow  a double  thread  in  the 
German  plan:  to  detach  Slovakia  from  Prague,  and  to  pre- 
pare for  the  liquidation  of  what  remained  of  the  state  by 
the  military  occupation  of  the  Czech  lands,  Bohemia  and 
Moravia.  On  October  21,  1938,  as  we  have  seen,  Hitler 
had  directed  the  Wehrmacht  to  be  ready  to  carry  out  that 
liquidation.*  On  December  17,  General  Keitel  issued  what 
he  called  a “supplement  to  Directive  of  October  21”: 

TOP  SECRET 

With  reference  to  the  “liquidation  of  the  Rump  Czech 
State,”  the  Fuehrer  has  given  the  following  orders: 

* November  24,  Hitler  issued  another  secret  directive  instructing  the 
Wehrmacht  to  make  preparations  for  the  military  occupation  of  Danzig,  but 
that  will  be  taken  up  later.  Already  the  Fuehrer  was  looking  beyond  the  final 
conquest  of  Czechoslovakia. 


The  Road  to  War 


591 


The  operation  is  to  be  prepared  on  the  assumption  that  no 
resistance  worth  mentioning  is  to  be  expected. 

To  the  outside  world  it  must  clearly  appear  that  it  is 
merely  a peaceful  action  and  not  a warlike  undertaking. 

The  action  must  therefore  be  carried  out  by  the  peacetime 
armed  forces  only,  without  reinforcement  by  mobiliza- 
tion . . ,14 

Try  as  it  might  to  please  Hitler,  the  new  pro-German 
government  of  Czechoslovakia  began  to  realize  as  the  new 
year  began  that  the  country’s  goose  was  cooked.  Just  be- 
fore Christmas,  1938,  the  Czech  cabinet,  in  order  to 
further  appease  the  Fuehrer,  had  dissolved  the  Communist 
Party  and  suspended  all  Jewish  teachers  in  German 
schools.  On  January  12,  1939,  Foreign  Minister  Chvalkov- 
sky,  in  a message  to  the  German  Foreign  Office,  stressed 
that  his  government  “will  endeavor  to  prove  its  loyalty 
and  good  will  by  far-reaching  fulfillment  of  Germany’s 
wishes.”  On  the  same  day  he  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  German  charge  in  Prague  the  spreading  rumors  “that 
the  incorporation  of  Czechoslovakia  into  the  Reich  was 
imminent.”  15 

To  see  if  even  the  pieces  could  be  saved  Chvalkovsky 
finally  prevailed  upon  Hitler  to  receive  him  in  Berlin  on 
January  21.  It  turned  out  to  be  a painful  scene,  though  not 
as  painful  for  the  Czechs  as  one  that  would  shortly  follow. 
The  Czech  Foreign  Minister  groveled  before  the  mighty 
German  dictator,  who  was  in  one  of  his  most  bullying 
moods.  Czechoslovakia,  said  Hitler,  had  been  saved  from 
catastrophe  by  “Germany’s  moderation.”  Nevertheless,  un- 
less the  Czechs  showed  a different  spirit,  he  would  “an- 
nihilate” them.  They  must  forget  their  “history,”  which 
was  “schoolboy  nonsense,”  and  do  as  the  Germans 
bade.  That  was  their  only  salvation.  Specifically,  Czecho- 
slovakia must  leave  the  League  of  Nations,  drastically  re- 
duce the  size  of  her  Army — “because  it  did  not  count 
anyway” — join  the  Anti-Comintern  Pact,  accept  German 
direction  of  her  foreign  policy,  make  a preferential  trade 
agreement  with  Germany,  one  condition  of  which  was  that 
no  new  Czech  industries  could  be  established  without  Ger- 
man consent,*  dismiss  all  officials  and  editors  not  friendly 

* Hitler  also  demanded  that  the  Czechoslovak  National  Bank  turn  over  part 
of  its  gold  reserve  to  the  Reichsbank.  The  sum  requested  was  391.2  million 
Czech  crowns  in  gold.  On  February  18  Goering  wrote  the  German  Foreign 
Office:  “In  view  of  the  increasingly  difficult  currency  position,  I must  insist 


592 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  the  Reich  and,  finally,  outlaw  the  Jews,  as  Germany 
had  done  under  its  Nuremberg  Laws.  (“With  us,  the  Jews 
will  be  destroyed,”  Hitler  told  his  visitor.)  On  the  same 
day  Chvalkovsky  received  further  demands  from  Ribben- 
trop,  who  threatened  “catastrophic  consequences”  unless 
the  Czechs  immediately  mended  their  ways  and  did  as 
they  were  told.  The  German  Foreign  Minister,  so  much 
the  lackey  in  the  presence  of  Hitler  but  a boor  and  a 
bully  with  anyone  over  whom  he  had  the  upper  hand, 
bade  Chvalkovsky  not  to  mention  the  new  German  de- 
mands to  the  British  and  French  but  just  to  go  ahead 
and  carry  them  out.17 

And  to  do  so  without  worrying  about  any  German 
guarantee  of  the  Czech  frontiers!  Apparently  there  had 
been  little  worry  about  this  in  Paris  and  Ixindon.  Four 
months  had  gone  by  since  Munich,  and  still  Hitler  had 
not  honored  his  word  to  add  Germany’s  guarantee  to  that 
given  by  Britain  and  France.  Finally  on  February  8 an 
Anglo-French  note  vebale  was  presented  in  Berlin  stat- 
ing that  the  two  governments  “would  now  be  glad  to  learn 
the  views  of  the  German  Government  as  to  the  best  way 
of  giving  effect  to  the  understanding  reached  at  Munich  in 
regard  to  the  guarantee  of  Czechoslovakia.”  18 

Hitler  himself,  as  the  captured  German  Foreign  Office 
documents  establish,  drafted  the  reply,  which  was  not 
made  until  February  28.  It  said  that  the  time  had  not  yet 
come  for  a German  guarantee.  Germany  would  have  to 
“await  first  a clarification  of  the  internal  development  of 
Czechoslovakia.”  19 

The  Fuehrer  already  was  shaping  that  “internal  devel- 
opment” toward  an  obvious  end.  On  February  12  he  re- 
ceived as  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  Dr.  Vojtech  Tuka, 
one  of  the  Slovak  leaders,  whose  long  imprisonment  had 
embittered  him  against  the  Czechs.* *  Addressing  Hitler  as 
“my  Fuehrer,”  as  the  secret  German  memorandum  of  the 
talk  emphasizes,  Dr.  Tuka  begged  the  German  dictator  to 
make  Slovakia  independent  and  free.  “I  lay  the  destiny  of 
my  people  in  your  hands,  my  Fuehrer,”  he  declared.  “My 
people  await  their  complete  liberation  from  you.” 

most  strongly  that  the  30  to  40  million  Reichsmarks  in  gold  [from  the  Czech 
National  Bank]  which  are  involved  come  into  our  possession  very  shortly; 
they  are  urgently  required  for  the  execution  of  important  orders  of  the 
Fuehrer.”18 

* See  above,  p.  487. 


The  Road  to  War 


593 


Hitler’s  reply  was  somewhat  evasive.  He  said  that  un- 
fortunately he  had  not  understood  the  Slovak  problem. 
Had  he  known  the  Slovaks  wanted  to  be  independent  he 
would  have  arranged  it  at  Munich.  It  would  be  “a  comfort 
to  him  to  know  that  Slovakia  was  independent  . . . He 
could  guarantee  an  independent  Slovakia  at  any  time, 
even  today  . . .”  These  were  comforting  words  to  Professor 
Tuka  too.20  “This,”  he  said  later,  “was  the  greatest  day 
of  my  life.” 

The  curtain  on  the  next  act  of  the  Czechoslovak  tragedy 
could  now  go  up.  By  another  one  of  those  ironies  with 
which  this  narrative  history  is  so  full,  it  was  the  Czechs  in 
Prague  who  forced  the  curtain  up  a little  prematurely.  By 
the  beginning  of  March  1938  they  were  caught  in  a terrible 
dilemma.  The  separatist  movements  in  Slovakia  and 
Ruthenia,  fomented,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  German  gov- 
ernment (and  in  Ruthenia  also  by  Hungary,  which  was 
hungry  to  annex  that  little  land)  had  reached  such  a 
state  that  unless  they  were  squelched  Czechoslovakia 
would  break  up.  In  that  case  Hitler  would  surely  occupy 
Prague.  If  the  separatists  were  put  down  by  the  centri 
government,  then  the  Fuehrer,  just  as  certainly,  would  take 
advantage  of  the  resulting  disturbance  to  also  march  into 
Prague. 

The  Czech  government,  after  much  hesitation  and  only 
after  the  provocation  became  unbearable,  chose  the  second 
alternative.  On  March  6,  Dr.  Hacha,  the  President  of 
Czechoslovakia,  dismissed  the  autonomous  Ruthenian  gov- 
ernment from  office,  and  on  the  night  of  March  9-10  the 
autonomous  Slovakian  government.  The  next  day  he  or- 
dered the  arrest  of  Monsignor  Tiso,  the  Slovak  Premier,  Dr. 
Tuka  and  Durcansky  and  proclaimed  martial  law  in  Slo- 
vakia. The  one  courageous  move  of  this  government,  which 
had  become  so  servile  to  Berlin,  quickly  turned  into  a 
disaster  which  destroyed  it. 

The  swift  action  by  the  tottering  Prague  government 
caught  Berlin  by  surprise.  Goering  had  gone  off  to  sunny 
San  Remo  for  a vacation.  Hitler  was  on  the  point  of  leav- 
ing for  Vienna  to  celebrate  the  first  anniversary  of  the 
Anschluss.  But  now  the  master  improviser  went  feverishly 
to  work.  On  March  11,  he  decided  to  take  Bohemia  and 
Moravia  by  ultimatum.  The  text  was  drafted  that  day  on 


594 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Hitler’s  orders  by  General  Keitel  and  sent  to  the  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office.  It  called  upon  the  Czechs  to  submit 
to  military  occupation  without  resistance.21  For  the  mo- 
ment, however,  it  remained  a “top  military  secret.” 

It  was  now  time  for  Hitler  to  “liberate”  Slovakia.  Karol 
Sidor,  who  had  represented  the  autonomous  Slovak  govern- 
ment at  Prague,  was  named  by  President  Hacha  to  be 
the  new  Premier  of  it  in  place  of  Monsignor  Tiso.  Returning 
to  Bratislava,  the  Slovak  seat  of  government,  on  Saturday, 
March  11,  Sidor  called  a meeting  of  his  new  cabinet.  At 
ten  o’clock  in  the  evening  the  session  of  the  Slovak  govern- 
ment was  interrupted  by  strange  and  unexpected  visitors. 
Seyss-Inquart,  the  quisling  Nazi  Governor  of  Austria,  and 
Josef  Buerckel,  the  Nazi  Gauleiter  of  Austria,  accompanied 
by  five  German  generals,  pushed  their  way  into  the  meet- 
ing and  told  the  cabinet  ministers  to  proclaim  the  inde- 
pendence of  Slovakia  at  once.  Unless  they  did.  Hitler,  who 
had  decided  to  settle  the  question  of  Slovakia  definitely 
and  now,  would  disinterest  himself  in  the  fate  of  Slo- 
vakia.22 

Sidor,  who  opposed  severing  all  links  with  the  Czechs, 
stalled  for  time,  but  the  next  morning  Monsignor  Tiso, 
who  had  escaped  from  a monastery  where  he  supposedly 
was  under  house  arrest,  demanded  a cabinet  meeting, 
though  he  was  no  longer  himself  in  the  cabinet.  To  fore- 
stall further  interruptions  by  high  German  officials  and 
generals,  Sidor  called  the  meeting  in  his  own  apartment, 
and  when  this  became  unsafe — for  German  storm  troopers 
were  taking  over  the  town — he  adjourned  it  to  the  offices 
of  a local  newspaper.  There  Tiso  informed  him  that  he 
had  just  received  a telegram  from  Buerckel  inviting  him 
to  go  at  once  to  see  the  Fuehrer  in  Berlin.  If  he  refused 
the  invitation,  Buerckel  threatened,  two  German  divisions 
across  the  Danube  from  Bratislava  would  march  in  and 
Slovakia  would  be  divided  up  between  Germany  and 
Hungary.  Arriving  in  Vienna  the  next  morning,  Monday, 
March  13,  with  the  intention  of  proceeding  to  Berlin  by 
train,  the  chubby  little  prelate  * was  packed  into  a plane 

* Monsignor  Tiso,  as  this  writer  recalls  him,  was  almost  as  broad  as  he  was 
high.  He  was  an  enormous  eater.  “When  I get  worked  up,”  he  once  told  Dr. 
Paul  Schmidt,  “I  eat  half  a pound  of  ham,  and  that  soothes  my  nerves.”  He 
was  to  die  on  the  gallows.  Arrested  by  American  Army  authorities  on  June 
8,  1945,  and  turned  over  to  the  newly  restored  Czechoslovakia,  he  was  con- 
demned to  death  on  April  15,  1947,  after  a trial  lasting  four  months,  and 
was  executed  on  April  18. 


The  Road  to  War 


595 


by  the  Germans  and  flown  to  the  presence  of  Hitler.  For 
the  Fuehrer,  there  was  no  time  to  waste. 

When  Tiso  and  Durcansky  arrived  at  the  Chancellery  in 
Berlin  at  7:40  on  the  evening  of  March  13,  they  found 
Hitler  flanked  not  only  by  Ribbentrop  but  by  his  two  top 
generals,  Brauchitsch,  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Ger- 
man Army,  and  Keitel,  Chief  of  OKW.  Though  they  may 
not  have  realized  it,  the  Slovaks  also  found  the  Fuehrer  in 
a characteristic  mood.  Here  again,  thanks  to  the  captured 
confidential  minutes  of  the  meeting,  we  may  peer  into  the 
weird  mind  of  the  German  dictator,  rapidly  giving  way  to 
megalomania,  and  watch  him  spinning  his  fantastic  lies 
and  uttering  his  dire  threats  in  a manner  and  to  an  extent 
which  he  no  doubt  was  sure  would  never  come  to  public 
attention.23 

“Czechoslovakia,”  he  said,  “owed  it  only  to  Germany 
that  she  had  not  been  mutilated  further.”  The  Reich  had 
exhibited  “the  greatest  self-control.”  Yet  the  Czechs  had 
not  appreciated  this.  “During  recent  weeks,”  he  went  on, 
working  himself  up  easily  to  a fine  lather,  “conditions 
have  become  impossible.  The  old  Benes  spirit  has  come 
to  life  again.” 

The  Slovaks  had  also  disappointed  him.  After  Munich 
he  had  “fallen  out”  with  his  friends  the  Hungarians  by 
not  permitting  them  to  grab  Slovakia.  He  had  thought 
Slovakia  wanted  to  be  independent. 

He  had  now  summoned  Tiso  in  order  to  clear  up  this  ques- 
tion in  a very  short  time.*  . . . The  question  was:  Did 
Slovakia  want  to  lead  an  independent  existence  or  not?  . . . 
It  was  a question  not  of  days  but  of  hours.  If  Slovakia 
wished  to  become  independent  he  would  support  and  even 
guarantee  it  ...  If  she  hesitated  or  refused  to  be  separated 
from  Prague,  he  would  leave  the  fate  of  Slovakia  to  events 
for  which  he  was  no  longer  responsible. 

At  this  point,  the  German  minutes  reveal,  Ribbentrop 
“handed  to  the  Fuehrer  a report  just  received  announcing 
Hungarian  troop  movements  on  the  Slovak  frontier.  The 
Fuehrer  read  this  report,  told  Tiso  of  its  contents,  and 
expressed  the  hope  that  Slovakia  would  reach  a decision 
soon.” 

Tiso  did  not  give  his  decision  then.  He  asked  the  Fueh- 
rer to  “pardon  him  if,  under  the  impact  of  the  Chan- 


Italics  in  the  original  German  minutes. 


596  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

cellor’s  words,  he  could  make  no  definite  decision  at 
once.  But  the  Slovaks,  he  quickly  added,  “would  prove 
themselves  worthy  of  the  Fuehrer’s  benevolence.” 

This  they  did  in  a conference  which  continued  far  into 
the  night  at  the  Foreign  Ministry.  According  to  the 
Nuremberg  testimony  of  Keppler,  who  had  been  Hitler’s 
secret  agent  in  Bratislava,  as  he  had  been  the  year  before 
in  Vienna  on  the  eve  of  the  Anschluss,  the  Germans 
helped  Tiso  draft  a telegram,  which  the  “Premier”  was 
to  send  as  soon  as  he  returned  to  Bratislava,  proclaiming 
Slovakia’s  independence  and  urgently  requesting  the  Fueh- 
rer to  take  over  the  protection  of  the  new  state.24  It  is 
reminiscent  of  the  “telegram”  dictated  by  Goering  just  a 
year  before  in  which  Seyss-Inquart  was  to  appeal  to  Hitler 
to  send  German  troops  to  Austria.  By  this  time  the  Nazi 
“telegram”  technique  had  been  perfected.  The  telegram, 
considerably  abridged,  was  duly  dispatched  by  Tiso  on 
March  16,  and  Hitler  immediately  replied  that  he  would 
be  glad  to  “take  over  the  protection  of  the  Slovak  State.” 

At  the  Foreign  Office  that  night  Ribbentrop  also  drafted 
the  Slovak  proclamation  of  “independence”  and  had  it 
translated  into  Slovak  in  time  for  Tiso  to  take  it  back  to 
Bratislava,  where  the  “Premier”  read  it — in  slightly  altered 
form,  as  one  German  agent  reported — to  Parliament  on 
the  following  day,  Tuesday,  March  14.  Attempts  by  sev- 
eral Slovak  deputies  to  at  least  discuss  it  were  squelched 
by  Karmasin,  the  leader  of  the  German  minority,  who 
warned  that  German  troops  would  occupy  the  country  if 
there  was  any  delay  in  proclaiming  independence.  Faced 
with  this  threat  the  doubting  deputies  gave  in. 

Thus  was  “independent”  Slovakia  born  on  March  14, 
1939.  Though  British  diplomatic  representatives  were 
quick  to  inform  London  as  to  the  manner  of  its  birth, 
Chamberlain,  as  we  shall  see,  was  just  as  quick  to  use 
Slovakia’s  “secession”  as  an  excuse  for  Britain  not  to 
honor  its  guarantee  of  Czechoslovakia  after  Hitler  on 
that  very  evening,  March  14,  acted  to  finish  what  had 
been  left  undone  at  Munich. 

The  life  of  the  Czechoslovak  Republic  of  Masaryk  and 
Benes  had  now  run  out.  And  once  again  the  harassed 
leaders  in  Prague  played  into  Hitler’s  hands  to  set  up  the 
final  act  of  their  country’s  tragedy.  The  aging,  bewildered 


The  Road  to  War 


597 


President  Hacha  asked  to  be  received  by  the  Fuehrer.* 
Hitler  graciously  consented.  It  gave  him  an  opportunity  to 
set  the  stage  for  one  of  the  most  brazen  acts  of  his  entire 
career. 

Consider  how  well  the  dictator  had  already  arranged 
the  set  as  he  waited  on  the  afternoon  of  March  14  for 
the  President  of  Czechoslovakia  to  arrive.  The  proclama- 
tions of  independence  of  Slovakia  and  Ruthenia,  which  he 
had  so  skillfully  engineered,  left  Prague  with  only  the 
Czech  core  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia.  Had  not  Czechoslo- 
vakia in  reality  ceased  to  exist — the  nation  whose  fron- 
tiers Britain  and  France  had  guaranteed  against  aggres- 
sion? Chamberlain  and  Daladier,  his  partners  at  Munich 
where  the  guarantee  had  been  solemnly  given,  already  had 
their  “out.”  That  they  would  take  it  he  had  no  doubt — 
and  he  was  right.  That  disposed  of  any  danger  of  foreign 
intervention.  But  to  make  doubly  sure — to  see  to  it  that 
his  next  move  looked  quite  legal  and  legitimate  by  the 
vague  standards  of  international  law,  at  least  on  paper — 
he  would  force  the  weak  and  senile  Hacha,  who  had 
begged  to  see  him,  to  accept  the  very  solution  which  he 
had  intended  to  achieve  by  military  force.  And  in  so 
doing  he  could  make  it  appear — he,  who,  alone  in  Europe, 
had  mastered  the  new  technique  of  bloodless  conquest,  as 
the  Anschluss  and  Munich  had  proved — that  the  Presi- 
dent of  Czechoslovakia  had  actually  and  formally  asked 
for  it.  The  niceties  of  “legality,”  which  he  had  perfected 
so  well  in  taking  over  power  in  Germany,  would  be  pre- 
served in  the  conquest  of  a non-Germanic  land. 

Hitler  had  also  set  the  stage  to  fool  the  German  and 
other  gullible  people  in  Europe.  For  several  days  now 
German  provocateurs  had  been  trying  to  stir  up  trouble 
in  various  Czech  towns,  Prague,  Bruenn  and  Iglau.  They 
had  not  had  much  success  because,  as  the  German  Lega- 
tion in  Prague  reported,  the  Czech  “police  have  been  in- 
structed to  take  no  action  against  Germans,  even  in  cases 
of  provocation.”  26  But  this  failure  did  not  prevent  Dr. 

* There  is  a difference  of  opinion  on  this  point.  Some  historians  have  con- 
tended that  the  Germans  forced  Hacha  to  come  to  Berlin.  They  probably 
base  this  contention  on  a dispatch  of  the  French  ambassador  in  Berlin,  who 
said  he  had  learned  this  “from  a reliable  source.”  But  the  German  Foreign 
Office  documents,  subsequently  discovered,  make  it  clear  that  the  initiative 
came  from  Hacha.  He  first  requested  an  interview  with  Hitler  on  March  13, 
through  the  German  Legation  in  Prague,  and  repeated  the  request  on  the 
morning  of  the  fourteenth.  Hitler  agreed  to  it  that  afternoon.26 


598 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Goebbels  from  whipping  up  the  German  press  into  a 
frenzy  over  invented  acts  of  terror  by  the  Czechs  against 
the  poor  Germans.  As  the  French  ambassador,  M.  Coulon- 
dre,  informed  Paris,  they  were  the  same  stories  with  the 
same  headlines  which  Dr.  Goebbels  had  concocted  during 
the  Sudeten  crisis — down  to  the  pregnant  German  woman 
struck  down  by  Czech  beasts  and  the  general  "Blutbad" 
( blood  bath”)  to  which  the  defenseless  Germans  were 
being  subjected  by  the  Czech  barbarians.  Hitler  could  as- 
sure the  proud  German  people  that  their  kinsmen  would 
not  remain  unprotected  for  long. 

Such  was  the  situation  and  such  were  Hitler’s  plans, 
we  now  know  from  the  German  archives,  as  the  train 
bearing  President  Hacha  and  his  Foreign  Minister 
Chvalkovsky,  drew  into  the  Anhalt  Station  in  Berlin  at 
10:40  on  the  evening  of  March  14.  Because  of  a heart 
condition  the  President  had  been  unable  to  fly. 

THE  ORDEAL  OF  DR.  HACHA 

The  German  protocol  was  perfect.  The  Czech  Presi- 
dent was  accorded  all  the  formal  honors  due  to  a head  of 
state.  There  was  a military  guard  of  honor  at  the  station, 
where  the  German  Foreign  Minister  himself  greeted  the 
distinguished  visitor  and  slipped  his  daughter  a fine  bou- 
quet of  flowers.  At  the  swank  Adlon  Hotel,  where  the 
party  was  put  up  in  the  best  suite,  there  were  chocolates 
for  Miss  Hacha— a personal  gift  of  Adolf  Hitler,  who 
believed  that  everyone  else  shared  his  craving  for  sweets. 
And  when  the  aged  President  and  his  Foreign  Minister 
arrived  at  the  Chancellery  he  was  given  a salute  by  an 
S.S.  guard  of  honor. 

They  were  not  summoned  to  Hitler’s  presence  until 
1:15  a.m.  Hacha  must  have  known  what  was  in  store  for 
him.  Before  his  train  had  left  Czech  territory  he  learned 
from  Prague  that  German  troops  had  already  occupied 
Moravska-Ostrava,  an  important  Czech  industrial  town, 
and  were  poised  all  along  the  perimeter  of  Bohemia  and 
Moravia  to  strike.  And  he  saw  at  once,  as  he  entered  the 
Fuehrer’s  study  in  the  early-morning  hour,  that,  besides 
Ribbentrop  and  Weizsaecker,  Field  Marshal  Goering, 
who  had  been  urgently  recalled  from  his  holiday  at  San 
Remo,  and  General  Keitel  stood  at  Hitler’s  side  Most 


The  Road  to  War 


599 


probably,  as  he  went  into  this  lion’s  den,  he  did  not  notice 
that  Hitler’s  physician,  the  quack  Dr.  Theodor  Morell, 
was  on  tap.  But  the  doctor  was,  and  for  good  reason. 

The  secret  German  minutes  of  the  meeting  reveal  a 
pitiful  scene  at  the  very  outset.  The  unhappy  Dr.  Hacha, 
despite  his  background  as  a respected  judge  of  the  Su- 
preme Court,  shed  all  human  dignity  by  groveling  before 
the  swaggering  German  Fuehrer.  Perhaps  the  President 
thought  that  only  in  this  way  could  he  appeal  to  Hitler’s 
generosity  and  save  something  for  his  people;  but  re- 
gardless of  his  motive,  his  words,  as  the  Germans  recorded 
them  for  their  confidential  archives,  nauseate  the  reader 
even  so  long  afterward  as  today.  He  himself,  Hacha 
assured  Hitler,  had  never  mixed  in  politics.  He  had 
rarely  seen  the  founders  of  the  Czechoslovak  Republic, 
Masaryk  and  Benes,  and  what  he  had  seen  of  them  he 
did  not  like.  Their  regime,  he  said,  was  “alien”  to  him — 
“so  alien  that  immediately  after  the  change  of  regime 
[after  Munich]  he  had  asked  himself  whether  it  was  a 
good  thing  for  Czechoslovakia  to  be  an  independent  state 
at  all.” 

He  was  convinced  that  the  destiny  of  Czechoslovakia  lay 
in  the  Fuehrer’s  hands,  and  he  believed  it  was  in  safe- 
keeping in  such  hands  . . . Then  he  came  to  what  affected 
him  most,  the  fate  of  his  people.  He  felt  that  it  was  pre- 
cisely the  Fuehrer  who  would  understand  his  holding  the 
view  that  Czechoslovakia  had  the  right  to  live  a national 
life  . . . Czechoslovakia  was  being  blamed  because  there 
still  existed  many  supporters  of  the  Benes  system  . . . The 
Government  was  trying  by  every  means  to  silence  them. 
This  was  about  all  he  had  to  say. 

Adolf  Hitler  then  said  all  there  was  to  say.  After  re- 
hearsing all  the  alleged  wrongs  which  the  Czechoslovakia 
of  Masaryk  and  Benes  had  done  to  Germans  and  Ger- 
many, and  reiterating  that  unfortunately  the  Czechs  had 
not  changed  since  Munich,  he  came  to  the  point. 

He  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  this  journey  by  the 
President,  despite  his  advanced  years,  might  be  of  great  bene- 
fit to  his  country  because  it  was  only  a matter  of  hours 
now  before  Germany  intervened  ...  He  harbored  no  enmity 
against  any  nation  . . . That  the  Rump  State  of  Czechoslo- 
vakia existed  at  all  was  attributable  only  to  his  loyal  atti- 
tude ...  In  the  autumn  he  had  not  wished  to  draw  the 


600 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


final  conclusions  because  he  had  thought  a coexistence  possi- 
ble, but  he  had  left  no  doubt  that  if  the  Benes  tendencies 
did  not  disappear  completely  he  would  destroy  this  state 
completely. 

They  had  not  disappeared,  and  he  gave  “examples.” 

And  so  last  Sunday,  March  12,  the  die  was  cast  . . . He  had 
given  the  order  for  the  invasion  by  the  German  troops 
and  for  the  incorporation  of  Czechoslovakia  into  the  German 
Reich.* 

“Hacha  and  Chvalkovsky,”  noted  Dr.  Schmidt,  “sat  as 
though  turned  to  stone.  Only  their  eyes  showed  that  they 
were  alive.”  But  Hitler  was  not  quite  through.  He  must 
humble  his  guests  with  threats  of  Teutonic  terror. 

The  German  Army  [Hitler  continued]  had  already 
marched  in  today,  and  at  a barracks  where  resistance  was 
offered  it  had  been  ruthlessly  broken. 

Tomorrow  morning  at  six  o’clock  the  German  Army  was  to 
enter  Czechia  from  all  sides  and  the  German  Air  Force 
would  occupy  the  Czech  airfields.  There  were  two  possibili- 
ties. The  first  was  that  the  entry  of  German  troops  might 
develop  into  fighting.  In  that  case,  resistance  would  be  bro- 
ken by  brute  force.  The  other  possibility  was  that  the  entry 
of  the  German  troops  would  take  place  in  a peaceful  man- 
ner, in  which  case  it  would  be  easy  for  the  Fuehrer  to 
accqrd  Czechoslovakia  a generous  way  of  life  of  her  own, 
autonomy,  and  a certain  measure  of  national  freedom. 

He  was  doing  all  this  not  from  hatred  but  in  order  to 
protect  Germany.  If  last  autumn  Czechoslovakia  had  not 
given  in,  the  Czech  people  would  have  been  exterminated. 
No  one  would  have  prevented  him  doing  it.  If  it  came  to  a 
fight  ...  in  two  days  the  Czech  Army  would  cease  to  exist. 
Naturally,  some  Germans  would  be  killed  too  and  this  would 
engender  a hatred  which  would  compel  him,  in  self-preserva- 
tion, not  to  concede  autonomy.  The  world  would  not  care 
a jot  about  this.  He  sympathized  with  the  Czech  people 
when  he  read  the  foreign  press.  It  gave  him  the  impression 
which  might  be  summed  up  in  the  German  proverb:  “The 
Moor  has  done  his  duty;  the  Moor  can  go.”  . . . 

That  was  why  he  had  asked  Hacha  to  come  here.  This 
was  the  last  good  turn  he  could  render  the  Czech  people 
. . . Perhaps  Hacha’s  visit  might  prevent  the  worst  . . . 

The  hours  were  passing.  At  six  o’clock  the  troops  would 
march  in.  He  was  almost  ashamed  to  say  it,  but  for  every 
Czech  battalion  there  was  a German  division.  He  would  like 

* The  emphasis  is  in  the  German  original. 


The  Road  to  War 


601 


now  to  advise  him  [Hacha]  to  withdraw  with  Chvalkovsky 
and  discuss  what  was  to  be  done. 

What  was  to  be  done?  The  broken  old  President  did 
not  have  to  withdraw  to  decide  that.  He  told  Hitler  at 
once,  “The  position  is  quite  clear.  Resistance  would  be 
folly.”  But  how,  he  asked — since  it  was  now  a little  after 
2 a.m. — could  he,  in  the  space  of  four  hours,  arrange  to 
restrain  the  whole  Czech  people  from  offering  resistance? 
The  Fuehrer  replied  that  he  had  better  consult  with  his 
companions.  The  German  military  machine  was  already 
in  motion  and  could  not  be  stopped.  Hacha  should  get 
in  touch  at  once  with  Prague.  “It  was  a grave  decision,” 
the  German  minutes  report  Hitler  as  saying,  “but  he  saw 
dawning  the  possibility  of  a long  period  of  peace  between 
the  two  peoples.  Should  the  decision  be  otherwise,  he  saw 
the  annihilation  of  Czechoslovakia.” 

With  these  words,  he  dismissed  his  guests  for  the  time 
being.  It  was  2:15  a.m.  In  an  adjoining  room  Goering  and 
Ribbentrop  stepped  up  the  pressure  on  the  two  victims. 
According  to  the  French  ambassador,  who  in  an  official 
dispatch  to  Paris  depicted  the  scene  as  he  got  it  from 
what  he  believed  to  be  an  authentic  source,  Hacha  and 
and  Chvalkovsky  protested  against  the  outrage  to  their 
nation.  They  declared  they  would  not  sign  the  document 
of  surrender.  Were  they  to  do  so  they  would  be  forever 
cursed  by  their  people. 

The  German  ministers  [Goering  and  Ribbentrop]  were 
pitiless  [M.  Coulondre  wrote  in  his  dispatch].  They  literally 
hunted  Dr.  Hacha  and  M.  Chvalkovsky  round  the  table  on 
which  the  documents  were  lying,  thrusting  them  continually 
before  them,  pushing  pens  into  their  hands,  incessantly  re- 
peating that  if  they  continued  in  their  refusal,  half  of 
Prague  would  lie  in  ruins  from  bombing  within  two  hours, 
and  that  this  would  be  only  the  beginning.  Hundreds  of 
bombers  were  waiting  the  order  to  take  off,  and  they  would 
receive  that  order  at  six  in  the  morning  if  the  signatures  were 
not  forthcoming.* 

At  this  point,  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  seems  to  have  managed 
to  be  present  whenever  and  wherever  the  drama  of  the 

* On  the  stand  in  Nuremberg,  Goering  admitted  that  he  told  Hacha,  “I 
should  be  sorry  if  I had  to  bomb  beautiful  Prague.”  He  really  didn’t  intend 
to  carry  ou*  the  threat — “that  would  not  have  been  necessary,”  he  explained. 
“But  a point  like  that,  I thought,  might  serve  as  an  argument  and  accelerate 
the  whole  matter.”  27 


602  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Third  Reich  reached  a climax,  heard  Goering  shouting  for 
Dr.  Morell. 

“Hacha  has  fainted!”  Goering  cried  out. 

For  a moment  the  Nazi  bullies  feared  that  the  prostrate 
Czech  President  might  die  on  their  hands  and,  as  Schmidt 
says,  “that  the  whole  world  will  say  tomorrow  that  he 
was  murdered  at  the  Chancellery.”  Dr.  Morell’s  specialty 
was  injections — much  later  he  would  almost  kill  Hitler 
with  them — and  he  now  applied  the  needle  to  Dr.  Hacha 
and  brought  him  back  to  consciousness.  The  President  was 
revived  sufficiently  to  be  able  to  grasp  the  telephone  which 
the  Germans  thrust  into  his  hand  and  talk  to  his  govern- 
ment in  Prague  over  a special  line  which  Ribbentrop  had 
ordered  rigged  up.  He  apprised  the  Czech  cabinet  of  what 
had  happened  and  advised  surrender.  Then,  somewhat 
further  restored  by  a second  injection  from  the  needle  of 
Dr.  Morell,  the  President  of  the  expiring  Republic  stum- 
bled back  into  the  presence  of  Adolf  Hitler  to  sign  his 
country’s  death  warrant.  It  was  now  five  minutes  to  four 
in  the  morning  of  March  15,  1939. 

The  text  had  been  prepared  “beforehand  by  Hitler,” 
Schmidt  recounts,  and  during  Hacha’s  fainting  spells  the 
German  interpreter  had  been  busy  copying  the  official  com- 
munique, which  had  also  been  written  up  “beforehand,” 
and  which  Hacha  and  Chvalkovsky  were  also  forced  to 
sign.  It  read  as  follows: 

Berlin,  March  15,  1939 

At  their  request,  the  Fuehrer  today  received  the  Czecho- 
slovak President,  Dr.  Hacha,  and  the  Czechoslovak  Foreign 
Minister,  Dr.  Chvalkovsky,  in  Berlin  in  the  presence  of  For- 
eign Minister  von  Ribbentrop.  At  the  meeting  the  serious 
situation  created  by  the  events  of  recent  weeks  in  the  pres- 
ent Czechoslovak  territory  was  examined  with  complete 
frankness. 

The  conviction  was  unanimously  expressed  on  both  sides 
that  the  aim  of  all  efforts  must  be  the  safeguarding  of  calm, 
order  and  peace  in  this  part  of  Central  Europe.  The  Czecho- 
slovak President  declared  that,  in  order  to  serve  this  object 
and  to  achieve  ultimate  pacification,  he  confidently  placed 
the  fate  of  the  Czech  people  and  country  in  the  hands  of 
the  Fuehrer  of  the  German  Reich.  The  Fuehrer  accepted 
this  declaration  and  expressed  his  intention  of  taking  the 
Czech  people  under  the  protection  of  the  German  Reich  and 


The  Road  to  War 


603 


of  guaranteeing  them  an  autonomous  development  of  their 
ethnic  life  as  suited  to  their  character. 

Hitler’s  chicanery  had  reached,  perhaps,  its  summit. 

According  to  one  of  his  woman  secretaries,  Hitler 
rushed  from  the  signing  into  his  office,  embraced  all  the 
women  present  and  exclaimed,  “Children!  This  is  the  great- 
est day  of  my  life!  I shall  go  down  in  history  as  the 
greatest  German!” 

It  did  not  occur  to  him — how  could  it? — that  the  end 
of  Czechoslovakia  might  be  the  beginning  of  the  end  of 
Germany.  From  this  dawn  of  March  15,  1939 — the  Ides 
of  March — the  road  to  war,  to  defeat,  to  disaster,  as  we 
now  know,  stretched  just  ahead.  It  would  be  a short  road 
and  as  straight  as  a line  could  be.  And  once  on  it,  and 
hurtling  down  it,  Hitler,  like  Alexander  and  Napoleon 
before  him,  could  not  stop.28 

At  6 a.m.  on  March  15  German  troops  poured  into  Bo- 
hemia and  Moravia.  They  met  no  resistance,  and  by  eve- 
ning Hitler  was  able  to  make  the  triumphant  entry  into 
Prague  which  he  felt  Chamberlain  had  cheated  him  of  at 
Munich.  Before  leaving  Berlin  he  had  issued  a grandiose 
proclamation  to  the  German  people,  repeating  the  tire- 
some lies  about  the  “wild  excesses”  and  “terror”  of  the 
Czechs  which  he  had  been  forced  to  bring  an  end  to, 
and  proudly  proclaiming,  “Czechoslovakia  has  ceased  to 
exist!” 

That  night  he  slept  in  Hradschin  Castle,  the  ancient 
seat  of  the  kings  of  Bohemia  high  above  the  River  Moldau 
where  more  recently  the  despised  Masaryk  and  Benes  had 
lived  and  worked  for  the  first  democracy  Central  Europe 
had  ever  known.  The  Fuehrer’s  revenge  was  complete, 
and  that  it  was  sweet  he  showed  in  the  series  of  procla- 
mations which  he  issued.  He  had  paid  off  all  the  burning 
resentments  against  the  Czechs  which  had  obsessed  him 
as  an  Austrian  in  his  vagabond  days  in  Vienna  three  dec- 
ades before  and  which  had  flamed  anew  when  BeneS 
dared  to  oppose  him,  the  all-powerful  German  dictator, 
over  the  past  year. 

The  next  day,  from  Hradschin  Castle,  he  proclaimed 
the  Protectorate  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  which  though 
it  professed  to  provide  “autonomy  and  self-government” 
for  the  Czechs  brought  them,  by  its  very  language,  com- 


604 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pletely  under  the  German  heel.  All  power  was  given  to 
the  “Reich  Protector”  and  to  his  Secretary  of  State  and 
his  Head  of  the  Civil  Administration,  who  were  to  be 
appointed  by  the  Fuehrer.  To  placate  outraged  public 
opinion  in  Britain  and  France,  Hitler  brought  the  “moder- 
ate” Neurath  out  of  cold  storage  and  named  him  Pro- 
tector.* The  two  top  Sudeten  leaders,  Konrad  Henlein  and 
the  gangster  Karl  Hermann  Frank,  were  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  get  revenge  on  the  Czechs  by  being  appointed 
Head  of  the  Civil  Administration  and  Secretary  of  State 
respectively.  It  was  not  long  before  Himmler,  as  boss  of 
the  German  police,  got  a stranglehold  on  the  protectorate. 
To  do  his  work,  he  made  the  notorious  Frank  chief  of 
police  of  the  protectorate  and  ranking  S.S.  officer,  t 

For  a thousand  years  [Hitler  said  in  his  proclamation  of 
the  protectorate]  the  provinces  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia 
formed  part  of  the  Lebensraum  of  the  German  people  . . . 
Czechoslovakia  showed  its  inherent  inability  to  survive  and 
has  therefore  now  fallen  a victim  to  actual  dissolution.  The 
German  Reich  cannot  tolerate  continuous  disturbances  in 
these  areas  . . . Therefore  the  German  Reich,  in  keeping 
with  the  law  of  self-preservation,  is  now  resolved  to  in- 
tervene decisively  to  rebuild  the  foundations  of  a reason- 
able order  in  Central  Europe.  For  in  the  thousand  years  of 
its  history  it  has  already  proved  that,  thanks  to  the  great- 
ness and  the  qualities  of  the  German  people,  it  alone  is 
called  upon  to  undertake  this  task. 

A long  night  of  German  savagery  now  settled  over 
Prague  and  the  Czech  lands. 

On  March  16,  Hitler  took  Slovakia  too  under  his  benev- 
olent protection  in  response  to  a “telegram,”  actually  com- 
posed in  Berlin,  as  we  have  seen,  from  Premier  Tiso. 
German  troops  quickly  entered  Slovakia  to  do  the  “pro- 
tecting.” On  March  18,  Hitler  was  in  Vienna  to  approve 

* On  the  stand  at  Nuremberg,  Neurath  stated  that  he  was  taken  by  “com- 
plete surprise”  when  Hitler  named  him  Protector,  and  that  he  had  “mis- 
givings” about  taking  the  job.  However,  he  says,  he  took  it  when  Hitler 
explained  that  by  this  appointment  he  wanted  to  assure  Britain  and  France 
“that  he  did  not  wish  to  carry  on  a policy  hostile  to  Czechoslovakia.”29 
t It  might  be  of  interest  to  skip  ahead  here  and  note  what  happened  to  some 
of  the  characters  in  the  drama  just  recounted.  Frank  was  sentenced  to  death 
by  a postwar  Czech  court  and  publicly  hanged  near  Prague  on  May  22, 
1946.  Henlein  committed  suicide  after  his  arrest  by  Czech  resistance  forces 
in  1945.  Chvalkovsky,  who  became  the  representative  of  the  protectorate  in 
Berlin,  was  killed  in  an  Allied  bombing  there  in  1944.  H&cha  was  arrested 
by  the  Czechs  on  May  14,  1945,  but  died  before  he  could  be  tried. 


The  Road  to  War 


605 


the  “Treaty  of  Protection,”  which,  as  signed  on  March 
23  in  Berlin  by  Ribbentrop  and  Dr.  Tuka,  contained  a 
secret  protocol  giving  Germany  exclusive  rights  to  exploit 
the  Slovak  economy.30 

As  for  Ruthenia,  which  had  formed  the  eastern  tip  of 
Czechoslovakia,  its  independence  as  the  “Republic  of  Car- 
patho-Ukraine,”  proclaimed  on  March  14,  lasted  just 
twenty-four  hours.  Its  appeal  to  Hitler  for  “protection” 
was  in  vain.  Hitler  had  already  awarded  this  territory  to 
Hungary.  In  the  captured  Foreign  Office  archives  there 
is  an  interesting  letter  in  the  handwriting  of  Miklos 
Horthy,  Regent  of  Hungary,  addressed  to  Adolf  Hitler 
on  March  13. 

Your  Excellency:  Heartfelt  thanks!  I cannot  express 
how  happy  I am,  for  this  headwater  region  [Ruthenia] 
is  for  Hungary — I dislike  using  big  words — a vital  ques- 
tion. . . . We  are  tackling  the  matter  with  enthusiasm.  The 
plans  are  already  laid.  On  Thursday,  the  16th,  a frontier 
incident  will  take  place,  to  be  followed  Saturday  by  the  big 
thrust.31 

As  things  turned  out,  there  was  no  need  for  an  “inci- 
dent.” Hungarian  troops  simply  moved  into  Ruthenia 
at  6 a.m.  on  March  15,  timing  their  entry  with  that  of  the 
Germans  to  the  west,  and  on  the  following  day  the  terri- 
tory was  formally  annexed  by  Hungary. 

Thus  by  the  end  of  the  day  of  March  15,  which  had 
started  in  Berlin  at  1:15  a.m.  when  Hacha  arrived  at  the 
Chancellery,  Czechoslovakia,  as  Hitler  said,  had  ceased 
to  exist. 

Neither  Britain  nor  France  made  the  slightest  move  to 
save  it,  though  at  Munich  they  had  solemnly  guaranteed 
Czechoslovakia  against  aggression. 

Since  that  meeting  not  only  Hitler  but  Mussolini  had 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  British  had  become  so 
weak  and  their  Prime  Minister,  as  a consequence,  so  ac- 
commodating that  they  need  pay  little  further  attention 
to  London.  On  January  11,  1939,  Chamberlain,  accom- 
panied by  Lord  Halifax,  had  journeyed  to  Rome  to  seek 
improvement  in  Anglo-Italian  relations.  This  writer  hap- 
pened to  be  at  the  station  in  Rome  when  the  two  English- 
men arrived  and  noted  in  his  diary  the  “fine  smirk”  on 
Mussolini's  face  as  he  greeted  his  guests.  “When  Mussolini 


606  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

passed  me,”  I noted  as  the  party  left  the  station,  “he  was 
joking  with  his  son-in-law  [Ciano],  passing  wise- 
cracks.” 32  I could  not,  of  course,  catch  what  he  was 
saying,  but  later  Ciano,  in  his  diary,  revealed  the  gist  of  it. 

Arrival  of  Chamberlain.  [Ciano  wrote  on  January  11  and 
12]  . . . How  far  apart  we  are  from  these  people!  It  is  an- 
other world.  We  were  talking  about  it  after  dinner  with  the 
Duce.  “These  men  are  not  made  of  the  same  stuff,”  he  was 
saying,  as  the  Francis  Drakes  and  the  other  magnificent  ad- 
venturers who  created  the  Empire.  These,  after  all,  are  the 
tired  sons  of  a long  line  of  rich  men,  and  they  will  lose 
their  Empire.” 

The  British  do  not  want  to  fight.  They  try  to  draw  back 
as  slowly  as  possible,  but  they  do  not  fight  . . . Our  con- 
versations with  the  British  have  ended.  Nothing  was  ac- 
complished. I have  telephoned  Ribbentrop  that  the  visit  was 
“a  big  lemonade”  [a  farce]. . . . 

I accompanied  the  Duce  to  the  station  on  the  departure  of 
Chamberlain  [Ciano  wrote  on  January  14].  . . . Chamber- 
lain’s eyes  filled  with  tears  when  the  train  started  moving 
and  his  countrymen  began  singing  “For  He’s  a Jolly  Good 
Fellow.”  “What  is  this  little  song?”  the  Duce  asked.22 

Though  during  the  Sudeten  crisis  Hitler  had  been  solici- 
tous of  Chamberlain’s  views,  there  is  not  a word  in  the 
captured  German  papers  to  indicate  that  thereafter  he 
cared  a whit  what  the  Prime  Minister  thought  of  his  de- 
stroying the  rest  of  Czechoslovakia  despite  the  British 
guarantee — and,  for  that  matter,  despite  the  Munich  Agree- 
ment. On  March  14,  as  Hitler  waited  in  Berlin  to  humble 
Hdcha,  and  as  angry  questions  were  raised  in  the  House 
of  Commons  in  London  about  Germany’s  engineering  Slo- 
vakia’s “secession”  and  about  its  effect  on  Britain’s  guar- 
antee to  Prague  against  aggression,  Chamberlain  replied 
heatedly,  “No  such  aggression  has  taken  place.” 

But  the  next  day,  March  15,  after  it  had  taken  place, 
the  Prime  Minister  used  the  proclamation  of  Slovakia’s 
“independence”  as  an  excuse  not  to  honor  his  country’s 
word.  “The  effect  of  this  declaration,”  he  explained,  “put 
an  end  by  internal  disruption  to  the  State  whose  frontier 
we  had  proposed  to  guarantee.  His  Majesty’s  Government 
cannot  accordingly  hold  themselves  any  longer  bound  by 
this  obligation.” 

Hitler’s  strategy  had  thus  worked  to  perfection.  He  had 


The  Road  to  War 


607 


given  Chamberlain  his  out  and  the  Prime  Minister  had 
taken  it. 

It  is  interesting  that  the  Prime  Minister  did  not  even 
wish  to  accuse  Hitler  of  breaking  his  word.  “I  have  so 
often  heard  charges  of  breach  of  faith  bandied  about 
which  did  not  seem  to  me  to  be  founded  upon  sufficient 
premises,”  he  said,  “that  I do  not  wish  to  associate  my- 
self today  with  any  charges  of  that  character.”  He  had 
not  one  word  of  reproach  for  the  Fuehrer,  not  even  for 
his  treatment  of  Hacha  and  the  shabby  swindle  which 
obviously — even  if  the  details  were  still  unknown — had 
been  perpetrated  at  the  Reich  Chancellery  on  the  early 
morning  of  this  day,  March  15. 

No  wonder  that  the  British  protest  that  day,  if  it  could 
be  called  that,*  was  so  tepid,  and  that  the  Germans  treated 
it — and  subsequent  Anglo-French  complaints — with  so 
much  arrogance  and  contempt. 

His  Majesty’s  Government  have  no  desire  to  interfere  un- 
necessarily in  a matter  with  which  other  Governments  may 
be  more  directly  concerned.  . . . They  are,  however,  as  the 
German  Government  will  surely  appreciate,  deeply  concerned 
for  the  success  of  all  efforts  to  restore  confidence  and  a 
relaxation  of  tension  in  Europe.  They  would  deplore  any  ac- 
tion in  Central  Europe  which  would  cause  a setback  to  the 
growth  of  this  general  confidence  . . ,34 

There  was  not  a word  in  this  note,  which  was  delivered 
on  March  15  by  Ambassador  Henderson  to  Ribbentrop 
as  an  official  message  from  Lord  Halifax,  about  the  spe- 
cific events  of  the  day. 

The  French  were  at  least  specific.  Robert  Coulondre, 
the  new  ambassador  of  France  in  Berlin,  shared  neither 
his  British  colleague’s  illusions  about  Nazism  nor  Hender- 
son’s disdain  of  the  Czechs.  On  the  morning  of  the  fif- 
teenth he  demanded  an  interview  with  Ribbentrop,  but 
the  vain  and  vindictive  German  Foreign  Minister  was  al- 
ready on  his  way  to  Prague,  intending  to  share  in  Hit- 
ler’s humiliation  of  a beaten  people.  State  Secretary  von 
Weizsaecker  received  Coulondre,  instead,  at  noon.  The 
ambassador  lost  no  time  in  saying  what  Chamberlain  and 
Henderson  were  not  yet  ready  to  say:  that  by  its  military 
intervention  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  Germany  had  vio- 


* On  March  16  Chamberlain  told  the  Commons  that  “so  far"  no  protest  had 
been  lodged  with  the  German  government. 


608 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

lated  both  the  Munich  Agreement  and  the  Franco— Ger- 
man declaration  of  December  6.  Baron  von  Weizsaecker, 
who  later  was  to  insist  that  he  had  been  stoutly  anti- 
Nazi  all  along,  was  in  an  arrogant  mood  that  would 
have  done  credit  to  Ribbentrop.  According  to  his  own 
memorandum  of  the  meeting, 

I spoke  rather  sharply  to  the  Ambassador  and  told  him 
not  to  mention  the  Munich  Agreement,  which  he  alleged 
had  been  violated,  and  not  to  give  us  any  lectures  ...  I 
told  him  that  in  view  of  the  agreement  reached  last  night 
with  the  Czech  government  I could  see  no  reason  for  any 
demarche  by  the  French  ambassador  . . . and  that  I was 
sure  he  would  find  fresh  instructions  when  he  returned  to 
his  Embassy,  and  these  would  set  his  mind  at  rest.35 

Three  days  later,  on  March  18,  when  the  British  and 
French  governments,  in  deference  to  outraged  public  opin- 
ion at  home,  finally  got  around  to  making  formal  protests 
to  the  Reich,58  Weizsaecker  fairly  outdid  his  master,  Rib- 
bentrop, in  his  insolence — again  on  his  own  evidence.  In  a 
memorandum  found  in  the  German  Foreign  Office,  he 
tells  with  evident  glee  how  he  refused  even  to  accept 
the  formal  French  note  of  protest. 

I immediately  replaced  the  Note  in  its  envelope  and  thrust 
it  back  at  the  Ambassador  with  the  remark  that  I cate- 
gorically refused  to  accept  from  him  any  protest  regarding 
the  Czecho-Slovak  affair.  Nor  would  I take  note  of  the 
communication,  and  I would  advise  M.  Coulondre  to  urge 
his  government  to  revise  the  draft  . . ,36 

Coulondre,  unlike  Henderson  at  this  period,  was  not 
an  envoy  who  could  be  browbeaten  by  the  German?.  He 
retorted  that  his  government’s  note  had  been  written  after 
due  consideration  and  that  he  had  no  intention  of  asking 
for  it  to  be  revised.  When  the  State  Secretary  continued  to 
refuse  to  accept  the  document,  the  ambassador  reminded 
him  of  common  diplomatic  practice  and  insisted  that 
France  had  a perfect  right  to  make  known  its  views  to 
the  German  government.  Finally  Weizsaecker,  according 
to  his  own  account,  left  the  note  lying  on  his  desk,  ex- 
plaining that  he  “would  regard  it  as  transmitted  to  us 
through  the  post.”  But  before  he  arrived  at  this  impudent 
gesture,  he  got  the  following  off  his  mind: 

From  the  legal  point  of  view  there  existed  a Declaration 


609 


The  Road  to  War 

which  had  come  about  between  the  Fuehrer  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Czecho-Slovak  State.  The  Czech  President,  at  his 
own  request,  had  come  to  Berlin  and  had  then  immediately 
declared  that  he  wished  to  place  the  fate  of  his  country  in 
the  Fuehrer’s  hands.  I could  not  imagine  that  the  French 
Government  were  more  Catholic  than  the  Pope  and  intended 
meddling  in  things  which  had  been  duly  settled  between  Bri- 
lin  and  Prague.* 

Weizaecker  behaved  quite  differently  to  the  accommodat- 
ing British  ambassador,  who  transmitted  his  government’s 
protest  late  on  the  afternoon  of  March  18.  Great  Britain 
now  held  that  it  could  not  “but  regard  the  events  of  the 
past  few  days  as  a complete  repudiation  of  the  Munich 
Agreement”  and  that  the  “German  military  actions”  were 
“devoid  of  any  basis  of  legality.”  Weizaecker,  in  recording 
it,  noted  that  the  British  note  did  not  go  as  far  in  this 
respect  as  the  French  protest,  which  said  that  France 
“would  not  recognize  the  legality  of  the  German  oc- 
cupation.” 

Henderson  had  gone  to  see  Weizsaecker  on  March  17  to 
inform  him  of  his  recall  to  London  for  “consultations”  and, 
according  to  the  State  Secretary,  had  sounded  him  out 
“for  arguments  which  he  could  give  Chamberlain  for  use 
against  the  latter’s  political  opposition  . . . Henderson 
explained  that  there  was  no  direct  British  interest  in  the 
Czechoslovak  territory.  His — Henderson’s — anxieties  were 
more  for  the  future.”  37 

Even  Hitler’s  destruction  of  Czechoslovakia  apparently 
had  not  awakened  the  British  ambassador  to  the  nature  of 
the  government  he  was  accredited  to,  nor  did  he  seem 
aware  of  what  was  happening  that  day  to  the  government 
which  he  represented. 

For,  suddenly  and  unexpectedly,  Neville  Chamberlain, 
on  March  17,  two  days  after  Hitler  extinguished  Czecho- 
slovakia, had  experienced  a great  awakening.  It  had  not 
come  without  some  prodding.  Greatly  to  his  surprise,  most 
of  the  British  press  (even  the  Times,  but  not  the  Daily 
Mail)  and  the  House  of  Commons  had  reacted  violently  to 

* Coulondre’s  version  of  the  interview  is  given  in  the  French  Yellow  Book 
(No.  78,  pp.  102-3,  in  the  French  edition).  He  confirms  Weizsaecker’s  ac- 
count. Later,  at  his  trial  in  Nuremberg,  the  State  Secretary  argued  that  in 
his  memoranda  of  such  meetings  he  had  purposely  exaggerated  his  Nazi 
sentiments  in  order  to  cover  his  real  anti-Nazi  activities.  But  Coulondre  s 
account  of  the  meeting  is  only  one  piece  of  evidence  that  Weizsaecker  did 
not  exaggerate  at  all. 


610 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hitler’s  latest  aggression.  More  serious,  many  of  his  own 
backers  in  Parliament  and  half  of  the  cabinet  had  re- 
volted against  any  further  appeasement  of  Hitler.  Lord 
Halifax,  especially,  as  the  German  ambassador  informed 
Berlin,  had  insisted  that  the  Prime  Minister  recognize 
what  had  happened  and  abruptly  change  his  course.38  It 
dawned  on  Chamberlain  that  his  own  position  as  head 
of  government  and  leader  of  the  Conservative  Party  was 
in  jeopardy. 

His  radical  change  of  mind  came  abruptly.  As  late  as 
the  evening  of  March  16,  Sir  John  Simon,  on  behalf  of  the 
government,  had  made  a speech  in  the  Commons  which 
was  so  cynical  in  regard  to  the  Czechs,  and  so  much  in 
the  Munich  spirit,”  that  according  to  press  accounts  it 
aroused  the  House  to  “a  pitch  of  anger  rarely  seen.”  The 
next  day,  on  the  eve  of  his  seventieth  birthday.  Chamber- 
lain  was  scheduled  to  make  a speech  in  his  home  city  of 
Birmingham.  He  had  drafted  an  address  on  domestic  mat- 
ters with  special  emphasis  on  the  social  services.  On  the 
afternoon  train  going  up  to  Birmingham,  according  to  an 
account  given  this  writer  by  French  diplomatic  sources, 
Chamberlain  finally  made  his  decision.  He  jettisoned  his 
prepared  speech  and  quickly  jotted  down  notes  for  one  of 
quite  a different  kind. 

To  all  of  Britain  and  indeed  to  large  parts  of  the  world, 
for  the  speech  was  broadcast,  Chamberlain  apologized  for 
‘the  very  restrained  and  cautious  . . . somewhat  cool  and 
objective  statement”  which  he  had  felt  obliged  to  make 
in  the  Commons  two  days  before.  “I  hope  to  correct  that 
statement  tonight,”  he  said. 

The  Prime  Minister  at  last  saw  that  Adolf  Hitler  had 
deceived  him.  He  recapitulated  the  Fuehrer’s  various  as- 
surances that  the  Sudetenland  had  been  his  last  territorial 
demand  in  Europe  and  that  he  “wanted  no  Czechs.”  Now 
Hitler  had  gone  back  on  them— “he  has  taken  the  law  into 
his  own  hands.” 

Now  we  are  told  that  this  seizure  of  territory  has  been  ne- 
cessitated by  disturbances  in  Czechoslovakia.  ...  If  there 
were  disorders,  were  they  not  fomented  from  without? 

Is  this  the  end  of  an  old  adventure  or  is  it  the  beginning 
of  a new?  Is  this  the  last  attack  upon  a small  State  or  is  it 
to  be  followed  by  others?  Is  this,  in  effect,  a step  in  the 
direction  of  an  attempt  to  dominate  the  world  by  force? 


611 


The  Road  to  War 

While  I am  not  prepared  to  engage  this  country  by  new 
and  unspecified  commitments  operating  under  conditions 
which  cannot  now  be  foreseen,  yet  no  greater  mistake  could 
be  made  than  to  suppose  that  because  it  believes  war  to  be  a 
senseless  and  cruel  thing,  this  nation  has  so  lost  its  fiber 
that  it  will  not  take  part  to  the  utmost  of  its  power  in  re- 
sisting such  a challenge  if  it  ever  were  made. 

This  was  an  abrupt  and  fateful  turning  point  for  Cham- 
berlain and  for  Britain,  and  Hitler  was  so  warned  the  very 
next  day  by  the  astute  German  ambassador  in  London.  “It 
would  be  wrong,”  Herbert  von  Dirksen  notified  the  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  in  a lengthy  report  on  March  18,  “to 
cherish  any  illusions  that  a fundamental  change  has  not 
taken  place  in  Britain’s  attitude  to  Germany.”  3® 

It  was  obvious  to  anyone  who  had  read  Mein  Kampf, 
who  glanced  at  a map  and  saw  the  new  positions  of  the 
German  Army  in  Slovakia,  who  had  wind  of  certain  Ger- 
man diplomatic  moves  since  Munich,  or  who  had  pondered 
the  dynamics  of  Hitler’s  bloodless  conquests  of  Austria 
and  Czechoslovakia  in  the  past  twelve  months,  just  which 
of  the  “small  states”  would  be  next  on  the  Fuehrer’s  list. 
Chamberlain,  like  almost  everyone  else,  knew  perfectly 
well. 

On  March  31,  sixteen  days  after  Hitler  entered  Prague, 
the  Prime  Minister  told  the  House  of  Commons: 

In  the  event  of  any  action  which  clearly  threatened  Po- 
lish independence  and  which  the  Polish  Government  ac- 
cordingly considered  it  vital  to  resist  with  their  national 
forces.  His  Majesty’s  Government  would  feel  themselves 
bound  at  once  to  lend  the  Polish  Government  all  support  in 
their  power.  They  have  given  the  Polish  Government  an  as- 
surance of  this  effect.  I may  add  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment have  authorized  me  to  make  it  plain  that  they  stand  in 
the  same  position  in  this  matter. 

The  turn  of  Poland  had  come. 


14 


THE  TURN  OF  POLAND 


ON  OCTOBER  24,  1938,  less  than  a month  after  Munich, 
Ribbentrop  was  host  to  Jozef  Lipski,  the  Polish  ambas- 
sador in  Berlin,  at  a three-hour  lunch  at  the  Grand  Hotel 
in  Berchtesgaden.  Poland,  like  Germany  and  indeed  in 
connivance  with  her,  had  just  seized  a strip  of  Czech  terri- 
tory. The  luncheon  talk  proceeded,  as  a German  Foreign 
Office  memorandum  stressed,  “in  a very  friendly  atmos- 
phere.” 1 

Nevertheless,  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  lost  little  time 
in  getting  down  to  business.  The  time  had  come,  he  said, 
for  a general  settlement  between  Poland  and  Germany.  It 
was  necessary,  first  of  all,  he  continued,  “to  speak  with 
Poland  about  Danzig.”  It  should  “revert”  to  Germany. 
Also,  Ribbentrop  said,  the  Reich  wished  to  build  a super 
motor  highway  and  a double-track  railroad  across  the  Po- 
lish Corridor  to  connect  Germany  with  Danzig  and  East 
Prussia.  Both  would  have  to  enjoy  extraterritorial  rights. 
Finally,  Hitler  wished  Poland  to  join  the  Anti-Comintern 
Pact  against  Russia.  In  return  for  all  these  concessions, 
Germany  would  be  willing  to  extend  the  Polish-German 
treaty  by  from  ten  to  twenty  years  and  guarantee  Poland’s 
frontiers. 

Ribbentrop  emphasized  he  was  broaching  these  prob- 
lems “in  strict  confidence.”  He  suggested  that  the  ambas- 
sador make  his  report  to  Foreign  Minister  Beck  “orally 
— since  otherwise  there  was  great  danger  of  its  leaking  out, 
especially  to  the  press.”  Lipski  promised  to  report  to  War- 
saw but  warned  Ribbentrop  that  personally  he  saw  “no  pos- 
sibility” of  the  return  of  Danzig  to  Germany.  He  further 
reminded  the  German  Foreign  Minister  of  two  recent  oc- 
casions— November  5,  1937,  and  January  14,  1938 — when 
Hitler  had  personally  assured  the  Poles  that  he  would 

612 


613 


The  Road  to  War 

not  support  any  change  in  the  Danzig  Statute.2  Ribben- 
trop  replied  that  he  did  not  wish  an  answer  now,  but  ad- 
vised the  Poles  “to  think  it  over.” 

The  government  in  Warsaw  did  not  need  much  time  to 
collect  its  thoughts.  A week  later,  on  October  31,  Foreign 
Minister  Beck  dispatched  detailed  instructions  to  his  am- 
bassador in  Berlin  on  how  to  answer  the  Germans.  But  it 
was  not  until  November  19  that  the  latter  was  able  to 
secure  an  interview  with  Ribbentrop — the  Nazis  obviously 
wanted  the  Poles  to  consider  well  their  response.  It  was 
negative.  As  a gesture  of  understanding,  Poland  was  will- 
ing to  replace  the  League  of  Nations’  guarantee  of  Danzig 
with  a German-Polish  agreement  about  the  status  of  the 

Free  City.  , 

“Any  other  solution,”  Beck  wrote  in  a memorandum 
which  Lipski  read  to  Ribbentrop,  “and  in  particular  any 
attempt  to  incorporate  the  Free  City  into  the  Reich,  must 
inevitably  lead  to  conflict.”  And  he  added  that  Marshal 
Pilsudski,  the  late  dictator  of  Poland,  had  warned  the  Ger- 
mans in  1934,  during  the  negotiations  for  a nonaggression 
pact,  that  “the  Danzig  question  was  a sure  cirterion  for 
estimating  Germany’s  intentions  toward  Poland. 

Such  a reply  was  not  to  Ribbentrop’s  taste.  “He  regretted 
the  position  taken  by  Beck”  and  advised  the  Poles  that  it 
was  “worth  the  trouble  to  give  serious  consideration  to  the 
German  proposals.”  3 . 

Hitler’s  response  to  Poland’s  rebuff  on  Danzig  was  more 
drastic.  On  November  24,  five  days  after  the  Ribbentrop- 
Lipski  meeting,  he  issued  another  directive  to  the  com- 
manders in  chief  of  the  armed  forces. 

TOP  SECRET 


The  Fuehrer  has  ordered:  Apart  from  the  three  con- 
tingencies mentioned  in  the  instructions  of  10/21/38  * PreP" 
arations  are  also  to  be  made  to  enable  the  Free  State  of 
Danzig  to  be  occupied  by  German  troops  by  surprise. 

The  preparations  will  be  made  on  the  following  basis: 
Condition  is  a quasi-revolutionary  occupation  of  Danzig, 
exploiting  a politically  favorable  situation,  not  a war  against 

Poland,  t . . . . . . . 

The  troops  to  be  employed  for  this  purpose,  must  not 


* See  above  d 578.  The  three  “contingencies”  were  the  liquidation  of  the 
rest  of  Czechoslovakia,  occupation  of  Memel  and  protection  of  the  Reich  s 
frontiers. 

t Italics  in  the  original. 


614 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

simultaneously  be  earmarked  for  the  occupation  of  the 
Memelland,  so  that  both  operations  can,  if  necessary,  take 
place  simultaneously.  The  Navy  will  support  the  Army’s  op- 
eration by  . attack  from  the  sea  . . . The  plans  of  the  branches 
1939  armed  forces  are  to  be  submitted  by  January  10, 

Though  Beck  had  just  warned  that  an  attempt  by  Ger- 
many to  take  Danzig  would  lead  “inevitably”  to  conflict. 
Hitler  now  convinced  himself  that  it  could  be  done  without 
a war.  Local  Nazis  controlled  Danzig  and  they  took  their 
orders,  as  had  the  Sudeteners,  from  Berlin.  It  would  not 
be  difficult  to  stir  up  a “quasi-revolutionary”  situation 
there. 

Thus,  as  1938  approached  its  end,  the  year  that  had 
seen  the  bloodless  occupation  of  Austria  and  the  Sudeten- 
land,  Hitler  was  preoccupied  with  further  conquest:  the 
remainder  of  Czechoslovakia,  Memel,  and  Danzig.  It  had 
been  easy  to  humble  Schuschnigg  and  Benel  Now  it  was 
Jozef  Beck’s  turn. 

Yet,  when  the  Fuehrer  received  the  Polish  Foreign 
Minister  at  Berchtesgaden  shortly  after  New  Year’s — on 
January  5,  1939 — he  was  not  yet  prepared  to  give  him  the 
treatment  which  he  had  meted  out  to  Schuschnigg  and 
was  shortly  to  apply  to  president  Hacha.  The  rest  of 
Czechoslovakia  would  have  to  be  liquidated  first.  Hitler, 
as  the  secret  Polish  and  German  minutes  of  the  meeting 
make  clear,  was  in  one  of  his  more  conciliatory  moods. 
He  was  “quite  ready,”  he  began,  “to  be  at  Beck’s  service.” 
Was  there  anything  “special,”  he  asked,  on  the  Polish 
Foreign  Minister’s  mind?  Beck  replied  that  Danzig  was 
on  his  mind.  It  became  obvious  that  it  had  also  been  on 
Hitler’s. 

“Danzig  is  German,”  the  Fuehrer  reminded  his  guest, 
“will  always  remain  German,  and  will  sooner  or  later 
become  part  of  Germany.”  He  could  give  the  assurance, 
however,  that  “no  fait  accompli  would  be  engineered  in 
Danzig.” 

He  wanted  Danzig  and  he  wanted  a German  highway 
and  railroad  across  the  Corridor.  If  he  and  Beck  would 
depart  from  old  patterns  and  seek  solutions  along  en- 
tirely new  lines,”  he  was  sure  they  could  reach  an  agree- 
ment which  would  do  justice  to  both  countries. 

Beck  was  not  so  sure.  Though,  as  he  confided  to  Rib- 


61S 


The  Road  to  War 

bentrop  the  next  day,  he  did  not  want  to  be  too  blunt  with 
the  Fuehrer,  he  had  replied  that  “the  Danzig  problem 
was  a very  difficult  one.”  He  did  not  see  in  the  Chancel- 
lor’s suggestion  any  “equivalent”  for  Poland.  Hitler  there- 
upon pointed  out  the  “great  advantage”  to  Poland  “of 
having  her  frontier  with  Germany,  including  the  Corridor, 
secured  by  treaty.”  This  apparently  did  not  impress  Beck, 
but  in  the  end  he  agreed  to  think  the  problem  over 
further.4 

After  mulling  it  over  that  night,  the  Polish  Foreign 
Minister  had  a talk  with  Ribbentrop  the  next  day  in 
Munich.  He  requested  him  to  inform  the  Fuehrer  that 
whereas  all  his  previous  talks  with  the  Germans  had  filled 
him  with  optimism,  he  was  today,  after  his  meeting  with 
Hitler,  “for  the  first  time  in  a pessimistic  mood.”  Particu- 
larly in  regard  to  Danzig,  as  it  had  been  raised  by  the  Chan- 
cellor, he  “saw  no  possibility  whatever  of  agreement.”  5 

It  had  taken  Colonel  Beck,  like  so  many  others  who  have 
figured  in  these  pages,  some  time  to  awaken  and  to  arrive 
at  such  a pessimistic  view.  Like  most  Poles,  he  was 
violently  anti-Russian.  Moreover,  he  disliked  the  French, 
for  whom  he  had  nursed  a grudge  since  1923,  when,  as 
Polish  military  attache  in  Paris,  he  had  been  expelled  for 
allegedly  selling  documents  relating  to  the  French  Army. 
Perhaps  it  had  been  natural  for  this  man,  who  had  become 
Polish  Foreign  Minister  in  November  1932,  to  turn  to 
Germany.  For  the  Nazi  dictatorship  he  had  felt  a warm 
sympathy  from  the  beginning,  and  over  the  past  six  years 
he  had  striven  to  bring  his  country  closer  to  the  Third 
Reich  and  to  weaken  its  traditional  ties  with  France. 

Of  all  the  countries  that  lay  on  the  borders  of  Germany, 
Poland  had,  in  the  long  run,  the  most  to  fear.  Of  all  the 
countries,  it  had  been  the  most  blind  to  the  German  danger. 
No  other  provision  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  had  been 
resented  by  the  Germans  as  much  as  that  which  es- 
tablished the  Corridor,  giving  Poland  access  to  the  sea — 
and  cutting  off  East  Prussia  from  the  Reich.  The  detach- 
ment of  the  old  Hanseatic  port  of  Danzig  from  Germany 
and  its  creation  as  a free  city  under  the  supervision  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  but  dominated  economically  by 
Poland,  had  equally  outraged  German  public  opinion. 
Even  the  weak  and  peaceful  Weimar  Republic  had  never 


616 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

accepted  what  it  regarded  as  the  Polish  mutilation  of  the 
German  Reich.  As  far  back  as  1922,  General  von  Seeckt, 
as  we  have  seen,*  had  defined  the  German  Army’s  attitude. 

Polands  existence  is  intolerable  and  incompatible  with 
the  essential  conditions  of  Germany’s  life.  Poland  must 
?°,a"?  w'!'  gc!~a£  a ,result  of  her  own  internal  weaknesses 

of  PoLh  ,bl  RuSSlaTW,,th  our  aid  • • • The  obliteration 
of  Poland  must  be  one  of  the  fundamental  drives  of  German 

Ei/o  ’ -[and]  * attainabIe  ^ means  of,  and  with  the 
help  of,  Russia. 

Prophetic  wordsl 

The  Germans  forgot — or  perhaps  did  not  wish  to  re- 
member that  almost  all  of  the  German  land  awarded 
Poland  at  Versailles,  including  the  provinces  of  Posen  and 
Polish  Pomerania  (Pomorze),  which  formed  the  Corridor 
had  been  grabbed  by  Prussia  at  the  time  of  the  partitions 
when  Prussia,  Russia  and  Austria  had  destroyed  the  Po- 
lish nation.  For  more  than  a millennium  it  had  been  in- 
habited  by  Poles — and,  to  a large  extent,  it  still  was. 

No  nation  re-created  by  Versailles  had  had  such  a rough 
time  as  Poland.  In  the  first  turbulent  years  of  its  rebirth 
it  had  waged  aggressive  war  against  Russia,  Lithuania, 
Germany  and  even  Czechoslovakia— in  the  last  instance 
over  the  coal-nch  Teschen  area.  Deprived  of  their  political 
freedom  for  a century  and  a half  and  thus  without  modem 
experience  in  self-rule,  the  Poles  were  unable  to  establish 
stable  government  or  to  begin  to  solve  their  economic  and 
prob,ler?s-  In  1926  Marshal  Pilsudski,  the  hero  of 
tne  1 91 8 revolution,  had  marched  on  Warsaw,  seized  control 
°f  j government  and,  though  an  old-time  Socialist,  had 
gradually  replaced  a chaotic  democratic  regime  with  his 

•>Wio«Ctat0rSllip'-  °ne  °f  his  Iast  acts>  before  his  death 
m 1935,  was  to  sign  a treaty  of  nonaggression  with  Hitler. 
This  took  place  on  January  26,  1934,  and,  as  has  been 
recounted,  f was  one  of  the  first  steps  in  the  undermining 
of  France  s system  of  alliances  with  Germany’s  Eastern 
neighbors  and  m the  weakening  of  the  League  of  Nations 
and  its  concept  of  collective  security.  After  Pilsudski’s 
death,  Poland  was  largely  governed  by  a small  band  of 
colonels  leaders  of  Pilsudski’s  old  Polish  Legion  which 
had  fought  against  Russia  during  the  First  World  War.  At 

* See  above,  p.  295.  ~ 

t See  above,  pp.  295-96. 


The  Road  to  War 


617 


the  head  of  these  was  Marshal  Smigly-Rydz,  a capable 
soldier  but  in  no  way  a statesman.  Foreign  Policy  drifted 
into  the  hands  of  Colonel  Beck.  From  1934  on,  it  be- 
came increasingly  pro-German. 

This  was  bound  to  be  a policy  of  suicide.  And  indeed 
when  one  considers  Poland’s  position  in  post-Versailles 
Europe  it  is  difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  the 
Poles  in  the  nineteen  thirties,  as  on  occasions  in  the 
centuries  before,  were  driven  by  some  fateful  flaw  in  their 
national  character  toward  self-destruction  and  that  in  this 
period,  as  sometimes  formerly,  they  were  their  own  worst 
enemies.  As  long  as  Danzig  and  the  Corridor  existed  as 
they  were,  there  could  be  no  lasting  peace  between  Poland 
and  Nazi  Germany.  Nor  was  Poland  strong  enough  to 
afford  the  luxury  of  being  at  odds  with  both  her  giant 
neighbors,  Russia  and  Germany.  Her  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  had  been  uniformly  bad  since  1920,  when 
Poland  had  attacked  Russia,  already  weakened  by  the 
World  War  and  the  civil  war,  and  a savage  conflict  had 
followed.* 

Seizing  an  opportunity  to  gain  the  friendship  of  a 
country  so  stoutly  anti-Russian  and  at  the  same  time  to 
detach  her  from  Geneva  and  Paris,  thus  undermining  the 
system  of  Versailles,  Hitler  had  taken  the  initiative  in 
bringing  about  the  Polish-German  pact  of  1934.  It  was 
not  a popular  move  in  Germany.  The  German  Army, 
which  had  been  pro-Russian  and  anti-Polish  since  the  days 
of  Seeckt,  resented  it.  But  it  served  Hitler  admirably  for 
the  time  being.  Poland’s  sympathetic  friendship  helped 
him  to  get  first  things  done  first:  the  reoccupation  of  the 
Rhineland,  the  destruction  of  independent  Austria  and 
Czechoslovakia.  On  all  of  these  steps,  which  strengthened 
Germany,  weakened  the  West  and  threatened  the  East, 
Beck  and  his  fellow  colonels  in  Warsaw  looked  on  benev- 
olently and  with  utter  and  inexplicable  blindness. 

If  the  Polish  Foreign  Minister  at  the  very  start  of  the 
new  year  had,  as  he  said,  been  plunged  into  a pessimistic 

* As  a result  of  that  war,  Poland  pushed  its  eastern  boundary  150  miles  east 
of  the  ethnographic  Curzon  Line,  at  the  expense  of  the  Soviet  Union — a 
frontier  which  transferred  four  and  a half  million  Ukrainians  and  one  and 
a half  million  White  Russians  to  Polish  rule.  Thus  Poland’s  western  and 
eastern  borders  were  unacceptable  to  Germany  and  Russia  respectively — a 
fact  which  seems  to  have  been  lost  sight  of  in  the  Western  democracies  when 
Berlin  and  Moscow  began  to  draw  together  in  the  summer  of  1939. 


618 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

mood  by  Hitler’s  demands,  his  spirits  sank  much  lower 
with  the  coming  of  spring.  Though  in  his  anniversary 
speech  to  the  Reichstag  on  January  30,  1939  Hitler 
spoke  in  warm  terms  of  “the  friendship  between  Germany 
and  Poland”  and  declared  that  it  was  “one  of  the  re- 
assuring factors  in  the  political  life  in  Europe,”  Ribben- 
trop  had  talked  with  more  frankness  when  he  paid  a state 
visit  to  Warsaw  four  days  before.  He  again  raised  with 
Beck  the  question  of  Hitler’s  demands  concerning  Danzig 
and  communications  through  the  Corridor,  insisting  that 
they  were  “extremely  moderate.”  But  neither  on  these 
questions  nor  on  his  insistence  that  Poland  join  the  Anti- 
Comintern  Pact  against  the  Soviet  Union  did  the  German 
Foreign  Minister  get  a satisfactory  answer.6  Colonel  Beck 
was  becoming  wary  of  his  friends.  As  a matter  of  fact  he 
was  beginning  to  squirm.  On  February  26,  the  German 
ambassador  in  Warsaw  informed  Berlin  that  Beck  had 
taken  the  initiative  in  getting  himself  invited  to  visit 
London  at  the  end  of  March  and  that  he  might  go  on  to 
Pans  afterward.  Though  it  was  late  in  the  day,  Poland, 
as  Moltke  put  it  in  his  dispatch,  “desires  to  get  in  touch 
with  the  Western  democracies  . . . [for]  fear  that  a 
conflict  might  arise  with  Germany  over  Danzig.”  7 With 
Beck  too,  as  with  so  many  others  who  had  tried  to  appease 
the  ravenous  appetite  of  Adolf  Hitler,  the  scales  were  fall- 
ing from  the  eyes. 

They  fell  completely  and  forever  on  March  15  when 
Hitler  occupied  Bohemia  and  Moravia  and  sent  his  troops 
to  protect  “independent”  Slovakia.  Poland  woke  up  that 
morning  to  find  itself  flanked  in  the  south  along  the 
Slovak  border,  as  it  already  was  in  the  north  on  the 
frontiers  of  Pomerania  and  East  Prussia,  by  the  German 
Army.  Its  military  position  had  overnight  become  un- 
tenable. 

March  21,  1939,  is  a day  to  be  remembered  in  the  story 
of  Europe’s  march  toward  war. 

There  was  intense  diplomatic  activity  that  day  in  Berlin, 
Warsaw  and  London.  The  President  of  the  French  Re- 
public, accompanied  by  Foreign  Minister  Bonnet,  arrived 
in  the  British  capital  for  a state  visit.  To  the  French  Cham- 
berlain suggested  that  their  two  countries  join  Poland  and 
the  Soviet  Union  in  a formal  declaration  stating  that  the 


619 


The  Road  to  War 

four  nations  would  consult  immediately  about  steps  to  halt 
further  aggression  in  Europe.  Three  days  before,  Litvinov 
had  proposed — as  he  had  just  a year  before,  after  the 
Anschluss — a European  conference,  this  time  of  France, 
Britain,  Poland,  Russia,  Rumania  and  Turkey,  which  would 
join  together  to  stop  Hitler.  But  the  British  Prime  Minister 
had  found  the  idea  “premature.”  He  was  highly  distrustful 
of  Moscow  and  thought  a “declaration”  by  the  four  pow- 
ers, including  the  Soviet  Union,  was  as  far  as  he  could  go.* 

His  proposal  was  presented  to  Beck  in  Warsaw  by  the 
British  ambassador  on  the  same  day,  March  21,  and  re- 
ceived a somewhat  cool  reception,  as  far  as  including  the 
Russians  was  concerned.  The  Polish  Foreign  Minister  was 
even  more  distrustful  of  the  Soviet  Union  than  Chamber- 
lain  and,  moreover,  shared  the  Prime  Minister’s  views  about 
the  worthlessness  of  Russian  military  aid.  He  was  to  hold 
these  views,  unflinchingly,  right  up  to  the  moment  of  dis- 
aster. 

But  the  most  fateful  event  of  this  day  of  March  21  for 
Poland  took  place  in  Berlin.  Ribbentrop  invited  the  Polish 
ambassador  to  call  on  him  at  noon.  For  the  first  time,  as 
Lipski  noted  in  a subsequent  report,  the  Foreign  Minister 
was  not  only  cool  toward  him  but  aggressive.  The 
Fuehrer,  he  warned,  “was  becoming  increasingly  amazed 
at  Poland’s  attitude.”  Germany  wanted  a satisfactory  reply 
to  her  demands  for  Danzig  and  a highway  and  railroad 
through  the  Corridor.  This  was  a condition  for  continued 
friendly  Polish-German  relations.  “Poland  must  realize,” 
Ribbentrop  laid  it  down,  “that  she  could  not  take  a middle 
course  between  Russia  and  Germany.”  Her  only  salvation 
was  “a  reasonable  relationship  with  Germany  and  her 
Fuehrer.”  That  included  a joint  “anti-Soviet  policy.”  More- 
over, the  Fuehrer  desired  Beck  “to  pay  an  early  visit  to 
Berlin.”  In  the  meantime,  Ribbentrop  strongly  advised  the 
Polish  ambassador  to  hurry  to  Warsaw  and  explain  to  his 
Foreign  Minister  in  person  what  the  situation  was.  “He 
advised,”  Lipski  informed  Beck,  “that  the  talk  [with  Hit- 
ler] should  not  be  delayed,  lest  the  Chancellor  should 

* “I  must  confess,”  Chamberlain  wrote  in  a private  letter  on  March  26,  “to 
the  most  profound  distrust  of  Russia.  I have  no  belief  whatever  in  her 
ability  to  maintain  an  effective  offensive,  even  if  she  wanted  to.  And  I dis- 
trust  her  motives  . . . Moreover,  she  is  both  hated  and  suspected  by  many 
of  the  smaller  states,  notably  by  Poland,  Rumania  and  Finland.”  (Felling, 
The  Life  of  Neville  Chamberlain,  p.  603.) 


620  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

come  to  the  conclusion  that  Poland  was  rejecting  all  his 
offers.”  8 

A SLIGHT  AGGRESSION  BY  THE  BY 

Before  leaving  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  Lipski  had  asked 
Ribbentrop  whether  he  could  tell  him  anything  about  his 
conversation  with  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Lithuania.  The 
German  replied  that  they  had  discussed  the  Memel  ques- 
tion, “which  called  for  a solution.” 

As  a matter  of  fact,  Ribbentrop  had  received  the  Lith- 
uanian Foreign  Minister,  Juozas  Urbays,  who  was  passing 
through  Berlin  after  a trip  to  Rome,  on  the  previous  day 
and  demanded  that  Lithuania  hand  back  the  Memel  district 
to  Germany  forthwith.  Otherwise  “the  Fuehrer  would  act 
with  lightning  speed.”  The  Lithuanians,  he  warned,  must 
not  deceive  themselves  by  expecting  “some  kind  of  help 
from  abroad.”  8 

Actually,  some  months  before,  on  December  12,  1938, 
the  French  ambassador  and  the  British  charge  d’affaires 
had  called  the  attention  of  the  German  government  to  re- 
ports that  the  German  population  of  Memel  was  planning 
a revolt  and  had  asked  it  to  use  its  influence  to  see  that  the 
Memel  Statute,  guaranteed  by  both  Britain  and  France, 
was  respected.  The  Foreign  Office  reply  had  expressed  “sur- 
prise and  astonishment”  at  the  Anglo-French  demarche, 
and  Ribbentrop  had  ordered  that  if  there  were  any  further 
such  steps  the  two  embassies  should  be  told  “that  we  had 
really  expected  that  the  French  and  British  would  finally 
become  tired  of  meddling  in  Germany’s  affairs.”  10 

For  some  time  the  German  government  and  particularly 
the  party  and  S.S.  leaders  had  been  organizing  the  Ger- 
mans of  Memel  along  lines  with  which  we  are  now  familiar 
from  the  Austrian  and  Sudeten  affairs.  The  German 
armed  forces  had  also  been  called  in  to  co-operate  and,  as 
we  have  seen,*  three  weeks  after  Munich  Hitler  had  or- 
dered his  military  chiefs  to  prepare,  along  with  the  liq- 
uidation of  the  remainder  of  Czechoslovakia,  the  occu- 
pation of  Memel.  Since  the  Navy  had  had  no  opportu- 
nity for  glory  in  the  march-in  to  landlocked  Austria  and 
Sudetenland,  Hitler  decided  that  Memel  should  be  taken 
from  the  sea.  In  November,  naval  plans  for  the  venture 


* See  above,  pp.  57S-579. 


The  Road  to  War 


621 


were  drawn  up  under  the  code  name  “Transport  Exercise 
Stettin.”  Hitler  and  Admiral  Raeder  were  so  keen  on  this 
little  display  of  naval  might  that  they  actually  put  to  sea 
from  Swinemuende  aboard  the  pocket  battleship  Deutsch- 
land for  Memel  on  March  22,  exactly  a week  after  the 
Fuehrer’s  triumphant  entry  into  Prague,  before  defense- 
less Lithuania  had  time  to  capitulate  to  a German  ulti- 
matum. r 

On  March  21,  Weizsaecker,  who  much  later  would  pro- 
claim his  distaste  for  the  brutality  of  Nazi  methods,  notified 
the  Lithuanian  government  that  “there  was  no  time  to 
lose”  and  that  its  plenipotentiaries  must  come  to  Berlin  “by 
special  plane  tomorrow”  to  sign  away  to  Germany  the  dis- 
■ trict  of  Memel.  The  Lithuanians  had  obediently  ar- 
rived late  in  the  afternoon  of  March  22,  but  despite  Ger- 
man pressure  administered  in  person  by  Ribbentrop,  egged 
on  by  a seasick  Hitler  aboard  his  battleship  at  sea,  they 
took  their  time  about  capitulating.  Twice  during  the  night, 
the  captured  German  documents  reveal,  the  Fuehrer  got 
off  urgent  radiograms  from  the  Deutschland  to  Ribbentrop 
asking  whether  the  Lithuanians  had  surrendered,  as  re- 
quested. The  dictator  and  his  Admiral  had  to  know 
whether  they  must  shoot  their  way  into  the  port  of 
Memel.  Finally,  at  1:30  a.m.  on  March  23,  Ribbentrop  was 
able  to  transmit  by  radio  to  his  master  the  news  that  the 
Lithuanians  had  signed.11 

At  2:30  in  the  afternoon  of  the  twenty-third.  Hitler 
made  another  of  his  triumphant  entries  into  a newly  oc- 
cupied city  and  at  the  Stadttheater  in  Memel  again  ad- 
dressed a delirious  “liberated”  German  throng.  Another 
provision  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  had  been  tom  up. 
Another  bloodless  conquest  had  been  made.  Although  the 
Fuehrer  could  not  know  it,  it  was  to  be  the  last. 

THE  HEAT  ON  POLAND 

The  German  annexation  of  the  Memelland  came  as  “a 
very  unpleasant  surprise”  to  the  Polish  government,  as 
the  German  ambassador  to  Poland,  Hans-Adolf  von  Moltke 
reported  to  Berlin  from  Warsaw  on  the  following  day.  “The 
main  reason  for  this,”  he  added,  “is  that  it  is  generally 
feared  that  now  it  will  be  the  turn  of  Danzig  and  the  Cor- 
ridor.” 12  He  also  informed  the  German  Foreign  Office 


622  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

that  Polish  reservists  were  being  called  up.  The  next  day, 
March  25,  Admiral  Canaris,  chief  of  the  Abwehr,  reported 
that  Poland  had  mobilized  three  classes  and  was  concen- 
trating troops  around  Danzig.  General  Keitel  did  not  be- 
lieve this  showed  “any  aggressive  intentions  on  the  part 
of  the  Poles,”  but  the  Army  General  Staff,  he  noted, 
“took  a somewhat  more  serious  view.”  13 

Hitler  returned  to  Berlin  from  Memel  on  March  24  and 
on  the  next  day  had  a long  talk  with  General  von  Brauch- 
itsch,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army.  From  the 
latter’s  confidential  memorandum  of  the  conversation 
it  appears  that  the  Leader  had  not  yet  made  up  his  mind 
exactly  how  to  proceed  against  Poland.14  In  fact,  his 
turbulent  brain  seemed  to  be  full  of  contradictions.  Am- 
bassador Lipski  was  due  back  on  the  next  day,  March  26, 
and  the  Fuehrer  did  not  want  to  see  him 

Lipski  will  return  from  Warsaw  on  Sunday,  March  26 
[Brauchitsch  noted].  He  was  commissioned  to  ask  whether 
Poland  would  be  prepared  to  come  to  some  terms  with  re- 
gard to  Danzig.  The  Fuehrer  left  during  the  night  of  March 
25:  he  does  not  wish  to  be  here  when  Lipski  returns.  Ribben- 
trop  shall  negotiate  at  first.  The  Fuehrer  does  not  wish, 
though,  to  solve  the  Danzig  problem  by  force.  He  would  not 
like  to  drive  Poland  into  the  arms  of  Great  Britain  by 
doing  so. 

A military  occupation  of  Danzig  would  have  to  be  taken 
mto  consideration  only  if  Lipski  gives  a hint  that  the  Polish 
Government  could  not  take  the  responsibility  toward  their 
own  people  to  cede  Danzig  voluntarily  and  the  solution 
would  be  made  easier  for  them  by  a fait  accompli. 

This  is  an  interesting  insight  into  Hitler’s  mind  and 
character  at  this  moment.  Three  months  before,  he  had 
personally  assured  Beck  that  there  would  be  no  German 
fait  accompli  in  Danzig.  Yet  he  remembered  that  the 
Polish  Foreign  Minister  had  stressed  that  the  Polish  people 
would  never  stand  for  turning  over  Danzig  to  Germany. 
If  the  Germans  merely  seized  it,  would  not  this  fait  ac- 
compli make  it  easier  for  the  Polish  government  to  ac- 
cept it?  Hitherto  Hitler  had  been  a genius  at  sizing  up  the 
weaknesses  of  his  foreign  opponents  and  taking  advantage 
of  them,  but  here,  for  almost  the  first  time,  his  judgment 
has  begun  to  falter.  The  “colonels”  who  governed  Poland 
were  a mediocre  and  muddling  lot,  but  the  last  thing 


623 


The  Road  to  War 

they  wanted,  or  would  accept,  was  a fait  accompli  in 
Danzig. 

The  Free  City  was  uppermost  in  Hitler’s  mind,  but  he 
was  also  thinking  beyond  it,  just  as  he  had  done  in  regard 
to  Czechoslovakia  after  Munich  had  given  him  the  Sude- 
tenland. 

For  the  time  being  [Brauchitsch  noted],  the  Fuehrer 
does  not  intend  to  solve  the  Polish  question.  However,  it 
should  be  worked  on.  A solution  in  the  near  future  would 
have  to  be  based  on  especially  favorable  political  conditions. 
In  that  case  Poland  shall  be  knocked  down  so  completely 
that  it  need  not  be  taken  into  account  as  a political  factor 
for  the  next  few  decades.  The  Fuehrer  has  in  mind  as  such  a 
solution,  a borderline  advanced  from  the  eastern  border  of 
East  Prussia  to  the  eastern  tip  of  Upper  Silesia. 

Brauchitsch  well  knew  what  that  border  signified.  It 
was  Germany’s  prewar  eastern  frontier,  which  Versailles 
had  destroyed,  and  which  had  prevailed  as  long  as  there 
was  no  Poland. 

If  Hitler  had  any  doubts  as  to  what  the  Polish  reply 
would  be  they  were  dissipated  when  Ambassador  Lipski 
returned  to  Berlin  on  Sunday,  March  26,  and  presented  his 
country’s  answer  in  the  form  of  a written  memorandum.15 
Ribbentrop  read  it  at  once,  rejected  it,  stormed  about 
Polish  mobilization  measures  and  varned  the  envoy  “of 
possible  consequences.”  He  also  declared  that  any  vio- 
lation of  Danzig  territory  by  Polish  troops  would  be  re- 
garded as  aggression  against  the  Reich. 

Poland’s  written  response,  while  couched  in  conciliatory 
language,  was  a firm  rejection  of  the  German  demands.  It 
expressed  willingness  to  discuss  further  means  of  facili- 
tating German  rail  and  road  traffic  across  the  Corridor 
but  refused  to  consider  making  such  communications  ex- 
traterritorial. As  for  Danzig,  Poland  was  willing  to  replace 
the  League  of  Nations  status  by  a Polish-German  guaran- 
tee but  not  to  see  the  Free  City  become  a part  of  Germany. 

Nazi  Germany  by  this  time  was  not  accustomed  to  see  a 
smaller  nation  turning  down  its  demands,  and  Ribbentrop 
remarked  to  Lipski  that  “it  reminded  him  of  certain  risky 
steps  taken  by  another  state” — an  obvious  reference  to 
Czechoslovakia,  which  Poland  had  helped  Hitler  to  dis- 
member. It  must  have  been  equally  obvious  to  Lipski, 
when  he  was  summoned  again  to  the  Foreign  Office  the 


624 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


next  day  by  Ribbentrop,  that  the  Third  Reich  would  now 
resort  to  the  same  tactics  against  Poland  which  had  been 
used  so  successfully  against  Austria  and  Czechoslovakia. 
The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  raged  at  the  alleged  persecution 
of  the  German  minority  in  Poland,  which,  he  said,  had 
created  “a  disastrous  impression  in  Germany.” 

In  conclusion,  the  [German]  Foreign  Minister  remarked 
that  he  could  no  longer  understand  the  Polish  Government 
. . . The  proposals  transmitted  yesterday  by  the  Polish  Am- 
bassador could  not  be  regarded  as  a basis  for  a settlement. 
Relations  between  the  two  countries  were  therefore  rapidly 
deteriorating.1® 

Warsaw  was  not  so  easily  intimidated  as  Vienna  and 
Prague.  The  next  day,  March  28,  Beck  sent  for  the  German 
ambassador  and  told  him,  in  answer  to  Ribbentrop’s  dec- 
laration that  a Polish  coup  against  Danzig  would  signify 
a casus  belli,  that  he  in  turn  was  forced  to  state  that  any 
attempt  by  Germany  or  the  Nazi  Danzig  Senate  to  alter 
the  status  of  the  Free  City  would  be  regarded  by  Poland 
as  a casus  belli. 

“You  want  to  negotiate  at  the  point  of  a bayonet!”  ex- 
claimed the  ambassador. 

“This  is  your  own  method,”  Beck  replied.17 

The  reawakened  Polish  Foreign  Minister  could  afford 
to  stand  up  to  Berlin*  more  firmly  than  BeneS  had  been 
able  to  do,  for  he  knew  that  the  British  government, 
which  a year  before  had  been  anxious  to  help  Hitler  obtain 
his  demands  against  Czechoslovakia,  was  now  taking  pre- 
cisely the  opposite  course  in  regard  to  Poland.  Beck  him- 
self had  torpedoed  the  British  proposal  for  a four-power 
declaration,  declaring  that  Poland  refused  to  associate  it- 
self with  Russia  in  any  manner.  Instead,  on  March  22,  he 
had  suggested  to  Sir  Howard  Kennard,  the  British  am- 
bassador in  Warsaw,  the  immediate  conclusion  of  a secret 
Anglo-Polish  agreement  for  consultation  in  case  of  a 
threatened  attack  by  a third  power.  But,  alarmed  by  Ger- 
man troop  movement  adjacent  to  Danzig  and  the  Corridor 
and  by  British  intelligence  concerning  German  demands  on 
Poland  (which  the  tricky  Beck  had  denied  to  the  British), 
Chamberlain  and  Halifax  wanted  to  go  further  than  mere 
“consultations.” 

On  the  evening  of  March  30,  Kennard  presented  to  Beck 
an  Anglo-French  proposal  for  mutual-assistance  pacts  in 


625 


The  Road  to  War 

case  of  German  aggression.*  But  even  this  step  was  over- 
taken by  events.  Fresh  reports  of  the  possibility  of  an  im- 
minent German  attack  on  Poland  prompted  the  British 
government  on  the  same  evening  to  ask  Beck  whether  he 
had  any  objection  to  an  interim  unilateral  British  guarantee 
of  Poland’s  independence.  Chamberlain  had  to  know  by 
the  morrow,  as  he  wished  to  answer  a parliamentary  ques- 
tion on  the  subject.  Beck — his  sense  of  relief  may  be  im- 
agined— had  no  objection.  In  fact,  he  told  Kennard,  he 
“agreed  without  hesitation.”  18 

The  next  day,  March  31,  as  we  have  seen,  Chamberlain 
made  his  historic  declaration  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  Britain  and  France  “would  lend  the  Polish  Govern- 
ment  all  support  in  their  power”  if  Poland  were  attacked 
and  resisted. t 

To  anyone  in  Berlin  that  weekend  when  March  193y 
came  to  an  end,  as  this  writer  happened  to  be,  the  sudden 
British  unilateral  guarantee  of  Poland  seemed  incompre- 
hensible, however  welcome  it  might  be  in  the  lands  to  the 
west  and  the  east  of  Germany.  Time  after  time,  as  we 
have  seen,  in  1936  when  the  Germans  marched  into  the 
demilitarized  Rhineland,  in  1938  when  they  took  Austria 
and  threatened  a European  war  to  take  the  Sudetenland, 
even  a fortnight  before,  when  they  grabbed  Czecho- 
slovakia, Great  Britain  and  France,  backed  by  Russia, 
could  have  taken  action  to  stop  Hitler  at  very  little  cost 
to  themselves.  But  the  peace-hungry  Chamberlain  had 
shied  away  from  such  moves.  Not  only  that:  he  had  gone 
out  of  his  way,  he  had  risked,  as  he  said,  his  political 
career  to  help  Adolf  Hitler  get  what  he  wanted  in  the 
neighboring  lands.  He  had  done  nothing  to  save  the  in- 
dependence of  Austria.  He  had  consorted  with  the  Ger- 
man dictator  to  destroy  the  independence  of  Czecho- 
slovakia, the  only  truly  democratic  nation  on  Germany’s 
eastern  borders  and  the  only  one  which  was  a friend  of 
the  West  and  which  supported  the  League  of  Nations  and 

* In  the  telegram  of  instructions  to  Kennard  18  it  was  made  dear  that  Russia 
was  to  be  left  out  in  the  cold.  “It  is becoming f clear,  it . thff  car 
attempts  to  consolidate  the  situation  will  be  frustrated  if  the  Soviet  Union 
is  openly  associated  with  the  initiation  of  the  scheme.  Recent  telegrams  from 
a number  of  His  Majesty’s  Missions  abroad  have  warned  us  that  the  in- 
clusion of  Russia  would  not  only  jeopardise,  the  success  of  our  constructive 
effort  but  also  tend  to  consolidate  the  relations  of  the  parties  to  the  Anti- 
Comintern  Pact,  as  well  as  excite  anxiety  among  a number  of  friendly 
governments.” 

T See  above,  p.  611. 


626 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  idea  of  collective  security.  He  had  not  even  con- 
sidered the  military  value  to  the  West  of  Czechoslovakia’s 
thirty-five  well-trained,  well-armed  divisions  entrenched  be- 
hind their  strong  mountain  fortifications  at  a time  when 
Britain  could  put  only  two  divisions  in  France  and  when 
the  German  Army  was  incapable  of  fighting  on  two  fronts 
and,  according  to  the  German  generals,  even  incapable  of 
penetrating  the  Czech  defenses. 

Now  overnight,  in  his  understandably  bitter  reaction  to 
Hitler’s  occupation  of  the  rest  of  Czechoslovakia,  Cham- 
berlain, after  having  deliberately  and  recklessly  thrown  so 
much  away,  had  undertaken  to  unilaterally  guarantee  an 
Eastern  country  run  by  a junta  of  politically  inept 
“colonels”  who  up  to  this  moment  had  closely  collaborated 
with  Hitler,  who  like  hyenas  had  joined  the  Germans  in 
the  carving  up  of  Czechoslovakia  and  whose  country  had 
been  rendered  militarily  indefensible  by  the  very  German 
conquests  which  Britain  and  Poland  had  helped  the  Reich 
to  achieve.*  And  he  had  taken  this  eleventh-hour  risk 
without  bothering  to  enlist  the  aid  of  Russia,  whose  pro- 
posals for  joint  action  against  further  Nazi  aggression  he 
had  twice  turned  down  within  the  year. 

Finally,  he  had  done  exactly  what  for  more  than  a year 
he  had  stoutly  asserted  that  Britain  would  never  do:  he 
had  left  to  another  nation  the  decision  whether  his  coun- 
try would  go  to  war. 

Nevertheless,  the  Prime  Minister’s  precipitate  step,  be- 
lated as  it  was,  presented  Adolf  Hitler  with  an  entirely 
new  situation.  From  now  on,  apparently,  Britain  would 
stand  in  the  way  of  his  committing  further  aggression.  He 
could  no  longer  use  the  technique  of  taking  one  nation 

•Chamberlain  could  not  have  been  ignorant  of  Poland’s  military  weakness. 
Colonel  Sword,  the  British  military  attache  in  Warsaw,  had  sent  to  London  a 
week  before, . on  March  22,  a long  report  on  the  disastrous  strategic  position 
°J  Poland,  “bounded  on  three  sides  by  Germany,”  and  on  the  deficiencies  of 
toe  Polish  armed  forces^  especially  in  modern  arms  and  equipment.20 

On  April  6,  while  Colonel  Beck  was  in  London  discussing  a mutual- 
assistance  pact.  Colonel  Sword  and  also  the  British  air  attache  in  Warsaw, 
Group  Captain  Vachell,  sent  fresh  reports  which  were  even  less  hopeful. 
Vachell  emphasized  that  during  the  next  twelve  months  the  Polish  Air  Force 
would  have  “no  more  than  about  600  aircraft,  many  of  which  are  no  match 
for  German  aircraft.”  Sword  reported  that  the  Polish  Army  and  Air  Force 
were  both  so  lacking  in  modern  equipment  that  they  could  put  up  only  a 
limited  resistance  to  an  all-out  German  attack.  Ambassador  Kennard,  sum- 
ming up  his  attaches’  reports,  informed  London  that  the  Poles  would  be 
unable  to  defend  the  Corridor  or  the  western  frontier  against  Germany  and 
would  have  to  fall  back  on  the  Vistula  in  the  heart  of  Poland.  “A  friendly 
Russia,  he  added,  was  “thus  of  paramount  importance”  for  Poland.21 


627 


The  Road  to  War 

at  a time  while  the  Western  democracies  stood  aside 
debating  what  to  do.  Moreover,  Chamberlain’s  move 
appeared  to  be  the  first  serious  step  toward  forming  a 
coalition  of  powers  against  Germany  which,  unless  it  were 
successfully  countered,  might  bring  again  that  very 
encirclement  which  had  been  the  nightmare  of  the  Reich 
since  Bismarck. 

CASE  WHITE 

The  news  of  Chamberlain’s  guarantee  of  Poland  threw 
the  German  dictator  into  one  of  his  characteristic  rages. 
He  happened  to  be  with  Admiral  Canaris,  chief  of  the 
Abwehr,  and  according  to  the  latter  he  stormed  about  the 
room,  pounding  his  fists  on  the  marble  table  top,  his  face 
contorted  with  fury,  and  shouting  against  the  British,  “I’ll 
cook  them  a stew  they’ll  choke  on!”  22 

The  next  day,  April  1,  he  spoke  at  Wilhelmshaven  at  the 
launching  of  the  battleship  Tirpitz  and  was  in  such  a bel- 
ligerent mood  that  apparently  he  did  not  quite  trust  him- 
self, for  at  the  last  moment  he  ordered  that  the  direct 
radio  broadcast  of  his  speech  be  canceled;  he  directed  that 
it  be  rebroadcast  later  from  recordings,  which  could  be 
edited.*  Even  the  rebroadcast  version  was  spotted  with 
warnings  to  Britain  and  Poland. 

If  they  [the  Western  Allies]  expect  the  Germany  of  to- 
day to  sit  patiently  by  until  the  very  last  day  while  they 
create  satellite  States  and  set  them  against  Germany,  then 
they  are  mistaking  the  Germany  of  today  for  the  Germany 
of  before  the  war. 

He  who  declares  himself  ready  to  pull  the  chestnuts  out 
of  the  fire  for  these  powers  must  realize  he  bums  his 
fingers.  . . . 

When  they  say  in  other  countries  that  they  will  arm  and 
will  keep  arming  still  more,  I can  tell  those  statesmen  only 
this:  “Me  you  will  never  tire  out!”  I am  determined  to  con- 
tinue on  this  road. 

* Actually,  the  relay  of  the  broadcast  to  the  American  radio  networks  was 
cut  off  after  Hitler  had  begun  to  speak.  This  led  to  reports  in  New  York 
that  he  had  been  assassinated.  I was  in  the  control  room  of  the  short-wave 
section  of  the  German  Broadcasting  Company  in  Berlin,  looking  after  the 
relay  to  the  Columbia  Broadcasting  System  in  New  York,  when  the  broad- 
cast was  suddenly  shut  off.  To  my  protests,  German  officials  answered  that 
the  order  had  come  from  Hitler  himself.  Within  fifteen  minutes  CBS  was 
telephoning  me  from  New  York  to  check  on  the  assassination  report.  I could 
easily  deny  it  because  through  an  open  telephone  circuit  to  Wilhelmshaven 
I could  hear  Hitler  shouting  his  speech.  It  would  have  been  difficult  to  shoot 
the  Fuehrer  that  day  because  he  spoke  behind  a bulletproof  glass  enclosure. 


628 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hitler,  as  his  cancellation  of  the  direct  broadcast 
showed,  was  cautious  enough  not  to  provoke  foreign 
opinion  too  much.  It  was  reported  in  Berlin  that  day  that 
he  would  denounce  the  Anglo-German  naval  treaty  as 
his  first  reply  to  Chamberlain.  But  in  his  speech  he  merely 
declared  that  if  Great  Britain  no  longer  wished  to  adhere 
to  it,  Germany  “would  accept  this  very  calmly.” 

As  so  often  before,  Hitler  ended  on  an  old  familiar 
note  of  peace:  “Germany  has  no  intention  of  attacking 
other  people  . . . Out  of  this  conviction  I decided  three 
weeks  ago  to  name  the  coming  party  rally  the  ‘Party  Con- 
vention of  Peace’  ” — a slogan,  which  as  the  summer  of 
1939  developed,  became  more  and  more  ironic. 

That  was  for  public  consumption.  In  the  greatest  of 
secrecy  Hitler  gave  his  real  answer  to  Chamberlain  and 
Colonel  Beck  two  days  later,  on  April  3.  It  was  contained 
in  a top-secret  directive  to  the  armed  forces,  of  which 
only  five  copies  were  made,  inaugurating  “Case  White.” 
This  was  a code  name  which  was  to  loom  large  in  the 
subsequent  history  of  the  world. 

TOP  SECRET 

Case  White 

The  present  attitude  of  Poland  requires  . . . the  initiation 
of  military  preparations  to  remove,  if  necessary,  any  threat 
from  this  direction  forever. 

1.  Political  Requirements  and  Aims 

. . . The  aim  will  be  to  destroy  Polish  military  strength 
and  create  in  the  East  a situation  which  satisfies  the  re- 
quirements of  national  defense.  The  Free  State  of  Danzig  will 
be  proclaimed  a part  of  the  Reich  territory  at  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities,  at  the  latest. 

The  political  leaders  consider  it  their  task  in  this  case  to 
isolate  Poland  if  possible,  that  is  to  say,  to  limit  the  war 
to  Poland  only. 

The  development  of  increasing  internal  crises  in  France 
and  the  resulting  British  cautiousness  might  produce  such  a 
situation  in  the  not  too  distant  future. 

Intervention  by  Russia  . . . cannot  be  expected  to  be  of 
any  use  to  Poland  . . . Italy’s  attitude  is  determined  by 
the  Rome-Berlin  Axis. 

2.  Military  Conclusions 

The  great  objectives  in  the  building  up  of  the  German 
armed  forces  will  continue  to  be  determined  by  the  an- 
tagonism of  the  Western  democracies.  “Case  White"  con- 


The  Road  to  War 


629 


stitutes  only  a precautionary  complement  to  these  prepara- 
tions . . . 

The  isolation  of  Poland  will  be  all  the  more  easily  main- 
tained, even  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  if  we  succeed 
in  starting  the  war  with  sudden,  heavy  blows  and  in  gaining 
rapid  successes  . . . 

3.  Tasks  of  the  Armed  Forces 

The  task  of  the  Wehrmacht  is  to  destroy  the  Polish  armed 
forces.  To  this  end  a surprise  attack  is  to  be  aimed  at  and 
prepared. 

As  for  Danzig: 

Surprise  occupation  of  Danzig  may  become  possible  inde- 
pendently of  “Case  White”  by  exploiting  a favorable  political 
situation  . . . Occupation  by  the  Army  will  be  carried  out 
from  East  Prussia.  The  Navy  will  support  the  action  of  the 
Army  by  intervention  from  the  sea. 

Case  White  is  a lengthy  document  with  several  “en- 
closures,” “annexes”  and  “special  orders,”  most  of  which 
were  reissued  as  a whole  on  April  11  and  of  course  added 
to  later  as  the  time  for  hostilities  approached.  But  already 
on  April  3,  Hitler  appended  the  following  directives  to 
Case  White: 

1.  Preparations  must  be  made  in  such  a way  that  the 
operation  can  be  carried  out  at  any  time  from  September 
1,  1939,  onward. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  date  Hitler  gave  long  in  advance 
for  getting  the  Sudetenland — October  1,  1938 — this  more 
important  date  of  September  1,  1939,  would  also  be  kept. 

2.  The  High  Command  of  the  Armed  Forces  [OKW]  is 
charged  with  drawing  up  a precise  timetable  for  “Case 
White”  and  is  to  arrange  for  synchronized  timing  between 
the  three  branches  of  the  Wehrmacht. 

3.  The  plans  of  the  branches  of  the  Wehrmacht  and  the 
details  for  the  timetable  must  be  submitted  to  OKW  by 
May  1,  1939.23 

The  question  now  was  whether  Hitler  could  wear  down 
the  Poles  to  the  point  of  accepting  his  demands,  as  he 
had  done  with  the  Austrians  and  (with  Chamberlain’s  help) 
the  Czechs,  or  whether  Poland  would  hold  its  ground  and 
resist  Nazi  aggression  if  it  came,  and  if  so,  with  what. 
This  writer  spent  the  first  week  of  April  in  Poland  in 
search  of  answers.  They  were,  as  far  as  he  could  see,  that 
the  Poles  would  not  give  in  to  Hitler’s  threats,  would  fight 


630 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


if  their  land  were  invaded,  but  that  militarily  and  po- 
litically they  were  in  a disastrous  position.  Their  Air  Force 
was  obsolete,  their  Army  cumbersome,  their  strategic 
position — surrounded  by  the  Germans  on  three  sides — 
almost  hopeless.  Moreover,  the  strengthening  of  Germany’s 
West  Wall  made  an  Anglo-French  offensive  against  Ger- 
many in  case  Poland  were  attacked  extremely  difficult.  And 
finally  it  became  obvious  that  the  headstrong  Polish  “colo- 
nels” would  never  consent  to  receiving  Russian  help  even 
if  the  Germans  were  at  the  gates  of  Warsaw. 

Events  now  moved  quickly.  On  April  6 Colonel  Beck 
signed  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  in  London  trans- 
forming the  unilateral  British  guarantee  into  a temporary 
pact  of  mutual  assistance.  A permanent  treaty,  it  was  an- 
nounced, would  be  signed  as  soon  as  the  details  had  been 
worked  out. 

The  next  day,  April  7,  Mussolini  sent  his  troops  into 
Albania  and  added  the  conquest  of  that  mountainous  lit- 
tle country  to  that  of  Ethiopia.  It  gave  him  a springboard 
against  Greece  and  Yugoslavia  and  in  the  tense  atmosphere 
of  Europe  served  to  make  more  jittery  the  small  countries 
which  dared  to  defy  the  Axis.  As  the  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice papers  make  clear,  it  was  done  with  the  complete  ap- 
proval of  Germany,  which  was  informed  of  the  step  in 
advance.  On  April  13,  France  and  Britain  countered  with 
a guarantee  to  Greece  and  Rumania.  The  two  sides  were 
beginning  to  line  up.  In  the  middle  of  April,  Goering 
arrived  in  Rome  and  much  to  Ribbentrop’s  annoyance  had 
two  long  talks  with  Mussolini,  on  the  fifteenth  and  six- 
teenth.24 They  agreed  that  they  “needed  two  or  three 
years”  to  prepare  for  “a  general  conflict,”  but  Goering 
declared  that  if  war  came  sooner  “the  Axis  was  in  a 
very  strong  position”  and  “could  defeat  any  likely  op- 
ponents.” 

Mention  was  made  of  an  appeal  from  President  Roose- 
velt which  had  arrived  in  Rome  and  Berlin  on  April  15. 
Thq  Duce,  according  to  Ciano,  had  at  first  refused  to  read 
it  and  Goering  declared  that  it  was  not  worth  answering. 
Mussolini  thought  it  “a  result  of  infantile  paralysis,”  but 
Goering’s  impression  was  that  “Roosevelt  was  suffering 
from  an  incipient  mental  disease.”  In  his  telegram  to  Hitler 
and  Mussolini  the  President  of  the  United  States  had  ad- 
dressed a blunt  question: 


631 


The  Road  to  War 

Are  you  willing  to  give  assurance  that  your  armed  forces 
will  not  attack  or  invade  the  territory  of  the  following  in- 
dependent nations? 

There  had  followed  a list  of  thirty-one  countries,  in- 
cluding Poland,  the  Baltic  States,  Russia,  Denmark,  the 
Netherlands,  Belgium,  France  and  Britain.  The  President 
hoped  that  such  a guarantee  of  nonaggression  could  be 
given  for  “ten  years  at  the  least”  or  “a  quarter  of  a cen- 
tury, if  we  dare  look  that  far  ahead.”  If  it  were  given,  he 
promised  American  participation  in  world-wide  “discus- 
sions” to  relieve  the  world  from  “the  crushing  burden  of 
armament”  and  to  open  up  avenues  of  international  trade. 

“You  have  repeatedly  asserted,”  he  reminded  Hitler, 
“that  you  and  the  German  people  have  no  desire  for  war. 
If  this  is  true  there  need  be  no  war.” 

In  the  light  of  what  now  is  known,  this  seemed  like  a 
naive  appeal,  but  the  Fuehrer  found  it  embarrassing 
enough  to  let  it  be  known  that  he  would  reply  to  it — 
not  directly,  but  in  a speech  to  a specially  convoked  ses- 
sion of  the  Reichstag  on  April  28. 

In  the  meantime,  as  the  captured  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice papers  reveal,  the  Wilhelmstrasse  in  a circular  tele- 
gram of  April  17  put  two  questions  of  its  own  to  all  the 
states  mentioned  by  Roosevelt  except  Poland,  Russia, 
Britain  and  France:  Did  they  feel  themselves  in  any  way 
threatened  by  Germany?  Had  they  authorized  Roosevelt 
to  make  his  proposal? 

“We  are  in  no  doubt,”  Ribbentrop  wired  his  various 
envoys  in  the  countries  concerned,  “that  both  questions 
will  be  answered  in  the  negative,  but  nevertheless,  for  spe- 
cial reasons,  we  should  like  to  have  authentic  confirma- 
tion at  once.”  The  “special  reasons”  would  become  evident 
when  Hitler  spoke  on  April  28. 

By  April  22  the  German  Foreign  Office  was  able  to 
draw  up  a report  for  the  Fuehrer  that  most  of  the  coun- 
tries, including  Yugoslavia,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Norway, 
the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg  “have  answered  both 
questions  in  the  negative” — a reply  which  would  soon  show 
what  an  innocent  view  their  governments  took  of  the  Third 
Reich.  From  Rumania,  however,  came  a tart  answer  that 
the  “Reich  Government  were  themselves  in  a position  to 
know  whether  a threat  might  arise.”  Little  Latvia  up  in 
the  Baltic  did  not  at  first  understand  what  answer  was 


632 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


expected  of  it,  but  the  Foreign  Office  soon  put  it  right. 
Oh  April  18  Weizsaecker  rang  up  his  minister  in  Riga 

to  tell  him  we  were  unable  to  understand  the  answer  of  the 
Latvian  Foreign  Minister  to  our  question  about  the  Roose- 
velt telegram.  While  practically  all  the  other  governments 
have  already  answered,  and  naturally  in  the  negative,  M. 
Munters  treated  this  ridiculous  American  propaganda  as  a 
question  on  which  he  wished  to  consult  his  cabinet.  If 
M.  Munters  did  not  answer  “no”  to  our  question  right 
away,  we  should  have  to  add  Latvia  to  those  countries 
which  made  themselves  into  willing  accomplices  of  Mr. 
Roosevelt.  I said  that  I assumed  that  a word  on  these  lines 
by  Herr  von  Kotze  [the  German  minister]  would  be 
enough  to  obtain  the  obvious  answer  from  him.25 

It  was. 

HITLER’S  REPLY  TO  ROOSEVELT 

— The  replies  were  potent  ammunition  for  Hitler,  and  he 
made  masterly  use  of  them  as  he  swung  into  his  speech 
to  the  Reichstag  on  the  pleasant  spring  day  of  April  28, 
1939.  It  was,  I believe,  the  longest  major  public  speech  he 
ever  made,  taking  more  than  two  hours  to  deliver.  In 
many  ways,  especially  in  the  power  of  its  appeal  to  Ger- 
mans and  to  the  friends  of  Nazi  Germany  abroad,  it  was 
probably  the  most  brilliant  oration  he  ever  gave,  certainly 
the  greatest  this  writer  ever  heard  from  him.  For  sheer 
eloquence,  craftiness,  irony,  sarcasm  and  hypocrisy,  it 
reached  a new  level  that  he  was  never  to  approach  again. 
And  though  prepared  for  German  ears,  it  was  broadcast 
not  only  on  all  German  radio  stations  but  on  hundreds  of 
others  throughout  the  world;  in  the  United  States  it  was 
carried  by  the  major  networks.  Never  before  or  afterward 
was  there  such  a world-wide  audience  as  he  had  that  day.* 

The  speech  began,  after  the  usual  introductory  disserta- 
tion on  the  iniquities  of  Versailles  and  the  many  injustices 
and  long  suffering  heaped  upon  the  German  people  by  it, 

* On  the  day  of  the  speech  Weizsaecker  wired  Hans  Thomsen,  German 
charge  in  Washington,  instructing  him  to  give  the  Fuehrer’s  address  the 
widest  possible  publicity  in  the  United  States  and  assuring  him  that  extra 
funds  would  be  provided  for  the  purpose.  On  May  1 Thomsen  replied,  “In- 
terest in  speech  surpasses  anything  so  far  known.  I have  therefore  directed 
that  the  English  text  printed  here  is  to  be  sent  ...  to  tens  of  thousands  of 
addressees  of  all  classes  and  callings,  in  accordance  with  the  agreed  plan. 
Claim  for  costs  to  follow.”  20 


633 


The  Road  to  War 

with  an  answer  first  to  Great  Britain  and  Poland  which 
shook  an  uneasy  Europe. 

After  declaring  his  feeling  of  admiration  and  friendship 
for  England  and  then  attacking  it  for  its  distrust  of  him 
and  its  new  “policy  of  encirclement”  of  Germany,  he  de- 
nounced the  Anglo— German  Naval  Treaty  of  1935.  “The 
basis  for  it,”  he  said,  “has  been  removed.” 

Likewise  with  Poland.  He  made  known  his  proposal  to 
Poland  concerning  Danzig  and  the  Corridor  (which  had 
been  kept  secret),  called  it  “the  greatest  imaginable  con- 
cession in  the  interest  of  European  peace”  and  informed 
the  Reichstag  that  the  Polish  government  had  rejected  this 
“one  and  only  offer.” 

I have  regretted  this  incomprehensible  attitude  of  the 
Polish  Government  . . . The  worst  is  that  now  Poland,  like 
Czechoslovakia  a year  ago,  believes,  under  pressure  of  a 
lying  international  campaign,  that  it  must  call  up  troops,  al- 
though Germany  has  not  called  up  a single  man  and  had  not 
thought  of  proceeding  in  any  way  against  Poland.  This  is  in 
itself  very  regrettable,  and  posterity  will  one  day  decide 
whether  it  was  really  right  to  refuse  this  suggestion,  made 
this  once  by  me  ...  a truly  unique  compromise  . . . 

Reports  that  Germany  intended  to  attack  Poland,  Hitler 
went  on,  were  “mere  inventions  of  the  international 
press.”  (Nof  one  of  the  tens  of  millions  of  persons  listen- 
ing could  know  that  only  three  weeks  before  he  had  given 
written  orders  to  his  armed  forces  to  prepare  for  the  de- 
struction of  Poland  by  September  1,  “at  the  latest.”)  The 
inventions  of  the  press,  he  continued,  had  led  Poland  to 
make  its  agreement  with  Great  Britain  which,  “under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  would  compel  Poland  to  take  military 
action  against  Germany.”  Therefore,  Poland  had  broken 
the  Polish-German  nonaggression  pact!  “Therefore,  I 
look  upon  the  agreement  ...  as  having  been  unilaterally 
infringed  by  Poland  and  thereby  no  longer  in  existence.” 

Having  himself  unilaterally  torn  up  two  formal  treaties, 
Hitler  then  told  the  Reichstag  that  he  was  willing  to 
negotiate  replacements  for  them!  “I  can  but  welcome  such 
an  idea,”  he  exclaimed.  “No  one  would  be  happier  than 
I at  the  prospect.”  This  was  an  old  trick  he  had  pulled 
often  before  when  he  had  broken  a treaty,  as  we  have 
seen,  but  though  he  probably  did  not  know  it,  it  would 
no  longer  work. 


634 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hitler  next  turned  to  President  Roosevelt,  and  here  the 
German  dictator  reached  the  summit  of  his  oratory.  To  a 
normal  ear,  to  be  sure,  it  reeked  with  hypocrisy  and  de- 
ception. But  to  the  hand-picked  members  of  the  Reichstag, 
and  to  millions  of  Germans,  its  masterly  sarcasm  and 
irony  were  a delight.  The  paunchy  deputies  rocked  with 
raucous  laughter  as  the  Fuehrer  uttered  with  increasing 
effect  his  seemingly  endless  ridicule  of  the  American 
President.  One  by  one  he  took  up  the  points  of  Roose- 
velt’s telegram,  paused,  almost  smiled,  and  then,  like  a 
schoolmaster,  uttered  in  a low  voice  one  word,  “an- 
swer”—and  gave  it.  (This  writer  can  still,  in  his  mind, 
See  Pausing  time  after  time  to  say  quietly,  “Ant- 

wort,”  while  above  the  rostrum  in  the  President’s  chair 
Goering  tried  ineffectually  to  stifle  a snicker  and  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Reichstag  prepared,  as  soon  as  the  Antwort 
was  given,  to  roar  and  laugh.) 

Mr.  Roosevelt  declares  that  it  is  clear  to  him  that  all  inter- 
national problems  can  be  solved  at  the  council  table. 

Answer:  . . . I would  be  very  happy  if  these  problems 
could  really  find  their  solution  at  the  council  table.  My 
skepticism,  however,  is  based  on  the  fact  that  it  was  America 
herself  who  gave  sharpest  expression  to  her  mistrust  in  the 
effectiveness  of  conferences.  For  the  greatest  conference  of  all 
tune  was  the  League  of  Nations  . . . representing,  all  the  peo- 
ples of  the  world,  created  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  an 
American  President.  The  first  State,  however,  that  shrank 
from  this  endeavor  was  the  United  States  ...  It  was  not 
until  after  years  of  purposeless  participation  that  I resolved 
to  follow  the  example  of  America.  . . . 

The  freedom  of  North  America  was  not  achieved  at  the 
conference  table  any  more  than  the  conflict  between  the 
North  and  the  South  was  decided  there.  I will  say  nothing 
about  the  innumerable  struggles  which  finally  led  to  the  sub- 
jugation of  the  North  American  continent  as  a whole. 

I mention  all  this  only  in  order  to  show  that  your  view, 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  although  undoubtedly  deserving  of  all 
honor,  finds  no  confirmation  in  the  history  of  your  own 
country  or  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Germany,  Hitler  reminded  the  President,  had  once  gone 
to  a conference — at  Versailles — not  to  discuss  but  to  be 
told  what  to  do:  its  representatives  “were  subjected  to 
even  greater  degradations  than  can  ever  have  been  in- 
flicted on  the  chieftains  of  the  Sioux  tribes.” 


The  Road  to  War 


635 


Hitler  finally  got  to  the  core  of  his  answer  to  the  Presi- 
dent’s request  that  he  give  assurances  not  to  attack  any 
of  thirty-one  nations. 

Answer:  How  has  Mr.  Roosevelt  learned  which  nations 
consider  themselves  threatened  by  German  policy  and 
which  do  not?  Or  is  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  a position,  in  spite  of 
the  enormous  amount  of  work  which  must  rest  upon  him 
in  his  own  country,  to  recognize  of  his  own  accord  all  these 
inner  spiritual  and  mental  impressions  of  other  peoples  and 
their  governments? 

Finally,  Mr.  Roosevelt  asks  that  assurance  be  given  him 
that  the  German  armed  forces  will  not  attack,  and  above 
all,  not  invade  the  territory  or  possessions  of  the  following 
independent  nations  . . . 

Hitler  then  read  out  slowly  the  name  of  each  country 
and  as  he  intoned  the  names,  I remember,  the  laughter  in 
the  Reichstag  grew.  Not  one  member,  no  one  in  Berlin, 
I believe,  including  this  writer,  noticed  that  he  slyly  left 
out  Poland. 

Hitler  now  pulled  the  ace  out  of  the  pack,  or  so  he 
must  have  thought. 

Answer:  I have  taken  the  trouble  to  ascertain  from  the 
States  mentioned,  firstly  whether  they  feel  themselves 
threatened,  and  secondly  and  above  all,  whether  this  inquiry 
by  the  American  President  was  addressed  to  us  at  their 
suggestion,  or  at  any  rate,  with  their  consent. 

The  reply  was  in  all  cases  negative  ...  It  is  true  that  I 
could  not  cause  inquiries  to  be  made  of  certain  of  the 
States  and  nations  mentioned  because  they  themselves — as 
for  example,  Syria — are  at  present  not  in  possession  of  their 
freedom,  but  are  occupied  and  consequently  deprived  of 
their  rights  by  the  military  agents  of  democratic  States. 

Apart  from  this  fact,  however,  all  States  bordering  on  Ger- 
many have  received  much  more  binding  assurances  . . . 
than  Mr.  Roosevelt  asked  from  me  in  his  curious  telegram.  . . . 

I must  draw  Mr.  Roosevelt’s  attention  to  one  or  two  his- 
torical errors.  He  mentioned  Ireland,  for  instance,  and  asks 
for  a statement  that  Germany  will  not  attack  Ireland.  Now, 
I have  just  read  a speech  by  De  Valera,  the  Irish  Taoiseach,* 
in  which,  strangely  enough,  and  contrary  to  Mr.  Roose- 
velt’s opinion,  he  does  not  charge  Germany  with  oppressing 
Ireland  but  he  reproaches  England  with  subjecting  Ireland 
to  continuous  aggression  . . . 

In  the  same  way,  the  fact  has  obviously  escaped  Mr. 

* Hitler  was  careful  to  use  the  Gaelic  word  for  Prime  Minister. 


636 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Roosevelt’s  notice  that  Palestine  is  at  present  occupied  not 
by  German  troops  but  by  the  English;  and  that  the  country 
is  having  its  liberty  restricted  by  the  most  brutal  resort  to 
force  .... 

Nevertheless,  said  Hitler,  he  was  prepared  “to  give  each 
of  the  States  named  an  assurance  of  the  kind  desired  by 
Mr.  Roosevelt.”  But  more  than  that!  His  eyes  lit  up. 

I should  not  like  to  let  this  opportunity  pass  without 
giving  above  all  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  an  as- 
surance regarding  those  territories  which  would,  after  all, 
give  him  most  cause  for  apprehension,  namely  the  United 
States  itself  and  the  other  States  of  the  American  continent. 

I here  solemnly  declare  that  all  the  assertions  which  have 
been  circulated  in  any  way  concerning  an  intended  German 
attack  or  invasion  on  or  in  American  territory  are  rank 
frauds  and  gross  untruths,  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that 
such  assertions,  as  far  as  the  military  possibilities  are  con- 
cerned, could  have  their  origin  only  in  a stupid  imagina- 
tion. 

The  Reichstag  rocked  with  laughter;  Hitler  did  not 
crack  a smile,  maintaining  with  great  effect  his  solemn 
mien. 

And  then  came  the  peroration — the  most  eloquent  for 
German  ears,  I believe,  he  ever  made. 

Mr.  Roosevelt!  I fully  understand  that  the  vastness  of  your 
nation  and  the  immense  wealth  of  your  country  allow  you 
to  feel  responsible  for  the  history  of  the  whole  world  and  for 
the  history  of  all  nations.  I,  sir,  am  placed  in  a much  more 
modest  and  smaller  sphere  . . . 

I once  took  over  a State  which  was  faced  by  complete 
ruin,  thanks  to  its  trust  in  the  promises  of  the  rest  of  the 
world  and  to  the  bad  regime  of  democratic  governments  . . . 
I have  conquered  chaos  in  Germany,  re-established  order 
and  enormously  increased  production  . . . developed  traffic, 
caused  mighty  roads  to  be  built  and  canals  to  be  dug,  called 
into  being  gigantic  new  factories  and  at  the  same  time  en- 
deavored to  further  the  education  and  culture  of  our  peo- 
ple. 

I have  succeeded  in  finding  useful  work  once  more  for 
the  whole  of  the  Seven  million  unemployed  . . . Not  only 
have  I united  the  German  people  politically,  but  I have  also 
rearmed  them.  I have  also  endeavored  to  destroy  sheet  by 
sheet  that  treaty  which  in  its  four  hundred  and  forty-eight 
articles  contains  the  vilest  oppression  which  peoples  and  hu- 
man beings  have  ever  been  expected  to  put  up  with. 


The  Road  to  War 


637 


I have  brought  back  to  the  Reich  provinces  stolen  from  us 
in  1919.  I have  led  back  to  their  native  country  millions  of 
Germans  who  were  torn  away  from  us  and  were  in  misery 
. . . and,  Mr.  Roosevelt,  without  spilling  blood  and  without 
bringing  to  my  people,  and  consequently  to  others,  the 

misery  of  war  . . . 

You,  Mr.  Roosevelt,  have  a much  easier  task  in  compari- 
son. You  became  President  of  the  United  States  in  1933 
when  I became  Chancellor  of  the  Reich.  From  the  very  out- 
set you  stepped  to  the  head  of  one  of  the  largest  and 

wealthiest  States  in  the  world  . . . Conditions  prevailing 

in  your  country  are  on  such  a large  scale  that  you  can 

find  time  and  leisure  to  give  your  attention  to  universal 
problems  . . . Your  concerns  and  suggestions  cover  a much 
larger  and  wider  area  than  mine,  because  my  world,  Mr. 
Roosevelt,  in  which  Providence  has  placed  me  and  for  which 
I am  therefore  obliged  to  work,  is  unfortunately  much 
smaller,  although  for  me  it  is  more  precious  than  anything 
else,  for  it  is  limited  to  my  people! 

I believe  however  that  this  is  the  way  in  which  I can  be  of 
the  most  service  to  that  for  which  we  are  all  concerned, 
namely,  the  justice,  well-being,  progress  and  peace  of  the 
whole  community. 

In  the  hoodwinking  of  the  German  people,  this  speech 
was  Hitler’s  greatest  masterpiece.  But  as  one  traveled  about 
Europe  in  the  proceeding  days  it  was  easy  to  see  that, 
unlike  a number  of  Hitler’s  previous  orations,  this  one  no 
longer  fooled  the  people  or  the  governments  abroad.  In 
contrast  to  the  Germans,  they  were  able  to  see  through 
the  maze  of  deceptions.  And  they  realized  that  the  Ger- 
man Fuehrer,  for  all  his  masterful  oratory,  though  scoring 
off  Roosevelt,  had  not  really  answered  the  President’s 
fundamental  questions:  Had  he  finished  with  aggression? 
Would  he  attack  Poland? 

As  it  turned  out,  this  was  the  last  great  peacetime  public 
speech  of  Hitler’s  life.  The  former  Austrian  waif  had 
come  as  far  in  this  world  as  was  possible  by  the  genius 
of  his  oratory.  From  now  on  he  was  to  try  to  make  his 
niche  in  history  as  a warrior. 

Retiring  for  the  summer  to  his  mountain  retreat  at 
Berchtesgaden,  Hitler  did  not  publicly  respond  to  the 
Polish  answer  to  him  which  was  given  on  May  5 in  a 
speech  by  Colonel  Beck  to  Parliament  and  in  an  official 
government  memorandum  presented  to  Germany  on  that 


638 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


date.  The  Polish  statement  and  Beck’s  speech  constituted 
a dignified,  conciliatory  but  also  firm  reply. 

It  is  clear  [it  said]  that  negotiations,  in  which  one  State 
formulates  demands  and  the  other  is  obliged  to  accept 
those  demands  unaltered,  are  not  negotiations. 

THE  INTERVENTION  OF  RUSSIA:  I 

In  his  speech  to  the  Reichstag  on  April  28,  Hitler  had 
omitted  his  customary  attack  on  the  Soviet  Union.  There 
was  not  a word  about  Russia..  Colonel  Beck,  in  his  reply, 
had  mentioned  “various  other  hints”  made  by  Germany 
“which  went  much  further  than  the  subjects  of  discussion” 
and  reserved  the  right  “to  return  to  this  matter,  if  neces- 
sary”— a veiled  but  obvious  reference  to  Germany’s  pre- 
vious efforts  to  induce  Poland  to  join  the  Anti-Comintern 
Pact  against  Russia.  Though  Beck  did  not  know  it,  nor 
did  Chamberlain,  those  anti-Russian  efforts  were  now 
being  abandoned.  Fresh  ideas  were  beginning  to  germi- 
nate in  Berlin  and  Moscow. 

It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  exactly  when  the  first  moves 
were  made  in  the  two  capitals  toward  an  understanding 
between  Nazi  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union  which  was 
to  lead  to  such  immense  consequences  for  the  world.  One 
of  the  first  slight  changes  in  the  wind,  as  has  already  been 
noted,*  took  place  as  far  back  as  October  3,  1938,  four 
days  after  Munich,  when  the  counselor  of  the  German 
Embassy  in  Moscow  informed  Berlin  that  Stalin  would 
draw  certain  conclusions  from  the  Sudeten  settlement, 
from  which  he  had  been  excluded,  and  might  well  become 
“more  positive”  toward  Germany.  The  diplomat  strongly 
advocated  a “wider”  economic  collaboration  between  the 
two  countries  and  renewed  his  appeal  in  a second  dis- 
patch a week  later.27  Toward  the  end  of  October,  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  in  Moscow,  Friedrich  Werner  Count  von 
der  Schulenburg,  notified  the  German  Foreign  Office  that 
it  was  his  “intention  in  the  immediate  future  to  approach 
Molotov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  the  People’s 
Commissars,  in  an  attempt  to  reach  a settlement  of  the 
questions  disturbing  German-Soviet  relations.”  28  The  am- 
bassador would  hardly  have  conceived  such  an  intention  on 
his  own,  in  view  of  Hitler’s  previous  extremely  hostile  atti- 


See  above,  page  576. 


The  Road  to  War 


639 


tude  toward  Moscow.  The  hint  must  have  come  from  Berlin. 

That  it  did  becomes  clear  from  a study  of  the  captured 
Foreign  Office  archives.  The  first  step,  in  the  German 
view,  was  to  improve  trade  between  the  two  countries.  A 
Foreign  Office  memorandum  of  November  4,  1938,  re- 
veals “an  emphatic  demand  from  Field  Marshal  Goering’s 
office  at  least  to  try  to  reactivate  our  Russian  trade, 
especially  insofar  as  Russian  raw  materials  are  con- 
cerned.” 29  The  Russo-German  economic  agreements  ex- 
pired at  the  end  of  the  year  and  the  Wilhelmstrasse  files 
are  full  of  material  showing  the  ups  and  downs  experienced 
in  negotiating  a renewal.  The  two  sides  were  highly  sus- 
picious of  each  other  but  were  vaguely  drawing  closer  to- 
gether. On  December  22,  there  were  lengthy  talks  in  Mos- 
cow between  Russian  trade  officials  and  Germany’s  crack 
economic  troubleshooter,  Julius  Schnurre. 

Shortly  after  the  New  Year,  the  Soviet  ambassador  in 
Berlin,  Alexei  Merekalov,  made  one  of  his  infrequent  trips 
to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  to  inform  it  “of  the  Soviet  Union’s 
desire  to  begin  a new  era  in  German-Soviet  economic 
relations.”  And  for  a few  weeks  there  were  promising 
talks,  but  by  February  1939  they  had  pretty  much  broken 
down,  ostensibly  over  whether  the  main  negotiations  should 
be  conducted  in  Moscow  or  Berlin.  But  the  real  reason 
was  revealed  in  a memorandum  of  the  director  of  the 
Economic  Policy  Department  of  the  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice on  March  11,  1939:  Though  Germany  was  hungry  for 
Russia’s  raw  materials  and  Goering  was  constantly  de- 
manding that  they  be  obtained,  the  Reich  simply  could 
not  supply  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  goods  which  would 
have  to  be  exchanged.  The  director  thought  the  “rupture 
of  negotiations”  was  “extremely  regrettable  in  view  of 
Germany’s  raw-materials  position.”  30 

But  if  the  first  attempt  to  draw  nearer  in  their  economic 
relations  had  failed  for  the  time  being,  there  were  other 
straws  in  the  wind.  On  March  10,  1939,  Stalin  made  a long 
speech  at  the  first  session  of  the  Eighteenth  Party  Con- 
gress in  Moscow.  Three  days  later  the  attentive  Schulen- 
burg  filed  a long  report  on  it  to  Berlin.  He . thought  it 
“noteworthy  that  Stalin’s  irony  and  criticism  were  directed 
in  considerably  sharper  degree  against  Britain  than  against 
the  so-called  aggressor  States,  and  in  particular,  Germany.” 
The  ambassador  underlined  Stalin’s  remarks  that  “the 


640 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


weakness  of  the  democratic  powers  . . . was  evident  from 
the  fact  that  they  had  abandoned  the  principle  of  col- 
lective security  and  had  turned  to  a policy  of  noninterven- 
tion and  neutrality.  Underlying  this  policy  was  the  wish 
to  divert  the  aggressor  States  to  other  victims.”  And  he 
quoted  further  the  Soviet  dictator’s  accusations  that  the 
Western  Allies  were 

pushing  the  Germans  further  eastward,  promising  them  an 
easy  prey  and  saying:  “Just  start  a war  with  the  Bolsheviks, 
everything  else  will  take  care  of  itself.  This  looks  very  much 
like  encouragement  ...  It  looks  as  if  the  purpose  . . . was 
to  engender  the  fury  of  the  Soviet  Union  against  Ger- 
many . . . and  to  provoke  a conflict  with  Germany  without 
apparent  reasons.  . . . 

In  conclusion  Stalin  formulated  the  guiding  principles: 

1.  To  continue  to  pursue  a policy  of  peace  and  consoli- 
dation of  econmic  relations  with  all  countries. 

2.  . . . Not  to  let  our  country  be  drawn  into  conflict  by 
warmongers,  whose  custom  it  is  to  let  others  pull  their 
chestnuts  out  of  the  fire.31 

This  was  a plain  warning  from  the  man  who  made  all 
the  ultimate  decisions  in  Russia  that  the  Soviet  Union  did 
not  intend  to  be  maneuvered  into  a war  with  Nazi  Ger- 
many in  order  to  spare  Britain  and  France;  and  if  it 
was  ignored  in  London,  it  was  at  least  noticed  in  Berlin.* 

Still,  it  is  evident  from  Stalin’s  speech  and  from  the 
various  diplomatic  exchanges  which  shortly  took  place  that 
Soviet  foreign  policy,  while  cautious,  was  still  very  much 
open.  Three  days  after  the  Nazi  occupation  of  Czecho- 
slovakia on  March  15,  the  Russian  government  proposed, 

* Though  an  Associated  Press  dispatch  from  Moscow  (published  in  the  New 
York  Times  March  12)  reported  that  Stalin’s  condemnation  of  efforts  to 
embroil  Russia  in  a war  with  Germany  had  led  to  talk  in  diplomatic  circles 
in  Moscow  of  the  possibility  of  a rapprochement  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Germany,  Sir  William  Seeds,  the  British  ambassador,  apparently  did 
not  participate  in  any  such  talk.  In  his  dispatch  reporting  Stalin’s  speech 
Seeds  made  no  mention  of  such  a possibility.  One  Western  diplomat,  Joseph 
E.  Davies,  former  American  ambassador  in  Moscow,  who  was  now  stationed 
in  Brussels,  did  draw  the  proper  conclusions  from  Stalin’s  speech.  “It  is  a 
most  significant  statement/’  he  noted  in  his  diary  on  March  11.  “It  bears 
the  earmarks  of  a definite  warning  to  the  British  and  French  governments 
that  the  Soviets  are  getting  tired  of  ‘nonrealistic’  opposition  to  the  aggressors. 
This  . . is  really  ominous  for  the  negotiations  . . . between  the  British 
Foreign  Office  and  the  Soviet  Union.  It  certainly  is  the  most  significant 
danger  signal  that  I have  yet  seen.’’  On  March  21  he  wrote  to  Senator  Key 
Pittman:  “.  . . Hitler  is  making  a desperate  effort  to  alienate  Stalin  from 
France  and  Britain.  Unless  the  British  and  French  wake  up,  I am  afraid 
he  will  succeed.”  82 


The  Road  to  War 


641 


as  we  have  seen,*  a six-power  conference  to  discuss  means 
of  preventing  further  aggression,  and  Chamberlain  turned 
it  down  as  “premature.”  t That  was  on  March  18.  Two 
days  later  an  official  communique  in  Moscow,  which  the 
German  ambassador  there  hurriedly  wired  to  Berlin,  denied 
that  the  Soviet  Union  had  offered  Poland  and  Rumania 
assistance  “in  the  event  of  their  becoming  the  victims  of 
aggression.”  Reason:  “Neither  Poland  nor  Rumania  had 
approached  the  Soviet  government  for  assistance  or  in- 
formed [it]  of  any  danger  threatening  them.”  34 

The  British  government’s  unilateral  guarantee  of  Poland 
of  March  31  may  have  helped  to  convince  Stalin  that 
Great  Britain  preferred  an  alliance  with  the  Poles  to  one 
with  the  Russians  and  that  Chamberlain  was  intent,  as  he 
had  been  at  the  time  of  Munich,  on  keeping  the  Soviet 
Union  out  of  the  European  concert  of  powers.85 

In  this  situation  the  Germans  and  Italians  began  to 
glimpse  certain  opportunities.  Goering,  who  now  had  an 
important  influence  on  Hitler  in  foreign  affairs,  saw  Mus- 
solini in  Rome  on  April  16  and  called  the  Duce’s  atten- 
tion to  Stalin’s  recent  speech  to  the  Communist  Party 
Congress.  He  had  been  impressed  by  the  Soviet  dictator’s 
statement  that  “the  Russians  would  not  allow  themselves 
to  be  used  as  cannon  fodder  for  the  capitalist  powers.” 
He  said  he  “would  ask  the  Fuehrer  whether  it  would  not 
be  possible  to  put  out  feelers  cautiously  to  Russia  . . . with 
a view  to  rapprochement.”  And  he  reminded  Mussolini 
that  there  had  been  “absolutely  no  mention  of  Russia  in 
the  Fuehrer’s  latest  speeches.”  The  Duce,  according  to  the 
confidential  German  memorandum  of  the  meeting,  warmly 
welcomed  the  idea  of  a rapprochement  of  the  Axis  Pow- 
ers with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Italian  dictator  too  had 
sensed  a change  in  Moscow;  he  thought  a rapprochement 
could  be  “effected  with  comparative  ease.” 

The  object  [said  Mussolini]  would  be  to  induce  Russia 
to  react  coolly  and  unfavorably  to  Britain’s  efforts  at  en- 

* See  above,  p.  619. 

t In  explaining  to  the  Soviet  ambassador  in  London,  Ivan  Maisky,  on 
March  19  why  the  Russian  proposal  for  a conference,  preferably  at 
Bucharest,  was  “not  acceptable,”  Lord  Halifax  said  that  no  Minister  of  the 
Crown  could  be  spared  for  the  moment  to  go  to  Bucharest.  It  is  obvious  that 
this  rebuff  soured  the  Russians  in  the  subsequent  negotiations  with  the 
British  and  French.  Maisky  later  told  Robert  Boothby,  a Conservative  M.P., 
that  the  rejection  of  the  Russian  proposal  had  been  “another  smashing  blow 
at  the  policy  of  effective  collective  security”  and  that  it  had  decided  the  fate 
of  Litvinov.83 


642 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


circlement,  on  the  lines  of  Stalin’s  speech  . . . Moreover, 
in  their  ideological  struggle  against  plutocracy  and  capitalism 
the  Axis  Powers  had,  to  a certain  extent,  the  same  objectives 
as  the  Russian  regime.36 

This  was  a radical  turn  in  Axis  policy,  and  no  doubt  it 
would  have  surprised  Chamberlain  had  he  learned  of  it. 
Perhaps  it  would  have  surprised  Litvinov  too. 

On  the  very  day  of  this  discussion  between  Goering  and 
Mussolini,  April  16,  the  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar  re- 
ceived the  British  ambassador  in  Moscow  and  made  a 
formal  proposal  for  a triple  pact  of  mutual  assistance 
between  Great  Britain,  France  and  the  Soviet  Union.  It 
called  for  a military  convention  between  the  three  powers 
to  enforce  the  pact  and  a guarantee  by  the  signatories,  to 
be  joined  by  Poland,  if  it  desired,  of  all  the  nations  in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  which  felt  themselves 
menaced  by  Nazi  Germany.  It  was  Litvinov’s  last  bid  for 
an  alliance  against  the  Third  Reich,  and  the  Russian  For- 
eign Minister,  who  had  staked  his  career  on  a policy  of 
stopping  Hitler  by  collective  action,  must  have  thought 
that  at  last  he  would  succeed  in  uniting  the  Western  de- 
mocracies with  Russia  for  that  purpose.  As  Churchill  said 
in  a speech  on  May  4,  complaining  that  the  Russian  offer 
had  not  yet  been  accepted  in  London,  “there  is  no  means 
of  maintaining  an  Eastern  front  against  Nazi  aggression 
without  the  active  aid  of  Russia.”  No  other  power  in 
Eastern  Europe,  certainly  not  Poland,  possessed  the  mil- 
itary strength  to  maintain  a front  in  that  region.  Yet  the 
Russian  proposal  caused  consternation  in  London  and 
Paris. 

Even  before  it  was  rejected,  however,  Stalin  made  his 
first  serious  move  to  play  the  other  side  of  the  street. 

The  day  after  Litvinov  made  his  far-reaching  offer  to 
the  British  ambassador  in  Moscow,  on  April  17,  the  Soviet 
ambassador  in  Berlin  paid  a visit  to  Weizsaecker  at  the 
German  Foreign  Office.  It  was  the  first  call,  the  State  Sec- 
retary noted  in  a memorandum,  that  Merekalov  had  made 
on  him  since  he  assumed  his  post  nearly  a year  before. 
After  some  preliminary  remarks  about  German-Russian 
economic  relations,  the  ambassador  turned  to  politics  and 
asked  me  point-blank  [Weizsaecker  wrote]  what  I thought 


The  Road  to  War 


643 


of  German-Russian  relations  . . . The  Ambassador  spoke 
somewhat  as  follows: 

Russian  policy  had  always  followed  a straight  course. 
Ideological  differences  had  had  very  little  adverse  effect  on 
relations  between  Russia  and  Italy  and  need  not  disturb 
those  with  Germany  either.  Russia  had  not  exploited  the 
present  friction  between  Germany  and  the  Western  democ- 
racies against  us,  neither  did  she  wish  to  do  that.  As  far  as 
Russia  was  concerned,  there  was  no  reason  why  she  should 
not  live  on  a normal  footing  with  us,  and  out  of  normal  rela- 
tions could  grow  increasingly  improved  relations. 

With  this  remark,  toward  which  he  had  been  steering  the 
conversation,  M.  Merekalov  ended  the  talk.  He  intends  to 
visit  Moscow  in  a day  or  two.37 

In  the  Russian  capital,  to  which  the  Soviet  ambassador 
returned,  there  was  something  up. 

It  came  out  on  May  3.  On  that  date,  tucked  away  on 
the  back  page  of  the  Soviet  newspapers  in  a column  called 
“News  in  Brief,”  appeared  a small  item:  “M.  Litvinov 
has  been  released  from  the  Office  of  Foreign  Commissar 
at  his  own  request.”  He  was  replaced  by  Vyacheslav 
Molotov,  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  the  People’s  Com- 
missars. 

The  German  charge  d’affaires  reported  the  change  to 
Berlin  the  next  day. 

The  sudden  change  has  caused  the  greatest  surprise  here, 
as  Litvinov  was  in  the  midst  of  negotiations  with  the  British 
delegation,  had  appeared  in  close  proximity  to  Stalin  at  the 
parade  on  May  1 . . . 

Since  Litvinov  had  received  the  British  Ambassador  as  re- 
cently as  May  2 and  had  even  been  mentioned  in  the  press 
yesterday  as  a guest  of  honor  at  the  parade,  it  seems  that 
his  dismissal  must  be  due  to  a spontaneous  decision  by 
Stalin.  ...  At  the  last  Party  Congress  Stalin  urged  caution 
lest  the  Soviet  Union  be  dragged  into  conflicts.  Molotov, 
who  is  not  a lew,  has  the  reputation  of  being  the  “most 
intimate  friend  and  closest  collaborator”  of  Stalin.  His  ap- 
pointment is  obviously  intended  to  provide  a guarantee  that 
foreign  policy  will  be  conducted  strictly  on  lines  laid  down 
by  Stalin.33 

The  significance  of  Litvinov’s  abrupt  dismissal  was  ob- 
vious to  all.  It  meant  a sharp  and  violent  turning  in  Soviet 
foreign  policy.  Litvinov  had  been  the  archapostle  of  col- 
lective security,  of  strengthening  the  power  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  of  seeking  Russian  security  against  Nazi  Ger- 


644 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

many  by  a military  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  France. 
Chamberlain’s  hesitations  about  such  an  alliance  were  fatal 
to  the  Russian  Foreign  Commissar.  In  Stalin’s  judgment — 
and  his  was  the  only  one  which  counted  in  Moscow — 
Litvinov’s  policies  had  failed.  Moreover,  they  threatened 
to  land  the  Soviet  Union  in  a war  with  Germany  which 
the  Western  democracies  might  well  contrive  to  stay  out 
of.  It  was  time,  Stalin  concluded,  to  try  a new  tack.*  If 
Chamberlain  could  appease  Hitler,  could  not  the  Russian 
dictator?  The  fact  that  Litvinov,  a Jew,  was  replaced  by 
Molotov,  who,  as  the  German  Embassy  had  emphasized 
in  its  dispatch  to  Berlin,  was  not,  might  be  expected  to 
have  a certain  impact  in  high  Nazi  circles. 

To  see  that  the  significance  of  the  change  was  not  lost 
on  the  Germans,  Georgi  Astakhov,  the  Soviet  charge 
d’affaires,  brought  the  matter  up  on  May  5 when  he  con- 
ferred with  Dr.  Julius  Schnurre,  the  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice expert  on  East  European  economic  affairs. 

Astakhov  touched  upon  the  dismissal  of  Litvinov  [Schnurre 
reported]  and  tried  ...  to  learn  whether  this  event  would 
cause  a change  in  our  attitude  toward  the  Soviet  Union.  He 
stressed  the  great  importance  of  the  personality  of  Molotov, 
who  was  by  no  means  a specialist  in  foreign  policy  but  who 
would  have  all  the  greater  importance  for  future  Soviet 
foreign  policy.39 

The  charge  also  invited  the  Germans  to  resume  the 
trade  negotiations  which  had  been  broken  off  in  February. 

The  British  government  did  not  reply  until  May  8 to  the 
Soviet  proposals  of  April  16  for  a military  alliance.  The 
response  was  a virtual  rejection.  It  strengthened  suspicions 
in  Moscow  that  Chamberlain  was  not  willing  to  make  a 
military  pact  with  Russia  to  prevent  Hitler  from  taking 
Poland. 

* If  some  credence  can  be  cautiously  given  to  the  published  journal  of 
Litvinov  ( Notes  for  a Journal ),  Stalin  had  been  contemplating  such  a change 
since  Munich,  from  which  the  Soviet  Union  had  been  excluded.  Toward  the 
end  of  1938,  according  to  an  entry  in  this  journal,  Stalin  told  Litvinov  that 
we  are  prepared  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Germans  . . . and  also 
to  render  Poland  harmless.”  In  January  1939  the  Foreign  Commissar  noted: 

It  would  appear  they  have  decided  to  remove  me.”  In  the  same  entry  he 
reveals  that  all  his  communications  with  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Berlin  must 
now  go  through  Stalin  and  that  Ambassador  Merekalov,  on  Stalin’s  instruc- 
tions, is  about  to  begin  negotiations  with  Weizsaecker  in  order  to  let  Hitler 
know  “in  effect:  ‘We  couldn’t  come  to  an  agreement  until  now,  but  now  we 
can.’  ” The  Journal  is  a somewhat  dubious  book.  Professor  Edward  Hallett 
Carr,  a British  authority  on  the  Soviet  Union,  investigated  it  and  found  that 
though  undoubtedly  it  had  been  touched  up  to  a point  where  some  of  it  was 
pure  fiction,”  a large  part  of  it  fairly  represents  Litvinov’s  outlook. 


The  Road  to  Wap 


645 


It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  the  Russians  intensified 
their  approach  to  the  Germans.  On  May  17  Astakhov 
again  saw  Schnurre  at  the  Foreign  Office  and  after  dis- 
cussing problems  of  trade  turned  to  larger  matters. 

Astakhov  stated  [Schnurre  reported]  that  there  were 
no  conflicts  in  foreign  policy  between  Germany  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  that  therefore  there  was  no  reason  for  any 
enmity  between  the  two  countries.  It  was  true  that  in  the 
Soviet  Union  there  was  a distinct  feeling  of  being  menaced 
by  Germany.  It  would  undoubtedly  be  possible  to  eliminate 
this  feeling  of  being  menaced  and  the  distrust  in  Moscow 
. . . In  reply  to  my  incidental  question  he  commented  on 
the  Anglo-Soviet  negotiations  to  the  effect  that,  as  they 
stood  at  the  moment,  the  result  desired  by  Britain  would 
hardly  materialize.40 

Three  days  later,  on  May  20,  Ambassador  von  der 
Schulenburg  had  a long  talk  with  Molotov  in  Moscow. 
The  newly  appointed  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs  was 
in  a “most  friendly”  mood  and  informed  the  German  en- 
voy that  economic  negotiations  between  the  two  countries 
could  be  resumed  if  the  necessary  political  bases  for  them 
were  created.  This  was  a new  approach  from  the  Kremlin 
but  it  was  made  cautiously  by  the  cagey  Molotov.  When 
Schulenburg  asked  him  what  he  meant  by  “political  bases” 
the  Russian  replied  that  this  was  something  both  govern- 
ments would  have  to  think  about.  All  the  ambassador’s 
efforts  to  draw  out  the  wily  Foreign  Commissar  were  in 
vain.  “He  is  known,”  Schulenburg  reminded  Berlin,  “for 
his  somewhat  stubborn  manner.”  On  his  way  out  of  the 
Russian  Foreign  Office,  the  ambassador  dropped  in  on 
Vladimir  Potemkin,  the  Soviet  Deputy  Commissar  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  and  told  him  he  had  not  been  able  to  find 
out  what  Molotov  wanted  of  a political  nature.  “I  asked 
Herr  Potemkin,”  Schulenburg  reported,  “to  find  out.” 41 

The  renewed  contacts  between  Berlin  and  Moscow  did 
not  escape  the  watchful  eyes  of  the  French  ambassador 
in  the  German  capital.  As  early  as  May  7,  four  days  after 
Litvinov’s  dismissal,  M.  Coulondre  was  informing  the 
French  Foreign  Minister  that,  according  to  information 
given  him  by  a close  confidant  of  the  Fuehrer,  Germany 
was  seeking  an  understanding  with  Russia  which  would 
result  in,  among  other  things,  a fourth  partition  of  Poland. 
Two  days  later  the  French  ambassador  got  off  another 


646  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

telegram  to  Paris  telling  of  new  rumors  in  Berlin  “that 
Germany  had  made,  or  was  going  to  make,  to  Russia 
proposals  aimed  at  a partition  of  Poland.”  42 

THE  PACT  OF  STEEL 

Although  the  top  brass  of  the  Wehrmacht  had  a low 
opinion  of  Italian  military  power,  Hitler  now  pressed  for 
a military  alliance  with  Italy,  which  Mussolini  had  been  in 
no  hurry  to  conclude.  Staff  talks  between  the  two  high 
commands  began  in  April  and  Keitel  reported  to  OKW  his 
“impression”  that  neither  the  Italian  fighting  services  nor 
Italian  rearmament  were  in  very  good  shape.  A war,  he 
thought,  would  have  to  be  decided  quickly,  or  the  Italians 
would  be  out  of  it.45 

By  mid-April,  as  his  diary  shows,44  Ciano  was  alarmed 
by  increasing  signs  that  Germany  might  attack  Poland  at 
any  moment  and  precipitate  a European  war  for  which 
Italy  was  not  prepared.  When,  on  April  20,  Ambassador 
Attolico  in  Berlin  wired  Rome  that  German  action  against 
Poland  was  “imminent”  Ciano  urged  him  to  hasten  ar- 
rangements for  his  meeting  with  Ribbentrop  so  that  Italy 
would  not  be  caught  napping. 

The  two  foreign  ministers  met  at  Milan  on  May  6. 
Ciano  had  arrived  with  written  instructions  from  Mussolini 
to  emphasize  to  the  Germans  that  Italy  wished  to  avoid 
war  for  at  least  three  years.  To  the  Italian’s  surprise,  Rib- 
bentrop agreed  that  Germany  wished  to  keep  the  peace 
for  that  long  too.  In  fact,  Ciano  found  the  German  For- 
eign Minister  “for  the  first  time”  in  a “pleasantly  calm 
state  of  mind.”  They  reviewed  the  situation  in  Europe, 
agreed  on  improving  Axis  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  adjourned  for  a gala  dinner. 

When  after  dinner  Mussolini  telephoned  to  see  how 
the  talks  had  gone,  and  Ciano  replied  that  they  had  gone 
well,  the  Duce  had  a sudden  brain  storm.  He  asked  his 
son-in-law  to  release  to  the  press  a communique  saying 
that  Germany  and  Italy  had  decided  to  conclude  a mil- 
itary alliance.  Ribbentrop  at  first  hesitated.  He  finally 
agreed  to  put  the  matter  up  to  Hitler,  and  the  Fuehrer, 
when  reached  by  telephone,  readily  agreed  to  Mussolini’s 
suggestion.45 

Thus,  on  a sudden  impulse,  after  more  than  a year  of 


The  Road  to  War 


647 


hesitation,  Mussolini  committed  himself  irrevocably  to 
Hitler’s  fortunes.  This  was  one  of  the  first  signs  that  the 
Italian  dictator,  like  the  German,  was  beginning  to  lose 
that  iron  self-control  which  up  until  this  year  of  1939  had 
enabled  them  both  to  pursue  their  own  national  interests 
with  ice-cold  clarity.  The  consequences  for  Mussolini 
would  soon  prove  disastrous. 

The  “Pact  of  Steel,”  as  it  came  to  be  known,  was  duly 
signed  with  considerable  pomp  at  the  Reich  Chancellery 
in  Berlin  on  May  22.  Ciano  had  bestowed  on  Ribbentrop 
the  Collar  of  the  Annunziata,  which  not  only  made 
Goering  furious  but,  as  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister  no- 
ticed, brought  tears  to  his  eyes.  In  fact,  the  plump  Field 
Marshal  had  made  quite  a scene,  complaining  that  the 
collar  really  should  have  been  awarded  to  him  since  it 
was  he  who  had  really  promoted  the  alliance. 

“I  promised  Mackensen  [the  German  ambassador  in 
Rome],”  Ciano  reported,  “that  I would  try  to  get  Goering 
a collar.” 

Ciano  found  Hitler  looking  “very  well,  quite  serene,  less 
aggressive,”  though  he  seemed  a little  older  and  his  eyes 
more  deeply  wrinkled,  probably  from  lack  of  sleep.*  The 
Fuehrer  was  in  the  best  of  spirits  as  he  watched  the  two 
foreign  ministers  sign  the  document. 

It  was  a bluntly  worded  military  alliance  and  its  ag- 
gressive nature  was  underlined  by  a sentence  in  the  pre- 
amble which  Hitler  had  insisted  on  putting  in  declaring 
that  the  two  nations,  “united  by  the  inner  affinity  of  their 
ideologies  . . . are  resolved  to  act  side  by  side  and  with 
united  forces  to  secure  their  living  space."  The  core  of  the 
treaty  was  Article  HI. 

If  contrary  to  the  wishes  and  hopes  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  it  should  happen  that  one  of  them  became 
involved  in  warlike  complications  with  another  Power  or 
Powers,  the  other  High  Contracting  Party  would  immediately 

* Ciano’s  diary  for  May  22  is  full  of  titbits  about  Hitler  and  his  weird 
entourage.  Frau  Goebbels  complained  that  the  Fuehrer  kept  his  friends  up  all 
night  and  exclaimed,  “It  is  always  Hitler  who  talks!  He  repeats  himself  and 
bores  his  guests.”  Ciano  also  heard  hints  “of  the  Fuehrers  tender  feelings 
for  a beautiful  girl.  She  is  twenty  years  old,  with  beautiful  quiet  eyes, 
regular  features  and  a magnificent  body.  Her  name  is  Sigrid  von  Lappus. 
They  see  each  other  frequently  and  intimately.”  (The  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  85.) 
Ciano,  a great  man  with  the  ladies  himself,  was  obviously  intrigued.  Ap- 
parently he  had  not  yet  heard  of  Eva  Braun,  Hitler’s  mistress,  who  was 
rarely  permitted  at  this  time  to  come  to  Berlin. 


648  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

come  to  its  assistance  as  an  ally  and  support  it  with  all  its 
military  forces  on  land,  at  sea  and  in  the  air. 

Article  V provided  that  in  the  event  of  war  neither 
nation  would  conclude  a separate  armistice  or  peace.46 

In  the  beginning,  as  it  would  turn  out,  Mussolini  did 
not  honor  the  first,  nor,  at  the  end,  did  Italy  abide  by 
the  second. 

HITLER  BURNS  HIS  BOATS:  MAY  23,  1939 

The  day  after  the  signing  of  the  Pact  of  Steel,  on  May 
23,  Hitler  summoned  his  military  chiefs  to  the  study  in 
the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  and  told  them  bluntly  that 
further  successes  could  not  be  won  without  the  shedding 
of  blood  and  that  war  therefore  was  inevitable. 

This  was  a somewhat  larger  gathering  than  a similar 
one  on  November  5,  1937,  when  the  Fuehrer  had  first 
imparted  his  decision  to  go  to  war  to  the  commanders 
in  chief  of  the  three  armed  services.*  Altogether  fourteen 
officers  were  present,  including  Field  Marshal  Goering, 
Grand  Admiral  Raeder  (as  he  now  was),  General  von 
Brauchitsch,  General  Haider,  General  Keitel,  General 
Erhard  Milch,  Inspector  General  of  the  Luftwaffe,  and 
Rear  Admiral  Otto  Schniewind,  naval  Chief  of  Staff.  The 
Fuehrer’s  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Rudolf  Schmundt, 
was  also  present  and,  luckily  for  history,  took  notes.  His 
minutes  of  the  meeting  are  among  the  captured  German 
documents.  Apparently  Hitler’s  words  on  this  occasion 
were  regarded  as  such  a top  secret  that  no  copies  of  the 
minutes  were  made;  the  one  we  have  is  in  Schmundt’s 
own  handwriting.47 

It  is  one  of  the  most  revealing  and  important  of  the 
secret  papers  which  depict  Hitler’s  road  to  war.  Here,  be- 
fore the  handful  of  men  who  will  have  to  direct  the 
military  forces  in  an  armed  conflict,  Hitler  cuts  through 
his  own  propaganda  and  diplomatic  deceit  and  utters  the 
truth  about  why  he  must  attack  Poland  and,  if  necessary, 
take  on  Great  Britain  and  France  as  well.  He  predicts 
with  uncanny  accuracy  the  course  the  war  will  take — 
at  least  in  its  first  year.  And  yet  for  all  its  bluntness  his 
discourse — for  the  dictator  did  all  the  talking — discloses 
more  uncertainty  and  confusion  of  mind  than  he  has 

* See  above,  pp.  418-19. 


The  Road  to  War 


649 


shown  up  to  this  point.  Above  all,  Britain  and  the  British 
continue  to  baffle  him,  as  they  did  to  the  end  of  his  life. 

But  about  the  coming  of  war  and  his  aims  in  launching 
it  he  is  clear  and  precise,  and  no  general  or  admiral  could 
have  left  the  Chancellery  on  May  23  without  knowing  ex- 
actly what  was  coming  at  the  summer’s  end.  Germany’s 
economic  problems,  he  began,  could  only  be  solved  by 
obtaining  more  Lebensraum  in  Europe,  and  “this  is  im- 
possible without  invading  other  countries  or  attacking 
other  people’s  possessions.” 

Further  successes  can  no  longer  be  attained  without  the 
shedding  of  blood  . . . 

Danzig  is  not  the  subject  of  the  dispute  at  all.  It  is  a 
question  of  expanding  our  living  space  in  the  East,  of  se- 
curing our  food  supplies  and  also  of  solving  the  problem  of 
the  Baltic  States.  . . . There  is  no  other  possibility  in 
Europe  ...  If  fate  forces  us  into  a showdown  with  the  West 
it  is  invaluable  to  possess  a large  area  in  the  East.  In  war- 
time we  shall  be  even  less  able  to  rely  on  record  harvests 
than  in  peacetime. 

Besides,  Hitler,  adds,  the  population  of  non-German  ter- 
ritories in  the  East  will  be  available  as  a source  of  labor — 
an  early  hint  of  the  slave  labor  program  he  was  later  to 
put  into  effect. 

The  choice  of  the  first  victim  was  obvious. 

There  is  no  question  of  sparing  Poland  and  we  are  left  with 
the  decision: 

To  attack  Poland  at  the  first  suitable  opportunity.* 

We  cannot  expect  a repetition  of  the  Czech  affair.  There 
will  be  war.  Our  task  is  to  isolate  Poland.  Success  in 
isolating  her  will  be  decisive. 

So  there  will  be  war.  With  an  “isolated”  Poland  alone? 
Here  the  Fuehrer  is  not  so  clear.  In  fact,  he  becomes  con- 
fused and  contradictory.  He  must  reserve  to  himself,  he 
says,  the  final  order  to  strike. 

It  must  not  come  to  a simultaneous  showdown  with  the 
West — France  and  England. 

If  it  is  not  certain  that  a German-Polish  conflict  will  not 
lead  to  war  with  the  West,  then  the  fight  must  be  primarily 
against  England  and  France. 

Fundamentally  therefore:  Conflict  with  Poland — beginning 


Emphasis  in  the  original. 


650  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

with  an  attack  on  Poland — will  only  be  successful  if  the 
West  keeps  out  of  it. 

If  that  is  not  possible  it  is  better  to  fall  upon  the  West 
and  to  finish  off  Poland  at  the  same  time. 

In  the  face  of  such  rapid-fire  contradictions  the  generals 
must  have  winced,  perhaps  prying  their  monocles  loose, 
though  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  Schmundt  minutes  that 
this  happened  or  that  anyone  in  the  select  audience  even 
dared  to  ask  a question  to  straighten  matters  out. 

Hitler  next  turned  to  Russia.  “It  is  not  ruled  out,”  he 
said,  “that  Russia  might  disinterest  herself  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  Poland.”  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Soviet  Union 
allied  herself  to  Britain  and  France,  that  “would  lead  me 
to  attack  England  and  France  with  a few  devastating 
blows.”  That  would  mean  committing  the  same  mistake 
Wihelm  II  made  in  1914,  but  though  in  this  lecture  Hitler 
drew  several  lessons  from  the  World  War  he  did  not  draw 
this  one.  His  thoughts  now  turned  toward  Great  Britain. 

The  Fuehrer  doubts  the  possibility  of  a peaceful  settle- 
ment with  England.  It  is  necessary  to  be  prepared  for  the 
showdown.  England  sees  in  our  development  the  establish- 
ment of  a hegemony  which  would  weaken  England.  Therefore 
England  is  our  enemy,  and  the  conflict  with  England  is  a 
matter  of  life  and  death. 

What  will  this  conflict  be  like?  * 

England  cannot  finish  off  Germany  with  a few  powerful 
blows  and  force  us  down.  It  is  of  decisive  importance  for 
England  to  carry  the  war  as  near  as  possible  to  the  Ruhr. 
French  blood  will  not  be  spared.  (West  Wall!)  The  duration 
of  our  existence  is  dependent  on  possession  of  the  Ruhr. 

Having  decided  to  follow  the  Kaiser  in  one  mistake — 
attacking  France  and  England  if  they  lined  up  with  Rus- 
sia— Hitler  now  announced  that  he  would  follow  the 
Emperor  in  another  matter  which  eventually  had  proved 
disastrous  to  Germany. 

The  Dutch  and  Belgian  air  bases  must  be  militarily  oc- 
cupied. Declarations  of  neutrality  can  be  ignored.  If  England 
wants  to  intervene  in  the  Polish  war,  we  must  make  a 
lightning  attack  on  Holland.  We  must  aim  at  establishing  a 
new  line  of  defense  on  Dutch  territory  as  far  as  the  Zuyder 
Zee.  The  war  with  England  and  France  will  be  a war  of  life 
and  death. 

The  idea  that  we  can  get  off  cheaply  is  dangerous;  there 


Emphasis  in  the  original. 


651 


The  Road  to  War 

is  no  such  possibility.  We  must  then  burn  our  boats  and  it 
will  no  longer  be  a question  of  right  or  wrong  but  of  to 
be  or  not  to  be  for  eighty  million  people. 

Though  he  had  just  announced  that  Germany  would 
attack  Poland  “at  the  first  suitable  opportunity”  and 
though  his  listeners  knew  that  almost  all  of  Germany’s 
military  strength  was  being  concentrated  on  that  objec- 
tive, Hitler,  as  he  rambled  on,  could  not  keep  his  thoughts 
off  Great  Britain. 

“England,”  he  emphasized,  “is  the  driving  force  against 
Germany.”  Whereupon  he  discussed  her  strengths  and 
weaknesses. 

The  Britisher  himself  is  proud,  brave,  tough,  dogged  and  a 
gifted  organizer.  He  knows  how  to  exploit  every  new  de- 
velopment. He  has  the  love  of  adventure  and  the  courage  of 
the  Nordic  race  ... 

England  is  a world  power  in  herself.  Constant  for  three 
hundred  years.  Increased  by  alliances.  This  power  is  not  only 
something  concrete  but  must  also  be  considered  as  psy- 
chological force,  embracing  the  entire  world. 

Add  to  this  immeasurable  wealth  and  the  solvency  that 
goes  with  it. 

Geopolitical  security  and  protection  by  a strong  sea  power 
and  courageous  air  force. 

But  Britain,  Hitler  reminded  his  hearers,  also  had  her 
weaknesses,  and  he  proceeded  to  enumerate  them. 

If  in  the  last  war  we  had  two  more  battleships  and  two 
more  cruisers  and  had  begun  the  Battle  of  Jutland  in  the 
morning,  the  British  fleet  would  have  been  defeated  and 
England  brought  to  her  knees.*  It  would  have  meant  the 
end  of  the  World  War.  In  former  times  ...  to  conquer 
England  it  was  necessary  to  invade  her.  England  could  feed 
herself.  Today  she  no  longer  can. 

The  moment  England  is  cut  off  from  her  supplies  she  is 
forced  to  capitulate.  Imports  of  food  and  fuel  oil  are  de- 
pendent on  naval  protection. 

Luftwaffe  attacks  on  England  will  not  force  her  to  capitu- 
late. But  if  the  fleet  is  annihilated  instant  capitulation  re- 
sults. There  is  no  doubt  that  a surprise  attack  might  lead  to 
a quick  decision. 

A surprise  attack  with  what?  Surely  Admiral  Raeder 
must  have  thought  that  Hitler  was  talking  through  his  hat. 
Under  the  so-called  Z Plan,  promulgated  at  the  end  of 

* Hitler’s  understanding  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland  was  obviously  faulty. 


652 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1938,  German  naval  strength  would  only  begin  to  ap- 
proach that  of  the  British  by  1945.  At  the  moment,  in 
the  spring  of  1939,  Germany  did  not  have  the  heavy  ships 
to  sink  the  British  Navy,  even  by  a surprise  attack. 

Perhaps  Britain  could  be  brought  down  by  other  means. 
Here  Hitler  came  down  to  earth  again  and  outlined  a 
strategic  plan  which  a year  later,  in  fact,  would  be  carried 
out  with  amazing  success. 

The  aim  must  be  to  deal  the  enemy  a smashing  or  a 
finally  decisive  blow  right  at  the  start.  Considerations  of 
right  or  wrong,  or  of  treaties,  do  not  enter  into  the  matter. 
This  will  be  possible  only  when  we  do  not  “slide”  into  a 
war  with  England  on  account  of  Poland. 

Preparations  must  be  made  for  a long  war  as  well  as  for 
a surprise  attack,  and  every  possible  intervention  by  Eng- 
land on  the  Continent  must  be  smashed. 

The  Army  must  occupy  the  positions  important  for  the 
fleet  and  the  Luftwaffe.  If  we  succeed  in  occupying  and  se- 
curing Holland  and  Belgium,  as  well  as  defeating  France, 
the  basis  for  a successful  war  against  England  has  been 
created. 

The  Luftwaffe  can  then  closely  blockade  England  from 
western  France  and  the  fleet  undertake  the  wider  block- 
ade with  submarines. 

That  is  precisely  what  would  be  done  a little  more  than 
a year  later.  Another  decisive  strategic  plan,  which  the 
Fuehrer  emphasized  on  May  23,  would  also  be  carried  out. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  last  war,  had  the  German  Army 
executed  a wheeling  movement  toward  the  Channel  ports 
instead  of  toward  Paris,  the  end,  he  said,  would  have  been 
different.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been.  At  any  rate  he  would 
try  it  in  1940. 

“The  aim,”  Hitler  concluded,  apparently  forgetting  all 
about  Poland  for  the  moment,  “will  always  be  to  force 
England  to  her  knees.” 

There  was  one  final  consideration. 

Secrecy  is  the  decisive  prerequisite  for  success.  Our  ob- 
jectives must  be  kept  secret  from  both  Italy  and  Japan. 

Even  Hitler’s  own  Army  General  Staff,  whose  Chief, 
General  Haider,  sat  there  listening,  was  not  to  be  trusted 
entirely.  “Our  studies,”  the  Fuehrer  laid  down,  “must  not 
be  left  to  the  General  Staff.  Secrecy  would  then  no  longer 


The  Road  to  War 


653 


be  assured.”  He  ordered  that  a small  planning  staff  in 
OKW  be  set  up  to  work  out  the  military  plans. 

On  May  23,  1939,  then.  Hitler,  as  he  himself  said, 
burned  his  boats.  There  would  be  war.  Germany  needed 
Lebensraum  in  the  East.  To  get  it  Poland  would  be  at- 
tacked at  the  first  opportunity.  Danzig  had  nothing  to  do 
with  it.  That  was  merely  an  excuse.  Britain  stood  in  the 
way;  she  was  the  real  driving  force  against  Germany.  Very 
well,  she  would  he  taken  on  too,  and  France.  It  would 
be  a life-and-death  struggle. 

When  the  Fuehrer  had  first  outlined  his  plans  for  ag- 
gression to  the  military  chiefs,  on  November  5,  1937, 
Field  Marshal  von  Blomberg  and  General  von  Fritsch 
had  protested — at  least  on  the  grounds  that  Germany  was 
too  weak  to  fight  a European  war.*  During  the  following 
summer  General  Beck  had  resigned  as  Chief  of  the  Army 
General  Staff  for  the  same  reason.  But  on  May  23,  1939, 
not  a single  general  or  admiral,  so  far  as  the  record  shows, 
raised  his  voice  to  question  the  wisdom  of  Hitler’s  course. 

Their  job,  as  they  saw  it,  was  not  to  question  hut  to 
blindly  obey.  Already  they  had  been  applying  their  con- 
siderable talents  to  working  out  plans  for  military  aggres- 
sion. On  May  7,  Colonel  Guenther  Blumentritt  of  the  Army 
General  Staff,  who  with  Generals  von  Rundstedt  and  von 
Manstein  formed  a small  “Working  Staff,”  submitted  an 
estimate  of  the  situation  for  Case  White.  Actually  it  was 
a plan  for  the  conquest  of  Poland.  It  was  an  imaginative 
and  daring  plan,  and  it  would  be  followed  with  very  few 
changes.48 

Admiral  Raeder  came  through  with  naval  plans  for 
Case  White  in  a top-secret  directive  signed  May  16.49 
Since  Poland  had  only  a few  miles  of  coast  on  the  Baltic 
west  of  Danzig  and  possessed  only  a small  navy,  no  dif- 
ficulties were  expected.  France  and  Britain  were  the  Ad- 
miral’s chief  concern.  The  entrance  to  the  Baltic  was  to 
be  protected  by  submarines,  and  the  two  pocket  battleships 
and  the  two  battleships,  with  the  “remaining”  submarines, 
were  to  prepare  for  “war  in  the  Atlantic.”  According  to 
the  instructions  of  the  Fuehrer,  the  Navy  had  to  be  pre- 
pared to  carry  out  its  part  of  “White”  by  September  1 but 


See  above,  p.  422. 


654 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Raeder  urged  his  commanders  to  hasten  plans  because 
“due  to  the  latest  political  developments”  action  might 
come  sooner.50 

As  May  1939  came  to  an  end  German  preparations  for 
going  to  war  by  the  end  of  the  summer  were  well  along. 
The  great  armament  works  were  humming,  turning  out 
guns,  tanks,  planes  and  warships.  The  able  staffs  of  the 
Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force  had  reached  the  final  stage  of 
planning.  The  ranks  were  being  swelled  by  new  men  called 
up  for  “summer  training.”  Hitler  could  be  pleased  with 
what  he  had  accomplished. 

The  day  after  the  Fuehrer’s  lecture  to  the  military 
chiefs,  on  May  24,  General  Georg  Thomas,  head  of  the 
Economic  and  Armaments  Branch  of  OKW,  summed  up 
that  accomplishment  in  a confidential  lecture  to  the  staff 
of  the  Foreign  Office.  Whereas  it  had  taken  the  Imperial 
Army,  Thomas  reminded  his  listeners,  sixteen  years — from 
1898  to  1914 — to  increase  its  strength  from  forty-three 
to  fifty  divisions,  the  Army  of  the  Third  Reich  had  jumped 
from  seven  to  fifty-one  divisions  in  just  four  years. 
Among  them  were  five  heavy  armored  divisions  and  four 
light  ones,  a “modem  battle  cavalry”  such  as  no  other 
nation  possessed.  The  Navy  had  built  up  from  practically 
nothing  a fleet  of  two  battleships  of  26,000  tons,*  two 
heavy  cmisers,  seventeen  destroyers  and  forty-seven  sub- 
marines. It  had  already  launched  two  battleships  of  35,000 
tons,  one  aircraft  carrier,  four  heavy  cmisers,  five  de- 
stroyers and  seven  submarines,  and  was  planning  to  launch 
a great  many  more  ships.  From  absolutely  nothing,  the 
Luftwaffe  had  built  up  a force  of  twenty-one  squadrons 
with  a personnel  of  260,000  men.  The  armament  industry, 
General  Thomas  said,  was  already  producing  more  than 
it  had  during  the  peak  of  the  last  war  and  its  output  in 
most  fields  far  exceeded  that  of  any  other  country.  In 
fact,  total  German  rearmament,  the  General  declared,  was 
“probably  unique  in  the  world.” 

* In  giving  these  tonnages  for  German  battleships.  General  Thomas  was 
deceiving  even  the  Foreign  Office.  An  interesting  German  naval  document61 
dated  more  than  a year  before,  February  18,  1938,  notes  that  false  figures 
on  battleship  tonnage  had  been  furnished  the  British  government  under  the 
Anglo-German  naval  agreement.  It  states  that  the  actual  tonnage  of  the 
26,000-ton  ships  was  31,300  tons;  that  of  the  35,000-ton  battleships  (the  top 
level  in  the  British  and  American  navies)  was  actually  41,700  tons.  It  is  a 
curious  example  of  Nazi  deceit. 


The  Road  to  War 


655 


Formidable  as  German  military  power  was  becoming 
at  the  beginning  of  the  summer  of  1939,  the  prospect  of 
success  in  the  war  which  Hitler  was  planning  for  the 
early  fall  depended  on  what  kind  of  a war  it  was.  Ger- 
many was  still  not  strong  enough,  and  probably  would 
never  be,  to  take  on  France,  Britain  and  Russia  in  addi- 
tion to  Poland.  As  the  fateful  summer  commenced,  all 
depended  on  the  Fuehrer’s  ability  to  limit  the  war — 
above  all,  to  keep  Russia  from  forming  the  military  al- 
liance with  the  West  which  Litvinov,  just  before  his  fall, 
had  proposed  and  which  Chamberlain,  though  he  had  at 
first  seemed  to  reject  it,  was,  by  May’s  end,  again  mulling 
over. 

THE  INTERVENTION  OF  RUSSIA:  II 

In  a debate  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  May  19,  the 
British  Prime  Minister  had  again  taken  a cool  and  even 
disdainful  view,  as  Churchill  thought,  of  the  Russian  pro- 
posals. Somewhat  wearily  he  had  explained  to  the  House 
that  “there  is  a sort  of  veil,  a sort  of  wall,  between  the 
two  Governments  which  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  pene- 
trate.” Churchill,  on  the  other  hand,  backed  by  Lloyd 
George,  argued  that  Moscow  had  made  “a  fair  offer  . . . 
more  simple,  more  direct,  more  effective”  than  Chamber- 
lain’s own  proposals.  He  begged  His  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment “to  get  some  brutal  truths  into  their  heads.  Without 
an  effective  Eastern  front,  there  can  be  no  satisfactory  de- 
fense in  the  West,  and  without  Russia  there  can  be  no 
effective  Eastern  front.” 

Bowing  to  the  storm  of  criticism  from  all  sides,  Cham- 
berlain on  May  27  finally  instructed  the  British  ambas- 
sador in  Moscow  to  agree  to  begin  discussions  of  a pact 
of  mutual  assistance,  a military  convention  and  guarantees 
to  the  countries  threatened  by  Hitler.*  Ambassador  von 
Dirksen  in  London  advised  the  German  Foreign  Office 
that  the  British  government  had  taken  the  step  , “with  the 
greatest  reluctance.”  Furthermore,  Dirksen  divulged  what 

* On  May  27,  the  British  ambassador  and  the  French  charge  d’affaires  in 
Moscow  presented  Molotov  with  an  Anglo-French  draft  of  the  proposed 
pact.  To  the  surprise  of  the  Western  envoys,  Molotov  took  a very  cool  view 
of  it.5* 


656 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

was  perhaps  the  primary  reason  for  Chamberlain’s  move. 
The  British  Foreign  Office,  he  reported  urgently  to  Ber- 
lin,  had  got  wind  of  “German  feelers  in  Moscow”  and 
was  “afraid  that  Germany  might  succeed  in  keeping  So- 
viet Russia  neutral  or  even  inducing  her  to  adopt  benev- 
olent neutrality.  That  would  have  meant  the  complete 
collapse  of  the  encirclement  action.” 53 

On  the  last  day  of  May,  Molotov  made  his  first  public 
speech  as  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affaris  in  an  address 
to  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  U.S.S.R.  He  castigated  the 
Western  democracies  for  their  hesitation  and  declared  that 
if  they  were  serious  in  joining  Russia  to  stop  aggression 
they  must  get  down  to  brass  tacks  and  come  to  an  agree- 
ment on  three  main  points: 

1.  Conclude  a tripartite  mutual-assistance  pact  of  a 
purely  defensive  character. 

2.  Guarantee  the  states  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe, 
including  all  European  states  bordering  on  the  Soviet  Union! 

3.  Conclude  a definite  agreement  on  the  form  and  scope 
of  the  immediate  and  effective  aid  to  be  afforded  each 
other  and  the  smaller  states  threatened  by  aggression. 

Molotov  also  declared  that  the  talks  with  the  West 
did  not  mean  that  Russia  would  forego  “business  rela- 
tions on  a practical  footing”  with  Germany  and  Italy. 
In  fact,  he  said  that  “it  was  not  out  of  the  question”  that 
commercial  negotiations  with  Germany  could  be  resumed. 
Ambassador  von  der  Schulenburg,  in  reporting  the  speech 
to  Berlin,  pointed  out  that  Molotov  had  indicated  that 
Russia  was  still  prepared  to  conclude  a treaty  with  Brit- 
ain and  France  ‘ on  condition  that  all  her  demands  are 
accepted,  but  that  it  was  now  evident  from  the  address 
that  it  would  take  a long  time  before  any  real  agreement 
was  reached.  He  pointed  out  that  Molotov  had  “avoided 
sallies  against  Germany  and  showed  readiness  to  continue 
the  talks  begun  in  Berlin  and  Moscow.”  54 

This  readiness  was  now  suddenly  shared  by  Hitler  in 
Berlin. 

During  the  last  ten  days  of  May,  Hitler  and  his  ad- 
visers blew  hot  and  cold  over  the  thorny  question  of 
making  advances  to  Moscow  in  order  to  thwart  the  Anglo- 
Russian  negotiations.  It  was  felt  in  Berlin  that  Molotov 


The  Road  to  War 


657 


in  his  talk  with  Ambassador  von  der  Schulenburg  on 
May  20*  had  thrown  cold  water  on  Germany’s  approaches, 
and  on  the  following  day,  May  21,  Weizsaecker  wired 
the  ambassador  that  in  view  of  what  the  Foreign  Com- 
missar had  said  “we  must  now  sit  tight  and  wait  to  see 
if  the  Russians  will  speak  more  openly.”  55 

But  Hitler,  having  fixed  September  1 for  his  attack  on 
Poland,  could  not  afford  to  sit  tight.  On  or  about  May  25, 
Weizsaecker  and  Friedrich  Gaus,  director  of  the  Legal 
Department  of  the  German  Foreign  Office,  were  sum- 
moned to  Ribbentrop’s  country  house  at  Sonnenburg  and, 
according  to  Gaus’s  affidavit  submitted  at  Nuremberg,  t 
informed  that  the  Fuehrer  wanted  “to  establish  more  toler- 
able relations  between  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union.” 
Draft  instructions  to  Schulenburg  were  drawn  up  by  Rib- 
bentrop  outlining  in  considerable  detail  the  new  line  he 
was  to  take  with  Molotov,  whom  he  was  asked  to  see 
“as  soon  as  possible.”  This  draft  is  among  the  captured 
German  Foreign  Office  documents.56 

It  was  shown  to  Hitler,  according  to  a notation  on  the 
document,  on  May  26.  It  is  a revealing  paper.  It  discloses 
that  by  this  date  the  German  Foreign  Office  was  con- 
vinced that  the  Anglo-Russian  negotiations  would  be 
successfully  concluded  unless  Germany  intervened  decisive- 
ly. Ribbentrop  therefore  proposed  that  Schulenburg  tell 
Molotov  the  following: 

A real  opposition  of  interests  in  foreign  affairs  does  not 
exist  between  Germany  and  Soviet  Russia  . . . The  time  has 
come  to  consider  a pacification  and  normalization  of 
German-Soviet  Russian  foreign  relations  . . . The  Italo- 
German  alliance  is  not  directed  against  the  Soviet  Union.  It 
is  exclusively  directed  against  the  Anglo-French  combina- 
tion . . . 

If  against  our  wishes  it  should  come  to  hostilities  with 
Poland,  we  are  firmly  convinced  that  even  this  need  not  in 
any  way  lead  to  a clash  of  interests  with  Soviet  Russia.  We 
can  even  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  when  settling  the  German- 

* See  above,  p.  645 

t The  affidavit  was  rejected  as  evidence  by  the  tribunal  and  is  not  published 
in  the  Nazi  Conspiracy  and  Aggression  or  Trial  of  the  Major  IV ar  Criminals 
volumes  of  the  Nuremberg  evidence.  This  does  not  detract  from  its  authen- 
ticity. All  material  dealing  with  Nazi-Soviet  collaboration  during  this  period 
was  handled  gingerly  by  the  tribunal,  one  of  whose  four  judges  was  a 
Russian. 


658 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Polish  question — in  whatever  way  this  is  done — we  would 
take  Russian  interests  into  account  as  far  as  possible. 

Next  the  danger  to  Russia  of  an  alliance  with  Great 
Britain  was  to  be  pointed  up. 

We  are  unable  to  see  what  could  really  induce  the  Soviet 
Union  to  play  an  active  part  in  the  game  of  the  British  policy 
of  encirclement  . . . This  would  mean  Russia  undertaking  a 
one-sided  liability  without  any  really  valuable  British  quid 
pro  quo  . . . Britain  is  by  no  means  in  a position  to  offer 
Russia  a really  valuable  quid  pro  quo,  no  matter  how  the 
treaties  may  be  formulated.  All  assistance  in  Europe  is 
rendered  impossible  by  the  West  Wall  . . . We  are  there- 
fore convinced  that  Britain  will  once  more  remain  faithful  to 
her  traditional  policy  of  letting  other  powers  pull  her  chest- 
nuts out  of  the  fire. 

Schulenburg  also  was  to  emphasize  that  Germany  had 
“no  aggressive  intentions  against  Russia.”  Finally,  he  was 
instructed  to  tell  Molotov  that  Germany  was  ready  to 
discuss  with  the  Soviet  Union  not  only  economic  ques- 
tions but  “a  return  to  normal  in  political  relations.” 

Hitler  thought  the  draft  went  too  far  and  ordered  it 
held  up.  The  Fuehrer,  according  to  Gaus,  had  been  im- 
pressed by  Chamberlain’s  optimistic  statement  of  two 
days  before,  May  24,  when  the  Prime  Minister  had  told 
the  House  of  Commons  that  as  the  result  of  new  British 
proposals  he  hoped  that  full  agreement  with  Russia  could 
be  reached  “at  an  early  date.”  What  Hitler  feared  was  a 
rebuff.  He  did  not  abandon  the  idea  of  a rapprochement 
with  Moscow  but  decided  that  for  the  time  being  a more 
cautious  approach  would  be  best. 

The  backing  and  filling  which  took  place  in  the  Fuehrer’s 
mind  during  the  last  week  of  May  is  documented  in  the 
captured  German  Foreign  Office  papers.  On  or  about  the 
twenty-fifth — the  exact  day  is  not  quite  certain — he  had 
suddenly  come  out  for  pushing  talks  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  order  to  thwart  the  Anglo-Russian  negotia- 
tions. Schulenburg  was  to  see  Molotov  at  once  for  that 
purpose.  But  Ribbentrop’s  instructions  to  him,  which  were 
shown  Hitler  on  the  twenty-sixth,  were  never  sent.  The 
Fuehrer  canceled  them.  That  evening  Weizsaecker  wired 
Schulenburg  advising  him  to  maintain  an  “attitude  of 


The  Road  to  War 


659 


complete  reserve — you  personally  should  not  make  any 
move  until  further  notice.”  57 

This  telegram  and  a letter  which  the  State  Secretary 
wrote  the  ambassador  in  Moscow  on  May  27  but  did 
not  mail  until  May  30,  when  a significant  postscript  was 
added,  go  far  to  explaining  the  hesitations  in  Berlin.58 
Weizsaecker,  writing  on  the  twenty-seventh,  informed 
Schulenburg  that  it  was  the  opinion  in  Berlin  that  an 
Anglo-Russian  agreement  would  “not  be  easy  to  pre- 
vent” and  that  Germany  hesitated  to  intervene  decisively 
against  it  for  fear  of  provoking  “a  peal  of  Tartar  laughter” 
in  Moscow.  Also,  the  State  Secretary  revealed,  both  Ja- 
pan and  Italy  had  been  cool  toward  Germany’s  proposed 
move  in  Moscow,  and  the  reserve  of  her  allies  had  helped 
to  influence  the  decision  in  Berlin  to  sit  tight.  “Thus,” 
he  concluded,  “we  now  want  to  wait  and  see  how  deeply 
Moscow  and  Paris-London  mutually  engage  them- 
selves.” 

For  some  reason  Weizsaecker  did  not  post  his  letter 
at  once;  perhaps  he  felt  that  Hitler  had  not  yet  fully 
made  up  his  mind.  When  he  did  mail  it  on  May  30,  he 
added  a postscript: 

P.S.  To  my  above  lines  I must  add  that,  with  the 
approval  of  the  Fuehrer,  an  approach  is  nonetheless  now 
to  be  made  to  the  Russians,  though  a very  much  modified 
one,  and  this  by  means  of  a conversation  which  I am  to  hold 
today  with  the  Russian  charge  d’affaires. 

This  talk  with  Georgi  Astakhov  did  not  get  very  far, 
but  it  represented  for  the  Germans  a new  start.  Weiz- 
saecker’s  pretext  for  calling  in  the  Russian  charge  was 
to  discuss  the  future  of  the  Soviet  trade  delegation  in 
Prague,  which  the  Russians  were  anxious  to  maintain. 
Around  this  subject  the  two  diplomats  sparred  to  find 
out  what  was  in  each  other’s  mind.  Weizsaecker  said  he 
agreed  with  Molotov  that  political  and  economic  questions 
could  not  be  entirely  separated  and  expressed  interest  in 
the  “normalization  of  relations  between  Soviet  Russia  and 
Germany.”  Astakhov  asserted  that  Molotov  had  no  “in- 
tention of  barring  the  door  against  further  Russo-German 
discussions.” 

Cautious  as  both  men  were,  the  Germans  were  encour- 
aged. At  10:40  o’clock  that  evening  of  May  30  Weizsaecker 


660  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

got  off  a “most  urgent”  telegram 59  to  Schulenburg  in 
Moscow: 

Contrary  to  the  tactics  hitherto  planned  we  have  now, 
after  all,  decided  to  make  a certain  degree  of  contact  with 
the  Soviet  Union.* 

It  may  have  been  that  a long  secret  memorandum 
which  Mussolini  penned  to  Hitler  on  May  30  strengthened 
the  Fuehrer’s  resolve  to  turn  to  the  Soviet  Union,  how- 
ever cautiously.  As  the  summer  commenced,  the  Duce’s 
doubts  mounted  as  to  the  advisability  of  an  early  con- 
flict. He  was  convinced,  he  wrote  Hitler,  that  “war  be- 
tween the  plutocratic,  self-seeking  conservative  nations” 
and  the  Axis  was  “inevitable.”  But — “Italy  requires  a per- 
iod of  preparation  Which  may  extend  until  the  end  of 
1942  . . . Only  from  1943  onward  will  an  effort  by  war 
have  the  greatest  prospects  of  success.”  After  enumerating 
several  reasons  why  “Italy  needs  a period  of  peace,”  the 
Duce  concluded:  “For  all  these  reasons  Italy  does  not  wish 
to  hasten  a European  war,  although  she  is  convinced  of 
the  inevitability  of  such  a war.”  60 

Hitler,  who  had  not  taken  his  good  friend  and  ally 
into  his  confidence  about  the  date  of  September  1 which 
he  had  set  for  attacking  Poland,  replied  that  he  had  read 
the  secret  memorandum  “with  the  greatest  interest”  and 
suggested  that  the  two  leaders  meet  for  discussions  some- 
time in  the  future.  In  the  meantime  the  Fuehrer  decided 
to  See  if  a crack  could  be  made  in  the  Kremlin  wall. 
All  through  June  preliminary  talks  concerning  a new 
trade  agreement  were  held  in  Moscow  between  the  Ger- 
man Embassy  and  Anastas  Mikoyan,  the  Russian  Com- 
missar for  Foreign  Trade. 

The  Soviet  government  was  still  highly  suspicious  of 
Berlin.  As  Schulenburg  reported  toward  the  end  of  the 

* In  Nazi-Soviet  Relations,  a volume  of  German  Foreign  Office  docu- 
ments on  that  subject  published  by  the  U.S.  State  Department  in 
1949,  the  English  translation  of  the  telegram  came  out  much  stronger. 
The  key  sentence  was  given  as:  “We  have  now  decided  to  undertake 
definite  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union.”  This  has  led  many  his- 
torians, including  Churchill,  to  conclude  that  this  telegram  of  May 
30  marked  the  decisive  turning  point  in  Hitler’s  efforts  to  make  a 
deal  with  Moscow.  That  turning  point  came  later.  As  Weizsaecker 
pointed  out  in  the  May  30  postscript  to  his  letter  to  Schulenburg, 
the  German  approach,  which  Hitler  had  approved,  was  to  be  “a  very 
much  modified  one.” 


The  Road  to  War 


661 


month  (June  27),  the  Kremlin  believed  the  Germans,  in 
pressing  for  a trade  agreement,  wished  to  torpedo  the 
Russian  negotiations  with  Britain  and  France.  “They  are 
afraid,”  he  wired  Berlin,  “that  as  soon  as  we  have  gained 
this  advantage  we  might  let  the  negotiations  peter  out.”  61 

On  June  28  Schulenburg  had  a long  talk  with  Molotov 
which  proceeded,  he  told  Berlin  in  a “secret  and  urgent” 
telegram,  “in  a friendly  manner.”  Nevertheless,  when  the 
German  ambassador  referred  assuringly  to  the  nonaggres- 
sion treaties  which  Germany  had  just  concluded  with 
the  Baltic  States,*  the  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar  tartly 
replied  that  “he  must  doubt  the  permanence  of  such  treat- 
ies after  the  experiences  which  Poland  had  had.”  Sum- 
ming up  the  talk,  Schulenburg  concluded: 

My  impression  is  that  the  Soviet  Government  is  greatly 
interested  in  learning  our  political  views  and  in  maintaining 
contact  with  us.  Although  there  was  no  mistaking  the 
strong  distrust  evident  in  all  that  Molotov  said,  he  neverthe- 
less described  a normalization  of  relations  with  Germany  as 
being  desirable  and  possible.62 

The  ambassador  requested  telegraphic  instructions  as 
to  his  next  move.  Schulenburg  was  one  of  the  last  sur- 
vivors of  the  Seeckt,  Maltzan  and  Brockdorff-Rantzau 
school  which  had  insisted  on  a German  rapprochement 
with  Soviet  Russia  after  1919  and  which  had  brought  it 
about  at  Rapallo.  As  his  dispatches  throughout  1939  make 
clear,  he  sincerely  sought  to  restore  the  close  relations 
which  had  existed  during  the  Weimar  Republic.  But  like 
so  many  other  German  career  diplomats  of  the  old  school 
he  little  understood  Hitler. 

Suddenly  on  June  29  Hitler,  from  his  mountain  retreat 
at  Berchtesgaden,  ordered  the  talks  with  the  Russians 
broken  off. 

Berchtesgaden,  June  29,  1939 

. . . The  Fuehrer  has  decided  as  follows: 

The  Russians  are  to  be  informed  that  we  have  seen  from 
their  attitude  that  they  are  making  the  continuation  of 

* To  try  to  forestall  an  Anglo-French-Russian  guarantee  of  Latvia  and 
Estonia,  which  bordered  on  the  Soviet  Union,  Germany  had  hastily 
signed  nonaggression  pacts  with  these  two  Baltic  States  on  June  7. 
Even  before  this,  on  May  31,  Germany  had  pushed  through  a similar 
pact  with  Denmark,  which,  considering  recent  events,  appears  to  have  given 
the  Danes  an  astonishing  sense  of  security. 


662 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

further  talks  dependent  on  the  acceptance  of  the  basis  for 
our  economic  discussions  as  fixed  in  January.  Since  this 
basis  was  not  acceptable  to  us,  we  would  not  be  interested 
in  a resumption  of  the  economic  discussions  with  Russia  at 
present. 

The  Fuehrer  has  agreed  that  this  answer  be  delayed  for  a 
few  days.63 

Actually,  the  substance  of  it  was  telegraphed  to  the 
German  Embassy  in  Moscow  the  next  day. 

The  Foreign  Minister  [Weizsaecker  wired]  ...  is  of 
the  opinion  that  in  the  political  field  enough  has  been  said 
until  further  instructions  and  that  for  the  moment  the  talks 
should  not  be  taken  up  again  by  us. 

Concerning  the  possible  economic  negotiations  with  the 
Russian  Government,  the  deliberations  here  have  not  yet 
been  concluded.  In  this  field  too  you  are  requested  for  the 
time  being  to  take  no  further  action,  but  to  await  in- 
structions.64 

There  is  no  clue  in  the  secret  German  documents  which 
explains  Hitler’s  sudden  change  of  mind.  The  Russians 
already  had  begun  to  compromise  on  their  proposals  of 
January  and  February.  And  Schnurre  had  warned  on  June 
15  that  a breakdown  in  the  economic  negotiations  would 
be  a setback  for  Germany  both  economically  and  poli- 
tically. 

Nor  could  the  rocky  course  of  the  Anglo-French- 
Soviet  negotiations  have  so  discouraged  Hitler  as  to  lead 
him  to  such  a decision.  He  knew  from  the  reports  of 
the  German  Embassy  in  Moscow  that  Russia  and  the 
Western  Powers  were  deadlocked  over  the  question  of 
guarantees  to  Poland,  Rumania  and  the  Baltic  States. 
Poland  and  Rumania  were  happy  to  be  guaranteed  by 
Britain  and  France,  which  could  scarcely  help  them  in 
the  event  of  German  aggression  except  by  the  indirect 
means  of  setting  up  a Western  front.  But  they  refused  to 
accept  a Russian  guarantee  or  even  to  allow  for  Soviet 
troops  to  pass  through  their  territories  to  meet  a German 
attack.  Latvia,  Estonia  and  Finland  also  stoutly  declined 
to  accept  any  Russian  guarantee,  an  attitude  which,  as 
the  German  Foreign  Office  papers  later  revealed,  was  en- 
couraged by  Germany  in  the  form  of  dire  threats  should 
they  weaken  in  their  resolve. 


663 


The  Road  to  Wap 


In  this  impasse  Molotov  suggested  at  the  beginning  of 
June  that  Great  Britain  send  its  Foreign  Secretary  to  Mos- 
cow to  take  part  in  the  negotiations.  Apparently  in  the 
Russian  view  this  would  not  only  help  to  break  the  dead- 
lock but  would  show  that  Britain  was  in  earnest  in  arriv- 
ing at  an  agreement  with  Russia.  Lord  Halifax  declined 
to  go.*  Anthony  Eden,  who  was  at  least  a former  Foreign 
Secretary,  offered  to  go  in  his  place,  but  Chamberlain 
turned  him  down.  It  was  decided,  instead,  to  send  William 
Strang,  a capable  career  official  in  the  Foreign  Office  who 
had  previously  served  in  the  Moscow  Embassy  and  spoke 
Russian  but  was  little  known  either  in  his  own  country 
or  outside  of  it.  The  appointment  of  so  subordinate  an 
official  to  head  such  an  important  mission  and  to  nego- 
tiate directly  with  Molotov  and  Stalin  was  a signal  to 
the  Russians,  they  later  said,  that  Chamberlain  still  did 
not  take  very  seriously  the  business  of  building  an  alliance 
to  stop  Hitler. 

Strang  arrived  in  Moscow  on  June  14,  but  though  he 
participated  in  eleven  Anglo-French  meetings  with  Molo- 
tov, his  appearance  had  little  effect  on  the  course  of  Anglo- 
Soviet  negotiations.  A fortnight  later,  on  June  29,  Rus- 
sian suspicion  and  irritation  was  publicly  displayed  in  an 
article  in  Pravda  by  Andrei  Zhdanov  under  the  headline, 
“British  and  French  Governments  Do  Not  Want  a Treaty 
on  the  Basis  of  Equality  for  the  Soviet  Union.”  Though 
purporting  to  write  “as  a private  individual  and  not  com- 
mitting the  Soviet  Government,”  Zhdanov  was  not  only  a 
member  of  the  Politburo  and  president  of  the  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  of  the  Soviet  Parliament  but,  as 
Schulenburg  emphasized  to  Berlin  in  reporting  on  the 
matter,  “one  of  Stalin’s  confidants  [whose]  article  was 
doubtless  written  on  orders  from  above.” 


It  seems  to  me  [Zhdanov  wrote]  that  the  British  and 
French  Governments  are  not  out  for  a real  agreement  ac- 
ceptable to  the  U.S.S.R.  but  only  for  talks  about  an  agree- 

* According  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  papers,  Halifax ; told  Maisky 
on  June  8 that  he  had  thought  of  suggesting  to  the  Prime  Minister 
that  he  should  go  to  Moscow,  “but  it  was  really  impossible  to  get 
away  ” Maisky,  on  June  12,  after  Strang  had  left,  suggested  to  Halifax 
that  it  would  be  a good  idea  for  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  go  to 
Moscow  “when  things  were  quieter,”  but  Halifax  again  stressed  the 
impossibility  of  his  being  absent  from  London  “for  the  present. 


664 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ment  in  order  to  demonstrate  before  the  public  opinion  of 
their  own  countries  the  alleged  unyielding  attitude  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  thus  facilitate  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement 
with  the  aggressors.  The  next  few  days  will  show  whether 
this  is  so  or  not.66 

Stalin’s  distrust  of  Britain  and  France  and  his  suspicion 
that  the  Western  Allies  might  in  the  end  make  a deal 
with  Hitler,  as  they  had  the  year  before  at  Munich,  was 
thus  publicized  for  all  the  world  to  ponder.  Ambassador 
von  der  Schulenburg,  pondering  it,  suggested  to  Berlin 
that  one  purpose  of  the  article  was  “to  lay  the  blame 
on  Britain  and  France  for  the  possible  breakdown  of  the 
negotiations.”  67 


PLANS  FOR  TOTAL  WAR 

Still  Adolf  Hitler  did  not  rise  to  the  Russian  bait. 
Perhaps  it  was  because  all  during  June  he  was  busy  at 
Berchtesgaden  supervising  the  completion  of  military  plans 
to  invade  Poland  at  the  summer’s  end. 

By  June  15  he  had  General  von  Brauchitsch’s  top-secret 
plan  for  the  operations  of  the  Army  against  Poland.68 
“The  object  of  the  operation,”  the  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Army,  echoing  his  master,  declared,  “is  to  destroy 
the  Polish  armed  forces.  The  political  leadership  demands 
that  the  war  should  be  begun  by  heavy  surprise  blows 
and  lead  to  quick  successes.  The  intention  of  the  Army 
High  Command  is  to  prevent  a regular  mobilization  and 
concentration  of  the  Polish  Army  by  a surprise  invasion 
of  Polish  territory  and  to  destroy  the  mass  of  the  Polish 
Army,  which  is  expected  to  be  west  of  the  Vistula- 
Narew  line,  by  a concentric  attack  from  Silesia  on  the 
one  side  and  from  Pomerania-East  Prussia  on  the  other.” 

To  carry  out  his  plan,  Brauchitsch  set  up  two  army 
groups — Army  Group  South,  consisting  of  the  Eighth, 
Tenth  and  Fourteenth  armies,  and  Army  Group  North, 
made  up  of  the  Third  and  Fourth  armies.  The  southern 
army  group,  under  the  command  of  General  von  Rund- 
stedt,  was  to  attack  from  Silesia  “in  the  general  direction 
of  Warsaw,  scatter  opposing  Polish  forces  and  occupy  as 
early  as  possible  with  forces  as  strong  as  possible  the 
Vistula  on  both  sides  of  Warsaw  with  the  aim  of  destroying 


The  Road  to  War 


665 


the  Polish  forces  still  holding  out  in  western  Poland  in 
co-operation  with  Army  Group  North.”  The  first  mission 
of  the  latter  group  was  “to  establish  connection  between 
the  Reich  and  East  Prussia”  by  driving  across  the  Corri- 
dor. Detailed  objectives  of  the  various  armies  were  out- 
lined as  well  as  those  for  the  Air  Force  and  Navy.  Danzig, 
said  Brauchitsch,  would  be  declared  German  territory  on 
the  first  day  of  hostilities  and  would  be  secured  by  local 
forces  under  German  command. 

A supplemental  directive  issued  at  the  same  time  stip- 
ulated that  the  order  of  deployment  for  “White”  would 
be  put  into  operation  on  August  20.  “All  preparations,” 
it  laid  down,  “must  be  concluded  by  that  date.”  69 

A week  later,  on  June  22,  General  Keitel  submitted  to 
Hitler  a “preliminary  timetable  for  Case  White.”  70  The 
Fuehrer,  after  studying  it,  agreed  with  it  “in  the  main” 
but  ordered  that  “so  as  not  to  disquiet  the  population  by 
calling  up  reserves  on  a larger  scale  than  usual  . . . civilian 
establishments,  employers  or  other  private  persons  who 
make  inquiries  should  be  told  that  men  are  being  called 
up  for  the  autumn  maneuvers.”  Also  Hitler  stipulated 
that  “for  reasons  of  security,  the  clearing  of  hospitals  in 
the  frontier  area  which  the  Supreme  Command  of  the 
Army  proposed  should  take  place  from  the  middle  of 
July  must  not  be  carried  out.” 

The  war  which  Hitler  was  planning  to  launch  would 
be  total  war  and  would  require  not  only  military  mobiliza- 
tion but  a total  mobilization  of  all  the  resources  of  the  nation. 
To  co-ordinate  the  immense  effort  a meeting  of  the  Reich 
Defense  Council  was  convoked  the  next  day,  on  June  23, 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Goering.  Some  thirty-five  rank- 
ing officials,  civil  and  military,  including  Keitel,  Raeder, 
Haider,  Thomas  and  Milch  for  the  armed  forces  and  the 
Ministers  of  the  Interior,  Economics,  Finance  and  Trans- 
port, as  well  as  Himmler,  were  present.  It  was  only  the  sec- 
ond meeting  of  the  Council  but,  as  Goering  explained,  the 
body  was  convoked  only  to  make  the  most  important  deci- 
sions and  he  left  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  his  hearers,  as  the 
captured  secret  minutes  of  the  session  reveal,  that  war  was 
near  and  that  much  remained  to  be  done  about  manpower 
for  industry  and  agriculture  and  about  many  other  mat- 
ters relating  to  total  mobilization.71 


666 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Goering  informed  the  Council  that  Hitler  had  decided 
to  draft  some  seven  million  men.  To  augment  the  labor 
supply  Dr.  Funk,  the  Minister  of  Economics,  was  to 
arrange  “what  work  is  to  be  given  to  prisoners  of  war 
and  to  the  inmates  of  prisons  and  concentration  camps.” 
Himmler  chimed  in  to  say  that  “greater  use  will  be  made 
of  the  concentration  camps  in  wartime.”  And  Goering 
added  that  “hundreds  of  thousands  of  workers  from  the 
Czech  protectorate  are  to  be  employed  under  supervision 
in  Germany,  particularly  in  agriculture,  and  housed  in 
hutments.”  Already,  it  was  obvious,  the  Nazi  program  for 
slave  labor  was  taking  shape. 

Dr.  Frick,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  promised  to 
“save  labor  in  the  public  administration”  and  enlivened 
the  proceedings  by  admitting  that  under  the  Nazi  regime 
the  number  of  bureaucrats  had  increased  “from  twenty 
to  forty  fold — an  impossible  state  of  affairs.”  A commit- 
tee was  set  up  to  correct  this  lamentable  situation. 

An  even  more  pessimistic  report  was  made  by  Colonel 
Rudolf  Gercke,  chief  of  the  Transport  Department  of  the 
Army  General  Staff.  “In  the  transportation  sphere,"  he 
declared  bluntly,  “Germany  is  at  the  moment  not  ready 
for  war.” 

Whether  the  German  transportation  facilities  would  be 
equal  to  their  task  depended,  of  course,  on  whether  the 
war  was  confined  to  Poland.  If  it  had  to  be  fought  in  the 
West  against  France  and  Great  Britain  it  was  feared  that 
the  transport  system  would  simply  not  be  adequate.  In 
July  two  emergency  meetings  of  the  Defense  Council 
were  called  “in  order  to  bring  the  West  Wall,  by  August 
25  at  the  latest,  into  the  optimum  condition  of  prepared- 
ness with  the  material  that  can  be  obtained  by  that  time 
by  an  extreme  effort.”  High  officials  of  Krupp  and  the 
steel  cartel  were  enlisted  to  try  to  scrape  up  the  necessary 
metal  to  complete  the  armament  of  the  western  fortifica- 
tions. For  on  their  impregnancy,  the  Germans  knew,  de- 
pended whether  the  Anglo-French  armies  would  be  in- 
clined to  mount  a serious  attack  on  western  Germany 
while  the  Wehrmacht  was  preoccupied  in  Poland. 

Though  Hitler,  with  unusual  frankness,  had  told  his 
generals  on  May  23  that  Danzig  was  not  the  cause  of  the 


The  Road  to  War 


667 


dispute  with  Poland  at  all,  it  seemed  for  a few  weeks  at 
midsummer  that  the  Free  City  might  be  the  powder  keg 
which  any  day  would  set  off  the  explosion  of  war.  For 
some  time  the  Germans  had  been  smuggling  into  Danzig 
arms  and  Regular  Army  officers  to  train  the  local  defense 
guard  in  their  use.*  The  arms  and  officers  came  in  across 
the  border  from  East  Prussia,  and  in  order  to  keep  closer 
watch  on  them  the  Poles  increased  the  number  of  their 
customs  officials  and  frontier  guards.  The  local  Danzig 
authorities,  now  operating  exclusively  on  orders  from  Ber- 
lin, countered  by  trying  to  prevent  the  Polish  officials 
from  carrying  out  their  duties. 

The  conflict  reached  a crisis  on  August  4 when  the 
Polish  diplomatic  representative  in  Danzig  informed  the 
local  authorities  that  the  Polish  customs  inspectors  had 
been  given  orders  to  carry  out  their  functions  “with  arms” 
and  that  any  attempt  by  the  Danzigers  to  hamper  them 
would  be  regarded  “as  an  act  of  violence”  against  Polish 
officials,  and  that  in  such  a case  the  Polish  government 
would  “retaliate  without  delay  against  the  Free  City.” 

This  was  a further  sign  to  Hitler  that  the  Poles  could 
not  be  intimidated  and  it  was  reinforced  by  the  opinion  of 
the  German  ambassador  in  Warsaw,  who  on  July  6 tele- 
graphed Berlin  that  there  was  “hardly  any  doubt”  that 
Poland  would  fight  “if  there  was  a clear  violation”  of  her 
rights  in  Danzig.  We  know  from  a marginal  note  on  the 
telegram  in  Ribbentrop’s  handwriting  that  it  was  shown 
the  Fuehrer.73 

Hitler  was  furious.  The  next  day,  August  7,  he  sum- 
moned Albert  Forster,  the  Nazi  Gauleiter  of  Danzig,  to 
Berchtesgaden  and  told  him  that  he  had  reached  the  ex- 
treme limit  of  his  patience  with  the  Poles.  Angry  notes 
were  exchanged  between  Berlin  and  Warsaw — so  violent  in 
tone  that  neither  side  dared  to  make  them  public.  On  the 
ninth,  the  Reich  government  warned  Poland  that  a repe- 

* On  June  19  the  High  Command  of  the  Army  had  informed  the 
Foreign  Office  that  168  German  Army  officers  “have  been  granted 
permission  to  travel  through  the  Free  State  of  Danzig  in  civilian 
clothes  on  a tour  for  study  purposes.”  Early  in  July  General  Keitel 
inquired  of  the  Foreign  Office  “whether  it  is  politically  advisable  to  show 
in  public  the  twelve  light  and  four  heavy  guns  which  are  in  Danzig 
and  to  let  exercises  be  carried  out  with  them,  or  whether  it  is  better 
to  conceal  the  presence  of  these  guns.” 72  How  the  Germans  succeeded 
in  smuggling  in  heavy  artillery  past  the  Polish  inspectors  is  not 
revealed  in  the  German  papers. 


668  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tition  of  its  ultimatum  to  Danzig  “would  lead  to  an  aggrava- 
tion of  German-Polish  relations  ...  for  which  the  Ger- 
man Government  must  disclaim  all  responsibility.”  The 
next  day  the  Polish  government  replied  tartly 

that  they  will  continue  to  react  as  hitherto  to  any  attempt 
by  the  authorities  of  the  Free  City  to  impair  the  rights  and  in- 
terests which  Poland  enjoys  in  Danzig,  and  will  do  so  by  such 
means  and  measures  as  they  alone  may  deem  appropriate, 
and  that  they  will  regard  any  intervention  by  the  Reich 
Government ...  as  an  act  of  aggression.74 

No  small  nation  which  stood  in  Hitler’s  way  had  ever 
used  such  language.  When  on  the  following  day,  August 
11,  the  Fuehrer  received  Carl  Burckhardt,  a Swiss,  who 
was  League  of  Nations  High  Commissioner  at  Danzig  and 
who  had  gone  more  than  halfway  to  meet  the  German  de- 
mands there,  he  was  in  an  ugly  mood.  He  told  his  visitor 
that  “if  the  slightest  thing  was  attempted  by  the  Poles, 
he  would  fall  upon  them  like  lightning  with  all  the  power- 
ful arms  at  his  disposal,  of  which  the  Poles  had  not  the 
slightest  idea.” 

M.  Burckhardt  said  [the  High  Commissioner  later  re- 
ported] that  that  would  lead  to  a general  conflict.  Herr 
Hitler  replied  that  if  he  had  to  make  war  he  would  rather 
do  it  today  than  tomorrow,  that  he  would  not  conduct  it 
like  the  Germany  of  Wilhelm  II,  who  had  always  had 
scruples  about  the  full  use  of  every  weapon,  and  that  he 
would  fight  without  mercy  up  to  the  extreme  limit.75 

Against  whom?  Against  Poland  certainly.  Against  Brit- 
ain and  France,  if  necessary.  Against  Russia  too?  With 
regard  to  the  Soviet  Union,  Hitler  had  finally  made  up 
his  mind. 

THE  INTERVENTION  OF  RUSSIA:  HI 

A fresh  initiative  had  come  from  the  Russians. 

On  July  18,  E.  Babarin,  the  Soviet  trade  representative 
in  Berlin,  accompanied  by  two  aides,  called  on  Julius 
Schnurre  at  the  German  Foreign  Office  and  informed  him 
that  Russia  would  like  to  extend  and  intensify  German- 
Soviet  economic  relations.  He  brought  along  a detailed 
memorandum  for  a trade  agreement  calling  for  a greatly 
increased  exchange  of  goods  between  the  two  countries 


The  Road  to  War 


669 


and  declared  that  if  a few  differences  between  the  two 
parties  were  clarified  he  was  empowered  to  sign  a trade 
treaty  in  Berlin.  The  Germans,  as  Dr.  Schnurre’s  confi- 
dential memorandum  of  the  meeting  shows,  were  rather 
pleased.  Such  a treaty,  Schnurre  noted,  “will  not  fail  to 
have  its  effect  at  least  in  Poland  and  Britain.”  76  Four 
days  later,  on  July  22,  the  Russian  press  announced  in 
Moscow  that  Soviet-German  trade  negotiations  had  been 
resumed  in  Berlin. 

On  the  same  day  Weizsaecker  rather  exuberantly  wired 
Ambassador  von  der  Schulenburg  in  Moscow  some  in- 
teresting new  instructions.  As  to  the  trade  negotiations, 
he  informed  the  ambassador,  “we  will  act  here  in  a 
markedly  forthcoming  manner,  since  a conclusion,  and 
this  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  is  desired  here  for 
general  reasons.  As  far  as  the  purely  political  aspect  of 
our  conversations  with  the  Russians  is  concerned,”  he 
added,  “we  regard  the  period  of  waiting  stipulated  for  you 
in  our  telegram  [of  June  30]  * as  having  expired.  You 
are  therefore  empowered  to  pick  up  the  threads  again 
there,  without  in  any  way  pressing  the  matter.”  77 

They  were,  in  fact,  picked  up  four  days  later,  on  July 
26,  in  Berlin.  Dr.  Schnurre  was  instructed  by  Ribbentrop 
to  dine  Astakhov,  the  Soviet  charge,  and  Babarin  at  a 
swank  Berlin  restaurant  and  sound  them  out.  The  two 
Russians  needed  little  sounding.  As  Schnurre  noted  in  his 
confidential  memorandum  of  the  meeting,  “the  Russians 
stayed  until  about  12:30  a.m.”  and  talked  “in  a very  lively 
and  interested  manner  about  the  political  and  economic 
problems  of  interest  to  us.” 

Astakhov,  with  the  warm  approval  of  Babarin,  declared 
that  a Soviet-German  political  rapprochement  corre- 
sponded to  the  vital  interests  of  the  two  countries.  In 
Moscow,  he  said,  they  had  never  quite  understood  why 
Nazi  Germany  had  been  so  antagonistic  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  German  diplomat,  in  response,  explained  that 
“German  policy  in  the  East  had  now  taken  an  entirely 
different  course.” 

On  our  part  there  could  be  no  question  of  menacing  the 
Soviet  Union.  Our  aims  were  in  an  entirely  different  direc- 


See  above,  p.  662. 


670 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tion  . . . German  policy  was  aimed  at  Britain  ...  I could 
imagine  a far-reaching  arrangement  of  mutual  interests  with 
due  consideration  for  vital  Russian  problems. 

However;  this  possibility  would  be  barred  the  moment  the 
Soviet  Union  aligned  itself  with  Britain  against  Germany. 
The  time  for  an  understanding  between  Germany  and  the 
Soviet  Union  was  opportune  now,  but  would  no  longer  be 
so  after  the  conclusion  of  a pact  with  London. 

What  could  Britain  offer  Russia?  At  best,  participation 
in  a European  war  and  the  hostility  of  Germany.  What 
could  we  offer  against  this?  Neutrality  and  keeping  out  of  a 
possible  European  conflict  and,  if  Moscow  wished,  a German- 
Russian  understanding  on  mutual  interests  which,  just  as  in 
former  times,  would  work  out  to  the  advantage  of  both 
countries  . . . Controversial  problems  [between  Germany 
and  Russia]  did  not,  in  my  opinion,  exist  anywhere  along 
the  line  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  Black  Sea  and  to  the  Far 
East.  In  addition,  despite  all  the  divergencies  in  their  views  of 
life,  there  was  one  thing  common  to  the  ideology  of  Ger- 
many, Italy  and  the  Soviet  Union:  opposition  to  the  capi- 
talist democracies  in  the  West.78 

Thus  in  the  late-evening  hours  of  July  26  in  a small 
Berlin  restaurant  over  good  food  and  wine  partaken  by 
second-string  diplomats  was  Germany’s  first  serious  bid 
for  a deal  with  Soviet  Russia  made.  The  new  line  which 
Schnurre  took  had  been  given  him  by  Ribbentrop  himself. 
Astakhov  was  pleased  to  hear  it.  He  promised  Schnurre 
that  he  would  report  it  at  once  to  Moscow. 

In  the  Wilhelmstrasse  the  Germans  waited  impatiently 
to  see  what  the  reaction  in  the  Soviet  capital  would  be. 
Three  days  later,  on  July  29,  Weizsaecker  sent  a secret 
dispatch  by  courier  to  Schulenburg  in  Moscow. 

It  would  be  important  for  us  to  know  whether  the  re- 
marks made  to  Astakhov  and  Babarin  have  met  with  any 
response  in  Moscow.  If  you  see  an  opportunity  of  arranging 
a further  conversation  with  Molotov,  please  sound  him  out 
on  the  same  lines.  If  this  results  in  Molotov  abandoning  the 
reserve  he  has  so  far  maintained  you  could  go  a step  further 
. . . This  applies  in  particular  to  the  Polish  problem.  We 
would  be  prepared,  however  the  Polish  problem  may  de- 
velop ...  to  safeguard  all  Soviet  interests  and  to  come  to  an 
understanding  with  the  Government  in  Moscow.  In  the  Baltic 
question,  too,  if  the  talks  took  a positive  course,  the  idea 
could  be  advanced  of  so  adjusting  our  attitude  to  the  Baltic 


671 


The  Road  to  War 

States  as  to  respect  vital  Soviet  interests  in  the  Baltic  Sea.79 

Two  days  later,  on  July  31,  the  State  Secretary  wired 
Schulenburg  “urgent  and  secret”: 

With  reference  to  our  dispatch  of  July  29,  arriving  in  Mos- 
cow by  courier  today: 

Please  report  by  telegram  the  date  and  time  of  your  next 
interview  with  Molotov  as  soon  as  it  is  fixed. 

We  are  anxious  for  an  early  interview.80 

For  the  first  time  a note  of  urgency  crept  into  the  dis- 
patches from  Berlin  to  Moscow. 

There  was  good  reason  for  Berlin’s  sense  of  urgency. 
On  July  23,  France  and  Britain  had  finally  agreed  to  Rus- 
sia’s proposal  that  military-staff  talks  be  held  at  once  to 
draw  up  a military  convention  which  would  spell  out 
specifically  how  Hitler’s  armies  were  to  be  met  by  the 
three  nations.  Although  Chamberlain  did  not  announce 
this  agreement  until  July  31,  when  he  made  it  to  the 
House  of  Commons,  the  Germans  got  wind  of  it  earlier. 
On  July  28  Ambassador  von  Welczeck  in  Paris  wired  Ber- 
lin that  he  had  learned  from  “an  unusually  well-informed 
source”  that  France  and  Britain  were  dispatching  military 
missions  to  Moscow  and  that  the  French  group  would  be 
headed  by  General  Doumenc,  whom  he  described  as 
being  “a  particularly  capable  officer”  and  a former  Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff  under  General  Maxime  Weygand.81  It  was 
the  German  ambassador’s  impression,  as  he  stated  in  a 
supplementary  dispatch  two  days  later,  that  Paris  and 
London  had  agreed  to  military-staff  talks  as  a last  means 
of  preventing  the  adjournment  of  the  Moscow  negotia- 
tions.82 

It  was  a well-founded  impression.  As  the  confidential 
British  Foreign  Office  papers  make  clear,  the  political 
talks  in  Moscow  had  reached  an  impasse  by  the  last  week 
in  July  largely  over  the  impossibility  of  reaching  a defini- 
tion of  “indirect  aggression.”  To  the  British  and  French  the 
Russian  interpretation  of  that  term  was  so  broad  that  it 
might  be  used  to  justify  Soviet  intervention  in  Finland 
and  the  Baltic  States  even  if  there  were  no  serious  Nazi 
threat,  and  to  this  London  at  least — the  French  were  pre- 
pared to  be  more  accommodating — would  not  agree. 


672 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Also,  on  June  2 the  Russians  had  insisted  that  a mili- 
tary agreement  setting  down  in  detail  the  “methods,  form 
and  extent”  of  the  military  help  which  the  three  countries 
were  to  give  each  other  should  come  into  force  at  the 
same  time  as  the  mutual-assistance  pact  itself.  The  West- 
ern Powers,  which  did  not  think  highly  of  Russia’s  military 
prowess,*  tried  to  put  Molotov  off.  They  would  only  agree 
to  starting  staff  talks  after  the  political  agreement  had 
been  signed.  But  the  Russians  were  adamant.  When  the 
British  tried  to  strike  a bargain,  offering  on  July  17  to 
begin  staff  conversations  at  once  if  the  Soviet  Union 
would  yield  on  its  insistence  on  signing  political  and  mili- 
tary agreements  simultaneously  and  also — for  good  meas- 
ure— accept  the  British  definition  of  “indirect  aggression,” 
Molotov  answered  with  a blunt  rejection.  Unless  the 
French  and  British  agreed  to  political  and  military  agree- 
ments in  one  package,  he  said,  there  was  no  point  in  con- 
tinuing the  negotiations.  This  Russian  threat  to  end  the 
talks  caused  consternation  in  Paris,  which  seems  to  have 
been  more  acutely  aware  than  London  of  the  course  of 
Soviet-Nazi  flirtations,  and  it  was  largely  due  to  French 
pressure  that  the  British  government,  on  August  23,  while 
refusing  to  accept  the  Russian  proposals  on  “indirect  ag- 
gression,” reluctantly  agreed  to  negotiate  a military  con- 
vention.84 

Chamberlain  was  less  than  lukewarm  to  the  whole 
business  of  staff  talks,  t On  August  1 Ambassador  von 

* Thq  British  High  Command,  like  the  German  later,  grossly  under- 
estimated the  potential  strength  of  the  Red  Army.  This  may  have 

been  due.  in  large  part  to  the  reports  it  received  from  its  military 
attaches  in  Moscow.  On  March  6,  for  instance,  Colonel  Firebrace,  the 
military  attache,  and  Wing  Commander  Hallawell,  the  air  attache,  had 
filed,  long  reports  to  London  to  the  effect  that  while  the  defensive  capa- 
bilities of  the  Red  Army  and  Air  Force  were  considerable  they  were 

incapable  of  mounting  a serious  offensive.  Hallawell  thought  that 

the  Russian  Air  Force,  “like  the  Army,  is  likely  to  be  brought  to 
a standstill  as  much  by  the  collapse  of  essential  services  as  by  enemy 
action.”  Firebrace  found  that  the  purge  of  higher  officers  had  severely 
weakened  the  Red  Army.  But  he  did  point  out  to  London  that  “the 
Red  Army  considers  war  inevitable  and  is  undoubtedly  being  strenuously 
prepared  for  it.”83 

T Strang,  negotiating  with  Molotov  in  Moscow,  was  even  cooler.  “It  is, 
indeed,  extraordinary,”  he  wrote  the  Foreign  Office  on  July  20,  “that  we 
should  be  expected  to  talk  military  secrets  with  the  Soviet  Government 
before  we  are  sure  that  they  will  be  our  allies.” 

The  Russian  view  was  just  the  opposite  and  was  put  by  Molotov  to 
the  Anglo-French  negotiators  on  July  27:  “The  important  point  was 
to  see  how  many  divisions  each  party  would  contribute  to  the  common 
cause  and  where  they  would  be  located.”86  Before  the  Russians  com- 


673 


The  Road  to  War 

Dirksen  in  London  informed  Berlin  that  the  military  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Russians  were  “regarded  skeptically” 
in  British  government  circles. 

This  is  borne  out  [he  wrote]  by  the  composition  of  the 
British  Military  Mission.* *  The  Admiral  ...  is  practically  on 
the  retired  list  and  was  never  on  the  Naval  Staff.  The  Gen- 
eral is  also  purely  a combat  officer.  The  Air  Marshal  is  out- 
standing as  a pilot  and  an  instructor,  but  not  as  a strategist. 
This  seems  to  indicate  that  the  task  of  the  Military  Mission  is 
rather  to  ascertain  the  fighting  value  of  the  Soviet  forces 
than  to  conclude  agreements  on  operations  . . . The  Wehr- 
macht  attaches  are  agreed  in  observing  a surprising  skep- 
ticism in  British  military  circles  about  the  forthcoming  talks 
with  the  Soviet  armed  forces.86 

Indeed,  so  skeptical  was  the  British  government  that  it 
neglected  to  give  Admiral  Drax  written  authority  to  ne- 
gotiate— an  oversight,  if  it  was  that,  which  Marshal  Voro- 
shilov complained  about  when  the  staff  officers  first  met. 
The  Admiral’s  credentials  did  not  arrive  until  August  21, 
when  they  were  no  longer  of  use. 

But  if  Admiral  Drax  had  no  written  credentials  he  cer- 
tainly had  secret  written  instructions  as  to  the  course  he 
was  to  take  in  the  military  talks  in  Moscow.  As-  the  British 
Foreign  Office  papers  much  later  revealed,  the  Admiral 
was  admonished  to  “go  very  slowly  with  the  [military] 
conversations,  watching  the  progress  of  the  political  nego- 
tiations,” until  a political  agreement  had  been  con- 
cluded.87 It  was  explained  to  him  that  confidential  mili- 
tary information  could  not  be  imparted  to  the  Russians 
until  the  political  pact  was  signed. 

But  since  the  political  conversations  had  been  suspended 
on  August  2 and  Molotov  had  made  it  clear  that  he  would 
not  assent  to  their  being  renewed  until  the  military  talks 
had  made  some  progress,  the  conclusion  can  scarcely  be 
escaped  that  the  Chamberlain  government  was  quite  pre- 
pared to  take  its  time  in  spelling  out  the  military  obliga- 
tions of  each  country  in  the  proposed  mutual-assistance 
pact,  t In  fact  the  confidential  British  Foreign  Office  docu- 

mitted  themselves  politically  they  wanted  to  know  how  much  military 
help  they  could  expect  from  the  West.  ... 

* The  British  mission  consisted  of  Admiral  Sir  Reginald  Plunkett-Enle 
Drax,  who  had  been  Commander  in  Chief,  Plymouth,  1935—1938,  Air 
Marshal  Sir  Charles  Burnett  and  Major  General  Heywood. 
t A conclusion  reached  by  Arnold  Toynbee  and  his  collaborators  in. 


674 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ments  leave  little  doubt  that,  by  the  beginning  of  August, 
Chamberlain  and  Halifax  had  almost  given  up  hope  of 
reaching  an  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  to  stop  Hit- 
ler but  thought  that  if  they  stretched  out  the  staff  nego- 
tiations in  Moscow  this  might  somehow  deter  the  German 
dictator  from  taking,  during  the  next  four  weeks,  the  fatal 
step  toward  war.* * 

In  contrast  to  the  British  and  French,  the  Russians 
placed  on  their  military  mission  the  highest  officers  of 
their  armed  forces:  Marshal  Voroshiiov,  who  was  Com- 
missar for  Defense,  General  Shaposhnikov,  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  of  the  Red  Army,  and  the  commanders  in 
chief  of  the  Navy  and  Air  Force.  The  Russians  could  not 
help  noting  that  whereas  the  British  had  sent  the  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff,  General  Sir  Edmund  Ironside, 
to  Warsaw  in  July  for  military  talks  with  the  Polish  Gen- 
eral Staff,  they  did  not  consider  sending  this  ranking 
British  officer  to  Moscow. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  Anglo-French  military  mis- 
sions were  exactly  rushed  to  Moscow.  A plane  would  have 
got  them  there  in  a day.  But  they  were  sent  on  a slow 
boat — a passenger-cargo  vessel — which  took  as  long  to  get 
them  to  Russia  as  the  Queen  Mary  could  have  conveyed 
them  to  America.  They  sailed  for  Leningrad  on  August  5 
and  did  not  arrive  in  Moscow  until  August  11. 

By  that  time  it  was  too  late.  Hitler  had  beaten  them  to  it. 

While  the  British  and  French  military  officers  were  wait- 
ing for  their  slow  boat  to  Leningrad  the  Germans  were 
acting  swiftly.  August  3 was  a crucial  day  in  Berlin  and 
Moscow. 

their  book,  The  Eve  of  War,  1939,  based  largely  on  the  British  Foreign 
Office  documents.  See  p.  645. 

* On  August  16,  Air  Marshal  Sir  Charles  Burnett  wrote  to  London 
from  Moscow:  “I  understand  it  is  the  Government’s  policy  to  prolong 
negotiations  as  long  as  possible  if  we  cannot  get  acceptance  of  a 
treaty.”  Seeds,  the  British  ambassador  in  Moscow,  had  wired  London 
on  July  24,  the  day  after  his  government  agreed  to  staff  talks:  “I  am 
not  optimistic  as  to  the  success  of  military  conversations,  nor  do  I 
think  they  can  in  any  case  be  rapidly  concluded,  but  to  begin  with 
them  now  would  give  a healthy  shock  to  the  Axis  Powers  and  a fillip 
to  our  friends,  while  they  might  be  prolonged  sufficiently  to  tide  over 
the  next  dangerous  few  months.”  88  In  view  of  what  Anglo-French  in- 
telligence knew  of  the  meetings  of  Molotov  with  the  German  ambassador, 
of  German  efforts  to  interest  Russia  in  a new  partition  of  Poland — 
which  Coulondre  had  warned  Paris  of  as  early  as  May  7 (see  above, 
p.  645),  of  massive  German  troop  concentrations  on  the  Polish  border, 
and  of  Hitler’s  intentions,  this  British  trust  in  stalling  in  Moscow  is  some- 
what startling. 


The  Road  to  War 


675 


At  12:58  p.m.  on  that  day  Foreign  Minister  von  Ribben- 
trop,  who  invariably  left  the  sending  of  telegrams  to  State 
Secretary  von  Weizsaecker,  got  off  on  his  own  a wire 
marked  “Secret — Most  Urgent”  to  Schulenburg  in  Moscow. 

Yesterday  I had  a lengthy  conversation  with  Astakhov,  on 
which  a telegram  follows. 

I expressed  the  German  wish  for  remolding  German- 
Russian  relations  and  stated  that  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black 
Sea  there  was  no  problem  which  could  not  be  solved  to 
our  mutual  satisfaction.  In  response  to  Astakhov’s  desire 
for  more  concrete  conversations  on  topical  questions  ...  I 
declared  myself  ready  for  such  conversations  if  the  Soviet 
Government  would  inform  me  through  Astakhov  that  they 
also  desired  to  place  German-Russian  relations  on  a new  and 
definitive  basis.89 

It  was  known  at  the  Foreign  Office  that  Schulenburg  was 
seeing  Molotov  later  in  the  day.  An  hour  after  Ribbentrop’s 
telegram  was  dispatched,  Weizsaecker  got  off  one  of  his 
own,  also  marked  “Secret — Most  Urgent.” 

In  view  of  the  political  situation  and  in  the  interests  of 
speed,  we  are  anxious,  without  prejudice  to  your  conversa- 
tion with  Molotov  today,  to  continue  in  more  concrete  terms 
in  Berlin  the  conversations  on  harmonizing  German-Soviet 
intentions.  To  this  end  Schnurre  will  receive  Astakhov  today 
and  will  tell  him  that  we  would  be  ready  for  a continuation 
on  more  concrete  terms.90 

Though  Ribbentrop’s  sudden  desire  for  “concrete”  talks 
on  everything  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea  must  have 
surprised  the  Russians — at  one  point,  as  he  informed 
Schulenburg  in  his  following  telegram  which  was  sent  at 
3:47  p.m.,  he  “dropped  a gentle  hint  [to  Astakhov]  at 
our  coming  to  an  understanding  with  Russia  on  the  fate 
of  Poland” — the  Foreign  Minister  emphasized  to  his  am- 
bassador in  Moscow  that  he  had  told  the  Russian  charge 
that  “we  were  in  no  hurry.”  91 

This  was  bluff,  and  the  sharp-minded  Soviet  charge 
called  it  when  he  saw  Schnurre  at  the  Foreign  Office  at 
12:45  p.m.  He  remarked  that  while  Schnurre  seemed  to  be 
in  a hurry,  the  German  Foreign  Minister  the  previous  day 
“had  shown  no  such  urgency.”  Schnurre  rose  to  the  oc- 
casion. 

I told  M.  Astakhov  [he  noted  in  a secret  memorandum]  92 


676 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

that  though  the  Foreign  Minister  last  night  had  not  shown 
any  urgency  to  the  Soviet  Government,  we  nevertheless 
thought  it  expedient  to  make  use  of  the  next  few  days  * 
for  continuing  the  conversations  in  order  to  establish  a basis 
as  quickly  as  possible. 

For  the  Germans,  then,  it  had  come  down  to  a matter 
of  the  next  few  days.  Astakhov  told  Schnurre  that  he  had 
received  “a  provisional  answer”  from  Molotov  to  the  Ger- 
man suggestions.  It  was  largely  negative.  While  Moscow 
too  desired  an  improvement  in  relations,  “Molotov  said,” 
he  reported,  “that  so  far  nothing  concrete  was  known  of 
Germany’s  attitude.” 

The  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar  conveyed  his  ideas  di- 
rectly to  Schulenburg  in  Moscow  that  evening.  The  ambas- 
sador reported  in  a long  dispatch  filed  shortly  after 
midnight  93  that  in  a talk  lasting  an  hour  and  a quarter 
Molotov  had  “abandoned  his  habitual  reserve  and  appeared 
unusually  open.”  There  seems  no  doubt  of  that.  For  after 
Schulenburg  had  reiterated  Germany’s  view  that  no  dif- 
ferences existed  between  the  two  countries  “from  the  Baltic 
to  the  Black  Sea”  and  reaffirmed  the  German  wish  to 
“come  to  an  understanding,”  the  unbending  Russian  Min- 
ister enumerated  some  of  the  hostile  acts  that  the  Reich 
had  committed  against  the  Soviet  Union:  the  Anti-Comin- 
tern Pact,  support  of  Japan  against  Russia  and  the  exclusion 
of  the  Soviets  from  Munich. 

“How,”  asked  Molotov,  “could  the  new  German  state- 
ments be  reconciled  with  these  three  points?  Proofs  of  a 
changed  attitude  of  the  German  Government  were  for  the 
present  still  lacking.” 

Schulenburg  seems  to  have  been  somewhat  discouraged. 

My  general  impression  [he  telegraphed  Berlin]  is  that 
the  Soviet  Government  are  at  present  determined  to  conclude 
an  agreement  with  Britain  and  France,  if  they  fulfill  all 
Soviet  wishes  ...  I believe  that  my  statements  made  an  im- 
pression on  Molotov;  it  will  nevertheless  require  consider- 
able effort  on  our  part  to  cause  a reversal  in  the  Soviet 
Government’s  course. 

Knowledgeable  though  the  veteran  German  diplomat 
was  about  Russian  affairs,  he  obviously  overestimated  the 
progress  in  Moscow  of  the  British  and  French  negotiators. 


Emphasis  in  the  original  document. 


677 


The  Road  to  War 

Nor  did  he  yet  realize  the  lengths  to  which  Berlin  was  now 
prepared  to  go  to  make  the  “considerable  effort’  which  he 
thought  was  necessary  to  reverse  the  course  of  Soviet 
diplomacy. 

In  the  Wilhelmstrasse  confidence  grew  that  this  could 
be  accomplished.  With  Russia  neutralized,  Britain  and 
France  either  would  not  fight  for  Poland  or,  if  they  did, 
would  easily  be  held  on  the  western  fortifications  until  the 
Poles  were  quickly  liquidated  and  the  German  Army  could 
turn  its  full  strength  on  the  West. 

The  astute  French  charge  d’affaires  in  Berlin,  Jacques 
Tarbe  de  St.-Hardouin,  noticed  the  change  of  atmosphere 
in  the  German  capital.  On  the  very  day,  August  3,  when 
there  was  so  much  Soviet-German  diplomatic  activity  in 
Berlin  and  Moscow,  he  reported  to  Paris:  “In  the  course  of 
the  last  week  a very  definite  change  in  the  political  at- 
mosphere has  been  observed  in  Berlin  . . . The  period  of 
embarrassment,  hesitation,  inclination  to  temporization  or 
even  to  appeasement  has  been  succeeded  among  the  Nazi 
leaders  by  a new  phase.”  94 

THE  HESITATION  OF  GERMANY’S  ALLIES 

It  was  different  with  Germany’s  allies,  Italy  and  Hun- 
gary. As  the  summer  progressed,  the  governments  in  Buda- 
pest and  Rome  became  increasingly  fearful  that  their 
countries  would  be  drawn  into  Hitler’s  war  on  Germany  s 
side. 

On  July  24  Count  Teleki,  Premier  of  Hungary,  ad- 
dressed identical  letters  to  Hitler  and  Mussolini  informing 
them  that  “in  the  event  of  a general  conflict  Hungary  will 
make  her  policy  conform  to  the  policy  of  the  Axis.” 
Having  gone  so  far,  he  then  pulled  back.  On  the  same  day 
he  wrote  the  two  dictators  a second  letter  stating  that  “in 
order  to  prevent  any  possible  misinterpretation  of  my  let- 
ter of  July  24,  I . . . repeat  that  Hungary  could  not,  on 
moral  grounds,  be  in  a position  to  take  armed  action 
against  Poland.”  95 

The  second  letter  from  Budapest  threw  Hitler  into  one 
of  his  accustomed  rages.  When  he  received  Count  Csaky, 
the  Hungarian  Foreign  Minister,  at  Obersalzberg  on  Au- 
gust 8,  in  the  presence  of  Ribbentrop,  he  opened  the  con- 


678 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


versation  by  stating  that  he  had  been  “shocked”  at  the 
Hungarian  Prime  Minister’s  letter.  He  emphasized,  ac- 
cording to  the  confidential  memorandum  drawn  up  for 
the  Foreign  Office,  that  he  had  never  expected  help  from 
Hungary — or  from  any  other  state — “in  the  event  of  a 
German-Polish  conflict.”  Count  Teleki’s  letter,  he  added, 
“was  impossible.”  And  he  reminded  his  Hungarian  guest 
that  it  was  due  to  Germany’s  generosity  that  Hungary  had 
been  able  to  regain  so  much  territory  at  the  expense  of 
Czechoslovakia.  Were  Germany  to  be  defeated  in  war,  he 
said,  “Hungary  would  be  automatically  smashed  too.” 

The  German  memorandum  of  this  conversation,  which 
is  among  the  captured  Foreign  Office  documents,  reveals 
Hitler’s  state  of  mind  as  the  fateful  month  of  August  got 
under  way.  Poland,  he  said,  presented  no  military  prob- 
lem at  all  for  Germany.  Nevertheless,  he  was  reckoning 
from  the  start  with  a war  on  two  fronts.  “No  power  in  the 
world,”  he  boasted,  “could  penetrate  Germany’s  western 
fortifications.  Nobody  in  all  my  life  has  been  able  to 
frighten  me,  and  that  goes  for  Britain.  Nor  will  I suc- 
cumb to  the  oft-predicted  nervous  breakdown.”  As  for 
Russia: 

The  Soviet  Government  would  not  fight  against  us  . . . 
The  Soviets  would  not  repeat  the  Czar’s  mistake  and  bleed 
to  death  for  Britain.  They  would,  however,  try  to  enrich 
themselves,  possibly  at  the  expense  of  the  Baltic  States  or 
Poland,  without  engaging  in  military  action  themselves. 

So  effective  was  Hitler’s  harangue  that  at  the  end  of  a 
second  talk  held  the  same  day  Count  Csaky  requested 
him  “to  regard  the  two  letters  written  by  Teleki  as  not 
having  been  written.”  He  said  he  would  also  make  the 
same  request  of  Mussolini. 

For  some  weeks  the  Duce  had  been  worrying  and 
fretting  about  the  danger  of  the  Fuehrer  dragging  Italy 
into  war.  Attolico,  his  ambassador  in  Berlin,  had  been 
sending  increasingly  alarming  reports  about  Hitler’s  de- 
termination to  attack  Poland.*  Since  early  June  Mussolini 

* Typical  was  a vivid  report  Attolico  sent  of  a talk  he  had  with  Ribbentrop 
on  July  6.  If  Poland  dared  to  attack  Danzig,  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  told 
him,  Germany  would  settle  the  Danzig  question  in  forty-eight  hours — at 
Warsaw!  If  France  were  to  intervene  over  Danzig,  and  so  precipitate  a 
general  war,  let  her;  Germany  would  like  nothing  better.  France  would  be 


679 


The  Road  to  War 


had  been  pressing  for  another  meeting  with  Hitler  and  in 
July  it  was  fixed  for  August  4 at  the  Brenner.  On  July  24 
he  presented  to  Hitler  through  Attolico  “certain  basic 
principles”  for  their  discussion.  If  the  Fuehrer  considered 
war  “inevitable,”  then  Italy  would  stand  by  her  side.  But 
the  Duce  reminded  him  that  a war  with  Poland  could  not 
be  localized;  it  would  become  a European  conflict.  Mus- 
solini did  not  think  that  this  was  the  time  for  the  Axis  to 
start  such  a war.  He  proposed  instead  “a  constructive 
peaceful  policy  over  several  years,”  with  Germany  settling 
her  differences  with  Poland  and  Italy  hers  with  France 
by  diplomatic  negotiation.  He  went  further.  He  suggested 
another  international  conference  of  the  Big  Powers.97 

The  Fuehrer’s  reaction,  as  Ciano  noted  in  his  diary  on 
July  26,  was  unfavorable,  and  Mussolini  decided  it  might 
be  best  to  postpone  his  meeting  with  Hitler.98  He  pro- 
posed instead,  on  August  7,  that  the  foreign  ministers  of 
the  two  countries  meet  immediately.  Ciano’s  diary  notes 
during  these  days  indicate  the  growing  uneasiness  in  Rome. 
On  August  6 he  wrote: 

We  must  find  some  way  out.  By  following  the  Germans 
we  shall  go  to  war  and  enter  it  under  the  least  favorable 
conditions  for  the  Axis,  and  especially  for  Italy.  Our  gold 
reserves  are  reduced  to  almost  nothing,  as  well  as  our  stocks 
of  metals  ...  We  must  avoid  war.  I propose  to  the  Duce  the 
idea  of  my  meeting  with  Ribbentrop  . . . during  which  I 
would  attempt  to  continue  discussion  of  Mussolini’s  project 
for  a world  conference. 

August  9. — Ribbentrop  has  approved  the  idea  of  our  meet- 
ing. I decided  to  leave  tomorrow  night  in  order  to  meet  him 
at  Salzburg.  The  Duce  is  anxious  that  I prove  to  the  Germans, 


“annihilated”;  Britain,  if  she  stirred,  would  be  bringing  destruction  on  the 

British  Empire.  Russia?  There  was  going  to  be  a Russian-German  treaty, 
and  Russia  was  not  going  to  march.  America?  One  speech  of  the  Fuehrer  s 
had  been  enough  to  route  Roosevelt;  and  Americans  would  not  stir  anyway. 
Fear  of  Japan  would  keep  America  quiet. 


I listened  [Attolico  reported]  in  wondering  silence,  while  Ribben- 
trop drew  this  picture  of  the  war  ad  usum  Germanxae  which  his 
imagination  has  now  established  indelibly  in  his  head  . . . tie  can 
see  nothing  but  his  version — which  is  a really  amazing  one — ot  an 
assured  German  victory  in  every  field  and  against  all  comers  . . . At 
the  end,  I observed  that,  according  to  my  understanding,  there  was 
complete  agreement  between  the  Duce  and  the  Fuehrer  that  Italy 
and  Germany  were  preparing  for  a war  that  was  not  to  be  immediate. 


But  the  astute  Attolico  did  not  believe  that  at  all.  All  through  July 
his  dispatches  warned  of  imminent  German  action  in  Poland. 


680  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

by  documentary  evidence,  that  the  outbreak  of  war  at  this 
time  would  be  folly. 

August  10. — The  Duce  is  more  than  ever  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  delaying  the  conflict.  He  himself  has  worked  out 
the  outline  of  a report  concerning  the  meeting  at  Salzburg 
which  ends  with  an  allusion  to  international  negotiations  to 
settle  the  problems  that  so  dangerously  disturb  European  life. 

Before  letting  me  go  he  recommends  that  I shall  frankly 
inform  the  Germans  that  we  must  avoid  a conflict  with  Po- 
land since  it  will  be  impossible  to  localize  it,  and  a general 
war  would  be  disastrous  for  everybody." 

Armed  with  such  commendable  but,  in  the  circumstances, 
naive  thoughts  and  recommendations,  the  youthful  Fas- 
cist Foreign  Minister  set  out  for  Germany,  where  during 
the  next  three  days — August  11,  12  and  13 — he  received 
from  Ribbentrop  and  especially  from  Hitler  the  shock  of 
his  life. 

CIANO  AT  SALZBURG  AND  OBERSALZBERG: 

AUGUST  11,  12,  13 

For  some  ten  hours  on  August  11,  Ciano  conferred 
with  Ribbentrop  at  the  latter’s  estate  at  Fuschl,  outside 
Salzburg,  which  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  had  taken  from 
an  Austrian  monarchist  who,  conveniently,  had  been  put 
away  in  a concentration  camp.  The  hot-blooded  Italian 
found  the  atmosphere,  as  he  later  reported,  cold  and 
gloomy.  During  dinner  at  the  White  Horse  Inn  at  St. 
Wolfgang  not  a word  was  exchanged  between  the  two.  It 
was  scarcely  necessary.  Ribbentrop  had  informed  his  visi- 
tor earlier  in  the  day  that  the  decision  to  attack  Poland 
was  implacable. 

“Well,  Ribbentrop,”  Ciano  says  he  asked,  “what  do  you 
want?  The  Corridor  or  Danzig?” 

“Not  that  any  more,”  Ribbentrop  replied,  gazing  at  him 
with  his  cold,  metallic  eyes.  “We  want  war!” 

Ciano’s  arguments  that  a Polish  conflict  could  not  be 
localized,  that  if  Poland  were  attacked  the  Western  de- 
mocracies would  fight,  were  bluntly  rejected.  The  day  be- 
fore Christmas  Eve  four  years  later — 1943 — when  Ciano 
lay  in  Cell  27  of  the  Verona  jail  waiting  execution  at  the 
instigation  of  the  Germans,  he  still  remembered  that  chill- 
ing day  of  August  11  at  Fuschl  and  Salzburg.  Ribbentrop, 


The  Road  to  War 


681 


he  wrote  in  his  very  last  diary  entry  on  December  23, 
1943,  had  bet  him  “during  one  of  those  gloomy  meals  at 
the  Oesterreichischer  Hof  in  Salzburg”  a collection  of  old 
German  armor  against  an  Italian  painting  that  France  and 
Britain  would  remain  neutral — a bet,  he  remarks  rue- 
fully, which  was  never  paid.100 

Ciano  moved  on  to  Obersalzberg,  where  Hitler  during 
two  meetings  on  August  12  and  13  reiterated  that  France 
and  Britain  would  not  fight.  In  contrast  to  the  Nazi  For- 
eign Minister,  the  Fuehrer  was  cordial,  but  he  was  equally 
implacable  in  his  determination  to  go  to  war.  This  is  evi- 
dent not  only  from  Ciano’s  report  but  from  the  confidential 
German  minutes  of  the  meeting,  which  are  among  the  cap- 
tured documents.  101  The  Italian  Minister  found  Hitler 
standing  before  a large  table  covered  with  military  staff 
maps.  He  began  by  explaining  the  strength  of  Germany’s 
West  Wall.  It  was,  he  said,  impenetrable.  Besides,  he  added 
scornfully,  Britain  could  put  only  three  divisions  into 
France.  France  would  have  considerably  more,  but  since 
Poland  would  be  defeated  “in  a very  short  time,”  Ger- 
many could  then  concentrate  100  divisions  in  the  west 
“for  the  life-and-death  struggle  which  would  then  com- 
mence.” 

But  would  it?  A few  moments  later,  annoyed  by  Ciano’s 
initial  response,  the  Fuehrer  was  contradicting  himself. 
The  Italian  Minister,  as  he  had  promised  himself,  spoke  up 
to  Hitler.  According  to  the  German  minutes,  he  expressed 
“Italy’s  great  surprise  at  the  entirely  unexpected  gravity  of 
the  situation.”  Germany,  he  complained,  had  not  kept  her 
ally  informed.  “On  the  contrary,”  he  said,  “the  Reich 
Foreign  Minister  had  stated  [at  Milan  and  Berlin  in  May] 
that  the  Danzig  question  would  be  settled  in  due  course.” 
When  Ciano  went  on  to  declare  that  a conflict  with  Po- 
land would  spread  into  a European  war  his  host  inter- 
rupted to  say  that  he  differed. 

“I  personally,”  said  Hitler,  “am  absolutely  convinced  that 
the  Western  democracies  will,  in  the  last  resort,  recoil 
from  unleashing  a general  war.”  To  which  Ciano  replied 
(the  German  minutes  add)  “that  he  hoped  the  Fuehrer 
would  prove  right  but  he  did  not  believe  it.”  The  Italian 
Foreign  Minister  then  outlined  in  great  detail  Italy’s 
weaknesses,  and  from  his  tale  of  woe,  as  the  Germans  re- 


682 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


corded  it,  Hitler  must  have  been  finally  convinced  that 
Italy  would  be  of  little  help  to  him  in  the  coming  war.* 
One  of  Mussolini’s  reasons,  Ciano  said,  for  wanting  to 
postpone  the  war  was  that  he  “attached  great  importance 
to  holding,  according  to  plan,  the  World  Exhibition  of 
1942” — a remark  that  must  have  astounded  the  Fuehrer, 
lost  as  he  was  in  his  military  maps  and  calculations.  He 
must  have  been  equally  astounded  when  Ciano  naively 
produced  the  text  of  a communique,  which  he  urged  to 
be  published,  stating  that  the  meeting  of  the  Axis  ministers 
had  “reaffirmed  the  peaceful  intentions  of  their  govern- 
ments” and  their  belief  that  peace  could  be  maintained 
“through  normal  diplomatic  negotiations.”  Ciano  explained 
that  the  Duce  had  in  mind  a peace  conference  of  the  chief 
European  nations  but  that  out  of  deference  to  “the  Fueh- 
rer’s misgivings”  he  would  settle  for  ordinary  diplomatic 
negotiations. 

Hitler  did  not,  the  first  day,  turn  down  completely  the 
idea  of  a conference  but  reminded  Ciano  that  “Russia 
could  no  longer  be  excluded  from  future  meetings  of  the 
powers.”  This  was  the  first  mention  of  the  Soviet  Union 
but  it  was  not  the  last. 

Finally  when  Ciano  tried  to  pin  his  host  down  as  to 
the  date  of  the  attack  on  Poland  Hitler  replied  that  be- 
cause of  the  autumn  rains,  which  would  render  useless 
his  armored  and  motorized  divisions  in  a country  with 
few  paved  roads,  the  “settlement  with  Poland  would  have 
to  be  made  one  way  or  the  other  by  the  end  of  August.” 

At  last  Ciano  had  the  date.  Or  the  last  possible  date, 
for  a moment  later  Hitler  was  storming  that  if  the  Poles 
offered  any  fresh  provocation  he  was  determined  “to  at- 
tack Poland  within  forty-eight  hours.”  Therefore,  he  add- 
ed, “a  move  against  Poland  must  be  expected  any  mo- 
ment.” That  outburst  ended  the  first  day’s  talks  except 
for  Hitler’s  promise  to  think  over  the  Italian  proposals. 

Having  given  them  twenty-four  hours’  thought,  he  told 
Ciano  the  next  day  that  it  would  be  better  if  no  com- 
munique of  any  kind  were  issued  about  their  talks,  t 
Because  of  the  expected  bad  weather  in  the  fall 

* At  one  point,  Ribbentrop,  with  obvious  exasperation,  told  Ciano, 
“We  don’t  need  you!”;  to  which  Ciano  replied,  “The  future  will 
show.”  (From  General  Haider’s  unpublished  diary,  entry  of  August  14.102 
Haider  says  he  got  it  through  Weizsaecker.) 

t Though  the  German  minutes  explicitly  state  that  Ciano  agreed  with 


The  Road  to  War 


683 


it  was  of  decisive  importance,  firstly  [he  said],  that  within 
the  shortest  possible  time  Poland  should  make  her  intentions 
plain,  and  secondly,  that  no  further  acts  of  provocation  of 
any  sort  should  be  tolerated  by  Germany. 

When  Ciano  inquired  as  to  “what  the  shortest  possible 
time”  was.  Hitler  replied,  “By  the  end  of  August  at  the 
latest.”  While  it  would  take  only  a fortnight,  he  explained, 
to  defeat  Poland,  the  “final  liquidation”  would  require  a 
further  two  to  four  weeks — a remarkable  forecast  of  tim- 
ing, as  it  turned  out. 

Finally,  at  the  end,  Hitler  uttered  his  customary  flat- 
tery of  Mussolini,  whom  Ciano  must  have  convinced  him 
he  could  no  longer  count  on.  He  personally  felt  fortunate, 
he  declared,  “to  live  at  a time  when,  apart  from  himself, 
there  was  another  statesman  living  who  would  stand  out 
in  history  as  a great  and  unique  figure.  It  was  a source  of 
great  personal  happiness  that  he  could  be  a friend  of  this 
man.  When  the  hour  struck  for  the  common  fight  he 
would  always  be  found  at  the  side  of  the  Duce,  come 
what  may.” 

However  much  the  strutting  Mussolini  might  be  im- 
pressed by  such  words,  his  son-in-law  was  not.  “I  return 
to  Rome,”  he  wrote  in  his  diary  on  August  13,  after  the 
second  meeting  with  Hitler,  “completely  disgusted  with 
the  Germans,  with  their  leader,  with  their  way  of  doing 
things.  They  have  betrayed  us  and  lied  to  us.  Now  they 
are  dragging  us  into  an  adventure  which  we  have  not 
wanted  and  which  might  compromise  the  regime  and  the 
country  as  a whole.” 

But  Italy  at  the  moment  was  the  least  of  Hitler’s  con- 
cerns. His  thoughts  were  concentrating  on  Russia.  Toward 

Hitler  “that  no  communique  should  be  issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
conversation,”  the  Germans  immediately  double-crossed  their  Italian 
ally.  D.N.B.,  the  official  German  news  agency,  issued  a communique 
two  hours  after  Ciano’s  departure  and  without  any  consultation  whatever 
with  the  Italians,  that  the  talks  had  covered  all  the  problems  of  the  day — 
with  particular  attention  to  Danzig — and  had  resulted  in  a “hundred  per 
cent”  agreement.  So  much  so,  the  communique  added,  that  not  a single  prob- 
lem had  been  left  in  suspense,  and  therefore  there  would  be  no  further  meet- 
ings, because  there  was  no  occasion  for  them.  Attolico  was  furious.  He  pro- 
tested to  the  Germans,  accusing  them  of  bad  faith.  He  tipped  off  Henderson 
that  war  was  imminent.  And  in  an  angry  dispatch  to  Rome  he  described  the 
German  communique  as  “Machiavellian,”  pointed  out  that  it  was  deliberately 
done  to  bind  Italy  to  Germany  after  the  latter’s  attack  on  Poland  and 
pleaded  that  Mussolini  should  be  firm  with  Hitler  in  demanding  German 
fulfillment  of  the  “consultation”  provisions  of  the  Pact  of  Steel  and 
under  these  provisions  insist  on  a month’s  grace  to  settle  the  Danzig 
question  through  diplomatic  channels.103 


684  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  end  of  the  meeting  with  Ciano,  on  August  12,  a 
“telegram  from  Moscow,”  as  the  German  minutes  put  it, 
was  handed  to  the  Fuehrer.  The  conversation  was  inter- 
rupted for  a few  moments  while  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop 
perused  it.  They  then  informed  Ciano  of  its  contents. 

“The  Russians,”  Hitler  said,  “have  agreed  to  a German 
political  negotiator  being  sent  to  Moscow.” 


15 


THE  NAZI-SOVIET  PACT 


the  “telegram  from  Moscow”  whose  contents  Hitler  dis- 
closed to  Ciano  at  Obersalzberg  on  the  afternoon  of  Au- 
gust 12  appears  to  have  been,  like  certain  previous  “tele- 
grams” which  have  figured  in  this  narrative,  of  doubtful 
origin.  No  such  wire  from  the  Russian  capital  has  been 
found  in  the  German  archives.  Schulenburg  did  send  a 
telegram  to  Berlin  from  Moscow  on  the  twelfth,  but  it 
merely  reported  the  arrival  of  the  Franco-British  mili- 
tary missions  and  the  friendly  toasts  exchanged  between 
the  Russians  and  their  guests. 

Yet  there  was  some  basis  for  the  “telegram”  with  which 
Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  had  so  obviously  tried  to  impress 
Ciano.  On  August  12  a teleprint  was  sent  to  Obersalzberg 
from  the  Wilhelmstrasse  reporting  the  results  of  a call 
which  the  Russian  charge  had  made  on  Schnurre  in 
Berlin  on  that  day.  Astakhov  informed  the  Foreign  Of- 
fice official  that  Molotov  was  now  ready  to  discuss  the 
questions  raised  by  the  Germans,  including  Poland  and 
other  political  matters.  The  Soviet  government  proposed 
Moscow  as  the  place  of  these  negotiations.  But,  Astakhov 
made  it  clear,  they  were  not  to  be  hurried.  He  stressed, 
Schnurre  noted  in  his  report,  which  apparently  was  rushed 
to  Obersalzberg,  “that  the  chief  emphasis  in  his  instruc- 
tions from  Molotov  lay  in  the  phrase  ‘by  degrees’  . . . 
The  discussions  could  be  undertaken  only  by  degrees.”  1 

But  Adolf  Hitler  could  not  wait  for  negotiations  with 
Russia  “by  degrees.”  As  he  had  just  revealed  to  a shocked 
Ciano,  he  had  set  the  last  possible  date  for  the  onslaught 
on  Poland  for  September  1,  and  it  was  now  almost  the 
middle  of  August.  If  he  were  to  successfully  sabotage  the 
Anglo-French  parleys  with  the  Russians  and  swing  his 

685 


686  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

own  deal  with  Stalin,  it  had  to  be  done  quickly — not  by 
stages  but  in  one  big  leap. 

Monday,  August  14,  was  another  crucial  day.  While 
Ambassador  von  der  Schulenburg,  who  obviously  had  not 
yet  been  taken  fully  into  the  confidence  of  Hitler  and 
Ribbentrop,  was  writing  Weizsaecker  from  Moscow  advis- 
ing him  that  Molotov  was  “a  strange  man  and  a difficult 
character  and  that  “I  am  still  of  the  opinion  that  any 
hasty  measures  in  our  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
should  be  avoided,”  he  was  being  sent  a “most  urgent” 
telegram  from  Berlin.2  It  came  from  Ribbentrop  and  it 
was  dispatched  from  the  Wilhelmstrasse  (the  Foreign 
Minister  was  still  at  Fuschl)  at  10:53  p.m.  on  August  14. 
It  directed  the  German  ambassador  to  call  upon  Molotov 
and  read  him  a long  communication  “verbatim.” 

This,  finally,  was  Hitler’s  great  bid.  German— Russian 
relations  by  English  policy  [Ribbentrop  continued]  and 
ing  point  . . . There  exist  no  real  conflicts  of  interests 
between  Germany  and  Russia  ...  It  has  gone  well  with 
both  countries  previously  when  they  were  friends  and 
badly  when  they  were  enemies.” 

The  crisis  which  has  been  produced  in  Polish-German 
relations  by  English  policy  [Ribbentrop  continued]  and 
the  attempts  at  an  alliance  which  are  bound  up  with  that 
policy,  make  a speedy  clarification  of  German-Russian  re- 
lations necessary.  Otherwise  matters  . . . might  take  a turn 
which  would  deprive  both  Governments  of  the  possibility  of 
restoring  German-Russian  friendship  and  in  due  course 
clarifying  jointly  territorial  questions  in  Eastern  Europe.  The 
leadership  of  both  countries,  therefore,  should  not  allow 
the  situation  to  drift,  but  should  take  action  at  the  proper 
time.  It  would  be  fatal  if,  through  mutual  ignorance  of  views 
and  intentions,  the  two  peoples  should  finally  drift  apart. 

The  German  Foreign  Minister,  “in  the  name  of  the 
Fuehrer,”  was  therefore  prepared  to  act  in  proper  time. 

As  we  have  been  informed,  the  Soviet  Government  also 
feel  the  desire  for  a clarification  of  German-Russian  rela- 
tions. Since,  however,  according  to  previous  experience  this 
clarification  can  be  achieved  only  slowly  through  the  usual 
diplomatic  channels,  I am  prepared  to  make  a short  visit  to 
Moscow  in  order,  in  the  name  of  the  Fuehrer,  to  set  forth 
the  Fuehrer’s  views  to  M.  Stalin.  In  my  view,  only  through 
such  a direct  discussion  can  a change  be  brought  about, 


The  Road  to  War 


687 


and  it  should  not  be  impossible  thereby  to  lay  the  founda- 
tions for  a final  settlement  of  German-Russian  relations. 

The  British  Foreign  Secretary  had  not  been  willing  to 
go  to  Moscow,  but  now  the  German  Foreign  Minister 
was  not  only  willing  but  anxious  to  go— a contrast  which 
the  Nazis  calculated  quite  correctly  would  make  an  impres- 
sion on  the  suspicious  Stalin.*  The  Germans  saw  that  it 

was  highly  important  to  get  their  message  through  to 

the  Russian  dictator  himself.  Ribbentrop  therefore  added 
an  “annex”  to  his  urgent  telegram. 

I request  [Ribbentrop  advised  Schulenburg]  that  you 
do  not  give  M.  Molotov  these  instructions  in  writing,  but 
that  they  reach  M.  Stalin  in  as  exact  a form  as  possible  and 
I authorize  you,  if  the  occasion  arises,  to  request  from  M. 
Molotov  on  my  behalf  an  audience  with  M.  Stalin,  so  that 
you  may  be  able  to  make  this  important  communication 
directly  to  him  also.  In  addition  to  a conference  with  Molo- 
tov, a detailed  discussion  with  Stalin  would  be  a condition 

for  my  making  the  trip.3 

There  was  a scarcely  disguised  bait  in  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter’s proposal  which  the  Germans,  not  without  reason, 
must  have  thought  the  Kremlin  would  rise  to.  Reiterating 
that  “there  is  no  question  between  the  Baltic  Sea  and  the 
Black  Sea  which  cannot  be  settled  to  the  complete  satis- 
faction of  both  countries,”  Ribbentrop  specified  “the  Baltic 
States,  Poland,  southeastern  questions,  etc.”  And  he  spoke 
of  the  necessity  of  “clarifying  jointly  territorial  questions 
of  Eastern  Europe.” 

Germany  was  ready  to  divide  up  Eastern  Europe,  in- 
cluding Poland,  with  the  Soviet  Union.  This  was  a bid 
which  Britain  and  France  could  not — and,  obviously,  if 
they  could,  would  not — match.  And  having  made  it,  Hit- 
ler, apparently  confident  that  it  would  not  be  turned 
down,  once  more — on  the  same  day,  August  14 — called 
in  the  commanders  in  chief  of  his  armed  forces  to  listen 
to  him  lecture  on  the  plans  and  prospects  for  war. 

THE  MILITARY  CONFERENCE  AT 
OBERSALZBERG:  AUGUST  14  f 

“The  great  drama,”  Hitler  told  his  select  listeners,  “is 

* See  p.  698. 

t The  only  source  found  for  what  happened  at  this  meeting  is  in  the 
unpublished  diary  of  General  Haider,  Cnief  of  the  Army  General  Staff. 


688 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


now  approaching  its  climax.”  While  political  and  military 
successes  could  not  be  had  without  taking  risks,  he  was 
certain  that  Great  Britain  and  France  would  not  fight. 
For  one  thing,  Britain  “has  no  leaders  of  real  caliber. 
The  men  I got  to  know  at  Munich  are  not  the  kind  that 
start  a new  world  war.”  As  at  previous  meetings  with  his 
military  chiefs,  the  Fuehrer  could  not  keep  his  mind  off 
England  and  he  spoke  in  considerable  detail  of  her 
strengths  and  weaknesses,  especially  the  latter. 

England  [Haider  noted  down  the  words],  unlike  in  1914, 
will  not  allow  herself  to  blunder  into  a war  lasting  for  years 
. . . Such  is  the  fate  of  rich  countries  . . . Not  even  England 
has  the  money  nowadays  to  fight  a world  war.  What  should 
England  fight  for?  You  don’t  get  yourself  killed  for  an  ally. 

What  military  measures,  Hitler  asked,  could  Britain  and 
France  undertake? 


Drive  against  the  West  Wall  unlikely  [he  answered],  A 
northward  swing  through  Belgium  and  Holland  will  not 
bring  speedy  victory.  None  of  this  would  help  the  Poles. 

All  these  factors  argue  against  England  and  France  entering 
the  war  . . . There  is  nothing  to  force  them  into  it.  The  men 
of  Munich  will  not  take  the  risk  . . . English  and  French 
general  staffs  take  a very  sober  view  of  the  prospects  of  an 
armed  conflict  and  advise  against  it.  . . . 

All  this  supports  the  conviction  that  while  England  may 
talk  big,  even  recall  her  Ambassador,  perhaps  put  a complete 
embargo  on  trade,  she  is  sure  not  to  resort  to  armed  in- 
tervention in  the  conflict. 


So  Poland,  probably,  could  be  taken  on  alone,  but  she 
would  have  to  be  defeated  “within  a week  or  two,”  Hitler 
explained,  so  that  the  world  could  be  convinced  of  her 
collapse  and  not  try  to  save  her. 

Hitler  was  not  quite  ready  to  tell  his  generals  just  how 


It  is  the  first  entry,  August  14,  1939.  Haider  kept  his  diary  in 

Gabelsberger  shorthand  and  it  is  an  immensely  valuable  record  of 

the  most  confidential  military  and  political  goings  on  in  Nazi  Germany 
from  August  14,  1939  to  September  24,  1942,  when  he  was  dis- 
missed from  his  post.  The  Obersalzberg  entry  consists  of  Haider’s 

shorthand  notes  jotted  down  while  Hitler  spoke  and  a summary  which 
he  added  at  the  end  It  is  strange  that  no  American  or  British  publisher 
has  published  the  Haider  diary.  The  writer  had  access  to  the  German 
longhand  version  of  it,  transcribed  by  Haider  himself,  during  the  writing 
of  this  volume  Hitler’s  dally  record  book  confirms  the  date  of  this 
meeting  and  adds  that  besides  the  commanders  in  chief,  Brauchitsch, 

Goering  and  Raeder,  Dr.  Todt,  the  engineer  who  built  the  West  Wall 
also  was  present.  ’ 


The  Road  to  War 


689 


far  he  was  going  that  very  day  to  make  a deal  with  Russia, 
though  it  would  have  immensely  pleased  them,  convinced 
as  they  were  that  Germany  could  not  fight  a major  war 
on  two  fronts.  But  he  told  them  enough  to  whet  their 
appetite  for  more. 

“Russia,”  he  said,  “is  not  in  the  least  disposed  to  pull 
chestnuts  out  of  the  fire.”  He  explained  the  “loose  con- 
tacts” with  Moscow  which  had  started  with  the  trade 
negotiations.  He  was  now  considering  whether  “a  ne- 
gotiator should  go  to  Moscow  and  whether  this  should 
be  a prominent  figure.”  The  Soviet  Union,  he  declared, 
felt  under  no  obligation  to  the  West.  The  Russians  under- 
stood the  destruction  of  Poland.  They  were  interested  in 
a “delimitation  of  spheres  of  interest.”  The  Fuehrer  was 
“inclined  to  meet  them  halfway.” 

In  all  of  Haider’s  voluminous  shorthand  notes  on  the 
meeting  there  is  no  mention  that  he,  the  Chief  of  the 
Army’s  General  Staff,  or  General  von  Brauchitsch,  its 
Commander  in  Chief,  or  Goering  questioned  the  Fuehrer’s 
course  in  leading  Germany  into  a European  conflict — 
for  despite  Hitler’s  confidence  it  was  by  no  means  cer- 
tain that  France  and  Britain  would  not  fight  nor  that 
Russia  would  stay  out.  In  fact,  exactly  a week  before, 
Goering  had  received  a direct  warning  that  the  British 
would  certainly  fight  if  Germany  attacked  Poland. 

Early  in  July  a Swedish  friend  of  his,  Birger  Dahlerus, 
had  tried  to  convince  him  that  British  public  opinion  would 
not  stand  for  further  Nazi  aggression  and  when  the  Luft- 
waffe chief  expressed  his  doubts  had  arranged  for  him 
to  meet  privately  with  a group  of  seven  British  business- 
men on  August  7 in  Schleswig-Holstein,  near  the  Dan- 
ish border,  where  Dahlerus  had  a house.  The  British  busi- 
nessmen, both  orally  and  in  a written  memorandum,  did 
their  best  to  persuade  Goering  that  Great  Britain  would 
stand  by  its  treaty  obligations  with  Poland  should  Ger- 
many attack.  Whether  they  succeeded  is  doubtful,  though 
Dahlerus,  a businessman  himself,  thought  so.*  This  curi- 
ous Swede,  who  was  to  play  a certain  role  as  a peace- 

* Dahlerus  told  the  Nuremberg  tribunal  on  March  19,  1946,  when  he 
was  on  the  stand  as  a witness  for  Goering,  that  the  Field  Marshal 
had  assured  the  British  businessmen  “on  his  word  of  honor”  that  he 
would  do  everything  in  his  power  to  avert  war.  But  Goering’s  state 
of  mind  at  this  time  may  have  been  more  accurately  expressed  in  a state- 
ment he  made  two  days  after  seeing  the  British  visitors.  In  boasting  about 


690 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


maker  between  Germany  and  Britain  in  the  next  hectic 
weeks,  certainly  had  high  connections  in  Berlin  and  Lon- 
don. He  had  access  to  Downing  Street,  where  on  July  20 
he  had  been  received  by  Lord  Halifax,  with  whom  he 
discussed  the  coming  meeting  of  British  businessmen  with 
Goering;  and  soon  he  would  be  called  in  by  Hitler  and 
Chamberlain  themselves.  But,  though  well-meaning  in  his 
quest  to  save  the  peace,  he  was  naive  and,  as  a diplomat, 
dreadfully  amateurish.  Years  later  at  Nuremberg,  Sir  David 
Maxwell-Fyfe,  in  a devastating  cross-examination,  led 
the  Swedish  diplomatic  interloper  to  admit  sadly  that  he 
had  been  badly  misled  by  Goering  and  Hitler.4 

And  why  did  not  General  Haider,  who  had  been  the 
ringleader  in  the  plot  eleven  months  before  to  remove 
Hitler,  speak  up  on  August  14  to  oppose  the  Fuehrer’s 
determination  to  go  to  war?  Or,  if  he  thought  that  useless, 
why  did  he  not  renew  plans  to  get  rid  of  the  dictator  on 
the  same  grounds  as  just  before  Munich:  that  a war  now 
would  be  disastrous  for  Germany?  Much  later,  in  his 
interrogation  at  Nuremberg,  Haider  would  explain  that 
even  at  mid-August  1939  he  simply  did  not  believe  that 
Hitler  would,  in  the  end,  risk  war,  regardless  of  what 
he  said.5  Also,  a diary  entry  of  August  15,  the  day 
after  the  meeting  with  Hitler  at  the  Berghof,  shows  that 
Haider  did  not  believe  that  France  and  Britain  would 
risk  war  either. 

As  for  Brauchitsch,  he  was  not  the  man  to  question 
what  the  Fuehrer  planned  to  do.  Hassell,  who  on  August 
15  learned  of  the  military  conference  at  the  Obersalzberg 
from  Gisevius,  got  word  through  to  the  Army  chief  that 
he  was  “absolutely  convinced”  that  Britain  and  France 
would  intervene  if  Germany  invaded  Poland.  “Nothing 
can  be  done  with  him,”  Hassell  noted  sadly  in  his  diary. 
“Either  he  is  afraid  or  he  doesn’t  understand  what  it  is 
all  about.  . . . Nothing  is  to  be  hoped  for  from  the 
generals  . . . Only  a few  have  kept  clear  heads:  Haider, 
Canaris,  Thomas.”  6 

Only  General  Thomas,  the  brilliant  head  of  the  Eco- 
nomic and  Armaments  Branch  of  OKW,  dared  to  openly 
challenge  the  Fuehrer.  A few  days  after  the  August  14 


the  Luftwaffe’s  air  defenses,  he  said,  “The  Ruhr  will  not  be  subjected  to  a 
single  bomb.  If  an  enemy  bomber  reaches  the  Ruhr,  my  name  is  not  Her- 
mann Goering:  you  can  call  me  Meier  1" — a boast  he  was  soon  to  rue. 


The  Road  to  War 


691 


military  conference,  following  a discussion  with  the  now 
largely  inactive  conspirators  Goerdeler,  Beck  and  Schacht, 
General  Thomas  drew  up  a memorandum  and  personally 
read  it  to  General  Keitel,  the  Chief  of  OKW.  A quick 
war  and  a quick  peace  were  a complete  illusion,  he  argued. 
An  attack  on  Poland  would  unleash  a world  war  and 
Germany  lacked  the  raw  materials  and  the  food  supplies 
to  fight  it.  But  Keitel,  whose  only  ideas  were  those  he 
absorbed  from  Hitler,  scoffed  at  the  very  idea  of  a big 
war.  Britain  was  too  decadent,  France  too  degenerate, 
America  too  uninterested,  to  fight  for  Poland,  he  said.7 

And  so  as  the  second  half  of  August  1939  began,  the 
German  military  chiefs  pushed  forward  with  their  plans 
to  annihilate  Poland  and  to  protect  the  western  Reich 
just  in  case  the  democracies,  contrary  to  all  evidence,  did 
intervene.  On  August  15  the  annual  Nuremberg  Party 
Rally,  which  Hitler  on  April  1 had  proclaimed  as  the 
“Party  Rally  of  Peace”  and  which  was  scheduled  to  begin 
the  first  week  in  September,  was  secretly  canceled.  A 
quarter  of  a million  men  were  called  up  for  the  armies 
of  the  west.  Advance  mobilization  orders  to  the  railways 
were  given.  Plans  were  made  to  move  Army  headquarters 
to  Zossen,  east  of  Berlin.  And  on  the  same  day,  August  15, 
the  Navy  reported  that  the  pocket  battleships  Graf  Spee 
and  Deutschland  and  twenty-one  submarines  were  ready 
to  sail  for  their  stations  in  the  Atlantic. 

On  August  17  General  Haider  made  a strange  entry 
in  his  diary:  “Canaris  checked  with  Section  I [Opera- 
tions], Himmler,  Heydrich,  Obersalzberg:  150  Polish  uni- 
forms with  accessories  for  Upper  Silesia.” 

What  did  it  mean?  It  was  only  after  the  war  that  it 
became  clear.  It  concerned  one  of  the  most  bizarre  inci- 
dents ever  arranged  by  the  Nazis.  Just  as  Hitler  and  his 
Army  chiefs,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  considered  cook- 
ing up  an  “incident,”  such  as  the  assassination  of  the 
German  minister,  in  order  to  justify  their  invading  Austria 
and  Czechoslovakia,  so  now  they  concerned  themselves, 
as  time  began  to  run  out,  with  concocting  an  incident 
which  would,  at  least  in  their  opinion,  justify  before  the 
world  the  planned  aggression  against  Poland. 

The  code  name  was  “Operation  Himmler”  and  the  idea 


692 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


was  quite  simple — and  crude.  The  S.S. -Gestapo  would 
stage  a faked  attack  on  the  German  radio  station  at 
Gleiwitz,  near  the  Polish  border,  using  condemned  con- 
centration camp  inmates  outfitted  in  Polish  Army  uni- 
forms. Thus  Poland  could  be  blamed  for  attacking  Ger- 
many. Early  in  August  Admiral  Canaris,  chief  of  the 
Abwehr  Section  of  OKW,  had  received  an  order  from  Hit- 
ler himself  to  deliver  to  Himmler  and  Heydrich  150  Po- 
lish uniforms  and  some  Polish  small  arms.  This  struck 
him  as  a strange  business  and  on  August  17  he  asked 
General  Keitel  about  it.  While  the  spineless  OKW  Chief 
declared  he  did  not  think  much  of  “actions  of  this 
kind,”  he  nevertheless  told  the  Admiral  that  “nothing 
could  be  done,”  since  the  order  had  come  from  the  Fueh- 
rer.8 Repelled  though  he  was,  Canaris  obeyed  his  in- 
structions and  turned  the  uniforms  over  to  Heydrich. 

The  chief  of  the  S.D.  chose  as  the  man  to  carry  out 
the  operation  a young  S.S.  secret-service  veteran  by  the 
name  of  Alfred  Helmut  Naujocks.  This  was  not  the  first 
of  such  assignments  given  this  weird  individual  nor  would 
it  be  the  last.  Early  in  March  of  1939,  shortly  before  the 
German  occupation  of  Czechoslovakia,  Naujocks,  at  Hey- 
drich’s  instigation,  had  busied  himself  running  explosives 
into  Slovakia,  where  they  were  used,  as  he  later  testified, 
to  “create  incidents.” 

Alfred  Naujocks  was  a typical  product  of  the  S.S.- 
Gestapo,  a sort  of  intellectual  gangster.  He  had  studied 
engineering  at  Kiel  University,  where  he  got  his  first  taste 
of  brawling  with  anti-Nazis;  on  one  occasion  he  had  his 
nose  bashed  in  by  Communists.  He  had  joined  the  S.S. 
in  1931  and  was  attached  to  the  S.D.  from  its  inception 
in  1934.  Like  so  many  other  young  men  around  Heydrich 
he  dabbled  in  what  passed  as  intellectual  pursuits  in  the 
S.S. — “history”  and  “philosophy”  especially — while  rapid- 
ly emerging  as  a tough  young  man  (Skorzeny  was  another) 
who  could  be  entrusted  with  the  carrying  out  of  the  less 
savory  projects  dreamed  up  by  Himmler  and  Heydrich.  * 

* Naujocks  had  a hand  in  the  “Venlo  Incident,”  which  will  be  recounted 
further  on.  He  was  involved  in  an  undertaking  to  disguise  German 
soldiers  in  Dutch  and  Belgian  frontier  guard  uniforms  at  the  time  of  the 
invasion  of  the  West  in  May  1940.  Early  in  the  war,  he  managed 
a section  of  the  S.D.  which  forged  passports  and  while  thus  employed 
proposed  “Operation  Bernhard,”  a fantastic  plan  to  drop  forged  British 
banknotes  over  England.  Heydrich  eventually  tired  of  him  and  forced 


693 


The  Road  to  War 

On  October  19,  1944,  Naujocks  deserted  to  the  Americans 
and  at  Nuremberg  a year  later  made  a number  of  sworn 
affidavits,  in  one  of  which  he  preserved  for  history  the 
account  of  the  “incident”  which  Hitler  used  to  justify  his 
attack  on  Poland. 

On  or  about  August  10,  1939,  the  chief  of  the  S.D.,  Hey- 
drich,  personally  ordered  me  to  simulate  an  attack  on  the 
radio  station  near  Gleiwitz  near  the  Polish  border  [Naujocks 
related  in  an  affidavit  signed  in  Nuremburg  November  20, 
1945]  and  to  make  it  appear  that  the  attacking  force  con- 
sisted of  Poles.  Heydrich  said:  “Practical  proof  is  needed 
for  these  attacks  of  the  Poles  for  the  foreign  press  as  well  as 
for  German  propaganda.”  ... 

My  instructions  were  to  seize  the  radio  station  and  to 
hold  it  long  enough  to  permit  a Polish-speaking  German 
who  would  be  put  at  my  disposal  to  broadcast  a speech  in 
Polish.  Heydrich  told  me  that  this  speech  should  state  that 
the  time  had  come  for  conflict  between  Germans  and  Poles 
. Heydrich  also  told  me  that  he  expected  an  attack  on 
Poland  by  Germany  in  a few  days. 

I went  to  Gleiwitz  and  waited  there  fourteen  days  ...  Be- 
tween the  25th  and  31st  of  August,  I went  to  see  Heinrich 
Mueller,  head  of  the  Gestapo,  who  was  then  nearby  at 
Oppeln.  In  my  presence,  Mueller  discussed  with  a man 
named  Mehlhom *  * plans  for  another  border  incident,  in 
which  it  should  be  made  to  appear  that  Polish  soldiers  were 
attacking  German  troops  . . . Mueller  stated  that  he  had  12 
to  13  condemned  criminals  who  were  to  be  dressed  in 
Polish  uniforms  and  left  dead  on  the  ground  of  the  scene 
of  the  incident  to  show  they  had  been  killed  while  attacking. 
For  this  purpose  they  were  to  be  given  fatal  injections  by  a 
doctor  employed  by  Heydrich.  Then  they  were  also  to  be 

him  to  serve  in  the  ranks  of  an  S.S.  regiment  in  Russia,  where  he 
was  wounded.  In  1944  Naujocks  turned  up  in  Belgium  as  an  economic 
administrator,  but  his  principal  job  at  that  time  appears  to  have  been 
to  carry  out  in  Denmark  the  murder  of  a number  of  members  of 
the  Danish  resistance  movement.  He  probably  deserted  to  the  American 
Army  in  Belgium  to  save  his  neck.  In  fact,  he  had  a charmed  life.  Held 
as  a war  criminal,  he  made  a dramatic  escape  from  a special  camp 
in  Germany  for  war  criminals  in  1946  and  thus  escaped  trial. 
At  the  time  of  writing,  he  has  never  been  apprehended  or  heard  of. 
An  account  of  his  escape  is  given  in  Schaumburg-Lippe,  Zwischen  Krone 
und  Kerker. 

* S.S.  Oberfuehrer  Dr.  Mehlhom,  who  administered  the  S.D.  under 
Heydrich.  Schellenberg,  in  his  memoirs  ( The  Labyrinth,  pp.  48-50),  re- 
counts that  Mehlhom  told  him  on  August  26  that  he  had  been  put  in 
charge  of  staging  the  faked  attack  at  Gleiwitz  but  that  Mehlhorn  got 
out  of  it  by  feigning  illness.  Mehlhorn’s  stomach  grew  stronger  in 
later  years.  During  the  war  he  was  a notable  instigator  of  Gestapo 
terror  in  Poland. 


694 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

given  gunshot  wounds.  After  the  incident  members  of  the 
press  and  other  persons  were  to  be  taken  to  the  spot  of  the 
incident  . . . 

Mueller  told  me  he  had  an  order  from  Heydrich  to  make 
one  of  those  criminals  available  to  me  for  the  action  at 
Gleiwitz.  The  code  name  by  which  he  referred  to  these 
criminals  was  “Canned  Goods.”  9 

While  Himmler,  Heydrich  and  Mueller,  at  Hitler’s  com- 
mand, were  arranging  for  the  use  of  “Canned  Goods”  to 
fake  an  excuse  for  Germany’s  aggression  against  Poland, 
the  Fuehrer  made  his  first  decisive  move  to  deploy  his 
armed  forces  for  a possibly  bigger  war.  On  August  19 — 
another  fateful  day — orders  to  sail  were  issued  to  the 
German  Navy.  Twenty-one  submarines  were  directed  to 
put  out  for  positions  north  and  northwest  of  the  British 
Isles,  the  pocket  battleship  Graf  Spee  to  depart  for  waters 
off  the  Brazilian  coast  and  her  sister  ship,  the  Deutschland, 
to  take  a position  athwart  the  British  sea  lanes  in  the 
North  Atlantic.* 

The  date  of  the  order  to  dispatch  the  warships  for 
possible  action  against  Britain  is  significant.  For  on  Au- 
gust 19,  after  a hectic  week  of  frantic  appeals  from  Ber- 
lin, the  Soviet  government  finally  gave  Hitler  the  answer 
he  wanted. 

THE  NAZI-SOVIET  TALKS:  AUGUST  15-21,  1939 

Ambassador  von  der  Schulenburg  saw  Molotov  at  8 
p.m.  on  August  15  and,  as  instructed,  read  to  him  Ribben- 
trop’s  urgent  telegram  stating  that  the  Reich  Foreign  Min- 
ister was  prepared  to  come  to  Moscow  to  settle  Soviet- 
German  relations.  According  to  a “most  urgent,  secret” 
telegram  which  the  German  envoy  got  off  to  Berlin  later 
that  night,  the  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar  received  the  in- 
formation “with  the  greatest  interest”  and  “warmly  wel- 
comed German  intentions  of  improving  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.”  However,  expert  diplomatic  poker  player 
that  he  was,  Molotov  gave  no  sign  of  being  in  a hurry. 
Such  a trip  as  Ribbentrop  proposed,  he  suggested,  “re- 
quired adequate  preparation  in  order  that  the  exchange 
of  opinions  might  lead  to  results.” 

* The  submarines  sailed  between  August  19  and  23,  the  Graf  Spee  on 
the  twenty-first  and  the  Deutschland  on  the  twenty-fourth. 


The  Road  to  War 


69S 


What  results?  The  wily  Russian  dropped  some  hints. 
Would  the  German  government,  he  asked,  be  interested  in 
a nonaggression  pact  between  the  two  countries?  Would 
it  be  prepared  to  use  its  influence  with  Japan  to  improve 
Soviet-Japanese  relations  and  “eliminate  border  con- 
flicts”?— a reference  to  an  undeclared  war  which  had 
raged  all  summer  on  the  Manchurian-Mongolian  frontier. 
Finally,  Molotov  asked,  how  did  Germany  feel  about  a 
joint  guarantee  of  the  Baltic  States? 

All  such  matters,  he  concluded,  “must  be  discussed  in 
concrete  terms  so  that,  should  the  German  Foreign  Min- 
ister come  here,  it  will  not  be  a matter  of  an  exchange 
of  opinions  but  of  making  concrete  decisions.”  And  he 
stressed  again  that  “adequate  preparation  of  the  problems 
is  indispensable.”  10 

The  first  suggestion,  then,  for  a Nazi-Soviet  nonag- 
gression pact  came  from  the  Russians — at  the  very  mo- 
ment they  were  negotiating  with  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain to  go  to  war,  if  necessary,  to  oppose  further  German 
aggression.*  Hitler  was  more  than  willing  to  discuss  such 
a pact  “in  concrete  terms,”  since  its  conclusion  would 
keep  Russia  out  of  the  war  and  enable  him  to  attack 
Poland  without  fear  of  Soviet  intervention.  And  with  Rus- 
sia out  of  the  conflict  he  was  convinced  that  Britain  and 
France  would  get  cold  feet. 

Molotov’s  suggestions  were  just  what  he  had  hoped  for; 
they  were  more  specific  and  went  further  than  anything 
which  he  had  dared  to  propose.  There  was  only  one  dif- 
ficulty. With  August  running  out  he  could  not  wait  for 
the  slow  Soviet  tempo  which  was  indicated  by  Molotov’s 
insistence  on  “adequate  preparation”  for  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister’s visit  to  Moscow.  Schulenburg’s  report  on  his  con- 
versation with  Molotov  was  telephoned  by  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  to  Ribbentrop  at  Fuschl  at  6:40  a.m.  on  August 
16  and  he  hurried  across  the  mountain  to  seek  further 
instruction  from  the  Fuehrer  at  Obersalzberg.  By  early 
afternoon  they  had  drawn  up  a reply  to  Molotov  and  it 

* The  British  government  soon  learned  of  this.  On  August  17  Sumner 
Welles,  the  U.S.  Undersecretary  of  State,  informed  the  British  am- 
bassador in  Washington  of  Molotov’s  suggestions  to  Schulenburg.  The 
American  ambassador  in  Moscow  had  wired  them  to  Washington  the 
day  before  and  they  were  deadly  accurate.11  Ambassador  Steinhardt  had 
seen  Molotov  on  August  16. 


696 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

was  rushed  off  on  the  teleprinter  to  Weizsaecker  in  Berlin 
with  instructions  to  wire  it  “most  urgent”  to  Moscow 
immediately.12 

The  Nazi  dictator  accepted  the  Soviet  suggestions  uncon- 
ditionally. Schulenburg  was  directed  by  Ribbentrop  to  see 
Molotov  again  and  inform  him 

that  Germany  is  prepared  to  conclude  a nonaggression  pact 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and,  if  the  Soviet  Government  so  de- 
sire, one  which  would  be  undenounceable  for  a term  of 
twenty-five  years.  Further,  Germany  is  ready  to  guarantee 
the  Baltic  States  jointly  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Finally,  Ger- 
many is  prepared  to  exercise  influence  for  an  improvement 
and  consolidation  of  Russian-Japanese  relations. 

All  pretense  was  now  dropped  that  the  Reich  govern- 
ment was  not  in  a hurry  to  conclude  a deal  with  Moscow. 

The  Fuehrer  [Ribbentrop’s  telegram  continued]  is  of 
the  opinion  that,  in  view  of  the  present  situation  and  of  the 
possibility  of  the  occurrence  any  day  of  serious  events 
(please  at  this  point  explain  to  M.  Molotov  that  Germany  is 
determined  not  to  endure  Polish  provocation  indefinitely), 
a basic  and  rapid  clarification  of  German-Russian  relations, 
and  of  each  country’s  attitude  to  the  questions  of  the  mo- 
ment, is  desirable. 

For  these  reasons  I am  prepared  to  come  by  airplane  to 
Moscow  at  any  time  after  Friday,  August  18,  to  deal,  on  the 
basis  of  full  powers  from  the  Fuehrer,  with  the  entire  com- 
plex of  German-Russian  relations  and,  if  the  occasion 
arises,  to  sign  the  appropriate  treaties. 

Again  Ribbentrop  added  an  “annex”  of  personal  instruc- 
tions to  his  ambassador. 

I request  that  you  again  read  these  instructions  word  for 
word  to  Molotov  and  ask  for  the  views  of  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment and  of  M.  Stalin  immediately.  Entirely  confiden- 
tially, it  is  added  for  your  guidance  that  it  would  be  of 
very  special  interest  to  us  if  my  Moscow  trip  could  take 
place  at  the  end  of  this  week  or  the  beginning  of  next 
week. 

The  next  day,  on  their  mountaintop,  Hitler  and  Ribben- 
trop waited  impatiently  for  the  response  from  Moscow. 
Telegraphic  communication  between  Berlin  and  Moscow 
was  by  no  means  instantaneous — a condition  of  affairs 
which  did  not  seem  to  be  realized  in  the  rarefied  atmos- 


The  Road  to  War 


697 


phere  of  the  Bavarian  Alps.  By  noon  of  the  seventeenth, 
Ribbentrop  was  wiring  Schulenburg  “most  urgent”  re- 
questing “a  report  by  telegram  regarding  the  time  when 
you  made  your  request  to  be  received  by  Molotov  and 
the  time  for  which  the  conversation  has  been  arranged.”  13 
By  dinnertime  the  harassed  ambassador  was  replying,  also 
“most  urgent,”  that  he  had  only  received  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister’s telegram  at  eleven  the  night  before,  that  it  was  by 
then  too  late  to  conduct  any  diplomatic  business  and 
that  first  thing  in  the  morning  of  today,  August  17,  he 
had  made  an  appointment  with  Molotov  for  8 p.m.14 

For  the  now  frantic  Nazi  leaders  it  turned  out  to  be  a 
disappointing  meeting.  Conscious  of  Hitler’s  eagerness  and 
no  doubt  fully  aware  of  the  reasons  for  it,  the  Russian 
Foreign  Commissar  played  with  the  Germans,  teasing  and 
taunting  them.  After  Schulenburg  had  read  to  him  Ribben- 
trop’s  telegram,  Molotov,  taking  little  note  of  its  contents, 
produced  the  Soviet  government’s  written  reply  to  the 
Reich  Foreign  Minister’s  first  communication  on  August  15. 

Beginning  acidly  with  a reminder  of  the  Nazi  govern- 
ment’s previous  hostility  to  Soviet  Russia,  it  explained 
“that  until  very  recently  the  Soviet  Government  have  pro- 
ceeded on  the  assumption  that  the  German  Government 
are  seeking  occasion  for  clashes  with  the  Soviet  Union  . . . 
Not  to  mention  the  fact  that  the  German  Government,  by 
means  of  the  so-called  Anti-Comintern  Pact,  were  en- 
deavoring to  create,  and  have  created,  the  united  front  of 
a number  of  States  against  the  Soviet  Union.”  It  was  for 
this  reason,  the  note  explained,  that  Russia  “was  partic- 
ipating in  the  organization  of  a defensive  front  against 
[German]  aggression.” 

If,  however  [the  note  continued],  the  German  Govern- 
ment now  undertake  a change  from  the  old  policy  in  the 
direction  of  a serious  improvement  in  political  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  Soviet  Government  can  only  welcome 
such  a change,  and  are,  for  their  part,  prepared  to  revise 
their  policy  in  the  sense  of  a serious  improvement  in  respect 
to  Germany. 

But,  the  Russian  note  insisted,  it  must  be  “by  serious 
and  practical  steps” — not  in  one  big  leap,  as  Ribbentrop 
proposed. 

What  steps? 


698  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  first  step:  conclusion  of  a trade  and  credit  agree- 
ment. 

The  second  step,  “to  be  taken  shortly  thereafter”:  con- 
clusion of  a nonaggression  pact. 

Simultaneously  with  the  second  step,  the  Soviets  de- 
manded the  “conclusion  of  a special  protocol  defining  the 
interests  of  the  contracting  parties  in  this  or  that  question 
of  foreign  policy.”  This  was  more  than  a hint  that  in  re- 
gard to  dividing  up  Eastern  Europe  at  least,  Moscow  was 
receptive  to  the  German  view  that  a deal  was  possible. 

As  for  the  proposed  visit  of  Ribbentrop,  Molotov  de- 
clared that  the  Soviet  government  was  “highly  gratified” 
wdh  the  idea,  “since  the  dispatch  of  such  an  eminent 
politician  and  statesman  emphasized  how  serious  were  the 
intentions  of  the  German  Government.  This  stood,”  he 
added,  “in  noteworthy  contrast  to  England,  which,  in  the 
person  of  Strang,  had  sent  only  an  official  of  second-class 
rank  to  Moscow.  However,  the  journey  by  the  German 
Foreign  Minister  required  thorough  preparation.  The 
Soviet  Government  did  not  like  the  publicity  that  such  a 
journey  would  cause.  They  preferred  to  do  practical  work 
without  much  fuss.”  13 

Molotov  made  no  mention  of  Ribbentrop’s  urgent, 
specific  proposal  that  he  come  to  Moscow  over  the  week- 
end, and  Schulenburg,  perhaps  somewhat  taken  aback  by 
the  course  of  the  interview,  did  not  press  the  matter. 

The  next  day,  after  the  ambassador’s  report  had  been 
received,  Ribbentrop  did.  Hitler,  it  is  obvious,  was  now 
growing  desperate.  From  his  summer  headquarters  on  the 
Obersalzberg  there  went  out  on  the  evening  of  August 
18  a further  “most  urgent”  telegram  to  Schulenburg  signed 
by  Ribbentrop.  It  arrived  at  the  German  Embassy  in  Mos- 
cow at  5:45  a.m.  on  the  nineteenth  and  directed  the  am- 
bassador to  “arrange  immediately  another  conversation 
with  M.  Molotov  and  do  everything  possible  to  see  that  it 
takes  place  without  any  delay.”  There  was  no  time  to 
lose.  “I  ask  you,”  Ribbentrop  wired,  “to  speak  to  M. 
Molotov  as  follows”: 

. . . We,  too,  under  normal  circumstances,  would  naturally 
be  ready  to  pursue  a realignment  of  German-Russian  re- 
lations through  diplomatic  channels,  and  to  carry  it  out  in 
the  customary  way.  But  the  present  unusual  situation  makes 


The  Road  to  War 


699 


it  necessary,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Fuehrer,  to  employ  a 
different  method  which  would  lead  to  quick  results. 

German-Polish  relations  are  becoming  more  acute  from 
day  to  day.  We  have  to  take  into  account  that  incidents 
might  occur  any  day  that  would  make  the  outbreak  of  open 
conflict  unavoidable  . . . The  Fuehrer  considers  it  necessary 
that  we  be  not  taken  by  surprise  by  the  outbreak  of  a 
German-Polish  conflict  while  we  are  striving  for  a clarifi- 
cation of  German-Russian  relations.  He  therefore  considers  a 
previous  clarification  necessary,  if  only  to  be  able  to  take 
into  account  Russian  interests  in  case  of  such  a conflict, 
which  would,  of  course,  be  difficult  without  such  a clarifica- 
tion. 

The  ambassador  was  to  say  that  the  “first  stage”  in  the 
consultations  mentioned  by  Molotov,  the  conclusion  of 
the  trade  agreement,  had  been  concluded  in  Berlin  this 
very  day  (August  18)  and  that  it  was  now  time  to  “attack” 
the  second  stage.  To  do  this  the  German  Foreign  Minister 
proposed  his  “immediate  departure  for  Moscow,”  to  which 
he  would  come  “with  full  powers  from  the  Fuehrer,  au- 
thorizing me  to  settle  fully  and  conclusively  the  total 
complex  of  problems.”  In  Moscow,  Ribbentrop  added,  he 
would  “be  in  a position  ...  to  take  Russian  wishes  into 
account.” 

What  wishes?  The  Germans  now  no  longer  beat  around 
the  bush. 

I should  also  be  in  a position  [Ribbentrop  continued]  to 
sign  a special  protocol  regulating  the  interests  of  both  parties 
in  questions  of  foreign  policy  of  one  kind  or  another;  for 
instance,  the  settlement  of  spheres  of  interest  in  the  Baltic 
area.  Such  a settlement  will  only  be  possible,  however,  in  an 
oral  discussion. 

This  time  the  ambassador  must  not  take  a Russian 
“No.” 

Please  emphasize  [Ribbentrop  concluded]  that  German  for- 
eign policy  has  today  reached  a historic  turning  point  . . . 
Please  press  for  a rapid  realization  of  my  journey  and  oppose 
appropriately  any  fresh  Russian  objections.  In  this  connec- 
tion you  must  keep  in  mind  the  decisive  fact  that  an  early 
outbreak  of  open  German-Polish  conflict  is  possible  and 
that  we,  therefore,  have  the  greatest  interest  in  having  my 
visit  to  Moscow  take  place  immediately.16 

August  19  was  the  decisive  day.  Orders  for  the  German 


700 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

submarines  and  pocket  battleships  to  sail  for  British  waters 
were  being  held  up  until  word  came  from  Moscow.  The 
warships  would  have  to  get  off  at  once  if  they  were  to 
reach  their  appointed  stations  by  Hitler’s  target  date  for 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  September  1— only  thirteen  days 
away.  The  two  great  army  groups  designated  for  the  on- 
slaught on  Poland  would  have  to  be  deployed  immedi- 
ately. 

The  tension  in  Berlin  and  especially  on  the  Obersalz- 
berg,  where  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  waited  nervously  for 
Moscow  s decision,  was  becoming  almost  unbearable. 
The  Foreign  Office  dispatches  and  memoranda  that  day 
disclosed  the  jittery  feelings  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  Dr. 
Schnurre  reported  that  the  discussions  with  the  Russians 
on  the  trade  agreement  had  ended  the  previous  evening 
“with  complete  agreement”  but  that  the  Soviets  were  stall- 
ing on  signing  it.  The  signature,  he  said,  was  to  have 
taken  place  at  noon  this  day,  August  19,  but  at  noon  the 
Russians  had  telephoned  saying  they  had  to  await  in- 
structions from  Moscow.  “It  is  obvious,”  Schnurre  re- 
ported, “that  they  have  received  instructions  from  Moscow 
to  delay  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  for  political  rea- 
sons.”17  From  the  Obersalzberg,  Ribbentrop  wired  Schulen- 
burg  “most  urgent”  to  be  sure  to  report  anything  Molotov 
said  or  any  sign  of  “Russian  intentions”  by  telegram,  but 
the  only  wire  received  from  the  ambassador  during  the 
day  was  the  text  of  a denial  by  Tass,  the  Soviet  news 
agency,  in  Moscow  that  the  negotiations  between  the  Rus- 
sian and  Anglo-French  military  delegations  had  become 
snarled  over  the  Far  East.  However,  the  Tass  dementi 
added  that  there  were  differences  between  the  delegations 
on  “entirely  different  matters.”  This  was  a signal  to  Hitler 
that  there  was  still  time — and  hope. 

And  then  at  7:10  p.m.  on  August  19  came  the  anxiously 
awaited  telegram: 

SECRET 
MOST  URGENT 

The  Soviet  Government  agree  to  the  Reich  Foreign  Minister 
coming  to  Moscow  one  week  after  the  announcement  of  the 
signature  of  the  economic  agreement.  Molotov  stated  that  if 
the  conclusion  of  the  economic  agreement  is  made  public 


701 


The  Road  to  War 

tomorrow,  the  Reich  Foreign  Minister  could  arrive  in  Mos- 
cow on  August  26  or  27. 

Molotov  handed  me  a draft  of  a nonaggression  pact. 

A detailed  account  of  the  two  conversations  I had  with 
Molotov  today,  as  well  as  the  text  of  the  Soviet  draft,  follows 
by  telegram  at  once. 

SCHULENBURG  18 

The  first  talk  in  the  Kremlin,  which  began  at  2 p.m. 
on  the  nineteenth  and  lasted  an  hour,  did  not,  the  am- 
bassador reported,  go  very  well.  The  Russians,  it  seemed, 
could  not  be  stampeded  into  receiving  Hitler’s  Foreign 
Minister.  “Molotov  persisted  in  his  opinion,”  Schulenburg 
wired,  “that  for  the  present  it  was  not  possible  even  ap- 
proximately to  fix  the  time  of  the  journey  since  thorough 
preparations  would  be  required  ...  To  the  reasons  I 
repeatedly  and  very  emphatically  advanced  for  the  need  of 
haste,  Molotov  rejoined  that,  so  far,  not  even  the  first 
step — the  concluding  of  the  economic  agreement — had 
been  taken.  First  of  all,  the  economic  agreement  had  to  be 
signed  and  published,  and  achieve  its  effect  abroad.  Then 
would  come  the  turn  of  the  nonaggression  pact  and  proto- 
col. 

“Molotov  remained  apparently  unaffected  by  my  pro- 
tests, so  that  the  first  conversation  closed  with  a declara- 
tion by  Molotov  that  he  had  imparted  to  me  the  views  of 
the  Soviet  Government  and  had  nothing  to  add  to  them.” 

But  he  had  something,  shortly. 

“Hardly  half  an  hour  after  the  conversation  had  ended,” 
Schulenburg  reported,  “Molotov  sent  me  word  asking  me 
to  call  on  him  again  at  the  Kremlin  at  4:30  p.m.  He 
apologized  for  putting  me  to  the  trouble  and  explained 
that  he  had  reported  to  the  Soviet  Government.” 

Whereupon  the  Foreign  Commissar  handed  the  sur- 
prised but  happy  ambassador  a draft  of  the  nonaggression 
pact  and  told  him  that  Ribbentrop  could  arrive  in  Moscow 
on  August  26  or  27  if  the  trade  treaty  were  signed  and 
made  public  tomorrow. 

“Molotov  did  not  give  reasons,”  Schulenburg  added  in 
his  telegram,  “for  his  sudden  change  of  mind.  I assume 
that  Stalin  intervened.”  19 

The  assumption  was  undoubtedly  correct.  According  to 
Churchill,  the  Soviet  intention  to  sign  a pact  with  Ger- 


702 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


many  was  announced  to  the  Politburo  by  Stalin  on  the 
evening  of  August  19.20  A little  earlier  that  day — between 
3 p.m.  and  4:30  p.m. — it  is  clear  from  Schulenburg’s  dis- 
patch, he  had  communicated  his  fateful  decision  to 
Molotov. 

Exactly  three  years  later,  in  August  1942,  “in  the  early 
hours  of  the  morning,”  as  Churchill  later  reported,  the 
Soviet  dictator  gave  to  the  British  Prime  Minister,  then 
on  a mission  to  Moscow,  some  of  the  reasons  for  his 
brazen  move.21 

We  formed  the  impression  [said  Stalin]  that  the  British 
and  French  Governments  were  not  resolved  to  go  to  war  if 
Poland  were  attacked,  but  that  they  hoped  the  diplomatic 
line-up  of  Britain,  France  and  Russia  would  deter  Hitler. 
We  were  sure  it  would  not.  “How  many  divisions,”  Stalin 
had  asked,  “will  France  send  against  Germany  on  mobiliza- 
tion?” The  answer  was:  “About  a hundred.”  He  then  asked: 
“How  many  will  England  send?”  The  answer  was:  “Two, 
and  two  more  later.”  “Ah,  two,  and  two  more  later,”  Stalin 
had  repeated.  “Do  you  know,”  he  asked,  “how  many  di- 
visions we  shall  have  to  put  on  the  Russian  front  if  we  go  to 
war  with  Germany?”  There  was  a pause.  “More  than  three 
hundred.” 

In  his  dispatch  reporting  the  outcome  of  his  conversa- 
tions with  Molotov  on  August  19,  Schulenburg  had  added 
that  his  attempt  to  induce  the  Foreign  Commissar  to  ac- 
cept an  earlier  date  for  Ribbentrop’s  journey  to  Moscow 
“was,  unfortunately,  unsuccessful.” 

But  for  the  Germans  it  had  to  be  made  successful.  The 
whole  timetable  for  the  invasion  of  Poland,  indeed  the 
question  of  whether  the  attack  could  take  place  at  all  in 
the  brief  interval  before  the  autumn  rains,  depended  upon 
it.  If  Ribbentrop  were  not  received  in  Moscow  before  Au- 
gust 26  or  27  and  then  if  the  Russians  stalled  a bit,  as 
the  Germans  feared,  the  target  date  of  September  1 could 
not  be  kept. 

At  this  crucial  stage,  Adolf  Hitler  himself  intervened 
with  Stalin.  Swallowing  his  pride,  he  personally  begged 
the  Soviet  dictator,  whom  he  had  so  often  and  for  so 
long  maligned,  to  receive  his  Foreign  Minister  in  Moscow 
at  once.  His  telegram  to  Stalin  was  rushed  off  to  Moscow 
at  6:45  p.m.  on  Sunday,  August  20,  just  twelve  hours  after 
the  receipt  of  Schulenburg’s  dispatch.  The  Fuehrer  in- 


The  Road  to  War  703 

structed  the  ambassador  to  hand  it  to  Molotov  “at  once.” 
M.  Stalin,  Moscow, 

I sincerely  welcome  the  signing  of  the  new  German- 
Soviet  Commercial  Agreement  as  the  first  step  in  the  re- 
shaping of  German-Soviet  relations.* 

The  conclusion  of  a nonaggression  pact  with  the  Soviet 
Union  means  to  me  the  establishment  of  German  policy  for 
a long  time.  Germany  thereby  resumes  a political  course 
that  was  beneficial  to  both  States  during  bygone  centuries  . . . 

I accept  the  draft  of  the  nonaggression  pact  that  your 
Foreign  Minister,  M.  Molotov,  handed  over,  but  consider 
it  urgently  necessary  to  clarify  the  questions  connected 
with  it  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  substance  of  the  supplementary  protocol  desired 
by  the  Soviet  Union  can,  I am  convinced,  be  clarified 
in  the  shortest  possible  time  if  a responsible  German  states- 
man can  come  to  Moscow  himself  to  negotiate.  Other- 
wise the  Government  of  the  Reich  are  not  clear  as  to  how 
the  supplementary  protocol  could  be  cleared  up  and  settled 
in  a short  time. 

The  tension  between  Germany  and  Poland  has  become 
intolerable  ...  A crisis  may  arise  any  day.  Germany  is 
determined  from  now  on  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the 
Reich  with  all  the  means  at  her  disposal. 

In  my  opinion,  it  is  desirable  in  view  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  two  States  to  enter  into  a new  relationship  to 
each  other,  not  to  lose  any  time.  I therefore  again  pro- 
pose that  you  receive  my  Foreign  Minister  on  Tuesday, 
August  22,  but  at  the  latest  on  Wednesday,  August  23. 
The  Reich  Foreign  Minister  has  the  fullest  powers  to  draw 
up  and  sign  the  nonaggression  pact  as  well  as  the  pro- 
tocol. A longer  stay  by  the  Foreign  Minister  in  Moscow 
than  one  to  two  days  at  most  is  impossible  in  view  of  the 
international  situation.  I should  be  glad  to  receive  your 
early  answer. 

Adolf  Hitler  22 

During  the  next  twenty-four  hours,  from  the  evening 
of  Sunday,  August  20,  when  Hitler’s  appeal  to  Stalin  went 
out  over  the  wires  to  Moscow,  until  the  following  eve- 
ning, the  Fuehrer  was  in  a state  bordering  on  collapse. 
He  could  not  sleep.  In  the  middle  of  the  night  he  tele- 
phoned Goering  to  tell  of  his  worries  about  Stalin’s  reaction 
to  his  message  and  to  fret  over  the  delays  in  Moscow. 
At  3 a.m.  on  the  twenty-first,  the  Foreign  Office  re- 

* It  was  signed  in  Berlin  at  2 a.m.  on  Sunday,  August  20. 


704 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ceived  a “most  urgent”  wire  from  Schulenburg  saying  that 
Hitler’s  telegram,  of  which  Weizsaecker  had  advised  him 
earlier,  had  not  yet  arrived.  “Official  telegrams  from  Berlin 
to  Moscow,”  the  ambassador  reminded  the  Foreign  Office, 
“take  four  to  five  hours,  inclusive  of  two  hours’  differ- 
ence in  time.  To  this  must  be  added  the  time  for  de- 
ciphering.”23  At  10:15  a.m.  on  Monday,  August  21,  the 
anxious  Ribbentrop  got  off  an  urgent  wire  to  Schulenburg: 
“Please  do  your  utmost  to  ensure  that  the  journey  ma- 
terializes. Date  as  in  telegram.”  24  Shortly  after  noon,  the 
ambassador  advised  Berlin:  “I  am  to  see  Molotov  at  3 
p.m.  today.”  25 

Finally,  at  9:35  p.m.  on  August  21,  Stalin’s  reply  came 
over  the  wires  in  Berlin. 

To  the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Reich, 

A.  Hitler: 

I thank  you  for  the  letter.  I hope  that  the  German- 
Soviet  nonaggression  pact  will  bring  about  a decided  turn 
for  the  better  in  the  political  relations  between  our  coun- 
tries. 

The  peoples  of  our  countries  need  peaceful  relations 
with  each  other.  The  assent  of  the  German  Government  to 
the  conclusion  of  a nonaggression  pact  provides  the  foun- 
dation for  eliminating  the  political  tension  and  for  the 
establishment  of  peace  and  collaboration  between  our  countries. 

The  Soviet  Government  have  instructed  me  to  inform 
you  that  they  agree  to  Herr  von  Ribbentrop’s  arriving  in 
Moscow  on  August  23. 

J.  Stalin  23 

For  sheer  cynicism  the  Nazi  dictator  had  met  his  match 
in  the  Soviet  despot.  The  way  was  now  open  to  them  to 
get  together  to  dot  the  i’s  and  cross  the  t’s  on  one  of  the 
crudest  deals  of  this  shabby  epoch. 

Stalin’s  reply  was  transmitted  to  the  Fuehrer  at  the 
Berghof  at  10:30  p.m.  A few  minutes  later,  this  writer 
remembers — shortly  after  11  p.m. — a musical  program  on 
the  German  radio  was  suddenly  interrupted  and  a voice 
came  on  to  announce,  “The  Reich  government  and  the 
Soviet  government  have  agreed  to  conclude  a pact  of  non- 
aggression with  each  other.  The  Reich  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  will  arrive  in  Moscow  on  Wednesday,  August  23, 
for  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations.” 


The  Road  to  War 


705 


The  next  day,  August  22,  1939,  Hitler,  having  been  as- 
sured by  Stalin  himself  that  Russia  would  be  a friendly 
neutral,  once  more  convoked  his  top  military  commanders 
to  the  Obersalzberg,  lectured  them  on  his  own  greatness 
and  on  the  need  for  them  to  wage  war  brutally  and  with- 
out pity  and  apprised  them  that  he  probably  would  order 
the  attack  on  Poland  to  begin  four  days  hence,  on  Satur- 
day, August  26 — six  days  ahead  of  schedule.  Stalin,  the 
Fuehrer’s  mortal  enemy,  had  made  this  possible. 

THE  MILITARY  CONFERENCE  OF 
AUGUST  22,  1939 

The  generals  found  Hitler  in  one  of  his  most  arrogant 
and  uncompromising  moods.*  “I  have  called  you  to- 
gether,” he  told  them,  “to  give  you  a picture  of  the  political 
situation  in  order  that  you  may  have  some  insight  into 
the  individual  factors  on  which  I have  based  my  irrevo- 
cable decision  to  act  and  in  order  to  strengthen  your  con- 
fidence. After  that  we  shall  discuss  military  details.”  First 
of  all,  he  said,  there  were  two  personal  considerations. 

My  own  personality  and  that  of  Mussolini. 

Essentially,  all  depends  on  me,  on  my  existence,  be- 
cause of  my  political  talents.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that 
probably  no  one  will  ever  again  have  the  confidence  of  the 
whole  German  people  as  I have.  There  will  probably  never 

* No  official  minutes  of  Hitler’s  harangue  have  been  found,  but  several 
records  of  it,  two  of  them  made  by  high-ranking  officers  from  notes 
jotted  down  during  the  meeting,  have  come  to  light.  One  by  Admiral 
Hermann  Boehm,  Chief  of  the  High  Seas  Fleet,  was  submitted  at 
Nuremberg  in  Admiral  Raeder’s  defense  and  is  published  in  the  original 
German  in  TMWC,  XLI,  pp.  16-25.  General  Haider  made  voluminous 
notes  in  his  unique  Gabelsberger  shorthand,  and  an  English  translation 
of  them  frjm  his  diary  entry  of  August  22  is  published  in  DGFP,  VII, 
pp.  557-59.  The  chief  document  of  the  session  used  by  the  prosecution 
as  evidence  in  the  Nuremberg  trial  was  an  unsigned  memorandum  in 
two  parts  from  the  OKW  files  which  were  captured  by  American  troops 
at  Saalfelden  in  the  Austrian  Tyrol.  It  is  printed  in  English  translation 
in  NCA,  III,  pp.  581-86  (Nuremberg  Document  798-PS),  665-66  (N.D. 
1014-PS),  and  also  in  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  200-6.  The  original  German 
text  of  the  two-part  memorandum  is,  of  course,  in  the  TMWC  volumes. 
It  makes  Hitler’s  language  somewhat  more  lively  than  do  Admiral  Boehm 
and  General  Haider.  But  all  three  versions  are  similar  in  content  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  of  their  authenticity.  At  Nuremberg  there  was 
some  doubt  about  a fourth  account  of  Hitler’s  speech,  listed  as  N.D.  C-3 
(NCA,  VII,  pp.  752-54),  and  though  it  was  referred  to  in  the  pro- 
ceedings the  prosecution  did  not  submit  it  in  evidence.  While  it  un- 
doubtedly rings  true,  it  may  have  been  embellished  a little  by  persons 
who  wore  not  present  at  the  meeting  at  the  Berghof.  In  piecing  together 
Hitler’s  remarks  1 have  used  the  records  of  Boehm  and  Haider  and 
the  unsigned  memorandum  submitted  at  Nuremberg  as  evidence. 


706 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

again  in  the  future  be  a man  with  more  authority  than  I 

have.  My  existence  is  therefore  a factor  of  great  value. 

But  I can  be  eliminated  at  any  time  by  a criminal  or  a 
lunatic. 

, The  second  personal  factor  is  the  Duce.  His  existence 
is  also  decisive.  If  something  happens  to  him,  Italy’s  loy- 
alty to  the  alliance  will  no  longer  be  certain.  The  Italian 

Court  is  fundamentally  opposed  to  the  Duce. 

Franco  too  was  a help.  He  would  assure  Spain’s  “be- 
nevolent neutrality.”  As  for  “the  other  side,”  he  assured 
his  listeners,  “there  is  no  outstanding  personality  in  Eng- 
land or  France.” 

For  what  must  have  been  a period  of  several  hours, 
broken  only  by  a late  lunch,  the  demonic  dictator  rambled 
on,  and  there  is  no  evidence  from  the  records  that  a single 
general,  admiral  or  Air  Force  commander  dared  to  inter- 
rupt him  to  question  his  judgment  or  even  to  challenge 
his  lies.  He  had  made  his  decision  in  the  spring,  he  said, 
that  a conflict  with  Poland  was  inevitable,  but  he  had 
thought  that  first  he  would  turn  against  the  West.  In  that 
case,  however,  it  became  “clear”  to  him  that  Poland 
would  attack  Germany.  Therefore  she  must  be  liquidated 
now. 

The  time  to  fight  a war,  anyway,  had  come. 

For  us  it  is  easy  to  make  the  decision.  We  have  nothing 
to  lose;  we  can  only  gain.  Our  economic  situation  is  such 
that  we  cannot  hold  out  more  than  a few  years.  Goering 
can  confirm  this.  We  have  no  other  choice,  we  must 
act . . . 

Besides  the  personal  factor,  the  political  situation  is 
favorable  to  us,  in  the  Mediterranean,  rivalry  among 
Italy,  France  and  England;  in  the  Orient,  tension  . . . 

England  is  in  great  danger.  France’s  position  has  also 
deteriorated.  Decline  in  birth  rate  . . . Yugoslavia  carries 
the  germ  of  collapse  . . . Rumania  is  weaker  than  before 
. . . Since  Kemal’s  death,  Turkey  has  been  ruled  by  small 
minds,  unsteady,  weak  men. 

All  these  fortunate  circumstances  will  not  prevail  in 
two  to  three  years.  No  one  knows  how  long  I shall  live. 
Therefore  a showdown,  which  it  would  not  be  safe  to  put 
off  for  four  to  five  years,  had  better  take  place  now. 

Such  was  the  Nazi  Leader’s  fervid  reasoning. 

He  thought  it  “highly  probable”  that  the  West  would 


The  Road  to  War 


707 


not  fight,  but  the  risk  nevertheless  had  to  be  accepted. 
Had  he  not  taken  risks — in  occupying  the  Rhineland  when 
the  generals  wanted  to  pull  back,  in  taking  Austria,  the 
Sudetenland  and  the  rest  of  Czechoslovakia?  “Hannibal  at 
Cannae,  Frederick  the  Great  at  Leuthen,  and  Hinden- 
burg  and  Ludendorff  at  Tannenberg,”  he  said,  “took 
chances.  So  now  we  also  must  take  risks  which  can  only 
be  mastered  by  iron  determination.”  There  must  be  no 
weakening. 

It  has  done  much  damage  that  many  reluctant  Germans 
in  high  places  spoke  and  wrote  to  Englishmen  after  the 
solution  of  the  Czech  question.  The  Fuehrer  carried  his 
point  when  you  lost  your  nerve  and  capitulated  too  soon. 

Haider,  Witzleben  and  Thomas  and  perhaps  other  gen- 
erals who  had  been  in  on  the  Munich  conspiracy  must 
have  winced  at  this.  Hitler  obviously  knew  more  than  they 
had  realized. 

At  any  rate,  it  was  now  time  for  them  all  to  show 
their  fighting  qualities.  Hitler  had  created  Greater  Ger- 
many, he  reminded  them,  “by  political  bluff.”  It  had  now 
become  necessary  to  “test  the  military  machine.  The  Army 
must  experience  actual  battle  before  the  big  final  show- 
down in  the  West.”  Poland  offered  such  an  opportunity. 

Coming  back  to  England  and  France: 

The  West  has  only  two  possibilities  to  fight  against  us: 

1.  Blockade:  It  will  not  be  effective  because  of  our 
self-sufficiency  and  our  sources  of  aid  in  the  East. 

2.  Attack  from  the  West  from  the  Maginot  Line.  I con- 
sider this  impossible. 

Another  possibility  is  the  violation  of  Dutch,  Belgium 
and  Swiss  neutrality.  England  and  France  will  not  violate 
the  neutrality  of  these  countries.  Actually  they  cannot 
help  Poland. 

Would  it  be  a long  war? 

No  one  is  counting  on  a long  war.  If  Herr  von  Brau- 
chitsch  had  told  me  that  I would  need  four  years  to 
conquer  Poland  I would  have  replied,  It  cannot  be  done. 
It  is  nonsense  to  say  that  England  wants  to  wage  a long 
war. 

Having  disposed,  to  his  own  satisfaction,  at  least,  of 
Poland,  Britain  and  France,  Hitler  pulled  out  his  ace  card. 
He  turned  to  Russia. 


708 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


The  enemy  had  another  hope,  that  Russia  would  be- 
come our  enemy  after  the  conquest  of  Poland.  The  enemy 
did  not  count  on  my  great  power  of  resolution.  Our 
enemies  are  little  worms.  I saw  them  at  Munich. 

I was  convinced  that  Stalin  would  never  accept  the 
English  offer.  Only  a blind  optimist  could  believe  that 
Stalin  would  be  so  crazy  as  not  to  see  through  England’s 
intentions.  Russia  has  no  interest  in  maintaining  Poland 
. . . Litvinov’s  dismissal  was  decisive.  It  came  to  me  like  a 
cannon  shot  as  a sign  of  a change  in  Moscow  toward 
the  Western  Powers. 

I brought  about  the  change  toward  Russia  gradually.  In 
connection  with  the  commercial  treaty  we  got  into  po- 
litical conversations.  Finally  a proposition  came  from  the 
Russians  for  a nonaggression  treaty.  Four  days  ago  I took 
a special  step  which  brought  it  about  that  Russia  an- 
nounced yesterday  that  she  is  ready  to  sign.  The  personal 
contact  with  Stalin  is  established.  The  day  after  tomorrow 
Ribbentrop  will  conclude  the  treaty.  Now  Poland  is  in  the 
position  in  which  I wanted  her  ...  A beginning  has  been 
made  for  the  destruction  of  England’s  hegemony.  The  way 
is  open  for  the  soldier,  now  that  I have  made  the  political 
preparations. 

The  way  would  be  open  for  the  soldiers,  that  is,  if 
Chamberlain  didn’t  pull  another  Munich.  “I  am  only 
afraid,”  Hitler  told  his  warriors,  “that  some  Schweine- 
hund*  will  make  a proposal  for  mediation.” 

At  this  point  the  meeting  broke  up  for  lunch,  but  not 
until  Goering  had  expressed  thanks  to  the  Fuehrer  for 
pointing  the  way  and  had  assured  him  that  the  armed 
services  would  do  their  duty.t 

The  afternoon  lecture  was  devoted  by  Hitler  mainly  to 
bucking  up  his  military  chiefs  and  trying  to  steel  them 
for  the  task  ahead.  The  rough  jottings  of  all  three  records 
of  the  talk  indicate  its  nature. 

* “Dirty  dog.” 

t According  to  the  account  in  Nuremberg  Document  C-3  (see  footnote 
above,  p.  705),  Goering  jumped  up  on  the  table  and  gave  “bloodthirsty 
thanks  and  bloody  promises.  He  danced  around  like  a savage.  The  few 
doubtful  ones  remained  silent.”  This  description  greatly  nettled  Goering 
during  an  interrogation  at  Nuremberg  on  August  28  and  29,  1945.  “I 
dispute  the  fact  that  I stood  on  the  table,”  Goering  said.  “I  want 
you  to  know  that  the  speech  was  made  in  the  great  hall  of  Hitler’s 
private  house.  I did  not  have  the  habit  of  jumping  on  tables  in  private 
homes.  That  would  have  been  an  attitude  completely  inconsistent  with 
that  of  a German  officer.” 

“Well,  the  fact  is.”  Colonel  John  H.  Amen,  the  American  inter- 
rogator said  at  this  point,  “that  you  led  the  applause  after  the  speech, 
didn’t  you?” 

“Yes,  but  not  on  the  table,”  Goering  rejoined.  27 


The  Road  to  War 


709 

The  most  iron  determination  on  our  part.  No  shrink- 
ing back  from  anything.  Everyone  must  hold  the  view 
that  we  have  been  determined  to  fight  the  Western  powers 
right  from  the  start.  A life-and-death  struggle  ...  A long 
period  of  peace  would  not  do  us  any  good  ...  A manly 
bearing  . . . We  have  the  better  men  . . . On  the  opposite 
side  they  are  weaker  . . . In  1918  the  nation  collapsed  be- 
cause the  spiritual  prerequisites  were  insufficient.  Fred- 
erick the  Great  endured  only  because  of  his  fortitude. 

The  destruction  of  Poland  has  priority.  The  aim  is  to 
eliminate  active  forces,  not  to  reach  a definite  line.  Even  if 
war  breaks  out  in  the  West,  the  destruction  of  Poland  re- 
mains the  primary  objective.  A quick  decision,  in  view  of 
the  season. 

I shall  give  a propagandist  reason  for  starting  the  war — 
never  mind  whether  it  is  plausible  or  not.  The  victor  will 
not  be  asked  afterward  whether  he  told  the  truth  or  not. 
In  starting  and  waging  a war  it  is  not  right  that  matters, 
but  victory. 

Close  your  hearts  to  pity!  Act  brutally!  Eighty  million 
people  must  obtain  what  is  their  right  . . . The  stronger 
man  is  right  ...  Be  harsh  and  remorseless!  Be  steeled 
against  all  signs  of  compassion'  . . . Whoever  has 

pondered  over  this  world  order  knows  that  its  meaning 
lies  in  the  success  of  the  best  by  means  of  force  . . . 

Having  thundered  such  Nietzschean  exhortations,  the 
Fuehrer,  who  had  worked  himself  up  to  a fine  fit  of 
Teutonic  fury,  calmed  down  and  delivered  a few  directives 
for  the  campaign  ahead.  Speed  was  essential.  He  had  “un- 
shakable faith”  in  the  German  soldier.  If  any  crises  de- 
veloped they  would  be  due  solely  to  the  commanders’  los- 
ing their  nerve.  The  first  aim  was  to  drive  wedges  from 
the  southeast  to  the  Vistula,  and  from  the  north  to  the 
Narew  and  the  Vistula.  Military  operations,  he  insisted, 
must  not  be  influenced  by  what  he  might  do  with  Poland 
after  her  defeat.  As  to  that  he  was  vague.  The  new  Ger- 
man frontier,  he  said,  would  be  based  on  “sound  prin- 
ciples.” Possibly  he  would  set  up  a small  Polish  buffer 
state  between  Germany  and  Russia. 

The  order  for  the  start  of  hostilities,  Hitler  concluded, 
would  be  given  later,  probably  for  Saturday  morning,  Au- 
gust 26. 

The  next  day,  the  twenty-third,  after  a meeting  of  the 
OKW  section  chiefs,  General  Haider  noted  in  his  diary: 
“Y  Day  definitely  set  for  the  26th  (Saturday).” 


710 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ALLIED  STALEMATE  IN  MOSCOW 

By  the  middle  of  August  the  military  conversations  in 
Moscow  between  the  Western  democracies  and  the  Soviet 
Union  had  come  to  a virtual  standstill — and  for  this  the 
intransigence  of  the  Poles  was  largely  to  blame.  The 
Anglo-French  military  missions,  it  will  be  remembered, 
after  taking  a slow  boat  to  Leningrad,  had  arrived  in  Mos- 
cow on  August  11,  exactly  one  week  after  the  frustrated 
Mr.  Strang  had  left  the  Russian  capital,  obviously  relieved 
to  be  able  to  turn  over  to  the  generals  and  admirals  the 
difficult  and  unpleasant  job  of  trying  to  negotiate  with 
the  Russians.* 

What  now  had  to  be  worked  out  hurriedly  was  a mili- 
tary convention  which  would  spell  out  in  detail  just  how 
and  where,  and  with  what,  Nazi  armed  force  could  be 
met.  But  as  the  confidential  British  minutes  of  the  day-to- 
day  military  conversations  and  the  reports  of  the  British 
negotiators  reveal29  the  Anglo-French  military  team  had 
been  sent  to  Moscow  to  discuss  not  details  but  rather 
“general  principles.”  The  Russians,  however,  insisted  on 
getting  down  at  once  to  hard,  spec'fic  and — in  the  Allied 
view — awkward  facts,  and  Voroshilov’s  response  to  the 
Allied  declaration  of  principles  made  at  the  first  meeting 
by  General  Doumenc  was  that  they  were  “too  abstract 
and  immaterial  and  do  not  oblige  anyone  to  do  anything 
. . . We  are  not  gathered  here,”  he  declared  coolly,  “to 
make  abstract  declarations,  but  to  work  out  a complete 
military  convention.” 

The  Soviet  Marshal  posed  some  very  definite  questions: 
Was  there  any  treaty  which  defined  what  action  Poland 
would  take?  How  many  British  troops  could  reinforce  the 
French  Army  on  the  outbreak  of  the  war?  What  would 
Belgium  do?  The  answers  he  got  were  not  very  reassuring. 
Doumenc  said  he  had  no  knowledge  of  Polish  plans. 
General  Heywood  answered  that  the  British  envisaged 
“a  first  contingent  of  sixteen  divisions,  ready  for  service 
in  the  early  stages  of  a war,  followed  later  by  a second 
contingent  of  sixteen  divisions.”  Pressed  by  Voroshilov  to 
reveal  how  many  British  troops  there  would  be  immedi- 

* “A  humiliating  experience,”  Strang  had  called  it  in  a dispatch  to 
the  Foreign  Office  on  July  20. 28 


The  Road  to  War 


711 

ately  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  Heywood  replied,  “At  the 
moment  there  are  five  regular  divisions  and  one  mech- 
anized division  in  England.”  These  paltry  figures  came  as 
an  unpleasant  surprise  to  the  Russians,  who  were  pre- 
pared, they  said,  to  deploy  120  infantry  divisions  against 
an  aggressor  in  the  west  at  the  very  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

As  for  Belgium,  General  Doumenc  answered  the  Rus- 
sian question  by  saying  that  “French  troops  cannot  enter 
unless  and  until  they  are  asked  to,  but  France  is  ready 
to  answer  any  call.” 

This  reply  led  to  the  crucial  question  before  the  mil- 
itary negotiators  in  Moscow  and  one  which  the  British 
and  French  had  been  anxious  to  avoid.  During  the  very 
first  meeting  and  again  at  a critical  session  on  August  14, 
Marshal  Voroshilov  insisted  that  the  essential  question  was 
whether  Poland  was  willing  to  permit  Soviet  troops  to 
enter  her  territory  to  meet  the  Germans.  If  not,  how  could 
the  Allies  prevent  the  German  Army  from  quickly  over- 
running Poland?  Specifically — on  the  fourteenth — he  asked, 
“Do  the  British  and  Frenci  general  staffs  think  that 
the  Red  Army  can  move  across  Poland,  and  in  particular 
through  the  Vilna  gap  and  across  Galicia  in  order  to  make 
contact  with  the  enemy?” 

This  was  the  core  of  the  matter.  As  Seeds  wired  London, 
the  Russians  had  now 

raised  the  fundamental  problem,  on  which  the  military 
talks  will  succeed  or  fail  and  which  has  indeed  been  at 
the  bottom  of  all  our  difficulties  since  the  very  beginning 
of  the  political  conversations,  namely,  how  to  reach  any 
useful  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  as  long  as  this 
country  s neighbors  maintain  a sort  of  boycott  which  is 
only  to  be  broken  . . . when  it  is  too  late. 

If  the  question  came  up — and  how  could  it  help  com- 
ing up? — Admiral  Drax  had  been  instructed  by  the  British 
government  on  how  to  handle  it.  The  instructions,  re- 
vealed in  the  confidential  British  papers,  seem  unbeliev- 
ably naive  when  read  today.  The  “line  of  argument”  he 
was  to  take  in  view  of  the  refusal  of  Poland  and  Ru- 
mania “even  to  consider  plans  for  possible  co-operation” 
was: 

An  invasion  of  Poland  and  Rumania  would  greatly 
alter  their  outlook.  Moreover,  it  would  be  greatly  to 


712 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Russia’s  disadvantage  that  Germany  should  occupy  a posi- 
tion right  up  to  the  Russian  frontier  ...  It  is  in  Russia’s 
own  interest  therefore  that  she  should  have  plans  ready  to 
help  both  Poland  and  Rumania  should  these  countries  be 
invaded. 

If  the  Russians  propose  that  the  British  and  French  gov- 
ernments should  communicate  to  the  Polish,  Rumanian 
or  Baltic  States  proposals  involving  co-operation  with  the 
Soviet  Government  or  General  Staff,  the  Delegation  should 
not  commit  themselves  but  refer  home. 

And  this  is  what  they  did. 

At  the  August  14  session  Voroshilov  demanded 
“straightforward  answers”  to  his  questions.  “Without  an 
exact  and  unequivocal  answer,”  he  said,  “continuance  of 
the  military  conversations  would  be  useless  . . . The 
Soviet  Military  Mission,”  he  added,  “cannot  recommend 
to  its  Government  to  take  part  in  an  enterprise  so 
obviously  doomed  to  failure.” 

From  Paris  General  Gamelin  counseled  General 
Doumenc  to  try  to  steer  the  Russians  off  the  subject.  But 
they  were  not  to  be  put  off.30 

The  meeting  of  August  14,  as  General  Doumenc  later 
reported,  was  dramatic.  The  British  and  French  delegates 
were  cornered  and  they  knew  it.  They  tried  to  evade  the 
issue  as  best  they  could.  Drax  and  Doumenc  asserted  they 
were  sure  the  Poles  and  Rumanians  would  ask  for  Russian 
aid  as  soon  as  they  were  attacked.  Doumenc  was  confident 
they  would  “implore  the  Marshal  to  support  them.”  Drax 
thought  it  was  “inconceivable”  that  they  should  not  ask 
for  Soviet  help.  He  added — not  very  diplomatically,  it 
would  seem — that  “if  they  did  not  ask  for  help  when 
necessary  and  allow  themselves  to  be  overrun,  it  may  be 
expected  that  they  would  become  German  provinces.”  This 
was  the  last  thing  the  Russians  wanted,  for  it  meant  the 
presence  of  the  Nazi  armies  on  the  Soviet  border,  and 
Voroshilov  made  a special  point  of  the  Admiral’s  unfor- 
tunate remark. 

Finally,  the  uncomfortable  Anglo-French  representa- 
tives contended  that  Voroshilov  had  raised  political  ques- 
tions which  they  were  not  competent  to  handle.  Drax 
declared  that  since  Poland  was  a sovereign  state,  its  gov- 
ernment would  first  have  to  sanction  the  entry  of  Russian 
troops.  But  since  this  was  a political  matter,  it  would 


The  Road  to  War 


713 


have  to  be  settled  by  the  governments.  He  suggested  that 
the  Soviet  government  put  its  questions  to  the  Polish 
government.  The  Russian  delegation  agreed  that  this  was 
a political  matter.  But  it  insisted  that  the  British  and 
French  governments  must  put  the  question  to  the  Poles 
and  pressure  them  to  come  to  reason. 

Were  the  Russians,  in  view  of  their  dealings  with  the 
Germans  at  this  moment,  negotiating  in  good  faith  with 
the  Franco-British  military  representatives?  Or  did  they, 
as  the  British  and  French  foreign  offices,  not  to  mention 
Admiral  Drax,  later  concluded,  insist  on  the  right  to  deploy 
their  troops  through  Poland  merely  to  stall  the  talks  until 
they  saw  whether  they  could  make  a deal  with  Hitler?  * 

In  the  beginning,  the  British  and  French  confidential 
sources  reveal,  the  Western  Allies  did  think  that  the 
Soviet  military  delegation  was  negotiating  in  good  faith — 
in  fact,  that  it  took  its  job  much  too  seriously.  On  August 
13,  after  two  days  of  staff  talks,  Ambassador  Seeds  wired 
London  that  the  Russian  military  chiefs  seemed  really  “to 
be  out  for  business.”  As  a result,  Admiral  Drax’s  in- 
structions to  “go  very  slowly”  were  changed  and  on  Au- 
gust 15  he  was  told  by  the  British  government  to  support 
Doumenc  in  bringing  the  military  talks  to  a conclusion 
“as  soon  as  possible.”  His  restrictions  on  confiding  con- 
fidential military  information  to  the  Russians  were  par- 
tially lifted. 

Unlike  the  British  Admiral’s  original  instructions  to 
stall,  those  given  General  Doumenc  by  Premier  Daladier 
personally  had  been  to  try  to  conclude  a military  con- 
vention with  Russia  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  De- 
spite British  fears  of  leaks  to  the  Germans,  Doumenc  on 
the  second  day  of  the  meetings  had  confided  to  the  Rus- 
sians such  “highly  secret  figures,”  as  he  termed  them,  on 

* The  timing  is  important.  Molotov  did  not  receive  the  Nazi  proposal 
that  Ribbentrop  come  to  Moscow  until  the  evening  of  August  15.  (See 
above,  p.  694.)  And  though  he  did  not  accept  it  definitely  he  did  hint 
that  Russia  would  be  interested  in  a nonaggression  pact  with  Germany, 
which  of  course  would  have  made  negotiation  of  a military  alliance 
with  France  and  Britain  superfluous.  The  best  conclusion  this  writer 
can  come  to  is  that,  as  of  August  14,  when  Voroshilov  demanded  an 
“unequivocal  answer”  to  the  question  of  allowing  Soviet  troops  to 
meet  the  Germans  in  Poland,  the  Kremlin  still  had  an  open  mind  as 
to  which  side  to  join.  Unfortunately  the  Russian  documents,  which  could 
clear  up  this  crucial  question,  have  not  been  published.  At  any  rate, 
Stalin  does  not  seem  to  have  made  his  final  decision  until  the  afternoon 
of  August  19.  (See  above,  p.  702.) 


714 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  strength  of  the  French  Army  that  the  Soviet  members 
promised  “to  forget”  them  as  soon  as  the  meeting  was 
concluded. 

As  late  as  August  17,  after  he  and  Drax  had  waited 
vainly  for  three  days  for  instructions  from  their  govern- 
ments as  to  how  to  reply  to  the  Polish  question,  General 
Doumenc  telegraphed  Paris:  “The  U.S.S.R.  wants  a mili- 
tary pact  . . . She  does  not  want  us  to  give  her  a piece  of 
paper  without  substantial  undertakings.  Marshal  Voroshilov 
has  stated  that  all  problems  . . . would  be  tackled  without 
difficulty  as  soon  as  what  he  called  the  crucial  question 
was  settled.”  Doumenc  strongly  urged  Paris  to  get  Warsaw 
to  agree  to  accepting  Russian  help. 

Contrary  to  a widespread  belief  at  the  time,  not  only 
in  Moscow  but  in  the  Western  capitals,  that  the  British  and 
French  governments  did  nothing  to  induce  the  Poles  to 
agree  to  Soviet  troops  meeting  the  Germans  on  Polish  soil, 
it  is  clear  from  documents  recently  released  that  London 
and  Paris  went  quite  far— but  not  quite  far  enough.  It 
is  also  clear  that  the  Poles  reacted  with  unbelievable 
stupidity.31 

On  August  18,  after  the  first  Anglo-French  attempt  was 
made  in  Warsaw  to  open  the  eyes  of  the  Poles,  Foreign 
Minister  Beck  told  the  French  ambassador,  Leon  Noel, 
that  the  Russians  were  “of  no  military  value,”  and 
General  Stachiewicz,  Chief  of  the  Polish  General  Staff, 
backed  him  up  by  declaring  that  he  saw  “no  benefit  to  be 
gained  by  Red  Army  troops  operating  in  Poland.” 

The  next  day  both  the  British  and  French  ambassadors 
saw  Beck  again  and  urged  him  to  agree  to  the  Russian  pro- 
posal. The  Polish  Foreign  Minister  stalled,  but  promised 
to  give  them  a formal  reply  the  next  day.  The  Anglo- 
French  demarche  in  Warsaw  came  as  the  result  of  a con- 
versation earlier  on  the  nineteenth  in  Paris  between  Bon- 
net, the  French  Foreign  Minister,  and  the  British  charge 
d’affaires.  Somewhat  to  the  Briton’s  surprise,  this  arch- 
appeaser of  Hitler  was  now  quite  aroused  at  the  prospect 
of  losing  Russia  as  an  ally  because  of  Polish  stubbornness. 

It  would  be  disastrous  [Bonnet  told  him]  if,  in  con- 
sequence of  a Polish  refusal,  the  Russian  negotiations  were 
to  break  down  ...  It  was  an  untenable  position  for  the 
Poles  to  take  up  in  refusing  the  only  immediate  efficacious 
help  that  could  reach  them  in  the  event  of  a German  at- 


The  Road  to  War 


715 

tack.  It  would  put  the  British  and  French  Governments  in  an 
almost  impossible  position  if  we  had  to  ask  our  respective 
countries  to  go  to  war  in  defense  of  Poland,  which  had 
refused  this  help. 

If  this  were  so — and  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  was — why 
then  did  not  the  British  and  French  governments  at  this 
crucial  moment  put  the  ultimate  pressure  on  Warsaw  and 
simply  say  that  unless  the  Polish  government  agreed  to 
accept  Russian  help  Britain  and  France  could  see  no  use  of 
themselves  going  to  war  to  aid  Poland?  The  formal  Anglo- 
Polish  mutual-security  treaty  had  not  yet  been  signed. 
Could  Warsaw’s  acceptance  of  Russian  military  backing 
not  be  made  a condition  of  concluding  that  pact?  * 

In  his  talk  with  the  British  charge  in  Paris  on  August 
19,  Bonnet  suggested  this,  but  the  government  in  London 
frowned  upon  such  a “maneuver,”  as  Downing  Street 
called  it.  To  such  an  extreme  Chamberlain  and  Halifax 
would  not  go. 

On  the  morning  of  August  20  the  Polish  Chief  of  Staff 
informed  the  British  military  attache  in  Warsaw  that  “in 
no  case  would  the  admission  of  Soviet  troops  into  Poland 
be  agreed  to.”  And  that  evening  Beck  formally  rejected  the 
Anglo-French  request.  The  same  evening  Halifax,  through 
his  ambassador  in  Warsaw,  urged  the  Polish  Foreign  Min- 
ister to  reconsider,  emphasizing  in  strong  terms  that  the 
Polish  stand  was  “wrecking”  the  military  talks  in  Moscow. 
But  Beck  was  obdurate.  “I  do  not  admit,”  he  told  the 
French  ambassador,  “that  there  can  be  any  kind  of  dis- 
cussion whatsoever  concerning  the  use  of  part  of  our  ter- 
ritory by  foreign  troops.  We  have  not  got  a military  agree- 
ment with  the  U.S.S.R.  We  do  not  want  one.” 

Desperate  at  such  a display  of  blind  stubbornness  on  the 
part  of  the  Polish  government,  Premier  Daladier,  ac- 
cording to  an  account  he  gave  to  the  French  Constituent 

* Lloyd  George,  in  a speech  in  the  Commons  on  April  3,  four  days 
after  Chamberlain’s  unilateral  guarantee  to  Poland  had  been  announced, 
had  urged  the  British  government  to  make  such  a condition.  “If  we 
are  going  in  without  the  help  of  Russia  we  are  walking  into  a trap.  It 
is  the  only  country  whose  armies  can  get  there  [to  Poland],  ...  I can- 
not understand  why,  before  committing  ourselves  to  this  tremendous 
enterprise,  we  did  not  secure  beforehand  the  adhesion  of  Russia  . . . 

If  Russia  has  not  been  brought  into  this  matter  because  of  certain 
feelings  the  Poles  have  that  they  do  not  want  the  Russians  there, 
it  is  for  us  to  declare  the  conditions,  and  unless  the  Poles  are  pre- 

Eared  to  accept  the  only  conditions  with  which  we  can  successfully 
elp  them,  the  responsibility  must  be  theirs.” 


716  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Assembly  on  July  18,  1946,  took  matters  in  his  own  hands. 
After  once  more  appealing  to  the  Poles  to  be  realistic,  he 
telegraphed  General  Doumenc  on  the  morning  of  August 
21  authorizing  him  to  sign  a military  convention  with 
Russia  on  the  best  terms  he  could  get,  with  the  provision, 
however,  that  it  must  be  approved  by  the  French  govern- 
ment. The  French  ambassador,  Paul-fimile  Naggiar,  was 
at  the  same  time  instructed  by  Bonnet,  according  to  the 
latter’s  subsequent  account,  to  tell  Molotov  that  France 
agreed  “in  principle”  to  the  passage  of  Soviet  troops 
through  Poland  if  the  Germans  attacked. 

But  this  was  only  an  idle  gesture,  as  long  as  the  Poles 
had  not  agreed — and,  as  we  know  now,  a futile  gesture 
in  view  of  the  state  of  Russo-German  dealings.  Dou- 
menc did  not  receive  Daladier’s  telegram  until  late  in  the 
evening  of  August  21.  When  he  brought  it  to  the  attention 
of  Voroshilov  on  the  evening  of  the  next  day — the  eve  of 
Ribbentrop’s  departure  for  Moscow — the  Soviet  Marshal 
was  highly  skeptical.  He  demanded  to  see  the  French 
General’s  authorization  for  saying — as  Doumenc  had—  that 
the  French  government  had  empowered  him  to  sign  a mili- 
tary pact  permitting  the  passage  of  Russian  troops  through 
Poland.  Doumenc,  obviously,  declined.  Voroshilov  next 
wanted  to  know  what  the  British  response  was  and  whether 
the  consent  of  Poland  had  been  obtained.  These  were  em- 
barrassing questions  and  Doumenc  merely  answered  that 
he  had  no  information. 

But  neither  the  questions  nor  the  answers  had  by 
this  time  any  reality.  They  were  being  put  too  late.  Rib- 
bentrop  was  already  on  his  way  to  Moscow.  The  trip  had 
been  announced  publicly  the  night  before,  and  also  its 
purpose:  to  conclude  a nonaggression  pact  between  Nazi 
Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

Voroshilov,  who  seems  to  have  developed  a genuine 
liking  for  the  French  General,  tried  gently  to  let  him  know 
that  their  contacts  were  about  to  end. 

I fear  one  thing  [Voroshilov  said].  The  French  and 
English  sides  have  allowed  the  political  and  military  dis- 
cussions to  drag  on  too  long.  That  is  why  we  must  not  ex- 
clude the  possibility,  during  this  time,  of  certain  political 
events.* 


* At  a session  of  the  military  delegates  the  morning  before,  on  August 
21,  Voroshilov  had  demanded  the  indefinite  adjournment  of  the  talks 


The  Road  to  War 


717 


RIBBENTROP  IN  MOSCOW:  AUGUST  23,  1939 

Those  “certain  political  events”  now  took  place. 

Armed  with  full  powers  in  writing  from  Hitler  to  con- 
clude a nonaggression  treaty  “and  other  agreements”  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  which  would  become  effective  as  soon 
as  they  were  signed,  Ribbentrop  set  off  by  plane  for  Mos- 
cow on  August  22.  The  large  German  party  spent  the 
night  at  Koenigsberg  in  East  Prussia,  where  the  Nazi  For- 
eign Minister,  according  to  Dr.  Schmidt,  worked  through- 
out the  night,  constantly  telephoning  to  Berlin  and  Berch- 
tesgaden  and  making  copious  notes  for  his  talks  with 
Stalin  and  Molotov. 

The  two  large  Condor  transport  planes  carrying  the 
German  delegation  arrived  in  Moscow  at  noon  on  August 
23,  and  after  a hasty  meal  at  the  embassy  Ribbentrop 

(hurried  off  to  the  Kremlin  to  confront  the  Soviet  dictator 
and  his  Foreign  Commissar.  This  first  meeting  lasted  three 
hours  and,  as  Ribbentrop  advised  Hitler  by  “most  urgent” 
wire,  it  went  ■ fell  for  the  Germans.32  Judging  by  the 
Foreign  Minister’s  dispatch,  there  was  no  trouble  at  all  in 
reaching  agreement  on  the  terms  of  a nonaggression  pact 
which  would  keep  the  Soviet  Union  out  of  Hitler’s  war. 
In  fact  the  only  difficulty,  he  reported,  was  a distinctly 
minor  one  concerning  the  division  of  spoils.  The  Rus- 
sians, he  said,  were  demanding  that  Germany  recognize 
the  small  ports  of  Libau  and  Windau  in  Latvia  “as  being 
in  their  sphere  of  interest.”  Since  all  of  Latvia  was  to  be 

on  the  excuse  that  he  and  his  colleagues  would  be  busy  with  the 
autumn  maneuvers.  To  the  Anglo-French  protests  at  such  a delay 
the  Marshal  had  answered,  “The  intentions  of  the  Soviet  Delegation 
were,  and  still  are,  to  agree  on  the  organization  of  military  co-operation 
of  the  armed  forces  of  the  three  parties  . . . The  U.S.S.R.,  not  having 
a common  frontier  with  Germany,  can  give  help  to  France,  Britain, 
Poland  and  Rumania,  only  on  condition  that  her  troops  are  given 
rights  of  passage  across  Polish  and  Rumanian  territory  . . . The  Soviet 
forces  cannot  co-operate  with  the  armed  forces  of  Britain  and  France 
if  they  are  not  allowed  onto  Polish  and  Rumanian  territory  . . . The 
Soviet  Military  Delegation  cannot  picture  to  itself  how  the  governments 
TTececT>  s^a^s  Britain  and  France,  in  sending  their  missions  to 
the  U.S.S.R.  . . . could  not  have  given  them  some  directives  on  such 
an  elementary  matter  . . . This  can  only  show  that  there  are  reasons 
to  doubt  their  desire  to  come  to  serious  and  effective  co-operation  with 
the  U.S.S.R. 

The  logic  of  the  Marshal’s  military  argument  was  sound  and  the 
failure  of  the  French  and  especially  the  British  governments  to  answer 
it  would  prove  disastrous.  But  to  have  repeated  it— with  all  the  rest 
ot  the  statement— on  this  late  date,  August  21,  when  Voroshilov  could 
not  have  been  ignorant  of  Stalin’s  decision  of  August  19,  was  deceitful. 


718  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

placed  on  the  Soviet  side  of  the  line  dividing  the  interests 
of  the  two  powers,  this  demand  presented  no  problem  and 
Hitler  quickly  agreed.  Ribbentrop  also  advised  the  Fueh- 
rer after  the  first  conference  that  “the  signing  of  a secret 
protocol  on  the  delimitation  of  mutual  spheres  of  interest 
in  the  whole  Eastern  area  is  contemplated.” 

The  whole  works — the  nonaggression  treaty  and  the 
secret  protocol — were  signed  at  a second  meeting  at  the 
Kremlin  later  that  evening.  So  easily  had  the  Germans  and 
Russians  come  to  agreement  that  this  convivial  session, 
which  lasted  into  the  small  hours  of  the  following  morn- 
ing, was  taken  up  mostly  not  by  any  hard  bargaining  but 
with  a warm  and  friendly  discussion  of  the  state  of  the 
world,  country  by  country,  and  with  the  inevitable,  ef- 
fusive toasts  customary  at  gala  gatherings  in  the  Kremlin. 
A secret  German  memorandum  by  a member  of  the  Ger- 
man delegation  who  was  present  has  recorded  the  in- 
credible scene.33 

To  Stalin’s  questions  about  the  ambitions  of  Germany’s 
partners,  Italy  and  Japan,  Ribbentrop  gave  breezy,  reas- 
suring answers.  As  to  England  the  Soviet  dictato*  and  the 
Nazi  Foreign  Minister,  who  was  now  on  his  best  behavior, 
found  themselves  at  once  in  accord.  The  British  military 
mission  in  Moscow,  Stalin  confided  to  his  guest,  had  never 
told  the  Soviet  government  what  it  really  wanted.”  Rib- 
bentrop responded  by  emphasizing  that  Britain  had  always 
tried  to  disrupt  good  relations  between  Germany  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  “England  is  weak,”  he  boasted,  “and  wants 
to  let  others  fight  for  her  presumptuous  claim  to  world 
dominion.” 

“Stalin  eagerly  concurred,”  says  the  German  memoran- 
dum, and  he  remarked:  “If  England  dominated  the  world, 
that  was  due  to  the  stupidity  of  the  other  countries  that 
always  let  themselves  be  bluffed.” 

By  this  time  the  Soviet  ruler  and  Hitler’s  Foreign  Min- 
ister were  getting  along  so  splendidly  that  mention  of  the 
Anti-Comintern  Pact  no  longer  embarrassed  them.  Rib- 
bentrop explained  again  that  the  pact  had  been  directed 
not  against  Russia  but  against  the  Western  democracies. 
Stalin  interposed  to  remark  that  “the  Anti-Comintern  had 
in  fact  frightened  principally  the  City  of  London  [i.e., 
the  British  financiers]  and  the  English  shopkeepers.” 

At  this  juncture,  the  German  memorandum  reveals, 


719 


The  Road  to  War 

Ribbentrop  felt  himself  in  such  good  humor  at  Stalin’s 
accommodating  manner  that  he  even  tried  to  crack  a joke 
or  two — a remarkable  feat  for  so  humorless  a man. 

The  Reich  Foreign  Minister  [the  memorandum  continues] 
remarked  jokingly  that  M.  Stalin  was  surely  less  fright- 
ened by  the  Anti-Comintern  Pact  than  the  City  of  London 
and  the  English  shopkeepers.  What  the  German  people 
thought  of  this  matter  was  evident  from  a joke,  which  had 
originated  with  the  Berliners,  well  known  for  their  wit 
and  humor,  that  Stalin  will  yet  join  the  Anti-Comintern 

Pact  himself. 

Finally  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  dwelt  on  how  warmly 
the  German  people  welcomed  an  understanding  with  Rus- 
sia. ‘M.  Stalin  replied,”  says  the  German  record,  “that  he 
really  believed  this.  The  Germans  desired  peace.” 

Such  hokum  grew  worse  as  the  time  for  toasts  arrived. 

M.  Stalin  spontaneously  proposed  a toast  to  the  Fuehrer: 

“I  know  how  much  the  German  nation  loves  its  Fueh- 
rer. I should  therefore  like  to  drink  to  his  health.” 

M.  Molotov  thank  to  the  health  of  the  Reich  Foreign 

Minister  . . . MM.  Molotov  and  Stalin  drank  repeatedly 
to  the  Nonagression  Pact,  the  new  era  of  German- 
Russian  relations,  and  to  the  German  nation. 

The  Reich  Foreign  Minister  in  turn  proposed  a toast  to 
M.  Stalin,  toasts  to  the  Soviet  Government,  and  to  a 
favorable  development  of  relations  between  Germany  and 

the  Soviet  Union. 

And  yet  despite  such  warm  exchanges  between  those 
who  until  recently  had  been  such  mortal  enemies,  Stalin 
appears  to  have  had  mental  reservations  about  the  Nazis’ 
keeping  the  pact.  As  Ribbentrop  was  leaving,  he  took 
him  aside  and  said,  “The  Soviet  Government  take  the  new 
pact  very  seriously.  He  could  guarantee  on  his  word  of 
honor  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  not  betray  its  partner.” 

What  had  the  new  partners  signed? 

The  published  treaty  carried  an  undertaking  that  neither 
power  would  attack  the  other.  Should  one  of  them  be- 
come “the  object  of  belligerent  action”  by  a third  power, 
the  other  party  would  “in  no  manner  lend  its  support  to 
this  Third  Power.”  Nor  would  either  Germany  or  Russia 
“join  any  grouping  of  Powers  whatsoever  which  is  aimed 
directly  or  indirectly  at  the  other  Party.”  * 

* The  wording  of  the  essential  articles  is  almost  identical  to  that  of  a 


720 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Thus  Hitler  got  what  he  specifically  wanted:  an  im- 
mediate agreement  by  the  Soviet  Union  not  to  join  Britain 
and  France  if  they  honored  their  treaty  obligations  to  come 
to  the  aid  of  Poland  in  case  she  were  attacked.* * 

The  price  he  paid  was  set  down  in  the  “Secret  Additional 
Protocol”  to  the  treaty: 

On  the  occasion  of  the  signature  of  the  Nonaggression 
Treaty  between  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union  the  un- 
dersigned plenipotentiaries  discussed  in  strictly  confiden- 
tial conversations  the  question  of  the  delimitation  of  their 
respective  spheres  of  interest  in  Eastern  Europe. 

1.  In  the  event  of  a territorial  and  political  transforma- 
tion in  the  territories  belonging  to  the  Baltic  States  (Fin- 
land, Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania),  the  northern  frontier  of 
Lithuania  shall  represent  the  frontier  of  the  spheres  of  in- 
terest both  of  Germany  and  the  U.S.S.R. 

2.  In  the  event  of  a territorial  and  political  transforma- 
tion of  the  territories  belonging  to  the  Polish  State,  the 
spheres  of  interest  of  both  Germany  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
shall  be  bounded  approximately  by  the  line  of  the  rivers 
Narew,  Vistula  and  San. 

The  question  whether  the  interests  of  both  Parties  make 
the  maintenance  of  an  independent  Polish  State  appear  de- 
sirable and  how  the  frontiers  of  this  State  should  be 
drawn  can  be  definitely  determined  only  in  the  course  of 
further  political  developments. 

In  any  case  both  Governments  will  -esolve  this  question 
by  means  of  a friendly  understanding. 

Once  again  Germany  and  Russia,  as  in  the  days  of  the 
German  kings  and  Russian  emperors,  had  agreed  to  par- 
tition Poland.  And  Hitler  had  given  Stalin  a free  hand  in 
the  eastern  Baltic. 

Finally,  in  Southeastern  Europe,  the  Russians  empha- 
sized their  interest  in  Bessarabia,  which  the  Soviet  Union 

Soviet  draft  which  Molotov  handed  Schulenburg  on  August  19  and 
which  Hitler,  in  his  telegram  to  Stalin,  said  he  accepted.  The  Russian 
draft  had  specified  that  the  nonaggression  treaty  would  be  valid  only 
if  a “special  protocol”  were  signed  simultaneously  and  made  an  integral 
part  of  the  pact.34 

According  to  Friedrich  Gaus,  who  participated  at  the  evening  meeting, 
a high-falutin  preamble  which  Ribbentrop  wanted  to  insert  stressing  the 
formation  of  friendly  Soviet-German  relations  was  thrown  out  at  the 
insistence  of  Stalin.  The  Soviet  dictator  complained  that  “the  Soviet 
government  could  not  suddenly  present  to  the  public  assurances  of 
friendship  after  they  had  been  covered  with  pails  of  manure  by  the 
Nazi  government  for  six  years.”  35 

* Article  VII  provided  for  the  treaty  to  enter  into  force  immediately 
upon  signature.  Formal  ratification  in  two  such  totalitarian  states  was, 
to  be  sure,  a mere  formality.  But  it  would  take  a few  days.  Hitler  had 
insisted  on  this  provision. 


The  Road  to  War 


721 


had  lost  to  Rumania  in  1919,  and  the  Germans  declared 
their  disinterest  in  this  territory — a concession  Ribben- 
trop  later  was  to  regret. 

“This  protocol,”  the  document  concluded,  “will  be 
treated  by  both  parties  as  strictly  secret.”  36 

As  a matter  of  fact,  its  contents  became  known  only 
after  the  war  with  the  capture  of  the  secret  German  ar- 
chives. 

On  the  following  day,  August  24,  while  the  jubilant 
Ribbentrop  was  winging  his  way  back  to  Berlin,  the  Al- 
lied military  missions  in  Moscow  requested  to  see  Voro- 
shilov. Admiral  Drax  had  actually  sent  an  urgent  letter  to 
the  Marshal  requesting  his  views  on  the  continuation  of 
their  talks. 

Voroshilov  gave  them  to  the  British  and  French  military 
staffs  at  1 p.m.  the  next  day,  August  25.  “In  view  of  the 
changed  political  situation  ” he  said,  “no  useful  purpose 
can  be  served  in  continuing  the  conversations.” 

Two  years  later,  when  German  troops  were  pouring  into 
Russia  in  violation  of  the  pact,  Stalin  would  still  justify 
his  odious  deal  with  Hitler,  made  behind  the  backs  of 
the  Anglo-French  military  delegations  which  had  come  to 
negotiate  in  Moscow.  “We  secured  peace  for  our  country 
for  one  and  a half  years,”  he  boasted  in  a broadcast  to  the 
Russian  people  on  July  3,  1941,  “as  well  as  an  opportunity 
of  preparing  our  forces  for  defense  if  fascist  Germany 
risked  attacking  our  country  in  defiance  of  the  pact.  This 
was  a definite  gain  for  our  country  and  a loss  for  fascist 
Germany.” 

But  was  it?  The  point  has  been  debated  ever  since.  That 
the  sordid,  secret  deal  gave  Stalin  the  same  breathing 
space — peredyshka — which  Czar  Alexander  I had  secured 
from  Napoleon  at  Tilsit  in  1807  and  Lenin  from  the  Ger- 
mans at  Brest  Litovsk  in  1917  was  obvious.  Within  a short 
time  it  also  gave  the  Soviet  Union  an  advanced  defensive 
position  against  Germany  beyond  the  existing  Russian 
frontiers,  including  bases  in  the  Baltic  States  and  Finland 
—at  the  expense  of  the  Poles,  Latvians,  Estonians  and 
Finns.  And  most  important  of  all,  as  the  official  Soviet 
History  of  Diplomacy  later  emphasized,  it  assured  the 
Kremlin  that  if  Russia  were  later  attacked  by  Germany 
the  Western  Powers  would  already  be  irrevocably  com- 


722 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

mitted  against  the  Third  Reich  and  the  Soviet  Union  would 
not  stand  alone  against  the  German  might  as  Stalin  had 
feared  throughout  the  summer  of  1939. 

All  this  undoubtedly  is  true.  But  there  is  another  side  to 
the  argument.  By  the  time  Hitler  got  around  to  attacking 
Russia,  the  armies  of  Poland  and  France  and  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  on  the  Continent  had  been  destroyed 
and  Germany  had  the  resources  of  all  of  Europe  to  draw 
upon  and  no  Western  front  to  tie  her  hands.  All  through 
1941,  1942  and  1943  Stalin  was  to  complain  bitterly  that 
there  was  no  second  front  in  Europe  against  Germany  and 
that  Russia  was  forced  to  bear  the  brunt  of  containing  al- 
most the  entire  German  Army.  In  1939-40,  there  was  a 
Western  front  to  draw  off  the  German  forces.  And  Poland 
could  not  have  been  overrun  in  a fortnight  if  the  Russians 
had  backed  her  instead  of  stabbing  her  in  the  back.  More- 
over, there  might  not  have  been  any  war  at  all  if  Hitler 
had  known  he  must  take  on  Russia  as  well  as  Poland, 
England  and  France.  Even  the  politically  tir.ad  German 
generals,  if  one  can  judge  from  their  later  testimony  at 
Nuremberg,  might  have  put  their  foot  down  against  em- 
barking on  war  against  such  a formidable  coalition.  To- 
ward the  end  of  May,  according  to  the  French  ambassador 
in  Berlin,  both  Keitel  and  Brauchitsch  had  warned  Hitler 
that  Germany  had  little  chance  of  winning  a war  in  which 
Russia  participated  on  the  enemy  side. 

No  statesmen,  not  even  dictators,  can  foretell  the  course 
of  events  over  the  long  run.  It  is  arguable,  as  Churchill  has 
argued,  thar  cold-blooded  as  Stalin’s  move  was  in  making 
a deal  with  Hitler,  it  was  also  “at  the  moment  realistic  in 
a high  degree.”  39  Stalin’s  first  and  primary  consideration, 
as  was  that  of  any  other  head  of  government,  was  his 
nation’s  security.  He  was  convinced  in  the  summer  of  1939, 
as  he  later  told  Churchill,  that  Hitler  was  going  to  war. 
He  was  determined  that  Russia  should  not  be  maneuvered 
into  the  disastrous  position  of  having  to  face  the  German 
Army  alone.  If  a foolproof  alliance  with  the  West  proved 
impossible,  then  why  not  turn  to  Hitler,  who  suddenly 
was  knocking  at  his  door? 

By  the  end  of  July  1939,  Stalin  had  become  convinced, 
it  is  obvious,  not  only  that  France  and  Britain  did  not 
want  a binding  alliance  but  that  the  objective  of  the  Cham- 
berlain government  in  Britain  was  to  induce  Hitler  to  make 


The  Road  to  War 


723 


his  wars  in  Eastern  Europe.  He  seems  to  have  been  in- 
tensely skeptical  that  Britain  would  honor  its  guarantee 
to  Poland  any  more  than  France  had  kept  its  obligations 
to  Czechoslovakia.  And  everything  that  had  happened  in 
the  West  for  the  past  two  years  tended  to  increase  his  sus- 
picions: the  rejection  by  Chamberlain  of  Soviet  proposals, 
after  the  Anschluss  and  after  the  Nazi  occupation  of 
Czechoslovakia,  for  conferences  to  draw  up  plans  to  halt 
further  Nazi  aggression;  Chamberlain’s  appeasement  of  Hit- 
ler at  Munich,  from  which  Russia  had  been  excluded;  the 
delays  and  hesitations  of  Chamberlain  in  negotiating  a 
defensive  alliance  against  Germany  as  the  fateful  summer 
days  of  1939  ticked  by. 

One  thing  was  certain — to  almost  everyone  but  Cham- 
berlain. The  bankruptcy  of  Anglo-French  diplomacy, 
which  had  faltered  and  tottered  whenever  Hitler  made  a 
move,  was  now  complete.*  Step  by  step,  the  two  Western 
democracies  had  retreated:  when  Hitler  defied  them  by 
declaring  conscription  in  1935,  when  he  occupied  the 
Rhineland  in  1936,  when  he  took  Austria  in  1938  and  in 
the  same  year  demanded  and  got  the  Sudetenland;  and 
they  had  sat  by  weakly  when  he  occupied  the  rest  of 
Czechoslovakia  'n  March  1939.  With  the  Soviet  Union  on 
their  side,  they  still  might  have  dissuaded  the  German 
dictator  from  launching  war  or,  if  that  failed,  have  fairly 
quickly  defeated  him  in  an  armed  conflict.  But  they  had 
allowed  this  last  opportunity  to  slip  out  of  their  hands. t 
Now,  at  the  worst  possible  time  in  the  worst  possible  cir- 

* And  of  Polish  diplomacy  too.  Ambassador  Noel  reported  Foreign 
Minister  Beck’s  reaction  to  the  signing  of  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  in  a 
dispatch  to  Paris:  “Beck  is  cpiite  unperturbed  and  does  not  seem  in 
the  slightest  worried.  He  believes  that,  in  substance,  very  little  has 
changed.” 

t Despite  many  warnings,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Hitler  was  courting 
the  Kremlin.  On  June  1,  M.  Coulondre,  the  French  ambassador  in  Berlin, 
had  informed  Bonnet,  the  French  Foreign  Minister,  that  Russia  was 
looming  larger  and  larger  in  Hitler’s  thoughts.  “Hitler  will  risk  war,” 
Coulondre  wrote,  “if  he  does  not  have  to  fight  Russia.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  he  knows  he  has  to  fight  her  too  he  will  draw  back  rather 
than  expose  his  country,  his  party  and  himself  to  ruin.”  The  am- 
bassador urged  the  prompt  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-French  negotiations 
in  Moscow  and  advised  Paris  that  the  British  ambassador  in  Berlin 
had  made  a similar  appeal  to  his  government  in  London.  ( French 
Yellow  Book,  Fr.  ed.,  pp.  180—81.) 

On  August  15,  both  Coulondre  and  Henderson  saw  Weizsaecker  at 
the  Foreign  Office.  The  British  ambassador  informed  London  that  the 
State  Secretary  was  confident  that  the  Soviet  Union  “would  in  the 
end  join  in  sharing  the  Polish  spoils.”  ( British  Blue  Book,  p.  91.)  And 
Coulondre,  after  his  talk  with  Weizsaecker,  wired  Paris:  “It  is  necessary 


724 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


cumstances,  they  were  committed  to  come  to  the  aid  of 
Poland  when  she  was  attacked. 

The  recriminations  in  London  and  Paris  against  the 
double-dealing  of  Stalin  were  loud  and  bitter.  The  Soviet 
despot  for  years  had  cried  out  at  the  “fascist  beasts”  and 
called  for  all  peace-loving  states  to  band  together  to  halt 
Nazi  aggression.  Now  he  had  made  himself  an  accessory  to 
it.  The  Kremlin  could  argue,  as  it  did,  that  the  Soviet 
Union  had  only  done  what  Britain  and  France  had  done 
the  year  before  at  Munich:  bought  peace  and  the  time 
to  rearm  against  Germany  at  the  expense  of  a small  state. 
If  Chamberlain  was  right  and  honorable  in  appeasing  Hit- 
ler in  September  1938  by  sacrificing  Czechoslovakia,  was 
Stalin  wrong  and  dishonorable  in  appeasing  the  Fuehrer 
a year  later  at  the  expense  of  Poland,  which  had  shunned 
Soviet  help  anyway? 

Stalin’s  cynical  and  secret  deal  with  Hitler  to  divide  up 
Poland  and  to  obtain  a free  hand  to  gobble  up  Latvia, 
Estonia,  Finland  and  Bessarabia  was  not  known  outside 
Berlin  and  Moscow,  but  it  would  soon  become  evident 
from  Soviet  acts,  and  it  would  shock  most  of  the  world 
even  at  this  late  date.  The  Russians  might  say,  as  they  did, 
that  they  were  only  repossessing  territories  which  had  been 
taken  away  from  them  at  the  end  of  the  First  World  War. 
But  the  peoples  of  these  lands  were  not  Russian  and  had 
shown  no  desire  to  return  to  Russia.  Only  force,  which  the 
Soviets  had  eschewed  in  the  heyday  of  Litvinov,  could 
make  them  return. 

Since  joining  the  League  of  Nations  the  Soviet  Union 
had  built  up  a certain  moral  force  as  the  champion  of 
peace  and  the  leading  opponent  of  fascist  aggression.  Now 
that  moral  capital  had  been  utterly  dissipated. 

Above  all,  by  assenting  to  a shoddy  deal  with  Nazi  Ger- 

at  all  costs  to  come  to  some  solution  of  the  Russian  talks  as  soon 
as  possible."  ( French  Yellow  Book,  p.  282.) 

Throughout  June  and  July,  Laurence  Steinhardt,  the  American  ambassa- 
dor in  Moscow,  had  also  sent  warnings  of  an  impending  Soviet-Nazi  deal, 
which  President  Roosevelt  passed  on  to  the  British,  French  and  Polish  em- 
bassies. As  early  as  July  5,  when  Soviet  Ambassador  Constantine  Oumansky 
left  for  a leave  in  Russia,  he  carried  with  him  a message  from  Roosevelt  to 
Stalin  “that  if  his  government  joined  up  with  Hitler,  it  was  as  certain  as 
that  the  night  followed  day  that  as  soon  at  Hitler  had  conquered  France  he 
would  turn  on  Russia.”  (Joseph  E.  Davies,  Mission  to  Moscow,  p.  450.) 
The  President’s  warning  was  cabled  to  Steinhardt  with  instructions  to  repeat 
it  to  Molotov,  which  the  ambassador  did  on  August  16.  CU.S.  Diplomatic 
Papers,  1939,  I,  pp.  296-99.) 


The  Road  to  War 


725 


many,  Stalin  had  given  the  signal  for  the  commencement 
of  a war  that  almost  certainly  would  develop  into  a world 
conflict.  This  he  certainly  knew.*  As  things  turned  out,  it 
was  the  greatest  blunder  of  his  life. 


* Years  before,  Hitler,  had  written  prophetically  in  Mein  Kampf : “The  very 
fact  of  the  conclusion  of  an  alliance  with  Russia  embodies  a plan  for  the 
next  war.  Its  outcome  would  be  the  end  of  Germany.”  (See  p.  660  of  the 
Houghton  Mifflin  edition.  1943.) 


16 

THE  LAST  DAYS  OF  PEACE 


THE  BRITISH  government  had  not  waited  idly  for  the 
formal  signing  of  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  in  Moscow.  The 
announcement  in  Berlin  on  the  late  evening  of  August  21 
that  Ribbentrop  was  flying  to  Moscow  to  conclude  a 
German-Russian  agreement  stirred  the  British  cabinet  to 
action.  It  met  at  3 p.m.  on  the  twenty-second  and  issued 
a communique  stating  categorically  that  a Soviet-Nazi 
nonaggression  pact  “would  in  no  way  affect  their  obliga- 
tion to  Poland,  which  they  have  repeatedly  stated  in  pub- 
lic and  which  they  are  determined  to  fulfill.”  At  the  same 
time  Parliament  was  summoned  to  meet  on  August  24  to 
pass  the  Emergency  Powers  fDefense)  Bill,  and  certain 
precautionary  mobilization  measures  were  taken. 

Though  the  cabinet  statement  was  as  clear  as  words 
could  make  it,  Chamberlain  wanted  Hitler  to  have  no 
doubts  about  it.  Immediately  after  the  cabinet  meeting 
broke  up  he  wrote  a personal  letter  to  the  Fuehrer. 

. . . Apparently  the  announcement  of  a German-Soviet 
Agreement  is  taken  in  some  quarters  in  Berlin  to  indi- 
cate that  intervention  by  Great  Britain  on  behalf  of  Po- 
land is  no  longer  a contingency  that  need  be  reckoned 
with.  No  greater  mistake  could  be  made.  Whatever  may 
prove  to  be  the  nature  of  the  German— Soviet  Agreement, 
it  cannot  alter  Great  Britain’s  obligation  to  Poland  . . . 

It  has  been  alleged  that,  if  His  Majesty’s  Government  had 
made  their  position  more  clear  in  1914,  the  great  ca- 
tastrophe would  have  been  avoided.  Whether  or  not  there 
is  any  force  in  that  allegation,  His  Majesty’s  Government 
are  resolved  that  on  this  occasion  there  shall  be  no  such 
tragic  misunderstanding. 

If  the  case  should  arise,  they  are  resolved,  and  pre- 
pared, to  employ  without  delay  all  the  forces  at  their 

726 


The  Road  to  War 


727 


command,  and  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  the  end  of  hos- 
tilities once  engaged  . . .1 

Having,  as  he  added,  “thus  made  our  position  perfectly 
clear,”  the  Prime  Minister  again  appealed  to  Hitler  to  seek 
a peaceful  solution  of  his  differences  with  Poland  and 
once  more  offered  the  British  government’s  co-operation 
in  helping  to  obtain  it. 

The  letter,  which  Ambassador  Henderson,  flying  down 
from  Berlin,  delivered  to  Hitler  shortly  after  1 p.m.  on 
August  23  at  Berchtesgaden,  threw  the  Nazi  dictator  into 
a violent  rage.  “Hitler  was  excitable  and  uncompromising,” 
Henderson  wired  Lord  Halifax.  “His  language  was  vio- 
lent and  exaggerated  both  as  regards  England  and  Po- 
land.” 2 Henderson’s  report  of  the  meeting  and  the  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  memorandum  on  it — the  latter  among 
the  captured  Nazi  papers — agree  on  the  nature  of  Hit- 
ler’s tirade.  England,  he  stormed,  was  responsible  for 
Poland’s  intransigence  *just  "s  it  had  been  responsible  for 
Czechoslovakia’s  unreasonable  attitude  the  year  before. 
Tens  of  thousands  of  Volksdeutsche  in  Poland  were  being 
persecuted.  There  were  even,  he  claimed,  six  cases  of 
castration — a subject  that  obsessed  him.  He  could  stand 
it  no  more.  Any  further  persecution  of  Germans  by  the 
Poles  would  bring  immediate  action. 

I contested  every  point  [Henderson  wired  Halifax]  and 
kept  calling  his  statements  inaccurate  but  the  only  effect 
was  to  launch  him  on  some  fresh  tirade. 

Finally  Hitler  agreed  to  give  a written  answer  to  the 
Prime  Minister’s  letter  in  two  hour’s  time,  and  Hender- 
son withdrew  to  Salzburg  for  a little  respite.*  Later  in  the 
afternoon  Hitler  sent  for  him  and  handed  him  his  reply. 
In  contrast  to  the  first  meeting,  the  Fuehrer,  Henderson 
reported  to  London,  “was  quite  calm  and  never  raised  his 
voice.” 

He  was,  he  said  [Henderson  reported],  fifty  years  old; 
he  preferred  war  now  to  when  he  would  be  fifty-five  or 
sixty. 

The  megalomania  of  the  German  dictator,  declaiming 

* “Hardly  had  the  door  shut  on  the  Ambassador,”  Weizsaecker,  who  was 
present,  later  noted,  “than  Hitler  slapped  himself  on  the  thigh,  laughed  and 
said:  ‘Chamberlain  won’t  survive  that  conversation;  his  Cabinet  will  fall 
this  evening.’  ” (Weizsaecker,  Memoirs,  p.  203.) 


728  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

on  his  mountaintop,  comes  out  even  more  forcibly  in  the 
German  minutes  of  the  meeting.  After  quoting  him  as 
preferring  to  make  war  at  fifty  rather  than  later,  they  add: 

England  [Hitler  said]  would  do  well  to  realize  that  as 
a front-line  soldier  he  knew  what  war  was  and  would  utilize 
every  means  available.  It  was  surely  quite  clear  to  everyone 
that  the  World  War  [i.e.,  1914-1918]  would  not  have 

been  lost  if  he  had  been  Chancellor  at  the  time. 

Hitler’s  reply  to  Chamberlain  was  a mixture  of  all  the 
stale  lies  and  exaggerations  which  he  had  been  bellowing 
to  foreigners  and  his  own  people  since  the  Poles  dared  to 
stand  up  to  him.  Germany,  he  said,  did  not  seek  a 
conflict  with  Great  Britain.  It  had  been  prepared  all  along 
to  discuss  the  questions  of  Danzig  and  the  Corridor  with 
the  Poles  “on  the  basis  of  a proposal  of  truly  unparalleled 
magnanimity.”  But  the  unconditional  guarantee  of  Po- 
land by  Britain  had  only  encouraged  the  Poles  “to  unloos- 
en a wave  of  appalling  terrorism ‘against  the  one  and  a 
half  million  German  inhabitants  living  in  Poland.”  Such 
“atrocities”  he  declared,  “are  terrible  for  the  victims  but 
intolerable  for  a Great  Power  such  as  the  German  Reich.” 
Germany  would  no  longer  tolerate  them. 

Finally  he  took  note  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  assurance 
that  Great  Britain  would  hrnor  its  commitments  to  Po- 
land and  assured  him  “that  it  can  make  no  change  in  the 
determination  of  the  Reich  Government  to  safeguard  the 
interest  of  the  Reich  . . . Germany,  if  attacked  by  Eng- 
land, will  be  found  prepared  and  determined.” 3 

What  had  this  exchange  of  letters  accomplished?  Hitler 
now  had  a solemn  assurance  from  Chamberlain  that  Brit- 
ain would  go  to  war  if  Germany  attacked  Poland.  The 
Prime  Minister  had  the  Fuehrer’s  word  that  it  would  make 
no  difference.  But,  as  the  events  of  the  next  hectic  eight 
days  would  show,  neither  man  believed  on  August  23 
that  he  had  heard  the  last  word  from  the  other. 

This  was  especially  true  of  Hitler.  Buoyed  up  by  the 
good  news  from  Moscow  and  confident  that,  despite  what 
Chamberlain  had  just  written  him,  Great  Britain  and,  in 
its  wake,  France  would  have  second  thoughts  about  honor- 
ing their  obligations  to  Poland  after  the  defection  of 
Russia,  the  Fuehrer  on  the  evening  of  August  23,  as  Hen- 
derson was  flying  back  to  Berlin,  set  the  date  for  the 


The  Road  to  War  729 

onslaught  on  Poland:  Saturday,  August  26,  at  4:30  a.m. 

“There  will  be  no  more  orders  regarding  Y Day  and 
X Hour,”  General  Haider  noted  in  his  diary.  “Everything 
is  to  roll  automatically  ” 

But  the  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff  was  wrong. 
On  August  25  two  events  occurred  which  made  Adolf 
Hitler  shrink  back  from  the  abyss  less  than  twenty-four 
hours  before  his  troops  were  scheduled  to  break  across 
the  Polish  frontier.  One  originated  in  London,  the  other 
in  Rome. 

On  the  morning  of  August  25,  Hitler,  who  on  the  pre- 
vious day  had  returned  to  Berlin  to  welcome  Ribbentrop 
back  from  Moscow  and  receive  a firsthand  report  on  the 
Russians,  got  off  a letter  to  Mussolini.  It  contained  a be- 
lated explanation  as  to  why  he  had  not  been  able  to 
keep  his  Axis  partner  informed  of  his  negotiations  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  (He  had  “no  idea,”  he  said,  that  they 
would  go  so  far  so  fast.)  And  hr  declared  that  the  Russo- 
German  pact  “must  be  regarued  as  the  greatest  possible 
gain  for  the  Axis.” 

But  the  real  purpose  of  the  letter,  whose  text  is  among 
the  captured  documents,  was  to  warn  the  Duce  that  a 
German  attack  on  Poland  was  liable  to  take  place  at 
any  moment,  though  Hitler  refrained  from  giving  his 
friend  and  ally  the  exact  date  which  he  had  set.  “In  case 
of  intolerable  events  in  Poland,”  he  said,  “I  shall  act  im- 
mediately ...  In  these  circumstances  no  one  can  say  what 
the  next  hour  may  bring.”  Hitler  did  not  specifically  ask 
for  Italy’s  help.  That  was,  by  the  terms  of  the  Italo- 
German  alliance,  supposed  to  be  automatic.  He  contented 
himself  with  expressing  the  hope  for  Italy’s  understand- 
ing.4 Nevertheless,  he  was  anxious  for  an  immediate  an- 
swer. The  letter  was  telephoned  by  Ribbentrop  personally 
to  the  German  ambassador  in  Rome  and  reached  the 
Duce  at  3:20  p.m. 

In  the  meantime,  at  1:30  p.m.,  the  Fuehrer  had  received 
Ambassador  Henderson  at  the  Chancellery.  His  resolve 
to  destroy  Poland  had  in  no  way  lessened  but  he  was 
more  anxious  than  he  had  been  two  days  before,  when  he 
had  talked  with  Henderson  at  Berchtesgaden,  to  make  one 
last  attempt  to  keep  Britain  out  of  the  war.*  The  am- 


* According  to  Erich  Kordt  (Wahn  und  Wirklichkeit,  p.  192)  Hitler  was  so 
excited  by  his  triumph  in  Moscow  that  on  the  morning  of  August  25  he 


730 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


bassador  found  the  Fuehrer,  as  he  reported  to  London, 
“absolutely  calm  and  normal  and  [he]  spoke  with  great 
earnestness  and  apparent  sincerity.”  Despite  all  his  ex- 
perience of  the  past  year  Henderson  could  not,  even  at 
this  late  date,  see  through  the  “sincerity”  of  the  German 
Leader.  For  what  Hitler  had  to  say  was  quite  preposterous. 
He  “accepted”  the  British  Empire,  he  told  the  ambassador, 
and  was  ready  “to  pledge  himself  personally  to  its  con- 
tinued existence  and  to  commit  the  power  of  the  German 
Reich  for  this.” 

He  desired  [Hitler  explained]  to  make  a move  toward 
England  which  should  be  as  decisive  as  the  move  towards 
Russia  . . . The  Fuehrer  is  ready  to  conclude  agreements 
with  England  which  would  not  only  guarantee  the  existence 
of  the  British  Empire  in  all  circumstances  so  far  as  Germany 
is  concerned,  but  would  also  if  necessary  assure  the  British 
Empire  of  German  assistance  regardless  of  where  such  as- 
sistance should  be  necessary. 

He  would  also  be  ready,  he  added,  “to  accept  a rea- 
sonable limitation  of  armaments”  and  to  regard  the  Reich’s 
western  frontiers  as  final.  At  one  point,  according  to  Hen- 
derson, Hitler  lapsed  into  a typical  display  of  sentimental 
hogwash,  though  the  ambassador  did  not  describe  it  as 
that  when  he  recounted  it  in  his  dispatch  to  London.  The 
Fuehrer  stated 

that  he  was  by  nature  an  artist,  not  a politician,  and  that 
once  the  Polish  question  was  settled  he  would  end  his  life 
as  an  artist  and  not  as  a warmonger. 

But  the  dictator  ended  on  another  note. 

The  Fuehrer  repeated  [says  the  verbal  statement  drawn 
up  by  the  Germans  for  Henderson]  that  he  is  a man  of 
great  decisions  . . . and  that  this  is  his  last  offer.  If  they 
[the  British  government]  reject  these  ideas,  there  will  be 
war. 

In  the  course  of  the  interview  Hitler  repeatedly  pointed 
out  that  his  “large  comprehensive  offer”  to  Britain,  as 
he  described  it,  was  subject  to  one  condition:  that  it 
would  take  effect  only  “after  the  solution  of  the  German- 
Polish  problem.”  When  Henderson  kept  insisting  that 

asked  his  press  bureau  for  news  of  the  cabinet  crises  in  Paris  and  London. 
He  thought  both  governments  must  fall.  He  was  brought  down  to  earth  by 
being  told  of  the  firm  speeches  of  Chamberlain  and  Halifax  in  Parliament 
the  day  before. 


The  Road  to  War 


731 


Britain  could  not  consider  his  offer  unless  it  meant  at  the 
same  time  a peaceful  settlement  with  Poland,  Hitler  re- 
plied, “If  you  think  it  useless  then  do  not  send  my  offer 
at  all.” 

However,  the  ambassador  had  scarcely  returned  to  the 
embassy  a few  steps  up  the  Wilhelmstrasse  from  the  Chan- 
cellery before  Dr.  Schmidt  was  knocking  at  the  door  with 
a written  copy  of  Hitler’s  remarks — with  considerable  de- 
letions— coupled  with  a message  from  the  Fuehrer  beg- 
ging Henderson  to  urge  the  British  government  “to  take 
the  offer  very  seriously”  and  suggesting  that  he  himself 
fly  to  London  with  it,  for  which  purpose  a German  plane 
would  be  at  his  disposal.6 

It  was  rarely  easy,  as  readers  who  have  got  this  far  in 
this  book  are  aware,  to  penetrate  the  strange  and  fantastic 
workings  of  Hitler’s  fevered  mind.  His  ridiculous  “offer” 
of  August  25  to  guarantee  the  British  Empire  was  ob- 
viously a brain  storm  of  the  moment,  for  he  had  not  men- 
tioned it  two  days  betcre  when  he  discussed  Chamber- 
lain’s letter  with  Henderson  and  composed  a reply  to  it. 
Even  making  allowances  for  the  dictator’s  aberrations,  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  he  himself  took  it  as  seriously 
as  he  made  out  to  the  British  ambassador.  Besides,  how 
could  the  British  government,  as  he  requested,  be  asked  to 
take  it  “very  seriously”  when  Chamberlain  would  scarce- 
ly have  time  to  read  it  before  the  Nazi  armies  hurtled 
into  Poland  at  dawn  on  the  morrow — the  X Day  which 
still  held? 

But  behind  the  “offer,”  no  doubt,  was  a serious  purpose. 
Hitler  apparently  believed  that  Chamberlain,  like  Stalin, 
wanted  an  out  by  which  he  could  keep  his  country  out  of 
war.*  He  had  purchased  Stalin’s  benevolent  neutrality 
two  days  before  by  offering  Russia  a free  hand  in  Eastern 
Europe  “from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.”  Could  he  not 
buy  Britain’s  nonintervention  by  assuring  the  Prime  Min- 
ister that  the  Third  Reich  would  never,  like  the  Hohen- 
zollern  Germany,  become  a threat  to  the  British  Empire? 
What  Hitler  did  not  realize,  nor  Stalin — to  the  latter’s 

* Or  if  not  out  of  war,  out  of  any  serious  participation  in  it.  General  Haider 

intimates  this  in  a recapitulation  of  the  ‘‘sequence  of  events”  of  August  25 
in  a diary  entry  made  later,  on  August  28.  Noting  that  at  1:30  p.m.  on  the 
twenty-fifth  Hitler  saw  Henderson,  Haider  added:  “Fuehrer  would  not  take 
it  amiss  if  England  were  to  wage  a sham  war.” 


732  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

awful  cost — was  that  to  Chamberlain,  his  eyes  open  at 
long  last,  Germany’s  domination  of  the  European  continent 
would  be  the  greatest  of  all  threats  to  the  British  Empire 
— as  indeed  it  would  be  to  the  Soviet  Russian  Empire. 
For  centuries,  as  Hitler  had  noted  in  Mein  Kampf,  the 
first  imperative  of  British  foreign  policy  had  been  to  pre- 
vent any  single  nation  from  dominating  the  Continent. 

At  5:30  p.m.  Hitler  received  the  French  ambassador  but 
had  little  of  importance  to  say  to  him  beyond  repeating 
that  “Polish  provocation  of  the  Reich”  could  no  longer  be 
endured,  that  he  would  not  attack  France  but  that  if 
France  entered  the  conflict  he  would  fight  her  to  the  end. 
Whereupon  he  started  to  dismiss  the  French  envoy  by 
rising  from  his  chair.  But  Coulondre  had  something  to 
say  to  the  Fuehrer  of  the  Third  Reich  and  he  insisted  on 
saying  it.  He  told  him  on  his  word  of  honor  as  a soldier 
that  he  had  not  the  least  doubt  “that  if  Poland  is  attacked 
France  will  be  at  the  side  of  Poland  with  all  its  forces.” 

“It  is  painful  to  me,”  Hitler  replied,  “to  think  of  having 
to  fight  your  country,  but  that  does  not  depend  on  me. 
Please  say  that  to  Monsieur  Daladier.” 6 

It  was  now  6 p.m.  of  August  25  in  Berlin.  Tension  in  the 
capital  had  been  building  up  all  day.  Sincj  early  afternoon 
all  radio,  telegraph  and  telephone  communication  with 
the  outside  world  had  been  cut  off  on  orders  from  the 
Wilhelmstrasse.  The  night  before,  the  last  of  the  British 
and  French  correspondents  and  nonofficial  civilians  had 
hurriedly  left  for  the  nearest  frontier.  During  the  day  of 
the  twenty-fifth,  a Friday,  it  became  known  that  the  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  had  wired  the  embassies  and  consu- 
lates in  Poland,  France  and  Britain  requesting  that  Ger- 
man citizens  be  asked  to  leave  by  the  quickest  route. 
My  own  diary  notes  for  August  24-25  recall  the  feverish 
atmosphere  in  Berlin.  The  weather  was  warm  and  sultry 
and  everyone  seemed  to  be  on  edge.  All  through  the 
sprawling  city  antiaircraft  guns  were  being  set  up,  and 
bombers  flew  continually  overhead  in  the  direction  of  Po- 
land. “It  looks  like  war,”  I scribbled  on  the  evening  of  the 
twenty-fourth;  “War  is  imminent,”  I repeated  the  next  day, 
and  on  both  nights,  I remember,  the  Germans  we  saw  in 
the  Wilhelmstrasse  whispered  that  Hitler  had  ordered  the 
soldiers  to  march  into  Poland  at  dawn. 


The  Road  to  War  733 

Their  orders,  we  now  know,  were  to  attack  at  4:30  on 
Saturday  morning,  August  26.*  And  up  until  6 p.m.  on 
the  twenty-fifth  nothing  that  had  happened  during  the 
day,  certainly  not  the  personal  assurances  of  Ambassadors 
Henderson  and  Coulondre  that  Britain  and  France  would 
surely  honor  their  commitments  to  Poland,  had  budged 
Adolf  Hitler  from  his  resolve  to  go  ahead  with  his  aggres- 
sion on  schedule.  But  about  6 p.m.,  or  shortly  afterward, 
there  arrived  news  from  London  and  Rome  that  made 
this  man  of  apparently  unshakable  will  hesitate. 

It  is  not  quite  clear  from  the  confidential  German  rec- 
ords and  the  postwar  testimony  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse 
officials  at  just  what  time  Hitler  learned  of  the  signing  in 
London  of  the  formal  Anglo— Polish  treaty  which  trans- 
formed Britain’s  unilateral  guarantee  of  Poland  into  a pact 
of  mutual  assistance.f  There  is  some  evidence  in  Haider’s 
diary  and  in  the  German  Naval  Register  that  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse got  wind  . t noon  on  August  25  that  the  pact 
would  be  signed  during  the  day.  The  General  Staff  Chief 
notes  that  at  12  noon  he  got  a call  from  OKW  asking 
what  was  the  latest  deadline  for  postponement  of  the 
decision  to  attack  and  that  he  replied:  3 p.m.  The  Naval 
Register  also  mentions  that  news  of  the  Anglo-Polish 
pact  and  of  “information  from  the  Duce”  was  received  at 
noon.7  But  this  is  impossible.  Word  from  Mussolini  did 
not  arrive,  according  to  a German  notation  on  the  docu- 
ment, until  “about  6 p.m.”  And  Hitler  could  not  have 
learned  of  the  signing  of  the  Anglo-Polish  treaty  in 
London  until  about  that  time,  since  this  event  only  took 
place  at  5:35  p.m. — and,  at  that,  barely  fifteen  minutes 
after  the  Polish  ambassador  in  London,  Count  Edward 
Raczynski,  had  received  permission  from  his  Foreign  Min- 

* Although  Hitler’s  standing  orders,  which  had  not  been  canceled,  called  for 
the  attack  on  this  day  and  hour  and,  as  Haider  said,  were  “automatic,”  a 
number  of  German  writers  have  reported  that  the  Fuehrer  gave  specific 
orders  a few  minutes  after  3 p.m.  to  launch  Fall  Weiss  the  following  morn- 
ing- (See  Weizsaecker,  Memoirs;  Kordt,  Wahn  und  Wirklichkeit ; and 
Walther  Hofer,  War  Premeditated,  1939.)  Hofer  says  the  order  was  given 
at  3:02  p.m.  and  cites  as  his  source  General  von  Vormann,  who  was  present 
at  the  Chancellery  when  it  was  issued.  No  official  record  of  this  has  been 
found  in  the  German  documents. 

t There  was  a secret  protocol  to  this  treaty  which  stated  that  the  “European 
Power  mentioned  in  Article  I,  whose  aggression  would  bring  about  mutual 
military  assistance,  was  Germany.  This  saved  the  British  government  from 
the  disastrous  step  of  having  to  declare  war  on  the  Soviet  Union  when  the 
Red  Army,  in  cahoots  with  the  Germans,  invaded  eastern  Poland. 


734  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ister  in  Warsaw  over  the  telephone  to  affix  his  signature.* 
Whatever  time  he  received  it — and  around  6 p.m.  is  an 
accurate  guess — Hitler  was  moved  by  the  news  from  Lon- 
don. This  could  well  be  Britain’s  answer  to  his  “offer,” 
the  terms  of  which  must  have  reached  London  by  now. 
It  meant  that  he  had  failed  in  his  bid  to  buy  off  the 
British  as  he  had  bought  off  the  Russians.  Dr.  Schmidt, 
who  was  in  Hitler’s  office  when  the  report  arrived,  re- 
membered later  that  the  Fuehrer,  after  reading  it  sat 
brooding  at  his  desk.8 


MUSSOLINI  GETS  COLD  FEET 

His  brooding  was  interrupted  very  shortly  by  equally 
bad  news  from  Rome.  Throughout  the  afternoon  the  Ger- 
man dictator  had  waited  with  “unconcealed  impatience,” 
as  Dr.  Schmidt  describes  it,  for  the  Duce’s  reply  to  his 
letter.  The  Italian  ambassador,  Attolico,  was  summoned 
to  the  Chancellery  at  3 P.M.,  shotly  after  Henderson  had 
departed,  but  he  could  only  inform  the  Fuehrer  that  no 
answer  had  been  received  as  yet.  By  this  time  Hitler’s 
nerves  were  so  strained  that  he  sent  Ribbentrop  out  to  get 
piano  on  the  long-distance  telephone,  but  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister was  unable  to  get  through  to  him.  Attolico,  Schmidt 
says,  was  dismissed  “with  scant  courtesy.”  9 

For  some  days  Hitler  had  been  receiving  warnings  from 
Rome  that  his  Axis  partner  might  >o  back  on  him  at  the 
crucial  moment  of  the  attack  on  Poland,  and  this  intelli- 
gence was  not  without  foundation.  No  sooner  had  Ciano 
returned  from  his  disillusioning  meetings  with  Hitler  and 
Ribbentrop  on  August  11  to  13,  than  he  set  to  work  to 
turn  Mussolini  against  the  Germans — an  action  which  did 
not  escape  the  watchful  eyes  of  the  German  Embassy  in 
Rome.  The  Fascist  Foreign  Minister’s  diary  traces  the  ups 
and  downs  of  his  efforts  to  make  the  Italian  dictator  see 
the  light  and  disassociate  himself,  in  time,  from  Hitler’s 
war.10  On  the  evening  of  his  return  from  Berchtesgaden 
on  August  13,  Ciano  saw  the  Duce  and  after  describing 
his  talks  with  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  tried  to  convince  his 
chief  that  the  Germans  “have  betrayed  us  and  lied  to 
us”  and  “are  dragging  us  into  an  adventure.” 

The  Duce’s  reactions  are  varied  [Ciano  noted  in  his  diary 


* Germany  did  not  observe 
one-hour  difference  in  time 


summer  time,  as  did  Great  Britain.  Therefore  the 
between  Berlin  and  London  was  canceled  out. 


The  Road  to  War  735 

that  night].  At  first  he  agrees  with  me.  Then  he  says  that 
honor  compels  him  to  march  with  Germany.  Finally,  he 
states  that  he  wants  his  part  of  the  booty  in  Croatia  and 
Dalmatia. 

August  14. — I find  Mussolini  worried.  I do  not  hesitate  to 
arouse  in  him  every  possible  anti-German  reaction  by  every 
means  in  my  power.  I speak  to  him  of  his  diminished  pres- 
tige and  his  playing  the  role  of  second  fiddle.  And,  finally, 
I turn  over  to  him  documents  which  prove  the  bad  faith  of 
the  Germans  on  the  Polish  question.  The  alliance  was  based 
on  premises  which  they  now  deny;  they  are  traitors  and  we 
must  not  have  any  scruples  in  ditching  them.  But  Mussolini 
still  has  many  scruples. 

On  the  next  day,  Ciano  talked  it  out  with  Mussolini  for 
six  hours. 

August  15. — The  Duce  ...  is  convinced  that  we  must  not 
march  blindly  with  the  Germans.  However  ...  he  wants 
time  to  prepare  the  bri  ak  with  Germany  ...  He  is  more 
and  more  convinced  that  the  democracies  will  fight  . . . This 
time  it  means  war.  And  we  cannot  engage  in  war  because 
our  plight  does  not  permit  us  to  do  so. 

August  18. — A conversation  with  the  Duce  in  the  morn- 
ing; his  usual  shifting  feelings.  He  still  thinks  it  possible 
that  the  democracies  will  not  march  and  that  Germany 
might  do  good  business  cheaply,  from  which  business  he 
does  not  want  to  be  excluded.  Then,  too,  he  fears  Hitler’s 
rage.  He  believes  that  a denunciation  of  the  pact  or  some- 
thing like  it  might  induce  Hitler  to  abandon  the  Polish 
question  in  order  to  square  accounts  with  Italy.  All  this 
makes  him  nervous  and  disturbed. 

August  20. — The  Duce  made  an  about-face.  He  wants 
to  support  Germany  at  any  cost  in  the  conflict  which  is  now 
close  at  hand  . . . Conference  between  Mussolini,  myself, 
and  Attolico.  [The  ambassador  had  returned  from  Berlin 
to  Rome  for  consultations.]  This  is  the  substance:  It  is  al- 
ready too  late  to  go  back  on  the  Germans  . . . The  press  of 
the  whole  world  would  say  that  Italy  is  cowardly  ...  I try 
to  debate  the  matter  but  it  is  useless  now.  Mussolini  holds 
very  stubbornly  to  his  idea  . . . 

August  21. — Today  I have  spoken  very  clearly  . . . When 
I entered  the  room  Mussolini  confirmed  his  decision  to  go 
along  with  the  Germans.  “You,  Duce,  cannot  and  must  not 
do  it  ...  I went  to  Salzburg  in  order  to  adopt  a common 
line  of  action.  I found  myself  face  to  face  with  a Diktat. 
The  Germans,  not  ourselves,  have  betrayed  the  alliance  . . . 
Tear  up  the  pact.  Throw  it  in  Hitler’s  face!  . . .” 


736 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


The  upshot  of  this  conference  was  that  Ciano  should 
seek  a meeting  with  Ribbentrop  for  the  next  day  at  the 
Brenner  and  inform  him  that  Italy  would  stay  out  of  a 
conflict  provoked  by  a German  attack  on  Poland.  Ribben- 
trop was  not  available  for  several  hours  when  Ciano  put  in 
a call  for  him  at  noon,  but  at  5:30  he  finally  came  on  the 
line.  The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  could  not  give  Ciano  an 
immediate  answer  about  meeting  on  the  Brenner  on  such 
quick  notice,  because  he  was  “waiting  for  an  important 
message  from  Moscow”  and  would  call  back  later.  This 
he  did  at  10:30  p.m. 

August  22. — Last  evening  at  10:30  a new  act  opened 
[Ciano  recorded  in  his  diary].  Ribbentrop  telephoned  that 
he  would  prefer  to  see  me  in  Innsbruck  rather  than  at  the 
frontier,  because  he  was  to  leave  later  for  Moscow  to  sign  a 
political  pact  with  the  Soviet  Government. 

This  was  news,  and  of  the  most  startling  kind,  to  Ciano 
and  Mussolini.  They  decided  that  a meeting  of  the  two 
foreign  ministers  “would  no  longer  be  timely.”  Once  more 
their  German  ally  had  shown  its  contempt  for  them  by 
not  letting  them  know  about  the  deal  with  Moscow. 

The  hesitations  of  the  Duce,  the  anti-German  feelings 
of  Ciano  and  the  possibility  that  Italy  might  crawl  out  of 
its  obligations  under  Article  III  of  the  Pact  of  Steel,  which 
called  for  the  automatic  participation  in  war  of  one  party 
if  the  other  party  “became  involved  in  hostilities  with  an- 
other Power,”  became  known  in  Berlin  before  Ribbentrop 
set  off  for  Moscow  on  August  22. 

On  August  20,  Count  Massimo  Magistrati,  the  Italian 
charge  d’affaires  in  Berlin,  called  on  Weizsaecker  at  the 
Foreign  Office  and  revealed  “an  Italian  state  of  mind 
which,  although  it  does  not  surprise  me,”  the  State  Secre- 
tary informed  Ribbentrop  in  a confidential  memoran- 
dum,11 “must  in  my  opinion  definitely  be  considered.” 
What  Magistrati  brought  to  the  attention  of  Weizsaecker 
was  that  since  Germany  had  not  adhered  to  the  terms  of 
the  alliance,  which  called  for  close  contact  and  consulta- 
tion on  major  questions,  and  had  treated  its  conflict  with 
Poland  as  an  exclusively  German  problem,  “Germany  was 
thus  forgoing  Italy’s  armed  assistance.”  And  if  contrary  to 
the  German  view  the  Polish  conflict  developed  into  a big 


The  Road  to  War 


737 


war,  Italy  did  not  consider  that  the  “prerequisites”  of  the 
alliance  existed.  In  brief,  Italy  was  seeking  an  out. 

Two  days  later,  on  August  23,  a further  warning  was 
received  in  Berlin  from  Ambassador  Hans  Georg  von 
Mackensen  in  Rome.  He  wrote  to  Weizsaecker  on  what 
had  been  happening  “behind  the  scenes.”  The  letter,  ac- 
cording to  a marginal  note  in  Weizsaecker’s  handwriting 
on  the  captured  document,  was  “submitted  to  the  Fueh- 
rer.” It  must  have  opened  his  eyes.  The  Italian  position, 
following  a series  of  meetings  between  Mussolini,  Ciano 
and  Attolico,  was,  Mackensen  reported,  that  if  Germany 
invaded  Poland  she  would  violate  the  Pact  of  Steel,  which 
was  based  on  an  agreement  to  refrain  from  war  until 
1942.  Furthermore,  contrary  to  the  German  view,  Mus- 
solini was  sure  that  if  Germany  attacked  Poland  both 
Britain  and  France  would  intervene — “and  the  United 
States  too  after  a few  montiis.”  While  Germany  remained 
on  the  defensive  in  the  west  the  French  and  British, 

in  the  Duce’s  opinion,  would  descend  on  Italy  with  all  the 
forces  at  their  disposal.  In  this  situation  Italy  would  have 
to  bear  the  whole  brunt  of  the  war  in  order  to  give  the 
Reich  the  opportunity  of  liquidating  the  affair  in  the  East  . . .12 

It  was  with  these  warnings  in  mind  that  Hitler  got  off 
his  letter  to  Mussolini  on  the  morning  of  August  25  and 
waited  all  day,  with  mounting  impatience,  for  an  answer. 
Shortly  after  midnight  of  the  day  before,  Ribbentrop,  after 
an  evening  recounting  to  the  Fuehrer  the  details  of  his 
triumph  in  Moscow,  rang  up  Ciano  to  warn  him,  “at  the 
instigation  of  the  Fuehrer,”  of  the  “extreme  gravity  of  the 
situation  due  to  Polish  provocations.”  * A note  by  Weiz- 
saecker reveals  that  the  call  was  made  to  “prevent  the 
Italians  from  being  able  to  speak  of  unexpected  develop- 
ments.” 

By  the  time  Ambassador  Mackensen  handed  Mussolini 
Hitler’s  letter  at  the  Palazzo  Venezia  in  Rome  at  3:20 
p.M.  on  August  25,  the  Duce,  then,  knew  that  the  German 
attack  on  Poland  was  about  to  take  place.  Unlike  Hitler, 

* It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  “Polish  provocations”  which  Hitler  and 
Ribbentrop  harped  on  in  their  meetings  and  diplomatic  exchanges  with  the 
British,  French,  Russians  and  Italians  during  these  days,  and  the  news  of 
which  was  published  under  flaming  headlines  in  the  controlled  Nazi  press, 
were  almost  entirely  invented  by  the  Germans.  Most  of  the  provoking  in 
Poland  was  done,  on  orders  from  Berlin,  by  the  Germans.  The  captured 
German  documents  are  replete  with  evidence  on  this. 


738 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


he  was  certain  that  Great  Britain  and  France  would  im- 
mediately enter  the  war,  with  catastrophic  consequences 
for  Italy,  whose  Navy  was  no  match  for  the  British  Medi- 
terranean Fleet  and  whose  Army  would  be  overwhelmed 
by  the  French.*  According  to  a dispatch  which  Macken- 
sen  got  off  to  Berlin  at  10:25  p.m.  describing  the  meeting, 
Mussolini,  after  carefully  reading  the  letter  twice  in  his 
presence,  declared  that  he  was  “in  complete  agreement” 
about  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  and  that  he  realized  that  an 
“armed  conflict  with  Poland  could  no  longer  be  avoided.” 
Finally — “and  this  he  emphasized  expressly,”  Mackensen 
reported — “he  stood  beside  us  unconditionally  and  with 
all  his  resources.”  13 

But  this  was  not  what  the  Duce  wrote  the  Fuehrer,  un- 
beknownst to  the  German  ambassador,  the  text  of  which 
was  hurriedly  telephoned  by  Ciano  to  Attolico,  who  had 
returned  to  his  post  in  Berlin  and  who  “about  6 p.m.” 
arrived  at  the  Chancellery  to  deliver  it  in  person  to  Adolf 
Hitler.  It  struck  the  Fuehrer,  according  to  Schmidt,  who 
was  present,  like  a bombshell.  After  expressing  his  “com- 
plete approval”  of  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  and  his  “under- 
standing concerning  Poland,”  Mussolini  came  to  the  main 
point. 

As  for  the  practical  attitude  :f  Italy  in  case  of  military 
action  [Mussolini  wrote,  and  the  emphasis  is  his],  my 
point  of  view  is  as  follows: 

If  Germany  attacks  Poland  and  the  conflict  remains  local- 
ized, Italy  will  afford  Germany  every  form  of  political 
and  economic  assistance  which  is  requested  of  her. 

If  Germany  attacks  Poland  t and  the  latter’s  allies  open  a 
counterattack  against  Germany,  I inform  you  in  advance 
that  it  will  be  opportune  for  me  not  to  take  the  initiative 

* The  day  before,  on  August  24,  Ciano  had  visited  the  King  at  his  summer 
residence  in  Piedmont,  and  the  aging  ruler,  who  had  been  shunted  to  the 
sidelines  by  Mussolini,  spoke  contemptuously  of  the  country’s  armed  services. 

The  Army  is  in  a pitiful  state,”  Ciano  quotes  him  as  saying.  “Even  the" 
defense  of  our  frontier  is  insufficient.  He  has  made  thirty-two  inspections 
and  is  convinced  that  the  French  can  go  through  it  with  great  ease.  The 
officers  of  the  Italian  Army  are  not  qualified  for  the  job,  and  our  equipment 
is  old  and  obsolete.”  (Ciano  Diaries,  p.  127.) 

t In  the  German  translation  of  Mussolini’s  letter  found  in  the  Foreign  Office 
archives  after  the  war,  and  which  1 have  used  here,  the  word  “Germany”  has 
been  crossed  out  here  and  the  word  “Poland”  typed  above  it,  making  it  read: 

If  Poland  attacks  . . .”  In  the  Italian  original,  published  after  the  war 
by  the  Italian  government,  the  passage  reads  liSe  la  Germania  attacca  la 
Polonxa.  It  is  strange  that  the  Nazis  falsified  even  the  secret  documents 
deposited  in  their  official  government  archives.14 


The  Road  to  War 


739 


in  military  operations  in  view  of  the  present  state  of  Italian 
war  preparations,  of  which  we  have  repeatedly  and  in  good 
time  informed  you,  Fuehrer,  and  Herr  von  Ribbentrop. 

Our  intervention  can,  nevertheless,  take  place  at  once  if 
Germany  delivers  to  us  immediately  the  military  supplies 
and  the  raw  materials  to  resist  the  attack  which  the  French 
and  English  would  predominantly  direct  against  us. 

At  our  meetings  the  war  was  envisaged  for  1942,  and  by 
that  time  I would  have  been  ready  on  land,  on  sea  and  in 
the  air,  according  to  the  plans  which  had  been  concerted. 

I am  furthermore  of  the  opinion  that  the  purely  military 
measures  which  have  already  been  taken,  and  other  measures 
to  be  taken  later,  will  immobilize,  in  Europe  and  Africa, 
considerable  French  and  British  forces. 

I consider  it  my  bounden  duty  as  a loyal  friend  to  tell 
you  the  whole  truth  and  inform  you  beforehand  about 
the  real  situation.  Not  to  do  so  might  have  unpleasant 
consequences  for  us  all.  This  is  my  view,  and  since  within 
a short  time  I must  summon  the  highest  governmental 
bodies,  I beg  you  to  let  me  knows  yours. 

Mussolini  * 15 

So  though  Russia  was  in  the  bag  as  a friendly  neutral 
instead  of  a belligerent,  Germany’s  ally  of  the  Pact  of 
Steel  was  out  of  it — and  this  on  the  very  day  that  Britain 
had  seemed  to  commit  herself  irrevocably  by  signing  a 
mutual-assistance  pact  with  Poland  against  German  ag- 
gression. Hitler  read  the  Duce’s  letter,  told  Attolico  he 
would  answer  it  immediately  and  icily  dismissed  the  Ital- 
ian envoy. 

* As  if  Mussolini’s  letter  were  not  bad  enough  medicine  for  Hitler,  a number 
of  German  writers,  mostly  observers  at  first  hand  of  the  dramatic  events 
of  the  last  days  of  peace,  have  published  an  imaginary  text  of  this  letter 
of  the  Duce  to  the  Fuehrer.  Erich  Kordt,  one  of  the  anti-Nazi  conspirators, 
who  was  head  of  the  secretariat  at  the  Foreign  Office,  was  the  first  to 
commit  this  faked  version  to  print  in  his  book,  Wahn  und  IVirklichkeit, 
published  in  Stuttgart  in  1947.  Kordt  dropped  it  in  his  second  edition  but 
other  writers  continued  to  copy  it  from  the  first  edition.  It  shows  up  in 
Peter  Kleist’s  Zwischen  Hitler  und  Stalin,  published  in.  1950,  and  even  in 
the  English  translation  of  Paul  Schmidt’s  memoirs  published  in  New  York 
and  London  in  1951.  Yet  the  authentic  text  was  published  in  Italy  in  1946 
and  an  English  translation  in  the  State  Department’s  Nazi— Soviet  Relations 
in  1948.  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  was  with  Hitler  when  he  received  the  letter  from 
Attolico,  quotes  the  letter  as  saying,  “In  one  of  the  most  painful  moments 
of  my  life,  I have  to  inform  you  that  Italy  is  not  ready  for  war.  According 
to  what  the  responsible  heads  of  the  services  tell  me,  the  gasoline  supplies 
of  the  Italian  Air  Force  are  so  low  that  they  would  last  only  for  three  weeks 
of  fighting.  The  position  is  the  same  with  regard  to  supplies  for  the  Army, 
and  supplies  of  raw  materials  . . . Please  understand  my  situation.”  For 
an  amusing  note  on  the  faking  of  this  letter,  see  Namier,  In  the  Nazi  Era, 
p.  5. 


740  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“The  Italians  are  behaving  just  as  the  did  in  1914,” 
Dr.  Schmidt  overheard  Hitler  remark  bitterly  after  Attolico 
had  left,  and  that  evening  the  Chancellery  echoed  with 
unkind  words  about  the  “disloyal  Axis  partner.”  But 
words  were  not  enough.  The  German  Army  was  scheduled 
to  hop  off  against  Poland  in  nine  hours,  for  it  was  now 
6:30  p.m.  of  August  25  and  the  invasion  was  set  to  begin 
at  4:30  a.m.  on  August  26.  The  Nazi  dictator  had  to 
decide  at  once  whether,  in  view  of  the  news  from  London 
and  Rome,  to  go  ahead  with  it  or  postpone  or  cancel  it. 

Schmidt,  accompanying  Attolico  out  of  Hitler’s  study, 
bumped  into  General  Keitel  rushing  to  the  presence  of  the 
Fuehrer.  A few  minutes  later  the  General  hurried  out, 
crying  excitedly  to  his  adjutant,  “The  order  to  advance 
must  be  delayed  again!” 

Hitler,  pushed  into  a corner  by  Mussolini  and  Chamber- 
lain,  had  swiftly  made  his  decision.  “Fuehrer  considerably 
shaken,”  Haider  noted  in  his  diary,  and  then  continued: 

7:30  p.m. — Treaty  between  Poland  and  England  ratified. 
No  opening  of  hostilities.  All  troop  movements  to  be  stopped, 
even  near  the  frontier  if  not  otherwise  possible. 

8:35  p.m. — Keitel  confirms.  Canaris:  Telephone  restric- 
tions lifted  on  England  and  France.  Confirms  development  of 
events. 

The  German  Naval  Register  gives  a more  concise  ac- 
count of  the  postponement,  along  with  the  reasons: 

August  25: — Case  White  already  started  will  be  stopped  at 
20:30  (8:30  p.m.)  because  of  changed  political  conditions. 
(Mutual-Assistance  Pact  England-Poland  of  August  25, 
noon,  and  information  from  Duce  that  he  would  be  true  to 
his  word  but  has  to  ask  for  large  supply  of  raw  materials.)  16 

Three  of  the  chief  defendants  at  Nuremberg  submitted, 
under  interrogation,  their  version  of  the  postponement  of 
the  attack.17  Ribbentrop  claimed  that  when  he  heard  about 
the  Anglo-Polish  pact  and  “heard”  that  “military  steps 
were  being  taken  against  Poland”  (as  if  he  didn’t  know  all 
along  about  the  attack)  he  went  “at  once”  to  the  Fuehrer 
and  urged  him  to  call  off  the  invasion  of  Poland,  to 
which  “the  Fuehrer  at  once  agreed.”  This  is  surely  en- 
tirely untrue. 

But  the  testimony  of  Keitel  and  Goering  at  least  seemed 
more  honest.  “I  was  suddenly  called  to  Hitler  at  the 


The  Hoad  to  War 


741 

Chancellery,”  Keitel  recounted  on  the  stand  at  Nurem- 
berg, “and  he  said  to  me,  ‘Stop  everything  at  once.  Get 
Brauchitsch  immediately.  I need  time  for  negotiations.’  ” 

That  Hitler  still  believed  at  this  late  hour  that  he  could 
negotiate  his  way  out  of  his  impasse  was  confirmed  by 
Goering  during  a pretrial  interrogation  at  Nuremberg. 

On  the  day  that  England  gave  her  official  guarantee  to 
Poland  the  Fuehrer  called  me  on  the  telephone  and  told  me 
that  he  had  stopped  the  planned  invasion  of  Poland.  I asked 
him  whether  this  was  just  temporary  or  for  good.  He  said, 
“No,  I will  have  to  see  whether  we  can  eliminate  British  in- 
tervention.” 

Though  Mussolini’s  last-minute  defection  was  a heavy 
blow  to  Hitler,  it  is  obvious  from  the  above  testimony 
that  Britain’s  action  in  signing  a mutual-assistance  treaty 
with  Poland  was  the  stronger  influence  in  inducing  the 
German  leader  to  postpone  the  attack.  Yet  it  is  strange 
that  after  Ambassador  Henderson  on  this  very  day  had 
again  warned  him  that  Britain  would  fight  if  Poland  were 
attacked  and  that  after  the  British  government  had  now 
solemnly  given  its  word  to  that  effect  in  a formal  treaty,  he 
still  believed  he  could,  as  he  told  Goering,  “eliminate 
British  intervention.”  It  is  likely  that  his  experience  with 
Chamberlain  at  Munich  led  him  to  believe  that  the  Prime 
Minister  again  would  capitulate  if  a way  out  could  be 
concocted.  But  again  it  is  strange  that  a man  who  had 
previously  shown  such  insight  into  foreign  politics  did  not 
know  of  the  changes  in  Chamberlain  and  in  the  British 
position.  After  all.  Hitler  himself  had  provoked  them. 

It  took  some  doing  to  halt  the  German  Army  on  the 
evening  of  August  25,  for  many  units  were  already  on  the 
move.  In  East  Prussia  the  order  calling  off  the  attack 
reached  General  Petzel’s  I Corps  at  9:37  p.m.  and  only  the 
frantic  efforts  of  several  officers  who  were  rushed  out  to 
the  forward  detachments  succeeded  in  stopping  the  troops. 
The  motorized  columns  of  General  von  Kleist’s  corps  to  the 
south  had  begun  to  move  at  dusk  up  to  the  Polish  frontier. 
They  were  halted  on  the  border  by  a staff  officer  who 
made  a quick  landing  in  a small  scouting  plane  on  the 
frontier.  In  a few  sectors  the  orders  did  not  arrive  until 
after  the  shooting  began,  but  since  the  Germans  had  been 
provoking  incidents  all  along  the  border  for  several  days 


742 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  Polish  General  Staff  apparently  did  not  suspect  what 
had  really  happened.  It  did  report  on  August  26  that 
numerous  “German  bands”  had  crossed  the  border  and  at- 
tacked blockhouses  and  customs  posts  with  machine  guns 
and  hand  grenades  and  that  “in  one  case  it  was  a Regular 
Army  detachment.” 

JOY  AND  CONFUSION  OF  THE  “CONSPIRATORS” 

The  news  on  the  evening  of  August  25  that  Hitler  had 
called  off  the  attack  on  Poland  caused  great  jubilation 
among  the  conspiratorial  members  of  the  Abwehr.  Colonel 
Oster  gave  Schacht  and  Gisevius  the  news,  exclaiming, 
“The  Fuehrer  is  done  for,”  and  the  next  morning  Admiral 
Canaris  was  even  more  in  the  clouds.  “Hitler,”  Canaris 
declared,  “will  never  survive  this  blow.  Peace  has  been 
saved  for  the  next  twenty  years.”  Both  men  thought  there 
was  no  further  need  of  bothering  to  overthrow  the  Nazi 
dictator;  he  was  finished. 

For  several  weeks  as  the  fateful  summer  approached  its 
end  the  conspirators,  as  they  conceived  themselves,  had 
again  been  busy,  though  with  what  purpose  exactly  it  is 
difficult  to  comprehend.  Goerdeler,  Adam  von  Trott,  Hel- 
muth  von  Moltke,  Fabian  von  Schlabrendorff  and  Rudolf 
Pechel  had  all  made  the  pilgrimage  to  London  and  there 
had  informed  not  only  Chamberlain  and  Halifax  but 
Churchill  and  other  British  leaders  that  Hitler  planned  to 
attack  Poland  at  the  end  of  August.  These  German  op- 
ponents of  the  Fuehrer  could  see  for  themselves  that  Brit- 
ain, right  up  to  its  umbrella-carrying  Chamberlain,  had 
changed  since  the  days  of  Munich,  and  that  the  one  con- 
dition they  themselves  had  made  the  year  before  to  their 
resolve  to  get  rid  of  Hitler,  namely  that  Britain  and  France 
declare  they  would  oppose  any  further  Nazi  aggression  by 
armed  force,  had  now  been  fulfilled.  What  more  did  they 
want?  It  is  not  clear  from  the  records  they  have  left,  and 
one  gathers  the  impression  that  they  did  not  quite  know 
themselves.  Well-meaning  though  they  were,  they  were 
gripped  by  utter  confusion  and  a paralyzing  sense  of 
futility.  Hitler’s  hold  on  Germany— on  the  Army,  the 
police,  the  government,  the  people — was  too  complete  to 
be  loosened  or  undermined  by  anything  they  could  think 
of  doing. 


The  Road  to  War 


743 


On  August  15,  Hassell  visited  Dr.  Schacht  at  his  new 
bachelor  quarters  in  Berlin.  The  dismissed  Minister 
of  Economics  had  just  returned  from  a six-month  journey 
to  India  and  Burma.  “Schacht’s  view  is,”  Hassell  wrote  in 
his  diary,  “that  we  can  do  nothing  but  keep  our  eyes  open 
and  wait,  that  things  will  follow  their  inevitable  course.” 
Hassell  himself  told  Gisevius  the  same  day,  according  to 
his  own  diary  entry,  that  he  “too  was  in  favor  of  post- 
poning direct  action  for  the  moment.” 

But  what  “direct  action”  was  there  to  be  put  off?  Gen- 
eral Haider,  keen  as  Hitler  to  smash  Poland,  was  not  at  the 
moment  interested  in  getting  rid  of  the  dictator.  General 
von  Witzleben,  who  was  to  have  led  the  troops  in  the 
overthrow  of  the  Fuehrer  the  year  before,  was  now  in  com- 
mand of  an  army  group  in  the  west  and  was,  therefore,  in 
no  position  to  act  in  Berlin,  even  if  he  had  wished  to. 
But  did  he  have  any  such  wish?  Gisevius  visited  him  at 
his  headquarters,  found  him  listening  to  the  BBC  radio 
news  from  London  and  soon  realized  that  the  General 
was  interested  merely  in  finding  out  what  was  going  on. 

As  for  General  Haider,  he  was  preoccupied  with  last-min- 
ute plans  for  the  onslaught  on  Poland,  to  the  exclusion 
of  any  treasonable  thoughts  about  getting  rid  of  Hitler. 
When  interrogated  after  the  war — on  February  26,  1946 
— at  Nuremberg,  he  was  exceedingly  fuzzy  about  why  he 
and  the  other  supposed  enemies  of  the  Nazi  regime  had 
done  nothing  in  the  last  days  of  August  to  depose  the 
Fuehrer  and  thus  save  Germany  from  involvement  in  war. 
“There  was  no  possibility,”  he  said.  Why?  Because  General 
von  Witzleben  had  been  transferred  to  the  west.  Without 
Witzleben  the  Army  could  not  act. 

What  about  the  German  people?  When  Captain  Sam 
Harris,  the  American  interrogator,  reminding  Haider  that  he 
had  said  the  German  people  were  opposed  to  war,  asked, 
“If  Hitler  were  irrevocably  committed  to  war,  why  couldn’t 
you  count  on  the  support  of  the  people  before  the  invasion 
of  Poland?”  Haider  replied,  “You  must  excuse  me  if  I 
smile.  If  I hear  the  word  ‘irrevocably’  connected  with 
Hitler,  I must  say  that  nothing  was  irrevocable.”  And 
the  General  Staff  Chief  went  on  to  explain  that  as  late  as 
August  22,  after  Hitler  had  revealed  to  his  generals 
at  the  meeting  on  the  Obersalzberg  his  “irrevocable”  resolve 


744 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  attack  Poland  and  fight  the  West  if  necessary,  he 
himself  did  not  believe  that  the  Fuehrer  would  do  what  he 
said  he  would  do.18  In  the  light  of  Haider’s  own  diary 
entries  for  this  period,  this  is  an  astonishing  statement  in- 
deed. But  it  is  typical  not  only  of  Haider  but  of  most  of  the 
other  conspirators. 

Where  was  General  Beck,  Haider’s  predecessor  as  Chief 
/ of  the  Army  General  Staff  and  the  acknowledged  leader 
>■  of  the  conspirators?  According  to  Gisevius,  Beck  wrote  a 
1 letter  to  General  von  Brauchitsch  but  the  Army  Com- 
mander in  Chief  did  not  even  acknowledge  it.  Next,  Gise- 
vius says,  Beck  had  a long  talk  with  Haider,  who  agreed 
with  him  that  a big  war  would  be  the  ruin  of  Germany  but 
thought  “Hitler  would  never  permit  a world  war”  and  that 
therefore  there  was  no  need  at  the  moment  to  try  to  over- 
throw him.19 

On  August  14,  Hassell  dined  alone  with  Beck,  and  re- 
corded their  feelings  of  frustration  in  his  diary. 

Beck  [is]  a most  cultured,  attractive  and  intelligent 
man.  Unfortunately,  he  has  a very  low  opinion  of  the  lead- 
ing people  in  the  Army.  For  that  reason  he  could  see  no 
place  there  where  we  could  gain  a foothold.  He  is  firmly 
convinced  of  the  vicious  character  of  the  policies  of  the 
Third  Reich.20 

The  convictions  of  Beck — and  of  the  others  around  him 
— were  high  and  noble,  but  as  Adolf  Hitler  prepared  to  hurl 
Germany  into  war  not  one  of  these  estimable  Germans  did 
anything  to  halt  him.  The  task  was  obviously  difficult  and 
perhaps,  at  this  late  hour,  impossible  to  fulfill.  But  they 
did  not  even  attempt  it. 

General  Thomas,  perhaps,  tried.  Following  up  his  mem- 
orandum to  Keitel  which  he  had  personally  read  to  the 
OKW  Chief  at  the  middle  of  August,*  he  called  on  him 
again  on  Sunday,  August  27,  and,  according  to  his  own 
account,  “handed  him  graphically  illustrated  statistical 
evidence  . . . [which]  demonstrated  clearly  the  tre- 
mendous military-economic  superiority  of  the  Western 
Powers  and  the  tribulation  we  would  face.”  Keitel,  with 
unaccustomed  courage,  showed  the  material  to  Hitler,  who 
replied  that  he  did  not  share  General  Thomas’  “anxiety 


* See  above,  pp.  690-91. 


The  Road  to  Wap 


745 

over  the  danger  of  a world  war,  especially  since  he  had 
now  got  the  Soviet  Union  on  his  side.” 21 

Thus  ended  the  attempts  of  the  “conspirators”  to  pre- 
vent Hitler  from  launching  World  War  II,  except  for  the 
feeble  last-minute  efforts  of  Dr.  Schacht,  of  which  the 
canny  financier  made  much  in  his  own  defense  at  the 
Nuremberg  trial.  On  his  return  from  India  in  August  he 
wrote  letters  to  Hitler,  Goering  and  Ribbentrop — at  the 
fateful  moment  none  of  the  opposition  leaders  seem  to 
have  gone  beyond  writing  letters  and  memoranda — but,  to 
his  “very  great  surprise,”  as  he  said  later,  received  no 
replies.  Next  he  decided  to  go  to  Zossen,  a few  miles 
southeast  of  Berlin,  where  the  Army  High  Command  had 
set  up  headquarters  for  the  Polish  campaign,  and  per- 
sonally confront  General  von  Brauchitsch.  To  tell  him 
what?  On  the  witness  stand  at  Nuremberg  Schacht  ex- 
plained that  he  intended  to  tell  the  Army  chief  that  it 
would  be  unconstitutional  for  Germany  to  go  to  war 
without  the  approval  of  the  Reichstag!  It  was  therefore 
the  duty  of  the  Army  Commander  in  Chief  to  respect  his 
oath  to  the  constitution! 

Alas,  Dr.  Schacht  never  got  to  see  Brauchitsch.  He  was 
warned  by  Canaris  that  if  he  came  to  Zossen  the  Army 
commander  “would  probably  have  us  arrested  immediately” 
— a fate  that  did  not  seem  attractive  to  this  former  sup- 
porter of  Hitler.22  But  the  real  reason  Schacht  did  not  go 
to  Zossen  on  his  ridiculous  errand  (it  would  have  been 
child’s  play  for  Hitler  to  get  the  rubber-stamp  Reichstag  to 
approve  his  war  had  he  wanted  to  bother  with  such  a 
formality)  was  stated  by  Gisevius  when  he  took  the 
witness  stand  on  behalf  of  Schacht  at  Nuremberg.  It 
seems  that  Schacht  planned  to  go  to  Zossen  on  August  25 
and  called  off  the  trip  when  Hitler  on  that  evening  called 
off  the  attack  on  Poland  scheduled  for  the  next  day.  Three 
days  later,  according  to  the  testimony  of  Gisevius,  Schacht 
again  decided  to  carry  out  his  mission  at  Zossen  but  Canaris 
informed  him  it  was  too  late.23  It  wasn’t  that  the  “con- 
spirators” missed  the  bus;  they  never  arrived  at  the  bus 
station  to  try  to  catch  it. 

As  ineffective  as  the  handful  of  anti-Nazi  Germans  in 
staying  Hitler’s  hand  were  the  various  neutral  world  leaders 
who  now  appealed  to  the  Fuehrer  to  avert  war.  On  Au- 


746 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


gust  24,  President  Roosevelt  sent  urgent  messages  to  Hit- 
ler and  the  President  of  Poland  pressing  them  to  settle  their 
differences  without  resorting  to  arms.  President  Moscicki, 
in  a dignified  reply  the  following  day,  reminded  Roose- 
velt that  it  was  not  Poland  which  was  “formulating  de- 
mands and  demanding  concessions”  but  that  nevertheless 
it  was  willing  to  settle  its  disputes  with  Germany  by 
direct  negotiation  or  by  conciliation,  as  the  American 
President  had  urged.  Hitler  did  not  reply  (Roosevelt  had 
reminded  him  that  he  had  not  answered  the  President’s  ap- 
peal to  him  of  last  April)  and  on  the  next  day,  August 
25,  Roosevelt  sent  a second  message,  informing  Hitler  of 
Moscicki’s  conciliatory  response,  and  beseeching  him  to 
“agree  to  the  pacific  means  of  settlement  accepted  by  the 
Government  of  Poland.” 

To  the  second  letter  there  was  no  answer  either,  although 
on  the  evening  of  August  26  Weizsaecker  summoned  the 
American  charge  d’affaires  in  Berlin,  Alexander  C. 
Kirk,  and  asked  him  to  tell  the  President  that  the  Fuehrer 
had  received  the  two  telegrams  and  had  placed  them  “in 
the  hands  of  the  Foreign  Minister  for  consideration  by  the 
government.” 

The  Pope  took  to  the  air  on  August  24  to  make  a 
broadcast  appeal  for  peace,  beseeching  “by  the  blood  of 
Christ  . . . the  strong  [to]  hear  us  that  they  may  not 
become  weak  through  injustice  . . . [and]  if  they  desire 
that  their  power  may  not  be  a destruction.”  On  the  after- 
noon of  August  31  the  Pope  sent  identical  notes  to  the 
governments  of  Germany,  Poland,  Italy  and  the  two  West- 
ern Powers  “beseeching,  in  the  name  of  God,  the  Ger- 
man and  Polish  Governments  ...  to  avoid  any  incident,” 
begging  the  British,  French  and  Italian  governments  to 
support  his  appeal  and  adding: 

The  Pope  is  unwilling  to  abandon  hope  that  pending 
negotiations  may  lead  to  a just  pacific  solution. 

His  Holiness,  like  almost  everyone  else  in  the  world, 
did  not  realize  that  the  “pending  negotiations”  were  but 
a propaganda  trick  by  Hitler  to  justify  his  aggression. 
Actually,  as  shortly  will  be  shown,  there  were  no  bona 
fide  negotiations,  pending  or  otherwise,  on  that  last  after- 
noon of  the  peace. 

A few  days  earlier,  on  August  23,  the  King  of  the 


The  Road  to  War 


747 

Belgians,  in  the  name  of  the  rulers  of  the  “Oslo”  powers 
(Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Finland  and  the 
three  Scandinavian  states),  has  also  broadcast  a moving 
appeal  for  peace,  calling  “on  the  men  who  are  responsible 
for  the  course  of  events  to  submit  their  disputes  and  their 
claims  to  open  negotiation.”  On  August  28  the  King  of 
the  Belgians  and  the  Queen  of  the  Netherlands  jointly 
offered  their  good  offices  “in  the  hope  of  averting 
war.”  24 

Noble  in  form  and  in  intent  as  all  these  neutral  ap- 
peals were,  there  is  something  unreal  and  pathetic  about 
them  when  reread  today.  It  was  as  if  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  the  Pope  and  the  rulers  of  the  small 
Northern  European  democracies  lived  on  a different  planet 
from  that  of  the  Third  Reich  and  had  no  more  under- 
standing of  what  was  going  on  in  Berlin  than  of  what 
might  be  transpiring  on  Mars.  This  ignorance  of  the  mind 
and  character  and  purposes  of  Adolf  Hitler,  and  indeed 
of  the  Germans,  who,  with  a few  exceptions,  were  ready 
to  follow  him  blindly  no  matter  where  nor  how,  regardless 
of  morals,  ethics,  honor,  or  the  Christian  concept  of  hu- 
manity, was  to  cost  the  peoples  led  by  Roosevelt  and  the 
monarchs  of  Belgium,  Holland,  Luxembourg,  Norway  and 
Denmark  dearly  in  the  months  to  come. 

Those  of  us  who  were  in  Berlin  during  those  last  few 
tense  days  of  peace  and  who  were  attempting  to  report 

I the  news  to  the  outside  world  knew  very  little  either  of 
what  was  going  on  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  where  the 
Chancellery  and  the  Foreign  Office  were,  or  in  the 
Bendlerstrasse,  where  the  military  had  their  offices.  We 
followed  as  best  we  could  the  frantic  comings  and  goings 
in  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  We  sifted  daily  an  avalanche  of 
rumors,  tips  and  “plants.”  We  caught  the  mood  of  the  peo- 
ple in  the  street  and  of  the  government  officials,  party 
leaders,  diplomats  and  soldiers  of  our  acquaintance.  But 
what  was  said  at  Ambassador  Henderson’s  frequent  and 
often  stormy  interviews  with  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop,  what 
was  written  between  Hitler  and  Chamberlain,  between 
Hitler  and  Mussolini,  between  Hitler  and  Stalin,  what  was 
talked  about  between  Ribbentrop  and  Molotov  and  be- 
tween Ribbentrop  and  Ciano,  what  was  contained  in  all 
the  secret,  coded  dispatches  humming  over  the  wires  be- 
tween the  stumbling,  harassed  diplomats  and  foreign-office 


748  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

officials,  and  all  the  moves  which  the  military  chiefs  were 
planning  or  making — of  all  this  we  and  the  general  pub- 
lic remained  almost  completely  ignorant  at  the  time. 

A few  things,  of  course,  we,  and  the  public,  knew.  The 
Nazi-Soviet  Pact  was  trumpeted  to  the  skies  by  the  Ger- 
mans, though  the  secret  protocol  dividing  up  Poland  and 
the  rest  of  Eastern  Europe  remained  unknown  until  after 
the  war.  We  knew  that  even  before  it  was  signed  Hender- 
son had  flown  to  Berchtesgaden  to  emphasize  to  Hitler 
that  the  pact  would  not  prevent  Britain  from  honoring  its 
guarantee  to  Poland.  As  the  last  week  of  August  began 
we  felt  in  Berlin  that  war  was  inevitable — unless  there 
was  another  Munich — and  that  it  would  come  within  a 
few  days.  By  August  25  the  last  of  the  British  and  French 
civilians  had  skipped  out.  The  next  day  the  big  Nazi  rally 
at  Tannenberg  scheduled  for  August  27,  at  which  Hitler 
was  to  have  spoken,  was  publicly  called  off,  as  was  the 
annual  party  convention  at  Nuremberg  (the  “Party  Rally 
of  Peace,”  Hitler  had  officially  called  it),  due  to  convene 
the  first  week  of  September.  On  August  27  the  government 
announced  that  rationing  of  food,  soap,  shoes,  textiles  and 
coal  would  begin  on  the  following  day.  This  announce- 
ment, I remember,  above  all  others,  woke  up  the  German 
people  to  the  imminence  of  war,  and  their  grumbling  about 
it  was  very  audible.  On  Monday,  August  28,  the  Berliners 
watched  troops  pouring  through  the  city  toward  the  east. 
They  were  being  transported  in  moving  vans,  grocery 
trucks  and  every  other  sort  of  vehicle  that  could  be  scraped 
up. 

That  too  must  have  alerted  the  man  in  the  street  as  to 
what  was  up.  The  weekend,  I remember,  had  been  hot 
and  sultry  and  most  of  the  Berliners,  regardless  of  how 
near  war  was,  had  betaken  themselves  to  the  lakes  and  the 
woods  which  surround  the  capital.  Returning  to  the  city 
Sunday  evening,  they  learned  from  the  radio  that  there 
had  been  a secret,  unofficial  meeting  of  the  Reichstag  at 
the  Chancellery.  A D.N.B.  communique  stated  that  the 
“Fuehrer  outlined  the  gravity  of  the  situation” — this  was 
the  first  the  German  public  had  been  told  by  Hitler  that 
the  hour  was  grave.  No  details  of  the  meeting  were  given 
and  no  one  outside  of  the  Reichstag  members  and  of 
Hitler’s  entourage  could  know  of  the  mood  the  Nazi  dic- 
tator was  in  that  day.  Haider’s  diary  of  August  28  sup- 


The  Road  to  War 


749 


plied — much  later — one  account,  given  him  by  Colonel 
Oster  of  the  Abwehr. 

Conference  at  Reich  Chancellery  at  5:30  p.m.  Reichstag 
and  several  Party  notables  . . . Situation  very  grave.  De- 
termined to  solve  Eastern  question  one  way  or  another.  Mini- 
mum demands:  return  of  Danzig,  settling  of  Corridor  ques- 
tion. Maximum  demands:  “Depending  on  military  situation.” 
If  minimum  demands  not  satisfied,  then  war:  Brutal!  He 
will  himself  be  on  front  line.  The  Duce’s  attitude  served  our 
best  interests. 

War  very  difficult,  perhaps  hopeless;  “As  long  as  I am  alive 
there  will  be  no  talk  of  capitulation.”  Soviet  Pact  widely 
misunderstood  by  Party.  A pact  with  Satan  to  cast  out  the 
Devil  ...  “Applause  on  proper  cues,  but  thin.” 

Personal  impression  of  Fuehrer:  exhausted,  haggard,  croak- 
ing voice,  preoccupied.  “Keeps  himself  completely  sur- 
rounded now  by  his  S.S.  advisers.” 

In  Berlin  too  a foreign  observer  could  watch  the  way 
the  press,  under  Goebbels’  expert  direction,  was  swindling 
the  gullible  German  people.  For  six  years,  since  the  Nazi 
“co-ordination”  of  the  daily  newspapers,  which  had  meant 
the  destruction  of  a free  press,  the  citizens  had  been  cut 
off  from  the  truth  of  what  was  going  on  in  the  world.  For 
a time  the  Swiss  German-language  newspapers  from 
Zurich  and  Basel  could  be  purchased  at  the  leading  news- 
stands in  Germany  and  these  presented  objective  news. 
But  in  recent  years  their  sale  in  the  Reich  had  been  either 
prohibited  or  limited  to  a few  copies.  For  Germans  who 
could  read  English  or  French,  there  were  occasionally  a 
few  copies  of  the  London  and  Paris  journals  available, 
though  not  enough  to  reach  more  than  a handful  of  per- 
sons. 

“How  completely  isolated  a world  the  German  people 
live  in,”  I noted  in  my  diary  on  August  10,  1939.  “A 
glance  at  the  newspapers  yesterday  and  today  reminds  you 
of  it.”  I had  returned  to  Germany  from  a brief  leave  in 
Washington,  New  York  and  Paris,  and  coming  up  in  the 
train  from  my  home  in  Switzerland  two  days  before  I 
had  bought  a batch  of  Berlin  and  Rhineland  newspapers. 
They  quickly  propelled  one  back  to  the  cockeyed  world 
of  Nazism,  which  was  as  unlike  the  world  I had  just 
left  as  if  it  had  been  on  another  planet.  I noted  further  on 
August  10,  after  I had  arrived  in  Berlin: 


750 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Whereas  all  the  rest  of  the  world  considers  that  the  peace 
is  about  to  be  broken  by  Germany,  that  it  is  Germany  that 
is  threatening  to  attack  Poland  . . . here  in  Germany,  in  the 
world  the  local  newspapers  create,  the  very  reverse  is  main- 
tained . . . What  the  Nazi  papers  are  proclaiming  is  this:  that 
it  is  Poland  which  is  disturbing  the  peace  of  Europe;  Poland 
which  is  threatening  Germany  with  armed  invasion.  . . . 

“Poland,  Look  Out!”  warns  the  B.Z.  headline,  adding: 
“Answer  to  Poland,  the  Runner-Amok  [Amokla'uffer] 
against  Peace  and  Right  in  Europe!” 

Or  the  headline  in  Der  Fuehrer,  daily  paper  of  Karlsruhe, 
which  I bought  on  the  train:  “Warsaw  Threatens  Bombard- 
ment of  Danzig — Unbelievable  Agitation  of  the  Po- 
lish Archmadness  [Polnischen  Groessenwahsn]!” 

You  ask:  But  the  German  people  can’t  possibly  believe 
these  lies?  Then  you  talk  to  them.  So  many  do. 

By  Saturday,  August  26,  the  date  originally  set  by  Hitler 
for  the  attack  on  Poland,  Goebbels’  press  campaign  had 
reached  its  climax.  I noted  in  my  diary  some  of  the  head- 
lines. 

The  B.Z.:  “Complete  Chaos  in  Poland — German 
Families  Flee — Polish  Soldiers  Push  to  Edge  of  Ger- 
man Border!”  The  12-Uhr  Blatt:  “This  Playing  with 
Fire  Going  Too  Far — Three  German  Passenger  Planes 
Shot  At  by  Poles — In  Corridor  Many  German  Farm- 
houses in  flames!” 

On  my  way  to  Broadcast  House  at  midnight  I picked 
Up  the  Sunday  edition  (August  27)  of  the  Voelkischer 
Beobachter.  Across  the  whole  top  of  the  front  page  were 
inch-high  headlines: 

WHOLE  OF  POLAND  IN  WAR  FEVER!  1,500,000 
MEN  MOBILIZED!  UNINTERRUPTED  TROOP  TRANS- 
PORT TOWARD  THE  FRONTIER!  CHAOS  IN  UPPER 
SILESIA! 

There  was  no  mention,  of  course,  of  any  German  mo- 
bilization, though,  as  we  have  seen,  Germany  had  been  mo- 
bilized for  a fortnight. 

THE  LAST  SIX  DAYS  OF  PEACE 

After  recovering  from  the  cold  douche  of  Mussolini’s 
letter  which  had  arrived  early  in  the  evening  of  August  25 
and  which,  along  with  the  news  of  the  signing  of  the 


The  Road  to  War  751 

Anglo— Polish  alliance,  had  caused  him  to  postpone  the 
attack  on  Poland  scheduled  for  the  next  day,  Hitler  got 
off  a curt  note  to  the  Duce  asking  him  “what  imple- 
ments of  war  and  raw  materials  you  require  and  within 
what  time  in  order  that  Italy  could  “enter  a major  Euro- 
pean conflict.”  The  letter  was  telephoned  by  Ribbentrop 
personally  to  the  German  ambassador  in  Rome  at  7:40 
p.m.  and  handed  to  the  Italian  dictator  at  9:30  p.m.25 

The  next  morning,  in  Rome,  Mussolini  had  a meeting 
with  the  chiefs  of  the  Italian  armed  services  to  draw  up  a 
list  of  his  minimum  requirements  for  a war  lasting  twelve 
months.  In  the  words  of  Ciano,  who  helped  draw  it  up, 
it  was  “enough  to  kill  a bull — if  a bull  could  read  it.”  26 
It  included  seven  million  tons  of  petroleum,  six  million 
tons  of  coal,  two  million  tons  of  steel,  one  million  tons  of 
timber  and  a long  list  of  other  items  down  to  600  tons  of 
molybdenum,  400  tons  of  titanium,  and  twenty  tons  of 
zirconium.  In  addition  Mussolini  demanded  150  antiair- 
craft batteries  to  protect  the  Italian  industrial  area  in  the 
north,  which  was  but  a few  minutes,  flying  time  from 
French  air  bases,  a circumstance  which  he  reminded  Hitler 
of  in  a letter  which  he  now  composed.  This  message  was 
telephoned  by  Ciano  to  Attolico  in  Berlin  shortly  after 
noon  on  August  26  and  immediately  delivered  to  Hitler.27 

It  contained  more  than  a swollen  list  of  materials 
needed.  By  now  the  deflated  Fascist  leader  was  obviously 
determined  to  wriggle  out  of  his  obligations  to  the  Third 
Reich,  and  the  Fuehrer,  after  reading  this  second  letter, 
could  no  longer  have  the  slightest  doubt  of  it. 

Fuehrer  [Mussolini  wrote  his  comrade],  I would  not 
have  sent  you  this  list,  or  else  it  would  have  contained  a 
smaller  number  of  items  and  much  lower  figures,  if  I had 
had  the  time  agreed  upon  beforehand  to  accumulate  stocks 
and  to  speed  up  the  tempo  of  autarchy. 

It  is  my  duty  to  tell  you  that  unless  I am  certain  of 
receiving  these  supplies,  the  sacrifices  I should  call  on  the 
Italian  people  to  make  . . . could  well  be  in  vain  and  could 
compromise  your  cause  along  with  my  own. 

On  his  own  hook,  Ambassador  Attolico,  who  was  op- 
posed to  war,  and  especially  to  Italy’s  joining  Germany 
in  it  if  it  came,  emphasized  to  Hitler,  when  he  delivered 
the  message,  “that  all  material  must  be  in  Italy  before  the 


752  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

beginning  of  hostilities”  and  that  this  demand  was  “de- 
cisive.” * 

Mussolini  was  still  hoping  for  another  Munich.  He 
added  a paragraph  to  his  note,  declaring  that  if  the  Fueh- 
rer thought  there  was  still  “any  possibility  whatsoever  of 
a solution  in  the  political  field”  he  was  ready,  as  before, 
to  give  his  German  colleague  his  full  support.  Despite  their 
close  personal  relations  and  their  Pact  of  Steel  and  all 
the  noisy  demonstrations  of  solidarity  they  had  given  in 
the  past  years,  the  fact  remains  that  even  at  this  eleventh 
hour  Hitler  had  not  confided  to  Mussolini  his  true  aim, 
the  destruction  of  Poland,  and  that  the  Italian  partner 
remained  quite  ignorant  of  it.  Only  at  the  end  of  this 
day,  the  twenty-sixth,  was  this  gulf  between  them  finally 
bridged. 

Within  three  hours  on  August  26,  Hitler  sent  a long 
reply  to  the  Duce’s  message.  Ribbentrop  again  telephoned 
it,  at  3:08  p.m.,  to  Ambassador  von  Mackensen  in  Rome, 
who  rushed  it  to  Mussolini  shortly  after  5 p.m.  While 
some  of  Italy’s  requirements  such  as  coal  and  steel,  Hitler 
said,  could  be  met  in  full,  many  others  could  not.  In  any 
case,  Attolico’s  insistence  that  the  materials  must  be  sup- 
plied before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  was  “impossible.” 

And  now,  finally,  Hitler  took  his  friend  and  ally  into 
his  confidence  as  to  his  real  and  immediate  aims. 

As  neither  France  nor  Britain  can  achieve  any  decisive 
successes  in  the  West,  and  as  Germany,  as  a result  of  the 
Agreement  with  Russia,  will  have  all  her  forces  free  in  the 
East  after  the  defeat  of  Poland  ...  I do  not  shrink 
from  solving  the  Eastern  question  even  at  the  risk  of  com- 
plications in  the  West. 

Duce,  I understand  your  position,  and  would  only  ask 
you  to  try  to  achieve  the  pinning  down  of  Anglo-French 
forces  by  active  propaganda  and  suitable  military  demon- 
strations such  as  you  have  already  proposed  to  me.29 

This  is  the  first  evidence  in  the  German  documents  that, 

* This  caused  added  resentment  in  Berlin  and  some  confusion  in  Rome  which 
Ciano  had  to  straighten  out.  Attolico  told  Ciano  later  he  had  deliberately 
insisted  on  complete  deliveries  before  hostilities  “in  order  to  discourage  the 
Oermans  from  meeting  our  requests."  To  deliver  thirteen  million  tons  of 
supplies  in  a few  days  was,  of  course,  utterly  impossible,  and  Mussolini 
apologized  to  Ambassador  von  Mackensen  for  the  "misunderstanding  ” re- 
markmg  that  even  the  Almighty  Himself  could  not  transport  such  quan- 
tities here  in  a few  days.  It  had  never  occurred  to  him  to  make  such  an 
absurd  request.  28 


The  Road  to  War 


753 


twenty-four  hours  after  he  had  canceled  the  onslaught  on 
Poland,  Hitler  had  recovered  his  confidence  and  was  going 
ahead  with  his  plans,  “even  at  the  risk”  of  war  with  the 
West. 

The  same  evening,  August  26,  Mussolini  made  some- 
what of  an  effort  to  still  dissuade  him.  He  wrote  again  to 
the  Fuehrer,  Ciano  again  telephoned  it  to  Attolico  and  it 
reached  the  Reich  Chancellery  just  before  7 p.m. 

Fuehrer: 

I believe  that  the  misunderstanding  into  which  Attolico 
involuntarily  fell  was  cleared  up  immediately  . . . That 
which  I asked  of  you,  except  for  the  antiaircraft  batteries, 
was  to  be  delivered  in  the  course  of  twelve  months.  But 
even  though  the  misunderstanding  has  been  cleared  up,  it  is 
evident  that  it  is  impossible  for  you  to  assist  me  materially 
in  filling  the  large  gaps  which  the  wars  in  Ethiopia  and 
Spain  have  made  in  Italian  armaments. 

I will  therefore  adopt  the  attitude  which  you  advise,  at 
least  during  the  initial  phase  of  the  conflict,  thereby  im- 
mobilizing the  maximum  Franco-British  forces,  as  is  al- 
ready happening,  while  I shall  speed  up  military  prepara- 
tions to  the  utmost  possible  extent. 

But  the  anguished  Duce — anguished  at  cutting  such  a 
sorry  figure  at  such  a crucial  moment — still  thought  that 
the  possibilities  of  another  Munich  should  be  looked  into. 

...  I venture  to  insist  anew  [he  continued]  and  not  at 
all  from  considerations  of  a pacifist  character  foreign  to  my 
nature,  but  by  reason  of  the  interests  of  our  two  peoples 
and  our  two  regimes,  on  the  opportunity  for  a political 
solution  which  I regard  as  still  possible  and  such  a one  as 
will  give  full  moral  and  material  satisfaction  to  Germany.30 

The  Italian  dictator  was,  as  the  records  now  make  clear, 
striving  for  peace  because  he  was  not  ready  for  war.  But 
his  role  greatly  disturbed  him.  “I  leave  you  to  imagine,” 
he  declared  to  Hitler  in  this  last  of  the  exchange  of  mes- 
sages on  August  26,  “my  state  of  mind  in  finding  myself 
compelled  by  forces  beyond  my  control  not  to  afford  you 
real  solidarity  at  the  moment  of  action.”  Ciano.  noted  in 
his  diary  after  this  busy  day  that  “the  Duce  is  really  out 
of  his  wits.  His  military  instinct  and  his  sense  of  honor 
were  leading  him  to  war.  Reason  has  now  stopped  him. 
But  this  hurts  him  very  much  ...  Now  he  has  had  to 


754  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

confront  the  hard  truth.  And  this,  for  the  Duce,  is  a great 
blow.” 

After  such  a plentiful  exchange  of  letters,  Hitler  was 
now  resigned  to  Mussolini’s  leaving  him  in  the  lurch.  Late 
on  the  night  of  August  26  he  got  off  one  more  note  to  his 
Axis  partner.  It  was  dispatched  by  telegram  from  Berlin 
at  12:10  a.m.  on  August  27  and  reached  Mussolini  that 
morning  at  9 o’clock. 

Duce: 

I have  received  your  communication  on  your  final  atti- 
tude. I respect  the  reasons  and  motives  which  led  you  to 
take  this  decision.  In  certain  circumstances  it  can  never- 
theless work  out  well. 

In  my  opinion,  however,  the  prerequisite  is  that,  at  least 
until  the  outbreak  of  the  struggle,  the  world  should  have 
no  idea  of  the  attitude  Italy  intends  to  adopt.  I therefore 
cordially  request  you  to  support  my  struggle  psychologically 
with  your  press  or  by  other  means.  I would  also  ask  you, 
Duce,  if  you  possibly  can,  by  demonstrative  military  meas- 
ures, at  least  to  compel  Britain  and  France  to  tie  down  cer- 
tain of  their  forces,  or  at  all  events  to  leave  them  in  un- 
certainty. 

But,  Duce,  the  most  important  thing  is  this:  If,  as  I have 
said,  it  should  come  to  a major  war,  the  issue  in  the  East 
will  be  decided  before  the  two  Western  Powers  can  score 
a success.  Then,  this  winter,  at  latest  in  the  spring,  I shall  at- 
tack in  the  West  with  forces  which  will  be  at  least  equal  to 
those  of  France  and  Britain  . . . 

I must  now  ask  a great  favor  of  you,  Duce.  In  this  diffi- 
cult struggle  you  and  your  people  can  best  help  me  by  send- 
ing me  Italian  workers,  for  both  industrial  and  agricultural 
purposes  ...  In  specially  commending  this  request  of  mine 
to  your  generosity,  I thank  you  for  all  the  efforts  you  have 
made  for  our  common  cause. 

Adolf  Hitler  31 

The  Duce  replied  meekly  late  in  the  afternoon  that  the 
world  would  “not  know  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
what  the  attitude  of  Italy  is” — he  would  keep  the  secret 
well.  He  would  also  tie  down  as  many  Anglo-French 
military  and  naval  forces  as  possible  and  he  would  send 
Hitler  the  Italian  workers  he  requested.32  Earlier  in  the 
day  he  had  repeated  to  Ambassador  von  Mackensen  “in 
forceful  terms,”  as  the  latter  reported  to  Berlin,  “that  he 
still  believed  it  possible  to  attain  all  our  objectives  without 
resort  to  war”  and  had  added  that  he  would  again  bring 


The  Road  to  War 


755 

this  aspect  up  in  his  letter  to  the  Fuehrer.33  But  he  did 
not.  For  the  moment  he  seemed  too  discouraged  to  even 
mention  it  again. 

Although  France  would  provide  almost  the  entire  Allied 
army  on  Germany’s  western  border  if  war  were  suddenly 
to  come,  and  although,  in  the  initial  weeks,  it  would  far 
outnumber  the  German  forces  there,  Hitler  seemed  un- 
concerned as  August  began  to  run  out  about  what  the 
French  would  do.  On  August  26,  Premier  Daladier  dis- 
patched to  him  a moving  and  eloquent  letter  reminding 
him  of  what  France  would  do;  it  would  fight  if  Poland 
were  attacked. 

Unless  you  attribute  to  the  French  people  [Daladier 
wrote]  a conception  of  national  honor  less  high  than  that 
which  I myself  recognize  in  the  German  people,  you  can- 
not doubt  that  France  will  be  true  to  her  solemn  promises 
to  other  nations,  such  as  Poland  . . . 

After  appealing  to  Hitler  to  seek  a pacific  solution  of 
his  dispute  with  Poland,  Daladier  added: 

If  the  blood  of  France  and  Germany  flows  again,  as  it 
did  twenty-five  years  ago,  in  a longer  and  even  more  mur- 
derous war,  each  of  the  two  peoples  will  fight  with  con- 
fidence in  its  own  victory,  but  the  most  certain  victors  will 
be  the  forces  of  destruction  and  barbarism.34 

Ambassador  Coulondre,  in  presenting  the  Premier’s  let- 
ter, added  a passionate  verbal  and  personal  appeal  of  his 
own,  adjuring  Hitler  “in  the  name  of  humanity  and  for 
the  repose  of  his  own  conscience  not  to  let  pass  this  last 
chance  of  a peaceful  solution.”  But  the  ambassador  had 
the  “sadness”  to  report  to  Paris  that  Daladier’s  letter  had 
not  moved  the  Fuehrer — “he  stands  pat.” 

Hitler’s  reply  to  the  French  Premier  the  next  day  was 
cleverly  calculated  to  play  on  the  reluctance  of  French- 
men to  “die  for  Danzig,”  though  he  did  not  use  the 
phrase — that  was  left  for  the  French  appeasers.  Germany 
had  renounced  all  territorial  claims  on  France  after  the 
return  of  the  Saar,  Hitler  declared;  there  was  therefore 
no  reason  why  they  should  go  to  war.  If  they  did,  it  was 
not  his  fault  and  it  would  be  “very  painful”  to  him. 

That  was  the  extent  of  the  diplomatic  contact  between 
Germany  and  France  during  die  last  week  of  peace. 


756 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Coulondre  did  not  see  Hitler  after  the  meeting  on  August 
26  until  all  was  over.  The  country  that  concerned  the 
German  Chancellor  the  most  at  this  juncture  was  Great 
Britain.  As  Hitler  had  told  Goering  on  the  evening  of 
August  25,  when  he  postponed  the  move  into  Poland,  he 
wanted  to  see  whether  he  could  “eliminate  British  inter- 
vention.” 

GERMANY  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN  AT  THE 
ELEVENTH  HOUR 

“Fuehrer  considerably  shaken,”  General  Haider  had 
noted  in  his  diary  on  August  25  after  the  news  from  Rome 
and  London  had  induced  Hitler  to  draw  back  from  the 
precipice  of  war.  But  the  next  afternoon  the.  General  Staff 
Chief  noticed  an  abrupt  change  in  the  Leader.  “Fuehrer 
very  calm  and  clear,”  he  jotted  down  in  his  diary  at  3:22 
pm.  There  was  a reason  for  this  and  the  General’s  journal 
gives  it.  “Get  everything  ready  for  morning  of  7th  Mo- 
bilization Day.  Attack  starts  September  1.”  The  order  was 
telephoned  by  Hitler  to  the  Army  High  Command. 

Hitler,  then,  would  have  his  war  with  Poland.  That 
was  settled.  In  the  meantime  he  would  do  everything  he 
could  to  keep  the  British  out.  Haider’s  diary  notes  convey 
the  thinking  of  the  Fuehrer  and  his  entourage  during  the 
decisive  day  of  August  26. 

Rumor  has  it  that  England  is  disposed  to  consider  com- 
prehensive proposal.*  Details  when  Henderson  returns.  Ac- 
cording to  another  rumor  England  stresses  that  she  herself 
must  declare  that  Poland’s  vital  interests  are  threatened. 
In  France  more  and  more  representations  to  the  government 
against  war  . . . 

Plan:  We  demand  Danzig,  corridor  through  Corridor,  and 
plebiscite  on  the  same  basis  as  Saar.  England  will  perhaps 
accept.  Poland  probably  not.  Wedge  between  them.  35 

The  emphasis  is  Haider’s  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  it 
accurately  reflects  up  to  a point  what  was  in  Hitler’s  mind. 
He  would  contrive  to  drive  a wedge  between  Poland  and 
Britain  and  give  Chamberlain  an  excuse  to  get  out  of  his 
pledge  to  Warsaw.  Having  ordered  the  Army  to  be  ready 
to  march  on  September  1,  he  waited  to  hear  from  London 


* l.e.,  Hitler’s  offer  of  August  25  to  “guarantee”  the  British  Empire. 


The  Road  to  Wap 


757 


about  his  grandiose  offer  to  “guarantee”  the  British  Em- 
pire. 

He  now  had  two  contacts  with  the  British  government 
outside  of  the  German  Embassy  in  London,  whose  am- 
bassador (Dirksen)  was  on  leave,  and  which  played  no 
part  in  the  frenzied  eleventh-hour  negotiations.  One  con- 
tact was  official,  through  Ambassador  Henderson,  who  had 
flown  to  London  in  a special  German  plane  on  the  morn- 
ing of  Saturday,  August  26,  with  the  Fuehrer’s  proposals. 
The  other  was  unofficial,  surreptitious  and,  as  it  turned 
out,  quite  amateurish,  through  Goering’s  Swedish  friend, 
the  peripatetic  Birger  Dahlerus,  who  had  flown  to  London 
from  Berlin  with  a message  for  the  British  government 
from  the  Luftwaffe  chief  on  the  previous  day. 

“At  this  time,”  Goering  related  later  during  an  inter- 
rogation at  Nuremberg,  “I  was  in  touch  with  Halifax  by 
a special  courier  outside  the  regular  diplomatic  chan- 
nels.” * 36  ft  was  to  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  in  Lon- 
don that  the  Swedish  “courier”  made  his  way  at  6:30  p.m. 
on  Friday,  August  25.  Dahlerus  had  been  summoned  to 
Berlin  from  Stockholm  the  day  before  by  Goering,  who 
informed  him  that  despite  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact,  which 
had  been  signed  the  preceding  night,  Germany  wanted  an 
“understanding”  with  Great  Britain.  He  put  one  of  his 
own  planes  at  the  Swede’s  disposal  so  that  he  could  rush 
to  London  to  apprise  Lord  Halifax  of  this  remarkable 
fact. 

The  Foreign  Secretary,  who  an  hour  before  had  signed 
the  Anglo-Polish  mutual-assistance  pact,  thanked  Dah- 
lerus for  his  efforts  and  informed  him  that  Henderson  had 
just  conferred  with  Hitler  in  Berlin  and  was  flying  to  Lon- 
don with  the  Fuehrer’s  latest  proposals  and  that  since  of- 
ficial channels  of  communication  between  Berlin  and  Lon- 
don had  now  been  reopened  he  did  not  think  the  services 
of  the  Swedish  intermediary  would  be  needed  any  longer. 
But  they  soon  proved  to  be.  Telephoning  Goering  later  that 
evening  to  report  on  his  conference  with  Halifax,  Dahlerus 
was  informed  by  the  Field  Marshal  that  the  situation  had 

* “Ribbentrop  knew  nothing  whatsoever  about  Dahlerus  being  sent,”  Goering 
testified  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg.  “I  never  discussed  the  matter  of  Dah- 
lerus with  Ribbentrop.  He  did  not  know  at  all  that  Dahlerus  went  back 
and  forth  between  me  and  the  British  government.”  87  But  Goering  kept 
Hitler  informed. 


758 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

deteriorated  as  the  result  of  the  signing  of  the  Anglo- 
Polish  treaty  and  that  probably  only  a conference  between 
representatives  of  Britain  and  Germany  could  save  the 
peace.  As  he  later  testified  at  Nuremberg,  Goering,  like 
Mussolini,  had  in  mind  another  Munich. 

Late  the  same  night  the  indefatigable  Swede  informed 
the  British  Foreign  Office  of  his  talk  with  Goering,  and  the 
next  morning  he  was  invited  to  confer  again  with  Halifax. 
This  time  he  persuaded  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  to 
write  a letter  to  Goering,  whom  he  described  as  the  one 
German  who  might  prevent  war.  Couched  in  general  terms, 
the  letter  was  brief  and  noncommittal.  It  merely  reiterated 
Britain’s  desire  to  reach  a peaceful  settlement  and  stressed 
the  need  “to  have  a few  days”  to  achieve  it.* 

Nevertheless  it  struck  the  fat  Field  Marshal  as  being  of 
the  “greatest  importance.”  Dahlerus  had  delivered  it  to  him 
that  evening  (August  26),  as  he  was  traveling  in  his  special 
train  to  his  Luftwaffe  headquarters  at  Oranienburg  out- 
side Berlin.  The  train  was  stopped  at  the  next  station,  an 
automobile  was  commandeered  and  the  two  men  raced  to 
the  Chancellery,  where  they  arrived  at  midnight.  The 
Chancellery  was  dark.  Hitler  had  gone  to  bed.  But  Goering 
insisted  on  arousing  him.  Up  to  this  moment  Dahlerus, 
like  so  many  others,  believed  that  Hitler  was  not  an  un- 
reasonable man  and  that  he  might  accept  a peaceful  settle- 


* The  text  is  published  in  Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy,  Third 
Series,  V°l.  VII,  p.  283.  It  was  omitted  from  all  published  British  records 
until  the  above  volume  came  out  in  1954,  an  omission  much  commented  upon 
by  British  historians.  Dahlerus  is  not  mentioned  in  the  British  Blue  Book 
of  documents  concerning  the  outbreak  of  the  war  nor  in  Henderson’s  Final 
Report  nor  even  in  Henderson’s  book  Failure  of  a Mission,  though  in  the 
book  the„  Swedish  intermediary  is  referred  to  as  “a  source  in  touch  with 
Goering.’  In  Henderson’s  dispatches  and  in  those  from  other  members  of 
the  British  Embassy  which  have  now  been  published,  Dahlerus  and  his  activ- 
ities play  a fairly  prominent  part,  as  they  do  in  various  memoranda  of  the 
British  Foreign  Office. 

The  role  of  this  singular  Swedish  businessman  in  trying  to  save  the  peace 
was  a well-kept  secret  and  both  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  Downing  Street  went 
to  considerable  lengths  to  keep  his  movements  hidden  from  the  correspondents 
and  neutral  diplomats,  who,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  knew  absolutely 
nothing  of  them  until  Dahlerus  testified  at  Nuremberg  on  March  19  1946 
His  book,  The  Last  Attempt,  was  published  in  Swedish  in  1945,  at  the  end 
of  the  war,  but  the  English  edition  did  not  come  out  until  1948  and  there 
remained  a further  interval  of  six  years  before  his  role  was  officially  con- 
firmed, so  to  speak,  by  the  documents  in  Vol.  VII  of  the  DBrFP  series  The 
German  Foreign  Office  documents  for  August  do  not  mention  Dahlerus 
except  in  one  routine  memorandum  reporting  receipt  of  a message  from  the’ 
.Lufthansa  airline  that  “Dahlerus,  a gentleman  from  the  ‘Foreign  Office  ’ ” 
was  arriving  in  Berlin  August  26  on  one  of  its  planes.  He  does  appear, 
however,  in  some  later  papers. 


The  Road  to  War 


759 


ment,  as  he  had  the  year  before  at  Munich.  The  Swede  was 
now  to  confront  for  the  first  time  the  weird  fantasies  and 
the  terrible  temper  of  the  charismatic  dictator.38  It  was  a 
shattering  experience. 

Hitler  took  no  notice  of  the  letter  which  Dahlerus  had 
brought  from  Halifax  and  which  had  seemed  important 
enough  to  Goering  to  have  the  Fuehrer  waked  up  in  the 
middle  of  the  night.  Instead,  for  twenty  minutes  he  lectured 
the  Swede  on  his  early  struggles,  his  great  achievements  and 
all  his  attempts  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the 
British.  Next,  when  Dahlerus  had  got  in  a word  about  his 
having  once  lived  in  England  as  a worker,  the  Chancellor 
questioned  him  about  the  strange  island  and  its  strange 
people  whom  he  had  tried  so  vainly  to  understand.  There 
followed  a long  and  somewhat  technical  lecture  on  Ger- 
many’s military  might.  By  this  time,  Dahlerus  says,  he 
thought  his  visit  “would  not  prove  useful.”  In  the  end,  how- 
ever, the  Swede  seized  an  opportunity  to  tell  his  host 
something  about  the  British  as  he  had  come  to  know  them. 

Hitler  listened  without  interrupting  me  . . . but  then  sud- 
denly got  up,  and,  becoming  very  excited  and  nervous, 
walked  up  and  down  saying,  as  though  to  himself,  that  Ger- 
many was  irresistible  . . . Suddenly  he  stopped  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  room  and  stood  there  staring.  His  voice  was 
blurred,  and  his  behavior  that  of  a completely  abnormal 
person.  He  spoke  in  staccato  phrases:  “If  there  should  be 
war,  then  I shall  build  U-boats,  build  U-boats,  U-boats, 
U-boats,  U-boats.”  His  voice  became  more  indistinct  and 
finally  one  could  not  follow  him  at  all.  Then  he  pulled  himself 
together,  raised  his  voice  as  though  addressing  a large  au- 
dience and  shrieked:  “I  shall  build  airplanes,  build  air- 
planes, airplanes,  airplanes,  and  I shall  annihilate  my 
enemies.”  He  seemed  more  like  a phantom  from  a storybook 
than  a real  person.  I stared  at  him  in  amazement  and  turned 
to  see  how  Goering  was  reacting,  but  he  did  not  turn  a hair. 

Finally  the  excited  Chancellor  strode  up  to  his  guest 
and  said,  “Herr  Dahlerus,  you  who  know  England  so  well, 
can  you  give  me  any  reason  for  my  perpetual  failure  to  come 
to  an  agreement  with  her?”  Dahlerus  confesses  that  he 
“hesitated  at  first”  to  answer  but  then  replied  that  in  his 
personal  opinion  the  British  “lack  of  confidence  in  him 
and  in  his  Government  was  the  reason.” 

“Idiots!”  Dahlerus  says  Hitler  stormed  back,  flinging  out 


760  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

his  right  arm  and  striking  his  breast  with  his  left  hand. 
“Have  I ever  told  a lie  in  my  life?” 

The  Nazi  dictator  thereupon  calmed  down,  there  was  a 
discussion  of  Hitler’s  proposals  made  through  Henderson 
and  it  was  finally  settled  that  Dahlerus  should  fly  back  to 
London  with  a further  offer  to  the  British  government. 
Goering  objected  to  committing  it  to  writing  and  the  ac- 
commodating Swede,  was  told  he  must,  instead,  commit  it 
to  memory.  It  contained  six  points: 

L Germany  wanted  a pact  or  alliance  with  Britain. 

2.  Britain  was  to  help  Germany  obtain  Danzig  and  the 
Corridor,  but  Poland  was  to  have  a free  harbor  in 
Danzig,  to  retain  the  Baltic  port  of  Gdynia  and  a cor- 
ridor to  it. 

3.  Germany  would  guarantee  the  new  Polish  frontiers. 

4.  Germany  was  to  have  her  colonies,  or  their  equiva- 
lent, returned  to  her. 

5.  Guarantees  were  to  be  given  for  the  German  minority 
in  Poland. 

6.  Germany  was  to  pledge  herself  to  defend  the  British 
Empire. 

With  these  proposals  imprinted  in  his  memory,  Dahlerus 
flew  to  London  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  August  27,  and 
shortly  after  noon  was  whisked  by  a roundabout  route  so 
as  to  avoid  the  snooping  press  reporters  and  ushered  into 
the  presence  of  Chamberlain,  Lord  Halifax,  Sir  Horace 
Wilson  and  Sir  Alexander  Cadogan.  It  was  obvious  that  the 
British  government  now  took  the  Swedish  courier  quite 
seriously. 

He  had  brought  with  him  some  hastily  scribbled  notes 
jotted  down  in  the  plane  describing  his  meeting  with 
Hitler  and  Goering  the  night  before.  In  these  notes  he 
assured  the  two  leading  members  of  the  British  cabinet 
who  now  scanned  his  memorandum  that  during  the  inter- 
view Hitler  had  been  “calm  and  composed.”  Although  no 
record  of  this  extraordinary  Sabbath  meeting  has  been 
found  in  the  Foreign  Office  archives,  it  has  been  re- 
constructed in  the  volume  of  Foreign  Office  papers  (Vol- 
ume VII,  Third  Series)  from  data  furnished  by  Lord 
Halifax  and  Cadogan  and  from  the  emissary’s  memoran- 
dum. The  British  version  differs  somewhat  from  that  given 


The  Road  to  War  761 

by  Dahlerus  in  his  book  and  at  Nuremberg,  but  taking  the 
various  accounts  together  what  follows  seems  as  accurate 
a report  as  we  shall  ever  get. 

Chamberlain  and  Halifax  saw  at  once  that  they  were 
faced  with  two  sets  of  proposals  from  Hitler,  the  one  given 
to  Henderson  and  the  other  now  brought  by  Dahlerus,  and 
that  they  differed.  Whereas  the  first  had  proposed  to 
guarantee  the  British  Empire  after  Hitler  had  settled  ac- 
counts with  Poland,  the  second  seemed  to  suggest  that  the 
Fuehrer  was  ready  to  negotiate  through  the  British  for  the 
return  of  Danzig  and  the  Corridor,  after  which  he  would 
“guarantee”  Poland’s  new  boundaries.  This  was  an  old 
refrain  to  Chamberlain,  after  his  disillusioning  ex- 
periences with  Hitler  over  Czechoslovakia,  and  he  was 
skeptical  of  the  Fuehrer’s  offer  as  Dahlerus  outlined  it. 
He  told  the  Swede  that  he  saw  “no  prospect  of  a settle- 
ment on  these  terms;  the  Poles  might  concede  Danzig,  but 
they  would  fight  rather  than  surrender  the  Corridor.” 

Finally  it  was  agreed  that  Dahlerus  should  return  to 
Berlin  immediately  with  an  initial  and  unofficial  reply  to 
Hitler  and  report  back  to  London  on  Hitler’s  reception  of 
it  before  the  official  response  was  drawn  up  and  sent  to 
Berlin  with  Henderson  the  next  evening.  As  Halifax  put  it 
(according  to  the  British  version),  “the  issues  might  be 
somewhat  confused  as  a result  of  these  informal  and  secret 
communications  through  M.  Dahlerus.  It  was  [therefore] 
desirable  to  make  it  clear  that  when  Dahlerus  returned  to 
Berlin  that  night  he  went,  not  to  carry  the  answer  of  His 
Majesty’s  Government,  but  rather  to  prepare  the  way  for 
the  main  communication”  which  Henderson  would  bring.  39 

So  important  had  this  unknown  Swedish  businessman 
become  as  an  intermediary  in  the  negotiations  between 
the  governments  of  the  two  most  powerful  nations  in 
Europe  that,  according  to  his  own  account,  he  told  the 
Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  at  this  critical 
juncture  that  “they  should  keep  Henderson  in  London  until 
Monday  [the  next  day]  so  that  the  answer  could  be 
given  after  they  had  been  informed  how  Hitler  regarded 
the  English  standpoint.”  40 

And  what  was  the  English  standpoint,  as  Dahlerus  was  to 
present  it  to  Hitler?  There  is  some  confusion  about  it. 
According  to  Halifax’s  own  rough  notes  of  his  verbal  in- 


762  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

structions  to  Dahlerus,  the  British  standpoint  was  merely 
this: 

i.  Solemn  assurance  of  desire  for  good  understanding  be- 
tween G.  and  Gt.B.  [The  initials  are  Halifax’s].  Not  a sin- 
gle member  of  the  Govt,  who  thinks  different,  ii.  Gt.B. 
bound  to  honor  her  obligations  to  Poland.  Hi.  German- 
Polish  differences  must  be  settled  peacefully.  41 

According  to  Dahlerus,  the  unofficial  British  reply  en- 
trusted to  him  was  more  comprehensive. 

Naturally,  Point  6,  the  offer  to  defend  the  British  Empire, 
was  rejected.  Similarly  they  did  not  want  to  have  any  dis- 
cussion on  colonies  as  long  as  Germany  was  mobilized.  With 
regard  to  the  Polish  boundaries,  they  wanted  them  to  be 
guaranteed  by  the  five  great  powers.  Concerning  the  Corri- 
dor, they  proposed  that  negotiations  with  Poland  be  under- 
taken immediately.  As  to  the  first  point  [of  Hitler’s  pro- 
posals] England  was  willing  in  principle  to  come  to  an 
agreement  with  Germany.42 

Dahlerus  flew  back  to  Berlin  Sunday  evening  and  saw 
Goering  shortly  before  midnight.  The  Field  Marshal  did 
not  consider  the  British  reply  “very  favorable.”  But  after 
seeing  Hitler  at  midnight,  Goering  rang  up  Dahlerus  at 
his  hotel  at  1 a.m.  and  said  that  the  Chancellor  would 
“accept  the  English  standpoint”  provided  the  official  ver- 
sion to  be  brought  by  Henderson  Monday  evening  was  in 
agreement  with  it. 

Goering  was  pleased,  and  Dahlerus  even  more  so.  The 
Swede  woke  up  Sir  George  Ogilvie  Forbes,  the  counselor 
of  the  British  Embassy,  at  2 a.m.  to  give  him  the  glad 
tidings.  Not  only  to  do  that  but— -such  had  his  position 
become,  at  least  in  his  own  mind — to  advise  the  British 
government  what  to  say  in  its  official  reply.  That  note, 
which  Henderson  would  be  bringing  later  on  this  Monday, 
August  28,  must  contain  an  undertaking,  Dahlerus  em- 
phasized, that  Britain  would  persuade  Poland  to  negotiate 
with  Germany  directly  and  immediately. 

Dahlerus  has  just  telephoned  [read  a later  dispatch  from 
Forbes  on  August  28]  from  Goering’s  office  following  sug- 
gestions which  he  considers  most  important. 

1.  British  reply  to  Hitler  should  not  contain  any  reference 
to  Roosevelt  plan.* 

* Presumably  President  Roosevelt's  message  to  Hitler  on  August  24  and  25 
urging  direct  negotiations  between  Germany  and  Poland. 


The  Road  to  War 


763 


2.  Hitler  suspects  Poles  will  try  to  avoid  negotiations. 
Reply  should  therefore  contain  clear  statement  that  the 
Poles  have  been  strongly  advised  to  immediately  establish 
contact  with  Germany  and  negotiate.  * 43 

Throughout  the  day  the  now  confident  Swede  not  only 
heaped  advice  on  Forbes,  who  dutifully  wired  it  to  Lon- 
don, but  himself  telephoned  the  British  Foreign  Office  with 
a message  for  Halifax  containing  further  suggestions. 

At  this  critical  moment  in  world  history  the  amateur 
Swedish  diplomat  had  indeed  become  the  pivotal  point 
between  Berlin  and  London.  At  2 p.m.  on  August  28, 
Halifax,  who  had  been  apprised  both  from  his  Berlin  em- 
bassy and  from  Dahlerus’  telephone  call  to  the  Foreign 
Office  of  the  Swede’s  urgent  advice,  wired  the  British 
ambassador  in  Warsaw,  Sir  Howard  Kennard,  to  see  For- 
eign Minister  Beck  “at  once”  and  get  him  to  authorize 
the  British  government  to  inform  Hitler  “that  Poland  is 
ready  to  enter  at  once  into  direct  discussion  with  Ger- 
many.” The  Foreign  Secretary  was  in  a hurry.  He  wanted 
to  include  the  authorization  in  the  official  reply  to  Hitler 
which  Henderson  was  waiting  to  carry  back  to  Berlin  this 
same  day.  He  urged  his  ambassador  in  Warsaw  to  tele- 
phone Beck’s  reply.  Late  in  the  afternoon  Beck  gave  the 
requested  authorization  and  it  was  hastily  inserted  in  the 
British  note.44 

Henderson  arrived  back  in  Berlin  with  it  on  the  evening 
of  August  28,  and  after  being  received  at  the  Chancellery 
by  an  S.S.  guard  of  honor,  which  presented  arms  and 
rolled  its  drums  (the  formal  diplomatic  pretensions  were 
preserved  to  tne  end),  he  was  ushered  into  the  presence 
of  Hitler,  to  whom  he  handed  a German  translation  of 
the  note,  at  10:30  p.m.  The  Chancellor  read  it  at  once. 

The  British  government  “entirely  agreed”  with  him,  the 
communication  said,  that  there  must  “first”  be  a settle- 
ment of  the  differences  between  Germany  and  Poland. 
“Everything,  however,”  it  added,  “turns  upon  the  nature 
of  the  settlement  and  the  method  by  which  it  is  to  be 
reached.”  On  this  matter,  the  note  said,  the  Chancellor 
had  been  “silent.”  Hitler’s  offer  to  “guarantee”  the  British 

* Dahlerus,  it  must  be  pointed  out  in  all  fairness,  was  not  so  pro-German  as 
some  of  his  messages  seem  to  imply.  On  the  night  of  this  same  Monday,  after 
two  hours  with  Goering  at  Luftwaffe  headquarters  at  Oranienburg,  he  rang 
up  Forbes  to  tell  him,  “German  Army  will  be  in  final  position  of  attack  on 
Poland  during  night  of  Wednesday-Thursday,  August  30-31.”  Forbes  got 
this  intelligence  off  to  London  as  quickly  as  possible. 


764 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Empire  was  gently  declined.  The  British  government 
“could  not,  for  any  advantage  offered  to  Great  Britain, 
acquiesce  in  a settlement  which  put  in  jeopardy  the  in- 
dependence of  a State  to  whom  they  had  given  their 
guarantee.” 

That  guarantee  would  be  honored,  but  because  the 
British  government  was  “scrupulous”  concerning  its  ob- 
ligations to  Poland  the  Chancellor  must  not  think  it  was 
not  anxious  for  an  equitable  settlement. 

It  follows  that  the  next  step  should  be  the  initiation  of 
direct  discussions  between  the  German  and  Polish  Govern- 
ments on  a basis  ...  of  safeguarding  Poland’s  essential  in- 
terests and  the  securing  of  the  settlement  by  an  international 
guarantee. 

They  [the  British  government]  have  already  received  a 
definite  assurance  from  the  Polish  Government  that  they  are 
prepared  to  enter  into  discussions  on  this  basis,  and  H.  M. 
Government  hope  the  German  Government  would  also  be 
willing  to  agree  to  this  course. 

...  A just  settlement  . . . between  Germany  and  Poland 
may  open  the  way  to  world  peace.  Failure  to  reach  it  would 
ruin  the  hopes  of  an  understanding  between  Germany  and 
Great  Britain,  would  bring  the  two  countries  into  conflict 
and  might  well  plunge  the  whole  world  into  war.  Such  an 
outcome  would  be  a calamity  without  parallel  in  history.45 

When  Hitler  had  finished  reading  the  communication, 
Henderson  began  to  elaborate  on  it  from  notes,  he  told 
the  Fuehrer,  which  he  had  made  during  his  conversa- 
tions with  Chamberlain  and  Halifax.  It  was  the  only 
meeting  with  Hitler,  he  said  later,  in  which  he,  the  am- 
bassador, did  most  of  the  talking.  The  gist  of  his  remarks 
was  that  Britain  wanted  Germany’s  friendship,  it  wanted 
peace,  but  it  would  fight  if  Hitler  attacked  Poland.  The 
Fuehrer,  who  was  by  no  means  silent,  replied  by  expatiat- 
ing on  the  crimes  of  Poland  and  on  his  own  “generous” 
offers  for  a peaceful  settlement  with  her,  which  would  not 
be  repeated.  In  fact  today  “nothing  less  than  the  return  of 
Danzig  and  the  whole  of  the  Corridor  would  satisfy  him, 
together  with  a rectification  in  Silesia,  where  ninety  per 
cent  of  the  population  voted  for  Germany  at  the  postwar 
plebiscite.”  This  was  not  true  nor  was  Hitler’s  rejoinder 
a moment  later  that  a million  Germans  had  been  driven 
out  of  the  Corridor  after  1918.  There  had  been  only 
385,000  Germans  there,  according  to  the  German  census 


The  Road  to  War 


765 


of  1910,  but  by  this  time,  of  course,  the  Nazi  dictator  ex- 
pected everyone  to  swallow  his  lies.  For  the  last  time  in 
his  crumbling  mission  to  Berlin,  the  British  ambassador 
swallowed  a good  deal,  for,  as  he  declared  in  his  Final 
Report,  “Herr  Hitler  on  this  occasion  was  again  friendly 
and  reasonable  and  appeared  to  be  not  dissatisfied  with 
the  answer  which  1 had  brought  to  him.” 

“In  the  end  I asked  him  two  straight  questions,”  Hen- 
derson wired  London  at  2:35  a.m.  in  a long  dispatch  de- 
scribing the  interview.46 

Was  he  willing  to  negotiate  direct  with  the  Poles,  and 
was  he  ready  to  discuss  the  question  of  an  exchange  of 
populations?  He  replied  in  the  affirmative  as  regards  the  lat- 
ter (though  I have  no  doubt  that  he  was  thinking  at  the 
same  time  of  a rectification  of  frontiers). 

As  to  the  first  point,  he  would  first  have  to  give  “care- 
ful consideration”  to  the  whole  British  note.  At  this  point, 
Henderson  recounted  in  his  dispatch,  the  Chancellor  turned 
to  Ribbentrop  and  said,  “We  must  summon  Goering  to 
discuss  it  with  him.”  Hitler  promised  a written  reply  to 
the  British  communication  on  the  next  day,  Tuesday, 
August  29. 

“Conversation  was  conducted,”  Henderson  emphasized 
to  Halifax,  “in  quite  a friendly  atmosphere  in  spite  of 
absolute  firmness  on  both  sides.”  Probably  Henderson, 
despite  all  of  his  personal  experience  with  his  host,  did  not 
quite  appreciate  why  Hitler  had  made  the  atmosphere  so 
friendly.  The  Fuehrer  was  still  resolved  to  go  to  war  that 
very  weekend  against  Poland;  he  was  still  hopeful,  despite 
all  the  British  government  and  Henderson  had  said,  of 
keeping  Britain  out  of  it. 

Apparently,  Hitler,  encouraged  by  the  obsequious  and 
ignorant  Ribbentrop,  simply  could  not  believe  that  the 
British  meant  what  they  said,  though  he  said  he  did. 

The  next  day  Henderson  added  a postscript  to  his  long 
dispatch. 

Hitler  insisted  that  he  was  not  bluffing,  and  that  people 
would  make  a big  mistake  if  they  believed  that  he  was.  I 
replied  that  I was  fully  aware  of  the  fact  and  that  we  were  not 
bluffing  either.  Herr  Hitler  stated  that  he  fully  realized 
that.47 

He  said  so,  but  did  he  realize  it?  For  in  his  reply  on 


766 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

August  29  he  deliberately  tried  to  trick  the  British  govern- 
ment in  a way  which  he  must  have  thought  would  enable 
him  to  eat  his  cake  and  have  it  too. 

The  British  reply  and  Hitler’s  first  reaction  to  it  gener- 
ated a burst  of  optimism  in  Berlin,  especially  in  Goering’s 
camp,  where  the  inimitable  Dahlerus  now  spent  most  of 
his  time.  At  1:30  in  the  morning  of  August  29  the  Swede 
received  a telephone  call  from  one  of  the  Field  Marshal’s 
adjutants,  who  was  calling  from  the  Chacellery,  where 
Hitler,  Ribbentrop  and  Goering  had  pondered  the  British 
note  after  Henderson’s  departure.  The  word  to  Dahlerus 
from  his  German  friend  was  that  the  British  reply  “was 
highly  satisfactory  and  that  there  was  every  hope  that 
the  threat  of  war  was  past.” 

Dahlerus  conveyed  the  good  news  by  long-distance,  tele- 
phone to  the  British  Foreign  Office  later  that  morning, 
informing  Halifax  that  “Hitler  and  Goering  considered  that 
there  was  now  a definite  possibility  of  a peaceful  settle- 
ment. ’ At  10:50  a.m.  Dahlerus  saw  Goering,  who  greeted 
him  effusively,  pumped  his  hand  warmly  and  exclaimed, 
“There  will  be  peace!  Peace  is  secured!”  Fortified  with  such 
happy  assurances,  the  Swedish  courier  made  immediately 
for  the  British  Embassy  to  let  Henderson,  whom  he  had 
not  yet  personally  met,  in  on  the  glad  tidings.  According 
to  the  ambassador’s  dispatch  describing  this  encounter, 
Dahlerus  reported  that  the  Germans  were  highly  optimistic. 
They  “agreed”  with  the  “main  point”  of  the  British 
reply.  Hitler,  Dahlerus  said,  was  asking  “only”  for  Danzig 
and  the  Corridor — not  the  whole  Corridor  but  just  a small 
one  along  the  railroad  tracks  to  Danzig.  In  fact,  Dahlerus 
reported,  the  Fuehrer  was  prepared  to  be  “most  reason- 
able. He  would  go  a long  way  to  meet  the  Poles.”  48 

Sir  Nevile  Henderson,  on  whom  some  light  was  finally 
dawning,  was  not  so  sure.  He  told  his  visitor,  according 
to  the  latter,  that  one  could  not  believe  a word  that  Hitler 
said  and  the  same  went  for  Dahlerus’  friend,  Hermann 
Goering,  who  had  lied  to  the  ambassador  “heaps  of  times.” 
Hitler,  in  the  opinion  of  Henderson,  was  playing  a dis- 
honest and  ruthless  game. 

But  the  Swede,  now  at  the  very  center  of  affairs,  could 
not  be  persuaded  his  awakening  was  to  come  even  after 
Henderson  s.  Just  to  make  sure  that  the  ambassador’s  in- 
explicable pessimism  did  not  jeopardize  his  own  efforts,  he 


The  Road  to  War 


767 


again  telephoned  the  British  Foreign  Office  at  7:10  p.m. 
to  leave  a message  for  Halifax  that  there  would  be  “no 
difficulties  in  the  German  reply.”  But,  advised  the  Swede, 
the  British  government  should  tell  the  Poles  “to  behave 
properly.”  49 

Five  minutes  later,  at  7:15  o’clock  on  the  evening  of 
August  29,  Henderson  arrived  at  the  Chancellery  to  re- 
ceive from  the  Fuehrer  Germany’s  actual  reply.  It  soon 
became  evident  how  hollow  had  been  the  optimism  of 
Goering  and  his  Swedish  friend.  The  meeting,  as  the  am- 
bassador advised  Halifax  immediately  afterward,  “was  of 
a stormy  character  and  Herr  Hitler  was  far  less  reasonable 
than  yesterday.” 

The  formal,  written  German  note  itself  reiterated  the 
Reich’s  desire  for  friendship  with  Great  Britain  but  em- 
phasized that  “it  could  not  be  bought  at  the  price  of  a 
renunciation  of  vital  German  interests.”  After  a long  and 
familiar  rehearsal  of  Polish  misdeeds,  provocations  and 
“barbaric  actions  of  maltreatment  which  cry  to  heaven,” 
the  note  presented  Hitler’s  demands  officially  and  in  writ- 
ing for  the  first  time:  return  of  Danzig  and  the  Corridor, 
and  the  safeguarding  of  Germans  in  Poland.  To  eliminate 
“present  conditions,”  it  added,  “there  no  longer  remain 
days,  still  less  weeks,  but  perhaps  only  hours.” 

Germany,  the  communications  continued,  could  no  long- 
er share  the  British  view  that  a solution  could  be  reached 
by  direct  negotiations  with  Poland.  However,  “solely”  to 
please  the  British  government  and  in  the  interests  of  Anglo- 
German  friendship,  Germany  was  ready  “to  accept  the 
British  proposal  and  enter  into  direct  negotiations”  with 
Poland.  “In  the  event  of  a territorial  rearrangement  in 
Poland,”  the  German  government  could  not  give  guaran- 
tees without  the  agreement  of  the  Soviet  Union.  (The  British 
government,  of  course,  did  not  know  of  the  secret  protocol 
of  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  dividing  up  Poland.)  “For  the 
rest,  in  making  these  proposals,”  the  note  declared,  “the 
German  Government  never  had  any  intention  of  touching 
Poland’s  vital  interests  or  questioning  the  existence  of  an 
independent  Polish  State.” 

And  then,  at  the  very  end,  came  the  trap. 

The  German  Government  accordingly  agree  to  accept  the 
British  Government’s  offer  of  their  good  offices  in  securing 
the  dispatch  to  Berlin  of  a Polish  emissary  with  full  powers. 


768  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

They  count  on  the  arrival  of  this  emissary  on  Wednesday, 
August  30,  1939. 

The  German  Government  will  immediately  draw  up  pro- 
posals for  a solution  acceptable  to  themselves  and  will,  if 
possible,  place  these  at  the  disposal  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment before  the  arrival  of  the  Polish  negotiator.60 

Henderson  read  through  the  note  while  Hitler  and  Rib- 
bentrop  watched  him  and  said  nothing  until  he  came  to 
the  passage  saying  that  the  Germans  expected  the  arrival 
of  a Polish  emissary  with  full  powers  on  the  following 
day. 

“That  sounds  like  an  ultimatum,”  he  commented,  but 
Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  strenuously  denied  it.  They  merely 
Wished  to  stress,  they  said,  “the  urgency  of  the  moment 
when  two  fully  mobilized  armies  were  standing  face  to 
face.” 

The  ambassador,  no  doubt  mindful  of  the  reception  ac- 
corded by  Hitler  to  Schuschnigg  and  Hacha,  says  he 
asked  whether  if  a Polish  plenipotentiary  did  come  he 
would  be  “well  received”  and  the  discussions  “conducted 
on  a footing  of  complete  equality.” 

“Of  course,”  Hitler  answered. 

There  followed  an  acrimonious  discussion  provoked  at 
one  point  by  Hitler’s  “gratuitous”  remark,  as  Henderson 
put  it,  that  the  ambassador  did  not  “care  a row  of  pins” 
how  many  Germans  were  being  slaughtered  in  Poland. 
To  this  Henderson  says  he  made  a “heated  retort.”  * 

“I  left  the  Reich  Chancellery  that  evening  filled  with  the 
gloomiest  forebodings,”  Henderson  recounted  later  in  his 
memoirs,  though  he  does  not  seem  to  have  mentioned  this 
in  his  dispatches  which  he  got  off  to  London  that  night. 
“My  soldiers,”  Hitler  had  told  him,  “are  asking  me,  ‘Yes 
or  no?’  ” They  had  already  lost  a week  and  they  could  not 
afford  to  lose  another  “lest  the  rainy  season  in  Poland 
be  added  to  their  enemies.” 

Nevertheless  it  is  evident  from  the  ambassador’s  official 
reports  and  from  his  book  that  he  did  not  quite  compre- 
hend the  nature  of  Hitler’s  trap  until  the  next  day,  when 
another  trap  was  sprung  and  the  Fuehrer’s  trickery  be- 
came clear.  The  dictator’s  game  seems  quite  obvious  from 


* I proceeded  to  outshout  Hitler,”  Henderson  wired  Halifax  the  next  day. 

...  X added  a good  deal  more  shouting  at  the  top  of  my  voice.”  51  This 
temperamental  display  was  not  mentioned  in  earlier  British  documents. 


The  Road  to  War 


769 


the  text  of  his  formal  note.  He  demanded  on  the  evening 
of  August  29  that  an  emissary  with  full  powers  to  ne- 
gotiate show  up  in  Berlin  the  next  day.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  he  had  in  mind  inflicting  on  him  the  treatment 
he  had  accorded  the  Austrian  Chancellor  and  the  Czecho- 
slovak President  under  what  he  thought  were  similiar  cir- 
cumstances. If  the  Poles,  as  he  was  quite  sure,  did  not 
rush  the  emissary  to  Berlin,  or  even  if  they  did  and  the 
negotiator  declined  to  accept  Hitler’s  terms,  then  Poland 
could  be  blamed  for  refusing  a “peaceful  settlement”  and 
Britain  and  France  might  be  induced  not  to  come  to  its 
aid  when  attacked.  Primitive,  but  simple  and  clear.* 

But  on  the  night  of  August  29  Henderson  did  not  see  it 
so  clearly.  While  he  was  still  working  on  his  dispatches 
to  London  describing  his  meeting  with  Hitler  he  invited 
the  Polish  ambassador  to  come  over  to  the  embassy.  He 
filled  him  in  on  the  German  note  and  his  talk  with  Hitler 
and,  by  his  own  account,  “impressed  on  him  the  need  for 
immediate  action.  I implored  him,  in  Poland’s  own  in- 
terests, to  urge  his  Government  to  nominate  without  any 
delay  someone  to  represent  them  in  the  proposed  negoti- 
ations.” 52 

In  the  London  Foreign  Office,  heads  were  cooler.  At 
2 a.m.  on  August  29,  Halifax,  after  pondering  the  German 
reply  and  Henderson’s  account  of  the  meeting  with  Hitler, 
wired  the  ambassador  that  while  careful  consideration  would 
be  given  the  German  note,  it  was  “of  course  unreasonable 
to  expect  that  we  can  produce  a Polish  representative  in 
Berlin  today,  and  German  Government  must  not  expect 
this.”  53  The  diplomats  and  Foreign  Office  officials  were 
now  laboring  frantically  around  the  clock  and  Henderson 
conveyed  this  message  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  at  4:30  a.m. 

He  conveyed  four  further  messages  from  London  dur- 
ing the  day,  August  30.  One  was  a personal  note  from 
Chamberlain  to  Hitler  advising  him  that  the  German  reply 
was  being  considered  “with  all  urgency”  and  that  it  would 
be  answered  later  in  the  afternoon.  In  the  meantime  the 
Prime  Minister  urged  the  German  government,  as  he  said 
he  had  the  Polish  government,  to  avoid  frontier  incidents. 

* General  Haider  put  Hitler’s  game  succinctly  in  a diary  entry  of  August 
29:  “Fuehrer  hopes  to  drive  wedge  between  British,  French  and  Poles. 
Strategy:  Raise  a barrage  of  demographic  and  democratic  demands  . . . The 
Poles  will  come  to  Berlin  on  August  30.  On  August  31  the  negotiations  will 
blow  up.  On  September  1,  start  to  use  force.” 


770 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

For  the  rest,  he  welcomed  the  evidence  in  the  exchanges 
of  views  which  are  taking  place  of  the  desire  for  an  Anglo- 
German  understanding.” 54  The  second  message  was  in 
similar  terms  from  Halifax.  A third  from  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary spoke  of  reports  of  German  sabotage  in  Poland  and 
asked  the  Germans  to  refrain  from  such  activities.  The 
fourth  message  from  Halifax,  dispatched  at  6:50  p.m.,  re- 
flected a stiffening  of  both  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Brit- 
ish ambassador  in  Berlin. 

On  further  reflection,  Henderson  had  got  off  a wire  to 
London  earlier  in  the  day: 

While  I still  recommend  that  the  Polish  Government  should 
swallow  this  eleventh-hour  effort  to  establish  direct  contact 
with  Hitler,  even  if  it  be  only  to  convince  the  world  that 
they  were  prepared  to  make  their  own  sacrifice  for  preser- 
vation of  peace,  one  can  only  conclude  from  the  German 
reply  that  Hitler  is  determined  to  achieve  his  ends  by  so- 
called  peaceful  fair  means  if  he  can,  but  by  force  if  he 
cannot.65 

By  this  time  even  Henderson  had  no  more  stomach  for 
another  Munich.  The  Poles  had  never  considered  one — for 
themselves.  At  10  a.m.  that  morning  of  August  30,  the 
British  ambassador  in  Warsaw  had  wired  Halifax  that  he 
felt  sure  “that  it  would  be  impossible  to  induce  the  Polish 
Government  to  send  M.  Beck  or  any  other  representative 
immediately  to  Berlin  to  discuss  a settlement  on  the  basis 
proposed  by  Hitler.  They  would  sooner  fight  and  perish 
rather  than  submit  to  such  humiliation,  especially  after  the 
examples  of  Czechoslovakia,  Lithuania  and  Austria.”  He 
suggested  that  if  negotiations  were  to  be  “between  equals” 
they  must  take  place  in  some  neutral  country.56 

His  own  stiffening  attitude  thus  reinforced  from  his  am- 
bassadors in  Berlin  and  Warsaw,  Halifax  wired  Henderson 
that  the  British  government  could  not  “advise”  the  Poles 
to  comply  with  Hitler’s  demand  that  an  emissary  with  full 
powers  come  to  Berlin.  It  was,  said  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
“wholly  unreasonable.” 

Could  you  not  suggest  [Halifax  added]  to  German  Gov- 
ernment that  they  adopt  the  normal  procedure,  when  their 
proposals  are  ready,  of  inviting  the  Polish  Ambassador  to 
call  and  handing  proposals  to  him  for  transmission  to  Warsaw 
and  inviting  suggestions  as  to  conduct  of  negotiations.5? 


The  Road  to  War 


771 


The  promised  British  reply  to  Hitler’s  latest  note  was 
delivered  to  Ribbentrop  by  Henderson  at  midnight  on 
August  30-31.  There  now  ensued  a highly  dramatic  meet- 
ing which  Dr.  Schmidt,  the  only  observer  present,  later 
described  as  “the  stormiest  I have  ever  experienced  during 
my  twenty-three  years  as  interpreter.”  58 

“I  must  tell  you,”  the  ambassador  wired  Halifax  im- 
mediately afterward,  “that  Ribbentrop’s  whole  demeanor 
during  an  unpleasant  interview  was  aping  Hitler  at  his 
worst.”  And  in  his  Final  Report  three  weeks  later  Hen- 
derson recalled  the  German  Foreign  Minister’s  “intense 
hostility,  which  increased  in  violence  as  I made  each  com- 
munication in  turn.  He  kept  leaping  from  his  chair  in  a 
state  of  great  excitement  and  asking  if  I had  anything 
more  to  say.  I kept  replying  that  I had.”  According  to 
Schmidt,  Henderson  was  also  aroused  from  his  chair.  At 
one  point,  says  this  sole  eyewitness,  both  men  leaped 
from  their  seats  and  glared  at  each  other  so  angrily  that 
the  German  interpreter  thought  they  were  coming  to  blows. 

But  what  is  important  for  history  is  not  the  grotesque- 
ness of  this  meeting  between  the  German  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  His  Majesty’s  Ambassador  in  Berlin 
at  midnight  of  August  30—31,  but  a development,  dur- 
ing the  tempestuous  interview,  which  produced  Hitler’s 
final  act  of  trickery  and  completed,  when  it  was  too  late, 
the  education  of  Sir  Nevile  Henderson  insofar  as  the  Third 
Reich  was  concerned. 

Ribbentrop  scarcely  glanced  at  the  British  reply  or  lis- 
tened to  Henderson’s  attempted  explanation  of  it.*  When 
Henderson  ventured  to  ask  for  the  German  proposals  for 
a Polish  settlement,  which  had  been  promised  the  British 
in  Hitler  s last  note,  Ribbentrop  retorted  contemptuously 
that  it  was  now  too  late  since  the  Polish  emissary  had  not 
arrived  by  midnight.  However,  the  Germans  had  drawn 
up  proposals  and  Ribbentrop  now  proceeded  to  read  them. 


Though  couched  in  conciliatory  terms,  the  British  note  was  firm  His 
Majesty  s Government  it  said,  “reciprocated”  the  German  desire  for  im- 
rnlr'ta  ir'  b,f,  ,tbey  could  not„sa.£nfice  the  interests  of  other  friends 
t W tlf  r obta  n that  lmPrt>vement.  They  fully  understood,  it  continued, 
h,u  rhh»  P er";a?' S0Vemment  collId  ?ot  “sacrifice  Germany’s  vital  interests 
but  the  Polish  Government  are  m the  same  position.”  The  British  govern- 
ment  must  make  an  express  reservation”  regarding  Hitler’s  terms  and, 
while  urging  direct  negotiations  between  Berlin  and  Warsaw,  considered 

■mBrAhBlue'Bo^pp mSSj?,' “ C°ntaC*  " “rly  aS  t0day'”  (TeXt 


772 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


He  read  them  in  German  “at  top  speed,  or  rather  gab- 
bled to  me  as  fast  as  he  could,  in  a tone  of  utmost  annoy- 
ance,” Henderson  reported. 

Of  the  sixteen  articles  I was  able  to  gather  the  gist  of  six 
or  seven,  but  it  would  have  been  quite  impossible  to  guaran- 
tee even  the  exact  accuracy  of  these  without  a careful  study 
of  the  text  itself.  When  he  had  finished  I accordingly  asked 
him  to  let  me  see  it.  Ribbentrop  refused  categorically,  threw 
the  document  with  a contemptuous  gesture  on  the  table 
and  said  that  it  was  now  out  of  date  since  no  Polish  emissary 
had  arrived  by  midnight.* 

It  may  have  been  out  of  date,  since  the  Germans  chose 
to  make  it  so,  but  what  is  important  is  that  these  German 
“proposals”  were  never  meant  to  be  taken  seriously  or  in- 
deed to  be  taken  at  all.  In  fact  they  were  a hoax.  They 
were  a sham  to  fool  the  German  people  and,  if  possible, 
world  opinion  into  believing  that  Hitler  had  attempted  at 
the  last  minute  to  reach  a reasonable  settlement  of  his 
claims  against  Poland.  The  Fuehrer  admitted  as  much.  Dr. 
Schmidt  later  heard  him  say,  “I  needed  an  alibi,  especi- 
ally with  the  German  people,  to  show  them  that  I had 
done  everything  to  maintain  peace.  This  explains  my  gener- 
ous offer  about  the  settlement  of  the  Danzig  and  Corridor 
questions.”  t 

Compared  to  his  demands  of  recent  days,  they  were 
generous,  astonishingly  so.  In  them  Hitler  demanded  only 
that  Danzig  be  returned  to  Germany.  The  future  of  the 

* Ribbentrop,  who  it  seemed  to  this  writer,  cut  the  sorriest  figure  of  all  the 
chief  defendants  at  the  Nuremberg  trial — and  made  the  weakest  defense — 
claimed  on  the  stand  that  Hitler,  who,  he  said,  “personally  dictated”  the 
sixteen  points,  had  “expressly  forbidden  me  to  let  these  proposals  out  of  my 
hands.”  Why,  he  did  not  say  and  was  not  asked  on  cross-examination. 
“Hitler  told  me,”  Ribbentrop  conceded,  “that  I might  communicate  to  the 
British  Ambassador  only  the  substance  of  them,  if  1 thought  it  advisable.  I 
did  a little  more  than  that:  I read  all  the  proposals  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end.”  50  Dr.  Schmidt  denies  that  Ribbentrop  read  the  text  of  the  proposals 
in  German  so  fast  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  Henderson  to 
grasp  them.  He  says  the  Foreign  Minister  did  not  “particularly  hurry  over 
them.”  Henderson,  Schmidt  says,  was  “not  exactly  a master  of  German” 
and  he  might  have  been  more  effective  in  these  crucial  talks  had  he  used  his 
native  language.  Ribbentrop’s  English  was  excellent,  but  he  refused  to  speak 
it  during  these  parleys.00 

t The  text  of  the  sixteen  proposals  was  telegraphed  to  the  German  charge 
d’affaires  in  London  at  9:15  p.m.  on  August  30,  four  hours  before  Ribben- 
trop “gabbled”  them  to  Henderson.  But  the  German  envoy  in  London  was 
instructed  that  they  were  to  “be  kept  strictly  secret  and  not  to  be  com- 
municated to  anyone  else  until  further  instructions.”  01  Hitler  in  his  note  of 
the  previous  day,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  promised  to  place  them  at  the 
disposal  of  the  British  government  before  the  arrival  of  the  Polish  negotiator. 


The  Road  to  War 


773 


Corridor  would  be  decided  by  a plebiscite,  and  then  only 
after  a period  of  twelve  months  when  tempers  had  calmed 
down.  Poland  would  keep  the  port  of  Gdynia.  Whoever 
received  the  Corridor  in  the  plebiscite  would  grant  the 
other  party  extraterritorial  highway  and  railroad  routes 
through  it — this  was  a reversion  to  his  “offer”  of  the  pre- 
vious spring.  There  was  to  be  an  exchange  of  populations 
and  full  rights  accorded  to  nationals  of  one  country  in 
the  other. 

One  may  speculate  that  had  these  proposals  been  offered 
seriously  they  would  undoubtedly  have  formed  at  least 
the  basis  of  negotiations  between  Germany  and  Poland  and 
might  well  have  spared  the  world  its  second  great  war  in 
a generation.  They  were  broadcast  to  the  German  people 
at  9 p.m.  on  August  31,  eight  and  one  half  hours  after 
Hitler  had  issued  the  final  orders  for  the  attack  on  Poland, 
and,  so  far  as  I could  judge  in  Berlin,  they  succeeded  in 
their  aim  of  fooling  the  German  people.  They  certainly 
fooled  this  writer,  who  was  deeply  impressed  by  their  rea- 
sonableness when  he  heard  them  over  the  radio,  and  who 
said  so  in  his  broadcast  to  America  on  that  last  night  of  the 
peace. 

Henderson  returned  to  His  Majesty’s  Embassy  that 
night  of  August  30-31,  convinced,  as  he  later  said,  “that 
the  last  hope  for  peace  had  vanished.”  Still,  he  kept  trying. 
He  roused  the  Polish  ambassador  out  of  bed  at  2 A.M.,  in- 
vited him  to  hurry  over  to  the  embassy,  gave  him  “an 
objective  and  studiously  moderate  account”  of  his  conver- 
sation with  Ribbentrop,  mentioned  the  cession  of  Danzig 
and  the  plebiscite  in  the  Corridor  as  the  two  main  points 
in  the  German  proposals,  stated  that  so  far  as  he  could 
gather  “they  were  not  too  unreasonable”  and  suggested 
that  Lipski  recommend  to  his  government  that  they  should 
propose  at  once  a meeting  between  Field  Marshals 
Smigly-Rydz  and  Goering.  “I  felt  obliged  to  add,”  says 
Henderson,  “that  I could  not  conceive  of  the  success  of 
any  negotiations  if  they  were  conducted  by  Herr  von  Rib- 
bentrop.” * 62 

* In  a dispatch  to  Halifax  filed  at  5:15  a.m.  (August  31),  Henderson  re- 
ported  that  he  had  also  advised  Lipski  “in  the  very  strongest  terms”  to 
“ring  up”  Ribbentrop  and  ask  for  the  German  proposals  so  .that  he  could 
communicate  them  to  the  Polish  government.  Lipski  said  he  would  first  have 
to  talk  with  Warsaw.  “The  Polish  Ambassador,”  Henderson  added,  “prom- 


774 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


In  the  meantime  the  tireless  Dahlerus  had  not  been  in- 
active. At  10  p.m.  on  August  29,  Goering  had  summoned 
him  to  his  home  and  informed  him  of  the  “unsatisfactory 
course”  of  the  meeting  just  finished  between  Hitler,  Rib- 
bentrop  and  Henderson.  The  corpulent  Field  Marshal  was 
in  one  of  his  hysterical  moods  and  treated  his  Swedish 
friend  to  a violent  outburst  against  the  Poles  and  the  Brit- 
ish. Then  he  calmed  down,  assured  his  visitor  that  the 
Fuehrer  was  already  at  work  drawing  up  a “magnani- 
mous” (" grosszuegig ”)  offer  to  Poland  in  which  the  only 
clear-cut  demand  would  be  the  return  of  Danzig  and  gen- 
erously leaving  the  future  of  the  Corridor  to  be  decided  by 
a plebiscite  “under  international  control.”  Dahlerus  mildly 
inquired  about  the  size  of  the  plebiscite  area,  whereupon 
Goering  tore  a page  out  of  an  old  atlas  and  with  colored 
pencils  shaded  off  the  “Polish”  and  “German”  parts,  includ- 
ing in  the  latter  not  only  prewar  Prussian  Poland  but  the 
industrial  city  of  Lodz,  which  was  sixty  miles  east  of 
the  1914  frontier.  The  Swedish  interloper  could  not  help 
but  notice  the  “rapidity  and  the  recklessness”  with  which 
such  important  decisions  were  made  in  the  Third  Reich. 
However,  he  agreed  to  Goering’s  request  that  he  fly  imme- 
diately back  to  London,  emphasize  to  the  British  govern- 
ment that  Hitler  still  wanted  peace  and  hint  that  as  proof 
of  it  the  Fuehrer  was  already  drawing  up  a most  generous 
offer  to  Poland. 

Dahlerus,  who  seems  to  have  been  incapable  of  fatigue, 
flew  off  to  London  at  4 a.m.  August  30  and,  changing  cars 
several  times  on  the  drive  in  from  Heston  to  the  city  to 
throw  the  newspaper  reporters  off  the  track  (apparently  no 
journalist  even  knew  of  his  existence),  arrived  at  Down- 
ing Street  at  10:30  a.m.,  where  he  was  immediately  re- 
ceived by  Chamberlain,  Halifax,  Wilson  and  Cadogan. 

But  by  now  the  three  British  architects  of  Munich  (Cad- 
ogan, a permanent  Foreign  Office  official,  had  always  been 
impervious  to  Nazi  charms)  could  no  longer  be  taken  in 
by  Hitler  and  Goering,  nor  were  they  much  impressed 
by  Dahlerus’  efforts.  The  well-meaning  Swede  found  them 
“highly  mistrustful”  of  both  Nazi  leaders  and  “inclined 


ised  to  telephone  at  once  to  his  Government,  but  he  is  so  inert  or  so  handi- 
capped by  instructions  of  his  Government  that  I cannot  rely  on  his  action 
being  very  effective."  63 


The  Road  to  War 


775 


to  assume  that  nothing  would  now  prevent  Hitler  from  de- 
claring war  on  Poland.”  Moreover  the  British  government, 
it  was  made  plain  to  the  Swedish  mediator,  had  not  fallen 
for  Hitler’s  trickery  in  demanding  that  a Polish  plenipo- 
tentiary show  up  in  Berlin  within  twenty-four  hours. 

But  Dahlerus,  like  Henderson  in  Berlin,  kept  on  trying. 
He  telephoned  Goering  in  Berlin,  suggested  that  the  Polish 
-German  delegates  meet  “outside  Germany”  and  received 
the  summary  answer  that  “Hitler  was  in  Berlin”  and  the 
meeting  would  have  to  take  place  there. 

So  the  Swedish  go-between  accomplished  nothing  by 
this  flight.  By  midnight  he  was  back  in  Berlin,  where,  it 
must  be  said,  he  had  another  opportunity  to  be  at  least  help- 
ful. He  reached  Goering’s  headquarters  at  half  past  mid- 
night to  find  the  Luftwaffe  chief  once  more  in  an  expansive 
mood.  The  Fuehrer,  said  Goering,  had  just  handed  Hen- 
derson through  Ribbentrop  a “democratic,  fair  and  work- 
able offer”  to  Poland.  Dahlerus,  who  seems  to  have  been 
sobered  by  his  meeting  in  Downing  Street,  called  up  Forbes 
at  the  British  Embassy  to  check  and  learned  that  Ribben- 
trop had  “gabbled”  the  terms  so  fast  that  Henderson  had 
not  been  able  to  fully  grasp  them  and  that  the  ambassa- 
dor had  been  refused  a copy  of  the  text.  Dahlerus  says 
he  told  Goering  that  this  was  no  way  “to  treat  the  ambas- 
sador of  an  empire  like  Great  Britain”  and  suggested  that 
the  Field  Marshal,  who  had  a copy  of  the  sixteen  points, 
permit  him  to  telephone  the  text  to  the  British  Embassy. 
After  some  hesitation  Goering  acquiesced.* 

In  such  a way,  at  the  instigation  of  an  unknown  Swed- 
ish businessman  in  connivance  with  the  chief  of  the  Air 
Force,  were  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  circumvented  and  the 
British  informed  of  the  German  “proposals”  to  Poland. 
Perhaps  by  this  time  the  Field  Marshal,  who  was  by  no 
means  unintelligent  or  inexperienced  in  the  handling  of 
foreign  affairs,  saw  more  quickly  than  the  Fuehrer  and  his 
fawning  Foreign  Minister  certain  advantages  which  might 
be  gained  by  finally  letting  the  British  in  on  the  secret. 

To  make  doubly  sure  that  Henderson  got  it  correctly, 
Goering  dispatched  Dahlerus  to  the  British  Embassy  at 

* On  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  Goering  claimed  that  in  turning  over  the  text 
of  Hitler  s “offer”  to  the  British  Embassy  he  was  taking  “an  enormous  risk, 
f* 1MC^  * • fuehrer  had  forbidden  this  information  being  made  public.  Only 

I,  Goering  told  the  tribunal,  “could  take  that  risk.”  04 


776 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


10  A.M.  of  Thursday,  August  31,  with  a typed  copy  of 
the  sixteen  points.  Henderson  was  still  trying  to  persuade 
the  Polish  ambassador  to  establish  the  “desired  contact” 
with  the  Germans.  At  8 a.m.  he  had  once  more  urged  this 
on  Lipski,  this  time  over  the  telephone,  warning  him  that 
unless  Poland  acted  by  noon  there  would  be  war.*  Shortly 
after  Dahlerus  had  arrived  with  the  text  of  the  German 
proposals,  Henderson  dispatched  him,  along  with  Forbes, 
to  the  Polish  Embassy.  Lipski,  who  had  never  heard  of 
Dahlerus,  was  somewhat  confused  at  meeting  the  Swede — 
he  was  by  this  time,  like  most  of  the  key  diplomats  in 
Berlin,  strained  and  dead  tired — and  became  irritated  when 
Dahlerus  urged  him  to  go  immediately  to  Goering  and 
accept  the  Fuehrer’s  offer.  Requesting  the  Swede  to  dictate 
the  sixteen  points  to  a secretary  in  an  adjoining  room, 
he  expressed  his  annoyance  to  Forbes  for  bringing  in  a 
“stranger”  at  this  late  date  on  so  serious  a matter.  The 
harassed  Polish  ambassador  must  have  been  depressed  too 
at  the  pressure  which  Henderson  was  bringing  on  him  and 
his  government  to  negotiate  immediately  on  the  basis  of  an 
offer  which  he  had  just  received  quite  unofficially  and  sur- 
reptitiously, but  which  the  British  envoy,  as  he  had  told 
Lipski  the  night  before,  thought  was  not  “on  the  whole 
too  unreasonable.”  t He  did  not  know  that  Henderson's 

* Even  the  levelheaded  French  ambassador  supported  his  British  colleague 
in  this.  Henderson  had  telephoned  him  at  9 a.m.  to  say  that  if  the  Poles  did 
not  agree  by  noon  to  sending  a plenipotentiary  to  Berlin  the  German  Army 
would  begin  its  attack.  Coulondre  went  immediately  to  the  Polish  Embassy 
and  urged  Lipski  to  telephone  his  government,  asking  authorization  to  make 
immediate  contact  with  the  Germans  “as  a plenipotentiary.”  ( French  Yellow 
Book,  French  edition,  pp.  366-67.) 

t By  now,  that  is  before  noon  of  August  31,  Henderson,  striving  desperately 
for  peace  at  almost  any  price,  had  convinced  himself  that  the  German  terms 
were  quite  reasonable  and  even  moderate.  And  though  Ribbentrop  had  told 
him  the  previous  midnight  that  the  German  proposals  were  “out  of  date, 
since  no  Polish  emissary  had  arrived,”  and  though  the  Polish  government 
had  not  yet  even  seen  them,  and  though,  they  were,  in  sum,  a hoax,  Hender- 
son kept  urging  Halifax  all  day  to  put  pressure  on  the  Poles  to  send  a 
plenipotentiary,  as  Hitler  had  demanded,  and  kept  stressing  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  Fuehrer’s  sixteen  points. 

At  12:30  p.m.  (on  August  31)  Henderson  wired  Halifax  “urging”  him 
to  “insist”  to  Poland  that  Lipski  ask  the  German  government  for  the  German 
proposals  for  urgent  communication  to  his  government  “with  a view  to  dis- 
patching a plenipotentiary.  The  terms  sound  moderate  to  me,”  Henderson 
contended.  “This  is  no  Munich  . . . Poland  will  never  get  such  good  terms 
again  ...” 

At  the  same  time  Henderson  wrote  a long  letter  to  Halifax:  . . The 

German  proposals  do  not  endanger  the  independence  of  Poland  . . . She  is 
likely  to  get  a worse  deal  later  . . .” 

Still  keeping  at  it,  Henderson  wired  Halifax  at  12:30  a.m.  on  September 
1,  four  hours  before  the  German  attack  was  scheduled  to  begin  (though  he 


The  Road  to  War 


777 


view  was  not  endorsed  by  Downing  Street.  What  he  did 
know  was  that  he  had  no  intention  of  taking  the  ad- 
vice of  an  unknown  Swede,  even  though  he  had  been  sent 
to  him  by  the  British  ambassador,  and  of  going  to  Goer- 
ing  to  accept  Hitler’s  “offer,”  even  if  he  had  been  empow- 
ered to  do  so,  which  he  was  not.* * 

THE  LAST  DAY  OF  PEACE 

Having  got  the  Germans  and  Poles  to  agree  to  direct 
negotiations,  as  they  thought,  the  British  and  French  gov- 
ernments, though  highly  skeptical  of  Hitler,  had  concen- 
trated their  efforts  on  trying  to  bring  such  talks  about.  In 
this  Britain  took  the  lead,  supported  diplomatically  in  Ber- 
lin and  especially  in  Warsaw  by  France.  Although  the 
British  did  not  advise  the  Poles  to  accept  Hitler’s  ultima- 
tum and  fetch  an  emissary  with  full  powers  to  Berlin  on 
August  30,  holding  that  such  a demand  was,  as  Halifax 
had  wired  Henderson,  “wholly  unreasonable,”  they  did 
urge  Colonel  Beck  to  declare  that  he  was  prepared  to  nego- 
tiate with  Berlin  “without  delay.”  This  was  the  substance 
of  a message  which  Halifax  got  off  to  his  ambassador  in 
Warsaw  late  on  the  night  of  August  30.  Kennard  was  to 
inform  Beck  of  the  contents  of  the  British  note  to  Germany 

did  not  know  this)  : “German  proposals  . . . are  not  unreasonable  ...  I 
submit  that  on  German  offer  war  would  be  completely  unjustifiable.”  He 
urged  again  that  the  British  government  pressure  the  Poles  “in  unmistakable 
language”  to  state  “their  intention  to  send  a plenipotentiary  to  Berlin.” 

The  British  ambassador  in  Warsaw  took  a different  view.  He  wired  to 
Halifax  on  August  31:  “H.  M.  Ambassador  at  Berlin  appears  to  consider 
German  terms  reasonable.  I fear  that  I cannot  agree  with  him  from  point  of 
view  of  Warsaw.”  85 

* There  was  another  somewhat  weird  diplomatic  episode  this  last  day  of 
peace  which  deserves  a footnote.  Dahlerus  returned  from  the  visit  with 
Lipski  to  the  British  Embassy,  where  from  Henderson’s  office  he  put  through 
at  midday  a telephone  call  to  Sir  Horace  Wilson  at  the  British  Foreign 
Office  in  London.  He  told  Wilson  that  the  German  proposals  were  “ex- 
tremely liberal”  but  that  the  Polish  ambassador  had  just  rejected  them.  “It 
is  clear,”  he  said,  “that  the  Poles  are  obstructing  the  possibilities  of  negotia- 
tions.” 

At  this  moment  Wilson  heard  certain  noises  on  the  long-distance  line 
which  sounded  to  him  as  though  the  Germans  were  listening  in.  He  tried 
to  end  the  conversation,  but  Dahlerus  persisted  in  rambling  on  about  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  Poles.  “I  again  told  Dahlerus,”  Sir  Horace  noted 
in  a Foreign  Office  memorandum,  “to  shut  up,  but  as  he  did  not  I put  down 
the  receiver.” 

Wilson  reported  this  indiscretion,  committed  in  the  very  office  of  H.  M. 
Ambassador  in  Berlin,  to  his  superiors.  At  1 p.m.,  less  than  an  hour  later, 
Halifax  wired  Henderson  in  code:  “You  really  must  be  careful  of  use  of 
telephone.  D’s  conversation  I Dahlerus  was  always  referred  to  in  the  mes- 
sages between  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Berlin  Embassy  as  “D”]  at  mid- 
day from  Embassy  was  most  indiscreet  and  has  certainly  been  heard  by  the 
Germans.”  06 


778 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


which  Henderson  was  presenting  to  Ribbentrop,  assure  him 
that  Britain  would  stand  by  its  commitments  to  Poland, 
but  stress  the  importance  of  Poland’s  agreeing  to  direct 
discussions  with  Germany  at  once. 

We  regard  it  as  most  important  [Halifax  telegraphed]  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  internal  situation  in  Germany  and  of 
world  opinion  that,  so  long  as  the  German  Government 
profess  themselves  ready  to  negotiate,  no  opportunity  should 
be  given  them  for  placing  the  blame  for  a conflict  on  Po- 
land.67 

Kennard  saw  Beck  at  midnight  and  the  Polish  Foreign 
Minister  promised  to  consult  his  government  and  give  him 
a “considered  reply”  by  midday  on  August  31.  Kennard’s 
dispatch  describing  this  interview  reached  the  British  For- 
eign Office  at  8 a.m.  and  Halifax  was  not  entirely  satisfied 
with  it.  At  noon — it  was  now  the  last  day  of  August — 
he  wired  Kennard  that  he  should  “concert”  with  his  French 
colleague  in  Warsaw  (Leon  Noel,  the  French  ambassa- 
dor) and  suggest  to  the  Polish  government 

that  they  should  now  make  known  to  the  German  Govern- 
ment, preferably  direct,  but  if  not,  through  us,  that  they 
have  been  made  aware  of  our  last  reply  to  German  Govern- 
ment and  that  they  confirm  their  acceptance  of  the  principle 
of  direct  discussions. 

French  Government  fear  that  German  Government  might 
take  advantage  of  silence  on  part  of  Polish  Government.68 

Lord  Halifax  was  still  uneasy  about  his  Polish  allies, 
and  less  than  two  hours  later,  at  1:45  p.m.,  he  again  wired 
Kennard: 

Please  at  once  inform  Polish  Government  and  advise 
them,  in  view  of  fact  that  they  have  accepted  principle  of 
direct  discussions,  immediately  to  instruct  Polish  Ambassa- 
dor in  Berlin  to  say  to  German  Government  that,  if  latter 
have  any  proposals,  he  is  ready  to  transmit  them  to  his 
Government  so  that  they  may  at  once  consider  them  and 
make  suggestions  for  early  discussions.69 

But  shortly  before  this  telegram  was  dispatched,  Beck, 
in  response  to  the  demarche  of  the  midnight  before,  had 
already  informed  the  British  ambassador  in  a written  note 
that  the  Polish  government  “confirm  their  readiness  . . . for 
a direct  exchange  of  views  with  the  German  Government” 


The  Road  to  War 


779 


and  had  orally  assured  him  that  he  was  instructing  Lipski 
to  seek  an  interview  with  Ribbentrop  to  say  that  “Poland 
had  accepted  the  British  proposals.”  When  Kennard  asked 
Beck  what  Lipski  would  do  if  Ribbentrop  handed  over 
the  German  proposals,  the  Foreign  Minister  replied  that 
his  ambassador  in  Berlin  would  not  be  authorized  to  accept 
them  as.  “in  view  of  past  experience,  it  might  be  accom- 
panied by  some  sort  of  an  ultimatum.”  The  important 
thing,  said  Beck,  was  to  re-establish  contact  “and  then  de- 
tails should  be  discussed  as  to  where,  with  whom  and  on 
what  basis  negotiations  should  be  commenced.”  In  the  light 
of  the  “past  experience”  which  the  once  pro-Nazi  Polish 
Foreign  Minister  mentioned,  this  was  not  an  unreasonable 
view.  Beck  added,  Kennard  wired  London,  that  “if  invited 
to  go  to  Berlin  he  would  of  course  not  go,  as  he  had  no 
intention  of  being  treated  like  President  Hacha.”  70 

Actually  Beck  did  not  send  to  Lipski  quite  those  instruc- 
tions. Instead  of  saying  that  Poland  “accepted”  the  Brit- 
ish proposals,  Lipski  was  told  to  tell  the  Germans  that 
Poland  “was  favorably  considering”  the  British  suggestions 
and  would  make  a formal  reply  “during  the  next  few  hours 
at  the  latest.” 

There  was  more  to  Beck’s  instructions  to  Lipski  than 
that  and  the  Germans,  having  solved  the  Polish  ciphers, 
knew  it. 

For  a simple  and  good  reason  that  will  soon  become  ap- 
parent, the  Germans  were  not  anxious  to  receive  the  Polish 
ambassador  in  Berlin.  It  was  too  late.  At  1 P.M.,  a few 
minutes  after  he  had  received  his  telegraphic  instructions 
from  Warsaw,  Lipski  requested  an  interview  with  Ribben- 
trop for  the  purpose  of  presenting  a communication  from 
his  government.  After  cooling  his  heels  for  a couple  of 
hours  he  received  a telephone  call  from  Weizsaecker  ask- 
ing, on  behalf  of  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  whether 
he  was  coming  as  an  emissary  with  full  power  “or  in  some 
other  capacity.” 

“I  replied,”  Lipski  reported  later  in  his  final  report,71 
“that  I was  asking  for  an  interview  as  Ambassador,  to  pre- 
sent a declaration  from  my  Government.” 

Another  long  wait  followed.  At  5 p.m.  Attolico  called 
on  Ribbentrop  and  communicated  the  “urgent  desire  of 
the  Duce”  that  the  Fuehrer  should  receive  Lipski  “to 


780 


' The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


establish  in  this  way  at  least  the  minimum  contact  neces- 
sary for  the  avoidance  of  a final  breach.”  The  German 
Foreign  Minister  promised  to  “transmit”  the  Duce’s 
wishes  to  the  Fuehrer.72 

This  was  not  the  first  call  the  Italian  ambassador  had 
made  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  on  this  last  day  of  August  in 
order  to  try  to  save  the  peace.  At  9 that  morning  Attolico 
had  advised  Rome  that  the  situation  was  “desperate”  and 
that  unless  “something  new  comes  up  there  will  be  war 
in  a few  hours.”  In  Rome  Mussolini  and  Ciano  put  their 
heads  together  to  find  something  new.  The  first  result  was 
that  Ciano  telephoned  Halifax  to  say  that  Mussolini  could 
not  intervene  unless  he  were  able  to  produce  for  Hitler  a 
“fat  prize:  Danzig.”  The  British  Foreign  Secretary  did  not 
rise  to  the  bait.  He  told  Ciano  the  first  thing  to  be  done 
was  to  establish  direct  contact  between  the  Germans  and 
the  Poles  through  Lipski. 

Thus  at  11:30  a.m.  Attolico  saw  Weizsaecker  at  the 
German  Foreign  Office  and  apprised  him  that  Mussolini 
was  in  contact  with  London  and  had  suggested  the  return 
of  Danzig  as  a first  step  toward  a German— Polish  settle- 
ment, and  that  the  Duce  needed  a certain  “margin  of  time” 
to  perfect  his  plan  for  peace.  In  the  meantime,  couldn’t 
the  German  government  receive  Lipski? 

Lipski  was  received  by  Ribbentrop  at  6:15  P.M.,  more 
than  five  hours  after  he  had  requested  the  interview.  It 
did  not  last  long.  The  ambassador,  despite  his  fatigue  and 
his  worn  nerves,  behaved  with  dignity.  He  read  to  the  Nazi 
Foreign  Minister  a written  communication. 

Last  night  the  Polish  Government  were  informed  by  the 
British  Government  of  an  exchange  of  views  with  the  Reich 
Government  as  to  a possibility  of  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Polish  and  German  Governments. 

The  Polish  Government  are  favorably  considering  the 
British  Government’s  suggestion,  and  will  make  them  a 
formal  reply  on  the  subject  during  the  next  few  hours. 

“I  added,”  said  Lipski  later,  “that  I had  been  trying  to 
present  this  delcaration  since  1 p.m.”  When  Ribbentrop 
asked  him  whether  he  had  come  as  an  emissary  empow- 
ered to  negotiate,  the  ambassador  replied  that,  “for  the  time 
being,”  he  had  only  been  instructed  to  remit  the  com- 
munication which  he  had  just  read,  whereupon  he  handed 


The  Road  to  War 


781 


it  to  the  Foreign  Minister.  He  had  expected,  Ribbentrop 
said,  that  Lipski  would  come  as  a “fully  empowered  dele- 
gate,” and  when  the  ambassador  again  declared  that  he 
had  no  such  role  he  was  dismissed.  Ribbentrop  said  he 
would  inform  the  Fuehrer.73 

“On  my  return  to  the  embassy,”  Lipski  later  related,  “I 
found  myself  unable  to  communicate  with  Warsaw,  as  the 
Germans  had  cut  my  telephone.” 

The  questions  of  Weizsaecker  and  Ribbentrop  as  to  the 
ambassador’s  status  as  a negotiator  were  purely  formal, 
with  an  eye,  no  doubt,  for  the  record,  for  ever  since  noon, 
when  Lipski’s  communication  had  been  received  by  tele- 
gram from  Warsaw,  the  Germans  had  known  that  he  was 
not  coming,  as  they  had  demanded,  as  a plenipotentiary. 
They  had  decoded  the  telegram  immediately.  A copy  had 
been  sent  to  Goering,  who  showed  it  to  Dahlerus  and  in- 
structed him  to  take  it  posthaste  to  Henderson  so  that  the 
British  government,  as  the  Field  Marshal  later  explained  on 
the  stand  at  Nuremberg,  “should  find  out  as  quickly  as 
possible  how  intransigent  the  Polish  attitude  was.”  Goer- 
ing read  to  the  tribunal  the  secret  instructions  to  Lipski, 
which  were  that  the  ambassador  should  refrain  from  con- 
ducting official  negotiations  “under  any  circumstances” 
and  should  insist  that  he  had  “no  plenipotentiary  powers” 
and  that  he  was  merely  empowered  to  deliver  the  official 
communication  of  his  government.  In  his  testimony,  the 
Field  Marshal  made  much  of  this  during  his  vain  effort  to 
convince  the  Nuremberg  judges  that  Poland  had  “sabo- 
taged” Hitler’s  last  bid  for  peace  and  that,  as  he  said,  he, 
Goering,  did  not  want  war  and  had  done  everything  he 
could  to  prevent  it.  But  Goering’s  veracity  was  only  a 
shade  above  Ribbentrop’s  and  one  example  of  this  was 
his  further  assertion  to  the  court  that  only  after  Lipski’s 
visit  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  at  6:15  p.m.  on  August  31  did 
Hitler  decide  “on  invasion  the  next  day.” 

The  truth  was  quite  otherwise.  In  fact,  all  these  scram- 
bling eleventh-hour  moves  of  the  weary  and  exhausted 
diplomats,  and  of  the  overwrought  men  who.  directed 
them  on  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  that  last  day  of 
August  1939,  were  but  a flailing  of  the  air,  completely 
futile,  and,  in  the  case  of  the  Germans,  entirely  and  pur- 
posely deceptive. 


782 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


For  at  half  after  noon  on  August  31,  before  Lord  Halifax 
had  urged  the  Poles  to  be  more  accommodating  and 
before  Lipski  had  called  on  Ribbentrop  and  before  the 
Germans  had  made  publicly  known  their  “generous”  pro- 
posals to  Poland  and  before  Mussolini  had  tried  to  inter- 
vene, Adolf  Hitler  had  taken  his  final  decision  and  issued 
the  decisive  order  that  was  to  throw  the  planet  into  its 
bloodiest  war. 

SUPREME  COMMANDER  OF  THE  ARMED  FORCES 
MOST  SECRET 

Berlin,  August  31,  1939 
Directive  No.  1 for  the  Conduct  of  the  War 

1.  Now  that  all  the  political  possibilities  of  disposing  by 
peaceful  means  of  a situation  on  the  Eastern  Frontier  which  is 
intolerable  for  Germany  are  exhausted,  I have  determined 
on  a solution  by  force.  * 

2.  The  attack  on  Poland  is  to  be  carried  out  in  accord- 
ance with  the  preparations  made  for  Case  White,  with  the 
alterations  which  result,  where  the  Army  is  concerned,  from 
the  fact  that  it  has  in  the  meantime  almost  completed  its 
dispositions. 

Allotment  of  tasks  and  the  operational  target  remain  un- 
changed. 

Date  of  attack:  September  1,  1939. 

Time  of  attack:  4:45  a.m.  [Inserted  in  red  pencil.] 

This  timing  also  applies  to  the  operation  at  Gdynia,  Bay  of 
Danzig  and  the  Dirschau  Bridge. 

3.  In  the  West  it  is  important  that  the  responsibility  for 
the  opening  of  hostilities  should  rest  squarely  on  England 
and  France.  For  the  time  being  insignificant  frontier  viola- 
tions should  be  met  by  purely  local  action. 

The  neutrality  of  Holland,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and 
Switzerland,  to  which  we  have  given  assurances,  must  be 
scrupulously  observed. 

On  land,  the  German  Western  Frontier  is  not  to  be 
crossed  without  my  express  permission. 

At  sea,  the  same  applies  for  all  warlike  actions  or  actions 
which  could  be  regarded  as  such.t 

4.  If  Britain  and  France  open  hostilities  against  Germany, 
it  is  the  task  of  the  Wehrmacht  formations  operating  in  the 
West  to  conserve  their  forces  as  much  as  possible  and  thus 

* The  emphasis  is  in  the  original  German  text. 

t A marginal  note  in  the  directive  clears  up  this  ambiguous  point — "Thus, 
Atlantic  forces  will  for  the  time  being  remain  in  a waiting  positon.” 


The  Road  to  War 


783 


maintain  the  conditions  for  a victorious  conclusion  of  the 
operations  against  Poland.  Within  these  limits  enemy  forces 
and  their  military-economic  resources  are  to  be  damaged  as 
much  as  possible.  Orders  to  go  over  to  the  attack  I reserve, 
in  any  case,  to  myself. 

The  Army  will  hold  the  West  Wall  and  make  preparations 
to  prevent  its  being  outflanked  in  the  north  through  violation 
of  Belgian  or  Dutch  territory  by  the  Western  powers  . . . 

The  Navy  will  carry  on  warfare  against  merchant  ship- 
ping, directed  mainly  at  England  . . . The  Air  Force  is,  in 
the  first  place,  to  prevent  the  French  and  British  Air  Forces 
from  attacking  the  German  Army  and  the  German  Lebens- 
raum. 

In  conducting  the  war  against  England,  preparations  are 
to  be  made  for  the  use  of  the  Luftwaffe  in  disrupting  British 
supplies  by  sea,  the  armaments  industry,  and  the  transport 
of  troops  to  France.  A favorable  opportunity  is  to  be  taken 
for  an  effective  attack  on  massed  British  naval  units,  espe- 
cially against  battleships  and  aircraft  carriers.  Attacks 
against  London  are  reserved  for  my  decision. 

Preparations  are  to  be  made  for  attacks  against  the  Brit- 
ish mainland,  bearing  in  mind  that  partial  success  with  in- 
sufficient forces  is  in  all  circumstances  to  be  avoided. 

Adolf  Hitler  74 

Shortly  after  noon  on  August  31,  then,  Hitler  formally 
and  in  writing  directed  the  attack  on  Poland  to  begin  at 
dawn  the  next  day.  As  his  first  war  directive  indicates,  he 
was  still  not  quite  sure  what  Britain  and  France  would  do. 
He  would  refrain  from  attacking  them  first.  If  they  took 
hostile  action,  he  was  prepared  to  meet  it.  Perhaps,  as 
Haider  had  indicated  in  his  diary  entry  of  August  28,  the 
British  would  go  through  the  motions  of  honoring  their 
obligation  to  Poland  and  “wage  a sham  war.’’  If  so,  the 
Fuehrer  would  not  take  it  “amiss.” 

Probably  the  Nazi  dictator  made  his  fateful  decision  a 
little  earlier  than  12:30  p.m.  on  the  last  day  of  August.  At 
6:40  p.m.  on  the  previous  day  Haider  jotted  in  his  diary 
a communication  from  Lieutenant  Colonel  Curt  Siewert, 
adjutant  of  General  von  Brauchitsch:  “Make  all  prepara- 
tions so  that  attack  can  begin  at  4:30  a.m.  on  September  1. 
Should  negotiations  in  London  require  postponement,  then 
September  2.  In  that  case  we  shall  be  notified  before 
3 p.m.  tomorrow.  . . . Fuehrer:  either  September  1 or  2. 
All  off  after  September  2.”  Because  of  the  autumn  rains, 
the  attack  had  to  begin  at  once  or  be  called  off  altogether. 


784  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Very  early  on  the  morning  of  August  31,  while  Hitler 
still  claimed  he  was  waiting  for  the  Polish  emissary, 
the  German  Army  received  its  orders.  At  6:30  a.m.  Haider 
jotted  down:  “Word  from  the  Reich  Chancellery  that  jump- 
off  order  has  been  given  for  September  1.”  At  1 1:30:  “Gen. 
Stuelpnagel  reports  on  fixing  of  time  of  attack  for  0445 
[4:45  a.m.].  Intervention  of  West  said  to  be  unavoidable;  in 
spite  of  this  Fuehrer  has  decided  to  attack.”  An  hour  later 
the  formal  Directive  No.  1 was  issued. 

There  was,  I remember,  an  eerie  atmosphere  that  day 
in  Berlin;  everyone  seemed  to  be  going  around  in  a daze.  At 
7:25  in  the  morning  Wizesaecker  had  telephoned  Ulrich 
von  Hassell,  one  of  the  “conspirators,”  and  asked  him  to 
hurry  over  to  see  him.  The  State  Secretary  saw  only 
one  last  hope:  that  Henderson  should  persuade  Lipski  and 
his  government  to  send  a Polish  plenipotentiary  at  once 
or  at  least  to  announce  the  intention  of  dispatching  one. 
Could  the  unemployed  Hassell  see  his  friend  Henderson 
at  once  and  also  Goering  to  this  end?  Hassell  tried.  He  saw 
Henderson  twice  and  Goering  once.  But  veteran  diplomat 
and,  now,  anti-Nazi  that  he  was,  he  did  not  seem  to  realize 
that  events  had  outstripped  such  puny  efforts.  Nor  did  he 
grasp  the  extent  of  his  own  confusions  and  of  those  of 
Weizsaecker  and  all  the  “good”  Germans  who,  of  course, 
wanted  peace — on  German  terms.  For  it  must  have  been 
obvious  to  them  on  August  31  that  there  would  be  war 
unless  either  Hitler  or  the  Poles  backed  down,  and  that 
there  was  not  the  slightest  possibility  of  the  one  or  the 
other  capitulating.  And  yet,  as  Hassell’s  diary  entry  for 
this  day  makes  clear,  he  expected  the  Poles  to  back  down 
and  to  follow  the  same  disastrous  route  which  the  Aus- 
trians and  Czechs  had  taken. 

When  Henderson  tried  to  point  out  to  Hassell  that  the 
“chief  difficulty”  was  in  German  methods,  in  the  way  they 
were  trying  to  order  the  Poles  around  “like  stupid  little 
boys,”  Hassell  retorted  “that  the  persistent  silence  of  the 
Poles  was  also  objectionable.”  He  added  that  “everything 
depended  on  Lipski  putting  in  an  appearance — not  to  ask 
questions  but  to  declare  his  willingness  to  negotiate.”  Even 
to  Hassell  the  Poles,  who  were  threatened  with  imminent 
attack  on  trumped-up  Nazi  charges,  were  not  supposed  to 
ask  questions.  And  when  the  former  ambassador  summed 
up  his  “final  conclusions”  about  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 


The  Road  to  War 


785 


though  he  blamed  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  for  “knowingly 
taking  the  risk  of  war  with  the  Western  Powers,”  he  also 
heaped  much  responsibility  on  the  Poles  and  even  on 
the  British  and  French.  “The  Poles,  for  their  part,”  he 
wrote,  “with  Polish  conceit  and  Slavic  aimlessness,  con- 
fident of  English  and  French  support,  had  missed  every 
remaining  chance  of  avoiding  war.”  One  can  only  ask  what 
chance  they  missed  except  to  surrender  to  Hitler’s  full  de- 
mands. “The  Government  in  London,”  Hassell  added,  “.  . . 
gave  up  the  race  in  the  very  last  days  and  adopted  a kind 
of  devil-may-care  attitude.  France  went  through  the  same 
stages,  only  with  much  more  hesitation.  Mussolini  did  all 
in  his  power  to  avoid  war.”  75  If  an  educated,  cultivated 
and  experienced  diplomat  such  as  Hassell  could  be  so  woolly 
in  his  thinking  is  it  any  wonder  that  it  was  easy  for  Hitler 
to  take  in  the  mass  of  the  German  people? 

There  now  followed  during  the  waning  afternoon  of  the 
last  day  of  peace  a somewhat  grotesque  interlude.  In  view 
of  what  is  now  known  about  the  decisions  of  the  day  it 
might  have  been  thought  that  the  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  Luftwaffe,  which  was  to  carry  out  far-flung  air  opera- 
tions against  Poland  beginning  at  dawn  on  the  morrow, 
would  be  a very  busy  Field  Marshal.  On  the  contrary.  Dahl- 
erus  took  him  out  to  lunch  at  the  Hotel  Esplanade  and  plied 
him  with  good  food  and  drink.  The  cognac  was  of  such  high 
quality  that  Goering  insisted  on  lugging  away  two  bottles 
of  it  when  he  left.  Having  got  the  Field  Marshal  into  the 
proper  humor,  Dahlerus  proposed  that  he  invite  Henderson 
for  a talk.  After  receiving  Hitler’s  permission,  he  did  so, 
inviting  him  and  Forbes  to  his  house  for  tea  at  5 P.M, 
Dahlerus  (whose  presence  is  not  mentioned  by  Henderson 
in  his  Final  Report  or  in  his  book)  says  that  he  suggested 
that  Goering,  on  behalf  of  Germany,  meet  a Polish  emis- 
sary in  Holland  and  that  Henderson  promised  to  submit  the 
proposal  to  London.  The  British  ambassador’s  version  of 
the  tea  talk,  given  in  his  Final  Report,  was  that  Goering 
“talked  for  two  hours  of  the  iniquities  of  the  Poles  and 
about  Herr  Hitler’s  and  his  own  desire  for  friendship  with 
England.  It  was  a conversation  which  led  to  nowhere  . . . 
My  general  impression  was  that  it  constituted  a final  but 
forlorn  effort  on  his  part  to  detach  Britain  from  the 
Poles  ...  I augured  the  worst  from  the  fact  that  he  was 
in  a position  at  such  a moment  to  give  me  so  much  of  his 


786 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


time  ...  He  could  scarcely  have  afforded  at  such  a mo- 
ment to  spare  time  in  conversation  if  it  did  not  mean  that 
everything  down  to  the  last  detail  was  now  ready  for 
action.” 


The  third  and  most  piquant  description  of  this  bizarre  tea 
party  was  given  by  Forbes  in  answer  to  a questionnaire  from 
Goering’s  lawyer  at  Nuremberg. 

The  atmosphere  was  negative  and  desperate,  though 
friendly  . . . Goering’s  statement  to  the  British  ambassador 
was:  If  the  Poles  should  not  give  in,  Germany  would  crush 
them  like  lice,  and  if  Britain  should  decide  to  declare  war, 
he  would  regret  it  greatly,  but  it  would  be  most  imprudent 
of  Britain.76 


Later  in  the  evening  Henderson,  according  to  his  own 
account,  drafted  a dispatch  to  London  saying  “that  it 
would  be  quite  useless  for  me  to  make  any  further  sug- 
gestions since  they  would  now  only  be  outstripped  by 
events  and  that  the  only  course  remaining  to  us  was  to 
show  our  inflexible  determination  to  resist  force  by  force.”  * 
Sir  Nevile  Henderson’s  disillusionment  seemed  com- 
plete. Despite  all  his  strenuous  efforts  over  the  years  to  ap- 
pease the  insatiable  Nazi  dictator,  his  mission  to  Germany, 
as  he  called  it,  had  failed.  In  the  fading  hours  of  August’s 
last  day  this  shallow,  debonair  Englishman  whose  personal 
diplomacy  in  Berlin  had  been  so  disastrously  blind  tried  to 
face  up  to  the  shattering  collapse  of  his  vain  hopes  and 
abortive  plans.  And  though  he  would  suffer  one  more 
typical,  incredible  lapse  the  next  day,  the  first  day  of  war, 
an  ancient  truth  was  dawning  on  him:  that  there  were 
times  and  circumstances  when,  as  he  at  last  said,  force  must 
be  met  by  force,  t 


* He  may  have  drafted  it  that  evening  but  he  did  not  send  it  to  London  until 
£ i ff'.T  next  day,  nearly  twelve  hours  after  the  German  attack  on 
roland  had  begun.  It  followed  several  of  his  telegrams,  which  like  it  were 
telephoned  to  London  so  that  transmission  was  simultaneous — reporting 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  It  read:  “Mutual  distrust  of  Germans  and  Poles 
is  so  complete  that  I do  not  feel  I can  usefully  acquiesce  [sic]  in  any  further 
suggestions  from  here*  which  would  only  once  again  be  outstripped  by  events 
or  lead  to  nothing  as  the  result  of  methods  followed  or  of  considerations  of 
honor  and  prestige. 

“Last__hope  lies  in  inflexible  determination  on  our  part  to  resist  force  by 
force.  “ 


t Since  friends  who  have  read  this  section  have  expressed  doubts  about  this 
writer  s objectivity  in  dealing  with  Henderson,  perhaps  another’s  view  of  the 
British  ambassador  in  Berlin  should  be  given.  Sir  L.  B.  Namier,  the  British 
historian,  has  summed  up  Henderson  as  follows:  “Conceited  vain  self- 
opinionated,  rigidly  adhering  to  his  preconceived  ideas,  he  poured  out  tele- 


The  Road  to  War 


787 


As  darkness  settled  over  Europe  on  the  evening  of  Au- 
gust 31,  1939,  and  a million  and  a half  German  troops 
began  moving  forward  to  their  final  positions  on  the  Polish 
border  for  the  jump-off  at  dawn,  all  that  remained  for 
Hitler  to  do  was  to  perpetrate  some  propaganda  trickery  to 
prepare  the  German  people  for  the  shock  of  aggressive  war. 

The  people  were  in  need  of  the  treatment  which  Hitler, 
abetted  by  Goebbels  and  Himmler,  had  become  so  expert 
in  applying.  I had  been  about  in  the  streets  of  Berlin,  talk- 
ing with  the  ordinary  people,  and  that  morning  noted  in 
my  diary:  “Everybody  against  the  war.  People  talking 
openly.  How  can  a country  go  into  a major  war  with  a 
population  so  dead  against  it?”  Despite  all  my  experience  in 
the  Third  Reich  I asked  such  a naive  question!  Hitler 
knew  the  answer  very  well.  Had  he  not  the  week  before  on 
his  Bavarian  mountaintop  promised  the  generals  that  he 
would  “give  a propagandist  reason  for  starting  the  war” 
and  admonished  them  not  to  “mind  whether  it  was  plausi- 
ble or  not”?  “The  victor,”  he  had  told  them,  “will  not  be 
asked  afterward  whether  he  told  the  truth  or  not.  In  start- 
ing and  waging  a war  it  is  not  right  that  matters,  but 
victory.” 

At  9 p.m.,  as  we  have  seen,  all  German  radio  stations 
broadcast  the  Fuehrer’s  Polish  peace  proposals  which,  as 
they  were  read  over  the  air,  seemed  so  reasonable  to  this 
misled  correspondent.  The  fact  that  Hitler  had  never  pre- 
sented them  to  the  Poles  nor  even,  except  in  a vague  ancl 
unofficial  manner,  to  the  British,  and  then  less  than  twen- 
ty-four hours  before,  was  brushed  over.  In  fact,  in  a lengthy 
statement  explaining  to  the  German  people  how  their  gov- 
ernment had  exhausted  every  diplomatic  means  to  preserve 
the  peace  the  Chancellor,  no  doubt  aided  by  Goebbels, 
showed  that  he  had  lost  none  of  his  touch  for  masterly 
deceit.  After  the  British  government  on  August  28,  it  said, 
had  offered  its  mediation  between  Germany  and  Poland’ 
the  German  government  on  the  next  day  had  replied  that’ 

in  spite  of  being  skeptical  of  the  desire  of  the  Polish  Gov- 
ernment to  come  to  an  understanding,  they  declared  them- 
selves  ready  in  the  interests  of  peace  to  accept  the  British 


1 1?™?’  d'spa'ches  and  letters  in  unbelievable  numbers  and  of  formidable 
length,  repeating  a hundred  times  the  same  ill-founded  views  and  ideas 
Obtuse  enough  to  be  a menace  and  not  stupid  enough  to  be  innocuous,  he 
proved  un  homme  nefaste.  (Namier,  In  the  Nazi  Era,  p.  162.) 


788 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

mediation  or  suggestion  . . . They  considered  it  necessary 
. . . if  the  danger  of  a catastrophe  was  to  be  avoided  that 
action  must  be  taken  readily  and  without  delay.  They  de- 
clared themselves  ready  to  receive  a personage  appointed 
by  the  Polish  Government  up  to  the  evening  of  August  30, 
with  the  proviso  that  the  latter  was  empowered  not  only  to 
discuss  but  to  conduct  and  conclude  negotiations. 

Instead  of  a statement  regarding  the  arrival  of  an  au- 
thorized personage,  the  first  answer  the  Government  of  the 
Reich  received  to  their  readiness  for  an  understanding  was 
the  news  of  the  Polish  mobilization  . . . 

The  Reich  Government  cannot  be  expected  continually  not 
only  to  emphasize  their  willingness  to  start  negotiations,  but 
actually  to  be  ready  to  do  so,  while  being  from  the  Polish 
side  merely  put  off  with  empty  subterfuges  and  meaningless 
declarations. 

It  has  once  more  been  made  clear  as  a result  of  a de- 
marche which  has  meanwhile  been  made  by  the  Polish  Am- 
bassador that  the  latter  himself  has  no  plenary  powers 
either  to  enter  into  any  discussion  or  even  to  negotiate. 

The  Fuehrer  and  the  German  Government  have  thus 
waited  two  days  in  vain  for  the  arrival  of  a Polish  negotiator. 

In  these  circumstances  the  German  Government  regard 
their  proposals  as  having  this  time  too  been  . . . rejected, 
although  they  considered  that  these  proposals,  in  the  form 
in  which  they  were  made  known  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment also,  were  more  than  loyal,  fair  and  practicable. 

Good  propaganda,  to  be  effective,  as  Hitler  and  Goeb- 
bels  had  learned  from  experience,  needs  more  than  words. 
It  needs  deeds,  however  much  they  may  have  to  be  fabri- 
cated. Having  convinced  the  German  people  (and  of  this 
the  writer  can  testify  from  personal  observation)  that  the 
Poles  had  rejected  the  Fuehrer’s  generous  peace  offer,  there 
remained  only  the  concocting  of  a deed  which  would 
‘prove”  that  not  Germany  but  Poland  had  attacked  first. 

For  this  last  shady  business,  it  will  be  remembered,  the 
Germans,  at  Hitler’s  direction,  had  made  careful  prep- 
aration.* For  six  days  Alfred  Naujocks,  the  intellectual 
SS.  ruffian,  had  been  waiting  at  Gleiwitz  on  the  Polish 
border  to  carry  out  a simulated  Polish  attack  on  the  Ger- 
man radio  station  there.  The  plan  had  been  revised.  S.S. 
men  outfitted  in  Polish  Army  uniforms  were  to  do  the 
shooting,  and  drugged  concentration  camp  inmates  were 
to  be  left  dying  as  “casualties” — this  last  delectable  part  of 


* See  above,  pp.  691-94. 


The  Road  to  War 


789 

the  operation  had,  as  we  have  seen,  the  expressive  code 
name  “Canned  Goods,”  There  were  to  be  several  such 
faked  “Polish  attacks”  but  the  principal  one  was  to  be  on 
the  radio  station  at  Gleiwitz. 

At  noon  on  August  31  [Naujocks  related  in  his  Nurem- 
berg affidavit]  I received  from  Heydrich  the  code  word 
for  the  attack  which  was  to  take  place  at  8 o’clock  that 
evening.  Heydrich  said:  “In  order  to  carry  out  this  attack 
report  to  Mueller  for  Canned  Goods.”  I did  this  and  gave 
Mueller  instructions  to  deliver  the  man  near  the  radio  sta- 
tion. I received  this  man  and  had  him  laid  down  at  the  en- 
trance to  the  station.  He  was  alive  but  completely  uncon- 
scious. I tried  to  open  his  eyes.  I could  not  recognize  by  his 
eyes  that  he  was  alive,  only  by  his  breathing.  I did  not  see 
the  gun  wounds  but  a lot  of  blood  was  smeared  across  his 
face.  He  was  in  civilian  clothes. 

We  seized  the  radio  station,  as  ordered,  broadcast  a speech 
of  three  to  four  minutes  over  an  emergency  transmitter,* 
fired  some  pistol  shots  and  left.t 79 

Berlin  that  evening  was  largely  shut  off  from  the  out- 
side world,  except  for  outgoing  press  dispatches  and 
broadcasts  which  reported  the  Fuehrer’s  “offer”  to  Poland 
and  the  German  allegations  of  Polish  “attacks”  on  Ger- 
man territory.  I tried  to  get  through  on  the  telephone  to 
Warsaw,  London  and  Paris  but  was  told  that  communica- 
tions with  these  capitals  were  cut.  Berlin  itself  was  quite 
normal  in  appearance.  There  had  been  no  evacuation  of 
women  and  children,  as  there  had  been  in  Paris  and 
London,  nor  any  sandbagging  of  storefront  windows,  as 
was  reported  from  the  other  capitals.  Toward  4 a.m.  on 
September  1,  after  my  last  broadcast,  I drove  back  from 
Broadcasting  House  to  the  Adlon  Hotel.  There  was  no 
traffic.  The  houses  were  dark.  The  people  were  asleep  and 
perhaps — for  all  I knew — had  gone  to  bed  hoping  for  the 
best,  for  peace. 

* The  speech  in  Polish  had  been  outlined  by  Heydrich  to  Naujocks.  It  con- 
tained inflammatory  statements  against  Germany  and  declared  that  the 
Poles  were  attacking.  See  above,  p.  693. 

t The  “Polish  attack”  at  Gleiwitz  was  used  by  Hitler  in  his  speech  to  the 
Reichstag  the  next  day  and  was  cited  as  justification  for  the  Nazi  aggression 
by  Ribbentrop,  Weizsaecker  and  other  members  of  the  Foreign  Office  in 
their  propaganda.  The  New  York  Times  and  other  newspapers  reported  it, 
as  well  as  similar  incidents,  in  their  issues  of  September  1,  1939.  It  remains 
only  to  be  added  that  according  to  the  testimony  at  Nuremberg  of  General 
Lahousen,  of  the  Abwehr,  all  the  S.S.  men  who  wore  Polish  uniforms  in 
the  simulated  attacks  that  evening  were,  as  the  General  put  it,  “put  out  of 
the  way.”  78 


790 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Hitler  himself  had  been  in  fine  fettle  all  day.  At  6 p.m. 
on  August  31  General  Haider  noted  in  his  diary,  “Fueh- 
rer calm;  has  slept  well  . . . Decision  against  evacuation 
[in  the  west]  shows  that  he  expects  France  and  Eng- 
land will  not  take  action.”  * 

Admiral  Canaris,  chief  of  the  Abwehr  in  OKW  and 
one  of  the  key  anti-Nazi  conspirators,  was  in  a different 
mood.  Though  Hitler  was  carrying  Germany  into  war, 
an  action  which  the  Canaris  circle  had  supposedly  sworn 
to  prevent  by  getting  rid  of  the  dictator,  there  was  no  con- 
spiracy in  being  now  that  the  moment  for  it  had  arrived. 

Later  in  the  afternoon  Gisevius  had  been  summoned  to 
OKW  headquarters  by  Colonel  Oster.  This  nerve  center  of 
Germany’s  military  might  was  humming  with  activity. 
Canaris  drew  Gisevius  down  a dimly  lit  corridor.  In  a 
voice  choked  with  emotion  he  said: 

“This  means  the  end  of  Germany.”  81 


* During  the  day  Hitler  found  time  to  send  a telegram  to  the  Duke  of 
Windsor  at  Antibes,  France. 

Berlin,  August  31,  1939 
I thank  you  for  your  telegram  of  August  27.  You  may  rest  assured 
that  my  attitude  toward  Britain  and  my  desire  to  avoid  another  war 
between  our  peoples  remain  unchanged.  It  depends  on  Britain,  however, 
whether  my  wishes  for  the  future  development  of  German-British  rela- 
tions can  be  realized.  Adolf  Hitler  80 

This  is  the  first  mention  of  the  former  King  of  England,  but  by  no  means 
the  last,  in  the  captured  German  documents.  Subsequently,  for  a time,  as 
will  be  recorded  further  on,  the  Duke  of  Windsor  loomed  large  in  certain 
calculations  of  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop. 


17 


THE  LAUNCHING  OF  WORLD  WAR  II 


at  daybreak  on  September  1,  1939,  the  very  date  which 
Hitler  had  set  in  his  first  directive  for  “Case  White”  back 
on  April  3,  the  German  armies  poured  across  the  Polish 
frontier  and  converged  on  Warsaw  from  the  north,  south 
and  west. 

Overhead  German  warplanes  roared  toward  their  tar- 
gets: Polish  troop  columns  and  ammunition  dumps, 
bridges,  railroads  and  open  cities.  Within  a few  minutes 
they  were  giving  the  Poles,  soldiers  and  civilians  alike, 
the  first  taste  of  sudden  death  and  destruction  from  the 
skies  ever  experienced  on  any  great  scale  on  the  earth 
and  thereby  inaugurating  a terror  which  would  become 
dreadfully  familiar  to  hundreds  of  millions  of  men,  wom- 
en and  children  in  Europe  and  Asia  during  the  next  six 
years,  and  whose  shadow,  after  the  nuclear  bombs  came, 
would  haunt  all  mankind  with  the  threat  of  utter  extinc- 
tion. 

It  was  a gray,  somewhat  sultry  morning  in  Berlin,  with 
clouds  hanging  low  over  the  city,  giving  it  some  protec- 
tion from  hostile  bombers,  which  were  feared  but  never 
came. 

The  people  in  the  streets,  I noticed,  were  apathetic 
despite  the  immensity  of  the  news  which  had  greeted 
them  from  their  radios  and  from  the  extra  editions  of 
the  morning  newspapers.*  Across  the  street  from  the 
Adlon  Hotel  the  morning  shift  of  laborers  had  gone  to 
work  on  the  new  I.  G.  Farben  building  just  as  if  nothing 
had  happened,  and  when  newsboys  came  by  shouting 

* Hitler’s  proclamation  to  the  Army  announcing  the  opening  of  hostilities 
was  broadcast  over  the  German  radio  at  5:40  a.m.,  and  the  newspaper  extras 
were  on  the  street  shortly  after.  See  below,  p.  793. 


791 


792 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

their  extras  no  one  laid  down  his  tools  to  buy  one.  Per- 
haps, it  occurred  to  me,  the  German  people  were  simply 
dazed  at  waking  up  on  this  first  morning  of  September  to 
find  themselves  in  a war  which  they  had  been  sure  the 
Fuehrer  somehow  would  avoid.  They  could  not  quite 
believe  it,  now  that  it  had  come. 

What  a contrast,  one  could  not  help  thinking,  between 
this  gray  apathy  and  the  way  the  Germans  had  gone  to 
war  in  1914.  Then  there  had  been  a wild  enthusiasm.  The 
crowds  in  the  streets  had  staged  delirious  demonstrations, 
tossed  flowers  at  the  marching  troops  and  frantically 
cheered  the  Kaiser  and  Supreme  Warlord,  Wilhelm  II. 

There  were  no  such  demonstrations  this  time  for  the 
troops  or  for  the  Nazi  warlord,  who  shortly  before  10  a.m. 
drove  from  the  Chancellery  to  the  Reichstag  through 
empty  streets  to  address  the  nation  on  the  momentous 
happenings  which  he  himself,  deliberately  and  cold- 
bloodedly, had  just  provoked.  Even  the  robot  members  of 
the  Reichstag,  party  hacks,  for  the  most  part,  whom 
Hitler  had  appointed,  failed  to  respond  with  much  en- 
thusiasm as  the  dictator  launched  into  his  explanation  of 
why  Germany  found  itself  on  this  morning  engaged  in 
war.  There  was  far  less  cheering  than  on  previous  and 
less  important  occasions  when  the  Leader  had  declaimed 
from  this  tribune  in  the  ornate  hall  of  the  Kroll  Opera 
House. 

Though  truculent  at  times  he  seemed  strangely  on  the 
defensive,  and  throughout  the  speech,  I thought  as  I lis- 
tened, ran  a curious  strain,  as  though  he  himself  were 
dazed  at  the  fix  he  had  got  himself  into  and  felt  a little 
desperate  about  it.  His  explanation  of  why  his  Italian  ally 
had  reneged  on  its  automatic  obligations  to  come  to  his 
aid  did  not  seem  to  go  over  even  with  this  hand-picked 
audience. 

I should  like  [he  said]  here  above  all  to  thank  Italy, 
which  throughout  has  supported  us,  but  you  will  understand 
that  for  the  carrying  out  of  this  struggle  we  do  not  intend 
to  appeal  for  foreign  help.  We  will  carry  out  this  task  our- 
selves. 

Having  lied  so  often  on  his  way  to  power  and  in  his 
consolidation  of  power,  Hitler  could  not  refrain  at  this 
serious  moment  in  history  from  thundering  a few  more 


The  Road  to  War 


793 

lies  to  the  gullible  German  people  in  justification  of  his 
wanton  act. 

You  know  the  endless  attempts  I made  for  a peaceful 
clarification  and  understanding  of  the  problem  of  Austria, 
and  later  of  the  problem  of  the  Sudetenland,  Bohemia  and 
Moravia.  It  was  all  in  vain  . . . 

In  my  talks  with  Polish  statesmen  ...  I formulated  at  last 
the  German  proposals  and  . . . there  is  nothing  more  modest 
or  loyal  than  these  proposals.  I should  like  to  say  this  to 
the  world.  I alone  was  in  the  position  to  make  such  pro- 
posals, for  I know  very  well  that  in  doing  so  I brought  my- 
self into  opposition  to  millions  of  Germans.  These  proposals 
have  been  refused.  . . . 

For  two  whole  days  I sat  with  my  Government  and  waited 
to  see  whether  it  was  convenient  for  the  Polish  Government 
to  send  a plenipotentiary  or  not  . . . But  I am  wrongly 
judged  if  my  love  of  peace  and  my  patience  are  mistaken 
for  weakness  or  even  cowardice  ...  I can  no  longer  find 
any  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  Polish  Government  to 
conduct  serious  negotiations  with  us  ...  I have  therefore 
resolved  to  speak  to  Poland  in  the  same  language  that  Po- 
land for  months  past  has  used  toward  us  . . . 

This  night  for  the  first  time  Polish  regular  soldiers  fired 
on  our  own  territory.  Since  5:45  a.m.  we  have  been  returning 
the  fire,  and  from  now  on  bombs  will  be  met  with  bombs. 

Thus  was  the  faked  German  attack  on  the  German 
radio  station  at  Gleiwitz,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
carried  out  by  S.S.  men  in  Polish  uniforms  under  the  di- 
rection of  Naujocks,  used  by  the  Chancellor  of  Germany 
as  justification  of  his  cold-blooded  aggression  against 
Poland.  And  indeed  in  its  first  communiques  the  German 
High  Command  referred  to  its  military  operations  as  a 
“counterattack.”  Even  Weizsaecker  did  his  best  to  per- 
petrate this  shabby  swindle.  During  the  day  he  got  off  a 
circular  telegram  from  the  Foreign  Office  to  all  German 
diplomatic  missions  abroad  advising  them  on  the  line 
they  were  to  take. 

In  defense  against  Polish  attacks,  German  troops  moved 
into  action  against  Poland  at  dawn  today.  This  action  is  for 
the  present  not  to  be  described  as  war,  but  merely  as  en- 
gagements which  have  been  brought  about  by  Polish  attacks.1 

Even  the  German  soldiers,  who  could  see  for  them- 
selves who  had  done  the  attacking  on  the  Polish  border. 


794 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

were  bombarded  with  Hitler’s  lie.  In  a grandiose  proc- 
lamation to  the  German  Army  on  September  1,  the  Fueh- 
rer said: 

The  Polish  State  has  refused  the  peaceful  settlement  of  re- 
lations which  I desired,  and  has  appealed  to  arms  ...  A 
series  of  violations  of  the  frontier,  intolerable  to  a great 
Power,  prove  that  Poland  is  no  longer  willing  to  respect 
the  frontier  of  the  Reich. 

In  order  to  put  an  end  to  this  lunacy,  I have  no  other 
choice  than  to  meet  force  with  force  from  now  on. 

Only  once  that  day  did  Hitler  utter  the  truth. 

I am  asking  of  no  German  man  [he  told  the  Reichstag] 
More  than  I myself  was  ready  throughout  four  years  to  do 
. . . I am  from  now  on  just  the  first  soldier  of  the  German 
Reich.  I have  once  more  put  on  that  coat  that  was  most 
sacred  and  dear  to  me.  I will  not  take  it  off  again  until  vic- 
tory is  secured,  or  I will  not  survive  the  outcome. 

In  the  end,  this  once,  he  would  prove  as  good  as  his 
word.  But  no  German  I met  in  Berlin  that  day  noticed 
that  what  the  Leader  was  saying  quite  bluntly  was  that 
he  could  not  face,  not  take,  defeat  should  it  come. 

In  his  speech  Hitler  named  Goering  as  his  successor 
should  anything  happen  to  him.  Hess,  he  added,  would  be 
next  in  line.  “Should  anything  happen  to  Hess,”  Hitler 
advised,  “then  by  law  the  Senate  will  be  called  and  will 
choose  from  its  midst  the  most  worthy — that  is  to  say,  the 
bravest — successor.”  What  law?  What  Senate?  Neither 
existed! 

Hitler’s  relatively  subdued  manner  at  the  Reichstag 
gave  way  to  another  and  uglier  mood  as  soon  as  he  had 
returned  to  the  Chancellery.  The  ubiquitous  Dahlerus,  in 
tow  of  Goering,  found  him  there  in  an  “exceedingly  nerv- 
ous and  very  agitated”  state. 

He  told  me  [the  Swedish  mediator  later  testified]  he 
had  all  along  suspected  that  England  wanted  the  war.  He 
told  me  further  that  he  would  crush  Poland  and  annex 
the  whole  country  . . . 

He  grew  more  and  more  excited,  and  began  to  wave  his 
arms  as  he  shouted  in  my  face:  “If  England  wants  to  fight 
for  a year,  I shall  fight  for  a year;  if  England  wants  to 
fight  two  years,  I shall  fight  two  years  . . .”  He  paused 
and  then  yelled,  his  voice  rising  to  a shrill  scream  and  his 


The  Road  to  War 


795 


arms  milling  wildly:  “If  England  wants  to  fight  for  three 
years,  I shall  fight  for  three  years  . . 

The  movements  of  his  body  now  began  to  follow  those  of 
his  arms,  and  when  he  finally  bellowed:  "Und  wenrt  es 
erforderlich  ist,  will  ich  zehn,  Jahre  kaempfen”  (“And  if 
necessary,  I will  fight  for  ten  years”)  he  brandished  his  fist 
and  bent  down  so  that  it  nearly  touched  the  floor.2 

Yet  for  all  his  hysteria  Hitler  was  by  no  means  con- 
vinced that  he  would  have  to  fight  Great  Britain  at  all.  It 
was  now  past  noon,  German  armored  columns  were  al- 
ready several  miles  inside  Poland  and  advancing  rapidly 
and  most  of  Poland’s  cities,  including  Warsaw,  had  been 
bombed  with  considerable  civilian  casualties.  But  there 
was  not  a word  from  London  or  Paris  that  Britain  and 
France  were  in  any  hurry  to  honor  their  word  to  Poland. 

Their  course  seemed  clear,  but  Dahlerus  and  Hender- 
son appeared  to  be  doing  their  best  to  confuse  it. 

At  10:30  a.m.  the  British  ambassador  telephoned  a 
message  to  Halifax. 

I understand  [he  said]  that  the  Poles  blew  up  the 
Dirschau  bridge  during  the  night.*  And  that  fighting  took 
place  with  the  Danzigers.  On  receipt  of  this  news,  Hitler 
gave  orders  for  the  Poles  to  be  driven  back  from  the  border 
line  and  to  Goering  for  destruction  of  the  Polish  Air  Force 
along  the  frontier. 

Only  at  the  end  of  his  dispatch  did  Henderson  add: 

This  information  comes  from  Goering  himself. 

Hitler  may  ask  to  see  me  after  Reichstag  as  a last  effort 
to  save  the  peace.3 

What  peace?  Peace  for  Britain?  For  six  hours  Germany 
had  been  waging  war — with  all  its  military  might — against 
Britain’s  ally. 

Hitler  did  not  send  for  Henderson  after  his  Reichstag 
speech,  and  the  ambassador,  who  had  accommodatingly 
passed  along  to  London  Goering’s  lies  about  the  Poles 
beginning  the  attack,  became  discouraged — but  not  com- 
pletely discouraged.  At  10:50  a.m.  he  telephoned  a fur- 

* The  German  operation  to  seize  the  Dirschau  bridge  over  the  Vistula  before 
the  Poles  could  blow  it  up  had  been  planned  early  in  the  summer  and  appears 
constantly  in  the  papers  for  “Case  White.”  It  was  specifically  ordered  in 
Hitler’s  Directive  No.  1 on  August  31.  Actually  the  operation  failed,  partly 
because  early-morning  fog  hampered  the  dropping  of  paratroopers  who  were 
to  seize  the  bridge.  The  Poles  succeeded  in  blowing  it  up  just  in  time. 


796 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ther  message  to  Halifax.  A new  idea  had  sprung  up  in  his 
fertile  but  confused  mind. 

I feel  it  my  duty  [he  reported],  however  little  prospect 
there  may  be  of  its  realization,  to  express  the  belief  that  the 
only  possible  hope  now  for  peace  would  be  for  Marshal 
Smigly-Rydz  to  announce  his  readiness  to  come  immediately 
to  Germany  to  discuss  as  soldier  and  plenipotentiary  the 
whole  question  with  Field  Marshal  Goering.4 

It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  this  singular 
British  ambassador  that  Marshal  Smigly-Rydz  might  have 
his  hands  full  trying  to  repel  the  massive  and  unprovoked 
German  attack,  or  that  if  he  could  break  off  and  did  come 
to  Berlin  as  a “plenipotentiary”  it  would  be  equivalent, 
under  the  circumstances,  to  surrender.  The  Poles  might 
be  quickly  beaten  but  they  would  not  surrender. 

Dahlerus  was  even  more  active  than  Henderson  during 
this  first  day  of  the  German  attack  on  Poland.  At  8 a.m.  he 
had  gone  to  see  Goering,  who  told  him  that  “war  had 
broken  out  because  the  Poles  had  attacked  the  radio 
station  at  Gleiwitz  and  blown  up  a bridge  near  Dirschau.” 
The  Swede  immediately  rang  up  the  Foreign  Office  in 
London  with  the  news. 

“I  informed  somebody,”  he  later  testified  in  cross-exam- 
ination at  Nuremberg,  “that  according  to  the  information 
I had  received  the  Poles  had  attacked,  and  they  naturally 
wondered  what  was  happening  to  me  when  I gave  that 
information.” 5 But  after  all,  it  was  only  what  H.  M. 
Ambassador  in  Berlin  would  be  telephoning  a couple  of 
hours  later. 

A confidential  British  Foreign  Office  memorandum  re- 
cords the  Swede’s  call  at  9:05  a.m.  Aping  Goering, 
Dahlerus  insisted  to  London  that  “the  Poles  are  sabotaging 
everything,”  and  that  he  had  “evidence  they  never  meant 
to  attempt  to  negotiate.”  6 

At  half  after  noon  Dahlerus  was  on  the  long-distance 
phone  again  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  London,  and  this 
time  got  Cadogan.  He  again  blamed  the  Poles  for  sabo- 
taging the  peace  by  blowing  the  Dirschau  bridge  and  sug- 
gested that  he  once  again  fly  to  London  with  Forbes.  But 
the  stern  and  unappeasing  Cadogan  had  had  about  enough 
of  Dahlerus  now  that  the  war  which  he  had  tried  to 
prevent  had  come.  He  told  the  Swede  that  “nothing  could 
now  be  done.” 


The  Road  to  War 


797 


But  Cadogan  was  merely  the  permanent  Undersecretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  not  even  a member  of  the  cabinet. 
Dahlerus  insisted  that  his  request  be  submitted  to  the 
cabinet  itself,  informing  Cadogan  haughtily  that  he  would 
ring  back  in  an  hour.  This  he  did,  and  got  his  answer. 

Any  idea  of  mediation  [Cadogan  said]  while  German 
troops  are  invading  Poland  is  quite  out  of  the  question.  The 
only  way  in  which  a world  war  can  be  stopped  is  (one)  that 
hostilities  be  suspended,  and  (two)  that  German  troops  be 
immediately  withdrawn  from  Polish  territory.7 

At  10  a.m.  the  Polish  ambassador  in  London,  Count 
Raczynski,  had  called  on  Lord  Halifax  and  officially 
communicated  to  him  the  news  of  the  German  aggression, 
adding  that  “it  was  a plain  case  as  provided  for  by  the 
treaty.”  The  Foreign  Secretary  answered  that  he  had  no 
doubt  of  the  facts.  At  10:50  he  summoned  the  German 
charge  d’affaires,  Theodor  Kordt,  to  the  Foreign  Office 
and  asked  him  if  he  had  any  information.  Kordt  replied 
that  he  had  neither  information  about  a German  attack  on 
Poland  nor  any  instructions.  Halifax  then  declared  that 
the  reports  which  he  had  received  “create  a very  serious 
situation.”  But  further  than  that  he  did  not  go.  Kordt 
telephoned  this  information  to  Berlin  at  11:45  a.m. 

By  noon,  then,  Hitler  had  reason  to  hope  that  Britain, 
though  it  considered  the  situation  serious,  might  not  go  to 
war  after  all.  But  the  hope  was  soon  to  be  dashed. 

At  7:15  p.m.  a member  of  the  British  Embassy  in  Berlin 
telephoned  the  German  Foreign  Office  and  requested  Rib- 
bentrop  to  receive  Henderson  and  Coulondre  “on  a matter 
of  urgency  as  soon  as  possible.”  The  French  Embassy 
made  a similar  request  a few  minutes  later.  Ribbentrop, 
having  declined  to  meet  the  two  ambassadors  together, 
received  Henderson  at  9 p.m.  and  Coulondre  an  hour 
later.  From  the  British  ambassador  he  was  handed  a 
formal  note  from  the  British  government. 

. . . Unless  the  German  Government  are  prepared  [it 
said]  to  give  His  Majesty’s  Government  satisfactory  as- 
surances that  the  German  Government  have  suspehded  all 
aggressive  action  against  Poland  and  are  prepared  promptly 
to  withdraw  their  forces  from  Polish  territory.  His  Majesty’s 
Government  will  without  hesitation  fulfill  their  obligation 
to  Poland.8 


798  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  French  communication  was  in  identical  words. 

To  both  ambassadors  Ribbentrop  replied  that  he  would 
transmit  their  notes  to  Hitler,  whereupon  he  launched 
into  a lengthy  dissertation  declaring  that  “there  was  no 
question  of  German  aggression”  but  of  Polish  aggression 
and  repeating  the  by  now  somewhat  stale  lie  that  “regular” 
Polish  troops  had  attacked  German  soil  on  the  previous 
day.  Still,  the  diplomatic  niceties  were  maintained.  Sir 
Nevile  Henderson  did  not  fail  to  note  in  his  dispatch  that 
night  describing  the  meeting  that  Ribbentrop  had  been 
“courteous  and  polite.”  As  the  ambassador  prepared  to 
take  his  leave  an  argument  arose  as  to  whether  the  German 
Foreign  Minister  had  gabbled  the  text  of  the  German 
“proposals”  to  Poland  at  their  stormy  meeting  two  eve- 
nings before.  Henderson  said  he  had;  Ribbentrop  said  he 
had  read  them  “slowly  and  clearly  and  even  given  oral 
explanations  of  the  main  points  so  that  he  could  suppose 
Henderson  had  understood  everything.”  It  was  an  argu- 
ment that  would  never  be  settled — but  what  difference 
did  it  make  now?  9 

On  the  night  of  September  1,  as  the  German  armies 
penetrated  further  into  Poland  and  the  Luftwaffe  bombed 
and  bombed,  Hitler  knew  from  the  Anglo-French  notes 
that  unless  he  stopped  his  armies  and  quickly  withdrew 
them — which  was  unthinkable — he  had  a world  war  on 
his  hands.  Or  did  he  still  hope  that  night  that  his  luck — 
his  Munich  luck — might  hold?  For  his  friend  Mussolini, 
frightened  by  the  advent  of  war  and  fearing  that  an  over- 
whelming Anglo-French  naval  and  military  force  might 
strike  against  Italy,  was  desperately  trying  to  arrange 
another  Munich. 

THE  LAST-MINUTE  INTERVENTION  OF 
MUSSOLINI 

As  late  as  August  26,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  Duce, 
in  ducking  out  of  Italy’s  obligations  under  the  Pact 
of  Steel,  had  insisted  to  the  Fuehrer  that  there  was  still  a 
possibility  of  “a  political  solution”  which  would  give 
“full  moral  and  material  satisfaction  to  Germany.”  * Hitler 
had  not  bothered  to  argue  the  matter  with  his  friend  and 


* See  above,  pp.  753-54. 


The  Road  to  War 


799 


ally,  and  this  had  discouraged  the  junior  partner  in  the 
Axis.  Nevertheless  on  August  31,  as  we  have  seen,  Musso- 
lini and  Ciano,  after  being  advised  by  their  ambassador 
in  Berlin  that  the  situation  had  become  desperate,  had 
urged  Hitler  at  least  to  see  the  Polish  ambassador,  Lipski, 
and  had  informed  him  that  they  were  trying  to  get  the 
British  government  to  agree  to  the  return  of  Danzig  “as 
a first  step”  in  peace  negotiations.* 

But  it  was  too  late  for  Hitler  to  be  tempted  by  such  small 
bait.  Danzig  was  a mere  pretense,  as  the  Fuehrer  had  told 
his  generals.  What  he  wanted  was  to  destroy  Poland.  But 
the  Duce  did  not  know  this.  On  the  morning  of  Septem- 
ber 1,  he  himself  was  confronted  with  the  choice  of  im- 
mediately declaring  Italy’s  neutrality  or  risking  an  attack 
by  Britain  and  France.  Ciano’s  diary  entries  make  clear 
what  a nightmare  this  prospect  was  for  his  deflated  father- 
in-law.  t 

Early  on  the  morning  of  September  1 the  unhappy  Ital- 
ian dictator  personally  telephoned  Ambassador  Attolico 
in  Berlin  and,  in  the  words  of  Ciano,  “urged  him  to  entreat 
Hitler  to  send  him  a telegram  releasing  him  from  the 
obligations  of  the  alliance.”  11  The  Fuehrer  quickly  and 
even  graciously  obliged.  Just  before  he  left  for  the  Reich- 
stag, at  9:40  a.m.,  he  got  off  a telegram  to  his  friend 
which  was  telephoned  through  to  the  German  Embassy 
in  Rome  to  save  time. 

Duce: 

I thank  you  most  cordially  for  the  diplomatic  and  political 
support  which  you  have  been  giving  recently  to  Germany 
and  her  just  cause.  I am  convinced  that  we  can  carry  out 
the  task  imposed  upon  us  with  the  military  forces  of  Ger- 
many. 1 do  not  therefore  expect  to  need  Italy’s  military  sup- 
port in  these  circumstances.  I also  thank  you,  Duce,  for 
everything  which  you  will  do  in  future  for  the  common 
cause  of  Fascism  and  National  Socialism. 

Adolf  Hitler  4 12 


* See  above,  p.  780.  _ . . , .....  a. 

t Actually  Mussolini’s  decision  was  conveyed  to  Britain  the  night  betore.  At 
11:15  p.M.  on  August  31  the  Foreign  Office  received  a message  from  Sir 
Percy  I.oraine  in  Rome;  '‘Decision  of  the  Italian  (lovernnient  is  taken. 
Italy  will  not  fight  against  either  England  or  France  . . . This  Communica- 
tion made  to  me  by  Ciano  at  21:15  19:15  p.m.]  under  seal  of  secrecy.  10 
That  evening  the  Italians  had  been  given  a scare  by  the  British  cutting  off 
all  telephone  communication  with  Rome  after  8 p.m.  Ciano  feared  it  might 
be  the  prelude  to  an  Anglo-French  attack.  ~ 

X At  4:30  p.m.,  following  a meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  in  Rome, 
the  Italian  radio  broadcast  the  Council’s  announcement  “to  the  Italian  peo- 


800  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

At  12:45  P.M.,  after  having  addressed  the  Reichstag 
and  after  having,  apparently,  recovered  from  the  effects 
of  his  outburst  to  Dahlerus,  Hitler  was  moved  to  send  a 
further  message  to  Mussolini.  Declaring  that  he  had  been 
prepared  to  solve  the  Polish  problem  “by  negotiation” 
and  that  for  two  whole  days  I have  waited  in  vain  for  a 
Polish  negotiator”  and  that  “last  night  alone  there  were 
fourteen  more  cases  of  frontier  violation”  and  that  con- 
sequently he  had  “now  decided  to  answer  force  with  force,” 
he  again  expressed  his  gratitude  to  his  welshing  partner. 

I thank  you,  Duce,  for  all  your  efforts.  I thank  you  in 
particular  also  for  your  offers  of  mediation.  But  from  the 
start  I was  skeptical  about  these  attempts  because  the  Polish 
Government,  if  they  had  had  even  the  slightest  intentioa  of 
solving  the  matter  amicably,  could  have  done  so  at  any 
time.  But  they  refused  . . . 

For  this  reason,  Duce,  I did  not  want  to  expose  you  to 
the  danger  of  assuming  the  role  of  mediator  which,  in  view 
of  the  Polish  Government’s  intransigent  attitude,  would  in 
all  probability  have  been  in  vain  . . . 

Adolf  Hitler  13 

But  Mussolini,  prompted  by  Ciano,  made  one  last 
desperate  effort  to  expose  himself  to  the  danger  of  being 
a mediator.  Already  on  the  previous  day,  shortly  after 
noon,  Ciano  had  proposed  to  the  British  and  French  am- 
bassadors in  Rome  that,  if  their  governments  agreed, 
Mussolini  would  invite  Germany  to  a conference  on  Sep- 
tember 5 for  the  purpose  of  “examining  the  clauses  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  which  are  the  cause  of  the  present 
troubles.” 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  the  news  of  the  Ger- 
man invasion  of  Poland  the  next  morning  would  have 
rendered  Mussolini’s  proposal  superfluous.  But  to  the  Ital- 
ian’s surprise  Georges  Bonnet,  the  French  Foreign  Minister 
and  master  appeaser,  telephoned  Fran?ois-Poncet,  who 
was  now  the  ambassador  of  France  in  Rome,  at  11:45  a.m. 
on  September  1 and  asked  him  to  tell  Ciano  that  the 
French  government  welcomed  such  a conference  provided 
that  it  did  not  try  to  deal  with  problems  of  countries  not 
represented  and  that  it  did  not  restrict  itself  to  seeking 

pie  that  Italy  will  take  no  initiative  in  the  way  of  military  operations  ” 
Immediately  afterward  Hitler’s  message  to  Mussolini  releasing  Italy  from 
its  obligations  was  broadcast. 


The  Road  to  War 


801 


“partial  and  provisional  solutions  for  limited  and  immedi- 
ate problems.”  Bonnet  made  no  mention  of  any  withdrawal 
of  German  troops  or  even  of  their  halting,  as  a condition 
for  such  a conference.14  * 

But  the  British  were  insistent  upon  that  condition  and 
succeeded  in  carrying  the  badly  divided  French  cabinet 
along  with  them  so  that  identical  warning  notes  could  be 
delivered  in  Berlin  on  the  evening  of  September  1.  Since 
the  text  of  those  notes  giving  notice  that  Britain  and 
France  would  go  to  war  unless  the  German  troops  were 
withdrawn  from  Poland  was  made  public  the  same  eve- 
ning, it  is  interesting  that  Mussolini,  now  clutching  des- 
perately at  every  straw — or  even  at  straws  which  were  not 
there — went  ahead  the  next  morning  in  a further  appeal 
to  Hitler  just  as  if  he,  the  Duce,  did  not  take  the  Anglo- 
French  warnings  at  face  value. 

September  2,  as  Henderson  noted  in  his  Final  Report, 
was  a day  of  suspense.!  He  and  Coulondre  waited 
anxiously  for  Hitler’s  reply  to  their  notes,  but  none  came. 
Shortly  after  midday  Attolico,  somewhat  out  of  breath, 
arrived  at  the  British  Embassy  and  told  Henderson  he 
must  know  one  thing  immediately:  Was  the  British  note 
of  the  previous  evening  an  ultimatum  or  not? 

“I  told  him,”  Henderson  later  wrote,  “that  I had  been 
authorized  to  tell  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  if  he  had 
asked  me — which  he  had  not  done — that  it  was  not  an 
ultimatum  but  a warning.”  16 

Having  received  his  answer,  the  Italian  ambassador 
hastened  down  the  Wilhelmstrasse  to  the  German  Foreign 
Office.  Attolico  had  arrived  at  10  o’clock  that  morning  at 
the  Wilhelmstrasse  with  a communication  from  Mussolini 
and,  being  told  that  Ribbentrop  was  unwell,  handed  it  to 
Weizsaecker. 

* Twice  during  the  afternoon  of  September  1,  Bonnet  instructed  Noel,  the 
French  ambassador  in  Warsaw,  to  ask  Beck  if  Poland  would  accept  the  Ital- 
ian proposal  for  a conference.  Later  that  evening  he  received  his  reply:  “We 
are  in  the  midst  of  war  as  the  result  of  unprovoked  aggression.  It  is  no 
longer  a question  of  a conference  but  of  common  action  which  the  Allies 
should  take  to  resist.”  Bonnet’s  messages  and  Beck’s  reply  are  in  the  French 
Yellow  Book. 

The  British  government  did  not  associate  itself  with  Bonnet’s  efforts.  A 
Foreign  Office  memorandum  signed  by  R.  M.  Makins  notes  that  the  British 
government  “was  neither  consulted  nor  informed  of  the  demarche  16 
t The  previous  afternoon,  on  instructions  from  Halifax,  Henderson  had 
burned  his  ciphers  and  confidential  documents  and  officially  requested  the 
United  States  charge  d’affaires  “to  be  good  enough  to  take  charge  of  British 
interests  in  the  event  of  war.”  ( British  Blue  Book,  p.  21.) 


802 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


September  2,  1939 

For  purposes  of  information,  Italy  wishes  to  make  known, 
naturally  leaving  any  decision  to  the  Fuehrer,  that  she  still 
has  the  possibility  of  getting  France,  Britain  and  Poland  to 
agree  to  a conference  on  the  following  bases: 

1.  An  armistice,  which  leaves  the  armies  where  [em- 
phasis in  the  original]  they  now  are. 

2.  Convening  of  the  conference  within  two  or  three  days. 

3.  Settlement  of  the  Polish— German  dispute,  which,  as 
matters  stand  today,  would  certainly  be  favorable  to  Ger- 
many. 

The  idea,  which  originally  emanated  from  the  Duce,  is  now 
supported  particularly  by  France.* 

Danzig  is  already  German,  and  Germany  has  already  in 
her  hands  pledges  which  guarantee  her  the  greater  part  of 
her  claims.  Moreover,  Germany  has  already  had  her 
moral  satisfaction.”  If  she  accepted  the  proposal  for  a con- 
ference she  would  achieve  all  her  aims  and  at  the  same 
time  avoid  a war,  which  even  now  looks  like  becoming  gen- 
eral and  of  extremely  long  duration. 

The  Duce  does  not  want  to  insist,  but  it  is  of  the  greatest 
moment  to  him  that  the  above  should  be  immediately 
brought  to  the  attention  of  Herr  von  Ribbentrop  and  the 
Fuehrer.17 

No  wonder  that  when  Ribbentrop,  who  had  quickly  re- 
covered from  his  indisposition,  saw  Attolico  at  12:30  p.m., 
he  pointed  out  that  the  Duce’s  proposal  could  not  be 
“reconciled”  with  the  Anglo-French  notes  of  the  eve- 
ning before,  which  had  “the  character  of  an  ultimatum.” 

The  Italian  ambassador,  who  was  as  anxious  as  his 
chief  to  avoid  a world  war  and  certainly  more  sincere, 
interrupted  Ribbentrop  to  say  that  the  British  and  French 
declarations  “had  been  superseded  by  the  latest  communi- 
cation from  the  Duce.”  Attolico,  of  course,  had  no  author- 
ity whatsoever  to  make  such  a statement,  which  was  not 
true,  but  at  this  late  hour  he  probably  thought  he  could 
lose  nothing  by  being  reckless.  When  the  German  Foreign 
Minister  expressed  his  doubts,  Attolico  stuck  to  his  view. 

The  French  and  British  declarations  [he  said]  no  longer 
came  into  consideration.  Count  Ciano  had  telephoned  only 

* Ciano  claims  that  the  note  was  sent  as  the  result  of  “French  pressure.” 
{Ciano  Dianes,  p.  136.)  But  this  is  surely  misleading.  Though  Bonnet  was 
doing  all  he  could  to  get  a conference,  Mussolini  was  pushing  the  proposal 
even  more  desperately. 


The  Road  to  War 


803 


at  8:30  this  morning,  that  is  to  say  at  a time  when  the 
declarations  had  already  been  given  out  on  the  radio  in 
Italy.  It  followed  that  the  two  declarations  must  be  con- 
sidered as  superseded.  Count  Ciano  stated  moreover  that 
France  in  particular  was  greatly  in  favor  of  the  Duce’s  pro- 
posal. The  pressure  comes  at  the  moment  from  France  but 
England  will  follow.18 

Ribbentrop  remained  skeptical.  He  had  just  discussed 
Mussolini’s  proposal  with  Hitler,  he  said,  and  what  the 
Fuehrer  wanted  to  know  was:  Were  the  Anglo-French 
notes  ultimata?  The  Foreign  Minister  finally  agreed  to 
Attolico’s  suggestion  that  the  Italian  envoy  should  immedi- 
ately consult  Henderson  and  Coulondre  to  find  out. 

That  was  the  reason  for  Attolico’s  call  at  the  British 
Embassy.  “I  can  still  see  Attolico,  no  longer  in  his  first 
youth,”  Schmidt,  who  acted  as  interpreter,  wrote  later, 
“running  out  of  Ribbentrop’s  room  and  down  the  steps  to 
consult  Henderson  and  Coulondre  ...  A half  hour  later 
Attolico  came  running  back,  as  breathless  as  he  had  left.”  19 

Regaining  his  breath,  the  Italian  ambassador  reported 
that  Henderson  had  just  told  him  the  British  note  was  not 
an  ultimatum.  Ribbentrop  replied  that  while  “a  German 
reply  to  the  Anglo-French  declarations  could  only  be 
negative  the  Fuehrer  was  examining  the  Duce’s  proposals 
and,  if  Rome  confirmed  that  there  had  been  no  question 
of  an  ultimatum  in  the  Anglo-French  declaration,  would 
draft  an  answer  in  a day  or  two.”  When  Attolico  pressed 
for  an  earlier  answer,  Ribbentrop  finally  agreed  to  reply 
by  noon  the  next  day,  Sunday,  September  3. 

Meantime  in  Rome  Mussolini’s  hopes  were  being 
smashed.  At  2 p.m.  Ciano  received  the  British  and  French 
ambassadors  and  in  their  presence  telephoned  to  both 
Halifax  and  Bonnet  and  informed  them  of  Attolico’s  talks 
with  the  German  Foreign  Minister.  Bonnet  was  effusive  as 
usual  and,  according  to  his  own  account  (in  the  French 
Yellow  Book),  warmly  thanked  Ciano  for  his  efforts  on 
behalf  of  peace.  Halifax  was  sterner.  He  confirmed  that  the 
British  note  was  not  an  ultimatum — one  marvels  at  the 
splitting  of  hairs  among  the  statesmen  over  a single  word, 
for.  the  Anglo-French  declarations  spoke  for  themselves 
unequivocably — but  added  that  in  his  own  view  the  British 
could  not  accept  Mussolini’s  proposal  for  a conference 


804 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


unless  the  German  armies  withdrew  from  Poland,  a matter 
on  which  Bonnet  again  was  silent.  Halifax  promised  to  tele- 
phone Ciano  the  decision  of  the  British  cabinet  on  that. 

The  decision  came  shortly  after  7 p.m.  Britain  accepted 
the  Duce’s  offer  on  condition  that  Hitler  pull  back  his 
troops  to  the  German  frontier.  The  Italian  Foreign  Min- 
ister realized  that  Hitler  would  never  accept  this  and  that 
“nothing  more  could  be  done,”  as  he  put  it  in  his  diary. 

It  isn’t  my  business  [he  added]  to  give  Hitler  advice 
that  he  would  reject  decisively  and  maybe  with  contempt.  I 
tell  this  to  Halifax,  to  the  two  ambassadors  and  to  the  Duce, 
and  finally  I telephone  to  Berlin  that  unless  the  Germans 
advise  us  to  the  contrary  we  shall  let  the  conversations  lapse. 
The  last  note  of  hope  has  died.20 

And  so  at  8:50  p.m.  on  September  2 the  weary  and 
crushed  Attolico  once  more  made  his  way  to  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  in  Berlin.  This  time  Ribbentrop  received  him  in  the 
Chancellery,  where  he  was  in  conference  with  Hitler.  A 
captured  Foreign  Office  memo  records  the  scene. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  brought  the  Foreign  Minister  the 
information  that  the  British  were  not  prepared  to  enter  into 
negotiations  on  the  basis  of  the  Italian  proposal  of  media- 
tion. The  British  demanded,  before  starting  negotiations, 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  all  German  troops  from  the 
occupied  Polish  areas  and  from  Danzig  . . . 

In  conclusion  the  Italian  Ambassador  stated  that  the  Duce 
now  considered  his  mediation  proposal  as  no  longer  in 
being.  The  Foreign  Minister  received  the  communication 
from  the  Italian  Ambassador  without  comment.21 

Not  a word  of  thanks  to  the  tireless  Attolico  for  all  his 
efforts!  Only  the  contempt  of  silence  toward  an  ally  who 
was  trying  to  cheat  Germany  of  its  Polish  spoils. 

The  last  slight  possibility  of  averting  World  War  II  had 
now  been  exhausted.  This  apparently  was  obvious  to  all 
except  one  actor  in  the  drama.  At  9 p.m.  the  pusillanimous 
Bonnet  telephoned  Ciano,  confirmed  once  more  that  the 
French  note  to  Germany  did  not  have  the  “character  of 
an  ultimatum”  and  reiterated  that  the  French  government 
was  prepared  to  wait  until  noon  of  September  3 — the  next 
day — for  a German  response.  However,  “in  order  for  the 
conference  to  achieve  favorable  results,”  Bonnet  told 
Ciano,  the  French  government  agreed  with  the  British  that 
German  troops  must  “evacuate”  Poland.  This  was  the  first 


The  Road  to  War 


805 

time  Bonnet  had  mentioned  this — and  now  only  because 
the  British  had  insisted  upon  it.  Ciano  replied  that  he  did 
not  think  the  Reich  government  would  accept  this  condi- 
tion. But  Bonnet  would  not  give  up.  He  sought  during  the 
night  a final  escape  from  France’s  obligations  to  the  now 
battered  and  beleaguered  Poland.  Ciano  recounts  this 
bizarre  move  in  the  first  paragraph  of  his  diary  entry  for 
September  3. 

During  the  night  I was  awakened  by  the  Ministry  be- 
cause Bonnet  had  asked  Guariglia  [the  Italian  ambassador 
in  Paris]  if  we  could  not  at  least  obtain  a symbolic  with- 
drawal of  German  forces  from  Poland  ...  I throw  the  pro- 
posal in  the  wastebasket  without  informing  the  Duce.  But  this 
shows  that  France  is  moving  toward  the  great  test  without 
enthusiasm  and  full  of  uncertainty.22 

THE  POLISH  WAR  BECOMES  WORLD  WAR  II 

.Sunday,  September  3,  1939,  in  Berlin  was  a lovely,  end- 
of-the-summer  day.  The  sun  was  shining,  the  air  was 
balmy — “the  sort  of  day,”  I noted  in  my  diary,  “the 
Berliner  loves  to  spend  in  the  woods  or  on  the  lakes 
nearby.” 

As  it  dawned  a telegram  arrived  at  the  British  Embassy 
from  Lord  Halifax  for  Sir  Nevile  Henderson,  instructing 
him  to  seek  an  interview  with  the  German  Foreign  Minister 
at  9 a.m.  and  convey  a communication  the  text  of  which 
was  then  given. 

The  Chamberlain  government  had  reached  the  end  of 
the  road.  Some  thirty-two  hours  before,  it  had  informed 
Hitler  that  unless  Germany  withdrew  its  troops  from  Po- 
land, Britain  would  go  to  war.  There  had  been  no  answer, 
and  now  the  British  government  was  determined  to  make 
good  its  word.  On  the  previous  day  it  had  feared,  as 
Charles  Corbin,  the  French  ambassador  in  London,  had 
informed  the  hesitant  Bonnet  at  2:30  p.M.,  that  Hitler  was 
deliberately  delaying  his  reply  in  order  to  grab  as  much 
Polish  territory  as  possible,  after  which,  having  secured 
Danzig,  the  Corridor  and  other  areas,  he  might  make  a 
“magnanimous”  peace  proposal  based  on  his  sixteen  points 
of  August  31.23 

To  avoid  that  trap  Halifax  had  proposed  to  the  French 
that  unless  the  German  government  gave  a favorable  reply 
within  a few  hours  to  the  Anglo-French  communications 


806 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  September  1,  the  two  Western  nations  should  declare 
themselves  at  war  with  Germany.  Following  a British 
cabinet  meeting  on  the  afternoon  of  September  2,  when  a 
definite  decision  was  made,  Halifax  suggested  specifically 
that  the  two  allies  present  an  ultimatum  to  Berlin  that  very 
midnight  which  would  expire  at  6 a.m.  on  September  3.24 
Bonnet  would  not  hear  of  any  such  precipitate  action. 

Indeed,  the  badly  divided  French  cabinet  had  had  a 
difficult  time  over  the  past  week  reaching  a decision  to 
honor  France’s  obligations  to  Poland — and  to  Britain — 
in  the  first  place.  On  the  dark  day  of  August  23,  over- 
whelmed by  the  news  that  Ribbentrop  had  arrived  in  Mos- 
cow to  conclude  a Nazi-Soviet  nonaggression  pact,  Bon- 
net had  persuaded  Daladier  to  call  a meeting  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense  to  consider  what  France 
should  do.*  Besides  Premier  Daladier  and  Bonnet,  it  was 
attended  by  the  ministers  of  the  three  armed  services, 
General  Gamelin,  the  chiefs  of  the  Navy  and  Air  Force 
and  four  additional  generals — twelve  in  all. 

The  minutes  state  that  Daladier  posed  three  questions: 

1.  Can  France  remain  inactive  while  Poland  and  Rumania 
(or  one  of  them)  are  being  wiped  off  the  map  of  Europe? 

2.  What  means  has  she  of  opposing  it? 

3.  What  measures  should  be  taken  now? 

Bonnet  himself,  after  explaining  the  grave  turn  of 
events,  posed  a question  which  was  to  remain  uppermost 
in  his  mind  to  the  last: 

Taking  stock  of  the  situation,  had  we  better  remain  faith- 
ful to  our  engagements  and  enter  the  war  forthwith,  or 
should  we  reconsider  our  attitude  and  profit  by  the  respite 
thus  gained?  . . . The  answer  to  this  question  is  essentially 
of  a military  character. 

When  thus  handed  the  ball,  Gamelin  and  Admiral  Darlan 
answered 

that  the  Army  and  Navy  were  ready.  In  the  early  stages  of 
the  conflict  they  can  do  little  against  Germany.  But  the  French 
mobilization  by  itself  would  bring  some  relief  to  Poland 
by  tying  down  some  considerable  German  units  at  our 
frontier. 


The  minutes  of  the  meeting,  drawn  up  by  General  Decamp,  chief  of 
Premier  Daladier’s  military  cabinet,  came  to  light  at  the  Riom  trial  The 
paper  was  never  submitted  to  other  members  of  the  meeting  for  correction, 
and  General  Gamelin  in  his  book,  Scrvir,  claims  it  was  so  abbreviated  as  to 
be  misleading.  Still,  even  the  timid  generalissimo  confirms  its  main  outlines. 


The  Road  to  War 


807 


. . . General  Gamelin,  asked  how  long  Poland  and  Rumania 
could  resist,  says  that  he  believes  Poland  would  honorably 
resist,  which  would  prevent  the  bulk  of  the  German  forces 
from  turning  against  France  before  next  spring;  by  then 
Great  Britain  would  be  by  her  side.* 

After  a great  deal  of  talk  the  French  finally  reached  a 
decision,  which  was  duly  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the 
meeting. 

In  the  course  of  the  discussion  it  is  pointed  out  that  if 
we  are  stronger  a few  months  hence,  Germany  will  have 
gained  even  more,  for  she  will  have  the  Polish  and  Ru- 
manian resources  at  her  disposal. 

Therefore  France  has  no  choice. 

The  only  solution  ...  is  to  adhere  to  our  engagements  to 
Poland  assumed  before  negotiations  were  started  with  the 
U.S.S.R. 

Having  made  up  its  mind,  the  French  government  began 
to  act.  Following  this  meeting  on  August  23,  the  alerte 
was  sounded,  which  placed  all  frontier  troops  in  their  war 
stations.  The  next  day  360,000  reservists  were  called  up. 
On  August  31  the  cabinet  published  a communique  saying 
France  would  “firmly  fulfill”  its  obligations.  And  the  next 
day,  the  first  day  of  the  German  attack  on  Poland,  Bonnet 
was  persuaded  by  Halifax  to  associate  France  with  Britain 
in  the  warning  to  Berlin  that  both  countries  would 
honor  their  word  to  their  ally. 

But  on  September  2,  when  the  British  pressed  for  an 
ultimatum  to  be  presented  to  Hitler  at  midnight,  General 
Gamelin  and  the  French  General  Staff  held  back.  After 
all,  it  was  the  French  who  alone  would  have  to  do  the 
fighting  if  the  Germans  immediately  attacked  in  the  West. 

* In  his  book,  Servir,  Gamelin  admits  that  he  hesitated  to  call  attention  to 
some  of  France’s  military  weaknesses  because  he  did  not  trust  Bonnet.  He 
quotes  Daladier  as  later  telling  him,  “You  did  right.  If  you  had  exposed 
them,  the  Germans  would  have  known  about  them  the  next  day.” 

Gamelin  also  claimed  (in  his  book)  that  he  did  point  out  at  this  conference 
the  weakness  of  France’s  military  position.  He  says  he  explained  that  if 
Germany  “annihilated  Poland’’  and  then  threw  her  whole  weight  against  the 
French,  France  would  be  in  a “difficult"  situation.  “In  this  case,”  he  said, 
“it  would  no  longer  be  possible  for  France  to  enter  upon  the  struggle  . . . 
By  spring,  with  the  help  of  British  troops  and  American  equipment  I hoped 
we  should  be  in  a position  to  fight  a defensive  battle  (of  course  if  necessary). 
I added  that  we  could  not  hope  for  victory  except  in  a long  war.  It  had 
always  been  my  opinion  that  we  should  not  be  able  to  assume  the  offensive 
in  less  than  about  two  years  . . . that  is,  in  1941-2.” 

The  French  generalissimo’s  timid  views  explain  a good  deal  of  subsequent 
history. 


80S 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


There  would  not  be  a single  British  trooper  to  aid  them. 
The  General  Staff  insisted  on  a further  forty-eight  hours 
in  which  to  carry  out  the  general  mobilization  unhindered. 

At  6 p.m.  Halifax  telephoned  Sir  Eric  Phipps,  the 
British  ambassador  in  Paris:  “Forty-eight  hours  is  impos- 
sible for  British  Government.  The  French  attitude  is 
very  embarrassing  to  H.  M.  Government.” 

It  was  to  become  dangerously  so  a couple  of  hours 
later  when  Chamberlain  rose  to  address  a House  of  Com- 
mons whose  majority  of  members,  regardless  of  party, 
was  impatient  at  the  British  delay  in  honoring  its  obliga- 
tions. Their  patience  became  almost  exhausted  after  the 
Prime  Minister  spoke.  He  informed  the  House  that  no  reply 
had  yet  come  from  Berlin.  Unless  it  did,  and  contained  a 
German  assurance  of  withdrawal  from  Poland,  the  gov- 
ernment would  “be  bound  to  take  action.”  If  the  Germans 
did  agree  to  withdraw,  the  British  government,  he  said, 
would  “be  willing  to  regard  the  position  as  being  the  same 
as  it  was  before  the  German  forces  crossed  the  Polish 
frontier.”  In  the  meantime,  he  said,  the  government  was 
in  communication  with  France  about  a time  limit  to  their 
warning  to  Germany. 

After  thirty-nine  hours  of  war  in  Poland  the  House  of 
Commons  was  in  no  mood  for  such  dilatory  tactics.  A 
smell  of  Munich  seemed  to  emanate  from  the  government 
bench.  “Speak  for  England!”  cried  Leopold  Amery  from 
the  Conservative  benches  as  the  acting  leader  of  the  Labor 
Opposition,  Arthur  Greenwood,  got  up  to  talk. 

“I  wonder  how  long  we  are  prepared  to  vacillate,” 
said  Greenwood,  “at  a time  when  Britain  and  all  that 
Britain  stands  for,  and  human  civilization,  are  in  peril  . . . 
We  must  march  with  the  French  . . 

That  was  the  trouble.  It  was  proving  difficult  at  this 
moment  to  get  the  French  to  march.  But  so  disturbed  was 
Chamberlain  at  the  angry  mood  of  the  House  that  he  in- 
tervened in  the  sharp  debate  to  plead  that  it  took  time  to 
synchronize  “thoughts  and  actions”  by  telephone  with 
Paris.  “I  should  be  horrified  if  the  House  thought  for  one 
moment,”  he  added,  “that  the  statement  that  I have  made 
to  them  betrayed  the  slightest  weakening  either  of  this 
Government  or  of  the  French  Government.”  He  said  he 
understood  the  French  government  was  “in  session  at 
this  moment”  and  that  a communication  would  be  received 


The  Road  to  War 


809 


from  it  “in  the  next  few  hours.”  At  any  rate,  he  tried  to 
assure  the  aroused  members,  “I  anticipate  that  there  is 
only  one  answer  I shall  be  able  to  give  the  House  tomor- 
row . . . and  I trust  the  House  . . . will  believe  me  that 
I speak  in  complete  good  faith  . . 

The  inexorable  approach  of  the  greatest  ordeal  in  British 
history  was  announced,  as  Namier  later  wrote,  “in  a sin- 
gularly halting  manner.” 

Chamberlain  well  understood,  as  the  confidential  Brit- 
ish papers  make  clear  that  he  was  in  deep  trouble  with 
his  own  people  and  that  at  this  critical  moment  for  his 
country  his  own  government  was  in  danger  of  being  over- 
thrown. 

As  soon  as  he  left  the  Commons  he  rang  up  Daladier. 
The  time  is  recorded  as  9:50  p.m.  and  Cadogan,  listening 
in,  made  a minute  of  it  for  the  record. 

Chamberlain:  The  situation  here  is  very  grave  . . . There 
has  been  an  angry  scene  in  the  House  ...  if  France  were 
to  insist  on  forty-eight  hours  to  run  from  midday  tomorrow, 
it  would  be  impossible  for  the  Government  to  hold  the  situa- 
tion here. 

The  Prime  Minister  said  he  quite  realized  that  it  is 
France  who  must  bear  the  burden  of  a German  attack.  But 
he  was  convinced  some  step  must  be  taken  this  evening. 

He  proposed  a compromise  . . . An  ultimatum  at  8 a.m. 
tomorrow  . . . expiring  at  noon.  . . . 

Daladier  replied  that  unless  British  bombers  were  ready  to 
act  at  once  it  would  be  better  for  French  to  delay,  if  possi- 
ble, for  some  hours  attacks  on  German  armies. 

Less  than  an  hour  later,  at  10:30  p.m.,  Halifax  rang  up 
Bonnet.  He  urged  the  French  to  agree  to  the  British  com- 
promise, an  ultimatum  to  be  presented  in  Berlin  at  8 a.m. 
on  the  morrow  (September  3)  and  to  expire  at  noon.  The 
French  Foreign  Minister  not  only  would  not  agree,  he 
protested  to  Halifax  that  the  British  insistence  on  such 
speed  would  create  a “deplorable  impression.”  He  demand- 
ed that  London  wait  at  least  until  noon  before  presenting 
any  ultimatum  to  Hitler. 

Halifax:  It  is  impossible  for  H.  M.  Government  to  wait 
until  that  hour  ...  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  [British] 
Government  could  hold  the  position  here. 

The  House"  of  Commons  was  to  meet  at  noon,  on  Sun- 
day, September  3,  and  it  was  obvious  to  Chamberlain 


810 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


and  Halifax  from  the  mood  of  Saturday  evening’s  session 
that  in  order  to  survive  they  would  have  to  give  Parliament 
the  answer  it  demanded.  At  2 o’clock  the  next  morning  the 
French  ambassador  in  London,  Corbin,  warned  Bonnet 
that  the  Chamberlain  cabinet  risked  overthrow  if  it  could 
not  give  Parliament  definite  word.  Halifax,  at  the  close  of 
his  telephone  conversation  with  Bonnet,  therefore  informed 
him  that  Britain  proposed  “to  act  on  its  own.” 

The  telegram  of  Halifax  to  Henderson  reached  Berlin 
about  4 A.M.*  The  communication  he  was  to  make  to  the 
German  government  at  9 a.m.  on  Sunday,  September  3, 
recalled  the  British  note  of  September  1 in  which  Great 
Britain  declared  its  intention  of  fulfilling  its  obligations 
to  Poland  unless  German  troops  were  promptly  with- 
drawn. 

Although  this  communication  [it  continued]  was  made  more 
than  24  hours  ago,  no  reply  has  been  received  but  German 
attacks  upon  Poland  have  been  continued  and  intensified.  I have 
accordingly  the  honor  to  inform  you  that,  unless  not  later 
than  11  a.m.,  British  summer  time,  today  September  3,  satis- 
factory assurances  to  the  above  effect  have  been  given  by  the 
German  Government  and  have  reached  His  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment in  London,  a state  of  war  will  exist  between  the  two 
countries  as  from  that  hour. 26  f 

In  the  early  predawn  Sabbath  hours  Henderson  found 
it  difficult  to  make  contact  with  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  He 
was  told  that  Ribbentrop  would  not  be  “available”  at  9 a.m. 
on  the  Sunday  but  that  he  could  leave  his  communica- 
tion with  the  official  interpreter,  Dr.  Schmidt. 

On  this  historic  day  Dr.  Schmidt  overslept,  and,  rush- 


* The  Foreign  Secretary  had  sent  Henderson  two  warning  telegrams  during 
the  night.  The  first  dispatched  at  11 :50  p.m.,  read: 

I may  have  to  send  you  instructions  tonight  to  make  an  immediate 
communication  to  the  German  Government.  Please  be  ready  to  act.  You 
had  better  warn  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  you  may  have  to 
ask  to  see  him  at  any  moment. 

It  would  seem  from  this  telegram  that  the  British  government  had  not 
quite  made  up  its  mind  to  go  it  alone  despite  the  French.  But  thirty-five 
minutes  later,  at  12:25  a.m.  on  September  3,  Halifax  wired  Henderson: 

You  should  ask  for  an  appointment  with  M.F.A.  [Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs]  at  9 a.m.  Sunday  morning.  Instructions  will  follow. ^ 

The  decisive  telegram  from  Halifax  is  dated  5 a.m.,  London  time.  Hen- 
derson, in  his  Final  Report,  says  he  received  it  4 a.m. 

t Halifax  sent  an  additional  wire,  also  dated  5 a.m.,  informing  the  ambassa- 
dor that  Coulondre  “will  not  make  a similar  communication  to  the  German 
Government  until  midday  today  (Sunday).”  He  did  not  know  what  the 
French  time  limit  would  be  but  thought  it  “likely”  to  be  anything  between 
six  and  nine  hours.27 


The  Road  to  War 


811 


ing  to  the  Foreign  Office  by  taxi,  he  saw  the  British  am- 
bassador already  mounting  the  steps  to  the  Foreign  Office 
as  he  arrived.  Ducking  in  by  a side  door,  Schmidt  man- 
aged to  slip  into  Ribbentrop’s  office  just  at  the  stroke  of 
9 o’clock,  in  time  to  receive  Henderson  on  the  dot.  “He 
came  in  looking  very  serious,”  Schmidt  later  recounted, 
“shook  hands,  but  declined  my  invitation  to  be  seated,  re- 
maining solemnly  standing  in  the  middle  of  the  room.”  28 
He  read  out  the  British  ultimatum,  handed  Schmidt  a 
copy,  and  bade  him  goodby. 

The  official  interpreter  hastened  down  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  to  the  Chancellery  with  the  document.  Outside 
the  Fuehrer’s  office  he  found  most  members  of  the  cabi- 
net and  several  ranking  party  officials  collected  about  and 
“anxiously  awaiting”  his  news. 

When  I entered  the  next  room  [Schmidt  later  recounted] 
Hitler  was  sitting  at  his  desk  and  Ribbentrop  stood  by  the 
window.  Both  looked  up  expectantly  as  I came  in.  I stopped 
at  some  distance  from  Hitler’s  desk,  and  then  slowly  trans- 
lated the  British  ultimatum.  When  I finished  there  was  com- 
plete silence. 

Hitler  sat  immobile,  gazing  before  him  . . . After  an  in- 
terval which  seemed  an  age,  he  turned  to  Ribbentrop,  who 
had  remained  standing  by  the  window.  “What  now?”  asked 
Hitler  with  a savage  look,  as  though  implying  that  his 
Foreign  Minister  had  misled  him  about  England’s  probable 
reaction. 

Ribbentrop  answered  quietly:  “I  assume  that  the  French 
will  hand  in  a similar  ultimatum  within  the  hour.”  29 
** 

His  duty  performed,  Schmidt  withdrew,  stopping  in  the 
outer  room  to  apprise  the  others  of  what  had  happened. 
They  too  were  silent  for  a moment.  Then: 

Goering  turned  to  me  and  said:  “If  we  lose  this  war, 
then  God  have  mercy  on  us!” 

Goebbels  stood  in  a corner  by  himself,  downcast  and  self- 
absorbed.  Everywhere  in  the  room  I saw  looks  of  grave 
concern.30 

In  the  meantime  the  inimitable  Dahlerus  had  been 
making  his  last  amateurish  effort  to  avoid  the  inevitable. 
At  8 a.m.  Forbes  had  informed  him  of  the  British  ulti- 
matum which  was  being  presented  an  hour  later.  He  has- 
tened out  to  Luftwaffe  headquarters  to  see  Goering  and, 


812 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

according  to  his  later  account  on  the  stand  at  Nurem- 
berg, appealed  to  him  to  see  to  it  that  the  German  reply 
to  the  ultimatum  was  “reasonable.”  He  further  suggested 
that  the  Field  Marshal  himself,  before  11  o’clock,  declare 
himself  prepared  to  fly  to  London  “to  negotiate.”  In  his 
book  the  Swedish  businessman  claims  that  Goering  ac- 
cepted the  suggestion  and  telephoned  to  Hitler,  who  also 
agreed.  There  is  no  mention  of  this  in  the  German  pa- 
pers, and  Dr.  Schmidt  makes  it  clear  that  Goering,  a few 
minutes  after  9 o’clock,  was  not  at  his  headquarters  but 
at  the  Chancellery  in  the  Fuehrer’s  anteroom. 

At  any  rate,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Swedish  inter- 
mediary telephoned  the  British  Foreign  Office — not  once 
but  twice.  In  the  first  call,  at  10:15  a.m.,  he  took  it  upon 
himself  to  inform  the  British  government  that  the  Ger- 
man reply  to  its  ultimatum  was  “on  the  way”  and  that 
the  Germans  were  still  “most  anxious  to  satisfy  the  Brit- 
ish Government  and  to  give  satisfactory  assurances  not 
to  violate  the  independence  of  Poland.”  (!)  He  hoped 
London  would  consider  Hitler’s  response  “in  the  most 
favorable  light.”  31 

Half  an  hour  later,  at  10:50  a.m. — ten  minutes  before 
the  ultimatum  ran  out — Dahlerus  was  once  more  on  the 
long-distance  line  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  London,  this 
time  to  present  his  proposal  that  Goering,  with  Hitler’s 
assent,  fly  immediately  to  the  British  capital.  He  did  not 
realize  that  it  was  past  time  for  such  diplomatic  antics, 
but  he  was  soon  made  to.  He  was  given  an  uncompromis- 
ing answer  from  Halifax.  His  proposal  could  not  be  enter- 
tained. The  German  government  had  been  asked  a defi- 
nite question,  “and  presumably  they  would  be  sending  a 
definite  answer.”  H.  M.  Government  could  not  wait  for 
further  discussion  with  Goering.32 

Whereupon  Dahlerus  hung  up  and  disappeared  into 
the  limbo  of  history  until  he  reappeared,  briefly,  after  the 
war  at  Nuremberg — and  in  his  book — to  recount  his  bi- 
zarre attempt  to  save  world  peace.*  He  had  meant  well, 
he  had  striven  for  peace;  for  a few  moments  he  had  found 
himself  in  the  center  of  the  dazzling  stage  of  world  his- 


* He  reappeared  for  a moment  on  September  24  when  he  met  with  Forbes 
at  Oslo  “to  ascertain,”  as  he  told  the  Nuremberg  tribunal  before  he  was 
shut  off,  “if  there  was  still  a possibility  of  averting  a world  war.”  83 


The  Road  to  War 


813 


tory.  But  as  happened  to  almost  everyone  else,  the  con- 
fusion had  been  too  great  for  him  to  see  clearly;  and  as 
he  would  admit  at  Nuremberg,  he  had  at  no  time  realized 
how  much  he  had  been  taken  in  by  the  Germans. 

Shortly  after  1 1 a.m.,  when  the  time  limit  in  the  British 
ultimatum  had  run  out,  Ribbentrop,  who  had  declined  to 
see  the  British  ambassador  two  hours  before,  sent  for  him 
in  order  to  hand  him  Germany’s  reply.  The  German  gov- 
ernment, it  said,  refused  “to  receive  or  accept,  let  alone 
to  fulfill”  the  British  ultimatum.  There  followed  a lengthy 
and  shabby  propaganda  statement  obviously  hastily  con- 
cocted by  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  during  the  intervening 
two  hours.  Designed  to  fool  the  easily  fooled  German 
people,  it  rehearsed  all  the  lies  with  which  we  are  now 
familiar,  including  the  one  about  the  Polish  “attacks”  on 
German  territory,  blamed  Britain  for  all  that  had  hap- 
pened, and  rejected  attempts  “to  force  Germany  to  recall 
their  forces  which  are  lined  up  for  the  defense  of  the 
Reich.”  It  declared,  falsely,  that  Germany  had  accepted 
Mussolini’s  eleventh-hour  proposals  for  peace  and  point- 
ed out  that  Britain  had  rejected  them.  And  after  all  of 
Chamberlain’s  appeasement  of  Hitler  it  accused  the  Brit- 
ish government  of  “preaching  the  destruction  and  ex- 
termination of  the  German  people.”  * 

Henderson  read  the  document  (“this  completely  false 
representation  of  events,”  as  he  later  called  it)  and  re- 
marked, “It  would  be  left  to  history  to  judge  where  the 
blame  really  lay.”  Ribbentrop  retorted  that  “history  had 
already  proved  the  facts.” 

I was  standing  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  before  the  Chan- 
cellery about  noon  when  the  loudspeakers  suddenly  an- 
nounced that  Great  Britain  had  declared  herself  at  war 
with  Germany.!  Some  250  people — no  more — were 

* So  shoddy  was  this  hastily  prepared  note  that  it  ended  with  this  sentence: 
‘The  intention,  communicated  to  us  by  order  of  the  British  Government  by 
Mr.  King-Hall,  of  carrying  the  destruction  of  the  German  people  even 
further  than  was  done  through  the  Versailles  Treaty,  is  taken  note  of  by  us, 
and  we  shall  therefore  answer  any  aggressive  action  on  the -part  of  England 
with  the  same  weapons  and  in  the  same  form.”  The  British  government  had, 
of  course,  never  presented  to  Germany  any  intentions  of  Stephen  King-Hall, 
a retired  naval  officer,  whose  newsletters  were  a purely  private  venture.  In 
fact,  Henderson  had  protested  to  the  Foreign  Office  against  the  circulation 
of  King-Hall’s  publication  in  Germany  and  the  British  government  had 
requested  the  editor  to  desist. 

t In  London  at  11:15  a.m.  Halifax  had  handed  the  German  charge  d’affaires 


814 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

standing  there  in  the  sun.  They  listened  attentively  to 
the  announcement.  When  it  was  finished,  there  was  not  a 
murmur.  They  just  stood  there.  Stunned.  It  was  difficult 
for  them  to  comprehend  that  Hitler  had  led  them  into  a 
world  war. 

Soon,  though  it  was  the  Sabbath,  the  newsboys  were 
crying  their  extras.  In  fact,  I noticed,  they  were  giving  the 
papers  away.  I took  one.  It  was  the  Deutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  its  headlines  marching  in  large  type  across  the 
page: 

BRITISH  ULTIMATUM  TURNED  DOWN 

ENGLAND  DECLARES  A STATE  OF  WAR 
WITH  GERMANY 

BRITISH  NOTE  DEMANDS  WITHDRAWAL 
OF  OUR  TROOPS  IN  THE  EAST 

THE  FUEHRER  LEAVING  TODAY 
FOR  THE  FRONT 

The  headline  over  the  official  account  read  as  though 
it  had  been  dictated  by  Ribbentrop. 

GERMAN  MEMORANDUM  PROVES 
ENGLAND’S  GUILT 

Proved”  though  it  may  have  been  to  a people  as  easily 
swindled  as  the  Germans,  it  aroused  no  ill  feelings  to- 
ward the  British  during  the  day.  When  I passed  the  Brit- 
ish Embassy,  from  whose  premises  Henderson  and  his 
staff  were  moving  to  the  Hotel  Adlon  around  the  corner, 
a lone  Schupo  paced  up  and  down  before  the  building. 
He  had  nothing  to  do  but  saunter  back  and  forth. 

The  French  held  out  a little  longer.  Bonnet  played  for 
time  until  the  last  moment,  clinging  stubbornly  to  the 
hope  that  Mussolini  might  still  swing  a deal  with  Hitler 
which  would  let  France  off  the  hook.  He  even  pleaded 
with  the  Belgian  ambassador  to  get  King  Leopold  to  use 
his  influence  with  Mussolini  to  influence  Hitler.  All  day 


a formal  note  stating  that  since  no  German  assurances  had  been  received 
by  11  a.m.,  I have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  a state  of  war  exists  be- 
tween the  two  countries  as  from  11  a.m.  today,  September  3.” 


The  Road  to  War 


815 


Saturday,  September  2,  he  argued  with  his  own  cabinet,  as 
he  did  with  the  British,  that  he  had  “promised”  Ciano  to 
wait  until  noon  of  September  3 for  the  German  answer 
to  the  Anglo-French  warning  notes  of  September  1,  and 
that  he  could  not  go  back  on  his  word.  He  had,  to  be 
sure,  given  this  assurance  to  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister 
over  the  phone — but  not  until  9 o’clock  on  the  evening 
of  September  2*  By  that  time  the  Duce’s  proposal  for  a 
conference  was  as  dead  as  stone,  as  Ciano  had  tried  to 
tell  him.  And  by  that  hour,  too,  the  British  were  pleading 
with  him  to  present  a joint  ultimatum  to  Berlin  at  mid- 
night. 

Shortly  before  midnight  on  September  2,  the  French 
government  finally  reached  a decision.  At  precisely  mid- 
night, Bonnet  wired  Coulondre  at  Berlin  that  in  the  morn- 
ing he  would  forward  the  terms  of  a “new  demarche”  to 
be  made  “at  noon  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse.”  t 

This  he  did,  at  10:20  a.m.  on  Sunday,  September  3 — 
forty  minutes  before  the  British  ultimatum  ran  out.  The 
French  ultimatum  was  similarly  worded  except  that  in 
case  of  a negative  reply  France  declared  that  she  would 
fulfill  her  obligations  to  Poland  “which  are  known  to  the 
German  government” — even  at  this  final  juncture  Bonnet 
held  out  against  a formal  declaration  of  war. 

In  the  official  French  Yellow  Book  the  text  of  the 
French  ultimatum  wired  to  Coulondre  gives  5 p.m.  as  the 
time  limit  for  the  German  response.  But  this  was  not  the 
hour  set  in  the  original  telegram.  At  8:45  a.m.  Ambassa- 
dor Phipps  had  notified  Halifax  from  Paris:  “Bonnet 
tells  me  French  time  limit  will  only  expire  at  5 o’clock 
Monday  morning  [September  4].”  That  was  the  time 
given  in  Bonnet’s  telegram. 

Though  it  represented  a concession  wrung  by  Daladier 
early  Sunday  morning  from  the  French  General  Staff, 
which  had  insisted  on  a full  forty-eight  hours  from  the 
time  the  ultimatum  was  given  Berlin  at  noon,  it  still  irri- 
tated the  British  government,  whose  displeasure  was  com- 
municated to  Paris  in  no  uncertain  terms  during  the  fore- 
noon. Premier  Daladier  therefore  made  one  last  appeal 

* See  above,  p.  805. 

t But  even  after  that,  it  will  be  remembered  (see  above,  p.  805),  Bonnet 
made  a last-minute  effort  to  keep  France  out  of  the  war  by  proposing,  during 
the  night,  to  the  Italians  that  they  get  Hitler  to  make  a “symbolic”  with- 
drawal from  Poland. 


816  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  the  military.  He  called  in  General  Colston,  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  at  11:30  a.m.  and  urged  a shorter  deadline.  The 
General  reluctantly  agreed  to  move  it  up  by  twelve  hours 
to  5 P.M. 

Thus  it  was  that  just  as  Coulondre  was  leaving  the 
French  Embassy  in  Berlin  for  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  Bon- 
net got  through  to  him  on  the  telephone  and  instructed 
him  to  make  the  necessary  change  in  the  zero  hour.34 

Ribbentrop  was  not  available  to  the  French  ambassa- 
dor at  the  noon  hour.  He  was  taking  part  in  a little  cere- 
mony at  the  Chancellery,  where  the  new  Soviet  ambassa- 
dor, Alexander  Shkvarzev,  was  being  warmly  received  by 
the  Fuehrer — an  occasion  that  lent  a bizarre  note  to  this 
historic  Sabbath  in  Berlin.  Coulondre,  insistent  on  follow- 
ing the  letter  of  his  instructions  to  call  at  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse at  precisely  twelve  noon,  was  therefore  received 
by  Weizsaecker.  To  the  ambassador’s  inquiry  as  to  wheth- 
er the  State  Secretary  was  empowered  to  give  a “satisfac- 
tory” answer  to  the  French,  Weizsaecker  replied  that  he 
was  not  in  a position  to  give  him  “any  kind  of  reply.” 

There  now  followed  at  this  solemn  moment  a minor 
diplomatic  comedy.  When  Coulondre  attempted  to  treat 
Weizsaecker’s  response  as  the  negative  German  reply 
which  he  fully  anticipated  and  to  hand  to  the  State  Sec- 
retary France’s  formal  ultimatum,  the  latter  declined  to 
accept  it.  He  suggested  that  the  ambassador  “be  good 
enough  to  be  patient  a little  longer  and  see  the  Foreign 
Minister  personally.”  Thus  rebuffed — and  not  for  the  first 
time — Coulondre  cooled  his  heels  for  nearly  half  an 
hour.  At  12:30  p.m.  he  was  conducted  to  the  Chancellery 
to  see  Ribbentrop.35 

Though  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  knew  what  the  am- 
bassador s mission  was,  he  could  not  let  the  opportunity, 
the  very  last  such  one,  slip  by  without  treating  the  French 
envoy  to  one  of  his  customary  prevarications  of  history. 
After  remarking  that  Mussolini,  in  presenting  his  last- 
minute  peace  proposal,  had  emphasized  that  France  ap- 
proved it,  Ribbentrop  declared  that  “Germany  had  in- 
formed the  Duce  yesterday  that  she  also  was  prepared  to 
agree  to  the  proposal.  Later  in  the  day,”  Ribbentrop 
added,  “the  Duce  reported  that  his  proposal  had  been 
wrecked  by  the  intransigence  of  the  British  Government.” 

But  Coulondre,  over  the  past  months,  had  heard 


The  Road  to  War 


817 


enough  of  Ribbentrop’s  falsifications.  After  listening  a 
little  longer  to  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister,  who  had  gone 
on  to  say  that  he  would  regret  it  if  France  followed  Great 
Britain  and  that  Germany  had  no  intention  of  attacking 
France,  the  ambassador  got  in  the  question  he  had  come 
to  ask:  Did  the  Foreign  Minister’s  remarks  mean  that  the 
response  of  the  German  government  to  the  French  com- 
munication of  September  1 was  negative? 

“Ja,"  replied  Ribbentrop. 

The  ambassador  then  handed  the  Foreign  Minister 
France’s  ultimatum,  prefacing  it  with  a remark  that  “for 
the  last  time”  he  must  emphasize  the  “heavy  responsibil- 
ity of  the  Reich  Government”  in  attacking  Poland  “with- 
out a declaration  of  war”  and  in  refusing  the  Anglo- 
French  request  that  German  troops  be  withdrawn. 

“Then  France  will  be  the  aggressor,”  Ribbentrop  said. 

“History  will  be  the  judge  of  that,”  Coulondre  replied. 

On  that  Sunday  in  Berlin  all  the  participants  in  the 
final  act  of  the  drama  seemed  intent  on  calling  upon  the 
judgment  of  history. 

Although  France  was  mobilizing  an  army  which  would 
have  overwhelming  superiority  for  the  time  being  over 
the  German  forces  in  the  west,  it  was  Great  Britain, 
whose  army  at  the  moment  was  negligible,  which  loomed 
in  Hitler’s  feverish  mind  as  the  main  enemy  and  as  the 
antagonist  who  was  almost  entirely  responsible  for  the 
pass  in  which  he  found  himself  as  September  3,  1939, 
began  to  wane  and  pass  into  history.  This  was  made  clear 
in  the  two  grandiose  proclamations  which  he  issued  dur- 
ing the  afternoon  to  the  German  people  and  to  the  Army 
of  the  West.  His  bitter  resentment  and  hysterical  anger  at 
the  British  burst  forth. 

Great  Britain  [he  said  in  an  “Appeal  to  the  German 
People”]  has  for  centuries  pursued  the  aim  of  rendering 
the  peoples  of  Europe  defenseless  against  the  British  policy 
of  world  conquest  . . . [and]  claimed  the  right  to  attack 
on  threadbare  pretexts  and  destroy  that  European  state  which 
at  the  moment  seemed  most  dangerous  ... 

We  ourselves  have  been  witnesses  of  the  policy  of  en- 
circlement . . . carried  on  by  Great  Britain  against  Ger- 
many since  before  the  war  . . . The  British  war  inciters  . . . 
oppressed  the  German  people  under  the  Versailles  Dik- 
tat..  . 


818 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Soldiers  of  the  Western  Army!  [Hitler  said  in  an  appeal 
to  the  troops  who  for  many  weeks  could  only  face  the 

French  Army]  . . . Great  Britain  has  pursued  the  policy  of 

Germany’s  encirclement  . . . The  British  Government,  driven 
on  by  those  warmongers  whom  we  knew  in  the  last  war, 
have  resolved  to  let  fall  their  mask  and  to  proclaim  war  on  a 
threadbare  pretext . . . 

There  was  not  a word  about  France. 

In  London  at  six  minutes  past  noon,  Chamberlain  ad- 
dressed the  House  of  Commons  and  informed  it  that 
Britain  was  now  at  war  with  Germany.  Though  Hitler, 
on  September  1,  had  forbidden  listening  to  foreign  broad- 
casts on  the  pain  of  death,  we  picked  up  in  Berlin  the 

words  of  the  Prime  Minister  as  quoted  over  the  BBC.  To 

those  of  us  who  had  seen  him  risking  his  political  life  at 
Godesberg  and  Munich  to  appease  Hitler,  his  words  were 
poignant. 

This  is  a sad  day  for  all  of  us,  and  to  none  is  it  sadder 
than  to  me.  Everything  that  I have  worked  for,  everything 
that  I have  believed  in  during  my  public  life,  has  crashed 
into  ruins.  There  is  only  one  thing  left  for  me  to  do:  that 
is,  to  devote  what  strength  and  powers  I have  to  forwarding 
the  victory  of  the  cause  for  which  we  have  to  sacrifice  so 
much  ...  I trust  I may  live  to  see  the  day  when  Hitlerism 
has  been  destroyed  and  a liberated  Europe  has  been  re- 
established. 

Chamberlain  was  fated  not  to  live  to  see  that  day.  He 
died,  a broken  man — though  still  a member  of  the  cabi- 
net— on  November  9,  1940.  In  view  of  all  that  has  been 
written  about  him  in  these  pages  it  seems  only  fitting  to 
quote  what  was  said  of  him  by  Churchill,  whom  he  had 
excluded  from  the  affairs  of  the  British  nation  for  so  long 
and  who  on  May  10,  1940,  succeeded  him  as  Prime  Min- 
ister. Paying  tribute  to  his  memory  in  the  Commons  on 
November  12,  1940,  Churchill  said: 

...  It  fell  to  Neville  Chamberlain  in  one  of  the  supreme 
crises  of  the  world  to  be  contradicted  by  events,  to  be  dis- 
appointed in  his  hopes,  and  to  be  deceived  and  cheated  by  a 
wicked  man.  But  what  were  these  hopes  in  which  he  was 
disappointed?  What  were  these  wishes  in  which  he  was  frus- 
trated? What  was  that  faith  that  was  abused?  They  were 
surely  among  the  most  noble  and  benevolent  instincts  of 


The  Road  to  War 


819 


the  human  heart — the  love  of  peace,  the  toil  for  peace, 
the  strife  for  peace,  the  pursuit  of  peace,  even  at  great 
peril  and  certainly  in  utter  disdain  of  popularity  or  clamor. 

His  diplomacy  having  failed  to  keep  Britain  and  France 
out  of  the  war,  Hitler  turned  his  attention  during  the 
afternoon  of  September  3 to  military  matters.  He  issued 
Top-Secret  Directive  No.  2 for  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 
Despite  the  Anglo-French  war  declarations,  it  said,  “the 
German  war  objective  remains  for  the  time  being  the 
speedy  and  victorious  conclusion  of  the  operations 
against  Poland  . . . In  the  West  the  opening  of  hostilities 
is  to  be  left  to  the  enemy  . . . Against  Britain,  naval  of- 
fensive operations  are  permitted.”  The  Luftwaffe  was  not 
to  attack  even  British  naval  forces  unless  the  British 
opened  similar  attacks  on  German  targets — and  then  only 
“if  prospects  of  success  are  particularly  favorable.”  The 
conversion  of  the  whole  of  German  industry  to  “war 
economy”  was  ordered.36 

At  9 o’clock  in  the  evening  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  left 
Berlin  in  separate  special  trains  for  General  Headquar- 
ters in  the  East.  But  not  before  they  had  made  two  more 
diplomatic  moves.  Britain  and  France  were  now  at  war 
with  Germany.  But  there  were  the  two  other  great  Euro- 
pean powers,  whose  support  had  made  Hitler’s  venture 
possible,  to  consider:  Italy,  the  ally,  which  had  reneged 
at  the  last  moment,  and  Soviet  Russia,  which,  though  dis- 
trusted by  the  Nazi  dictator,  had  obliged  him  by  making 
his  gamble  on  war  seem  worth  the  taking. 

Just  before  leaving  the  capital,  Hitler  got  off  another  let- 
ter to  Mussolini.  It  was  dispatched  by  wire  at  8:51  p.m., 
nine  minutes  before  the  Fuehrer’s  special  train  pulled  out 
of  the  station.  Though  not  entirely  frank  nor  devoid  of 
deceit  it  gives  the  best  picture  we  shall  probably  ever  have 
of  the  mind  of  Adolf  Hitler  as  he  set  out  for  the  first 
time  from  the  darkened  capital  of  the  Third  Reich  to  as- 
sume his  role  as  Supreme  German  Warlord.  It  is  among 
the  captured  Nazi  papers. 

Duce: 

I must  first  thank  you  for  your  last  attempt  at  mediation. 
I would  have  been  ready  to  accept,  but  only  on  condition 
that  some  possibility  could  have  been  found  to  give  me  cer- 
tain guarantees  that  the  conference  would  be  successful. 
For  the  German  troops  have  been  engaged  for  two  days  in 


820 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

an  extraordinarily  rapid  advance  into  Poland.  It  would  have 
been  impossible  to  allow  blood  which  was  there  sacrificed  to 
be  squandered  through  diplomatic  intrigue. 

Nevertheless,  I believe  that  a way  could  have  been  found 
if  England  had  not  been  determined  from  the  outset  to  let  it 
come  to  war  in  any  case.  I did  not  yield  to  England’s 
threats  because,  Duce,  I no  longer  believe  that  peace  could 
have  been  maintained  for  more  than  six  months  or,  shall  we 
say,  a year.  In  these  circumstances,  I considered  that  the  pres- 
ent moment  was,  in  spite  of  everything,  more  suitable  for 
making  a stand. 

. . . The  Polish  Army  will  collapse  in  a very  short  time. 
Whether  it  would  have  been  possible  to  achieve  this  quick 
success  in  another  year  or  two  is,  I must  say,  very  doubtful 
in  my  opinion.  England  and  France  would  have  gone  on 
arming  their  allies  to  such  an  extent  that  the  decisive 
technical  superiority  of  the  German  Wehrmacht  could  not 
have  been  in  evidence  in  the  same  way.  I am  aware,  Duce, 
that  the  struggle  in  which  I am  engaging  is  a struggle  for 
life  and  death  . . . But  I am  also  aware  that  such  a struggle 
cannot  in  the  end  be  avoided,  and  that  the  moment  for 
resistance  must  be  chosen  with  icy  deliberation  so  that  the 
likelihood  of  success  is  assured;  and  in  this  success,  Duce, 
my  faith  is  as  firm  as  a rock. 

Next  came  words  of  warning  to  Mussolini. 

You  kindly  assured  me  recently  that  you  believe  you  can 
help  in  some  fields.  I accept  this  in  advance  with  sincere 
thanks.  But  I also  believe  that,  even  if  we  now  march 
down  separate  paths,  destiny  will  yet  bind  us  one  to  the 
other.  If  National  Socialist  Germany  were  to  be  destroyed 
by  the  Western  democracies.  Fascist  Italy  also  would  face  a 
hard  future.  I personally  was  always  aware  that  the  futures 
of  our  two  regimes  were  bound  up,  and  I know  that  you, 
Duce,  are  of  exactly  the  same  opinion. 

After  recounting  the  initial  German  victories  in  Po- 
land, Hitler  concluded: 

...  In  the  West  I shall  remain  on  the  defensive.  France 
can  shed  her  blood  there  first.  The  moment  will  then  come 
when  we  can  pit  ourselves  there  also  against  the  enemy  with 
the  whole  strength  of  the  nation. 

Please  accept  once  more  my  thanks,  Duce,  for  all  the 
support  you  have  given  me  in  the  past,  and  which  I ask  you 
not  to  refuse  me  in  the  future  either. 

Adolf  Hitler  37 

Hitler’s  disappointment  that  Italy  did  not  honor  her 


The  Road  to  War 


821 


word,  even  after  Britain  and  France  had  honored  theirs 
by  declaring  war  on  this  day,  was  kept  under  tight  con- 
trol. A friendly  Italy,  even  though  nonbelligerent,  could 
still  be  helpful  to  him. 

But  even  more  helpful  could  be  Russia. 

Already  on  the  first  day  of  the  German  attack  on  Po- 
land the  Soviet  government,  as  the  secret  Nazi  papers 
would  later  reveal,  had  rendered  the  German  Luftwaffe 
a signal  service.  Very  early  on  that  morning  the  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Air  Force,  General  Hans  Jeschon- 
nek,  had  rung  up  the  German  Embassy  in  Moscow  to 
say  that  in  order  to  give  his  pilots  navigational  aid  in 
the  bombing  of  Poland — “urgent  navigation  tests,”  he 
called  it — he  would  appreciate  it  if  the  Russian  radio 
station  at  Minsk  would  continually  identify  itself.  By 
afternoon  Ambassador  von  der  Schulenburg  was  able  to 
inform  Berlin  that  the  Soviet  government  was  “prepared 
to  meet  your  wishes.”  The  Russians  agreed  to  introduce 
a station  identification  as  often  as  possible  in  the  pro- 
grams over  their  transmitter  and  to  extend  the  broadcast- 
ing time  of  the  Minsk  station  by  two  hours  so  as  to  aid 
the  German  flyers  late  at  night.38 

But  as  they  prepared  to  leave  Berlin  late  on  September 
3 Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  had  in  mind  much  more  sub- 
stantial Russian  military  help  for  their  conquest  of  Po- 
land. At  6:50  p.m.,  Ribbentrop  got  off  a “most  urgent” 
telegram  to  the  embassy  in  Moscow.  It  was  marked  “Top 
Secret”  and  began:  “Exclusive  for  the  Ambassador.  For 
the  Head  of  Mission  or  his  representative  personally. 
Special  security  handling.  To  be  decoded  by  himself. 
Most  secret.” 

In  the  greatest  of  secrecy  the  Germans  invited  the  So- 
viet Union  to  join  in  the  attack  on  Poland! 

We  definitely  expect  to  have  beaten  the  Polish  Army  de- 
cisively in  a few  weeks.  We  should  then  keep  the  territory 
that  was  fixed  at  Moscow  as  a German  sphere  of  interest 
under  military  occupation.  We  should  naturally,  however, 
for  military,  reasons,  have  to  continue  to  take  action  against 
such  Polish  military  forces  as  are  at  that  time  located  in 
the  Polish  territory  belonging  to  the  Russian  sphere  of  in- 
terest. 

Please  discuss  this  at  once  with  Molotov  and  see  if  the 
Soviet  Union  does  not  consider  it  desirable  for  Russian 


822 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

forces  to  move  at  the  proper  time  against  Polish  forces  in 
the  Russian  sphere  of  interest  and  for  their  part  to  occupy 
this  territory.  In  our  estimation  this  would  be  not  only  a re- 
lief for  us,  but  also  be  in  the  sense  of  the  Moscow  agree- 
ments and  in  the  Soviet  interest  as  well.39 

That  such  a cynical  move  by  the  Soviet  Union  would 
be  a “relief’  to  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  is  obvious.  It 
would  not  only  avoid  misunderstandings  and  friction  be- 
tween the  Germans  and  the  Russians  in  dividing  up  the 
spoils  but  would  take  some  of  the  onus  of  the  Nazi  ag- 
gression in  Poland  off  Germany  and  place  it  on  the  So- 
viet Union.  If  they  shared  the  booty,  why  should  they  not 
share  the  blame? 

The  most  gloomy  German  of  any  consequence  in  Ber- 
lin that  Sunday  noon  after  it  became  known  that  Britain 
was  in  the  war  was  Grand  Admiral  Erich  Raeder,  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  German  Navy.  For  him  the  war 
had  come  four  or  five  years  too  soon.  By  1944-45,  the 
Navy’s  Z Plan  would  have  been  completed,  giving  Ger- 
many a sizable  fleet  with  which  to  confront  the  British. 
But  this  was  September  3,  1939,  and  Raeder  knew,  even 
if  Hitler  wouldn’t  listen  to  him,  that  he  had  neither  the 
surface  ships  nor  even  the  submarines  to  wage  effective 
war  against  Great  Britain. 

Confiding  to  his  diary,  the  Admiral  wrote: 

Today  the  war  against  France  and  England  broke  out,  the 
war  which,  according  to  the  Fuehrer’s  previous  assertions, 
we  had  no  need  to  expect  before  1944.  The  Fuehrer  be- 
lieved up  to  the  last  minute  that  it  could  be  avoided,  even  if 
this  meant  postponing  a final  settlement  of  the  Polish  ques- 
tion. . . . 

As  far  as  the  Navy  is  concerned,  obviously  it  is  in  no  way 
very  adequately  equipped  for  the  great  struggle  with  Great 
Britain  . . . the  submarine  arm  is  still  much  too  weak  to 
have  any  decisive  effect  on  the  war.  The  surface  forces, 
moreover,  are  so  inferior  in  number  and  strength  to  those 
of  the  British  Fleet  that,  even  at  full  strength,  they  can  do 
no  more  than  show  that  they  know  how  to  die  gallantly  ...  40 

Nevertheless  at  9 p.m.  on  September  3,  1939,  at  the  mo- 
ment Hitler  was  departing  Berlin,  the  German  Navy 
struck.  Without  warning,  the  submarine  U-30  torpedoed 
and  sank  the  British  liner  Athenia  some  two  hundred 


I 


The  Road  to  War  823 

miles  west  of  the  Hebrides  as  it  was  en  route  from  Liver- 
pool to  Montreal  with  1,400  passengers,  of  whom  112,  in- 
cluding twenty-eight  Americans,  lost  their  lives. 

World  War  II  had  begun. 


Booh  JFour 


* * * 


WAR: 

EARLY  VICTORIES 
AND 

THE  TURNING  POINT 


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18 

THE  FALL  OF  POLAND 


at  ten  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  September  5,  1939, 
General  Haider  had  a talk  with  General  von  Brauchitsch, 
the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Army,  and  Gen- 
eral von  Bock,  who  led  Army  Group  North.  After  sizing 
up  the  situation  as  it  looked  to  them  at  the  beginning  of 
the  fifth  day  of  the  German  attack  on  Poland  they  agreed, 
as  Haider  wrote  in  his  diary,  that  “the  enemy  is  prac- 
tically beaten.” 

By  the  evening  of  the  previous  day  the  battle  for  the 
Corridor  had  ended  with  the  junction  of  General  von 
Kluge’s  Fourth  Army,  pushing  eastward  from  Pomerania, 
and  General  von  Kuechler’s  Third  Army,  driving  west- 
ward from  East  Prussia.  It  was  in  this  battle  that  General 
Heinz  Guderian  first  made  a name  for  himself  with  his 
tanks.  At  one  point,  racing  east  across  the  Corridor,  they 
had  been  counterattacked  by  the  Pomorska  Brigade  of 
cavalry,  and  this  writer,  coming  upon  the  scene  a few 
days  later,  saw  the  sickening  evidence  of  the  carnage.  It 
was  symbolic  of  the  brief  Polish  campaign. 

Horses  against  tanks!  The  cavalryman’s  long  lance 
against  the  tank’s  long  cannon!  Brave  and  valiant  and 
foolhardy  though  they  were,  the  Poles  were  simply  over- 
whelmed by  the  German  onslaught.  This  was  their — and 
the  world’s — first  experience  of  the  blitzkrieg:  the  sudden 
surprise  attack;  the  fighter  planes  and  bombers  roaring 
overhead,  reconnoitering,  attacking,  spreading  flame  and 
terror;  the  Stukas  screaming  as  they  dove;  the  tanks, 
whole  divisions  of  them,  breaking  through  and  thrusting 
forward  thirty  or  forty  miles  in  a day;  self-propelled, 
rapid-firing  heavy  guns  rolling  forty  miles  an  hour  down 
even  the  rutty  Polish  roads;  the  incredible  speed  of  even 
the  infantry,  of  the  whole  vast  army  of  a million  and  a 

827 


828  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

half  men  on  motorized  wheels,  directed  and  co-ordinated 
through  a maze  of  electronic  communications  consisting 
of  intricate  radio,  telephone  and  telegraphic  networks. 
This  was  a monstrous  mechanized  juggernaut  such  as  the 
earth  had  never  seen. 

Within  forty-eight  hours  the  Polish  Air  Force  was  de- 
stroyed, most  of  its  five  hundred  first-line  planes  having 
been  blown  up  by  German  bombing  on  their  home  air- 
fields before  they  could  take  off.  Installations  were  burned 
and  most  of  the  ground  crews  were  killed  or  wounded. 
Cracow,  the  second  city  of  Poland,  fell  on  September  6. 
That  night  the  Polish  government  fled  from  Warsaw  to 
Lublin.  The  next  day  Haider  busied  himself  with  plans  to 
begin  transferring  troops  to  the  Western  front,  though  he 
could  detect  no  activity  there.  On  the  afternoon  of  Sep- 
tember 8 the  4th  Panzer  Division  reached  the  outskirts  of 
the  Polish  capital,  while  directly  south  of  the  city,  rolling 
up  from  Silesia  and  Slovakia,  Reichenau’s  Tenth  Army 
captured  Kielce  and  List’s  Fourteenth  Army  arrived  at 
Sandomierz,  at  the  junction  of  the  Vistula  and  San  rivers. 

In  one  week  the  Polish  Army  had  been  vanquished. 
Most  of  its  thirty-five  divisions — all  that  there  had  been 
time  to  mobilize — had  been  either  shattered  or  caught  in 
a vast  pincers  movement  that  closed  in  around  Warsaw. 
There  now  remained  for  the  Germans  the  “second  phase”: 
tightening  the  noose  around  the  dazed  and  disorganized 
Polish  units  which  were  surrounded  and  destroying  them, 
and  completing  a second  and  larger  pincers  movement  a 
hundred  miles  to  the  east  which  would  trap  the  remain- 
ing Polish  formations  west  of  Brest  Litovsk  and  the  River 
Bug. 

This  phase  began  September  9 and  ended  on  September 
17.  The  left  wing  of  Bock’s  Army  Group  North  headed 
for  Brest  Litovsk,  which  Guderian’s  XIXth  Corps  reached 
on  the  fourteenth  and  captured  two  days  later.  On  Sep- 
tember 17  it  met  patrols  of  List’s  Fourteenth  Army  fifty 
miles  south  of  Brest  Litovsk  at  Wlodawa,  closing  the  sec- 
ond great  pincers  there.  The  “counterattack,”  as  Guderian 
later  observed,  had  come  to  a “definite  conclusion”  on 
September  17.  All  Polish  forces,  except  for  a handful  on 
the  Russian  border,  were  surrounded.  Pockets  of  Polish 
troops  in  the  Warsaw  triangle  and  farther  west  near  Posen 
held  out  valiantly,  but  they  were  doomed.  The  Polish 


829 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

government,  or  what  was  left  of  it,  after  being  unceasing- 
ly bombed  and  strafed  by  the  Luftwaffe  reached  a village 
on  the  Rumanian  frontier  on  the  fifteenth.  For  it  and  the 
proud  nation  all  was  over,  except  the  dying  in  the  ranks 
of  the  units  which  still,  with  incredible  fortitude,  held  out. 

It  was  now  time  for  the  Russians  to  move  in  on  the 
stricken  country  to  grab  a share  of  the  spoils. 

THE  RUSSIANS  INVADE  POLAND 

The  Kremlin  in  Moscow,  like  every  other  seat  of  gov- 
ernment, had  been  taken  by  surprise  at  the  rapidity  with 
which  the  German  armies  hurtled  through  Poland.  On 
September  5 Molotov,  in  giving  a formal  written  reply  to 
the  Nazi  suggestion  that  Russia  attack  Poland  from  the 
east,  stated  that  this  would  be  done  “at  a suitable  time” 
but  that  “this  time  has  not  yet  come.”  He  thought  that 
“excessive  haste”  might  injure  the  Soviet  “cause”  but  he 
insisted  that  even  though  the  Germans  got  there  first  they 
must  scrupulously  observe  the  “line  of  demarcation”  in 
Poland  agreed  upon  in  the  secret  clauses  of  the  Nazi- 
Soviet  Pact.1  Russian  suspicion  of  the  Germans  was 
already  evident.  So  was  the  feeling  in  the  Kremlin  that 
the  German  conquest  of  Poland  might  take  quite  a long 
time. 

But  shortly  after  midnight  of  September  8,  after  a Ger- 
man armored  division  had  reached  the  outskirts  of  War- 
saw, Ribbentrop  wired  “urgent”  a “top  secret”  message  to 
Schulenburg  in  Moscow  stating  that  operations  in  Poland 
were  “progressing  even  beyond  our  expectations”  and  that 
in  these  circumstances  Germany  would  like  to  know  the 
“military  intentions  of  the  Soviet  Government.” 2 By 
4:10  p.m.  the  next  day  Molotov  had  replied  that  Russia 
would  move  militarily  “within  the  next  few  days.”  Earlier 
in  the  day  the  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar  had  officially  con- 
gratulated the  Germans  “on  the  entry  of  German  troops 
into  Warsaw.”  3 

On  September  10,  Molotov  and  Ambassador  von  der 
Schulenburg  got  into  a fine  snafu.  After  declaring  that  the 
Soviet  government  had  been  taken  “completely  by  surprise 
by  the  unexpectedly  rapid  German  military  successes” 
and  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  consequently  in  “a  dif- 
ficult situation,”  the  Foreign  Commissar  touched  on  the 


830 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


excuse  which  the  Kremlin  would  have  to  give  for  its  own 
aggression  in  Poland.  This  was,  as  Schulenburg  wired 
Berlin  “most  urgent”  and  “top  secret,” 

that  Poland  was  falling  apart  and  that  it  was  necessary  for 
the  Soviet  Union,  in  consequence,  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the 
Ukrainians  and  the  White  Russians  “threatened”  by  Ger- 
many. This  argument  [said  Molotov]  was  necessary  to 
make  the  intervention  of  the  Soviet  Union  plausible  to  the 
masses  and  at  the  same  time  avoid  giving  the  Soviet  Union  the 
appearance  of  an  aggressor. 

Furthermore,  Molotov  complained  that  General  von 
Brauchitsch  had  just  been  quoted  by  D.N.B.  as  saying 
that  “military  action  was  no  longer  necessary  on  the  Ger- 
man eastern  border.”  If  that  were  so,  if  the  war  was  over, 
Russia,  said  Molotov,  “could  not  start  a new  war.”  He 
was  very  displeased  about  the  whole  situation.4  To  fur- 
ther complicate  matters  he  summoned  Schulenburg  to  the 
Kremlin  on  September  14  and  after  informing  him  that 
the  Red  Army  would  march  sooner  than  they  had  antici- 
pated demanded  to  know  when  Warsaw  would  fall.  In 
order  to  justify  their  move  the  Russians  must  wait  on  the 
capture  of  the  Polish  capital.5 

The  Commissar  had  raised  some  embarrassing  ques- 
tions. When  would  Warsaw  fall?  How  did  the  Germans  like 
being  blamed  for  Russian  intervention?  On  the  evening  of 
September  15  Ribbentrop  dispatched  a “most  urgent,”  a 
“top  secret”  message  to  Molotov  through  the  German  am- 
bassador, answering  them.  Warsaw,  he  said,  would  be 
occupied  “in  the  next  few  days.”  Germany  would  “welcome 
the  Soviet  military  operation  now.”  As  to  the  Russian 
excuse  blaming  Germany  for  it,  this  “was  out  of  the  ques- 
tion . . . contrary  to  the  true  German  intentions  . . . would 
be  in  contradiction  to  the  arrangements  made  in  Moscow 
and  finally  . . . would  make  the  two  States  appear  as 
enemies  before  the  whole  world.”  He  ended  by  asking  the 
Soviet  government  to  set  “the  day  and  the  hour”  for  their 
attack  on  Poland.6 

This  was  done  the  next  evening  and  two  dispatches 
of  Schulenburg,  which  are  among  the  captured  German 
papers,  telling  how  it  was  done  give  a revealing  picture  of 
the  Kremlin’s  deceit. 

I saw  Molotov  at  6 p.m.  [Schulenburg  wired  on  Septem- 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  831 

ber  16],  Molotov  declared  that  military  intervention  by  the 
Soviet  Union  was  imminent — perhaps  even  tomorrow  or  the 
day  after.  Stalin  was  at  present  in  consultation  with  the  mili- 
tary leaders  . . . 

Molotov  added  that  . . . the  Soviet  Government  intended 
to  justify  its  procedure  as  follows:  The  Polish  State  had 
disintegrated  and  no  longer  existed;  therefore,  all  agree- 
ments concluded  with  Poland  were  void:  third  powers 
might  try  to  profit  by  the  chaos  which  had  arisen;  the 
Soviet  Government  considered  itself  obligated  to  intervene 
to  protect  its  Ukrainian  and  White  Russian  brothers  and 
make  it  possible  for  these  unfortunate  people  to  work  in 
peace. 

Since  Germany  could  be  the  only  possible  “third 
power”  in  question,  Schulenburg  objected. 

Molotov  conceded  that  the  proposed  argument  of  the 
Soviet  Government  contained  a note  that  was  jarring  to  Ger- 
man sensibilities  but  asked  us  in  view  of  the  difficult  situa- 
tion of  the  Soviet  Government  not  to  stumble  over  this 
piece  of  straw.  The  Soviet  Government  unfortunately  saw  no 
possiblity  of  any  other  motivation,  since  the  Soviet  Union 
had  heretofore  not  bothered  about  the  plight  of  its  minori- 
ties in  Poland  and  had  to  justify  abroad,  in  some  way  or 
other,  its  present  intervention.7 

At  5:20  p.m.  on  September  17,  Schulenburg  got  off  an- 
other “most  urgent”  and  “top  secret”  wire  to  Berlin. 

Stalin  received  me  at  2 o’clock  . . . and  declared  that 
the  Red  Army  would  cross  the  Soviet  border  at  6 o’clock 
. . . Soviet  planes  would  begin  today  to  bomb  the  district 
east  of  Lwow  (Lemberg). 

When  Schulenburg  objected  to  three  points  in  the  Soviet 
communique  the  Russian  dictator  “with  the  utmost  readi- 
ness” altered  the  text.8 

Thus  it  was  that  on  the  shabby  pretext  that  because 
Poland  had  ceased  to  exist  and  therefore  the  Polish- 
Soviet  nonaggression  pact  had  also  ceased  to  exist  and 
because  it  was  necessary  to  protect  its  own  interests  and 
those  of  the  Ukrainian  and  White  Russian  minorities,  the 
Soviet  Union  trampled  over  a prostrate  Poland  beginning 
on  the  morning  of  September  17.  To  add  insult  to  injury 
the  Polish  ambassador  in  Moscow  was  informed  that 
Russia  would  maintain  strict  neutrality  in  the  Polish  con- 
flict! The  next  day,  September  18,  Soviet  troops  met  the 
Germans  at  Brest  Litovsk,  where  exactly  twenty-one  years 


832 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


before  a newborn  Bolshevik  government  had  gone  back 
on  its  country’s  ties  with  the  Western  Allies  and  had  re- 
ceived from  the  German  Army,  and  accepted,  separate 
peace  terms  of  great  harshness. 

And  yet  though  they  were  now  accomplices  of  Nazi 
Germany  in  wiping  ancient  Poland  off  the  map,  the  Rus- 
sians were  at  once  distrustful  of  their  new  comrades.  At 
his  meeting  with  the  German  ambassador  on  the  eve  of 
the  Soviet  aggression,  Stalin  had  expressed  his  doubts, 
as  Schulenburg  duly  notified  Berlin,  whether  the  German 
High  Command  would  stand  by  the  Moscow  agreements 
and  withdraw  to  the  line  that  had  been  agreed  upon.  The 
ambassador  tried  to  reassure  him  but  apparently  with  no 
great  success.  “In  view  of  Stalin’s  well-known  attitude  of 
mistrust,”  Schulenburg  wired  Berlin,  “I  would  be  gratified 
if  I were  authorized  to  make  a further  declaration  of  such 
a nature  as  to  remove  his  last  doubts.”  9 The  next  day, 
September  19,  Ribbentrop  telegraphed  the  ambassador 
authorizing  him  to  “tell  Stalin  that  the  agreements  which 
I made  at  Moscow  will,  of  course,  be  kept,  and  that 
they  are  regarded  by  us  as  the  foundation  stone  of  the 
new  friendly  relations  between  Germany  and  the  Soviet 
Union.”  10 

Nevertheless  friction  between  the  two  unnatural  part- 
ners continued.  On  September  17  there  was  disagreement 
over  the  text  of  a joint  communique  which  would  “justify” 
the  Russo-German  destruction  of  Poland.  Stalin  objected 
to  the  German  version  because  “it  presented  the  facts  all 
too  frankly.”  Whereupon  he  wrote  out  his  own  version,  a 
masterpiece  of  subterfuge,  and  forced  the  Germans  to  ac- 
cept it.  It  stated  that  the  joint  aim  of  Germany  and  Russia 
was  “to  restore  peace  and  order  in  Poland,  which  has 
been  destroyed  by  the  disintegration  of  the  Polish  State, 
and  to  help  the  Polish  people  to  establish  new  conditions 
for  its  political  life.”  For  cynicism  Hitler  had  met  his 
match  in  Stalin. 

At  first  both  dictators  seem  to  have  considered  setting  up 
a rump  Polish  state  on  the  order  of  Napoleon’s  Grand 
Duchy  of  Warsaw  in  order  to  mollify  world  public  opin- 
ion. But  on  September  19  Molotov  disclosed  that  the  Bol- 
sheviks were  having  second  thoughts  on  that.  After  angrily 
protesting  to  Schulenburg  that  the  German  generals 
were  disregarding  the  Moscow  agreement  by  trying  to  grab 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  833 

territory  that  should  go  to  Russia,  he  came  to  the  main 
point. 

Molotov  hinted  [Schulenburg  wired  Berlin]  that  the 
original  inclination  entertained  by  the  Soviet  Government  and 
Stalin  personally  to  permit  the  existence  of  a residual  Po- 
land had  given  way  to  the  inclination  to  partition  Poland 
along  the  Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San  Line.  The  Soviet  Govern- 
ment wishes  to  commence  negotiations  on  this  matter  at  once.11 

Thus  the  initiative  to  partition  Poland  completely,  to 
deny  the  Polish  people  any  independent  existence  of  their 
own  whatsoever,  came  from  the  Russians.  But  the  Ger- 
mans did  not  need  much  urging  to  agree.  On  September 
23  Ribbentrop  wired  Schulenburg  instructing  him  to  tell 
Molotov  that  the  “Russian  idea  of  a border  line  along  the 
well-known  four-rivers  line  coincides  with  the  view  of  the 
Reich  Government.”  He  proposed  to  again  fly  to  Moscow 
to  work  out  the  details  of  that  as  well  as  of  “the  definitive 
structure  of  the  Polish  area.”  12 

Stalin  now  took  personal  charge  of  the  negotiations, 
and  his  German  allies  learned,  as  his  British  and  American 
allies  later  would  also  learn,  what  a tough,  cynical  and 
opportunistic  bargainer  he  was.  The  Soviet  dictator  sum- 
moned Schulenburg  to  the  Kremlin  at  8 P.M.  on  Septem- 
ber 25  and  the  ambassador’s  dispatch  later  that  evening 
warned  Berlin  of  some  stern  realities  and  of  some  chickens 
that  were  coming  home  to  roost. 

Stalin  stated  ...  he  considered  it  wrong  to  leave  an  in- 
dependent residual  Poland.  He  proposed  that  from  the 
territory  to  the  east  of  the  demarcation  line,  all  the  Province 
of  Warsaw  which  extends  to  the  Bug  should  be  added  to  our 
share.  In  return  we  should  waive  our  claim  to  Lithuania. 

Stalin  . . . added  that  if  we  consented,  the  Soviet  Union 
would  immediately  take  up  the  solution  of  the  problem  of 
the  Baltic  countries  in  accordance  with  the  [secret]  Protocol 
of  August  23,  and  expected  in  this  matter  the  unstinting 
support  of  the  German  Government.  Stalin  expressly  in- 
dicated Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  but  did  not  mention 
Finland.13 

This  was  a shrewd  and  hard  bargain.  Stalin  was  offering 
to  trade  two  Polish  provinces,  which  the  Germans  had 
already  captured,  for  the  Baltic  States.  He  was  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  great  service  he  had  rendered  Hitler — 


834 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


making  it  possible  for  him  to  attack  Poland — to  get  every- 
thing he  could  for  Russia  while  the  getting  was  good. 
Moreover,  he  was  proposing  that  the  Germans  take  over 
the  mass  of  the  Polish  people.  As  a Russian,  he  well 
knew  what  centuries  of  history  had  taught:  that  the  Poles 
would  never  peacefully  submit  to  the  loss  of  their  inde- 
pendence. Let  them  be  a headache  for  the  Germans,  not 
the  Russians!  In  the  meantime  he  would  get  the  Baltic 
States,  which  had  been  taken  from  Russia  after  the  First 
World  War  and  whose  geographical  position  offered  the 
Soviet  Union  great  protection  against  surprise  attack  by 
his  German  ally. 

Ribbentrop  arrived  by  plane  in  Moscow  for  the  second 
time  at  6 p.m.  on  September  28,  and  before  proceeding  to 
the  Kremlin  he  had  time  to  read  two  telegrams  from  Berlin 
which  apprised  him  of  what  the  Russians  were  up  to.  They 
were  messages  forwarded  from  the  German  minister  at  Tal- 
linn, who  reported  that  the  Estonian  government  had 
just  informed  him  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  demanded, 
“under  the  gravest  threat  of  imminent  attack,”  military 
and  air  bases  in  Estonia.14  Later  that  night,  after  a long 
conference  with  Stalin  and  Molotov,  Ribbentrop  wired 
Hitler  that  “this  very  night”  a pact  was  being  concluded 
which  would  put  two  Red  Army  divisions  and  an  Air 
Force  brigade  “on  Estonian  territory,  without,  how- 
ever, abolishing  the  Estonian  system  of  government  at  this 
time.”  But  the  Fuehrer,  an  experienced  hand  at  this  sort 
of  thing,  knew  how  fleeting  Estonia’s  time  would  be.  The 
very  next  day  Ribbentrop  was  informed  that  Hitler  had 
ordered  the  evacuation  of  the  86,000  Volksdeutsche  in 
Estonia  and  Latvia.15 

Stalin  was  presenting  his  bill  and  Hitler,  for  the  time 
being  at  least,  had  to  pay  it.  He  was  instantly  abandoning 
not  only  Estonia  but  Latvia,  both  of  which,  he  had 
agreed  in  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact,  belonged  in  the  Soviet 
sphere  of  interest.  Before  the  day  was  up  he  was  also 
giving  up  Lithuania,  on  Germany’s  northeastern  border, 
which,  according  to  the  secret  clauses  of  the  Moscow 
Pact,  belonged  in  the  Reich’s  sphere. 

Stalin  had  presented  the  Germans  two  choices  in  the 
meeting  with  Ribbentrop,  which  began  at  10  p.m.  on  Sep- 
tember 27  and  lasted  until  1 a.m.  They  were,  as  he  had 


835 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

suggested  to  Schulenburg  on  the  twenty-fifth:  acceptance 
of  the  original  line  of  demarcation  in  Poland,  along  the 
Pissa,  Narew,  Vistula  and  San  rivers,  with  Germany  get- 
ting Lithuania;  or  yielding  Lithuania  to  Russia  in  return 
for  more  Polish  territory  (the  province  of  Lublin  and 
the  lands  to  the  east  of  Warsaw)  which  would  give  the 
Germans  almost  all  of  the  Polish  people.  Stalin  strongly 
urged  the  second  choice  and  Ribbentrop  in  a long  telegram 
to  Hitler  filed  at  4 a.m.  on  September  28  put  it  up  to 
Hitler,  who  agreed. 

Dividing  up  Eastern  Europe  took  quite  a bit  of  intricate 
drawing  of  maps,  and  after  three  and  a half  more  hours 
of  negotiations  on  the  afternoon  of  September  28,  followed 
by  a state  banquet  at  the  Kremlin,  Stalin  and  Molotov  ex- 
cused themselves  in  order  to  confer  with  a Latvian  delega- 
tion they  had  summoned  to  Moscow.  Ribbentrop  dashed 
off  to  the  opera  house  to  take  in  an  act  of  Swan  Lake, 
returning  to  the  Kremlin  at  midnight  for  further  consul- 
tations about  maps  and  other  things.  At  5 a.m.  Molotov 
and  Ribbentrop  put  their  signatures  to  a new  pact  officially 
called  the  “German-Soviet  Boundary  and  Friendship 
Treaty”  while  Stalin  once  more  beamed  on,  as  a German 
official  later  reported,  “with  obvious  satisfaction.”  * He 
had  reason  to.17 

The  Treaty  itself,  which  was  made  public,  announced 
the  boundary  of  the  “respective  national  interests”  of  the 
two  countries  in  “the  former  Polish  state”  and  stated  that 
within  their  acquired  territories  they  would  re-establish 
“peace  and  order”  and  “assure  the  people  living  there 
a peaceful  life  in  keeping  with  their  national  character.” 

But,  as  with  the  previous  Nazi-Soviet  deal,  there  were 
“secret  protocols” — three  of  them,  of  which  two  contained 
the  meat  of  the  agreement.  One  added  Lithuania  to  the 
Soviet  “sphere  of  influence,”  and  the  provinces  of  Lublin 
and  Eastern  Warsaw  to  the  German.  The  second  was  short 
and  to  the  point. 

Both  parties  will  tolerate  in  their  territories  no  Polish 
agitation  which  affects  the  territories  of  the  other  party.  They 
will  suppress  in  their  territories  all  beginnings  of  such  agi- 

* This  official,  Andor  Hencke,  Understate  Secretary  in  the  Foreign  Office, 
who  had  served  for  many  years  in  the  embassy  at  Moscow,  wrote  a detailed 
and  amusing  account  of  the  talks.  It  was  the  only  German  record  made  of 
the  second  day’s  conferences.18 


836  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tation  and  inform  each  other  concerning  suitable  measures 
for  this  purpose. 

So  Poland,  like  Austria  and  Czechoslovakia  before  it, 
disappeared  from  the  map  of  Europe.  But  this  time  Adolf 
Hitler  was  aided  and  abetted  in  his  obliteration  of  a coun- 
try by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  which  had 
posed  for  so  long  as  the  champion  of  the  oppressed  peo- 
ples. This  was  the  fourth  partition  of  Poland  by  Germany 
and  Russia  * (Austria  had  participated  in  the  others),  and 
while  it  lasted  it  was  to  be  by  far  the  most  ruthless  and 
pitiless.  In  the  secret  protocol  of  September  28  t Hitler 
and  Stalin  agreed  to  institute  in  Poland  a regime  of  terror 
designed  to  brutally  suppress  Polish  freedom,  culture  and 
national  life. 

Hitler  fought  and  won  the  war  in  Poland,  but  the 
greater  winner  was  Stalin,  whose  troops  scarcely  fired  a 
shot,  t The  Soviet  Union  got  nearly  half  of  Poland  and  a 
stranglehold  on  the  Baltic  States.  It  blocked  Germany 
more  solidly  than  ever  from  two  of  its  main  long-term  ob- 
jectives: Ukrainian  wheat  and  Rumanian  oil,  both  badly 
needed  if  Germany  was  to  survive  the  British  blockade. 
Even  Poland’s  oil  region  of  Borislav-Drogobycz,  which 
Hitler  desired,  was  claimed  successfully  by  Stalin,  who 
graciously  agreed  to  sell  the  Germans  the  equivalent  of  the 
area’s  annual  production. 

Why  did  Hitler  pay  such  a high  price  to  the  Russians?  It 
is  true  that  he  had  agreed  to  it  in  August  in  order  to  keep 
the  Soviet  Union  out  of  the  Allied  camp  and  out  of  the 
war.  But  he  had  never  been  a stickler  for  keeping  agree- 
ments and  now,  with  Poland  conquered  by  an  incompara- 
ble feat  of  German  arms,  he  might  have  been  expected 
to  welsh,  as  the  Army  urged,  on  the  August  23  pact.  If 
Stalin  objected,  the  Fuehrer  could  threaten  him  with  attack 
by  the  most  powerful  army  in  the  world,  as  the  Polish 
campaign  had  just  proved  it  to  be.  Or  could  he?  Not 
while  the  British  and  French  stood  at  arms  in  the  West. 
To  deal  with  Britain  and  France  he  must  keep  his  rear 

I £?noI<J  Toynbee,  in  his  various  writings,  calls  it  the  fifth  partition. 

tember  28  Slgned  at  5 A'M'  SeP‘ember  29,  the  treaty  is  officially  dated  Sep- 

t German  casualties  in  Poland  were  officially  given  as  10,572  killed,  30,322 
wounded  and  3,400  missing. 


837 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

free.  This,  as  subsequent  utterances  of  his  would  make 
clear,  was  the  reason  why  he  allowed  Stalin  to  strike  such 
a hard  bargain.  But  he  did  not  forget  the  Soviet  dictator’s 
harsh  dealings  as  he  now  turned  his  attention  to  the 
Western  front. 


19 


SITZKRIEG  IN  THE  WEST 


nothing  much  had  happened  there.  Hardly  a shot  had 
been  fired.  The  German  man  in  the  street  was  beginning 
to  call  it  the  “sit-down  war” — Sitzkrieg.  In  the  West  it 
would  soon  be  dubbed  the  “phony  war.”  Here  was  “the 
strongest  army  in  the  world  [the  French],”  as  the 
British  General  J.  F.  C.  Fuller  would  put  it,  “facing  no 
more  than  twenty-six  [German]  divisions,  sitting  still 
and  sheltering  behind  steel  and  concrete  while  a quixoti- 
cally valient  ally  was  being  exterminated!”  1 

Were  the  Germans  surprised?  Hardly.  In  Haider’s 
very  first  diary  entry,  that  of  August  14,  the  Chief  of 
the  Army  General  Staff  had  composed  a detailed  estimate 
of  the  situation  in  the  West  if  Germany  attacked  Poland. 
He  considered  a French  offensive  “not  very  likely.”  He  was 
sure  that  France  would  not  send  its  army  through  Bel- 
gium “against  Belgian  wishes.”  His  conclusion  was  that 
the  French  would  remain  on  the  defensive.  On  Septem- 
ber 7,  with  the  Polish  Army  already  doomed,  Haider,  as 
has  been  noted,  was  already  occupied  with  plans  to  trans- 
fer German  divisions  to  the  west. 

That  evening  he  noted  down  the  results  of  a conference 
which  Brauchitsch  had  had  during  the  afternoon  with 
Hitler. 

Operation  in  the  West  not  yet  clear.  Some  indications 
that  there  is  no  real  intention  of  waging  a war  . . . French 
cabinet  lacks  heroic  caliber.  Also  from  Britain  first  hints  of 
sobering  reflection. 

Two  days  later  Hitler  issued  Directive  No.  3 for  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  ordering  arrangements  to  be  made 
for  Army  and  Air  Force  units  to  be  sent  from  Poland  to 
838 


839 


¥ 

War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

the  west.  But  not  necessarily  to  fight.  “Even  after  the  ir- 
resolute opening  of  hostilities  by  Great  Britain  . . . and 
France  my  express  command,”  the  directive  laid  it 
down,  “must  be  obtained  in  each  of  the  following  cases: 
Every  time  our  ground  forces  [or]  . . . one  of  our 
planes  cross  the  western  borders;  [and]  for  every  air 
attack  on  Britain.”  2 

What  had  France  and  Britain  promised  Poland  to 
do  in  case  she  were  attacked?  The  British  guarantee  was 
general.  But  the  French  was  specific.  It  was  laid  down  in 
the  Franco-Polish  Military  Convention  of  May  19,  1939. 
In  this  it  was  agreed  that  the  French  would  “progressively 
launch  offensive  operations  against  limited  objectives  to- 
ward the  third  day  after  General  Mobilization  Day.”  Gen- 
eral mobilization  had  been  proclaimed  September  1.  But 
further,  it  was  agreed  that  “as  soon  as  the  principal 
German  effort  develops  against  Poland,  France  will  launch 
an  offensive  action  against  Germany  with  the  bulk  of  her 
forces,  starting  on  the  fifteenth  day  after  the  first  day  of 
the  general  French  mobilization.”  When  the  Deputy 
Chief  of  the  Polish  General  Staff,  Colonel  Jaklincz,  had 
asked  how  many  French  troops  would  be  available  for 
this  major  offensive,  General  Gamelin  had  replied  that 
there  would  be  about  thirty-five  to  thirty-eight  divisions.3 

But  by  August  23,  as  the  German  attack  on  Poland  be- 
came imminent,  the  timid  French  generalissimo  was  tell- 
ing his  government,  as  we  have  seen,* *  that  he  could  not 
possibly  mount  a serious  offensive  “in  less  than  about  two 
years  ...  in  1941-2” — assuming,  he  had  added,  that 
France  by  that  time  had  the  “help  of  British  troops  and 
American  equipment.” 

In  the  first  weeks  of  the  war,  to  be  sure,  Britain  had 
pitifully  few  troops  to  send  to  France.  By  October  11, 
three  weeks  after  the  fighting  was  over  in  Poland,  it  had 
four  divisions — 158,000  men — in  France.  “A  symbolic 
contribution,”  Churchill  called  it,  and  Fuller  noted  that 
the  first  British  casualty — a corporal  shot  dead  on  patrol 
— did  not  occur  until  December  9.  “So  bloodless  a war,” 
Fuller  comments,  “had  not  been  seen  since  the  Battles  of 
Molinella  and  Zagonara.”  t 

* See  above,  p.  80 7n. 

• t On  Octiber  9 this  writer  journeyed  by  rail  up  the  east  bank  of  the  Rhine 
where  for  a hundred  miles  it  forms  the  Franco-German  frontier  and  noted 


_ 


840 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


In  retrospect  at  Nuremberg  the  German  generals  agreed 
that  by  failing  to  attack  in  the  West  during  the  Polish 
campaign  the  Western  Allies  had  missed  a golden  oppor- 
tunity. 

The  success  against  Poland  was  only  possible  [said  Gen- 
eral Haider]  by  almost  completely  baring  our  Western  bor- 
der. If  the  French  had  seen  the  logic  of  the  situation  and 
had  used  the  engagement  of  the  German  forces  in  Poland, 
they  would  have  been  able  to  cross  the  Rhine  without  our 
being  able  to  prevent  it  and  would  have  threatened  the  Ruhr 
area,  which  was  the  most  decisive  factor  of  the  German 
conduct  of  the  war.4 

....  If  we  did  not  collapse  in  1939  [said  General 
Jodi]  that  was  due  only  to  the  fact  that  during  the  Polish 
campaign  the  approximately  110  French  and  British  divisions 
in  the  West  were  held  completely  inactive  against  the  23 
German  divisions.6 

And  General  Keitel,  Chief  of  the  OKW,  added  this 
testimony: 

We  soldiers  had  always  expected  an  attack  by  France 
during  the  Polish  campaign,  and  were  very  surprised  that 
nothing  happened  ...  A French  attack  would  have  en- 
countered only  a German  military  screen,  not  a real  de- 
fense.6 

Why  then  did  not  the  French  Army  (the  first  two  Brit- 
ish divisions  were  not  deployed  until  the  first  week  of 
October),  which  had  overwhelming  superiority  over  the 
German  forces  in  the  west,  attack,  as  General  Gamelin 
and  the  French  government  had  promised  in  writing  it 
would? 

There  were  many  reasons:  the  defeatism  in  the  French 
High  Command,  the  government  and  the  people;  the  mem- 
ories of  how  France  had  been  bled  white  in  the  First 
World  War  and  a determination  not  to  suffer  such  slaughter 
again  if  it  could  be  avoided;  the  realization  by  mid-Sep- 
tember that  the  Polish  armies  were  so  badly  defeated 
that  the  Germans  would  soon  be  able  to  move  superior 

in  his  diary:  “No  sign  of  war  and  the  train  crew  told  me  not  a shot  had  been 
fired  on  this  front  since  the  war  began  . . . We  could  see  the  French  bunkers 
and  at  many  places  great  mats  behind  which  the  French  were  building  forti- 
fications. Identical  picture  on  the  German  side.  The  troops  . . . went  about 
their  business  in  full  sight  and  range  of  each  other  . . . The  Germans  were 
hauling  up  guns  and  supplies  on  the  railroad  line,  but  the  French  did  not 
disturb  them.  Queer  kind  of  war.”  ( Berlin  Diary,  p.  234.) 


841 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 


forces  to  the  west  and  thus  probably  wipe  out  any  initial 
French  advances;  the  fear  of  German  superiority  in  arms 
and  in  the  air.  Indeed,  the  French  government  had  in- 
sisted from  the  start  that  the  British  Air  Force  should  not 
bomb  targets  in  Germany  for  fear  of  reprisal  on  French 
factories,  though  an  all-out  bombing  of  the  Ruhr,  the 
industrial  heart  of  the  Reich,  might  well  have  been  disas- 
trous to  the  Germans.  It  was  the  one  great  worry  of  the 
German  generals  in  September,  as  many  of  them  later 
admitted. 

Fundamentally  the  answer  to  the  question  of  why 
France  did  not  attack  Germany  in  September  was  probably 
best  stated  by  Churchill.  “This  battle,”  he  wrote,  “had 
been  lost  some  years  before.”  7 At  Munich  in  1938;  at 
the  time  of  the  reoccupation  of  the  Rhineland  in  1936; 
the  year  before  when  Hitler  proclaimed  a conscript  army 
in  defiance  of  Versailles.  The  price  of  those  sorry  Allied 
failures  to  act  had  now  to  be  paid,  though  it  seems  to 
have  been  thought  in  Paris  and  London  that  payment  might 
somehow  be  evaded  by  inaction. 

At  sea  there  was  action. 

The  German  Navy  was  not  put  under  such  wraps  as  the 
Army  in  the  west,  and  during  the  first  week  of  hostilities  it 
sank  eleven  British  ships  with  a total  tonnage  of  64,595 
tons,  which  was  nearly  half  the  weekly  tonnage  sunk  at 
the  peak  of  German  submarine  warfare  in  April  1917  when 
Great  Britain  had  been  brought  to  the  brink  of  disaster. 
British  losses  tapered  off  thereafter:  53,561  tons  the  sec- 
ond week,  12,750  the  third  week  and  only  4,646  the  fourth 
week — for  a total  during  September  of  twenty-six  ships  of 
135,552  tons  sunk  by  U-boats  and  three  ships  of  16,488 
tons  by  mines.* 


• CA,Urt;l'in'  the,n  T*rst  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  disclosed  the  general  figures 
m the  House  of  Commons  on  September  26.  He  gives  the  corrected  official 
figures  in  his  memoirs.  He  also  told  the  House  that  six  or  seven  U-boats  had 
been  sunk  but  actually,  as  he  also  notes  in  his  book,  the  figure  was  later 
learned  to  be  only  two. 

Churchill’s  speech  was  marked  by  an  amusing  anecdote  in  which  he  told 
tj0^  • l ■ °^t  commander  had  signaled  him  personally  the  position  of  a 
.British  ship  he  had  just  sunk  and  urged  that  rescue  should  be- sent.  “I  was 
in  some  doubt  to  what  address  I should  direct  a reply,”  Churchill  said. 

However,  he  is  now  in  our  hands.”  But  he  wasn’t.  This  writer  interviewed 
the  submarine  skipper,  Captain  Herbert  Schultze,  in  Berlin  two  days  later 
3 “u-n  ‘;?.st  tg,Amfr,i,ca-_,He produced  from  his  logbook  his  message  to 
Lhurchdl  (See  Churchill,  The  Gathering  Storm,  pp.  436-37;  Berlin  Diary, 

pp.  44 j 4 /•) 


842 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


There  was  a reason,  unknown  to  the  British,  for  the 
sharp  tapering  off.  On  September  7,  Admiral  Raeder  had 
a long  conference  with  Hitler.  The  Fuehrer,  jubilant  over 
his  initial  victories  in  Poland  and  the  failure  of  the  French 
to  attack  in  the  west,  advised  the  Navy  to  go  more  slowly. 
France  was  showing  “political  and  military  restraint”; 
the  British  were  proving  “hesitant.”  In  view  of  this  situa- 
tion it  was  decided  that  submarines  in  the  Atlantic  would 
spare  all  passenger  ships  without  exception  and  refrain  al- 
together from  attacking  the  French,  and  that  the  pocket 
battleships  Deutschland  in  the  North  Atlantic  and  the 
Graf  Spee  in  the  South  Atlantic  should  withdraw  to  their 
“waiting”  stations  for  the  time  being.  The  “general  policy,” 
Raeder  noted  in  his  diary,  would  be  “to  exercise  restraint 
until  the  political  situation  in  the  West  has  become  clearer, 
which  will  take  about  a week.”  8 

THE  SINKING  OF  THE  ATHEN1A 

There  was  one  other  decision  agreed  upon  by  Hitler  and 
Raeder  at  the  meeting  on  September  7.  The  Admiral  noted 
it  in  his  diary:  “No  attempt  shall  be  made  to  solve  the 
Athenia  affair  until  the  submarines  return  home.” 

The  war  at  sea,  as  we  have  noted,  had  begun  ten  hours 
after  Britain’s  declaration  of  war  when  the  British  liner 
Athenia,  jammed  with  some  1,400  passengers,  was  tor- 
pedoed without  warning  at  9 p.m.  on  September  3 some 
two  hundred  miles  west  of  the  Hebrides,  with  the  loss  of 
112  lives,  including  twenty -eight  Americans.  The  German 
Propaganda  Ministry  checked  the  first  reports  from  Lon- 
don with  the  Naval  High  Command,  was  told  that  there 
were  no  U-boats  in  the  vicinity  and  promptly  denied 
that  the  ship  had  been  sunk  by  the  Germans.  The  disaster 
was  most  embarrassing  to  Hitler  and  the  Naval  Command 
and  at  first  they  did  not  believe  the  British  reports.  Strict 
orders  had  been  given  to  all  submarine  commanders  to 
observe  the  Hague  Convention,  which  forbade  attacking  a 
ship  without  warning.  Since  all  U-boats  maintained  radio 
silence,  there  was  no  means  of  immediately  checking  what 
had  happened.*  That  did  not  prevent  the  controlled  Nazi 


* The  next  day,  September  4,  all  U-boats  were  signaled:  “By  order  of  the 
Fuehrer,  on  no  account  are  operations  to  be  carried  out  against  passenger 
steamers,  even  when  under  escort.” 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  843 


press  from  charging,  within  a couple  of  days,  that  the 
British  had  torpedoed  their  own  ship  in  order  to  provoke 
the  United  States  into  coming  into  the  war. 

The  Wilhelmstrasse  was  indeed  concerned  with  Ameri- 
can reaction  to  a disaster  that  had  caused  the  deaths  of 
twenty-eight  United  States  citizens.  The  day  after  the  sink- 
ing Weizsaecker  sent  for  the  American  charge,  Alexan- 
der Kirk,  and  denied  that  a German  submarine  had  done 
it.  No  German  craft  was  in  the  vicinity,  he  emphasized. 
That  evening,  according  to  his  later  testimony  at  Nurem- 
berg, the  State  Secretary  sought  out  Raeder,  reminded 
him  of  how  the  German  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  during 
the  First  World  War  had  helped  bring  America  into  it 
and  urged  that  “everything  should  be  done”  to  avoid 
provoking  the  United  States.  The  Admiral  assured  him  that 
no  German  U-boat  could  have  been  involved.” 9 

At  the  urging  of  Ribbentrop,  Admiral  Raeder  invited  the 
American  naval  attache  to  come  to  see  him  on  Septem- 
ber 16  and  stated  that  he  had  now  received  reports  from 
all  the  submarines,  ‘ as  a result  of  which  it  was  definitely 
established  that  the  Athenia  had  not  been  sunk  by  a 
German  U-boat.”  He  asked  him  to  so  inform  his  govern- 
ment, which  the  attache  promptly  did.  * 10 

The  Grand  Admiral  had  not  quite  told  the  truth.  Not 
all  the  submarines  which  were  at  sea  on  September  3 had 
yet  returned  to  port.  Among  those  that  had  not  was  the 
U-30,  commanded  by  Oberleutnant  Lemp,  which  did  not 
dock  in  home  waters  until  September  27.  It  was  met  by 
Admiral  Karl  Doenitz,  commander  of  submarines,  who 
years  later  at  Nuremberg  described  the  meeting  and  finally 
revealed  the  truth  about  who  sank  the  Athenia. 

, 1 the  captain,  Oberleutnant  Lemp  on  the  lockside 
at  Wimelmshaven  as  the  boat  was  entering  harbor,  and  he 
asked  permission  to  speak  to  me  in  private.  I noticed  im- 
mediately that  he  was  looking  very  unhappy  and  he  told  me 
at  once  that  he  thought  he  was  responsible  for  the  sinking 
of  the  Athenia  in  the  North  Channel  area.  In  accordance 
with  my  previous  instructions  he  had  been  keeping  a sharp 
lookout  for  possible  armed  merchant  cruisers  in  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  British  Isles,  and  had  torpedoed  a ship  he 
afterward  identified  as  the  Athenia  from  wireless  broad- 


VArparentlynctin  code.  A copy  of  the  naval  attache’s  cable  to  Washington 
showed  up  in  the  German  naval  papers  at  Nuremberg.  8 


844  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

casts,  under  the  impression  that  she  was  an  armed  merchant 
cruiser  on  patrol  . . . 

I dispatched  Lemp  at  once  by  air  to  report  to  the  Naval 
War  Staff  (SKL)  at  Berlin;  in  the  meantime  I ordered  com- 
plete secrecy  as  a provisional  measure.  Later  the  same  day,  or 
early  on  the  following  day,  I received  an  order  from  Kapi- 
taen  zur  See  Fricke  that: 

1.  The  affair  was  to  be  kept  a total  secret. 

2.  The  High  Command  of  the  Navy  (OKM)  considerd 
that  a court-martial  was  not  necessary,  as  they  were  satis- 
fied that  the  captain  had  acted  in  good  faith. 

3.  Political  explanations  would  be  handled  by  OKM.* 

I had  had  no  part  whatsoever  in  the  political  events  in 

which  the  Fuehrer  claimed  that  no  U-boat  had  sunk  the 
Athenia.11 

But  Doenitz,  who  must  have  suspected  the  truth  all 
along,  for  otherwise  he  would  not  have  been  at  the  dock 
to  greet  the  returning  U-30,  did  have  a part  in  altering 
the  submarine’s  log  and  his  own  diary  so  as  to  erase  any 
telltale  evidence  of  the  truth.  In  fact,  as  he  admitted  at 
Nuremberg,  he  himself  ordered  any  mention  of  the 
Athenia  stricken  from  the  U-30’ s log  and  deleted  it  from 
his  own  diary.  He  swore  the  vessel’s  crew  to  absolute 
secrecy,  t 

The  military  high  commands  of  all  nations  no  doubt 
have  skeletons  in  their  closets  during  the  course  of  war, 
and  it  was  understandable  if  not  laudable  that  Hitler,  as 
Admiral  Raeder  testified  at  Nuremberg,  insisted  that  the 
Athenia  affair  be  kept  secret,  especially  since  the  Naval 
Command  had  acted  in  good  faith  in  at  first  denying 
German  responsibility  and  would  have  been  greatly  em- 
barrassed to  have  to  admit  it  later.  But  Hitler  did  not  stop 
there.  On  the  evening  of  Sunday,  October  22,  Propaganda 
Minister  Goebbels  personally  took  to  the  air — this  writer 
well  remembers  the  broadcast — and  accused  Churchill  of 
having  sunk  the  Athenia.  The  next  day  the  official  Nazi 
newspaper,  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter,  ran  a front-page 

* The  italics  are  the  Admiral’s. 

t The  officers,  including  Lemp,  and  some  of  the  crew  were  transferred  to  the 
U-110  and  went  down  with  her  on  May  9,  1941.  One  member  of  the  crew 
was  wounded  by  aircraft  fire  a few  days  after  the  sinking  of  the  Athenia. 
He  was  disembarked  at  Reykjavik,  Iceland,  under  pledge  of  the  strictest 
secrecy,  later  taken  to  a POW  camp  in  Canada,  and  after  the  war  signed  an 
affidavit  giving  the  facts.  The  Germans  appear  to  have  been  worried  that  he 
would  “talk,”  but  he  didn’t  until  the  war’s  end.12 


845 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

story  under  the  headline  churchill  sank  the  “athenia” 
and  stating  that  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  had 
planted  a time  bomb  in  the  ship’s  hold.  At  Nuremberg 
it  was  established  that  the  Fuehrer  had  personally  or- 
dered the  broadcast  and  the  article — and  also  that  though 
Raeder,  Doenitz  and  Weizsaecker  were  highly  displeased 
at  such  a brazen  lie,  they  dared  not  do  anything  about  it.13 

This  spinelessness  on  the  part  of  the  admirals  and  the 
self-styled  anti-Nazi  leader  in  the  Foreign  Office,  which 
was  fully  shared  by  the  generals,  whenever  the  demonic 
Nazi  warlord  cracked  down,  was  to  lead  to  one  of  the 
darkest  pages  in  German  history. 

HITLER  PROPOSES  PEACE 

“Tonight  the  press  talks  openly  of  peace,”  I noted  in 
my  diary  September  20.  “All  the  Germans  I’ve  talked  to 
today  are  dead  sure  we  shall  have  peace  within  a month. 
They  are  in  high  spirits.” 

The  afternoon  before  at  the  ornate  Guild  Hall  in  Dan- 
zig I had  heard  Hitler  make  his  first  speech  since  his 
Reichstag  address  of  September  1 started  off  the  war. 
Though  he  was  in  a rage  because  he  had  been  balked 
from  making  this  speech  at  Warsaw,  whose  garrison  still 
gallantly  held  out,  and  dripped  venom  every  time  he  men- 
tioned Great  Britain,  he  made  a slight  gesture  toward 
peace.  “I  have  no  war  aims  against  Britain  and  France,” 
he  said.  “My  sympathies  are  with  the  French  poilu.  What 
he  is  fighting  for  he  does  not  know.”  And  he  called  upon 
the  Almighty,  “who  now  has  blessed  our  arms,  to  give 
other  peoples  comprehension  of  how  useless  this  war  will 
be  . . . and  to  cause  reflection  on  the  blessings  of  peace.” 

On  September  26,  the  day  before  Warsaw  fell,  the  Ger- 
man press  and  radio  launched  a big  peace  offensive.  The 
line,  I recorded  in  my  diary,  was:  “Why  do  France  and 
Britain  want  to  fight  now?  Nothing  to  fight  about.  Ger- 
many wants  nothing  in  the  West.” 

A couple  of  days  later,  Russia,  fast  devouring  its  share 
of  Poland,  joined  in  the  peace  offensive.  Alopg  with  the 
signing  of  the  German-Soviet  Boundary  and  Friendship 
Treaty,  with  its  secret  clauses  dividing  up  Eastern  Europe, 
Molotov  and  Ribbentrop  concocted  and  signed  at  Mos- 
cow on  September  28  a ringing  declaration  for  peace. 


846  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  governments  of  Germany  and  Russia,  it  said,  after 
having 

definitely  settled  the  problems  arising  from  the  disintegra- 
tion of  the  Polish  state  and  created  a firm  foundation  for  a 
lasting  peace  in  Eastern  Europe,  mutually  express  their  con- 
viction that  it  would  serve  the  true  interests  of  all  peoples 
to  put  an  end  to  the  state  of  war  between  Germany  and 
England  and  France.  Both  governments  will  therefore  direct 
their  common  efforts  . . . toward  attaining  this  goal  as  soon 
as  possible. 

Should,  however,  the  efforts  of  the  two  governments  re- 
main fruitless,  this  would  demonstrate  the  fact  that  England 
and  France  are  responsible  for  the  continuation  of  the 
war  . . . 

Did  Hitler  want  peace,  or  did  he  want  to  continue  the 
war  and,  with  Soviet  help,  push  the  responsibility  for 
its  continuance  on  the  Western  Allies?  Perhaps  he  did  not 
quite  know  himself,  although  he  was  pretty  certain. 

On  September  26  he  had  a long  talk  with  Dahlerus, 
who  had  by  no  means  given  up  the  quest  for  peace.  Two 
days  before,  the  indefatigable  Swede  had  seen  his  old 
friend  Ogilvie  Forbes  at  Oslo,  where  the  former  counselor 
of  the  Berlin  embassy  was  now  serving  in  a similar  ca- 
pacity in  the  British  Legation  in  the  Norwegian  capital. 
Dahlerus  reported  to  Hitler,  according  to  a confidential 
memorandum  of  Dr.  Schmidt,14  that  Forbes  had  told 
him  the  British  government  was  looking  for  peace.  The 
only  question  was:  How  could  the  British  save  face? 

“If  the  British  actually  want  peace,”  Hitler  replied, 
“they  can  have  it  in  two  weeks — without  losing  face.” 

They  would  have  to  reconcile  themselves,  said  the  Fueh- 
rer, to  the  fact  “that  Poland  cannot  rise  again.”  Beyond 
that  he  was  prepared,  he  declared,  to  guarantee  the  status 
quo  “of  the  rest  of  Europe,”  including  guarantees  of  the 
security”  of  Britain,  France  and  the  Low  Countries.  There 
followed  a discussion  of  how  to  launch  the  peace  talks. 
Hitler  suggested  that  Mussolini  do  it.  Dahlerus  thought 
the  Queen  of  the  Netherlands  might  be  more  “neutral.” 
Goering,  who  was  also  present,  suggested  that  representa- 
tives of  Britain  and  Germany  first  meet  secretly  in  Hol- 
land and  then,  if  they  made  progress,  the  Queen  could 
invite  both  countries  to  armistice  talks.  Hitler,  who  several 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  847 

times  professed  himself  as  skeptical  regarding  “the  British 
will  to  peace,”  finally  agreed  to  the  Swede’s  proposal 
that  he  “go  to  England  the  very  next  day  in  order  to 
send  out  feelers  in  the  direction  indicated.” 

“The  British  can  have  peace  if  they  want  it,”  Hitler 
told  Dahlerus  as  he  left,  “but  they  will  have  to  hurry.” 

That  was  one  trend  in  the  Fuehrer’s  thinking.  He  ex- 
pressed another  to  his  generals.  The  day  before,  on  Sep- 
tember 25,  an  entry  in  Haider’s  diary  mentions  receipt 
of  “word  on  Fuehrer’s  plan  to  attack  in  the  West.”  On 
September  27,  the  day  after  he  had  assured  Dahlerus  that 
he  was  ready  to  make  peace  with  Britain,  Hitler  convoked 
the  commanders  in  chief  of  the  Wehrmacht  to  the  Chan- 
cellery and  informed  them  of  his  decision  to  “attack  in 
the  West  as  soon  as  possible,  since  the  Franco— British 
army  is  not  yet  prepared.”  According  to  Brauchitsch  he 
even  set  a date  for  the  attack:  November  12. 15  No  doubt 
Hitler  was  fired  that  day  by  the  news  that  Warsaw  had 
finally  capitulated.  He  probably  thought  that  France,  at 
least,  could  be  brought  to  her  knees  as  easily  as  Poland, 
though  two  days  later  Haider  made  a diary  note  to  “ex- 
plain” to  the  Fuehrer  that  “technique  of  Polish  campaign 
no  recipe  for  the  West.  No  good  against  a well-knit  army.” 

Perhaps  Ciano  penetrated  Hitler’s  mind  best  when  he 
had  a long  talk  with  the  Chancellor  in  Berlin  on  October 
1.  The  young  Italian  Foreign  Minister,  who  by  now  thor- 
oughly detested  the  Germans  but  had  to  keep  up  appear- 
ances, found  the  Fuehrer  in  a confident  mood.  As  he 
outlined  his  plans,  his  eyes  “flashed  in  a sinister  fashion 
whenever  he  talked  about  his  ways  and  means  of  fighting,” 
Ciano  observed.  Summing  up  his  impressions,  the  Italian 
visitor  wrote: 

...  Today  to  offer  his  people  a solid  peace  after  a great 
victory  is  perhaps  an  aim  which  still  tempts  Hitler.  But  if  in 
order  to  reach  it  he  had  to  sacrifice,  even  to  the  smallest 
degree,  what  seems  to  him  the  legitimate  fruits  of  his  vic- 
tory, he  would  then  a thousand  times  prefer  battle.*  18 

To  me  as  I sat  in  the  Reichstag  beginning  at  noon  on 

* Mussolini  did  not  share  Hitler’s  confidence  in  victory,  which  Ciano  re- 
ported to  him.  He  thought  the  British  and  French  “would  hold  firm  . . . 
Why  hide  it?”  Ciano  wrote  in  his  diary  October  3,  “he  LMussolini]  is 
somewhat  bitter  about  Hitler’s  sudden  rise  to  fame.”  ( Ciano  Diaries,  p.  155.) 


848 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


October  6 and  listened  to  Hitler  utter  his  appeal  for  peace, 
it  seemed  like  an  old  gramophone  record  being  replayed 
for  the  fifth  or  sixth  time.  How  often  before  I had  heard 
him  from  this  same  rostrum,  after  his  latest  conquest, 
and  in  the  same  apparent  tone  of  earnestness  and  sin- 
cerity, propose  what  sounded — if  you  overlooked  his  latest 
victim — like  a decent  and  reasonable  peace.  He  did  so 
again  this  crisp,  sunny  autumn  day,  with  his  usual  elo- 
quence and  hypocrisy.  It  was  a long  speech — one  of  the 
most  lengthy  public  utterances  he  ever  made — but  toward 
the  end,  after  more  than  an  hour  of  typical  distortions 
of  history  and  a boastful  account  of  the  feat  of  German 
arms  in  Poland  (“this  ridiculous  state”)  he  came  to  his 
proposals  for  peace  and  the  reasons  therefore. 

My  chief  endeavor  has  been  to  rid  our  relations  with 
France  of  all  trace  of  ill  will  and  render  them  tolerable 
for  both  nations  . . . Germany  has  no  further  claims  against 
France  ...  I have  refused  even  to  mention  the  problem  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  ...  I have  always  expressed  to  France  my 
desire  to  bury  forever  our  ancient  enmity  and  bring  together 
these  two  nations,  both  of  which  have  such  glorious  pasts  . . . 

And  Britain? 

I have  devoted  no  less  effort  to  the  achievement  of  Anglo- 
German  understanding,  nay,  more  than  that,  of  an  Anglo- 
German  friendship.  At  no  time  and  in  no  place  have  I 
ever  acted  contrary  to  British  interests  ...  I believe  even 
today  that  there  can  only  be  real  peace  in  Europe  and 
throughout  the  world  if  Germany  and  England  come  to  an 
understanding. 

And  peace? 

Why  should  this  war  in  the  West  be  fought?  For  restora- 
tion of  Poland?  Poland  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  will  never 
rise  again  . . . The  question  of  re-establishment  of  the 
Polish  State  is  a problem  which  will  not  be  solved  by  war 
in  the  West  but  exclusively  by  Russia  and  Germany  ...  It 
would  be  senseless  to  annihilate  millions  of  men  and  to  de- 
stroy property  worth  millions  in  order  to  reconstruct  a State 
which  at  its  very  birth  was  termed  an  abortion  by  all  those 
not  of  Polish  extraction. 

What  other  reason  exists?  . . . 

If  this  war  is  really  to  be  waged  only  in  order  to  give 
Germany  a new  regime  . . . then  millions  of  human  lives 
will  be  sacrificed  in  vain  . . . No,  this  war  in  the  West 
cannot  settle  any  problems  . . . 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  849 

There  were  problems  to  be  solved.  Hitler  trotted  out  a 
whole  list  of  them:  “formation  of  a Polish  State”  (which 
he  had  already  agreed  with  the  Russians  should  not 
exist);  “solution  and  settlement  of  the  Jewish  problem”; 
colonies  for  Germany;  revival  of  international  trade;  “an 
unconditionally  guaranteed  peace”;  reduction  of  arma- 
ments; regulation  of  air  warfare,  poison  gas,  submarines, 
etc.”;  and  settlement  of  minority  problems  in  Europe. 

To  “achieve  these  great  ends”  he  proposed  a conference 
of  the  leading  European  nations  “after  the  most  thorough 
preparation.” 

It  is  impossible  [he  continued]  that  such  a conference, 
which  is  to  determine  the  fate  of  this  continent  for  many 
years  to  come,  could  carry  on  its  deliberations  while  cannon 
are  thundering  or  mobilized  armies  are  bringing  pressure  to 
bear  upon  it. 

If,  however,  these  problems  must  be  solved  sooner  or 
later,  then  it  would  be  more  sensible  to  tackle  the  solution 
before  millions  of  men  are  first  uselessly  sent  to  death  and 
billions  of  riches  destroyed.  Continuation  of  the  present  state 
of  affairs  in  the  West  is  unthinkable.  Each  day  will  soon  de- 
mand increasing  sacrifices  . . . The  national  wealth  of 
Europe  will  be  scattered  in  the  form  of  shells  and  the  vigor 
of  every  nation  will  be  sapped  on  the  battlefields  . . 

One  thing  is  certain.  In  the  course  of  world  history  there 
have  never  been  two  victors,  but  very  often  only  losers.  May 
those  peoples  and  their  leaders  who  are  of  the  same  opinion 
now  make  their  reply.  And  let  those  who  consider  war  to 
be  the  better  solution  reject  my  outstretched  hand. 

He  was  thinking  of  Churchill. 

If,  however,  the  opinions  of  Messrs.  Churchill  and  fol- 
lowers should  prevail,  this  statement  will  have  been  my  last. 
Then  we  shall  fight  . . . There  will  never  be  another  Novem- 
ber, 1918,  in  German  history. 

It  seemed  to  me  highly  doubtful,  as  I wrote  in  my  diary 
on  my  return  from  the  Reichstag,  that  the  British  and 
French  would  listen  to  these  vague  proposals  “for  five 
minutes.”  But  the  Germans  were  optimistic.  On  my  way 
to  broadcast  that  evening  I picked  up  an  early  edition  of 
Hitler’s  own  paper,  the  Voelkischer  Beobachter.  The  flam- 
boyant headlines  said: 

GERMANY’S  WILL  FOR  PEACE— NO  WAR  AIMS  AGAINST  FRANCE 
AND  ENGLAND NO  MORE  REVISION  CLAIMS  EXCEPT  COLONIES 


850 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


REDUCTION  OF  ARMAMENTS CO-OPERATION  WITH  ALL  NA- 
TIONS OF  EUROPE PROPOSAL  FOR  A CONFERENCE 

The  Wilhelmstrasse,  it  is  now  known  from  the  secret 
German  documents,  was  encouraged  to  believe  by  the 
reports  it  was  getting  from  Paris  through  the  Spanish  and 
Italian  ambassadors  there  that  the  French  had  no  stomach 
for  continuing  the  war.  As  early  as  September  8,  the 
Spanish  ambassador  was  tipping  the  Germans  off  that  Bon- 
net, “in  view  of  the  great  unpopularity  of  the  war  in 
France,  is  endeavoring  to  bring  about  an  understanding 
as  soon  as  the  operations  in  Poland  are  concluded.  There 
are  certain  indications  that  he  is  in  contact  with  Musso- 
lini to  that  end.” 17  On  October  2,  Attolico  handed 
Weizsaecker  the  text  of  the  latest  message  from  the  Ital- 
ian ambassador  in  Paris,  stating  that  the  majority  of  the 
French  cabinet  were  in  favor  of  a peace  conference  and  it 
was  now  mainly  a question  of  “enabling  France  and  Eng- 
land to  save  face.”  Apparently,  though.  Premier  Daladier 
did  not  belong  to  the  majority.*  18 

This  was  good  intelligence.  On  October  7,  Daladier  an- 
swered Hitler.  He  declared  that  France  would  not  lay 
down  her  arms  until  guarantees  for  a “real  peace  and 
general  security”  were  obtained.  But  Hitler  was  more  in- 
terested in  hearing  from  Chamberlain  than  from  the  French 
Premier.  On  October  10,  on  the  occasion  of  a brief 
address  at  the  Sportpalast  inaugurating  Winterhilfe,  Win- 
ter Relief,  he  again  stressed  his  “readiness  for  peace.” 
Germany,  he  added,  “has  no  cause  for  war  against  the 
Western  Powers.” 

Chamberlain’s  reply  came  on  October  12.  It  was  a cold 
douche  to  the  German  people,  if  not  to  Hitler,  t Ad- 
dressing the  House  of  Commons,  the  Prime  Minister 

* A little  later,  on  November  16,  the  Italians  informed  the  Germans  that 
according  to  their  information  from  Paris,  “Marshall  Petain  is  regarded  as 
the  advocate  of  a peace  policy  in  France  ...  If  the  question  of  peace  should 
become  more  acute  in  France,  Petain  will  play  a role.”  19  This  appears  to 
be  the  first  indication  to  the  Germans  that  Petain  might  prove  useful  to 
them  later  on. 

t The  day  before,  on  October  11,  there  had  been  a peace  riot  in  Berlin.  Early 
in  the  morning  a broadcast  on  the  Berlin  radio  wave  length  announced  that 
the  British  government  had  fallen  and  that  there  would  be  an  immediate 
armistice.  There  was  great  rejoicing  in  the  capital  as  the  rumor  spread.  Old 
women  in  the  vegetable  markets  tossed  their  cabbages  into  the  air,  wrecked 
their  stands  in  sheer  joy  and  made  for  the  nearest  pub  to  toast  the  peace  with 
Schnaps. 


851 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

termed  Hitler’s  proposals  “vague  and  uncertain”  and  noted 
that  “they  contain  no  suggestions  for  righting  the  wrongs 
done  to  Czechoslovakia  and  Poland.”  No  reliance,  he  said, 
could  be  put  on  the  promises  “of  the  present  German 
Government.”  If  it  wanted  peace,  “acts — not  words  alone 
— must  be  forthcoming.”  He  called  for  “convincing  proof” 
from  Hitler  that  he  really  wanted  peace. 

The  man  of  Munich  could  no  longer  be  fooled  by  Hit- 
ler’s promises.  The  next  day,  October  13,  an  official  Ger- 
man statement  declared  that  Chamberlain,  by  turning  down 
Hitler’s  offer  of  peace,  had  deliberately  chosen  war.  Now 
the  Nazi  dictator  had  his  excuse. 

Actually,  as  we  now  know  from  the  captured  German 
documents,  Hitler  had  not  waited  for  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter’s reply  before  ordering  preparations  for  an  immediate 
assault  in  the  West.  On  October  10  he  called  in  his  mili- 
tary chiefs,  read  them  a long  memorandum  on  the  state 
of  the  war  and  the  world  and  threw  at  them  Directive 
No.  6 for  the  Conduct  of  the  War.20 

The  Fuehrer’s  insistence  toward  the  end  of  September 
that  an  attack  be  mounted  in  the  West  as  soon  as  possible 
had  thrown  the  Army  High  Command  into  a fit. 
Brauchitsch  and  Haider,  aided  by  several  other  generals, 
had  consorted  to  prove  to  the  Leader  that  an  immediate 
offensive  was  out  of  the  question.  It  would  take  several 
months,  they  said,  to  refit  the  tanks  used  in  Poland.  Gen- 
eral Thomas  furnished  figures  to  show  that  Germany  had 
a monthly  steel  deficit  of  600,000  tons.  General  von 
Stuelpnagel,  the  Quartermaster  General,  reported  there 
was  ammunition  on  hand  only  “for  about  one  third  of 
our  divisions  for  fourteen  combat  days” — certainly  not  long 
enough  to  win  a battle  against  the  French.  But  the  Fueh- 
rer would  not  listen  to  his  Army  Commander  in  Chief 
and  his  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  when  they  presented 
a formal  report  to  him  on  Army  deficiencies  on  October 
7.  General  Jodi,  the  leading  yes  man  on  OKW,  next  to 
Keitel,  warned  Haider  “that  a very  severe  crisis  is  in  the 
making”  because  of  the  Army’s  opposition  to  an  offensive 
in  the  West  and  that  the  Fuehrer  was  “bitter  because  the 
soldiers  do  not  obey  him.” 

It  was  against  this  background  that  Hitler  convoked 
the  generals  at  11  a.m.  on  October  10.  They  were  not 


852 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

asked  for  their  advice.  Directive  No.  6,  dated  the  day  be- 
fore, told  them  what  to  do: 

TOP  SECRET 

If  it  should  become  apparent  in  the  near  future  that  Eng- 
land, and  under  England’s  leadership,  also  France,  are  not 
willing  to  make  an  end  of  the  war,  I am  determined  to  act 
vigorously  and  aggressively  without  great  delay  . . . 

Therefore  I give  the  following  orders: 

a.  Preparations  are  to  be  made  for  an  attacking  opera- 
tion . . . through  the  areas  of  Luxembourg,  Belgium  and 
Holland.  This  attack  must  be  carried  out  ...  at  as  early  a 
date  as  possible. 

b.  The  purpose  will  be  to  defeat  as  strong  a part  of  the 
French  operational  army  as  possible,  as  well  as  allies  fight- 
ing by  its  side,  and  at  the  same  time  to  gain  as  large  an 
area  as  possible  in  Holland,  Belgium  and  northern  France  as 
a base  for  conducting  a promising  air  and  sea  war  against 
England  . . . 

I request  the  Commanders  in  Chief  to  give  me,  as  soon  as 
possible,  detailed  reports  of  their  plans  on  the  basis  of  this 
directive  and  to  keep  me  currently  informed  . . . 

The  secret  memorandum,  also  dated  October  9,  which 
Hitler  read  out  to  his  military  chiefs  before  presenting 
them  the  directive  is  one  of  the  most  impressive  papers 
the  former  Austrian  corporal  ever  wrote.  It  showed  not 
only  a grasp  of  history,  from  the  German  viewpoint,  and 
of  military  strategy  and  tactics  which  is  remarkable  but, 
as  a little  later  would  be  proved,  a prophetic  sense  of  how 
the  war  in  the  West  would  develop  and  with  what  results. 
The  struggle  between  Germany  and  the  Western  Powers, 
which,  he  said,  had  been  going  on  since  the  dissolution 
of  the  First  German  Reich  by  the  Treaty  of  Muenster 
(Westphalia)  in  1648  “would  have  to  be  fought  out  one 
way  or  the  other.”  However,  after  the  great  victory  in 
Poland,  “there  would  be  no  objection  to  ending  the  war 
immediately”  providing  the  gains  in  Poland  were  not 
“jeopardized.” 

It  is  not  the  object  of  this  memorandum  to  study  the 
possibilities  in  this  direction  or  even  to  take  them  into  con- 
sideration. I shall  confine  myself  exclusively  to  the  other 
case:  the  necessity  to  continue  the  fight  . . . The  German 
war  aim  is  the  final  military  dispatch  of  the  West,  that  is,  the 
destruction  of  the  power  and  ability  of  the  Western  Powers 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  853 

ever  again  to  be  able  to  oppose  the  state  consolidation  and 
further  development  of  the  German  people  in  Europe. 

As  far  as  the  outside  world  is  concerned,  this  eternal  aim 
will  have  to  undergo  various  propaganda  adjustments 
This  does  not  alter  the  war  aim.  It  is  and  remains  the  de- 
struction  of  our  Western  enemies. 

The  generals  had  objected  to  haste  in  taking  the  of- 
fensive in  the  West.  Time,  however,  he  told  them,  was  on 
the  enemy’s  side.  The  Polish  victories,  he  reminded  them, 
were  possible  because  Germany  really  had  only  one  front! 
That  situation  still  held — but  for  how  long? 

By  no  treaty  or  pact  can  a lasting  neutrality  of  Soviet 
Russta  be  insured  with  certainty.  At  present  all  reasons 
speak  agamst  Russia’s  departure  from  neutrality.  In  eight 
months,  one  year,  or  even  several  years,  this  may  be  al- 
tered. The  trifling  significance  of  treaties  has  been  proved 
on  all  sides  in  recent  years.  The  greatest  safeguard  against 
any  Russian  attack  lies  ...  in  a prompt  demonstration  of 
German  strength. 

As  for  Italy,  the  “hope  of  Italian  support  for  Germany” 
was  dependent  largely  on  whether  Mussolini  lived  and 
on  whether  there  were  further  German  successes  to  entice 
the  Duce.  Here  too  time  was  a factor,  as  it  was  with 
Belgium  and  Holland,  which  could  be  compelled  by  Brit- 
ain and  France  to  give  up  their  neutrality — something 
Germany  could  not  afford  to  wait  for.  Even  with  the 
United  States,  “time  is  to  be  viewed  as  working  against 
Germany.” 

There  were  great  dangers  to  Germany,  Hitler  admitted, 
in  a long  war,  and  he  enumerated  several  of  them.  Friendly 
and  unfriendly  neutrals  (he  seems  to  have  been  thinking 
mainly  of  Russia,  Italy  and  the  U.S.A.)  might  be  drawn 
to  the  opposite  side,  as  they  were  in  the  First  World  War. 
Also,  he  said,  Germany’s  “limited  food  and  raw-material 
basis”  would  make  it  difficult  to  find  “the  means  for 
carrying  on  the  war.”  The  greatest  danger,  he  said  was 
the  vulnerability  of  the  Ruhr.  If  this  heart  of  German 
industrial  production  were  hit,  it  would  “lead  to  the  col- 
lapse of  the  German  war  economy  and  thus  of  the  ca- 
pacity to  resist.” 

It  must  be  admitted  that  in  this  memorandum  the 
former  corporal  showed  an  astonishing  grasp  of  military 


854 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


strategy  and  tactics,  accompanied  though  it  was  by  a 
typical  lack  of  morals.  There  are  several  pages  about  the 
new  tactics  developed  by  the  tanks  and  planes  in  Poland, 
and  a detailed  analysis  of  how  these  tactics  can  work  in 
the  West  and  just  where.  The  chief  thing,  he  said,  was 
to  avoid  the  positional  warfare  of  1914-18.  The  armored 
divisions  must  be  used  for  the  crucial  breakthrough. 

They  are  not  to  be  lost  among  the  maze  of  endless  rows 
of  houses  in  Belgian  towns.  It  is  not  necessary  for  them  to 
attack  towns  at  all,  but  ...  to  maintain  the  flow  of  the 
army’s  advance,  to  prevent  fronts  from  becoming  stable  by 
massed  drives  through  identified  weakly  held  positions. 

This  was  a deadly  accurate  forecast  of  how  the  war 
in  the  West  would  be  fought,  and  when  one  reads  it  one 
wonders  why  no  one  on  the  Allied  side  had  similar  in- 
sights. 

This  goes  too  for  Hitler’s  strategy.  “The  only  possible 
area  of  attack,”  he  said,  was  through  Luxembourg,  Bel- 
gium and  Holland.  There  must  be  two  military  objectives 
first  in  mind:  to  destroy  the  Dutch,  Belgian,  French  and 
British  armies  and  thereby  to  gain  positions  on  the  Chan- 
nel and  the  North  Sea  from  which  the  Luftwaffe  could 
be  “brutally  employed”  against  Britain. 

Above  all,  he  said,  returning  to  tactics,  improvise! 

The  peculiar  nature  of  this  campaign  may  make  it  neces- 
sary to  resort  to  improvisations  to  the  utmost,  to  concentrate 
attacking  or  defending  forces  at  certain  points  in  more  than 
normal  proportion  (for  example,  tank  or  antitank  forces) 
and  in  subnormal  concentrations  at  others. 

As  for  the  time  of  the  attack,  Hitler  told  his  reluctant 
generals,  “the  start  cannot  take  place  too  early.  It  is  to 
take  place  in  all  circumstances  (if  at  all  possible)  this 
autumn. 

The  German  admirals,  unlike  the  generals,  had  not 
needed  any  prodding  from  Hitler  to  take  the  offensive, 
outmatched  though  their  Navy  was  by  the  British.  In  fact 
all  through  the  last  days  of  September  and  the  first  days 
of  October  Raeder  pleaded  with  the  Fuehrer  to  take  the 
wraps  off  the  Navy.  This  was  gradually  done.  On  September 
17  a German  U-boat  torpedoed  the  British  aircraft  carrier 
Courageous  off  southwest  Ireland.  On  September  27 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  855 


Raeder  ordered  the  pocket  battleships  Deutschland  and 
Graf  Spee  to  leave  their  waiting  areas  and  start  attacking 
British  shipping.  By  the  middle  of  October  they  had  ac- 
counted for  seven  British  merchantmen  and  taken  in  prize 
the  American  ship  City  of  Flint. 

On  October  14,  the  German  U-boat  V-47,  commanded 
by  Oberleutnant  Guenther  Prien,  penetrated  the  seeming- 
ly impenetrable  defenses  of  Scapa  Flow,  the  great  British 
naval  base,  and  torpedoed  and  sank  the  battleship  Royal 
Oak  as  it  lay  at  anchor,  with  a loss  of  786  officers  and 
men.  It  was  a notable  achievement,  exploited  to  the  full 
by  Dr.  Goebbels  in  his  propaganda,  and  it  enhanced  the 
Navy  in  the  mind  of  Hitler. 

The  generals  remained,  however,  a problem.  Despite 
his  long  and  considered  memorandum  to  them  and  the 
issuance  of  Directive  No.  6 to  get  ready  for  an  imminent 
attack  in  the  West,  they  stalled.  It  wasn’t  that  they  had 
any  moral  scruples  against  violating  Belgium  and  Holland; 
they  simply  were  highly  doubtful  of  success  at  this  time. 
There  was  one  exception. 

General  Wilhelm  Ritter  von  Leeb,  commander  of  Army 
Group  C opposing  the  French  on  the  Rhine  and  along 
the  Maginot  Line,  not  only  was  skeptical  of  victory  in  the 
West;  he,  alone  so  far  as  the  available  records  reveal, 
opposed  attacking  neutral  Belgium  and  Holland  at  least 
partly  on  moral  grounds.  The  day  after  Hitler’s  meeting 
with  the  generals,  on  October  11,  Leeb  composed  a long 
memorandum  himself,  which  he  sent  to  Brauchitsch  and 
other  generals.  The  whole  world,  he  wrote,  would  turn 
against  Germany, 


which  for  the  second  time  within  25 
Belgium!  Germany,  whose  government 
and  promised  the  preservation  of  and 
trality  only  a few  weeks  ago! 


years  assaults  neutral 
solemnly  vouched  for 
respect  for  this  neu- 


Finally,  after  detailing  military  arguments  against  an 
attack  in  the  West,  he  appealed  for  peace.  “The  entire 
nation,”  he  said,  “is  longing  for  peace.”  21 

But  Hitler  by  this  time  was  longing  for  war,  for  battle, 
and  he  was  fed  up  with  what  he  thought  to  be  the  un- 
pardonable timidity  of  his  generals.  On  October  14 
Brauchitsch  and  Haider  put  their  heads  together  in  a 
lengthy  conference.  The  Army  chief  saw  “three  possibili- 


856  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ties:  Attack.  Wait  and  see.  Fundamental  changes.”  Haider 
noted  them  in  his  diary  that  day  and,  after  the  war,  ex- 
plained that  “fundamental  changes”  meant  “the  removal 
of  Hitler.”  But  the  weak  Brauchitsch  thought  such  a dras- 
tic measure  was  “essentially  negative  and  tends  to  render 
us  vulnerable.”  They  decided  that  none  of  the  three  pos- 
sibilities offered  “prospects  of  decisive  successes.”  The  only 
thing  to  do  was  to  work  further  on  Hitler. 

Brauchitsch  saw  the  Fuehrer  again  on  October  17,  but 
his  arguments,  he  told  Haider,  were  without  effect.  The 
situation  was  “hopeless.”  Hitler  informed  him  curtly,  as 
Haider  wrote  in  his  diary  that  day,  that  “the  British  will 
be  ready  to  talk  only  after  a beating.  We  must  get  at 
them  as  quickly  as  possible.  Date  between  November  15 
and  20  at  the  latest.” 

There  were  further  conferences  with  the  Nazi  warlord, 
who  finally  laid  down  the  law  to  the  generals  on  Octo- 
ber 27.  After  a ceremony  conferring  on  fourteen  of  them 
the  Knight’s  Cross  of  the  Iron  Cross,  the  Fuehrer  got 
down  to  the  business  of  the  attack  in  the  West.  When 
Brauchitsch  tried  to  argue  that  the  Army  would  not  be 
ready  for  a month,  not  before  November  26,  Hitler  an- 
swered that  this  was  “much  too  late.”  The  attack,  he 
ordered,  would  begin  on  November  12.  Brauchitsch  and 
Haider  retired  from  the  meeting  feeling  battered  and  de- 
feated. That  night  they  tried  to  console  one  another. 
“Brauchitsch  tired  and  dejected,”  Haider  noted  in  his  dairy. 

THE  ZOSSEN  “CONSPIRACY” 

TO  OVERTHROW  HITLER 

The  time  had  now  come  for  the  conspirators  to 
spring  to  action  once  more,  or  so  they  thought.  The  un- 
happy Brauchitsch  and  Haider  were  faced  with  the  stern 
alternatives  of  either  carrying  out  the  third  of  the  “possi- 
bilities” they  had  seen  on  October  14 — the  removal  of 
Hitler — or  organizing  an  attack  in  the  West  which  they 
thought  would  be  disastrous  for  Germany.  Both  the  mili- 
tary and  civilian  “plotters,”  suddenly  come  to  life,  were 
urging  the  first  alternative. 

They  had  already  been  balked  once  since  the  start  of 
the  war.  General  von  Hammerstein,  recalled  temporarily 
from  his  long  retirement  on  the  eve  of  the  attack  on 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  857 

Poland,  had  been  given  a command  in  the  west.  During 
the  first  week  of  the  war  he  had  urged  Hitler  to  visit  his 
headquarters  in  order  to  show  that  he  was  not  neglecting 
that  front  while  conquering  Poland.  Actually  Hammer- 
stein,  an  implacable  foe  of  Hitler,  planned  to  arrest  him. 
Fabian  von  Schlabrendorff  had  already  tipped  Ogilvie 
Forbes  on  this  plot  the  day  Britain  declared  war,  on  Sep- 
tember 3,  at  a hasty  meeting  in  the  Adlon  Hotel  in  Berlin. 
But  the  Fuehrer  had  smelled  a rat,  had  declined  to  visit 
the  former  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  shortly 
thereafter  had  sacked  him.22 

The  conspirators  continued  to  maintain  contact  with 
the  British.  Having  failed  to  take  any  action  to  prevent 
Hitler  from  destroying  Poland,  they  had  concentrated  their 
efforts  on  trying  to  keep  the  war  from  spreading  to  the 
West.  The  civilian  members  realized  that,  more  than  be- 
fore, the  Army  was  the  only  organization  in  the  Reich 
which  possessed  the  means  of  stopping  Hitler;  its  power 
and  importance  had  vastly  increased  with  general  mobili- 
zation and  the  lightning  victory  in  Poland.  But  its  ex- 
panded size,  as  Haider  tried  to  explain  to  the  civilians, 
also  was  a handicap.  The  officers’  ranks  had  been  swollen 
with  reserve  officers  many  of  whom  were  fanatical  Nazis; 
and  the  mass  of  the  troops  were  thoroughly  indoctrinated 
with  Nazism.  It  would  be  difficult,  Haider  pointed  out — 
he  was  a great  man  to  emphasize  difficulties,  whether  to 
friend  or  foe — to  find  an  army  formation  which  could  be 
trusted  to  move  against  the  Fuehrer. 

There  was  another  consideration  which  the  generals 
pointed  out  and  which  the  men  in  mufti  fully  appreciated. 
If  they  were  to  stage  a revolt  against  Hitler  with  the 
accompanying  confusion  in  the  Army  as  well  as  the  coun- 
try, might  not  the  British  and  French  take  advantage  of 
it  to  break  through  in  the  west,  occupy  Germany  and  mete 
out  a harsh  peace  to  the  German  people — even  though 
they  had  got  rid  of  their  criminal  leader?  It  was  neces- 
sary therefore  to  keep  in  contact  with  the  British  in 
order  to  come  to  a clear  understanding  that  the  Allies 
would  not  take  such  an  advantage  of  a German  anti- 
Nazi  coup. 

Several  channels  were  used.  One  was  developed  through 
the  Vatican  by  Dr.  Josef  Mueller,  a leading  Munich  lawyer, 
a devout  Catholic,  a man  of  such  great  physical  bulk 


858  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

and  tremendous  energy  and  toughness  that  he  had  been 
dubbed  in  his  youth  “Joe  the  Ox” — Ochsensepp.  Early 
in  October,  with  the  connivance  of  Colonel  Oster  of  the 
Abwehr,  Mueller  had  journeyed  to  Rome  and  at  the  Vati- 
can had  established  contact  with  the  British  minister  to 
the  Holy  See.  According  to  German  sources,  he  succeeded 
in  obtaining  not  only  an  assurance  from  the  British  but 
the  agreement  of  the  Pope  to  act  as  an  intermediary  be- 
tween a new  anti-Nazi  German  regime  and  Britain.23 

The  other  contact  was  in  Berne,  Switzerland.  There 
Weizsaecker  had  installed  Theodor  Kordt,  until  recently 
the  German  charge  in  London,  as  an  attache  in  the 
German  Legation  and  it  was  in  the  Swiss  capital  that  he 
saw  on  occasion  an  Englishman,  Dr.  Philip  Conwell-Evans, 
whose  professorship  at  the  German  University  of  Koenigs- 
berg  had  made  him  both  an  expert  on  Nazism  and  to 
some  extent  a sympathizer  with  it.  In  the  latter  part  of 
October  Conwell-Evans  brought  to  Kordt  what  the  latter 
later  described  as  a solemn  promise  by  Chamberlain  to 
deal  justly  and  understandingly  with  a future  anti-Nazi 
German  government.  Actually  the  Britisher  had  only 
brought  extracts  from  Chamberlain’s  speech  to  the  Com- 
mons in  which,  while  rejecting  Hitler’s  peace  proposals, 
the  Prime  Minister  had  declared  that  Britain  had  no  de- 
sire to  “exclude  from  her  rightful  place  in  Europe  a Ger- 
many which  will  live  in  amity  and  confidence  with  other 
nations.”  Though  this  statement  and  others  in  the  speech 
of  a friendly  nature  toward  the  German  people  had  been 
broadcast  from  London  and  presumably  picked  up  by  the 
conspirators,  they  hailed  the  “pledge”  brought  by  the  un- 
official British  representative  to  Berne  as  of  the  utmost 
importance.  With  this  and  the  British  assurances  they 
thought  they  had  through  the  Vatican,  the  conspirators 
turned  hopefully  to  the  German  generals.  Hopefully,  but 
also  desperately.  “Our  only  hope  of  salvation,”  Weizsaecker 
told  Hassell  on  October  17,  “lies  in  a military  coup  d’etat. 
But  how?” 

Time  was  short.  The  German  attack  through  Belgium 
and  Holland  was  scheduled  to  begin  on  November  12. 
The  plot  had  to  be  carried  out  before  that  date.  As  Hassell 
warned  the  others,  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  a “decent 
peace  after  Germany  had  violated  Belgium. 

There  are  several  accounts  from  the  participants  as 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  859 

to  what  happened  next,  or  rather  why  nothing  much  hap- 
pened, and  they  are  conflicting  and  confusing.  General 
Haider,  the  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff,  was  again 
the  key  figure,  as  he  had  been  at  the  time  of  Munich. 
But  he  blew  hot  and  cold,  was  hesitant  and  confused. 
In  his  interrogation  at  Nuremberg  he  explained  that  the 
“Field  Army”  could  not  stage  the  revolt  because  it  had 
a “fully  armed  enemy  in  front  of  it.”  He  says  he  appealed 
to  the  “Home  Army,”  which  was  not  up  against  the  enemy, 
to  act  but  the  most  he  could  get  from  its  commander, 
General  Friedrich  (Fritz)  Fromm,  was  an  understanding 
that  “as  a soldier” 24  he  would  execute  any  order  from 
Brauchitsch. 

But  Brauchitsch  was  even  more  wishy-washy  than  his 
General  Staff  Chief.  “If  Brauchitsch  hasn’t  enough  force 
of  character,”  General  Beck  told  Haider,  “to  make  a de- 
cision, then  you  must  make  the  decision  and  present  him 
with  a fait  accompli"  But  Haider  insisted  that  since 
Brauchitsch  was  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army, 
the  final  responsibility  was  his.  Thus  the  buck  was  con- 
tinually passed.  “Haider,”  Hassell  mourned  in  his  diary  at 
the  end  of  October,  “is  not  equal  to  the  situation  either 
in  caliber  or  in  authority.”  As  for  Brauchitsch,  he  was,  as 
Beck  said,  “a  sixth-grader.”  Still  the  conspirators,  led  this 
time  by  General  Thomas,  the  economic  expert  of  the 
Army,  and  Colonel  Oster  of  the  Abwehr,  worked  on  Hai- 
der, who  finally  agreed,  they  thought,  to  stage  a putsch 
as  soon  as  Hitler  gave  the  final  order  for  the  attack  in 
the  West.  Haider  himself  says  it  was  still  conditional  on 
Brauchitsch’s  making  the  final  decision.  At  any  rate,  on 
November  3,  according  to  Colonel  Hans  Groscurth  of 
OKW,  a confidant  of  both  Haider  and  Oster,  Haider  sent 
word  to  General  Beck  and  Goerdeler,  two  of  the  chief 
conspirators,  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  from  No- 
vember 5 on.  Zossen,  the  headquarters  of  both  the  Army 
Command  and  the  General  Staff,  became  a hotbed  of 
conspiratorial  activity. 

November  5 was  a key  date.  On  that  day  the  movement 
of  troops  to  their  jump-off  points  opposite  Holland,  Bel- 
gium and  Luxembourg  was  to  begin.  Also  on  that  day, 
Brauchitsch  had  an  appointment  for  a showdown  with 
Hitler.  He  and  Haider  had  visited  the  top  army  commands 
in  the  west  on  November  2 and  3 and  fortified  themselves 


860  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

with  the  negative  opinions  of  the  field  commanders.  “None 
of  the  higher  headquarters,”  Haider  confided  to  his  diary, 
“thinks  the  offensive  ...  has  any  prospect  of  success.” 
Thus  amply  supplied  with  arguments  from  the  generals 
on  the  Western  front  as  well  as  his  own  and  Haider’s 
and  Thomas’,  which  were  assembled  in  a memorandum, 
and  carrying  for  good  measure  a “countermemorandum,” 
as  Haider  calls  it,  replying  to  Hitler’s  memorandum  of 
October  9,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Army 
drove  over  to  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  on  November  5 
determined  to  talk  the  Fuehrer  out  of  his  offensive  in  the 
West.  If  Brauchitsch  were  unsuccessful,  he  would  then 
join  the  conspiracy  to  remove  the  dictator — or  so  the  con- 
spirators understood.  They  were  in  a high  state  of  excite- 
ment— and  optimism.  Goerdeler,  according  to  Gisevius, 
was  already  drawing  up  a cabinet  list  for  the  provisional 
anti-Nazi  government  and  had  to  be  restrained  by  the 
more  sober  Beck.  Schacht  alone  was  highly  skeptical. 
“Just  you  watch,”  he  warned.  “Hitler  will  smell  a rat  and 
won’t  make  any  decision  at  all  tomorrow.” 

They  were  all,  as  usual,  wrong. 

Brauchitsch,  as  might  have  been  expected,  got  nowhere 
with  his  memoranda  or  his  reports  from  the  front-line 
commanders  or  his  own  arguments.  When  he  stressed 
the  bad  weather  in  the  West  at  this  time  of  year,  Hitler 
retorted  that  it  was  as  bad  for  the  enemy  as  for  the 
Germans  and  moreover  that  it  might  be  no  better  in  the 
spring.  Finally  in  desperation  the  spineless  Army  chief  in- 
formed the  Fuehrer  that  the  morale  of  the  troops  in  the 
west  was  similar  to  that  in  1917—18,  when  there  was 
defeatism,  insubordination  and  even  mutiny  in  the  Ger- 
man Army. 

At  hearing  this,  Hitler,  according  to  Haider  (whose  diary 
is  the  principal  source  for  this  highly  secret  meeting,  flew 
into  a rage.  “In  what  units,”  he  demanded  to  know,  “have 
there  been  any  cases  of  lack  of  discipline?  What  hap- 
pened? Where?”  He  would  fly  there  himself  tomorrow. 
Poor  Brauchitsch,  as  Haider  notes,  had  deliberately  exag- 
gerated “in  order  to  deter  Hitler,”  and  he  now  felt  the 
full  force  of  the  Leader’s  uncontrolled  wrath.  “What  ac- 
tion has  been  taken  by  the  Army  Command?”  the  Fuehrer 
shouted.  “How  many  death  sentences  have  been  carried 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  861 

out?”  The  truth  was,  Hitler  stormed,  that  “the  Army  did 
not  want  to  fight.” 

“Any  further  conversation  was  impossible,”  Brauchitsch 
told  the  tribunal  at  Nuremberg  in  recalling  his  unhappy 
experience.  “So  I left.”  Others  remembered  that  he  stag- 
gered into  headquarters  at  Zossen,  eighteen  miles  away, 
in  such  a state  of  shock  that  he  was  unable  at  first  to  give 
a coherent  account  of  what  had  happened. 

That  was  the  end  of  the  “Zossen  Conspiracy.”  It  had 
failed  as  ignobly  as  the  “Haider  Plot”  at  the  time  of  Mu- 
nich. Each  time  the  conditions  laid  down  by  the  plotters  in 
order  to  enable  them  to  act  had  been  fulfilled.  This  time 
Hitler  had  stuck  to  his  decision  to  attack  on  November 
12.  In  fact,  after  the  stricken  Brauchitsch  had  left  his 
presence  he  had  the  order  reconfirmed  by  telephone  to 
Zossen.  When  Haider  asked  that  it  be  sent  in  writing,  he 
was  immediately  obliged.  Thus  the  conspirators  had  in 
writing  the  evidence  which  they  had  said  they  needed  in 
order  to  overthrow  Hitler — the  order  for  an  attack  which 
they  thought  would  bring  disaster  to  Germany.  But  they 
did  nothing  further  except  to  panic.  There  was  a great 
scramble  to  bum  incriminating  papers  and  cover  up 
traces.  Only  Colonel  Oster  seems  to  have  kept  his  head. 
He  sent  a warning  to  the  Belgian  and  Dutch  legations  in 
Berlin  to  expect  an  attack  on  the  morning  of  November 
12. 25  Then  he  set  out  for  the  Western  front  on  a fruitless 
expedition  to  see  if  he  could  again  interest  General  von 
Witzleben  in  bumping  off  Hitler.  The  generals,  Witzleben 
included,  knew  when  they  were  beaten.  The  former  cor- 
poral had  once  again  triumphed  over  them  with  the  great- 
est of  ease.  A few  days  later  Rundstedt,  commanding 
Army  Group  A,  called  in  his  corps  and  divisional  com- 
manders to  discuss  details  of  the  attack.  While  still  doubt- 
ing its  success  he  advised  his  generals  to  bury  their  doubts. 
“The  Army,”  he  said,  “has  been  given  its  task,  and  it  will 
fulfill  that  task!” 

The  day  after  provoking  Brauchitsch  to  the  edge  of  a 
nervous  breakdown  Hitler  busied  himself  with  composing 
the  texts  of  proclamations  to  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  peo- 
ple justifying  his  attack  on  them.  Haider  noted  the  pre- 
text: “French  march  into  Belgium.” 


862 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


But  on  the  next  day,  November  7,  to  the  relief  of  the 
generals.  Hitler  postponed  the  date  of  the  attack. 

TOP  SECRET 

Berlin,  November  7,  1939 

. . . The  Fuehrer  and  Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed 
Forces,  after  hearing  reports  on  the  meteorological  and  the 
railway  transport  situation,  has  ordered: 

A-day  is  postponed  by  three  days.  The  next  decision  will 
be  made  at  6 p.m.  on  November  9,  1939. 

Keitel 

This  was  the  first  of  fourteen  postponements  ordered  by 
Hitler  throughout  the  fall  and  winter,  copies  of  which 
were  found  in  the  OKW  archives  at  the  end  of  the  war.26 
They  show  that  at  no  time  did  the  Fuehrer  abandon  for 
one  moment  his  decision  to  attack  in  the  West;  he  merely 
put  off  the  date  from  week  to  week.  On  November  9, 
the  attack  was  postponed  to  November  19;  on  November 
13,  to  November  22;  and  so  on,  with  five  or  six  days’  no- 
tice being  given  each  time,  and  usually  the  weather  stated 
as  the  reason.  Probably  the  Fuehrer  was,  to  some  extent, 
deferring  to  the  generals.  Probably  he  got  it  through  his 
head  that  the  Army  was  not  ready.  Certainly  the  strategic 
and  tactical  plans  had  not  been  fully  worked  out,  for  he 
was  always  tinkering  with  them. 

There  may  have  been  other  reasons  for  Hitler’s  first 
postponement  of  the  offensive.  On  November  7,  the  day 
the  decision  was  made,  the  Germans  had  been  consider- 
ably embarrassed  by  a joint  declaration  of  the  King  of 
the  Belgians  and  the  Queen  of  the  Netherlands,  offering, 
“before  the  war  in  Western  Europe  begins  in  full  vio- 
lence,” to  mediate  a peace.  In  such  circumstances  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  convince  anyone,  as  Hitler  was  at- 
tempting to  do  in  the  proclamations  he  was  drafting,  that 
the  German  Army  was  moving  into  the  two  Low  Coun- 
tries because  it  had  learned  the  French  Army  was  about 
to  march  into  Belgium. 

Also  Hitler  may  have  got  wind  that  his  attack  on  the 
neutral  little  country  of  Belgium  would  not  have  the  bene- 
fit of  surprise,  on  which  he  had  counted.  At  the  end  of 
October,  Goerdeler  had  journeyed  to  Brussels  with  a se- 
cret message  from  Weizsaecker  urging  the  German  ambas- 
sador, Buelow-Schwante,  to  privately  warn  the  King  of  the 
“extreme  gravity  of  the  situation.”  This  the  ambassador 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  863 

did  and  shortly  thereafter  King  Leopold  rushed  to  The 
Hague  to  consult  with  the  Queen  and  draw  up  their 
declaration.  But  the  Belgians  had  more  specific  informa- 
tion. Some  of  it  came  from  Oster,  as  we  have  seen.  On 
November  8,  Buelow-Schwante  wired  Berlin  a warning 
that  King  Leopold  had  told  the  Dutch  Queen  that  he  had 
“exact  information”  of  a German  military  build-up  on  the 
Belgian  frontier  which  pointed  toward  a German  offen- 
sive through  Belgium  “in  two  or  three  days.”  27 

Then  on  the  evening  of  November  8 and  the  afternoon 
of  the  following  day  there  occurred  two  strange  events — 
a bomb  explosion  that  just  missed  killing  Hitler  and  the 
kidnaping  by  the  S.S.  of  two  British  agents  in  Holland 
near  the  German  border — which  at  first  distracted  the 
Nazi  warlord  from  his  plans  for  attacking  the  West  and 
yet  in  the  end  bolstered  his  prestige  in  Germany  while 
frightening  the  Zossen  conspirators,  who  actually  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  either  happening. 

A NAZI  KIDNAPING  AND  A BEERHOUSE  BOMB 

Twelve  minutes  after  Hitler  had  finished  making  his 
annual  speech,  on  the  evening  of  November  8,  to  the  “Old 
Guard”  party  cronies  at  the  Buergerbraukeller  in  Munich 
in  commemoration  of  the  1923  Beer  Hall  Putsch,  a 
shorter  speech  than  usual,  a bomb  which  had  been  planted 
in  a pillar  directly  behind  the  speaker’s  platform  exploded, 
killing  seven  persons  and  wounding  sixty-three  others.  By 
that  time  all  the  important  Nazi  leaders,  with  Hitler  at 
their  head,  had  hurriedly  left  the  premises,  though  it  had 
been  their  custom  in  former  years  to  linger  over  their 
beers  and  reminisce  with  old  party  comrades  about  the 
early  putsch. 

The  next  morning  Hitler’s  own  paper,  the  Voelkischer 
Beobachter,  alone  carried  the  story  of  the  attempt  on  the 
Fuehrer’s  life.  It  blamed  the  “British  Secret  Service”  and 
even  Chamberlain  for  the  foul  deed.  “The  attempted 
‘assassination,’  ” I wrote  that  evening  in  my  diary,  “un- 
doubtedly will  buck  up  public  opinion  behind  Hitler  and 
stir  up  hatred  of  England  . . . Most  of  us  think  it  smells 
of  another  Reichstag  fire.” 

What  connection  could  the  British  secret  service  have 
with  it,  outside  of  Goebbels’  feverish  mind?  An  attempt 


864 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


was  made  at  once  to  connect  them.  An  hour  or  two  after 
the  bomb  went  off  in  Munich,  Heinrich  Himmler,  chief  of 
the  S.S.  and  the  Gestapo,  telephoned  to  one  of  his  rising 
young  S.S.  subordinates,  Walter  Schellenberg,  at  Duessel- 
dorf  and  ordered  him  by  command  of  the  Fuehrer,  to 
cross  the  border  into  Holland  the  next  day  and  kidnap  two 
British  secret-service  agents  with  whom  Schellenberg  had 
been  in  contact. 

Himmler’s  order  led  to  one  of  the  most  bizarre  incidents 
of  the  war.  For  more  than  a month  Schellenberg,  who, 
like  Alfred  Naujocks,  was  a university-educated  intel- 
lectual gangster,  had  been  seeing  in  Holland  two  British 
intelligence  officers,  Captain  S.  Payne  Best  and  Major  R.  H. 
Stevens.  To  them  he  posed  as  “Major  Schaemmel,”  an 
anti-Nazi  officer  in  OKW  (Schellenberg  took  the  name  from 
a living  major)  and  gave  a convincing  story  of  how  the 
German  generals  were  determined  to  overthrow  Hitler. 
What  they  wanted  from  the  British,  he  said,  were  as- 
surances that  the  London  government  would  deal  fairly 
with  the  new  anti-Nazi  regime.  Since  the  British  had  heard 
from  other  sources  (as  we  have  seen)  of  a German  mili- 
tary conspiracy,  whose  members  wanted  the  same  kind  of 
assurances,  London  was  interested  in  developing  further 
contacts  with  “Major  Schaemmel.”  Best  and  Stevens  pro- 
vided him  with  a small  radio  transmitter  and  receiving 
set;  there  were  numerous  ensuing  communications  over 
the  wireless  and  further  meetings  in  various  Dutch  towns. 
By  November  7,  when  the  two  parties  met  at  Venlo,  a 
Dutch  town  on  the  German  frontier,  the  British  agents 
were  able  to  give  “Schaemmel”  a rather  vague  message 
from  London  to  the  leaders  of  the  German  resistance  stat- 
ing in  general  terms  the  basis  for  a just  peace  with  an 
anti-Nazi  regime.  It  was  agreed  that  “Schaemmel”  should 
bring  one  of  these  leaders,  a German  general,  to  Venlo 
the  next  day,  to  begin  definitive  negotiations.  This  meet- 
ing was  put  off  to  the  ninth. 

Up  to  this  moment  the  objectives  of  the  two  sides  were 
clear.  The  British  were  trying  to  establish  direct  contact 
with  the  German  military  putschists  in  order  to  encourage 
and  aid  them.  Himmler  was  attempting  to  find  out  through 
the  British  who  the  German  plotters  were  and  what  their 
connection  was  with  the  enemy  secret  service.  That  Himm- 
ler and  Hitler  were  already  suspicious  of  some  of  the 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  865 

generals  as  well  as  of  men  like  Oster  and  Canaris  of  the 
Abwehr  is  clear.  But  now  on  the  night  of  November  8, 
Hitler  and  Himmler  found  need  of  a new  objective:  Kidnap 
Best  and  Stevens  and  blame  these  two  British  secret- 
service  agents  for  the  Buergerbrau  bombing! 

A familiar  character  now  entered  the  scene.  Alfred 
Naujocks,  who  had  staged  the  “Polish  attack”  on  the 
German  radio  station  at  Gleiwitz,  showed  up  in  command 
of  a dozen  Security  Service  (S.D.)  toughs  to  help  Schel- 
lenberg  carry  out  the  kidnaping.  The  deed  came  off  nicely. 
At  4 p.m.  on  November  9,  while  Schellenberg  sipped  an 
aperitif  on  the  terrace  of  a cafe  at  Venlo,  waiting  for  a 
rendezvous  with  Best  and  Stevens,  the  two  British  agents 
drove  up  in  their  Buick,  parked  it  behind  the  cafe,  and 
then  ran  into  a hail  of  bullets  from  an  S.S.  car  filled  with 
Naujock’s  ruffians.  Lieutenant  Klop,  a Dutch  intelligence 
officer,  who  had  always  accompanied  the  British  pair  in 
their  talks  with  Schellenberg,  fell  mortally  wounded.  Best 
and  Stevens  were  tossed  into  the  S.S.  car  “like  bundles  of 
hay,”  as  Schellenberg  later  remembered,  along  with  the 
wounded  Klop,  and  driven  speedily  across  the  border  into 
Germany.*  28 

And  so  on  November  21  Himmler  announced  to  the 
public  that  the  assassination  plot  against  Hitler  at  the 
Buergerbraukeller  had  been  solved.  It  was  done  at  the 
instigation  of  the  British  Intelligence  Service,  two  of 
whose  leaders,  Stevens  and  Best,  had  been  arrested  “on 
the  Dutch-German  frontier”  on  the  day  following  the 
bombing.  The  actual  perpetrator  was  given  as  Georg 
Elser,  a German  Communist  carpenter  residing  in  Munich. 

Himmler’s  detailed  account  of  the  crime  sounded  “fishy” 
to  me,  as  I wrote  in  my  diary  the  same  day.  But  his  ac- 
complishment was  very  real.  “What  Himmler  and  his 
gang  are  up  to,  obviously,”  I jotted  down,  “is  to  con- 

* According  to  the  official  Dutch  account,  which  came  to  light  after  the  war, 
the  British  car,  with  Stevens,  Best  and  Klop  in  it,  was  towed  by  the  Germans 
across  the  frontier,  which  was  only  125  feet  away.  Starting  on.  November  10, 
the  next  day,  the  Dutch  government  made  nine  written  requests  at  frequent 
intervals  for  the  return  of  Klop  and  the  Dutch  chauffeur  of  the  car  and  also 
demanded  a German  investigation  of  this  violation  of  Dutch  neutrality.  No 
reply  was  ever  made  until  May  10,  when  Hitler  justified  his  attack  on  the 
Netherlands  partly  on  the  grounds  that  the  Venlo  affair  had  proven  the 
complicity  of  the  Dutch  with  the  British  secret  service.  Klop  died  from  his 
wounds  a few  days  later.  Best  and  Stevens  survived  five  years  in  Nazi 
concentration  camps.28 


866 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

vince  the  gullible  German  people  that  the  British  govern- 
ment tried  to  win  the  war  by  murdering  Hitler  and  his 
chief  aides.” 

The  mystery  of  who  arranged  the  bombing  has  never 
been  completely  cleared  up.  Elser,  though  not  the  half-wit 
that  was  Marinus  van  der  Lubbe  of  the  Reichstag  fire,  was 
a man  of  limited  intelligence  though  quite  sincere.  He 
not  only  pleaded  guilty  to  making  and  setting  off  the 
bomb,  he  boasted  of  it.  Though  of  course  he  had  never 
met  Best  and  Stevens  prior  to  the  attempt,  he  did  make 
the  former’s  acquaintance  during  long  years  at  the  Sach- 
senhausen  concentration  camp.  There  he  told  the  Eng- 
lishman a long  and  involved — and  not  always  logical — 
story. 

One  day  in  October  at  the  Dachau  concentration  camp, 
where  he  had  been  incarcerated  since  midsummer  as  a 
Communist  sympathizer,  he  related,  he  had  been  sum- 
moned to  the  office  of  the  camp  commandant,  where  he 
was  introduced  to  two  strangers.  They  explained  the 
necessity  of  doing  away  with  some  of  the  Fuehrer’s 
“traitorous”  followers  by  exploding  a bomb  in  the  Buerger- 
braukeller  immediately  after  Hitler  had  made  his  cus- 
tomary address  on  the  evening  of  November  8 and  had 
left  the  hall.  The  bomb  was  to  be  planted  in  a pillar  be- 
hind the  speakers’  platform.  Since  Elser  was  a skilled 
cabinetmaker  and  electrician  and  a tinkerer,  they  sug- 
gested that  he  was  the  man  to  do  the  job.  If  he  did, 
they  would  arrange  for  his  escape  to  Switzerland  and  for  a 
large  sum  of  money  to  keep  him  in  comfort  there.  As  a 
token  of  their  seriousness  they  promised  him  better  treat- 
ment in  the  camp  in  the  meanwhile:  better  food,  civilian 
clothes,  plenty  of  cigarettes- — for  he  was  a chain  smoker 
— and  a carpenter’s  bench  and  tools.  There  Elser  con- 
structed a crude  but  efficient  bomb  with  an  eight-day 
alarm-clock  mechanism  and  a contraption  by  which  the 
weapon  could  also  be  detonated  by  an  electric  switch. 
Elser  asserted  that  he  was  taken  one  night  early  in  No- 
vember to  the  beer  cellar,  where  he  installed  his  gadget 
in  the  well-placed  pillar. 

On  the  evening  of  November  8,  at  about  the  time  the 
bomb  was  set  to  go  off  he  was  taken  by  his  accomplices,  he 
said,  to  the  Swiss  frontier,  given  a sum  of  money  and— 
interestingly — a picture  postcard  of  the  interior  of  the 


867 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

beer  hall,  with  the  pillar  in  which  he  had  placed  his 
bomb  marked  with  a cross.  But  instead  of  being  helped 
across  the  frontier — and  this  seems  to  have  surprised  the 
dim-witted  fellow — he  was  nabbed  by  the  Gestapo,  post- 
card and  all.  Later  he  was  coached  by  the  Gestapo  to  im- 
plicate Best  and  Stevens  at  the  coming  state  trial,  in 
which  he  would  be  made  the  center  of  attention.* 

The  trial  never  came  off.  We  know  now  that  Himmler, 
for  reasons  best  known  to  himself,  didn’t  dare  to  have  a 
trial.  We  also  know — now — that  Elser  lived  on  at  Sach- 
senhausen  and  then  Dachau  concentration  camps,  being 
accorded,  apparently  on  the  express  orders  of  Hitler,  who 
had  personally  gained  so  much  from  the  bombing,  quite 
humane  treatment  under  the  circumstances.  But  Himm- 
ler kept  his  eye  on  him  to  the  last.  It  would  not  do  to  let 
the  carpenter  survive  the  war  and  live  to  tell  his  tale. 
Shortly  before  the  war  ended,  on  April  16,  1945,  the 
Gestapo  announced  that  Georg  Elser  had  been  killed  in 
an  Allied  bombing  attack  the  previous  day.  We  know  now 
that  the  Gestapo  murdered  him.30 

HITLER  TALKS  TO  HIS  GENERALS 

Having  escaped  assassination,  or  so  it  was  made  to 
seem,  and  quelled  defiance  among  his  generals,  Hitler 
went  ahead  with  his  plans  for  the  big  attack  in  the  West. 
On  November  20,  he  issued  Directive  No.  8 for  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War,  ordering  the  maintenance  of  the  “state  of 
alert”  so  as  to  “exploit  favorable  weather  conditions  im- 
mediately,” and  laying  down  plans  for  the  destruction  of 
Holland  and  Belgium.  And  then  to  put  courage  in  the 
fainthearted  and  arouse  them  to  the  proper  pitch  he 
thought  necessary  on  the  eve  of  great  battles,  he  sum- 
moned the  commanding  generals  and  General  Staff  officers 
to  the  Chancellery  at  noon  on  November  23. 

It  was  one  of  the  most  revealing  of  the  secret  pep  talks 

* Later  at  Dachau  Elser  told  a similar  story  to  Pastor  Niemoeller,  who  since 
has  stated  his  personal  conviction  that  the  bombing  was  sanctioned  by  Hitler 
to  increase  his  own  popularity  and  stir  up  the  war  fever  of  the  people.  It 
is  only  fair  to  add  that  Gisevius,  archenemy  of  Hitler,  Himmler  and  Schel- 
lenberg,  believes — as  he  testified  at  Nuremberg  and  in  his  book — that  Elser 
really  attempted  to  kill  Hitler  and  that  there  were  no  Nazi  accomplices. 
Schellenberg,  who  is  less  reliable,  states  that  though  he  was  suspicious  at 
first  of  Himmler  and  Heydrich,  he  later  concluded,  after  questioning  the 
carpenter  and  after  reading  interrogations  made  while  Elser  was  first 
drugged  and  then  hypnotized,  that  it  was  a case  of  a genuine  attempt  at 
assassination. 


868  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  his  principal  military  chiefs,  and  thanks  to  the  Allied 
discovery  of  some  of  the  OKW  files  at  Flensburg  it  has 
been  preserved  in  the  form  of  notes  taken  by  an  uni- 
dentified participant.31 

The  purpose  of  this  conference  [Hitler  began]  is  to  give 
you  an  idea  of  the  world  of  my  thoughts,  which  govern  me 
in  the  face  of  future  events,  and  to  tell  you  my  decisions. 

His  mind  was  full  of  the  past,  the  present  and  the  future, 
and  to  this  limited  group  he  spoke  with  brutal  frankness 
and  great  eloquence,  giving  a magnificent  resume  of  all 
that  had  gone  on  in  his  warped  but  fertile  brain  and  pre- 
dicting with  deadly  accuracy  the  shape  of  things  to  come. 
But  it  seems  difficult  to  imagine  that  anyone  who  heard 
it  could  have  had  any  further  doubts  that  the  man  who 
now  held  the  fate  of  Germany — and  the  world — in  his 
hands  had  become  beyond  question  a dangerous  megalo- 
maniac. 

I had  a clear  recognition  of  the  probable  course  of  his- 
torical events  [he  said  in  discussing  his  early  struggles]  and 
the  firm  will  to  make  brutal  decisions  ...  As  the  last  factor 
I must  name  my  own  person  in  all  modesty:  irreplaceable. 
Neither  a military  man  nor  a civilian  could  replace  me. 
Assassination  attempts  may  be  repeated.  I am  convinced  of 
the  powers  of  my  intellect  and  of  decision  ...  No  one  has 
ever  achieved  what  I have  achieved  ...  I have  led  the 
German  people  to  a great  height,  even  if  the  world  does 
hate  us  now  . . . The  fate  of  the  Reich  depends  only  on  me. 
I shall  act  accordingly. 

He  chided  the  generals  for  their  doubts  when  he  made 
his  “hard  decisions”  to  leave  the  League  of  Nations,  de- 
cree conscription,  occupy  the  Rhineland,  fortify  it  and 
seize  Austria.  “The  number  of  people  who  put  trust  in 
me,”  he  said,  “was  very  small.” 

“The  next  step,”  he  declared  in  describing  his  con- 
quests with  a cynicism  which  it  is  unfortunate  that  Cham- 
berlain never  heard,  “was  Bohemia,  Moravia  and  Poland.” 

It  was  clear  to  me  from  the  first  moment  that  I could  not 
be  satisfied  with  the  Sudeten-German  territory.  That  was  only 
a partial  solution.  The  decision  to  march  into  Bohemia  was 
made.  Then  followed  the  establishment  of  the  Protectorate 
and  with  that  the  basis  for  the  conquest  of  Poland  was 
laid,  but  I was  not  quite  clear  at  that  time  whether  I 
should  start  first  against  the  East  and  then  against  the  West, 


869 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

or  vice  versa.  By  the  pressure  of  events  it  came  first  to 
the  fight  against  Poland.  One  might  accuse  me  of  wanting  to 
fight  and  fight  again.  In  struggle  I see  the  fate  of  all  beings. 
Nobody  can  avoid  fighting  if  he  does  not  want  to  go  under. 

The  increasing  number  of  [German]  people  required  a 
larger  Lebensraum.  My  goal  was  to  create  a rational  rela- 
tion between  the  number  of  people  and  the  space  for  them 
to  live  in.  The  fight  must  start  here.  No  nation  can  evade  the 
solution  of  this  problem.  Otherwise  it  must  yield  and  gradu- 
ally go  down  . . . No  calculated  cleverness  is  of  any  help 
here:  solution  only  with  the  sword.  A people  unable  to  pro- 
duce the  strength  to  fight  must  withdraw  . . . 

The  trouble  with  the  German  leaders  of  the  past,  Hit- 
ler said,  including  Bismarck  and  Moltke,  was  “insufficient 
hardness.  The  solution  was  possible  only  by  attacking  a 
country  at  a favorable  moment.”  Failure  to  realize  this 
brought  on  the  1914  war  “on  several  fronts.  It  did  not 
bring  a solution  of  the  problem.” 

Today  [Hitler  went  on]  the  second  act  of  this 
drama  is  being  written.  For  the  first  time  in  sixty-seven  years 
we  do  not  have  a two-front  war  to  wage  . . . But  no  one 
can  know  how  long  that  will  remain  so  . . . Basically  I did 
not  organize  the  armed  forces  in  order  not  to  strike.  The  de- 
cision to  strike  was  always  in  me. 

Thoughts  of  the  present  blessings  of  a one-front  war 
brought  the  Fuehrer  to  the  question  of  Russia. 

Russia  is  at  present  not  dangerous.  It  is  weakened  by 
many  internal  conditions.  Moreover,  we  have  the  treaty  with 
Russia.  Treaties,  however,  are  kept  only  as  long  as  they 
serve  a purpose.  Russia  will  keep  it  only  as  long  as  Russia 
herself  considers  it  to  be  to  her  benefit  . . . Russia  still  has 
far-reaching  goals,  above  all  the  strengthening  of  her  posi- 
tion in  the  Baltic.  We  can  oppose  Russia  only  when  we  are 
free  in  the  West. 

As  for  Italy,  all  depended  on  Mussolini,  “whose  death 
can  alter  everything  . . . Just  as  the  death  of  Stalin,  so  the 
death  of  the  Duce  can  bring  danger  to  us.  How  easily  the 
death  of  a statesman  can  come  I myself  have  experienced 
recently.”  Hitler  did  not  think  that  the  United  States  was 
yet  dangerous — “because  of  her  neutrality  laws” — nor 
that  her  aid  to  the  Allies  yet  amounted  to  much.  Still, 
time  was  working  for  the  enemy.  “The  moment  is  favor- 


870  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

able  now;  in  six  months  it  might  not  be  so  any  more.” 
Therefore: 

My  decision  is  unchangeable.  I shall  attack  France  and 
England  at  the  most  favorable  and  earliest  moment.  Breach 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  Holland  is  of  no  impor- 
tance. Not  one  will  question  that  when  we  have  won.  We 
shall  not  justify  the  breach  of  neutrality  as  idiotically  as  in 
1914. 

The  attack  in  the  West,  Hitler  told  his  generals,  meant 
“the  end  of  the  World  War,  not  just  a single  action.  It 
concerns  not  just  a single  question  but  the  existence  or 
nonexistence  of  the  nation.”  Then  he  swung  into  his 
peroration. 

The  spirit  of  the  great  men  of  our  history  must  hearten 
us  all.  Fate  demands  from  us  no  more  than  from  the  great 
men  of  German  history.  As  long  as  I live  I shall  think  only  of 
the  victory  of  my  people.  I shall  shrink  from  nothing  and 
shall  annihilate  everyone  who  is  opposed  to  me  ...  I want  to 
annihilate  the  enemyl 

It  was  a telling  speech  and  so  far  as  is  known  not  a 
single  general  raised  his  voice  either  to  express  the  doubts 
which  almost  all  the  Army  commanders  shared  about  the 
success  of  an  offensive  at  this  time  or  to  question  the  im- 
morality of  attacking  Belgium  and  Holland,  whose  neu- 
trality and  borders  the  German  government  had  solemnly 
guaranteed.  According  to  some  of  the  generals  present 
Hitler’s  remarks  about  the  poor  spirit  in  the  top  echelons 
of  the  Army  and  the  General  Staff  were  much  stronger 
than  in  the  above  account. 

Later  that  day,  at  6 p.m.,  the  Nazi  warlord  sent  again 
for  Brauchitsch  and  Haider  and  to  the  former — the  General 
Staff  Chief  was  kept  waiting  outside  the  Fuehrer’s  office 
like  a bad  boy — delivered  a stem  lecture  on  the  “spirit  of 
Zossen.”  The  Army  High  Command  (OKH)  was  shot 
through  with  “defeatism,”  Hitler  charged,  and  Haider’s 
General  Staff  had  a “stiff-necked  attitude  which  kept  it 
from  falling  in  with  the  Fuehrer.”  The  beaten  Brauchitsch, 
according  to  his  own  account  given  much  later  on  the 
stand  at  Nuremberg,  offered  his  resignation,  but  Hitler 
rejected  it,  reminding  him  sharply,  as  the  Commander 
in  Chief  remembered,  “that  I had  to  fulfill  my  duty  and 
obligation  just  like  every  other  soldier.”  That  evening 


871 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Haider  scribbled  a shorthand  note  in  his  diary:  “A  day 
of  crisis!”  32 

In  many  ways  November  23,  1939,  was  a milestone. 
It  marked  Hitler’s  final,  decisive  triumph  over  the  Army, 
which  in  the  First  World  War  had  shunted  Emperor 
Wilhelm  II  aside  and  assumed  supreme  political  as  well 
as  military  authority  in  Germany.  From  that  day  on  the 
onetime  Austrian  corporal  considered  not  only  his  politi- 
cal but  his  military  judgment  superior  to  that  of  his 
generals  and  therefore  refused  to  listen  to  their  advice 
or  permit  their  criticism — with  results  ultimately  disas- 
trous to  all. 

“A  breach  had  occurred,”  Brauchitsch  told  the  Nurem- 
berg tribunal  in  describing  the  events  of  November  23, 
“which  was  later  closed  but  was  never  completely  mended.” 

Moreover,  Hitler’s  harangue  to  the  generals  that  au- 
tumn day  put  a complete  damper  on  any  ideas  Haider 
and  Brauchitsch  might  have  had,  however  tepidly,  to 
overthrow  the  Nazi  dictator.  He  had  warned  them  that  he 
would  “annihilate”  anyone  who  stood  in  his  way,  and 
Haider  says  Hitler  had  specifically  added  that  he  would 
suppress  any  opposition  to  him  on  the  General  Staff  “with 
brutal  force.”  Haider,  for  the  moment  at  least,  was  not 
the  man  to  stand  up  to  such  terrible  threats.  When  four 
days  later,  on  November  27,  General  Thomas  went  to 
see  him,  at  the  prompting  of  Schacht  and  Popitz,  and 
urged  him  to  keep  after  Brauchitsch  to  take  action  against 
the  Fuehrer  (“Hitler  has  to  be  removed!”  Haider  later 
remembered  Thomas  as  saying),  the  General  Staff  Chief 
reminded  him  of  all  the  “difficulties.”  He  was  not  yet 
sure,  he  said,  that  Brauchitsch  “would  take  part  actively  in 
a coup  d’etat.”  33 

A few  days  later  Haider  gave  Goerdeler  the  most  ludi- 
crous reasons  for  not  going  on  with  the  plans  to  get  rid 
of  the  Nazi  dictator.  Hassell  noted  them  down  in  his 
diary.  Besides  the  fact  that  “one  does  not  rebel  when  face 
to  face  with  the  enemy,”  Haider  added,  according  to  Has- 
sell, the  following  points:  “We  ought  to  give  Hitler  this 
last  chance  to  deliver  the  German  people  from  the  slavery 
of  English  capitalism  . . . There  is  no  great  man  available 
. . . The  opposition  has  not  yet  matured  enough  . . . One 
could  not  be  sure  of  the  younger  officers.”  Hassell  himself 
appealed  to  Admiral  Canaris,  one  of  the  original  con- 


872 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


spirators,  to  go  ahead,  but  got  nowhere.  “He  has  given  up 
hope  of  resistance  from  the  generals,”  the  former  am- 
bassador confided  to  his  diary  on  November  30,  “and 
thinks  it  would  be  useless  to  try  anything  more  along  this 
line.”  A little  later  Hassell  noted  that  “Haider  and  Brau- 
chitsch  are  nothing  more  than  caddies  to  Hitler.”  34 

NAZI  TERROR  IN  POLAND:  FIRST  PHASE 

Not  many  days  after  the  German  attack  on  Poland 
my  diary  began  to  fill  with  items  about  the  Nazi  terror  in 
the  conquered  land.  Later  one  would  learn  that  many 
another  diary  was  filling  with  them  too.  Hassell  on  October 
19  reported  hearing  of  “the  shocking  bestialities  of  the 
S.S.,  especially  toward  the  Jews.”  A little  later  he  was  con- 
fiding to  his  diary  a story  told  by  a German  landlord  in 
the  province  of  Posen. 

The  last  thing  he  had  seen  there  was  a drunken  district 
Party  leader  who  had  ordered  the  prison  opened;  he  had 
shot  five  whores,  and  attempted  to  rape  two  others.35 

On  October  18,  Haider  wrote  down  in  his  diary  the 
main  points  of  a talk  he  had  had  with  General  Eduard 
Wagner,  the  Quartermaster  General,  who  had  conferred 
with  Hitler  that  day  about  the  future  of  Poland.  That 
future  was  to  be  grim. 

We  have  no  intention  of  rebuilding  Poland  ...  Not 
to  be  a model  state  by  German  standards.  Polish  intelli- 
gentsia must  be  prevented  from  establishing  itself  as  a gov- 
erning class.  Low  standard  of  living  must  be  conserved. 
Cheap  slaves  . . . 

Total  disorganization  must  be  created!  The  Reich  will 
give  the  Governor  General  the  means  to  carry  out  this 
devilish  plan. 

The  Reich  did. 

A brief  account  of  the  beginning  of  Nazi  terror  in  Po- 
land, as  disclosed  by  the  captured  German  documents  and 
the  evidence  at  the  various  Nuremberg  trials,  may  now 
be  given.  It  was  but  a forerunner  to  dark  and  terrible 
deeds  that  would  eventually  be  inflicted  by  the  Germans 
on  all  the  conquered  peoples.  But  from  first  to  last  it  was 
worse  in  Poland  than  anyplace  else.  Here  Nazi  barbarism 
reached  an  incredible  depth. 

Just  before  the  attack  on  Poland  was  launched,  Hitler 


873 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

had  told  his  generals  at  the  conference  on  the  Obersalz- 
berg  on  August  22  that  things  would  happen  “which  would 
not  be  to  the  taste  of  German  generals”  and  he  warned 
them  that  they  “should  not  interfere  in  such  matters  but 
restrict  themselves  to  their  military  duties.”  He  knew 
whereof  he  spoke.  Both  in  Berlin  and  in  Poland  this 
writer  soon  was  being  overwhelmed  with  reports  of  Nazi 
massacres.  So  were  the  generals.  On  September  10,  with 
the  Polish  campaign  in  full  swing,  Haider  noted  in  his 
diary  an  example  which  soon  became  widely  known  in 
Berlin.  Some  toughs  belonging  to  an  S.S.  artillery  regi- 
ment, having  worked  fifty  Jews  all  day  on  a job  of 
bridge  repairing,  herded  them  into  a synagogue  and,  as 
Haider  put  it,  “massacred  them.”  Even  General  von  Kuech- 
ler,  the  commander  of  the  Third  Army,  who  was  later  to 
have  few  qualms,  refused  to  confirm  the  light  sentences  of 
the  court-martial  meted  out  to  the  murderers — one  year 
in  prison — on  the  ground  that  they  were  too  lenient.  But 
the  Army  Commander  in  Chief,  Brauchitsch,  quashed  the 
sentences  altogether  though  not  until  Himmler  had  inter- 
vened, with  the  excuse  that  they  came  under  a “general 
amnesty.” 

The  German  generals,  upright  Christians  that  they  con- 
sidered themselves  to  be,  found  the  situation  embarrassing. 
On  September  12,  there  was  a meeting  on  the  Fuehrer’s 
railroad  train  between  Keitel  and  Admiral  Canaris  at 
which  the  latter  protested  against  the  atrocities  in  Poland. 
The  lackey  Chief  of  OKW  curtly  replied  that  “the  Fuehrer 
has  already  decided  on  this  matter.”  If  the  Army  wanted 
“no  part  in  these  occurrences  it  would  have  to  accept  the 
S.S.  and  Gestapo  as  rivals” — that  is,  it  would  have  to 
accept  S.S.  commissars  in  each  military  unit  “to  carry  out 
the  exterminations.” 

I pointed  out  to  General  Keitel  [Canaris  wrote  in  his  diary, 
which  was  produced  at  Nuremberg]  that  I knew  that  extensive 
executions  were  planned  in  Poland  and  that  particularly  the 
nobility  and  the  clergy  were  to  be  exterminated.  Eventually 
the  world  would  hold  the  Wehrmacht  responsible  for  these 
deeds.36 

Himmler  was  too  clever  to  let  the  generals  wiggle  out 
of  part  of  the  responsibility.  On  September  19  Heydrich, 
Himmler’s  chief  assistant,  paid  a visit  to  the  Army  High 


874 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Command  and  told  General  Wagner  of  S.S.  plans  for 
the  “housecleaning  of  [Polish]  Jews,  intelligentsia,  clergy 
and  the  nobility.”  Haider’s  reaction  to  such  plans  was  put 
down  in  his  diary  after  Wagner  had  reported  to  him: 

Army  insists  that  “housecleaning”  be  deferred  until  Army 
has  withdrawn  and  the  country  has  been  turned  over  to  civil 
administration.  Early  December. 

This  brief  diary  entry  by  the  Chief  of  the  Army  Gen- 
eral Staff  provides  a key  to  the  understanding  of  the 
morals  of  the  German  generals.  They  were  not  going  to 
seriously  oppose  the  “housecleaning” — that  is,  the  wiping 
out  of  the  Polish  Jews,  intelligentsia,  clergy  and  nobility. 
They  were  merely  going  to  ask  that  it  be  “deferred”  until 
they  got  out  of  Poland  and  could  escape  the  responsibility. 
And,  of  course,  foreign  public  opinion  must  be  considered. 
As  Haider  jotted  down  in  his  diary  the  next  day,  after  a 
long  conference  with  Brauchitsch  about  the  “houseclean- 
ing” in  Poland: 

Nothing  must  occur  which  would  afford  foreign  countries 
an  opportunity  to  launch  any  sort  of  atrocity  propaganda 
based  on  such  incidents.  Catholic  clergy!  Impractical  at  this 
time. 

The  next  day,  September  21,  Heydrich  forwarded  to 
the  Army  High  Command  a copy  of  his  initial  “house- 
cleaning” plans.  As  a first  step  the  Jews  were  to  be  herded 
into  the  cities  (where  it  would  be  easy  to  round  them  up 
for  liquidation).  “The  final  solution,”  he  declared,  would 
take  some  time  to  achieve  and  must  be  kept  “strictly 
secret,”  but  no  general  who  read  the  confidential  memoran- 
dum could  have  doubted  that  the  “final  solution”  was 
extermination.37  Within  two  years,  when  it  came  time 
to  carry  it  out,  it  would  become  one  of  the  most  sinister 
code  names  bandied  about  by  high  German  officials  to 
cover  one  of  the  most  hideous  Nazi  crimes  of  the  war. 

What  was  left  of  Poland  after  Russia  seized  her  share 
in  the  east  and  Germany  formally  annexed  her  former 
provinces  and  some  additional  territory  in  the  west  was 
designated  by  a decree  of  the  Fuehrer  of  October  12  as 
the  General  Government  of  Poland  and  Hans  Frank  ap- 
pointed as  its  Governor  General,  with  Seyss-Inquart,  the 
Viennese  quisling,  as  his  deputy.  Frank  was  a typical 
example  of  the  Nazi  intellectual  gangster.  He  had  joined 


875 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

the  party  in  1927,  soon  after  his  graduation  from  law 
school,  and  quickly  made  a reputation  as  the  legal  light 
of  the  movement.  Nimble-minded,  energetic,  well  read  not 
only  in  the  law  but  in  general  literature,  devoted  to  the 
arts  and  especially  to  music,  he  became  a power  in  the 
legal  profession  after  the  Nazis  assumed  office,  serving  first 
as  Bavarian  Minister  of  Justice,  then  Reichsminister  with- 
out Portfolio  and  president  of  the  Academy  of  Law  and 
of  the  German  Bar  Association.  A dark,  dapper,  bouncy 
fellow,  father  of  five  children,  his  intelligence  and  culti- 
vation partly  offset  his  primitive  fanaticism  and  up  to 
this  time  made  him  one  of  the  least  repulsive  of  the  men 
around  Hitler.  But  behind  the  civilized  veneer  of  the  man 
lay  the  cold  killer.  The  forty-two-volume  journal  he  kept 
of  his  life  and  works,  which  showed  up  at  Nuremberg,* 
was  one  of  the  most  terrifying  documents  to  come  out 
of  the  dark  Nazi  world,  portraying  the  author  as  an  icy, 
efficient,  ruthless,  bloodthirsty  man.  Apparently  it  omitted 
none  of  his  barbaric  utterances. 

“The  Poles,”  he  declared  the  day  after  he  took  his  new 
job,  “shall  be  the  slaves  of  the  German  Reich.”  When  once 
he  heard  that  Neurath,  the  “Protector”  of  Bohemia,  had 
put  up  posters  announcing  the  execution  of  seven  Czech 
university  students,  Frank  exclaimed  to  a Nazi  journalist, 
“If  I wished  to  order  that  one  should  hang  up  posters 
about  every  seven  Poles  shot,  there  would  not  be  enough 
forests  in  Poland  with  which  to  make  the  paper  for  these 
posters.”  38 

Himmler  and  Heydrich  were  assigned  by  Hitler  to  liqui- 
date the  Jews.  Frank’s  job,  besides  squeezing  food  and 
supplies  and  forced  labor  out  of  Poland,  was  to  liquidate 
the  intelligentsia.  The  Nazis  had  a beautiful  code  name 
for  this  operation:  “Extraordinary  Pacification  Action” 
(Ausserordenliche  Befriedigungsaktion,  or  “AB  Action,”  as 
it  came  to  be  known).  It  took  some  time  for  Frank  to  get 
it  going.  It  was  not  until  the  following  late  spring,  when 
the  big  German  offensive  in  the  West  took  the  attention 
of  the  world  from  Poland,  that  he  began  to  achieve  re- 
sults. By  May  30,  as  his  own  journal  shows,  he  could 
boast  in  a pep  talk  to  his  police  aides  of  good  progress — 


* It  was  found  in  May  1945  by  Lieutenant  Walter  Stein  of  the  U.S.  Seventh 
Army  in  Frank’s  apartment  at  the  hotel  Berghof  near  Neuhaus  in  Bavaria. 


876 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  lives  of  “some  thousands”  of  Polish  intellectuals  taken, 
or  about  to  be  taken. 

“I  pray  you,  gentlemen,”  he  asked,  “to  take  the  most 
rigorous  measures  possible  to  help  us  in  this  task.”  Con- 
fidentially he  added  that  these  were  “the  Fuehrer’s  orders.” 
Hitler,  he  said,  had  expressed  it  this  way: 

“The  men  capable  of  leadership  in  Poland  must  be  liqui- 
dated. Those  following  them  . . . must  be  eliminated  in  their 
turn.  There  is  no  need  to  burden  the  Reich  with  this  ...  no 
need  to  send  these  elements  to  Reich  concentration  camps.” 

They  would  be  put  out  of  the  way,  he  said,  right 
there  in  Poland.39 

At  the  meeting,  as  Frank  noted  in  his  journal,  the  chief 
of  the  Security  Police  gave  a progress  report.  About  two 
thousand  men  and  several  hundred  women,  he  said,  had 
been  apprehended  “at  the  beginning  of  the  Extraordinary 
Pacification  Action.”  Most  of  them  already  had  been 
“summarily  sentenced” — a Nazi  euphemism  for  liquida- 
tion. A second  batch  of  intellectuals  was  now  being  round- 
ed up  “for  summary  sentence.”  Altogether  “about  3,500 
persons,”  the  most  dangerous  of  the  Polish  intelligentsia, 
would  thus  be  taken  care  of.40 

Frank  did  not  neglect  the  Jews,  even  if  the  Gestapo 
had  filched  the  direct  task  of  extermination  away  from 
him.  His  journal  is  full  of  his  thoughts  and  accomplish- 
ments on  the  subject.  On  October  7,  1940,  it  records  a 
speech  he  made  that  day  to  a Nazi  assembly  in  Poland 
summing  up  his  first  year  of  effort. 

My  dear  Comrades!  ...  I could  not  eliminate  all  lice 
and  Jews  in  only  one  year.  [“Public  amused,”  he  notes 
down  at  this  point.]  But  in  the  course  of  time,  and  if  you 
help  me,  this  end  will  be  attained.41 

A fortnight  before  Christmas  of  the  following  year, 
Frank  closed  a cabinet  session  at  Cracow,  his  headquarters, 
by  saying: 

As  far  as  the  Jews  are  concerned,  I want  to  tell  you  quite 
frankly  that  they  must  be  done  away  with  in  one  way  or  an- 
other . . . Gentlemen,  I must  ask  you  to  rid  yourself  of  all 
feeling  of  pity.  We  must  annihilate  the  Jews. 

It  was  difficult,  he  admitted,  to  “shoot  or  poison  the 
three  and  a half  million  Jews  in  the  General  Government, 
but  we  shall  be  able  to  take  measures  which  will  lead, 


877 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

somehow,  to  their  annihilation.”  This  was  an  accurate  pre- 
diction.42 

The  hounding  of  Jews  and  Poles  from  the  homes  which 
they  and  their  families  had  dwelt  in  for  generations  began 
as  soon  as  the  fighting  in  Poland  was  over.  On  October 
7,  the  day  after  his  “peace  speech”  in  the  Reichstag, 
Hitler  appointed  Himmler  to  be  the  head  of  a new  or- 
ganization, the  Reich  Commissariat  for  the  Strengthening 
of  German  Nationhood,  or  R.K.F.D.V.,  for  short.  It  was 
to  carry  out  the  deportation  of  Poles  and  Jews  first  from 
the  Polish  provinces  annexed  outright  by  Germany  and 
replace  them  by  Germans  and  Volksdeutsche,  the  latter 
being  Germans  of  foreign  nationality  who  were  streaming 
in  from  the  threatened  Baltic  lands  and  various  outlying 
parts  of  Poland.  Haider  had  heard  of  the  plan  a fortnight 
before,  noting  in  his  diary  that  “for  every  German  moving 
into  these  territories,  two  people  will  be  expelled  to  Poland.” 

On  October  9,  two  days  after  assuming  the  latest  of 
his  posts,  Himmler  decreed  that  550,000  of  the  650,000 
Jews  living  in  the  annexed  Polish  provinces,  together  with 
all  Poles  not  fit  for  “assimilation,”  should  be  moved  into 
the  territory  of  the  General  Government,  east  of  the 
Vistula  River.  Within  a year  1,200,000  Poles  and  300,000 
Jews  had  been  uprooted  and  driven  to  the  east.  But  only 
497,000  Volksdeutsche  had  been  settled  in  their  place. 
This  was  a little  better  than  Haider’s  ratio:  three  Poles 
and  Jews  expelled  to  one  German  settled  in  their  stead. 

It  was  an  unusually  severe  winter,  that  of  1939-40, 
as  this  writer  remembers,  with  heavy  snows,  and  the 
“resettlement,”  carried  out  in  zero  weather  and  often  dur- 
ing blizzards,  actually  cost  more  Jewish  and  Polish  lives 
than  had  been  lost  to  Nazi  firing  squads  and  gallows. 
Himmler  himself  may  be  cited  as  authority.  Addressing 
the  S.S.  Leibstandarte  the  following  summer  after  the  fall 
of  France,  he  drew  a comparison  between  the  deportations 
which  his  men  were  beginning  to  carry  out  in  the  West 
with  what  had  been  accomplished  in  the  East. 

[It]  happened  in  Poland  in  weather  forty  degrees  be- 
low zero,  where  we  had  to  haul  away  thousands,  tens  of 
thousands,  hundreds  of  thousands;  where  we  had  to  have  the 
toughness — you  should  hear  this,  but  also  forget  it  imme- 
diately— to  shoot  thousands  of  leading  Poles  . . . Gendemen, 


878 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

it  is  much  easier  in  many  cases  to  go  into  combat  with  a 
company  than  to  suppress  an  obstructive  population  of  low 
cultural  level,  or  to  carry  out  executions  or  to  haul  away  peo- 
ple or  to  evict  crying  and  hysterical  women.43 

Already  on  February  21,  1940,  S.S.  Oberfuehrer  Richard 
Gluecks,  the  head  of  the  Concentration  Camp  Inspectorate, 
scouting  around  near  Cracow,  had  informed  Himmler  that 
he  had  found  a “suitable  site”  for  a new  “quarantine 
camp  at  Auschwitz,  a somewhat  forlorn  and  marshy  town 
of  twelve  thousand  inhabitants  in  which  was  situated,  be- 
sides some  factories,  a former  Austrian  cavalry  barracks. 
Work  was  commenced  immediately  and  on  June  14  Ausch- 
witz was  officially  opened  as  a concentration  camp  for 
Polish  political  prisoners  whom  the  Germans  wished  to 
treat  with  special  harshness.  It  was  soon  to  become  a 
much  more  sinister  place.  In  the  meantime  the  directors 
of  I.  G.  Farben,  the  great  German  chemical  trust,  had 
discovered  Auschwitz  as  a “suitable”  site  for  a new  syn- 
thetic coal-oil  and  rubber  plant.  There  not  only  the  con- 
struction of  new  buildings  but  the  operation  of  the  new 
plant  would  have  the  benefit  of  cheap  slave  labor. 

To  superintend  the  new  camp  and  the  supply  of  slave 
labor  for  I.  G.  Farben  there  arrived  at  Auschwitz  in  the 
spring  of  1940  a gang  of  the  most  choice  ruffians  in  the 
S.S.,  among  them  Josef  Kramer,  who  would  later  become 
known  to  the  British  public  as  the  “Beast  of  Belsen,” 
and  Rudolf  Franz  Hoess,  a convicted  murderer  who  had 
served  five  years  in  prison — he  spent  most  of  his  adult 
life  as  first  a convict  and  then  a jailer — and  who  in  1946, 
at  the  age  of  forty-six,  would  boast  at  Nuremberg  that 
at  Auschwitz  he  had  superintended  the  extermination  of 
two  and  a half  million  persons,  not  counting  another  half 
million  who  had  been  allowed  to  “succumb  to  starvation.” 

For  Auschwitz  was  soon  destined  to  become  the  most 
famous  of  the  extermination  camps — V ernichtungslager — 
which  must  be  distinguished  from  the  concentration  camps, 
where  a few  did  survive.  It  is  not  without  significance 
for  an  understanding  of  the  Germans,  even  the  most  re- 
spectable Germans,  under  Hitler,  that  such  a distinguished, 
internationally  known  firm  as  I.  G.  Farben,  whose  directors 
were  honored  as  being  among  the  leading  businessmen  of 
Germany,  God-fearing  men  all,  should  deliberately  choose 
this  death  camp  as  a suitable  place  for  profitable  operations. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 


879 


FRICTION  BETWEEN  THE  TOT ALITARIAN S 

The  Rome-Berlin  Axis  became  squeaky  that  first  fall 
of  the  war. 

Sharp  exchanges  at  various  levels  took  place  over  sev- 
eral differences:  the  failure  of  the  Germans  to  carry  out 
the  evacuation  of  the  Volksdeutsche  from  Italian  South 
Tyrol,  which  had  been  agreed  upon  the  previous  June; 
failure  of  the  Germans  to  supply  Italy  with  a million  tons 
of  coal  a month;  failure  of  the  Italians  to  ignore  the 
British  blockade  and  supply  Germany  with  raw  materials 
brought  through  it;  Italy’s  thriving  trade  with  Britain  and 
France,  including  the  sale  to  them  of  war  materials; 
Ciano’s  increasingly  anti-German  sentiments. 

Mussolini,  as  usual,  blew  hot  and  cold,  and  Ciano  re- 
corded his  waverings  in  his  diary.  On  November  9,  the 
Duce  had  trouble  composing  a telegram  to  Hitler  congratu- 
lating him  on  his  escape  from  assassination. 

He  wanted  it  to  be  warm,  but  not  too  warm,  because  in 
his  judgment  no  Italian  feels  any  great  joy  over  the  fact 
that  Hitler  escaped  death — least  of  all  the  Duce. 

November  20.  . . . For  Mussolini  the  idea  of  Hitler’s  wag- 
ing war,  and,  worse  still,  winning  it,  is  altogether  unbearable. 

The  day  after  Christmas  the  Duce  was  expressing  a 
“desire  for  a German  defeat”  and  instructing  Ciano  to 
secretly  inform  Belgium  and  Holland  that  they  were  about 
to  be  attacked.*  But  by  New  Year’s  Eve  he  was  talking 
again  of  jumping  into  the  war  on  Hitler’s  side. 

The  chief  cause  of  friction  between  the  two  Axis  Powers 
was  Germany’s  pro-Russian  policy.  On  November  30, 
1939,  the  Soviet  Red  Army  had  attacked  Finland  and 
Hitler  had  been  placed  in  a most  humiliating  position. 
Driven  out  of  the  Baltic  as  the  price  of  his  pact  with 
Stalin,  forced  to  hurriedly  evacuate  the  German  families 
who  had  lived  there  for  centuries,  he  now  had  to  officially 
condone  Russia’s  unprovoked  attack  on  a little  country 
which  had  close  ties  with  Germany  and  whose  very  in- 
dependence as  a non-Communist  nation  had  been  won  from 
the  Soviet  Union  largely  by  the  intervention  of  regular 

* Ciano  conveyed  the  warning  to  the  Belgian  ambassador  in  Rome  on  Janu- 
ary 2,  noting  the  action  in  his  diary.  According  to  Weizsaecker  the  Germans 
intercepted  two  coded  telegrams  from  the  ambassador  to  Brussels  containing 
the  Italian  warning  and  deciphered  them.44 


880 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

German  troops  in  1918.*  It  was  a bitter  pill  to  swallow, 
but  he  swallowed  it.  Strict  instructions  were  given  to  Ger- 
man diplomatic  missions  abroad  and  to  the  German  press 
and  radio  to  support  Russia’s  aggression  and  avoid  ex- 
pressing any  sympathy  with  the  Finns. 

This  may  have  been  the  last  straw  with  Mussolini,  who 
had  to  cope  with  anti-German  demonstrations  through- 
out Italy.  At  any  rate,  shortly  after  the  New  Year,  1940, 
on  January  3,  he  unburdened  himself  in  a long  letter  to 
the  Fuehrer.  Never  before,  and  certainly  never  afterward, 
was  the  Duce  so  frank  with  Hitler  or  so  ready  to  give 
such  sharp  and  unpleasant  advice. 

He  was  ‘ profoundly  convinced,”  he  said,  that  Germany, 
even  if  assisted  by  Italy,  could  never  bring  Britain  and 
France  “to  their  knees  or  even  divide  them.  To  believe 
that  is  to  delude  oneself.  The  United  States  would  not 
permit  a total  defeat  of  the  democracies.”  Therefore,  now 
that  Hitler  had  secured  his  eastern  frontier,  was  it  neces- 
sary ‘ to  risk  all — including  the  regime — and  sacrifice  the 
flower  of  German  generations”  in  order  to  try  to  defeat 
them?  Peace  could  be  had,  Mussolini  suggested,  if  Ger- 
many would  allow  the  existence  of  “a  modest,  disarmed 
Poland,  which  is  exclusively  Polish.  Unless  you  are  ir- 
revocably resolved  to  prosecute  the  war  to  a finish,”  he 
added,  “I  believe  that  the  creation  of  a Polish  state  . . . 
would  be  an  element  that  would  resolve  the  war  and 
constitute  a condition  sufficient  for  the  peace.” 

But  it  was  Germany’s  deal  with  Russia  which  chiefly 
concerned  the  Italian  dictator. 

. . . Without  striking  a blow,  Russia  has  in  Poland  and 
the  Baltic  profited  from  the  war.  But  I,  a born  revolutionist, 
tell  you  that  you  cannot  permanently  sacrifice  the  prin- 
ciples of  your  Revolution  to  the  tactical  exigencies  of  a 
certain  political  moment  ...  It  is  my  duty  to  add  that  one 
further  step  in  your  relations  with  Moscow  would  have 
catastrophic  repercussions  in  Italy  . . ,45 

Mussolini’s  letter  not  only  was  a warning  to  Hitler  of 
the  degeneration  of  Italo-German  relations  but  it  hit 
a vulnerable  target:  the  Fuehrer’s  honeymoon  with  Soviet 

* On  October  9,  1918 — this  is  a little-known,  ludicrous  tidbit  of  history — 
the  Finnish  Diet,  under  the  impression  that  Germany  was  winning  the  war, 
elected  by  a vote  of  75  to  25  Prince  Friedrich  Karl  of  Hesse  to  be  King  of 
Finland.  Allied  victory  a month  later  put  an  end  to  this  fantastic  episode 


881 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Russia,  which  was  beginning  to  get  on  the  nerves  of  both 
parties.  It  had  enabled  him  to  launch  his  war  and  destroy 
Poland.  It  had  even  given  him  other  benefits.  The  cap- 
tured German  papers  reveal,  for  instance,  one  of  the  best- 
kept  secrets  of  the  war:  the  Soviet  Union’s  help  in  provid- 
ing ports  on  the  Arctic,  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Pacific 
through  which  Germany  could  import  badly  needed  raw 
materials  otherwise  shut  off  by  the  British  blockade. 

On  November  10,  1939,  Molotov  even  agreed  to  the 
Soviet  government’s  paying  the  freight  charges  on  all  such 
goods  carried  over  the  Russian  railways.46  Refueling  and 
repair  facilities  were  provided  German  ships,  including 
submarines,  at  the  Arctic  port  of  Teriberka,  east  of  Mur- 
mansk—Molotov  thought  the  latter  port  “was  not  isolated 
enough,”  whereas  Teriberka  was  “more  suited  because  it 
was  more  remote  and  not  visited  by  foreign  ships.”  47 
All  through  the  autumn  and  early  winter  of  1939  Mos- 
cow and  Berlin  negotiated  for  increased  trade  between 
the  two  countries.  By  the  end  of  October  Russian  deliveries 
of  raw  stuffs,  especially  grain  and  oil,  to  Germany  were 
considerable,  but  the  Germans  wanted  more.  However, 
they  were  learning  that  in  economics,  as  well  as  politics, 
the  Soviets  were  shrewd  and  hard  bargainers.  On  No- 
vember 1,  Field  Marshal  Goering,  Grand  Admiral  Raeder 
and  Colonel  General  Keitel,  “independently  of  each 
other,”  as  Weizsaecker  noted,  protested  to  the  German 
Foreign  Office  that  the  Russians  were  demanding  too 
much  German  war  material.  A month  later  Keitel  was 
again  complaining  to  Weizsaecker  that  Russian  require- 
ments for  German  products,  especially  machine  tools  for 
manufacturing  munitions,  were  “growing  more  and  more 
voluminous  and  unreasonable.”  48 

But  if  Germany  wanted  food  and  oil  from  Russia,  it 
would  have  to  pay  for  them  in  the  goods  Moscow  needed 
and  wanted.  So  desperate  was  the  blockaded  Reich  for 
these  necessities  from  Russia  that  later,  on  March  30, 
1940,  at  a crucial  moment.  Hitler  ordered  that  delivery 
of  war  material  to  the  Russians  should  have  priority  even 
over  that  to  the  German  armed  forces.*  60  At  one  point 

* After  the  conquest  of  France  and  the  lowlands,  Goering  informed  General 
Thomas,  the  economic  chief  of  OKW,  “that  the  Fuehrer  desired  punctual 
delivery  to  the  Russians  only  until  the  spring  of  1941.  Later  on,”  he  added, 
“we  would  have  no  further  interest  in  completely  satisfying  the  Russian 
demands.”48 


882 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  Germans  threw  in  the  unfinished  heavy  cruiser 
Luetzow  as  part  of  current  payments  to  Moscow.  Earlier, 
on  December  15,  Admiral  Raeder  proposed  selling  the 
plans  and  drawings  for  the  Bismarck,  the  world’s  biggest 
battleship  (45,000  tons),  then  building,  to  the  Russians 
if  they  paid  “a  very  high  price.”  61 

By  the  end  of  1939  Stalin  himself  was  personally  par- 
ticipating in  the  negotiations  at  Moscow  with  the  German 
trade  delegation.  The  German  economists  found  him  a 
formidable  trader.  In  the  captured  Wilhelmstrasse  papers 
there  are  long  and  detailed  memoranda  of  three  memora- 
ble meetings  with  the  awesome  Soviet  dictator,  who  had 
a grasp  of  detail  that  stunned  the  Germans.  Stalin,  they 
found,  could  not  be  bluffed  or  cheated  but  could  be  ter- 
ribly demanding,  and  at  times,  as  Dr.  Schnurre,  one  of 
the  Nazi  negotiators,  reported  to  Berlin,  he  “became  quite 
agitated.”  the  Soviet  Union,  Stalin  reminded  the  Germans, 
had  “rendered  a very  great  service  to  Germany  [and]  had 
made  enemies  by  rendering  this  assistance.”  In  return  it 
expected  some  consideration  from  Berlin.  At  one  con- 
ference at  the  Kremlin  on  New  Year’s  Eve,  1939-40, 

Stalin  characterized  the  total  price  of  the  airplanes  as  out  of 
the  question.  It  represented  a multiplication  of  the  actual 
prices.  If  Germany  did  not  wish  to  deliver  the  airplanes,  he 
would  have  preferred  to  have  this  openly  stated. 

At  a midnight  meeting  in  the  Kremlin  on  February  8 

Stalin  requested  the  Germans  to  propose  suitable  prices  and 
not  to  set  them  too  high,  as  had  happened  before.  As  ex- 
amples were  mentioned  the  total  price  of  300  million  Reichs- 
marks for  airplanes  and  the  German  valuation  of  the  cruiser 
Luetzow  at  150  million  RM.  One  should  not  take  advantage 
of  the  Soviet  Union’s  good  nature.62 

On  February  11,  1940,  an  intricate  trade  agreement 
was  finally  signed  in  Moscow  providing  for  an  exchange 
of  goods,  during  the  ensuing  eighteen  months,  of  a 
minimum  worth  of  640  million  Reichsmarks.  This  was  in 
addition  to  the  trade  agreed  upon  during  the  previous 
August  amounting  to  roughly  150  millions  a year.  Rus- 
sia was  to  get,  besides  the  cruiser  Luetzow  and  the  plans 
of  the  Bismarck,  heavy  naval  guns  and  other  gear  and 
some  thirty  of  Germany’s  latest  warplanes,  including  the 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  883 

Messerschmitt  fighters  109  and  110  and  the  Ju-88  dive 
bombers.  In  addition  the  Soviets  were  to  receive  machines 
for  their  oil  and  electric  industries,  locomotives,  turbines, 
generators,  Diesel  engines,  ships,  machine  tools  and  sam- 
ples of  German  artillery,  tanks,  explosives,  chemical-war- 
fare equipment  and  so  on.63 

What  the  Germans  got  the  first  year  was  recorded  by 
OKW — one  million  tons  of  cereals,  half  a million  tons 
of  wheat,  900,000  tons  of  oil,  100,000  tons  of  cotton, 
500,000  tons  of  phosphates,  considerable  amounts  of 
numerous  other  vital  raw  materials  and  the  transit  of  a 
million  tons  of  soybeans  from  Manchuria.64 

Back  in  Berlin,  Dr.  Schnurre,  the  Foreign  Office’s  eco- 
nomic expert,  who  had  masterminded  the  trade  negotia- 
tions for  Germany  in  Moscow,  drew  up  a long  memoran- 
dum on  what  he  had  gained  for  the  Reich.  Besides  the 
desperately  needed  raw  materials  which  Russia  would  sup- 
ply, Stalin,  he  said,  had  promised  “generous  help”  in 
acting  “as  a buyer  of  metals  and  raw  materials  in  third 
countries.” 

The  Agreement  [Schnurre  concluded]  means  a wide- 
open  door  to  the  East  for  us  . . . The  effects  of  the  British 
blockade  will  be  decisively  weakened.65 

This  was  one  reason  why  Hitler  swallowed  his  pride, 
supported  Russia’s  aggression  against  Finland,  which  was 
very  unpopular  in  Germany,  and  accepted  the  threat  of 
Soviet  troops  and  airmen  setting  up  bases  in  the  three 
Baltic  countries  (to  be  eventually  used  against  whom  but 
Germany?).  Stalin  was  helping  him  to  surmount  the  Brit- 
ish blockade.  But  more  important  than  that,  Stalin  still 
afforded  him  the  opportunity  of  fighting  a one-front  war, 
of  concentrating  all  his  military  might  in  the  west  for  a 
knockout  blow  against  France  and  Britain  and  the  over- 
running of  Belgium  and  Holland,  after  which — well,  Hit- 
ler had  already  told  his  generals  what  he  had  in  mind. 

As  early  as  October  17,  1939,  with  the  Polish  campaign 
scarcely  over,  he  had  reminded  Keitel  that  Polish  terri- 
tory 

is  important  to  us  from  a military  point  of  view  as  an  ad- 
vanced jumping-off  point  and  for  strategic  concentration  of 
troops.  To  that  end  the  railroads,  roads  and  communication 
channels  are  to  be  kept  in  order.66 


884 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


As  the  momentous  year  of  1939  approached  its  end 
Hitler  realized,  as  he  had  told  his  generals  in  his  memo- 
randum of  October  9,  that  Soviet  neutrality  could  not  be 
counted  on  forever.  In  eight  months  or  a year,  he  had 
said,  things  might  change.  And  in  his  harangue  to  them 
on  November  23  he  had  emphasized  that  “we  can  oppose 
Russia  only  when  we  are  free  in  the  West.”  This  was  a 
thought  which  never  left  his  restless  mind. 

The  fateful  year  faded  into  history  in  a curious  and 
even  eerie  atmosphere.  Though  there  was  world  war,  there 
was  no  fighting  on  land,  and  in  the  skies  the  big  bombers 
carried  only  propaganda  pamphlets,  and  badly  written  ones 
at  that.  Only  at  sea  was  there  actual  warfare.  U-boats 
continued  to  take  their  toll  of  British  and  sometimes  neu- 
tral shipping  in  the  cruel,  icy  northern  Atlantic. 

In  the  South  Atlantic  the  Graf  Spee,  one  of  Germany’s 
three  pocket  battleships,  had  emerged  from  its  waiting 
area  and  in  three  months  had  sunk  nine  British  cargo 
vessels  totaling  50,000  tons.  Then,  a fortnight  before  the 
first  Christmas  of  the  war,  on  December  14,  1939,  the 
German  public  was  electrified  by  the  news,  splashed  in 
flaming  headlines  and  in  bulletins  flashed  over  the  radio, 
of  a great  victory  at  sea.  The  Graf  Spee,  it  was  said,  had 
engaged  three  British  cruisers  on  the  previous  day  four 
hundred  miles  off  Montevideo  and  put  them  out  of  ac- 
tion. But  elation  soon  turned  to  puzzlement.  Three  days 
later  the  press  announced  that  the  pocket  battleship  had 
scuttled  herself  in  the  Plate  estuary  just  outside  the  Uru- 
guayan capital.  What  kind  of  a victory  was  that?  On 
December  21,  the  High  Command  of  the  Navy  announced 
that  the  Graf  Spee's  commander,  Captain  Hans  Langsdorff, 
had  “followed  his  ship”  and  thus  “fulfilled  like  a fighter 
and  hero  the  expectations  of  his  Fuehrer,  the  German 
people  and  the  Navy.” 

The  wretched  German  people  were  never  told  that  the 
Graf  Spee  had  been  severely  damaged  by  the  three  British 
cruisers,  which  it  outgunned,*  that  it  had  had  to  put  into 
Montevideo  for  repairs,  that  the  Uruguayan  government, 
in  accordance  with  international  law,  had  allowed  it  to 

* The  day  before  the  scuttling  Goebbels  had  made  the  German  press  play  up 
a faked  dispatch  from  Montevideo  saying  the  Graf  Spee  had  suffered  only 
“superficial  damage”  and  that  British  reports  that  it  had  been  severely 
crippled  were  “pure  lies.” 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  885 

remain  for  only  seventy-two  hours,  which  was  not  enough, 
that  the  “hero,”  Captain  Langsdorff,  rather  than  risk  fur- 
ther battle  with  the  British  with  his  crippled  ship,  had 
therefore  scuttled  it,  and  that  he  himself,  instead  of  going 
down  with  her,  had  shot  himself  two  days  afterward  in 
a lonely  hotel  room  in  Buenos  Aires.  Nor  were  they  told, 
of  course,  that,  as  General  Jodi  jotted  in  his  diary  on 
December  18,  the  Fuehrer  was  “very  angry  about  the 
scuttling  of  Graf  Spee  without  a fight”  and  sent  for  Ad- 
miral Raeder,  to  whom  he  gave  a dressing  down.67 

On  December  12,  Hitler  issued  another  top-secret  di- 
rective postponing  the  attack  in  the  West  and  stipulating 
that  a fresh  decision  would  not  be  made  until  December 
27  and  that  the  earliest  date  for  “A  Day”  would  be 
January  1,  1940.  He  advised  that  Christmas  leaves  could 
therefore  be  granted.  According  to  my  diary,  Christmas, 
the  high  point  of  the  year  for  Germans,  was  a bleak  one 
in  Berlin  that  winter,  with  few  presents  exchanged,  Spartan 
food,  the  menfolk  away,  the  streets  blacked  out,  the 
shutters  and  curtains  drawn  tight,  and  everyone  grumbling 
about  the  war,  the  food  and  the  cold. 

There  was  an  exchange  of  Christmas  greetings  between 
Hitler  and  Stalin. 

Best  wishes  [Hitler  wired]  for  your  personal  well-being 
as  well  as  for  the  prosperous  future  of  the  peoples  of  the 
friendly  Soviet  Union. 

To  which  Stalin  replied: 

The  friendship  of  the  peoples  of  Germany  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  cemented  by  blood,  has  every  reason  to  be  lasting 
and  Arm. 

In  Berlin  Ambassador  von  Hassell  used  the  holidays., 
to  confer  with  his  fellow  conspirators,  Popitz,  Goerdeler 
and  General  Beck,  and  on  December  30  recorded  in  his 
diary  the  latest  plan.  It  was 

to  have  a number  of  divisions  stop  in  Berlin  “in  transit 
from  west  to  east.”  Then  Witzleben  was  to  appear  in  Berlin 
and  dissolve  the  S.S.  On  the  basis  of  this  action  Beck  would 
go  to  Zossen  and  take  the  supreme  command  from  Brauch- 
itsch’s  hands.  A doctor  would  declare  Hitler  incapable  of 
continuing  in  office,  whereupon  he  would  be  taken  into  cus- 
tody. Then  an  appeal  would  be  made  to  the  people  along  these 
lines:  prevention  of  further  S.S.  atrocities,  restoration  of 


886  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

decency  and  Christian  morality,  continuation  of  the  war, 
but  readiness  for  peace  on  a reasonable  basis  . . . 

But  it  was  all  unreal;  all  talk.  And  so  confused  were 
the  “plotters”  that  Hassell  devoted  a long  patch  of  his 
diary  to  the  consideration  of  whether  they  should  retain 
Goering  or  not! 

Goering  himself,  along  with  Hitler,  Himmler,  Goebbels, 
Ley  and  other  party  leaders,  used  the  New  Year  to  issue 
grandiose  proclamations.  Ley  said,  “the  Fuehrer  is  always 
right!  Obey  the  Fuehrer!”  The  Fuehrer  himself  proclaimed 
that  not  he  but  “the  Jewish  and  capitalistic  warmongers” 
had  started  the  war  and  went  on: 

United  within  the  country,  economically  prepared  and 
militarily  armed  to  the  highest  degree,  we  enter  this  most 
decisive  year  in  German  history  . . . May  the  year  1940  bring 
the  decision.  It  will  be,  whatever  happens,  our  victory. 

On  December  27  he  had  again  postponed  the  attack  in 
the  West  “by  at  least  a fortnight.”  On  January  10  he 
ordered  it  definitely  set  for  January  17  “fifteen  minutes 
before  sunrise — 8:16  a.m.”  The  Air  Force  was  to  begin 
its  attack  on  January  14,  three  days  in  advance,  its  task 
being  to  destroy  enemy  airfields  in  France,  but  not  in 
Belgium  and  Holland.  The  two  little  neutral  countries 
were  to  be  kept  guessing  about  their  fate  until  the  last 
moment. 

But  on  January  13  the  Nazi  warlord  suddenly  postponed 
the  onslaught  again  “on  account  of  the  meteorological  situ- 
ation.” The  captured  OKW  file  on  D Day  in  the  West 
is  thereafter  silent  until  May  7.  Weather  may  have  played 
a part  in  the  calling  off  of  the  attack  on  January  13.  But 
we  now  know  that  two  other  events  were  mainly  re- 
sponsible— an  unfortunate  forced  landing  of  a very  spe- 
cial German  military  plane  in  Belgium  on  January  10 
and  a new  opportunity  that  now  appeared  to  the  north. 

On  the  very  day,  January  10,  that  Hitler  had  ordered 
the  attack  through  Belgium  and  Holland  to  begin  on  the 
seventeenth,  a German  military  plane  flying  from  Muen- 
ster  to  Cologne  became  lost  in  the  clouds  over  Belgium 
and  was  forced  to  land  near  Mechelen-sur-Meuse.  In  it 
was  Major  Helmut  Reinberger,  an  important  Luftwaffe 
staff  officer,  and  in  his  briefcase  were  the  German  plans, 
complete  with  maps,  for  the  attack  in  the  West.  As  Bel- 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  887 

gian  soldiers  closed  in,  the  major  made  for  some  nearby 
bushes  and  lit  a fire  to  the  contents  of  his  briefcase. 
Attracted  by  this  interesting  phenomenon  the  Belgian  sol- 
diers stamped  out  the  flames  and  retrieved  what  was  left. 
Taken  to  military  quarters  nearby,  Reinberger,  in  a des- 
perate gesture,  grabbed  the  partly  burned  papers,  which 
a Belgian  officer  had  placed  on  a table,  and  threw  them 
into  a lighted  stove.  The  Belgian  officer  quickly  snatched 
them  out. 

Reinberger  promptly  reported  to  Luftwaffe  headquarters 
in  Berlin  through  his  embassy  in  Brussels  that  he  had 
succeeded  in  burning  down  the  papers  to  “insignificant 
fragments,  the  size  of  the  palm  of  his  hand.”  But  in 
Berlin  there  was  consternation  in  high  quarters.  Jodi  im- 
mediately reported  to  Hitler  “on  what  the  enemy  may 
or  may  not  know.”  But  he  did  not  know  himself.  “If 
enemy  is  in  possession  of  all  the  files,”  he  confided  to 
his  diary  on  January  12,  after  seeing  the  Fuehrer,  “the  situa- 
tion is  catastrophic.”  That  evening  Ribbentrop  sent  a 
most  urgent”  wire  to  the  German  Embassy  in  Brussels 
asking  for  an  immediate  report  on  the  “destruction  of 
the  courier  baggage.”  On  the  morning  of  January  13, 
Jodi’s  diary  reveals,  there  was  a conference  of  Goering 
with  his  air  attache  in  Brussels,  who  had  flown  posthaste 
back  to  Berlin,  and  the  top  Luftwaffe  brass.  “Result:  Dis- 
patch case  burned  for  certain,”  Jodi  recorded. 

But  this  was  whistling  in  the  dark,  as  Jodi’s  journal 
makes  clear.  At  1 p.m.  it  noted:  “Order  to  Gen.  Haider 
by  telephone:  All  movements  to  stop.” 

The  same  day,  the  thirteenth,  the  German  ambassador 
in  Brussels  was  urgently  informing  Berlin  of  consider- 
able Belgian  troop  movements  “as  a result  of  alarming 
reports  received  by  the  Belgian  General  Staff.”  The  next 
day  the  ambassador  got  off  another  “most  urgent”  mes- 
sage to  Berlin:  The  Belgians  were  ordering  “Phase  D,”  the 
next-to-the-last  step  in  mobilization,  and  calling  up  two 
new  classes.  The  reason,  he  thought,  was  “reports  of  Ger- 
man troop  movements  on  the  Belgian  and  Dutch  frontiers 
as  well  as  the  content  of  the  partly  unburned  courier 
mail  found  on  the  German  Air  Force  officer.” 

By  the  evening  of  January  15  doubts  had  risen  in  the 
minds  of  the  top  brass  in  Berlin  whether  Major  Reinberger 
had  really  destroyed  the  incriminating  documents  as  he 


888  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

had  claimed.  They  were  “presumably  burned,”  Jodi  re- 
marked after  another  conference  on  the  matter.  But  on 
January  17  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister,  Paul-Henri  Spaak, 
sent  for  the  German  ambassador  and  told  him  flatly,  as  the 
latter  promptly  reported  to  Berlin,  that 

the  plane  which  made  an  emergency  landing  on  January  10 
had  put  into  Belgian  hands  a document  of  the  most  extraor- 
dinary and  serious  nature,  which  contained  clear  proof  of 
an  intention  to  attack.  It  was  not  just  an  operations  plan, 
but  an  attack  order  worked  out  in  every  detail,  in  which 
only  the  time  remained  to  be  inserted. 

The  Germans  were  never  quite  sure  whether  Spaak  was 
not  bluffing.  On  the  Allied  side — the  British  and  French 
general  staffs  were  given  copies  of  the  German  plan — 
there  was  a tendency  to  view  the  German  papers  as  a 
“plant.”  Churchill  says  he  vigorously  opposed  this  inter- 
pretation and  laments  that  nothing  was  done  about  this 
grave  warning.  What  is  certain  is  that  on  January  13,  the 
day  after  Hitler  was  informed  of  the  affair,  he  postponed 
the  attack  and  that  by  the  time  it  again  came  up  for 
decision  in  the  spring  the  whole  strategic  plan  had  been 
fundamentally  changed.58 

But  the  forced  landing  in  Belgium — and  the  bad  weather 
— were  not  the  only  reasons  for  putting  off  the  attack. 
Plans  for  a daring  German  assault  on  two  other  little 
neutral  states  farther  to  the  north  had  in  the  meantime 
been  ripening  in  Berlin  and  now  took  priority.  The  phony 
war,  so  far  as  the  Germans  were  concerned,  was  coming 
to  an  end  with  the  approach  of  spring. 


20 


TOE  CONQUEST  OF  DENMARK 
AND  NORWAY 


the  innocent-sounding  code  name  for  the  latest  plan 
of  German  aggression  was  Weseruebung,  or  “Weser  Exer- 
cise.” Its  origins  and  development  were  unique,  quite  un- 
like those  for  unprovoked  attack  that  have  filled  so  large 
a part  of  this  narrative.  It  was  not  the  brain  child  of 
Hitler,  as  were  all  the  others,  but  of  an  ambitious  ad- 
miral and  a muddled  Nazi  party  hack.  It  was  the  only  act 
of  German  military  aggression  in  which  the  German  Navy 
played  the  decisive  role.  It  was  also  the  only  one  for 
which  OKW  did  the  planning  and  co-ordinating  of  the 
three  armed  services.  In  fact,  the  Army  High  Command 
and  its  General  Staff  were  not  even  consulted,  much  to 
their  annoyance,  and  Goering  was  not  brought  into  the 
picture  until  the  last  moment — a slight  that  infuriated  the 
corpulent  chief  of  the  Luftwaffe. 

The  German  Navy  had  long  had  its  eyes  on  the  north. 
Germany  had  no  direct  access  to  the  wide  ocean,  a geo- 
graphical fact  which  had  been  imprinted  on  the  minds  of 
its  naval  officers  during  the  First  World  War.  A tight 
British  net  across  the  narrow  North  Sea,  from  the  Shet- 
land Islands  to  the  coast  of  Norway,  maintained  by  a 
mine  barrage  and  a patrol  of  ships,  had  bottled  up  the 
powerful  Imperial  Navy,  seriously  hampered  the  attempts 
of  U-boats  to  break  out  into  the  North  Atlantic,  and  kept 
German  merchant  shipping  off  the  seas.  The  German  High 
Seas  Fleet  never  reached  the  high  seas.  The  British  naval 
blockade  stifled  Imperial  Germany  in  the  first  war.  Be- 
tween the  wars  the  handful  of  German  naval  officers  who 
commanded  the  country’s  modestly  sized  Navy  pondered 
this  experience  and  this  geographical  fact  and  came  to 

889 


890 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  conclusion  that  in  any  future  war  with  Britain,  Ger- 
many must  try  to  gain  bases  in  Norway,  which  would 
break  the  British  blockade  line  across  the  North  Sea,  open 
up  the  broad  ocean  to  German  surface  and  undersea 
vessels  and  indeed  offer  an  opportunity  for  the  Reich  to 
reverse  the  tables  and  mount  an  effective  blockade  of  the 
British  Isles. 

It  was  not  surprising,  then,  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war 
in  1939  Admiral  Rolf  Carls,  the  third-ranking  officer  in 
the  German  Navy  and  a forceful  personality,  should  start 
peppering  Admiral  Raeder,  as  the  latter  noted  in  his  diary 
and  testified  at  Nuremberg,  with  letters  suggesting  “the 
importance  of  an  occupation  of  the  Norwegian  coast  by 
Germany.”  1 Raeder  needed  little  urging  and  on  October 
3,  at  the  end  of  the  Polish  Campaign,  sent  a confidential 
questionnaire  to  the  Naval  War  Staff  asking  it  to  ascertain 
the  possibility  of  gaining  “bases  in  Norway  under  the 
combined  pressure  of  Russia  and  Germany.”  Ribbentrop 
was  consulted  about  Moscow’s  attitude  and  replied  that 
“far-reaching  support  may  be  expected”  from  that  source. 
Raeder  told  his  staff  that  Hitler  must  be  informed  as  soon 
as  possible  about  the  “possibilities.”  2 

On  October  10,  in  the  course  of  a lengthy  report  to 
the  Fuehrer  on  naval  operations,  Raeder  suggested  the  im- 
portance of  obtaining  naval  bases  in  Norway,  if  necessary 
with  the  help  of  Russia.  This — so  far  as  the  confidential 
records  show — was  the  first  time  the  Navy  had  directly 
called  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  Hitler.  Raeder  says 
the  Leader  “saw  at  once  the  significance  of  the  Nor- 
wegian problem.”  He  asked  him  to  leave  his  notes  on  the 
subject  and  promised  to  give  the  question  some  thought. 
But  at  the  moment  the  Nazi  warlord  was  preoccupied  with 
launching  his  attack  in  the  West  and  with  overcoming  the 
hesitations  of  his  generals.*  Norway  apparently  slipped 
out  of  his  mind.3 

But  it  came  back  in  two  months — for  three  reasons. 

One  was  the  advent  of  winter.  Germany’s  very  existence 
depended  upon  the  import  of  iron  ore  from  Sweden.  For 
the  first  war  year  the  Germans  were  counting  on  eleven 

* It  was  on  October  10  that  Hitler  had  called  in  his  military  chiefs,  read 
them  a long  memorandum  on  the  necessity  of  an  immediate  attack  in  the 
West  and  handed  them  Directive  No.  6 ordering  preparations  for  an  offen- 
sive through  Belgium  and  Holland.  (See  above,  pp.  852-854.) 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  891 


million  tons  of  it  out  of  a total  annual  consumption  of 
fifteen  million  tons.  During  the  warm-weather  months 
this  ore  was  transported  from  northern  Sweden  down  the 
Gulf  of  Bothnia  and  across  the  Baltic  to  Germany,  and 
presented  no  problem  even  in  wartime,  since  the  Baltic 
was  effectively  barred  to  British  submarines  and  surface 
ships.  But  in  the  wintertime  this  shipping  lane  could  not 
be  used  because  of  thick  ice.  During  the  cold  months  the 
Swedish  ore  had  to  be  shipped  by  rail  to  the  nearby  Nor- 
wegian port  of  Narvik  and  brought  down  the  Norwegian 
coast  by  ship  to  Germany.  For  almost  the  entire  journey 
German  ore  vessels  could  sail  within  Norway’s  territorial 
waters  and  thereby  escape  destruction  by  British  naval 
vessels  and  bombers. 

Thus,  as  Hitler  at  first  pointed  out  to  the  Navy,  a 
neutral  Norway  had  its  advantages.  It  enabled  Germany 
to  obtain  its  lifeblood  of  iron  ore  without  interference 
from  Britain. 

In  London,  Churchill,  then  First  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty, perceived  this  at  once  and  in  the  very  first  weeks 
of  the  war  attempted  to  persuade  the  cabinet  to  allow 
him  to  lay  mines  in  Norwegian  territorial  waters  in  order 
to  stop  the  German  iron  traffic.  But  Chamberlain  and 
Halifax  were  most  reluctant  to  violate  Norwegian  neu- 
trality, and  the  proposal  was  for  the  time  being  dropped.4 

Russia’s  attack  on  Finland  on  November  30,  1939,  radi- 
cally changed  the  situation  in  Scandinavia,  immensely  in- 
creasing its  strategic  importance  to  both  the  Western  Al- 
lies and  Germany.  France  and  Britain  began  to  organize 
an  expeditionary  force  in  Scotland  to  be  sent  to  the  aid  of 
the  gallant  Finns,  who,  defying  all  predictions,  held  out 
stubbornly  against  the  onslaughts  of  the  Red  Army.  But 
it  could  reach  Finland  only  through  Norway  and  Sweden, 
and  the  Germans  at  once  saw  that  if  Allied  troops  were 
granted,  or  took,  transit  across  the  northern  part  of  the 
two  Scandinavian  lands  enough  of  them  would  remain,  on 
the  excuse  of  maintaining  communications,  to  completely 
cut  off  Germany’s  supply  of  Swedish  iron  ore.*  More- 


* I*  was  a correct  assumption.  It  is  now  known  that  the  Allied  Supreme 
War  Council,  meeting  in  Paris  on  February  5,  1940,  decided  that  in  sending 
an  expeditionary  force  to  Finland  the  Swedish  iron  fields  should  be  occupied 
by  troops  landed  at  Narvik,  which  was  but  a short  distance  from  the  mines, 
(bee  the  author  s The  Challenge  of  Scandinavia,  pp.  115-16n.)  Churchill 
remarks  that  at  the  meeting  it  was  decided  “incidentally  to  get  control  of  the 
Gullivare  ore-field.  ( The  Gathering  Storm,  p.  560.) 


892 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


over,  the  Western  Allies  would  outflank  the  Reich  on  the 
north.  Admiral  Raeder  was  not  backward  in  reminding 
Hitler  of  these  threats. 

The  chief  of  the  German  Navy  had  now  found  in  Nor- 
way itself  a valuable  ally  for  his  designs  in  the  person  of 
Major  Vidkun  Abraham  Lauritz  Quisling,  whose  name 
would  soon  become  a synonym  in  almost  all  languages  for 
a traitor. 

THE  EMERGENCE  OF  VIDKUN  QUISLING 

Quisling  had  begun  life  honorably  enough.  Born  in 
1887  of  peasant  stock,  he  had  graduated  first  in  his  class 
at  the  Norwegian  Military  Academy  and  while  still  in  his 
twenties  had  been  sent  to  Petrograd  as  military  attache. 
For  his  services  in  looking  after  British  interests  after 
diplomatic  relations  were  broken  with  the  Bolshevik  gov- 
ernment, Great  Britain  awarded  him  the  C.B.E.  At 
this  time  he  was  both  pro-British  and  pro-Bolshevik.  He 
remained  in  Soviet  Russia  for  some  time  as  assistant  to 
Fridtjof  Nansen,  the  great  Norwegian  explorer  and  hu- 
manitarian, in  Russian  relief  work. 

So  impressed  had  the  young  Norwegian  Army  officer 
been  by  the  success  of  the  Communists  in  Russia  that 
when  he  returned  to  Oslo  he  offered  his  services  to  the 
Labor  Party,  which  at  that  time  was  a member  of  the  Co- 
mintern. He  proposed  that  he  establish  a “Red  Guard,” 
but  the  Labor  Party  was  suspicious  of  him  and  his  project 
and  turned  him  down.  He  then  veered  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  After  serving  as  Minister  of  Defense  from  1931 
to  1933,  he  founded  in  May  of  the  latter  year  a fascist 
party  called  Nasjonal  Samling — National  Union — appro- 
priating the  ideology  and  tactics  of  the  Nazis,  who  had 
just  come  to  power  in  Germany.  But  Nazism  did  not 
thrive  in  the  fertile  democratic  soil  of  Norway.  Quisling 
was  unable  even  to  get  himself  elected  to  Parliament. 
Defeated  at  the  polls  by  his  own  people,  he  turned  to 
Nazi  Germany. 

There  he  established  contact  with  Alfred  Rosenberg, 
the  befuddled  official  philosopher  of  the  Nazi  movement, 
among  whose  jobs  was  that  of  chief  of  the  party’s  Office 
for  Foreign  Affairs.  This  Baltic  dolt,  one  of  Hitler’s  earliest 
mentors,  thought  he  saw  possibilities  in  the  Norwegian 


893 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

officer,  for  one  of  Rosenberg’s  pet  fantasies  was  the  es- 
tablishment of  a great  Nordic  Empire  from  which  the 
Jews  and  other  “impure”  races  would  be  excluded  and 
which  eventually  would  dominate  the  world  under  Nazi 
German  leadership.  From  1933  on,  he  kept  in  touch 
with  Quisling  and  heaped  on  him  his  nonsensical  philos- 
ophy and  propaganda. 

In  June  1939,  as  the  war  clouds  gathered  over  Europe, 
Quisling  took  the  occasion  of  his  attendance  at  a con- 
vention of  the  Nordic  Society  at  Luebeck  to  ask  Rosenberg 
for  something  more  than  ideological  support.  According 
to  the  latter’s  confidential  reports,  which  were  produced 
at  Nuremberg,  Quisling  warned  Rosenberg  of  the  danger 
of  Britain’s  getting  control  of  Norway  in  the  event  of  war 
and  of  the  advantages  to  Germany  of  occupying  it.  He 
asked  for  some  substantial  aid  for  his  party  and  press. 
Rosenberg,  a great  composer  of  memoranda,  dashed  out 
three  of  them  for  Hitler,  Goering  and  Ribbentrop,  but 
the  three  top  men  appear  to  have  ignored  them — no  one  in 
Germany  took  the  “official  philosopher”  very  seriously. 
Rosenberg  himself  was  able  to  arrange  at  least  for  a 
fortnight’s  training  course  in  Germany  in  August  for 
twenty-five  of  Quisling’s  husky  storm  troopers. 

During  the  first  months  of  the  war  Admiral  Raeder — or 
so  he  testified  at  Nuremberg — had  no  contact  with  Rosen- 
berg, whom  he  scarcely  knew,  and  none  with  Quisling,  of 
whom  he  had  never  heard.  But  immediately  after  the 
Russian  attack  on  Finland  Raeder  began  to  get  reports 
from  his  naval  attache  at  Oslo,  Captain  Richard  Schreiber, 
of  imminent  Allied  landings  in  Norway.  He  mentioned 
these  to  Hitler  on  December  8 and  advised  him  flatly,  “It 
is  important  to  occupy  Norway.”  5 

Shortly  afterward  Rosenberg  dashed  off  a memorandum 
(undated)  to  Admiral  Raeder  “regarding  visit  of  Privy 
Councilor  Quisling — Norway.”  The  Norwegian  conspirator 
had  arrived  in  Berlin  and  Rosenberg  thought  Raeder 
ought  to  be  told  who  he  was  and  what  he  was  up  to. 
Quisling,  he  said,  had  many  sympathizers  among  key 
officers  in  the  Norwegian  Army  and,  as  proof,  had  shown 
him  a recent  letter  from  Colonel  Konrad  Sundlo,  the  com- 
manding officer  at  Narvik,  characterizing  Norway’s  Prime 
Minister  as  a “blockhead”  and  one  of  his  chief  ministers 
as  “an  old  soak”  and  declaring  his  willingness  to  “risk  his 


894 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


bones  for  the  national  uprising.”  Later  Colonel  Sundlo  did 
not  risk  his  bones  to  defend  his  country  against  aggression. 

Actually,  Rosenberg  informed  Raeder,  Quisling  had  a 
plan  for  a coup.  It  must  have  fallen  upon  sympathetic 
ears  in  Berlin,  for  it  was  copied  from  the  Anschluss.  A 
number  of  Quisling’s  storm  troopers  would  be  hurriedly 
trained  in  Germany  “by  experienced  and  diehard  Na- 
tional Socialists  who  are  practiced  in  such  operations.” 
The  pupils,  once  back  in  Norway,  would  seize  strategic 
points  in  Oslo, 

and  at  the  same  time  the  German  Navy  with  contingents  of 
the  German  Army  will  have  put  in  an  appearance  at  a pre- 
arranged bay  outside  Oslo  in  answer  to  a special  summons 
from  the  new  Norwegian  Government. 

It  was  the  Anschluss  tactic  all  over  again,  with  Quis- 
ling playing  the  part  of  Seyss-Inquart. 

Quisling  has  no  doubt  [Rosenberg  added]  that  such  a 
coup  . . . would  meet  with  the  approval  of  those  sections  of 
the  Army  with  which  he  now  has  connections  ...  As  regards 
the  King,  he  believes  that  he  would  accept  such  a fait 
accompli. 

Quisling’s  estimate  of  the  number  of  German  troops  needed 
for  the  operation  coincides  with  the  German  estimates.6 

Admiral  Raeder  saw  Quisling  on  December  11,  the 
meeting  being  arranged  through  Rosenberg  by  one  Viljam 
Hagelin,  a Norwegian  businessman  whose  affairs  kept 
him  largely  in  Germany  and  who  was  Quisling’s  chief 
liaison  there.  Hagelin  and  Quisling  told  Raeder  a mouth- 
ful and  he  duly  recorded  it  in  the  confidential  naval 
archives. 

Quisling  stated  ...  a British  landing  is  planned  in  the 
vicinity  of  Stavanger,  and  Christiansand  is  proposed  as  a pos- 
sible British  base.  The  present  Norwegian  Government  as  well 
as  the  Parliament  and  the  whole  foreign  policy  are  con- 
trolled by  the  well-known  Jew,  Hambro  [Carl  Hambro,  the 
President  of  the  Storting],  a great  friend  of  Hore-Belisha 
. . . The  dangers  to  Germany  arising  from  a British  occupa- 
tion were  depicted  in  great  detail  . . . 

To  anticipate  a British  move,  Quisling  proposed  to  place 
“the  necessary  bases  at  the  disposal  of  the  German  Armed 
Forces.  In  the  whole  coastal  area  men  in  important  posi- 
tions (railway,  post  office,  communications)  have  already 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  895 

been  bought  for  this  purpose.”  He  and  Hagelin  had  come  to 
Berlin  to  establish  “clear-cut  relations  with  Germany  for 
the  future  . . . Conferences  are  desired  for  discussion  of 
combined  action,  transfer  of  troops  to  Oslo,  etc.”  7 

Raeder,  as  he  later  testified  at  Nuremberg,  was  im- 
pressed and  told  his  two  visitors  that  he  would  confer 
with  the  Fuehrer  and  inform  them  of  the  results.  This  he 
did  the  next  day  at  a meeting  at  which  Keitel  and  Jodi 
were  also  present  The  Navy  Commander  in  Chief  (whose 
report  on  this  conference  is  among  the  captured  docu- 
ments informed  Hitler  that  Quisling  had  made  “a  re- 
liable impression”  on  him.  He  then  outlined  the  main 
points  the  Norwegians  had  made,  emphasizing  Quisling’s 
good  connections  with  officers  in  the  Norwegian  Army” 
and  his  readiness  “to  take  over  the  government  by  a 
political  coup  and  ask  Germany  for  aid.”  All  present 
agreed  that  a British  occupation  of  Norway  could  not  be 
countenanced,  but  Raeder,  become  suddenly  cautious, 
pointed  out  that  a German  occupation  “would  naturally 
occasion  strong  British  countermeasures  . . . and  the  Ger- 
man Navy  is  not  yet  prepared  to  cope  with  them  for  any 
length  of  time.  In  the  event  of  occupation  this  is  a weak 
spot.”  On  the  other  hand,  Raeder  suggested  that  OKW 

be  permitted  to  make  plans  with  Quisling  for  preparing  and 
executing  the  occupation  either: 

a.  by  friendly  methods,  i.e.,  the  German  Armed  Forces 
are  called  upon  by  Norway,  or 

b.  by  force. 

Hitler  was  not  quite  ready  to  go  so  far  at  the  moment. 
He  replied  that  he  first  wanted  to  speak  to  Quisling  per- 
sonally “in  order  to  form  an  impression  of  him.”  8 

This  he  did  the  very  next  day,  December  14,  Raeder  per- 
sonally escorting  the  two  Norwegian  traitors  to  the 
Chancellery.  Although  no  record  of  this  meeting  has  been 
found,  Quisling  obviously  impressed  the  German  dicta- 
tor,* as  he  had  the  Navy  chief,  for  that  evening  Hitler 
order  OKW  to  work  out  a draft  plan  in  consultation  with 
Quisling.  Haider  heard  that  it  would  also  include  action 
against  Denmark.10 

* He  had  not  impressed  the  German  minister  in  Oslo,  Dr.  Curt  Brauer,  who 
twice  in  December  warned  Berlin  that  Quisling  “need  not  be  taken  seriously 
. . . his  influence  and  prospects  are  . . . very  slight.”0  For  his  frankness  and 
reluctance  to  play  Hitler’s  game,  the  minister  was  quickly  to  pay. 


896 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Hitler  saw  Quisling  again  on  December  16  and  18, 
despite  his  preoccupation  with  the  bad  news  about  the 
Graf  Spee:  The  naval  setback,  however,  seems  to  have 
added  to  his  cautiousness  about  a Scandinavian  adventure 
which  would  depend  first  of  all  on  the  Navy.  According  to 
Rosenberg,  the  Fuehrer  emphasized  to  his  visitor  that  “the 
most  preferable  attitude  for  Norway  would  be  . . . com- 
plete neutrality.”  However,  if  the  British  were  preparing 
to  enter  Norway  the  Germans  would  have  to  beat  them 
to  it.  In  the  meantime  he  would  provide  Quisling  with 
funds  to  combat  British  propaganda  and  strengthen  his 
own  pro-German  movement.  An  initial  sum  of  200,000 
gold  marks  was  allotted  in  January,  with  the  promise  of 
10,000  pounds  sterling  per  month  for  three  months  be- 
ginning on  March  15. 11 

Shortly  before  Christmas  Rosenberg  dispatched  a spe- 
cial agent,  Hans-Wilhelm  Scheidt,  to  Norway  to  work  with 
Quisling,  and  over  the  holidays  the  handful  of  officers  at 
OKW  who  were  in  the  know  began  working  on  “Study 
North,”  as  the  plans  were  first  called.  In  the  Navy  opinion 
was  divided.  Raeder  was  convinced  that  Britain  intended 
to  move  into  Norway  in  the  near  future.  The  Operations 
Division  of  the  Naval  War  Staff  disagreed,  and  in  its  con- 
fidential war  diary  for  January  13,  1940,  their  differences 
were  aired.12 

The  Operations  Division  does  not  believe  an  imminent 
British  occupation  of  Norway  is  probable  . . . [It]  con- 
siders, however,  that  an  occupation  of  Norway  by  Ger- 
many, if  no  British  action  is  to  be  feared,  would  be  a 
dangerous  undertaking. 

The  Naval  War  Staff  therefore  concluded  “that  the  most 
favorable  solution  is  definitely  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo”  and  emphasized  that  this  would  permit  the 
continued  use  of  Norwegian  territorial  waters  for  the  ore 
traffic  “in  perfect  safety.” 

Hitler  was  displeased  with  both  the  hesitations  of  the 
Navy  and  the  results  of  Study  North,  which  OKW  pre- 
sented to  him  the  middle  of  January.  On  January  27  he 
had  Keitel  issue  a top-secret  directive  stating  that  further 
work  on  “North”  be  continued  under  the  Fuehrer’s  “per- 
sonal and  immediate  supervision”  and  directing  Keitel  to 
take  charge  of  all  preparations.  A small  working  staff  com- 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  897 

posed  of  one  representative  from  each  of  the  three  armed 
services  was  to  be  set  up  in  OKW  and  henceforth  the 
operation  was  to  have  the  code  name  Weseruebung.13 

This  step  seems  to  have  marked  the  end  of  the  Fuehrer’s 
hesitations  about  occupying  Norway,  but  if  there  were 
any  lingering  doubts  in  his  mind  they  were  dispelled  by 
an  incident  which  occurred  in  Norwegian  waters  on  Feb- 
ruary 17. 

An  auxiliary  supply  ship  of  the  Graf  Spee,  the  A It  mark, 
had  managed  to  slip  back  through  the  British  blockade 
and  on  February  14  was  discovered  by  a British  scouting 
plane  proceeding  southward  in  Norwegian  territorial 
waters  toward  Germany.  The  British  government  knew  that 
aboard  it  were  three  hundred  captured  British  seamen 
from  the  ships  sunk  by  the  Graf  Spee.  They  were  being 
taken  to  Germany  as  prisoners  of  war.  Norwegian  naval 
officers  had  made  a cursory  inspection  of  the  Alt  mark, 
found  that  it  had  no  prisoners  aboard  and  was  unarmed, 
and  given  it  clearance  to  proceed  on  to  Germany.  Now 
Churchill,  who  knew  otherwise,  personally  ordered  a Brit- 
ish destroyer  flotilla  to  go  into  Norwegian  waters,  board 
the  Germ:.  , vessel  and  liberate  the  prisoners. 

The  British  destroyer  Cossack,  commanded  by  Captain 
Philip  Vian,  carried  out  the  mission  on  the  night  of  Feb- 
ruary 16-17  in  losing  Fjord,  where  the  Altmark  had 
sought  safety.  After  a scuffle  in  which  four  Germans  were 
killed  and  five  wounded,  the  British  boarding  party  liber- 
ated 299  seamen,  who  had  been  locked  in  storerooms  and 
in  an  empty  oil  tank  to  avoid  their  detection  by  the  Nor- 
wegians. 

The  Norwegian  government  made  a vehement  protest 
to  Britain  about  this  violation  of  its  territorial  waters, 
but  Chamberlain  replied  in  the  Commons  that  Norway 
itself  had  violated  international  law  by  allowing  its  waters 
to  be  used  by  the  Germans  to  convey  British  prisoners  to 
a German  prison. 

For  Hitler  this  was  the  last  straw.  It  convinced  him 
that  the  Norwegians  would  not  seriously  oppose  a British 
display  of  force  in  their  own  territorial  waters.  He  was 
also  furious,  as  Jodi  noted  in  his  diary,  that  the  members 
of  the  Graf  Spee  crew  aboard  the  Altmark  had  not  put 
up  a stiff er  fight — “no  resistance,  no  British  losses.”  On 
February  19,  Jodi’s  diary  discloses.  Hitler  “pressed  ener- 


898 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


getically”  for  the  completion  of  plans  for  Weseruebung. 
“Equip  ships.  Put  units  in  readiness,”  he  told  Jodi.  They 
still  lacked  an  officer  to  lead  the  enterprise  and  Jodi 
reminded  Hitler  that  it  was  time  to  appoint  a general 
and  his  staff  for  this  purpose. 

Keitel  suggested  an  officer  who  had  fought  with  General 
von  der  Goltz’s  division  in  Finland  at  the  end  of  the 
First  World  War,  General  Nikolaus  von  Falkenhorst,  who 
now  commanded  an  army  corps  in  the  west,  and  Hitler, 
who  had  overlooked  the  little  matter  of  a commander  for 
the  northern  adventure,  immediately  sent  for  him.  Though 
the  General  came  from  an  old  Silesian  military  family  by 
the  name  of  Jastrzembski,  which  he  had  changed  to  Fal- 
kenhorst (in  German,  “falcon’s  eyrie”),  he  was  personally 
unknown  to  the  Fuehrer. 

Falkenhorst  later  described  in  an  interrogation  at  Nu- 
remberg their  first  meeting  at  the  Chancellery  on  the  morn- 
ing of  February  21,  which  was  not  without  its  amusing 
aspects.  Falkenhorst  had  never  even  heard  of  the  “North” 
operation  and  this  was  the  first  time  he  had  faced  the 
Nazi  warlord,  who  apparently  did  not  awe  him  as  he  had 
all  the  other  generals. 

I was  made  to  sit  down  [he  recounted  at  Nuremberg], 
Then  I had  to  tell  the  Fuehrer  about  the  operations  in  Fin- 
land in  1918  . . . He  said:  “Sit  down  and  just  tell  me 
how  it  was,”  and  I did. 

Then  we  got  up  and  he  led  me  to  a table  that  was  cov- 
ered with  maps.  He  said:  . . The  Reich  Government  has 

knowledge  that  the  British  intend  to  make  a landing  in  Nor- 
way . . 

Falkenhorst  said  he  got  the  impression  from  Hitler  that 
it  was  the  Alt  mark  incident  which  had  influenced  the 
Leader  the  most  to  “carry  out  the  plan  now.”  And  the 
General,  to  his  surprise,  found  himself  appointed  then  and 
there  to  do  the  carrying  out  as  commander  in  chief.  The 
Army,  Hitler  added,  would  put  five  divisions  at  his  dis- 
posal. The  idea  was  to  seize  the  main  Norwegian  ports. 

At  noon  the  warlord  dismissed  Falkenhorst  and  told 
him  to  report  back  at  5 p.m.  with  his  plans  for  the  oc- 
cupation of  Norway. 

I went  out  and  bought  a Baedeker,  a travel  guide 
[Falkenhorst  explained  at  Nuremberg],  in  order  to  find  out 
just  what  Norway  was  like.  I didn’t  have  any  idea  . . . 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  899 

Then  I went  to  my  hotel  room  and  I worked  on  this 
Baedeker  ...  At  5 p.m.  I went  back  to  the  Fuehrer.14 

The  General’s  plans,  worked  out  from  an  old  Baedeker 
— he  was  never  shown  the  plans  worked  out  by  OKW — 
were,  as  can  be  imagined,  somewhat  sketchy,  but  they 
seem  to  have  satisfied  Hitler.  One  division  was  to  be 
allotted  to  each  of  Norway’s  five  principal  harbors,  Oslo, 
Stavanger,  Bergen,  Trondheim  and  Narvik.  “There  wasn’t 
much  else  you  could  do,”  Falkenhorst  said  later,  “because 
they  were  the  large  harbors.”  After  being  sworn  to  secrecy 
and  urged  “to  hurry  up,”  the  General  was  again  dismissed 
and  thereupon  set  to  work. 

Of  all  these  goings  on,  Brauchitsch  and  Haider,  busy 
preparing  the  offensive  on  the  Western  front,  were  largely 
ignorant  until  Falkenhorst  called  on  the  Army  General 
Staff  Chief  on  February  26  and  demanded  some  troops, 
especially  mountain  units,  to  carry  out  his  operation.  Hai- 
der was  not  very  co-operative;  in  fact,  he  was  indignant 
and  asked  for  more  information  on  what  was  up  and  what 
was  needed.  “Not  a single  word  on  this  matter  has  been 
exchanged  between  the  Fuehrer  and  Brauchitsch,”  Haider 
exclaimed  in  his  diary.  “That  must  be  recorded  for  the 
history  of  the  war!” 

However,  Hitler,  full  of  contempt  as  he  was  for  the 
old-line  generals  and  especially  for  his  General  Staff  Chief, 
was  not  to  be  put  off.  On  March  29  he  enthusiastically  ap- 
proved Falkenhorst’s  plans,  including  his  acquisition  of 
two  mountain  divisions,  and  moreover  declared  that 
more  troops  would  be  necessary  because  he  wanted  “a 
strong  force  at  Copenhagen.”  Denmark  had  definitely  been 
added  to  the  list  of  Hitler’s  victims;  the  Air  Force  had  its 
eyes  on  bases  there  to  be  used  against  Britain. 

The  next  day,  March  1,  Hitler  issued  the  formal  di- 
rective for  Weser  Exercise. 

MOST  SECRET 
TOP  SECRET 

The  development  of  the  situation  in  Scandinavia  requires 
the  making  of  all  preparations  for  the  occupation  of  Den- 
mark and  Norway.  This  operation  should  prevent  British 
encroachment  on  Scandinavia  and  the  Baltic.  Further  it  should 
guarantee  our  ore  base  in  Sweden  and  give  our  Navy  and  the 
Air  Force  a wider  starting  line  against  Britain  . . . 

In  view  of  our  military  and  political  power  in  comparison 


900  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

with  that  of  the  Scandinavian  States,  the  force  to  be  em- 
ployed in  “Weser  Exercise”  will  be  kept  as  small  as  possible. 
The  numerical  weakness  will  be  balanced  by  daring  actions 
and  surprise  execution. 

On  principle,  we  will  do  our  utmost  to  make  the  opera- 
tion appear  as  a peaceful  occupation,  the  object  of  which  is 
the  military  protection  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Scandinavian 
States.  Corresponding  demands  will  be  transmitted  to  the 
Governments  at  the  beginning  of  the  occupation.  If  neces- 
sary, demonstrations  by  the  Navy  and  Air  Force  will  pro- 
vide the  necessary  emphasis.  If,  in  spite  of  this,  resistance 
should  be  met,  all  military  means  will  be  used  to  crush  it 
. . . The  crossing  of  the  Danish  border  and  the  landings  in 
Norway  must  take  place  simultaneously  . . . 

It  is  most  important  that  the  Scandinavian  States  as  well 
as  the  Western  opponents  should  be  taken  by  surprise  . . . 
The  troops  may  be  acquainted  with  the  actual  objectives 
only  after  putting  to  sea  . . .15 

That  very  evening,  March  1,  there  was  “fury”  at  the 
Army  High  Command,  Jodi  reported,  because  of  Hitler’s 
demands  for  troops  for  the  northern  operation.  The  next 
day  Goering  “raged”  at  Keitel  and  went  to  complain  to 
Hitler.  The  fat  Field  Marshal  was  furious  at  having  been 
left  out  of  the  secret  so  long  and  because  the  Luftwaffe 
had  been  put  under  Falkenhorst’s  command.  Threatened 
by  a serious  jurisdictional  dispute,  Hitler  convoked  the 
heads  of  the  three  armed  services  to  the  Chancellery  on 
March  5 to  smooth  matters  out,  but  it  was  difficult. 

Field  Marshal  [Goering]  vents  his  spleen  [Jodi  wrote  in 
his  diary]  because  he  was  not  consulted  beforehand.  He  dom- 
inates the  discussion  and  tries  to  prove  that  all  previous 
preparations  are  good  for  nothing. 

The  Fuehrer  mollified  him  by  some  small  concessions, 
and  plans  raced  forward.  As  early  as  February  21,  ac- 
cording to  his  diary,  Haider  had  got  the  impression  that  the 
attack  on  Denmark  and  Norway  would  not  begin  until 
after  the  offensive  in  the  West  had  been  launched  and 
“carried  to  a certain  point.”  Hitler  himself  had  been  in 
doubt  which  operation  to  begin  first  and  raised  the  ques- 
tion with  Jodi  on  February  26.  Jodi’s  advice  was  to  keep 
the  two  operations  quite  separate  and  Hitler  agreed,  “if 
it  were  possible.” 

On  March  3 he  decided  that  Weser  Exercise  would  pre- 
cede “Case  Yellow”  (the  code  name  for  attack  in  the 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  901 


West)  and  expressed  “very  sharply”  to  Jodi  “the  necessity 
of  prompt  and  strong  action  in  Norway.”  By  this  time  the 
courageous  but  outmanned  and  outgunned  Finnish  Army 
was  facing  disaster  from  a massive  Russian  offensive  and 
there  were  well-founded  reports  that  the  Anglo-French 
expeditionary  corps  was  about  to  embark  from  its  bases 
in  Scotland  for  Norway  and  march  across  that  country 
and  Sweden  to  Finland  to  try  to  save  the  Finns.*  The 
threat  of  this  was  the  main  reason  for  Flitler’s  hurry. 

But  on  March  12  the  Russo— Finnish  War  suddenly 
ended  with  Finland  accepting  Russia’s  harsh  terms  for 
peace.  While  this  was  generally  welcomed  in  Berlin  be- 
cause it  freed  Germany  from  its  unpopular  championship 
of  the  Russians  against  the  Finns  and  also  brought  an  end, 
for  the  moment,  of  the  Soviet  drive  to  take  over  the 
Baltic,  it  nevertheless  embarrassed  Hitler  so  far  as  his  own 
Scandinavian  venture  was  concerned.  As  Jodi  confided 
to  his  diary,  it  made  the  “motivation”  for  the  occupation 
of  Norway  and  Denmark  “difficult.”  “Conclusion  of  peace 
between  Finland  and  Russia,”  he  noted  on  March  12, 
“deprives  England,  but  us  too,  of  any  political  basis  to 
occupy  Norway.” 

In  fact,  Hitler  was  now  hard  put  to  find  an  excuse. 
On  March  13  the  faithful  Jodi  recorded  that  the  Fuehrer 
was  “still  looking  for  some  justification.”  The  next  day: 
“Fuehrer  has  not  yet  decided  how  to  justify  the  ‘Weser 
Exercise.  To  make  matters  worse,  Admiral  Raeder  be- 
gan to  get  cold  feet.  He  was  “in  doubt  whether  it  was  still 
important  to  play  at  preventive  war  (?)  in  Norway.”  16 


(„0n  jMi/ch  i7 , (ie.neral  ,Ir?>nside,  Chief  of  the  British  General  Staff,  in- 
formed Marshal  Mannerheim  that  an  Allied  expeditionary  force  of  57,000 
a.s  ready  to  ??me  *°, the  aid  of  the  Finns  and  that  the  first  division,  of 
15,000  troops  could  reach  Finland  by  the  end  of  March  if  Norway  and 
Sweden  would  allow  them  transit.  Actually  five  days  before,  on  March  2,  as 
Mannerheim  knew,  both  Norway  and  Sweden  had  again  turned  down  the 
rSSSiT,  ™ M request  for  transit  privileges.  This  did  not  prevent  Premier 
i ir  on  ^tarrh  8 from  scolding  the  Finns  for  not  officially  asking  for 
Allied  troops  and  from  intimating  that  the  Allied  forces  would  be  sent 
regardless  of  Norwegian  and  Swedish  protests.  But  Mannerheim  was  not 
to  be  fooled,  and,  having  advised  his  government  to  sue  for  peace  while  the 
AImy  was  aff'1  fa  tact  and  undefeated,  he  approved  the  immediate 
dispatch  of  a peace  delegation  to  Moscow  on  March  8.  The  Finnish  Com- 
mander  in  Chief  seems  to  have  been  skeptical  of  the  French  zeal  for  fighting 

Mc^fo“MtrkafMa««rhtefmn)0n  **  fr°nt  “ Fmee-  (See  Tht 

arrSov  C,sn  T'u-  specu.Iat* i °P  t*fe  utter  confusion  which  would  have  resulted 
a™?“£,  f 1 fgerents  had  the  Franco-British  expeditionary  corps  ever 
fVrmd  m Flj1!a?d  and  fousht  the  Russians.  In  little  more  than  a year 

Wcst^vouldlliave  been* allies  ir^the^EasU3’  “ WUch  enenlieS  “ the 


902 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

For  the  moment  Hitler  hesitated.  Two  other  problems 
had  in  the  meantime  arisen:  (1)  how  to  handle  Sumner 
Welles,  the  United  States  Undersecretary  of  State,  who 
had  arrived  in  Berlin  March  1 on  a mission  from  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  to  see  if  there  was  any  chance  of  ending 
the  war  before  the  slaughter  began  in  the  West;  and  (2) 
how  to  placate  the  neglected,  offended  Italian  ally.  Hitler 
had  not  yet  bothered  to  answer  Mussolini’s  defiant  letter 
of  January  3,  and  relations  between  Berlin  and  Rome 
had  distinctly  cooled.  Now  Sumner  Welles,  the  Germans 
believed,  and  with  some  reason,  had  come  to  Europe  to 
try  to  detach  Italy  from  the  creaky  Axis  and  persuade 
her,  at  any  event,  not  to  enter  the  war  on  Germany’s 
side  if  the  conflict  continued.  Various  warnings  had 
reached  Berlin  from  Rome  that  it  was  time  something 
were  done  to  keep  the  sulking  Duce  in  line. 


HITLER  MEETS  WITH  SUMNER  WELLES  AND 
MUSSOLINI 


Hitler’s  ignorance  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  that 
of  Goering  and  Ribbentrop,  was  abysmal.*  And  though 
their  policy  at  this  time  was  to  try  to  keep  America  out 
of  the  war,  they,  like  their  predecessors  in  Berlin  in 
1914,  did  not  take  the  Yankee  nation  seriously  as  even 
a potential  military  power.  As  early  as  October  1,  1939, 


* Examples  of  Hitler’s  weird  views  on  America  have  been  given  in  earlier 

chapters,  but  in  the  captured  Foreign  Office  documents  there  is  a revealing 
¥?Pfr  °i?  j ,Fuehre,r’s  state  of  mind  at  this  very  moment.  On  March  12 
Hitler  had  a long  talk  with  Colin  Ross,  a German  “expert”  on  the  United 
states,  who  had  recently  returned  from  a lecture  trip  in  America,  where  he 
had  contributed  his  mite  to  Nazi  propaganda.  When  Ross  remarked  that  an 
imperialist  tendency’  prevailed  in  the  United  States,  Hitler  asked  (ac- 
cording to  the  shorthand  notes  of  Dr.  Schmidt)  “whether  this  imperialist 
tendency  did  not  strengthen  the  desire  for  the  Anschluss  of  Canada  to  the 
United  States,  and  thus  produce  an  anti-English  attitude.” 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Hitler’s  advisers  on  the  U.S.A.  were  not  very 
helpful  in  shedding  light  on  their  subject.  At  this  same  interview,  Ross,  in 
trying  to  answer  Hitler  s questions  as  to  why  America  was  so  anti-German, 
gave  the  following  answers,  among  others : 

...  An  additional  factor  in  hatred  against  Germany  ...  is  the  mon- 
strous power  of  Jewry,  directing  with  a really  fantastic  cleverness  and 
Socialist*101131  Skl  1 thC  Strugg  e gainst  everything  German  and  National 

Colin  Ross  then  talked  about  Roosevelt,  whom  he  believes  to  be  an 
enemy  of  the  Fuehrer  for  reasons  of  pure  personal  jealousy  and  also  on 
account  of  his  personal  lust  for  power  ...  He  had  come  to  power  the 
same  year  as  the  Fuehrer  and  he  had  to  watch  the  latter  carrying  out  his 
great  plans  win k he,  Roosevelt  . . . had  not  reached  his  goal.  He  too 
had  ideas  of  dictatorship  which  in  some  respects  were  very  similar  to 
National  Socialist  ideas  Yet  precisely  this  realization  that  the  Fuehrer 
had  attained  his  goal,  while  he  had  not,  gave  to  his  pathological  ambition 


903 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

the  German  military  attache  in  Washington,  General 
Friedrich  von  Boetticher,  advised  OKW  in  Berlin  not  to 
worry  about  any  possible  American  expeditionary  force 
in  Europe.  On  December  1 he  further  informed  his  mili- 
tary superiors  in  Berlin  that  American  armament  was  sim- 
ply inadequate  “for  an  aggressive  war  policy”  and  added 
that  the  General  Staff  in  Washington  “in  contrast  to  the 
State  Department’s  sterile  policy  of  hatred  and  the  im- 
pulsive policy  of  Roosevelt — often  based  on  an  overestima- 
tion of  American  military  power — still  has  understanding 
for  Germany  and  her  conduct  of  the  war.”  In  his  first 
dispatch  Boetticher  had  noted  that  “Lindbergh  and  the 
famous  flyer  Rickenbacker”  were  advocating  keeping 
America  out  of  the  war.  By  December  1,  however,  despite 
his  low  estimate  of  American  military  power,  he  warned 
OKW  that  “the  United  States  will  still  enter  the  war  if 
it  considers  that  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  threatened.”  18 

Hans  Thomsen,  the  German  charge  d’affaires  in  Wash- 
ington, did  his  best  to  impart  some  facts  about  the  U.S.A. 
to  his  ignorant  Foreign  Minister  in  Berlin.  On  September 
18,  as  the  Polish  campaign  neared  its  end,  he  warned  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  that  “the  sympathies  of  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  American  people  are  with  our  enemies, 
and  America  is  convinced  of  Germany’s  war  guilt.”  In  the 
same  dispatch  he  pointed  out  the  dire  consequences  of 
any  attempts  by  Germany  to  carry  out  sabotage  in  America 
and  requested  that  there  be  no  such  sabotage  “in  any 
manner  whatsoever.”  19 

The  request  evidently  was  not  taken  very  seriously 
in  Berlin,  for  on  January  25,  1940,  Thomsen  was  wiring 
Berlin: 

I have  learned  that  a German-American,  von  Hausberger, 
and  a German  citizen,  Walter,  both  of  New  York,  are  al- 
leged to  be  planning  acts  of  sabotage  against  the  American 
armament  industry  by  direction  of  the  German  Abwehr.  Von 
Hausberger  is  supposed  to  have  detonators  hidden  in  his 
dwelling. 

Thomsen  asked  Berlin  to  desist,  declaring  that 

there  is  no  surer  way  of  driving  America  into  the  war  than 
by  resorting  again  to  a course  of  action  which  drove 


the  desire  to  act  upon  the  stage  of  world  history  as  the  Fuehrer’s  rival  . . . 
After  Herr  Colin  Ross  had  taken  his  leave,  the  Fuehrer  remarked  that 
Ross  was  a very  intelligent  man  who  certainly  had  many  good  ideas.17 


-904 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


America  into  the  ranks  of  our  enemies  once  before  in  the 
World  War  and,  incidentally,  did  not  in  the  least  impede 
the  war  industries  of  the  United  States. 

Besides,  he  added,  “both  individuals  are  unfitted  in 
every  respect  to  act  as  agents  of  the  Abwehr.”  * 

Since  November  1938,  when  Roosevelt  had  recalled  the 
American  ambassador  in  Berlin  in  protest  against  the  of- 
ficially sponsored  Nazi  pogrom  against  the  Jews,  neither 
country  had  been  represented  in  the  other  by  an  ambas- 
sador. Trade  had  dwindled  to  a mere  trickle,  largely  as 
the  result  of  American  boycotts,  and  was  now  completely 
shut  down  by  the  British  blockade.  On  November  4, 

1939,  the  arms  embargo  was  lifted,  following  votes  in 
the  Senate  and  the  House,  thus  opening  the  way  for  the 
United  States  to  supply  the  Western  Allies  with  arms. 
It  was  against  this  background  of  rapidly  deteriorating  re- 
lations that  Sumner  Welles  arrived  in  Berlin  on  March  1, 

1940. 

The  day  before,  on  February  29 — it  was  a leap  year — 
Hitler  had  taken  the  unusual  step  of  issuing  a secret 
“Directive  for  the  Conversations  with  Mr.  Sumner 
Welles.” 20  It  called  for  “reserve”  on  the  German  side 
and  advised  that  “as  far  as  possible  Mr.  Welles  be  allowed 
to  do  the  talking.”  It  then  laid  down  five  points  for  the 
guidance  of  all  the  top  officials  who  were  to  receive  the 
special  American  envoy.  The  principal  German  argument 
was  to  be  that  Germany  had  not  declared  war  on  Britain 
and  France  but  vice  versa;  that  the  Fuehrer  had  offered 
them  peace  in  October  and  that  they  had  rejected  it;  that 
Germany  accepted  the  challenge;  that  the  war  aims  of 
Britain  and  France  were  “the  destruction  of  the  German 
State,”  and  that  Germany  therefore  had  no  alternative  but 
to  continue  the  war. 

A discussion  [Hitler  concluded]  of  concrete  political 
questions,  such  as  the  question  of  a future  Polish  state,  is 
to  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible.  In  case  [he]  brings  up 
subjects  of  this  kind,  the  reply  should  be  that  such  ques- 
tions are  decided  by  me.  It  is  self-evident  that  it  is  entirely 

* Weizsaecker  replied  that  Canaris  himself  had  assured  him  that  neither  of 
the  men  mentioned  by  Thomsen  was  an  agent  of  the  Abwehr.  But  no  good 
secret  service  admits  these  things.  Other  Foreign  Office  papers  reveal  that 
on  January  24  an  Abwehr  agent  left  Buenos  Aires  with  instructions  to  re- 
port to  Fritz  von  Hausberger  at  Weehawken,  N.J.,  “for  instructions  in  our 
specialty.”  Another  agent  had  been  sent  from  the  same  place  to  New  York 


905 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

out  of  the  question  to  discuss  the  subject  of  Austria  and  the 
Protectorate  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia  . . . 

All  statements  are  to  be  avoided  which  could  be  inter- 
preted ...  to  mean  that  Germany  is  in  any  way  interested 
at  present  in  discussing  possibilities  of  peace.  I request, 
rather,  that  Mr.  Sumner  Welles  not  be  given  the  slightest  rea- 
son to  doubt  that  Germany  is  determined  to  end  this  war 
victoriously  . . . 

Not  only  Ribbentrop  and  Goering  but  the  Leader  him- 
self followed  the  directive  to  a letter  when  they  saw 
Welles  separately  on  March  1,  3 and  2,  respectively. 
Judging  by  the  lengthy  minutes  of  the  talks  kept  by  Dr. 
Schmidt  (which  are  among  the  captured  documents),  the 
American  diplomat,  a somewhat  taciturn  and  cynical  man, 
must  have  got  the  impression  that  he  had  landed  in  a 
lunatic  asylum — if  he  could  believe  his  ears.  Each  of  the 
Big  Three  Nazis  bombarded  Welles  with  the  most  grotesque 
perversions  of  history,  in  which  facts  were  fantastically 
twisted  and  even  the  simplest  of  words  lost  all  meaning.* * 
Hitler,  who  on  March  1 had  issued  his  directive  for 
Weseruebung,  received  Welles  the  next  day  and  insisted 
that  the  Allied  war  aim  was  “annihilation,”  that  of  Ger- 
many “peace.”  He  lectured  his  visitor  on  all  he  had  done 
to  maintain  peace  with  England  and  France. 

Shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  British  Am- 
bassador had  sat  exactly  where  Sumner  Welles  was  now 
sitting,  and  the  Fuehrer  had  made  him  the  greatest  offer  of 
his  life. 

All  his  offers  to  the  British  had  been  rejected  and  now 
Britain  was  out  to  destroy  Germany.  Hitler  therefore  be- 
lieved “that  the  conflict  would  have  to  be  fought  to  a 
finish  . . . there  was  no  other  solution  than  a life-and- 
death  struggle.” 

No  wonder  that  Welles  confided  to  Weizsaecker  and 
repeated  to  Goering  that  if  Germany  were  determined  to 
win  a military  victory  in  the  West  then  his  trip  to  Europe 

in  December  to  gather  information  on  American  aircraft  factories  and  arms 
shipments  to  the  Allies.  Thomsen  himself  reported  on  February  20  the  ar- 
rival of  Baron  Konstantin  von  Maydell,  a Baltic  German  of  Estonian  citizen- 
ship, who  had  told  the  German  Embassy  in  Washington  that  he  was  on  a 
sabotage  mission  for  the  Abwehr. 

* “Before  God  and  the  world,”  Goering  exclaimed  to  Welles,  “he,  the  Field 
Marshal,  could  state  that  Germany  had  not  desired  the  war.  It  had  been 
forced  upon  her  ...  But  what  was  Germany  to  do  when  the  others  wanted 
to  destroy  her?” 


906  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“was  pointless  . . . and  there  was  nothing  more  for  him 
to  say.”  21  * 

Though  he  had  emphasized  in  his  talks  with  the  Ger- 
mans that  what  he  heard  from  the  European  statesmen 
on  this  trip  was  for  the  ears  of  Roosevelt  only,  Welles 
thought  it  wise  to  be  sufficiently  indiscreet  to  tell  both 
Hitler  and  Goering  that  he  had  had  a “long,  constructive 
and  helpful”  talk  with  Mussolini  and  that  the  Duce 
thought  “there  was  still  a possibility  of  bringing  about  a 
firm  and  lasting  peace  in  Europe.”  If  these  were  the  Italian 
dictator’s  thoughts,  then  it  was  time,  the  Germans  real- 
ized, to  correct  them.  Peace  yes,  but  only  after  a resound- 
ing German  victory  in  the  West. 

Hitler’s  failure  to  answer  Mussolini’s  letter  of  January 
3 had  filled  the  Duce  with  mounting  annoyance.  All 
through  the  month  Ambassador  Attolico  was  inquiring  of 
Ribbentrop  when  a reply  might  be  expected  and  hinting 
that  Italy’s  relations  with  France  and  Britain — and  their 
trade,  to  boot — were  improving. 

This  trade,  which  included  Italian  sales  of  war  materials, 
aggravated  the  Germans,  who  constantly  protested  in  Rome 
that  it  was  unduly  aiding  the  Western  Allies.  Ambas- 
sador von  Mackensen  kept  reporting  his  “grave  anxieties” 
to  his  friend  Weizsaecker  and  the  latter  himself  was  afraid 
that  Mussolini’s  unanswered  letter,  if  it  were  “disregarded” 
much  longer,  would  give  the  Duce  “freedom  of  action” 
— he  and  Italy  might  be  lost  for  good.23 

* A quite  unofficial  American  peacemaker  was  also  in  Berlin  at  this  time : 
James  D.  Mooney,  a vice-president  of  General  Motors.  He  had  been  in 
Berlin,  as  I recall,  shortly  before  or  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  trying 
like  that  other  amateur  in  diplomacy,  Dahlerus,  though  without  the  latter’s 
connections,  to  save  the  peace.  The  day  after  Welles  left  Berlin,  on  March 
4,  1940,  Hitler  received  Mooney,  who  told  him,  according  to  a captured 
German  record  of  the  meeting,  that  President  Roosevelt  was  “more  friendly 
and  sympathetic”  to  Germany  “than  was  generally  believed  in  Berlin”  and 
that  the  President  was.  prepared  to  act  as  “moderator”  in  bringing  the 
belligerents  together.  Hitler  merely  repeated  what  he  had  told  Welles  two 
days  before. 

On  March  11  Thomsen  sent  to  Berlin  a confidential  memorandum  pre- 
pared for  him  by  an  unnamed  American  informant  declaring  that  Mooney 
was  more  or  less  pro-German.”  The  General  Motors  executive  was  cer- 
tainly taken  in  by  the  Germans.  Thomsen’s  memorandum  states  that  Mooney 
had  informed  Roosevelt  on  the  basis  of  an  earlier  talk  with  Hitler  that  the 
Fuehrer  “was  desirous  of  peace  and  wished  to  prevent  the  bloodshed  of  a 
spring  campaign.”  Hans  Dieckhoff,  the  recalled  German  ambassador  to  the 
United  States,  who  was  whiling  away  his  time  in  Berlin,  saw  Mooney  im- 
mediately after  the  latter’s  interview  with  Hitler  and  reported  to  the  Foreign 
Office  that  the  American  businessman  was  “rather  verbose”  and  that  “I 
cannot  believe  that  the  Mooney  initiative  has  any  great  importance.”22 


907 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Then  on  March  1 Hitler  received  a break.  The  British 
announced  that  they  were  cutting  off  shipments  of  German 
coal  by  sea  via  Rotterdam  to  Italy.  This  was  a heavy  blow 
to  the  Italian  economy  and  threw  the  Duce  into  a rage 
against  the  British  and  warmed  his  feelings  toward  the 
Germans,  who  promptly  promised  to  find  the  means  of 
delivering  their  coal  by  rail.  Taking  advantage  of  this 
circumstance,  Hitler  got  off  a long  letter  to  Mussolini  on 
March  8,  which  Ribbentrop  delivered  personally  in  Rome 
two  days  later.24 

It  made  no  apologies  for  its  belatedness,  but  was  cordial 
in  tone  and  went  into  considerable  detail  about  the  Fueh- 
rer’s thoughts  and  policies  on  almost  every  conceivable 
subject,  being  more  wordy  than  any  previous  letter  of 
Hitler’s  to  his  Italian  partner.  It  defended  the  Nazi  alliance 
with  Russia,  the  abandonment  of  the  Finns,  the  failure 
to  leave  even  a rump  Poland. 

If  I had  withdrawn  the  German  troops  from  the  Gen- 
eral Government  this  would  not  have  brought  about  a paci- 
fication of  Poland,  but  a hideous  chaos.  And  the  Church 
would  not  have  been  able  to  exercise  its  function  in  praise 
of  the  Lord,  but  the  priests  would  have  had  their  heads 
chopped  off  . . . 

As  for  the  visit  of  Sumner  Welles,  Hitler  continued,  it 
had  achieved  nothing.  He  was  still  determined  to  attack 
in  the  West.  He  realized  “that  the  coming  battle  will  not 
be  a walkover  but  the  fiercest  struggle  in  Germany’s  his- 
tory ...  a battle  for  life  or  death.” 

And  then  Hitler  made  his  pitch  to  Mussolini  to  get 
into  the  war. 

I believe,  Duce,  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  out- 
come of  this  war  will  also  decide  the  future  of  Italy  . . . You 
will  some  day  be  confronted  by  the  very  opponents  who 
are  fighting  Germany  today  ...  I,  too,  see  the  destinies  of 
our  two  countries,  our  peoples,  our  revolutions  and  our 
regimes  indissolubly  joined  with  each  other  . . . 

And,  finally,  let  me  assure  you  that  in  spite  of  everything 
I believe  that  sooner  or  later  fate  will  force  us  after  all  to 
fight  side  by  side,  that  is,  that  you  will  likewise  not  escape 
this  clash  of  arms,  no  matter  how  the  individual  aspects  of 
the  situation  may  develop  today,  and  that  your  place  will 
then  more  than  ever  be  at  our  side,  just  as  mine  will  be  at 
yours. 


908  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Mussolini  was  flattered  by  the  letter  and  at  once  assured 
Ribbentrop  that  he  agreed  that  his  place  was  at  Hitler’s 
side  “on  the  firing  line.”  The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister,  on 
his  part,  lost  no  time  in  buttering  up  his  host.  The  Fueh- 
rer, he  said,  was  “deeply  aroused  by  the  latest  British 
measures  to  block  the  shipment  of  coal  from  Germany  to 
Italy  by  sea.”  How  much  coal  did  the  Italians  need? 
From  500,000  to  700,000  tons  a month,  Mussolini  replied. 
Germany  was  now  prepared,  Ribbentrop  answered  glibly, 
to  furnish  a million  tons  a month  and  would  provide 
most  of  the  cars  to  haul  it. 

There  were  two  lengthy  meetings  between  the  two,  with 
Ciano  present,  on  March  11  and  12,  and  Dr.  Schmidt’s 
shorthand  minutes  reveal  that  Ribbentrop  was  at  his  most 
flatulent.26  Though  there  were  more  important  things  to 
talk  about,  he  produced  captured  Polish  diplomatic  dis- 
patches from  the  Western  capitals  to  show  “the  monstrous 
war  guilt  of  the  United  States.” 

The  Foreign  Minister  explained  that  these  documents 
showed  specifically  the  sinister  role  of  the  American  Am- 
bassadors Bullitt  [Paris],  Kennedy  [London]  and  Drexel 
Biddle  [Warsaw]  . . . They  gave  an  intimation  of  the 
machinations  of  that  Jewish-plutocratic  clique  whose  in- 
fluence, through  Morgan  and  Rockefeller,  reached  all  the 
way  up  to  Roosevelt. 

For  several  hours  the  arrogant  Nazi  Foreign  Minister 
raved  on,  displaying  his  customary  ignorance  of  world 
affairs,  emphasizing  the  common  destiny  of  the  two  fascist 
nations  and  stressing  that  Hitler  would  soon  attack  in  the 
West,  “beat  the  French  Army  in  the  course  of  the  sum- 
mer” and  drive  the  British  from  the  Continent  “before 
fall.”  Mussolini  mostly  listened,  only  occasionally  inter- 
jecting a remark  whose  sarcasm  apparently  escaped  the 
Nazi  Minister.  When,  for  example,  Ribbentrop  pompously 
declared  that  “Stalin  had  renounced  the  idea  of  world  revo- 
lution,” the  Duce  retorted,  according  to  Schmidt’s  notes, 
“Do  you  really  believe  that?”  When  Ribbentrop  explained 
that  “there  was  not  a single  German  soldier  who  did  not 
believe  that  victory  would  be  won  this  year,”  Mussolini 
interjected,  “That  is  an  extremely  interesting  remark.” 
That  evening  Ciano  noted  in  his  diary: 


909 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

After  the  interview,  when  we  were  left  alone,  Mussolini 
says  that  he  does  not  believe  in  the  German  offensive  nor 
in  a complete  German  success. 

The  Italian  dictator  had  promised  to  give  his  own 
views  at  the  meeting  the  next  day  and  Ribbentrop  was 
somewhat  uneasy  as  to  what  they  might  be,  wiring  Hitler 
that  he  had  been  unable  to  obtain  a “hint  as  to  the  Duce’s 
thoughts.” 

He  need  not  have  worried.  The  next  day  Mussolini  was 
a completely  different  man.  He  had  quite  suddenly,  as 
Schmidt  noted,  “turned  completely  prowar.”  It  was  not  a 
question,  he  told  his  visitor,  of  whether  Italy  would  enter 
the  war  on  Germany’s  side,  but  when.  The  question  of 
timing  was  “extremely  delicate,  for  he  ought  not  to  in- 
tervene until  all  his  preparations  were  complete,  so  as  not 
to  burden  his  partner.” 

In  any  event  he  had  to  state  at  this  time  with  all  distinct- 
ness that  Italy  was  in  no  position  financially  to  sustain  a 
long  war.  He  could  not  afford  to  spend  a billion  lire  a day, 
as  England  and  France  were  doing. 

This  remark  seems  to  have  set  Ribbentrop  back  for  a 
moment  and  he  tried  to  pin  the  Duce  down  on  a date  for 
Italy’s  entry  into  the  war,  but  the  latter  was  wary  of  com- 
mitting himself.  “The  moment  would  come,”  he  said, 
“when  a definition  of  Italy’s  relations  with  France  and 
England,  i.e.,  a break  with  these  countries,  would  occur.” 
It  would  be  easy,  he  added,  to  “provoke”  such  a rupture. 
Though  he  persisted,  Ribbentrop  could  not  get  a definite 
date.  Obviously  Hitler  himself  would  have  to  intervene 
personally  for  that.  The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  thereupon 
suggested  a meeting  at  the  Brenner  between  the  two  men 
for  the  latter  part  of  March,  after  the  nineteenth,  to  which 
Mussolini  readily  agreed.  Ribbentrop,  incidentally,  had 
not  breathed  a word  about  Hitler’s  plans  to  occupy  Den- 
mark and  Norway.  There  were  some  secrets  you  did  not 
mention  to  an  ally,  even  while  pressing  for  it  to  join  you. 

Though  he  had  not  succeeded  in  getting  Mussolini  to 
agree  to  a date,  Ribbentrop  had  lured  the  Duce  into  a 
commitment  to  enter  the  war.  “If  he  wanted  to  reinforce 
the  Axis,”  Ciano  lamented  in  his  diary,  “he  has  suc- 
ceeded.” When  Sumner  Welles,  after  visiting  Berlin,  Paris 
and  London,  returned  to  Rome  and  saw  Mussolini  again 
on  March  16,  he  found  him  a changed  man. 


910 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

He  seemed  to  have  thrown  off  some  great  weight  [Welles 
wrote  later]  ...  I have  often  wondered  whether,  during 
the  two  weeks  which  had  elapsed  since  my  first  visit  to 
Rome,  he  had  not  determined  to  cross  the  Rubicon,  and 
during  Ribbentrop’s  visit  had  not  decided  to  force  Italy  into 
the  war.26 

Welles  need  not  have  wondered. 

As  soon  as  Ribbentrop  had  departed  Rome  in  his  special 
train  the  anguished  Italian  dictator  was  prey  to  second 
thoughts.  “He  fears,”  Ciano  jotted  in  his  diary  on  March 
12,  “that  he  has  gone  too  far  in  his  commitment  to  fight 
against  the  Allies.  He  would  now  like  to  dissuade  Hitler 
from  his  land  offensive,  and  this  he  hopes  to  achieve  at 
the  meeting  at  the  Brenner  Pass.”  But  Ciano,  limited  as  he 
was,  knew  better.  “It  cannot  be  denied,”  he  added  in  his 
diary,  “that  the  Duce  is  fascinated  by  Hitler,  a fascina- 
tion which  involves  something  deeply  rooted  in  his  make- 
up. The  Fuehrer  will  get  more  out  of  the  Duce  than 
Ribbentrop  was  able  to  get.”  This  was  true — with  reserva- 
tions, as  shortly  will  be  seen. 

No  sooner  had  he  returned  to  Berlin  than  Ribbentrop 
telephoned  Ciano — on  March  13 — asking  that  the  Brenner 
meeting  be  set  earlier  than  contemplated,  for  March  18. 
“The  Germans  are  unbearable,”  Mussolini  exploded.  “They 
don’t  give  one  time  to  breathe  or  to  think  matters  over.” 
Nevertheless,  he  agreed  to  the  date. 

The  Duce  was  nervous  [Ciano  recorded  in  his  diary  that 
day].  Until  now  he  has  lived  under  the  illusion  that  a real 
war  would  not  be  waged.  The  prospect  of  an  imminent  clash 
in  which  he  might  remain  an  outsider  disturbs  him  and,  to 
use  his  words,  humiliates  him.27 

It  was  snowing  when  the  respective  trains  of  the  two 
dictators  drew  in  on  the  morning  of  March  18,  1940,  at 
the  little  frontier  station  at  the  Brenner  Pass  below  the 
lofty  snow-mantled  Alps.  The  meeting,  as  a sop  to  Musso- 
lini, took  place  in  the  Duce’s  private  railroad  car,  but 
Hitler  did  almost  all  the  talking.  Ciano  summed  up  the 
conference  in  his  diary  that  evening. 

The  conference  is  more  a monologue  . . . Hitler  talks  all 
the  time  . . . Mussolini  listens  to  him  with  interest  and  with 
deference.  He  speaks  little  and  confirms  his  intention  to 


911 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

move  with  Germany.  He  reserves  to  himself  only  the  choice 
of  the  right  moment. 

He  realized,  Mussolini  said,  when  he  was  finally  able 
to  get  in  a word,  that  it  was  “impossible  to  remain  neutral 
until  the  end  of  the  war.”  Co-operation  with  England  and 
France  was  “inconceivable.  We  hate  them.  Therefore 
Italy’s  entry  into  the  war  is  inevitable.”  Hitler  had  spent 
more  than  an  hour  trying  to  convince  him  of  that — if 
Italy  did  not  want  to  be  left  out  in  the  cold  and,  as  he 
added,  become  “a  second-rate  power.” 28  But  having 
answered  the  main  question  to  the  Fuehrer’s  satisfaction, 
the  Duce  immediately  began  to  hedge. 

The  great  problem,  however,  was  the  date  . . . One  condi- 
tion for  this  would  have  to  be  fulfilled.  Italy  would  have  to 
be  “very  well  prepared”  . . . Italy’s  financial  position  did  not 
allow  her  to  wage  a protracted  war  . . . 

He  was  asking  the  Fuehrer  whether  there  would  be  any 
danger  for  Germany  if  the  offensive  were  delayed.  He  did 
not  believe  there  was  such  a danger  ...  he  would  [then] 
have  finished  his  military  preparations  in  three  to  four 
months,  and  would  not  be  in  the  embarrassing  position  of 
seeing  his  comrade  fighting  and  himself  limited  to  making 
demonstrations  . . . He  wanted  to  do  something  more  and 
he  was  not  now  in  a position  to  do  it. 

The  Nazi  warlord  had  no  intention  of  postponing  his 
attack  in  the  West  and  said  so.  But  he  had  a “few  theoreti- 
cal ideas”  which  might  solve  Mussolini’s  difficulty  of  mak- 
ing a frontal  attack  on  mountainous  southern  France, 
since  that  conflict,  he  realized,  “would  cost  a great  deal  of 
blood.”  Why  not,  he  suggested,  supply  a strong  Italian 
force  which  together  with  German  troops  would  advance 
along  the  Swiss  frontier  toward  the  Rhone  Valley  “in  order 
to  turn  the  Franco-Italian  Alpine  front  from  the  rear.” 
Before  this,  of  course,  the  main  German  armies  would 
have  rolled  back  the  French  and  British  in  the  north. 
Hitler  was  obviously  trying  to  make  it  easy  for  the 
Italians. 

When  the  enemy  has  been  smashed  [in  northern  France] 
the  moment  would  come  [Hitler  continued]  for  Italy  to 
intervene  actively,  not  at  the  most  difficult  point  on  the 
Alpine  front,  but  elsewhere  . . . 

The  war  will  be  decided  in  France.  Once  France  is  dis- 


912 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

posed  of,  Italy  will  be  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean  and 
England  will  have  to  make  peace. 

Mussolini,  it  must  be  said,  was  not  slow  at  seizing 
upon  this  glittering  prospect  of  getting  so  much  after  the 
Germans  had  done  all  the  hard  fighting. 

The  Duce  replied  that  once  Germany  had  made  a vic- 
torious advance  he  would  intervene  immediately  ...  he 
would  lose  no  time  . . . when  the  Allies  were  so  shaken  by 
the  German  attack  that  it  needed  only  a second  blow  to 
bring  them  to  their  knees. 

On  the  other  hand, 

If  Germany’s  progress  was  slow,  the  Duce  said  that  then  he 
would  wait. 

This  crude,  cowardly  bargain  seems  not  to  have  unduly 
bothered  Hitler.  If  Mussolini  was  personally  attracted  to 
him,  as  Ciano  said,  by  “something  deeply  rooted  in  his 
make-up,”  it  might  be  said  that  the  attraction  was  mutual, 
for  the  same  mysterious  reasons.  Disloyal  as  he  had  been 
to  some  of  his  closest  associates,  a number  of  whom  he 
had  had  murdered,  such  as  Roehm  and  Strasser,  Hitler 
maintained  a strange  and  unusual  loyalty  to  his  ridiculous 
Italian  partner  that  did  not  weaken,  that  indeed  was 
strengthened  when  adversity  and  then  disaster  overtook 
the  strutting,  sawdust  Roman  Caesar.  It  is  one  of  the 
interesting  paradoxes  of  this  narrative. 

At  any  rate,  for  what  it  was  worth — and  few  Germans 
besides  Hitler,  especially  among  the  generals,  thought  it 
was  worth  very  much — Italy’s  entrance  into  the  war  had 
now  at  last  been  solemnly  promised.  The  Nazi  warlord 
could  turn  his  thoughts  again  to  new  and  imminent  con- 
quests. Of  the  most  imminent  one — in  the  north — he  did 
not  breathe  a word  to  his  friend  and  ally. 

THE  CONSPIRATORS  AGAIN  FRUSTRATED 

Once  more  the  anti-Nazi  plotters  tried  to  persuade  the 
generals  to  depose  the  Leader — this  time  before  he  could 
launch  his  new  aggression  in  the  north,  of  which  they  had 
got  wind.  What  the  civilian  conspirators  again  wanted 
was  assurance  from  the  British  government  that  it  would 
make  peace  with  an  anti-Nazi  German  regime,  and,  being 


913 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

what  they  were,  they  were  insistent  that  in  any  settlement 
the  new  Reich  government  be  allowed  to  keep  most  of 
Hitler’s  territorial  gains:  Austria,  the  Sudetenland  and  the 
1914  frontier  in  Poland,  though  this  last  had  only  been 
obtained  in  the  past  by  the  wiping  out  of  the  Polish  nation. 

It  was  with  such  a proposal  that  Hassell,  with  con- 
siderable personal  courage,  journeyed  to  Arosa,  Switzer- 
land, on  February  21,  1940,  to  confer  with  a British 
contact  whom  he  calls  “Mr.  X”  in  his  diary  and  who  was 
a certain  J.  Lonsdale  Bryans.  They  conferred  in  the 
greatest  secrecy  at  four  meetings  on  February  22  and  23. 
Bryans,  who  had  cut  a certain  figure  in  the  diplomatic 
society  of  Rome,  was  another  of  those  self-appointed  and 
somewhat  amateurish  negotiators  for  peace  who  have 
turned  up  in  this  narrative.  He  had  contacts  in  Downing 
Street,  and  Hassell,  once  they  had  met,  was  personally 
impressed  by  him.  After  the  fiasco  of  the  attempt  of 
Major  Stevens  and  Captain  Best  in  Holland  to  get  in 
touch  with  the  German  conspirators,  the  British  were 
somewhat  skeptical  of  the  whole  business,  and  when  Bryans 
pressed  Hassell  for  some  reliable  information  as  to  whom 
he  was  speaking  for  the  German  envoy  became  cagey. 

“I  am  not  in  a position  to  name  the  men  who  are  back- 
ing me,”  Hassell  retorted.  “I  can  only  assure  you  that  a 
statement  from  Halifax  would  get  to  the  right  people.”  29 

Hassell  then  outlined  the  views  of  the  German  “opposi- 
tion”: it  was  realized  that  Hitler  had  to  be  overthrown 
“before  major  military  operations  are  undertaken”;  that 
this  must  be  “an  exclusively  German  affair”;  that  there 
must  be  “some  authoritative  English  statement”  about 
how  a new  anti-Nazi  regime  in  Berlin  would  be  treated 
and  that  “the  principal  obstacle  to  any  change  in  regime 
is  the  story  of  1918,  that  is,  German  anxiety  lest  things 
develop  as  they  did  then,  after  the  Kaiser  was  sacrificed.” 
Hassell  and  his  friends  wanted  guarantees  that  if  they 
got  rid  of  Hitler  Germany  would  be  treated  more  generous- 
ly than  it  was  after  the  Germans  had  got  rid  of  Wilhelm 
H. 

He  thereupon  handed  over  to  Bryans  a memorandum 
which  he  himself  had  drawn  up  in  English.  It  is  a wooly 
document,  though  full  of  noble  sentiments  about  a future 
world  based  “on  the  principles  of  Christian  ethics,  justice 
and  law,  social  welfare  and  liberty  of  thought  and  con- 


914 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


science.”  The  greatest  danger  of  continuing  “this  mad 
war,”  Hassell  wrote,  was  “a  bolshevization  of  Europe” — 
he  considered  that  worse  than  the  continuance  of  Nazism. 
And  his  main  condition  for  peace  was  that  the  new  Ger- 
many be  left  with  almost  all  of  Hitler’s  conquests,  which 
he  enumerated.  The  German  acquisition  of  Austria  and 
the  Sudetenland  could  not  even  be  discussed  in  any  pro- 
posed peace;  and  Germany  would  have  to  have  the  1914 
frontier  with  Poland,  which,  of  course,  though  he  did 
not  say  so,  was  actually  the  1914  frontier  with  Russia, 
since  Poland  had  not  been  allowed  to  exist  in  1914. 

Bryans  agreed  that  speedy  action  was  necessary  in  view 
of  the  imminence  of  the  German  offensive  in  the  West 
and  promised  to  deliver  Hassell’s  memorandum  to  Lord 
Halifax.  Hassell  returned  to  Berlin  to  acquaint  his  fellow 
plotters  with  his  latest  move.  Although  they  hoped  for 
the  best  from  Hassell’s  “Mr.  X”  they  were  more  concerned 
at  the  moment  with  the  so-called  “X  Report”  which  Hans 
von  Dohnanyi,  one  of  the  members  of  the  group  in  the 
Abwehr,  had  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  Dr.  Mueller's 
contact  with  the  British  at  the  Vatican.*  It  declared  that 
the  Pope  was  ready  to  intervene  with  Britain  for  reasonable 
peace  terms  with  a new  anti-Nazi  German  government, 
and  it  is  a measure  of  the  views  of  these  opponents  of 
Hitler  that  one  of  their  terms,  which  they  claimed  the 
Holy  Father  would  back,  was  “the  settlement  of  the  East- 
ern question  in  favor  of  Germany.”  The  demonic  Nazi 
dictator  had  obtained  a settlement  in  the  East  “in  favor 
of  Germany”  by  armed  aggression;  the  good  German  con- 
spirators wanted  the  same  thing  handed  to  them  by  the 
British  with  the  Pope’s  blessings. 

The  X Report  loomed  very  large  in  the  minds  of  the 
plotters  that  winter  of  1939—40.  At  the  end  of  October 
General  Thomas  had  shown  it  to  Brauchitsch  with  the 
intention  of  bucking  up  the  Army  Commander  in  Chief 
in  his  efforts  to  dissuade  Hitler  from  launching  the  of- 
fensive in  the  West  that  fall.  But  Brauchitsch  did  not 
appreciate  such  encouragement.  In  fact,  he  threatened  to 
have  General  Thomas  arrested  if  he  brought  the  matter 
up  again.  It  was  “plain  high  treason,”  he  barked  at  him. 

Now,  with  a fresh  Nazi  aggression  in  the  offing,  Thomas 


* See  above,  pp.  857-58. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  915 

took  the  X Report  to  General  Haider  in  the  hope  that  he 
might  act  on  it.  But  this  was  a vain  hope.  As  the  General 
Staff  Chief  told  Goerdeler,  one  of  the  most  active  of  the 
conspirators— who  had  also  begged  him  to  take  the  lead, 
since  the  spineless  Brauchitsch  would  not — he  could  not 
at  this  time  justify  breaking  his  oath  as  a soldier  to  the 
Fuehrer.  Besides: 

England  and  France  had  declared  war  on  us,  and  one  had 
to  see  it  through.  A peace  of  compromise  was  senseless.  Only 
in  the  greatest  emergency  could  one  take  the  action  desired  by 
Goerdeler. 

“Also,  dock!”  exclaimed  Hassell  in  his  diary  on  April 
6,  1940,  in  recounting  Haider’s  state  of  mind  as  explained 
to  him  by  Goerdeler.  “Haider,”  the  diarist  added,  “who 
had  begun  to  weep  during  the  discussion  of  his  responsi- 
bility, gave  the  impression  of  a weak  man  with  shattered 
nerves.” 

The  accuracy  of  such  an  impression  is  to  be  doubted. 
When  one  goes  over  Haider’s  diary  for  the  first  week  of 
April,  cluttered  as  it  is  with  hundreds  of  detailed  entries 
about  preparations  for  the  gigantic  offensive  in  the  West, 
which  he  was  helping  to  mastermind,  this  writer  at  least 
gets  the  impression  that  the  General  Staff  Chief  was  in  a 
buoyant  mood  as  he  conferred  with  the  field  commanders 
and  checked  the  final  plans  for  the  greatest  and  most 
daring  military  operation  in  German  history.  There  is 
no  hint  in  his  journal  of  treasonable  thoughts  or  of  any 
wrestling  with  his  conscience.  Though  he  has  misgivings 
about  the  attack  on  Denmark  and  Norway,  they  are  based 
purely  on  military  grounds,  and  there  is  not  a word  of 
moral  doubt  about  Nazi  aggression  against  the  four  small 
neutral  countries  whose  frontiers  Germany  had  solemnly 
guaranteed  and  whom  Haider  knew  Germany  was  about 
to  attack,  and  against  two  of  whom,  Belgium  and  Hol- 
land, he  himself  had  taken  a leading  part  in  drafting  the 
plans. 

So  ended  the  latest  attempt  of  the  “good  Germans”  to 
oust  Hitler  before  it  was  too  late.  It  was  the  last  oppor- 
tunity they  would  have  to  obtain  a generous  peace.  The 
generals,  as  Brauchitsch  and  Haider  had  made  clear,  were 
not  interested  in  a negotiated  peace.  They  were  thinking 
now,  as  was  the  Fuehrer,  of  a dictated  peace — dictated 


916 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


after  German  victory.  Not  until  the  chances  of  that  had 
gone  glimmering  did  they  seriously  return  to  their  old 
and  treasonable  thoughts,  which  had  been  so  strong  at 
Munich  and  at  Zossen,  of  removing  their  mad  dictator. 
This  state  of  mind  and  character  must  be  remembered 
in  view  of  subsequent  events  and  of  subsequent  spinning 
of  myths. 

THE  TAKING  OF  DENMARK  AND  NORWAY 

Hitler’s  preparations  for  the  conquest  of  Denmark  and 
Norway  have  been  called  by  many  writers  one  of  the 
best-kept  secrets  of  the  war,  but  it  has  seemed  to  this 
author  that  the  two  Scandinavian  countries  and  even  the 
British  were  caught  napping  not  because  they  were  not 
warned  of  what  was  coming  but  because  they  did  not 
believe  the  warnings  in  time. 

Ten  days  before  disaster  struck,  Colonel  Oster  of  the 
Abwehr  warned  a close  friend  of  his,  Colonel  J.  G.  Sas, 
the  Dutch  military  attache  in  Berlin,  of  the  German 
plans  for  W eseruebung  and  Sas  immediately  informed  the 
Danish  naval  attache,  Captain  Kjolsen.30  But  the  com- 
placent Danish  government  would  not  believe  its  own 
naval  attache,  and  when  on  April  4 the  Danish  minister 
in  Berlin  sent  Kjolsen  scurrying  to  Copenhagen  to  re- 
peat the  warning  in  person  his  intelligence  was  still  not 
taken  seriously.  Even  on  the  eve  of  catastrophe,  on  the 
evening  of  March  8,  after  news  had  been  received  of 
the  torpedoing  of  a German  transport  laden  with  troops 
off  the  south  coast  of  Norway— just  north  of  Denmark — 
and  the  Danes  had  seen  with  their  own  eyes  a great 
German  naval  armada  sailing  north  between  their  islands, 
the  King  of  Denmark  had  dismissed  with  a smile  a re- 
mark at  the  dinner  table  that  his  country  was  in  danger. 

“He  really  didn’t  believe  that,”  a Guards  officer  who 
was  present  later  reported.  In  fact,  this  officer  related,  the 
King  had  proceeded  after  dinner  to  the  Royal  Theater  in 
a “confident  and  happy”  frame  of  mind.31 

Already  in  March  the  Norwegian  government  had  re- 
ceived warnings  from  its  legation  in  Berlin  and  from  the 
Swedes  about  a German  concentration  of  troops  and  naval 
vessels  in  the  North  Sea  and  Baltic  ports  and  on  April  5 
definite  intelligence  arrived  from  Berlin  of  imminent  Ger- 


917 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

man  landings  on  the  southern  coast  of  Norway.  But  the 
complacent  cabinet  in  Oslo  remained  skeptical.  Not  even 
on  the  seventh,  when  several  large  German  war  vessels 
were  sighted  proceeding  up  the  Norwegian  coast  and  re- 
ports arrived  of  British  planes  strafing  a German  battle 
fleet  off  the  mouth  of  the  Skagerrak,  not  even  on  April  8, 
when  the  British  Admiralty  informed  the  Legation  of  Nor- 
way in  London  that  a strong  German  naval  force  had  been 
discovered  approaching  Narvik  and  the  newspapers  in  Oslo 
were  reporting  that  German  soldiers  rescued  from  the 
transport  Rio  de  Janeiro,  torpedoed  that  day  off  the  Nor- 
wegian coast  at  Lillesand  by  a Polish  submarine,  had 
declared  they  were  en  route  to  Bergen  to  help  defend 
it  against  the  British — not  even  then  did  the  Norwegian 
government  consider  it  necessary  to  take  such  obvious 
steps  as  mobilizing  the  Army,  fully  manning  the  forts 
guarding  the  harbors,  blocking  the  airfield  runways,  or, 
most  important  of  all,  mining  the  easily  mined  narrow 
water  approaches  to  the  capital  and  the  main  cities.  Had 
it  done  these  things  history  might  have  taken  a different 
turning. 

Ominous  news,  as  Churchill  puts  it,  had  begun  filtering 
into  London  by  the  first  of  April,  and  on  April  3 the 
British  War  Cabinet  discussed  the  latest  intelligence,  above 
all  from  Stockholm,  which  told  of  the  Germans  collect- 
ing sizable  military  forces  in  its  northern  ports  with  the 
objective  of  moving  into  Scandinavia.  But  the  news  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  taken  very  seriously.  Two  days 
later,  on  April  5,  when  the  first  wave  of  German  naval 
supply  ships  was  already  at  sea.  Prime  Minister  Chamber- 
lain  proclaimed  in  a speech  that  Hitler,  by  failing  to  at- 
tack in  the  West  when  the  British  and  French  were  un- 
prepared, had  “missed  the  bus” — a phrase  he  was  very 
shortly  to  rue.* 

The  British  government  at  this  moment,  according  to 
Churchill,  was  inclined  to  believe  that  the  German  build- 
up in  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  ports  was  being  done 
merely  to  enable  Hitler  to  deliver  a counterstroke  in  case 
the  British,  in  mining  Norwegian  waters  to  cut  off  the 

* The  first  three  German  supply  ships  had  sailed  for  Narvik  at  2 a.m.  on 
April  3.  Germany’s  largest  tanker  left  Murmansk  for  Narvik  on  April  6, 
with  the  connivance  of  the  Russians,  who  obligingly  furnished  the  cargo  of  oil. 


918 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ore  shipments  from  Narvik,  also  occupied  that  port  and 
perhaps  others  to  the  south. 

As  a matter  of  fact,  the  British  government  was  con- 
templating such  an  occupation.  After  seven  months  of 
frustration  Churchill,  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  had 
finally  succeeded  in  getting  the  approval  of  the  War 
Cabinet  and  the  Allied  Supreme  War  Council  to  mine 
the  Norwegian  Leads  on  April  8 — an  action  called  “Wil- 
fred.” Since  it  seemed  likely  that  the  Germans  would  react 
violently  to  the  mortal  blow  of  having  their  iron  ore  ship- 
ments from  Narvik  blocked,  it  was  decided  that  a small 
Anglo-French  force  should  be  dispatched  to  Narvik  and 
advance  to  the  nearby  Swedish  frontier.  Other  contingents 
would  be  landed  at  Trondheim,  Bergen  and  Stavanger 
farther  south  in  order,  as  Churchill  explained,  “to  deny 
these  bases  to  the  enemy.”  This  was  known  as  “Plan  R- 
4.”  32 

Thus  during  the  first  week  of  April,  while  German 
troops  were  being  loaded  on  various  warships  for  the 
passage  to  Norway,  British  troops,  though  in  much  fewer 
numbers,  were  being  embarked  on  transports  in  the  Clyde 
and  on  cruisers  in  the  Forth  for  the  same  destination. 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  2,  Hitler,  after  a long  con- 
ference with  Goering,  Raeder  and  Falkenhorst,  issued  a 
formal  directive  ordering  Weseruebung  to  begin  at  5:15 
a.m.  on  April  9.  At  the  same  time  he  issued  another  direc- 
tive stipulating  that  “the  escape  of  the  Kings  of  Denmark 
and  Norway  from  their  countries  at  the  time  of  the  oc- 
cupation must  be  prevented  by  all  means.”  33  Also  on  the 
same  day  OKW  let  the  Foreign  Office  in  on  the  secret. 
A lengthy  directive  was  presented  to  Ribbentrop  in- 
structing him  to  prepare  the  diplomatic  measures  for  in- 
ducing Denmark  and  Norway  to  surrender  without  a 
fight  as  soon  as  the  German  armed  forces  had  arrived  and 
to  concoct  some  kind  of  justification  for  Hitler’s  latest 
aggression.34 

But  trickery  was  not  to  be  confined  to  the  Foreign  Of- 
fice. The  Navy  was  also  to  make  use  of  it.  On  April  3, 
with  the  departure  of  the  first  vessels,  Jodi  reflected  in  his 
diary  on  the  problem  of  how  deceit  could  be  used  to 
hoodwink  the  Norwegians  in  case  they  became  suspicious 
of  the  presence  of  so  many  German  men-of-war  in  their 


919 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

vicinity.  Actually  this  little  matter  had  already  been  worked 
out  by  the  Navy.  It  had  instructed  its  warships  and  trans- 
ports to  try  to  pass  as  British  craft — even  if  it  were  neces- 
sary to  fly  the  Union  Jack!  Secret  German  naval  com- 
mands laid  down  detailed  orders  for  “Deception  and 
Camouflage  in  the  Invasion  of  Norway.”  85 

MOST  SECRET 

Behavior  During  Entrance  into  the  Harbor 

All  ships  darkened  . . . The  disguise  as  British  craft  must 
be  kept  as  long  as  possible.  All  challenges  in  Morse  by 
Norwegian  ships  will  be  answered  in  English.  In  answer, 
something  like  the  following  will  be  chosen: 

“Calling  at  Bergen  for  a short  visit.  No  hostile  intent.” 

. . . Challenges  to  be  answered  with  names  of  British  war- 
ships: 

Koeln — H.M.S.  Cairo. 

Koenigsberg — H.M.S.  Calcutta.  . . . (etc.) 

Arrangements  are  to  be  made  to  enable  British  war  flags 
to  be  illuminated  . . . 

For  Bergen  . . . Following  is  laid  down  as  guiding  prin- 
ciple should  one  of  our  own  units  find  itself  compelled  to 
answer  the  challenge  of  passing  craft: 

To  challenge:  (in  case  of  the  Koeln ) H.M.S.  Cairo. 

To  order  to  stop:  “(1)  Please  repeat  last  signal.  (2)  Im- 
possible to  understand  your  signal.” 

In  case  of  a warning  shot:  “Stop  firing.  British  ship.  Good 
friend.” 

In  case  of  an  inquiry  as  to  destination  and  purpose: 
“Going  Bergen.  Chasing  German  steamers.”  * 

And  so  on  April  9,  1940,  at  5:20  a.m.  precisely  (4:20 
a.m.  in  Denmark),  an  hour  before  dawn,  the  German  en- 
voys at  Copenhagen  and  Oslo,  having  routed  the  respec- 
tive foreign  ministers  out  of  bed  exactly  twenty  minutes 
before  (Ribbentrop  had  insisted  on  a strict  timetable  in 
co-ordination  with  the  arrival  at  that  hour  of  the  German 
troops),  presented  to  the  Danish  and  Norwegian  govern- 
ments a German  ultimatum  demanding  that  they  accept 
on  the  instant,  and  without  resistance,  the  “protection 
of  the  Reich.”  The  ultimatum  was  perhaps  the  most 
brazen  document  yet  composed  by  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop, 

* On  the  stand  at  Nuremberg,  Grand  Admiral  Raeder  justified  such  tactics 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  a legitimate  “ruse  of  war  against  which,  from 
the  legal  point  of  view,  no  objection  can  be  made.”88 


920 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

who  were  such  masters  and  by  now  so  experienced 
in  diplomatic  deceit.37 

After  declaring  that  the  Reich  had  come  to  the  aid  of 
Denmark  and  Norway  to  protect  them  against  an  Anglo- 
French  occupation,  the  memorandum  stated: 

The  German  troops  therefore  do  not  set  foot  on  Nor- 
wegian soil  as  enemies.  The  German  High  Command  does  not 
intend  to  make  use  of  the  points  occupied  by  German 
troops  as  bases  for  operations  against  England  as  long  as  it 
is  not  forced  to  ...  On  the  contrary,  German  military  opera- 
tions aim  exclusively  at  protecting  the  north  against  the  pro- 
posed occupation  of  Norwegian  bases  by  Anglo-French 
forces  . . . 

...  In  the  spirit  of  the  good  relations  between  Germany 
and  Norway  which  have  existed  hitherto,  the  Reich  Govern- 
ment declares  to  the  Royal  Norwegian  Government  that 
Germany  has  no  intention  of  infringing  by  her  measures  the 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  of  the  King- 
dom of  Norway  now  or  in  the  future  . . . 

The  Reich  Government  therefore  expects  that  the  Nor- 
wegian Government  and  the  Norwegian  people  will  . . . offer 
no  resistance  to  it.  Any  resistance  would  have  to  be,  and 
would  be,  broken  by  all  possible  means  . . . and  would 
therefore  lead  only  to  absolutely  useless  bloodshed.  . . . 

German  expectations  proved  justified  as  regards  Den- 
mark but  not  Norway.  This  became  known  in  the  Wil- 
helmstrasse  with  the  receipt  of  the  first  urgent  messages 
from  the  respective  ministers  to  those  countries.  The  Ger- 
man envoy  in  Copenhagen  wired  Ribbentrop  at  8:34  a.m. 
that  the  Danes  had  “accepted  all  our  demands  [though] 
registering  a protest.”  Minister  Curt  Brauer  in  Oslo  had 
a quite  different  report  to  make.  At  5:52  a.m.,  just  thirty- 
two  minutes  after  he  had  delivered  the  German  ultima- 
tum, he  wired  Berlin  the  quick  response  of  the  Norwegian 
government:  “We  will  not  submit  voluntarily:  the  struggle 
is  already  under  way.”  38 

The  arrogant  Ribbentrop  was  outraged.*  At  10:55  he 

* This  writer  had  rarely  seen  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  more  insufferable 
than  he  was  that  morning.  He  strutted  into  a specially  convoked  press  con- 
ference at  the  Foreign  Office,  garbed  in  a flashy  field-gray  uniform  and 
looking,  I noted  in  mv  diary,  “as  if  he  owned  the  earth.”  He  snapped,  “The 
Fuehrer  has  given  his  answer  . . . Germany  has  occupied  Danish  and 
Norwegian  soil  in  order  to  protect  those  countries  from  the  Allies,  and  will 
defend  their  true  neutrality  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Thus  an  honored  part 
of  Europe  has  been  saved  from  certain  downfall.” 

The  Berlin  press  was  also  something  to  see  that  day.  The  Boersen 
tettung:  England  goes  cold-bloodedly  over  the  dead  bodies  of  small  peoples. 


921 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

wired  Brauer  “most  urgent”:  “You  will  once  more  impress 
on  the  Government  there  that  Norwegian  resistance  is 
completely  senseless.” 

This  the  unhappy  German  envoy  could  no  longer  do. 
The  Norwegian  King,  government  and  members  of  Par- 
liament had  by  this  time  fled  the  capital  for  the  moun- 
tains in  the  north.  However  hopeless  the  odds,  they  were 
determined  to  resist.  In  fact,  resistance  had  already  begun 
in  some  places,  though  not  in  all,  with  the  arrival  of 
German  ships  out  of  the  night. 

The  Danes  were  in  a more  hopeless  position.  Their 
pleasant  little  island  country  was  incapable  of  defense.  It 
was  too  small,  too  flat,  and  the  largest  part,  Jutland,  lay 
open  by  land  to  Hitler’s  panzers.  There  were  no  moun- 
tains for  the  King  and  the  government  to  flee  to  as  there 
were  in  Norway,  nor  could  any  help  be  expected  from 
Britain.  It  has  been  said  that  the  Danes  were  too  civilized 
to  fight  in  such  circumstances;  at  any  rate,  they  did  not. 
General  W.  W.  Pryor,  the  Army  Commander  in  Chief, 
almost  alone  pleaded  for  resistance,  but  he  was  over- 
ruled by  Premier  Thorvald  Stauning,  Foreign  Minister 
Edvard  Munch,  and  the  King,  who,  when  the  bad  news 
began  coming  in  on  April  8,  refused  his  pleas  for  mobiliza- 
tion. For  reasons  which  remain  obscure  to  this  writer,  even 
after  an  investigation  in  Copenhagen,  the  Navy  never 
fired  a shot,  either  from  its  ships  or  from  its  shore  bat- 
teries, even  when  German  troop  ships  passed  under  the 
noses  of  its  guns  and  could  have  been  blown  to  bits.  The 
Army  fought  a few  skirmishes  in  Jutland,  the  Royal 
Guard  fired  a few  shots  around  the  royal  palace  in  the 
capital  and  suffered  a few  men  wounded.  By  the  time 
the  Danes  had  finished  their  hearty  breakfasts  it  was  all 
over.  The  King,  on  the  advice  of  his  government  but 
against  that  of  General  Pryor,  capitulated  and  ordered 
what  slight  resistance  there  was  to  cease. 

The  plans  to  take  Denmark  by  surprise  and  deceit,  as 
the  captured  German  Army  records  show,  had  been  pre- 
pared with  meticulous  care.  General  Kurt  Himer,  chief  of 
staff  of  the  task  force  for  Denmark,  had  arrived  by  train 

Germany  protects  the  weak  states  from  the  English  highway  robbers  . . . 
Norway  ought  to  see  the  righteousness  of  Germany’s  action,  which  was 
taken  to  ensure  the  freedom  of  the  Norwegian  people.”  Hitler’s  own  paper, 
the  Voelkischer  Beobachter,  carried  this  banner  line:  Germany  saves 

SCANDINAVIAl 


922 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

in  civilian  clothes  in  Copenhagen  on  April  7 to  recon- 
noiter  the  capital  and  make  the  necessary  arrangements 
for  a suitable  pier  to  dock  the  troopship  Hansestadt  Dan- 
zig and  a truck  to  handle  the  moving  of  a few  supplies 
and  a radio  transmitter.  The  commander  of  the  battalion 
— all  that  was  considered  necessary  to  capture  a great 
city — had  also  been  in  Copenhagen  in  civilian  clothes  a 
couple  of  days  before  to  get  the  layout  of  the  land. 

It  was  not  so  strange,  therefore,  that  the  plans  of  the 
General  and  the  battalion  major  were  carried  out  with 
scarcely  a hitch.  The  troopship  arrived  off  Copenhagen 
shortly  before  dawn,  passed  without  challenge  the  guns  of 
the  fort  guarding  the  harbor  and  those  of  the  Danish 
patrol  vessels  and  tied  up  neatly  at  the  Langelinie  Pier  in 
the  heart  of  the  city,  only  a stone’s  throw  from  the  Citadel, 
the  headquarters  of  the  Danish  Army,  and  but  a short 
distance  from  Amalienborg  Palace,  where  the  King  resided. 
Both  were  quickly  seized  by  the  lone  battalion  with  no 
resistance  worth  mentioning. 

Upstairs  in  the  palace,  amidst  the  rattle  of  scattered 
shots,  the  King  conferred  with  his  ministers.  The  latter 
were  all  for  nonresistance.  Only  General  Pryor  begged  to 
be  allowed  to  put  lip  a fight.  At  the  very  least  he  demanded 
that  the  King  should  leave  for  the  nearest  military  camp 
at  Hpvelte  to  escape  capture.  But  the  King  agreed  with 
his  ministers.  The  monarch,  according  to  one  eyewitness, 
asked  “whether  our  soldiers  had  fought  long  enough” — 
and  Pryor  retorted  that  they  had  not.  * 39 

General  Himer  became  restless  at  the  delay.  He  tele- 
phoned headquarters  for  the  combined  operation,  which 
had  been  set  up  at  Hamburg — the  Danish  authorities  had 
not  thought  of  cutting  the  telephone  lines  to  Germany — 
and,  according  to  his  own  story,40  asked  for  some  bomb- 
ers to  zoom  over  Copenhagen  “in  order  to  force  the  Danes 
to  accept.”  The  conversation  was  in  code  and  the  Luft- 
waffe understood  that  Himer  was  calling  for  an  actual 
bombing,  which  it  promised  to  carry  out  forthwith — an 
error  which  was  finally  corrected  just  in  time.  General 
Himer  says  the  bombers  “roaring  over  the  Danish  capital 
did  not  fail  to  make  their  impression:  the  Government 
accepted  the  German  requests.” 


* Total  Danish  casualties  throughout  the  realm  were  thirteen  killed  and 
twenty-three  wounded.  The  Germans  suffered  some  twenty  casualties. 


923 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

There  was  some  difficulty  in  finding  means  of  broad- 
casting the  government’s  capitulation  to  the  Danish  troops, 
because  the  local  radio  stations  were  not  yet  on  the  air 
at  such  an  early  hour.  This  was  solved  by  broadcasting  it 
on  the  Danish  wave  length  over  the  transmitter  which 
the  German  battalion  had  brought  along  with  it  and  for 
which  General  Himer  had  thoughtfully  dug  up  a truck  to 
haul  it  to  the  Citadel. 

At  2 o’clock  that  afternoon  General  Himer,  accom- 
panied by  the  German  minister,  Cecil  von  Renthe-Fink, 
called  on  the  King  of  Denmark,  who  was  no  longer 
sovereign  but  did  not  yet  realize  it.  Himer  left  a record 
of  the  interview  in  the  secret  Army  archives. 

The  seventy-year-old  King  appeared  inwardly  shattered,  al- 
though he  preserved  outward  appearances  perfectly  and 
maintained  absolute  dignity  during  the  audience.  His  whole 
body  trembled.  He  declared  that  he  and  his  government 
would  do  everything  possible  to  keep  peace  and  order  in  the 
country  and  to  eliminate  any  friction  between  the  German 
troops  and  the  country.  He  wished  to  spare  his  country 
further  misfortune  and  misery. 

General  Himer  replied  that  personally  he  very  much  re- 
gretted coming  to  the  King  on  such  a mission,  but  that  he 
was  only  doing  his  duty  as  a soldier  . . . We  came  as 
friends,  etc.  When  the  King  then  asked  whether  he  might 
keep  his  bodyguard,  General  Himer  replied  . . . that  the 
Fuehrer  would  doubtless  permit  him  to  retain  them.  He  had 
no  doubt  about  it. 

The  King  was  visibly  relieved  at  hearing  this.  During  the 
course  of  the  audience  . . . the  King  became  more  at  ease, 
and  at  its  conclusion  addressed  General  Himer  with  the 
words:  “General,  may  I,  as  an  old  soldier,  tell  you  some- 
thing? As  soldier  to  soldier?  You  Germans  have  done  the 
incredible  again!  One  must  admit  that  it  is  magnificent 
work!” 

For  nearly  four  years,  until  the  tide  of  war  had  changed, 
the  Danish  King  and  his  people,  a good-natured,  civilized 
and  happy-go-lucky  race,  offered  very  little  trouble  to 
the  Germans.  Denmark  became  known  as  the  “model 
protectorate.”  The  monarch,  the  government,  the  courts, 
even  the  Parliament  and  the  press,  were  at  first  allowed  a 
surprising  amount  of  freedom  by  their  conquerors.  Not 
even  Denmark’s  seven  thousand  Jews  were  molested — for 
a time.  But  the  Danes,  later  than  most  of  the  other  con- 


924 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

quered  peoples,  finally  came  to  the  realization  that  further 
“loyal  co-operation,”  as  they  called  it,  with  their  Teutonic 
tyrants,  whose  brutality  increased  with  the  years  and 
with  the  worsening  fortunes  of  war,  was  impossible — 
if  they  were  to  retain  any  shred  of  self-respect  and  honor. 
They  also  began  to  see  that  Germany  might  not  win  the 
war  after  all  and  that  little  Denmark  was  not  inexorably 
condemned,  as  so  many  had  feared  at  first,  to  be  a 
vassal  state  in  Hitler’s  unspeakable  New  Order.  Then  re- 
sistance began. 

THE  NORWEGIANS  RESIST 

It  began  in  Norway  from  the  outset,  though  certainly 
not  everywhere.  At  Narvik,  the  port  and  railhead  of  the 
iron  ore  line  from  Sweden,  Colonel  Konrad  Sundlo,  in 
command  of  the  local  garrison,  who,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  a fanatical  follower  of  Quisling,*  surrendered  to  the 
Germans  without  firing  a shot.  The  naval  commander  was 
of  a different  caliber.  With  the  approach  of  ten  German 
destroyers  at  the  mouth  of  the  long  fjord,  the  Eidsvold, 
one  of  two  ancient  ironclads  in  the  harbor,  fired  a warning 
shot  and  signaled  to  the  destroyers  to  identify  themselves. 
Rear  Admiral  Fritz  Bonte,  commanding  the  German 
destroyer  flotilla,  answered  by  sending  an  officer  in  a 
launch  to  the  Norwegian  vessel  to  demand  surrender. 
There  now  followed  a bit  of  German  treachery,  though 
German  naval  officers  later  defended  it  with  the  argu- 
ment that  in  war  necessity  knows  no  law.  When  the 
officer  in  the  launch  signaled  the  German  Admiral  that 
the  Norwegians  had  said  they  would  resist,  Bonte  waited 
only  until  his  launch  got  out  of  the  way  and  then 
quickly  blew  up  the  Eidsvold  with  torpedoes.  The  second 
Norwegian  ironclad,  the  Norge,  then  opened  fire  but  was 
quickly  dispatched.  Three  hundred  Norwegian  sailors — 
almost  the  entire  crews  of  the  two  vessels — perished.  By 
8 a.m.  Narvik  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  taken  by 
ten  destroyers  which  had  slipped  through  a formidable 
British  fleet,  and  occupied  by  a mere  two  battalions  of 
Nazi  troops  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  Ed- 
uard Dietl,  an  old  Bavarian  crony  of  Hitler  since  the  days 
of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch,  who  was  to  prove  himself  a re- 


See  above,  pp.  893-94. 


925 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

sourceful  and  courageous  commander  when  the  going  at 
Narvik  got  rough,  as  it  did  beginning  the  next  day. 

Trondheim,  halfway  down  the  long  Norwegian  west 
coast,  was  taken  by  the  Germans  almost  as  easily.  The 
harbor  batteries  failed  to  fire  on  the  German  naval  ships, 
led  by  the  heavy  cruiser  Hipper,  as  they  came  up  the  long 
fjord,  and  the  troops  aboard  that  ship  and  four  destroyers 
were  conveniently  disembarked  at  the  city’s  piers  without 
interference.  Some  forts  held  out  for  a few  hours  and 
the  nearby  airfield  at  Vaernes  for  two  days,  but  this  re- 
sistance did  not  affect  the  occupation  of  a fine  harbor  suit- 
able for  the  largest  naval  ships  as  well  as  submarines 
and  the  railhead  of  a line  that  ran  across  north-central 
Norway  to  Sweden  and  over  which  the  Germans  expected, 
and  with  reason,  to  receive  supplies  should  the  British 
cut  them  off  at  sea. 

Bergen,  the  second  port  and  city  of  Norway,  lying  some 
three  hundred  miles  down  the  coast  from  Trondheim 
and  connected  with  Oslo,  the  capital,  by  railway,  put  up 
some  resistance.  The  batteries  guarding  the  harbor  badly 
damaged  the  cruiser  Koenigsberg  and  an  auxiliary  ship, 
but  troops  from  other  vessels  landed  safely  and  occupied 
the  city  before  noon.  It  was  at  Bergen  that  the  first  direct 
British  aid  for  the  stunned  Norwegians  arrived.  In  the 
afternoon  fifteen  naval  dive  bombers  sank  the  Koenigsberg, 
the  first  ship  of  that  size  ever  to  go  down  as  the  result  of 
an  air  attack.  Outside  the  harbor  the  British  had  a power- 
ful fleet  of  four  cruisers  and  seven  destroyers  which  could 
have  overwhelmed  the  smaller  German  naval  force.  It 
was  about  to  enter  the  harbor  when  it  received  orders 
from  the  Admiralty  to  cancel  the  attack  because  of  the 
risk  of  mines  and  bombing  from  the  air,  a decision 
which  Churchill,  who  concurred  in  it,  later  regretted. 
This  was  the  first  sign  of  caution  and  of  half  measures 
which  would  cost  the  British  dearly  in  the  next  crucial 
days. 

Sola  airfield,  near  the  port  of  Stavanger  on  the  south- 
west coast,  was  taken  by  German  parachute  troops  after 
the  Norwegian  machine  gun  emplacements — there  was  no 
real  antiaircraft  protection — were  silenced.  This  was  Nor- 
way’s biggest  airfield  and  strategically  of  the  highest  im- 
portance to  the  Luftwaffe,  since  from  here  bombers  could 
range  not  only  against  the  British  fleet  along  the  Nor- 


926 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


wegian  coast  but  against  the  chief  British  naval  bases  in 
northern  Britain.  Its  seizure  gave  the  Germans  immediate 
air  superiority  in  Norway  and  spelled  the  doom  of  any 
attempt  by  the  British  to  land  sizable  forces. 

Kristiansand  on  the  south  coast  put  up  considerable  re- 
sistance to  the  Germans,  its  shore  batteries  twice  driving 
off  a German  fleet  led  by  the  light  cruiser  Karlsruhe.  But 
the  forts  were  quickly  reduced  by  Luftwaffe  bombing  and 
the  port  was  occupied  by  midafternoon.  The  Karlsruhe, 
however,  on  leaving  port  that  evening  was  torpedoed  by  a 
British  submarine  and  so  badly  damaged  that  it  had  to 
be  sunk. 

By  noon,  then,  or  shortly  afterward,  the  five  principal 
Norwegian  cities  and  ports  and  the  one  big  airfield  along 
the  west  and  south  coasts  that  ran  for  1,500  miles  from 
the  Skagerrak  to  the  Arctic  were  in  German  hands.  They 
had  been,  taken  by  a handful  of  troops  conveyed  by  a 
Navy  vastly  inferior  to  that  of  the  British.  Daring,  deceit 
and  surprise  had  brought  Hitler  a resounding  victory  at 
very  little  cost. 

But  at  Oslo,  the  main  prize,  his  military  force  and  his 
diplomacy  had  run  into  unexpected  trouble. 

All  through  the  chilly  night  of  April  8-9,  a gay  wel- 
coming party  from  the  German  Legation,  led  by  Captain 
Schreiber,  the  naval  attache,  and  joined  occasionally  by 
the  busy  Dr.  Brauer,  the  minister,  stood  at  the  quayside 
in  Oslo  Harbor  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  a German  fleet 
and  troop  transports.  A junior  German  naval  attache  was 
darting  about  the  bay  in  a motorboat  waiting  to  act  as 
pilot  for  the  fleet,  headed  by  the  pocket  battleship  Leutzow 
(its  name  changed  from  Deutschland  because  Hitler  did 
not  want  to  risk  losing  a ship  by  that  name)  and  the 
brand-new  heavy  cruiser  Bluecher,  flagship  of  the  squad- 
ron. 

They  waited  in  vain.  The  big  ships  never  arrived.  They 
had  been  challenged  at  the  entrance  to  the  fifty-mile-long 
Oslo  Fjord  by  the  Norwegian  mine  layer  Olav  Trygver- 
son,  which  sank  a German  torpedo  boat  and  damaged  the 
light  cruiser  Emden.  After  landing  a small  force  to  subdue 
the  shore  batteries  the  German  squadron,  however,  con- 
tinued on  its  way  up  the  fjord.  At  a point  some  fifteen 
miles  south  of  Oslo  where  the  waters  narrowed  to  fifteen 
miles,  further  trouble  developed.  Here  stood  the  ancient 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  927 

fortress  of  Oskarsborg,  whose  defenders  were  more  alert 
than  the  Germans  suspected.  Just  before  dawn  the  fort’s 
28-centimeter  Krupp  guns  opened  fire  on  the  Luetzow  and 
the  Bluecher,  and  torpedoes  were  also  launched  from  the 
shore.  The  10,000-ton  Bluecher,  ablaze  and  torn  by  the 
explosions  of  its  ammunition,  went  down,  with  the  loss  of 
1.600  men,  including  several  Gestapo  and  administrative 
officials  (and  all  their  papers)  who  were  to  arrest  the  King 
and  the  government  and  take  over  the  administration  of 
the  capital.  The  Luetzow  was  also  damaged  but  not  com- 
pletely disabled.  Rear  Admiral  Oskar  Kummetz,  com- 
mander of  the  squadron,  and  General  Erwin  Engelbrecht, 
who  led  the  163rd  Infantry  Division,  who  were  on  the 
Bluecher.,  managed  to  swim  ashore,  where  they  were  made 
prisoners  by  the  Norwegians.  Whereupon  the  crippled 
German  fleet  turned  back  for  the  moment  to  lick  its 
wounds.  It  had  failed  in  its  mission  to  take  the  main 
German  objective,  the  capital  of  Norway.  It  did  not  get 
there  until  the  next  day. 

Oslo,  in  fact,  fell  to  little  more  than  a phantom  German 
force  dropped  from  the  air  at  the  local,  undefended  air- 
port. The  catastrophic  news  from  the  other  seaports  and 
the  pounding  of  the  guns  fifteen  miles  down  the  Oslo 
Fjord  had  sent  the  Norwegian  royal  family,  the  govern- 
ment and  members  of  Parliament  scurrying  on  a special 
train  from  the  capital  at  9:30  a.m.  for  Hamar,  eighty  miles 
to  the  north.  Twenty  motor  trucks  laden  with  the  gold 
of  the  Bank  of  Norway  and  three  more  with  the  secret 
papers  of  the  Foreign  Office  got  away  at  the  same  hour. 
Thus  the  gallant  action  of  the  garrison  at  Oskarsborg  had 
foiled  Hitler’s  plans  to  get  his  hands  on  the  Norwegian 
King,  government  and  gold. 

But  Oslo  was  left  in  complete  bewilderment.  There  were 
some  Norwegian  troops  there,  but  they  were  not  put  into 
a state  for  defense.  Above  all,  nothing  was  done  to  block 
the  airport  at  nearby  Fornebu,  which  could  have  been 
done  with  a few  old  automobiles  parked  along  the  run- 
way and  about  the  field.  Late  on  the  previous  night  Cap- 
tain Spiller,  the  German  air  attache  in  Oslo,  had  sta- 
tioned himself  there  to  welcome  the  airborne  troops,  which 
were  to  come  in  after  the  Navy  had  reached  the  city. 
When  the  ships  failed  to  arrive  a frantic  radio  message 
was  sent  from  the  legation  to  Berlin  apprising  it  of  the 


928 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


unexpected  and  unhappy  situation.  The  response  was  im- 
mediate. Soon  parachute  and  airborne  infantry  troops 
were  being  landed  at  Fornebu.  By  noon  about  five  com- 
panies had  been  assembled.  As  they  were  only  lightly 
armed,  the  available  Norwegian  troops  in  the  capital  could 
have  easily  destroyed  them.  But  for  reasons  never  yet 
made  clear — so  great  was  the  confusion  in  Oslo — they 
were  not  mustered,  much  less  deployed,  and  the  token 
German  infantry  force  marched  into  the  capital  behind  a 
blaring,  if  makeshift,  military  band.  Thus  the  last  of  Nor- 
way’s cities  fell.  But  not  Norway;  not  yet. 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  9,  the  Storting,  the  Nor- 
wegian Parliament,  met  at  Hamar  with  only  five  of  the  two 
hundred  members  missing,  but  adjourned  at  7:30  p.m. 
when  news  was  received  that  German  troops  were  ap- 
proaching and  moved  on  to  Elverum,  a few  miles  to  the 
east  toward  the  Swedish  border.  Dr.  Brauer,  pressed  by 
Ribbentrop,  was  demanding  an  immediate  audience  with 
the  King,  and  the  Norwegian  Prime  Minister  had  as- 
sented on  condition  that  German  troops  withdraw  to  a 
safe  distance  south.  This  the  German  minister  would  not 
agree  to. 

Indeed,  at  this  moment  a further  piece  of  Nazi  treachery 
was  in  the  making.  Captain  Spiller,  the  air  attache,  had 
set  out  from  the  Fornebu  airport  for  Hamar  with  two 
companies  of  German  parachutists  to  capture  the  recal- 
citrant King  and  government.  It  seemed  to  them  more  of 
a lark  than  anything  else.  Since  Norwegian  troops  had 
not  fired  a shot  to  prevent  the  German  entry  into  Oslo, 
Spiller  expected  no  resistance  at  Hamar.  In  fact  the  two 
companies,  traveling  on  commandeered  autobuses,  were 
making  a pleasant  sightseeing  jaunt  of  it.  But  they  did  not 
reckon  with  a Norwegian  Army  officer  who  acted  quite 
unlike  so  many  of  the  others.  Colonel  Ruge,  Inspector 
General  of  Infantry,  who  had  accompanied  the  King 
northward,  had  insisted  on  providing  some  sort  of  pro- 
tection to  the  fugitive  government  and  had  set  up  a road- 
block near  Hamar  with  two  battalions  of  infantry  which 
he  had  hastily  rounded  up.  The  German  buses  were 
stopped  and  in  a skirmish  which  followed  Spiller  was 
mortally  wounded.  After  suffering  further  casualties  the 
Germans  fell  back  all  the  way  to  Oslo. 

The  next  day,  Dr.  Brauer  set  out  from  Oslo  alone 


929 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

along  the  same  road  to  see  the  King.  An  old-school  pro- 
fessional diplomat,  the  German  minister  did  not  relish 
his  role,  but  Ribbentrop  had  kept  after  him  relentlessly 
to  talk  the  King  and  the  government  into  surrender. 
Brauer’s  difficult  task  had  been  further  complicated 
by  certain  political  events  which  had  just  taken  place  in 
Oslo.  On  the  preceding  evening  Quisling  had  finally  be- 
stirred himself,  once  the  capital  was  firmly  in  German 
hands,  stormed  into  the  radio  station  and  broadcast  a 
proclamation  naming  himself  as  head  of  a new  government 
and  ordering  all  Norwegian  resistance  to  the  Germans  to 
halt  immediately.  Though  Brauer  could  not  yet  grasp  it 
— and  Berlin  could  never,  even  later,  understand  it — this 
treasonable  act  doomed  the  German  efforts  to  induce  Nor- 
way to  surrender.  And  paradoxically,  though  it  was  a 
moment  of  national  shame  for  the  Norwegian  people,  the 
treason  of  Quisling  rallied  the  stunned  Norwegians  to  a 
resistance  which  was  to  become  formidable  and  heroic. 

Dr.  Brauer  met  Haakon  VII,  the  only  king  in  the  twen- 
tieth century  who  had  been  elected  to  the  throne  by 
popular  vote  and  the  first  monarch  Norway  had  had  of 
its  own  for  five  centuries,*  in  a schoolhouse  at  the  little 
town  of  Elverum  at  3 p.m.  on  April  10.  From  a talk  this 
writer  later  had  with  the  monarch  and  from  a perusal  of 
both  the  Norwegian  records  and  Dr.  Brauer’s  secret  re- 
port (which  is  among  the  captured  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice documents)  it  is  possible  to  give  an  account  of  what 
happened.  After  considerable  reluctance  the  King  had 
agreed  to  receive  the  German  envoy  in  the  presence  of  his 
Foreign  Minister,  Dr.  Halvdan  Koht.  When  Brauer  in- 
sisted on  seeing  Haakon  at  first  alone  the  King,  with  the 
agreement  of  Koht,  finally  consented. 

The  German  minister,  acting  on  instructions,  alternately 
flattered  and  tried  to  intimidate  the  King.  Germany  wanted 
to  preserve  the  dynasty.  It  was  merely  asking  Haakon 
to  do  what  his  brother  had  done  the  day  before  in  Copen- 
hagen. It  was  folly  to  resist  the  Wehrmacht.  Only  useless 
slaughter  for  the  Norwegians  would  ensue.  The  King  was 

* Norway  had  been  a part  of  Denmark  for  four  centuries  and  of  Sweden 
for  a further  century,  regaining  its  complete  independence  only  in  1905, 
when  it  broke  away  from  its  union  with  Sweden  and  the  people  elected 
Prince  Carl  of  Denmark  as  King  of  Norway.  He  assumed  the  name  of 
Haakon  VII.  Haakon  VI  had  died  in  1380.  Haakon  VII  was  a brother  of 
Christian  X of  Denmark,  who  surrendered  so  promptly  to  the  Germans  on 
the  morning  of  April  9,  1940. 


930 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


asked  to  approve  the  government  of  Quisling  and  return 
to  Oslo.  Haakon,  a salty,  democratic  man  and  a great 
stickler,  even  at  this  disastrous  moment,  for  constitutional 
procedure,  tried  to  explain  to  the  German  diplomat  that 
in  Norway  the  King  did  not  make  political  decisions; 
that  was  exclusively  the  business  of  the  government,  which 
he  would  now  consult.  Koht  then  joined  the  conversation 
and  it  was  agreed  that  the  government’s  answer  would 
be  telephoned  to  Brauer  at  some  point  on  his  way  back 
to  Oslo. 

For  Haakon,  who,  though  he  could  not  make  the  politi- 
cal decision  could  surely  influence  it,  there  was  but  one 
answer  to  the  Germans.  Retiring  to  a modest  inn  in  the 
village  of  Nybergsund  near  Elverum — just  in  case  the  Ger- 
mans, with  Brauer  gone,  tried  to  capture  him  in  another 
surprise  attack — he  assembled  the  members  of  the  govern- 
ment as  Council  of  State. 

. . . For  my  part  [he  told  them]  I cannot  accept  the 
German  demands.  It  would  conflict  with  all  that  I have 
considered  to  be  my  duty  as  King  of  Norway  since  I came 
to  this  country  nearly  thirty-five  years  ago  ...  I do  not 
want  the  decision  of  the  government  to  be  influenced  by  or 
based  upon  this  statement.  But  ...  I cannot  appoint 
Quisling  Prime  Minister,  a man  in  whom  I know  neither  our 
people  . . . nor  its  representatives  in  the  Storting  have  any 
confidence  at  all. 

If  therefore  the  government  should  decide  to  accept  the 
German  demands — and  I fully  understand  the  reasons  in 
favor  of  it,  considering  the  impending  danger  of  war  in 
which  so  many  young  Norwegians  will  have  to  give  their 
lives — if  so,  abdication  will  be  the  only  course  open  to  me.41 

The  government,  though  there  may  have  been  some 
waverers  up  to  this  moment,  could  not  be  less  courageous 
than  the  King,  and  it  quickly  rallied  behind  him.  By  the 
time  Brauer  got  to  Eidsvold,  halfway  back  to  Oslo,  Koht 
was  on  the  telephone  line  to  him  with  the  Norwegian 
reply.  The  German  minister  telephoned  it  immediately  to 
the  legation  in  Oslo,  where  it  was  sped  to  Berlin. 

The  King  will  name  no  government  headed  by  Quisling 
and  this  decision  was  made  upon  the  unanimous  advice  of 
the  Government.  To  my  specific  question.  Foreign  Minister 
Koht  replied:  “Resistance  will  continue  as  long  as  possible.”  42 

That  evening  from  a feeble  little  rural  radio  station 


931 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

nearby,  the  only  means  of  communication  to  the  outside 
world  available,  the  Norwegian  government  flung  down 
the  gauntlet  to  the  mighty  Third  Reich.  It  announced  its 
decision  not  to  accept  the  German  demands  and  called 
upon  the  people — there  were  only  three  million  of  them — 
to  resist  the  invaders.  The  King  formally  associated  him- 
self with  the  appeal. 

But  the  Nazi  conquerors  could  not  quite  bring  them- 
selves to  believe  that  the  Norwegians  meant  what  they 
said.  Two  more  attempts  were  made  to  dissuade  the  King. 
On  the  morning  of  April  11  an  emissary  of  Quisling,  a 
Captain  Irgens,  arrived  to  urge  the  monarch  to  return  to 
the  capital.  He  promised  that  Quisling  would  serve  him 
loyally.  His  proposal  was  dismissed  with  silent  contempt. 

In  the  afternoon  an  urgent  message  came  from  Brauer, 
requesting  a further  audience  with  the  King  to  talk  over 
“certain  proposals.”  The  hard-pressed  German  envoy  had 
been  instructed  by  Ribbentrop  to  tell  the  monarch  that 
he  “wanted  to  give  the  Norwegian  people  one  last  chance 
of  a reasonable  agreement.”  * This  time  Dr.  Koht,  after 
consulting  the  King,  replied  that  if  the  German  minister 
had  “certain  proposals”  he  could  communicate  them  to 
the  Foreign  Minister. 

The  Nazi  reaction  to  this  rebuff  by  such  a small  and  now 
helpless  country  was  immediate  and  in  character.  The 
Germans  had  failed,  first,  to  capture  the  King  and  the 
members  of  the  government  and,  then,  to  persuade  them 
to  surrender.  Now  the  Germans  tried  to  kill  them.  Late 
on  April  11,  the  Luftwaffe  was  sent  out  to  give  the  village 
of  Nybergsund  the  full  treatment.  The  Nazi  flyers  demol- 
ished it  with  explosive  and  incendiary  bombs  and  then 
machine-gunned  those  who  tried  to  escape  the  burning 
ruins.  The  Germans  apparently  believed  at  first  that  they 
had  succeeded  in  massacring  the  King  and  the  members 
of  the  government.  The  diary  of  a German  airman,  later 
captured  in  northern  Norway,  had  this  entry  for  April  1 1 : 

* There  is  an  ominous  hint  of  further  treachery  in  Ribbentrop’s  secret  in- 
structions. Brauer  was  told  to  try  to  arrange  the  meeting  “at  a point  between 
Oslo  and  the  King’s  present  place  of  residence.  For  obvious  reasons  he, 
Brauer,  would  have  to  discuss  this  move  fully  with  General  von  Falkenhorst 
and  would  then  also  have  to  inform  the  latter  of  the  meeting  place  agreed 
upon.”  Gaus,  who  telephoned  Ribbentrop’s  instructions,  reported  that  “Herr 
Brauer  clearly  understood  the  meaning  of  the  instructions.”  One  cannot 
help  but  think  that  had  the  King  gone  to  this  meeting,  Falkenhorst’s  troops 
would  have  grabbed  him.48 


932 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“Nybergsund.  Oslo  Regierung.  Alles  vernichtet.”  (Oslo  gov- 
ernment. Completely  wiped  out.) 

The  village  had  been,  but  not  the  King  and  the  govern- 
ment. With  the  approach  of  the  Nazi  bombers  they  had 
taken  refuge  in  a nearby  wood.  Standing  in  snow  up  to 
their  knees,  they  had  watched  the  Luftwaffe  reduce  the 
modest  cottages  of  the  hamlet  to  ruins.  They  now  faced  a 
choice  of  either  moving  on  to  the  nearby  Swedish  border 
and  asylum  in  neutral  Sweden  or  pushing  north  into  their 
own  mountains,  still  deep  in  the  spring  snow.  They  de- 
cided to  move  on  up  the  rugged  Gudbrands  Valley,  which 
led  past  Hamar  and  Lillehammer  and  through  the  moun- 
tains to  Andalsnes  on  the  northwest  coast,  a hundred 
miles  southwest  of  Trondheim.  Along  the  route  they 
might  organize  the  still  dazed  and  scattered  Norwegian 
forces  for  further  resistance.  And  there  was  some  hope 
that  British  troops  might  eventually  arrive  to  help  them. 

THE  BATTLES  FOR  NORWAY 

In  the  far  north  at  Narvik  the  British  Navy  already 
had  reacted  sharply  to  the  surprise  German  occupation. 
It  had  been,  as  Churchill,  who  was  in  charge  of  it, 
admitted,  “completely  outwitted”  by  the  Germans.  Now 
in  the  north  at  least,  out  of  range  of  the  German  land- 
based  bombers,  it  went  over  to  the  offensive.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  April  10,  twenty-four  hours  after  ten  German 
destroyers  had  taken  Narvik  and  disembarked  Dietl’s  troops, 
a force  of  five  British  destroyers  entered  Narvik  harbor, 
sank  two  of  the  five  German  destroyers  then  in  the  port, 
damaged  the  other  three  and  sank  all  the  German  cargo 
vessels  except  one.  In  this  action  the  German  naval  com- 
mander, Rear  Admiral  Bonte,  was  killed.  On  leaving  the 
harbor,  however,  the  British  ships  ran  into  the  five  re- 
maining German  destroyers  emerging  from  nearby  fjords. 
The  German  craft  were  heavier  gunned  and  sank  one 
British  destroyer,  forced  the  beaching  of  another  on  which 
the  British  commander.  Captain  Warburton-Lee,  was  mor- 
tally wounded,  and  damaged  a third.  Three  of  the  five 
British  destroyers  managed  to  make  the  open  sea  where, 
in  retiring,  they  sank  a large  German  freighter,  laden 
with  ammunition,  which  was  approaching  the  port. 

At  noon  on  April  13  the  British,  this  time  with  the 


933 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

battleship  Warspite,  a survivor  of  the  First  World  War 
Battle  of  Jutland,  leading  a flotilla  of  destroyers,  returned 
to  Narvik  and  wiped  out  the  remaining  German  war  ves- 
sels. Vice-Admiral  W.  J.  Whitworth,  the  commanding  of- 
ficer, in  wirelessing  the  Admiralty  of  his  action  urged 
that  since  the  German  troops  on  shore  had  been  stunned 
and  disorganized — Dietl  and  his  men  had  in  fact  taken 
to  the  hills — Narvik  be  occupied  at  once  “by  the  main 
landing  force.”  Unfortunately  for  the  Allies,  the  British 
Army  commander,  Major  General  P.  J.  Mackesy,  was  an 
exceedingly  cautious  officer  and,  arriving  the  very  next  day 
with  an  advance  contingent  of  three  infantry  battalions, 
decided  not  to  risk  a landing  at  Narvik  but  to  disembark 
his  troops  at  Harstad,  thirty-five  miles  to  the  north,  which 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Norwegians.  This  was  a costly 
error. 

In  the  light  of  the  fact  that  they  had  prepared  a small 
expeditionary  corps  for  Norway,  the  British  were  un- 
accountably slow  in  getting  their  troops  under  way.  On 
the  afternoon  of  April  8,  after  news  was  received  of  the 
movement  of  German  fleet  units  up  the  Norwegian  coast, 
the  British  Navy  hurriedly  disembarked  the  troops  that  had 
already  been  loaded  on  shipboard  for  the  possible  occupa- 
tion of  Stavanger,  Bergen,  Trondheim  and  Narvik,  on  the 
ground  that  every  ship  would  be  needed  for  naval  ac- 
tion. By  the  time  the  British  land  forces  were  re-embarked 
all  those  port  cities  were  in  German  hands.  And  by  the 
time  they  reached  central  Norway  they  were  doomed,  as 
were  the  British  naval  ships  which  were  to  cover  them, 
by  the  Luftwaffe’s  control  of  the  air. 

By  April  20,  one  British  brigade,  reinforced  by  three 
battalions  of  French  Chasseurs  Alpins,  had  been  landed 
at  Namsos,  a small  port  eighty  miles  northeast  of 
Trondheim,  and  a second  British  brigade  had  been  put 
ashore  at  Andalsnes,  a hundred  miles  to  the  southwest 
of  Trondheim,  which  was  thus  to  be  attacked  from  north 
and  south.  But  lacking  field  artillery,  antiaircraft  guns  and 
air  support,  their  bases  pounded  night  and  day  by  Ger- 
man bombers  which  blocked  the  further  landing  of  supplies 
or  reinforcements,  neither  force  ever  seriously  threatened 
Trondheim.  The  Andalsnes  brigade,  after  meeting  a Nor- 
wegian unit  at  Dombas,  a rail  junction  sixty  miles  to  the 
east,  abandoned  the  proposed  attack  northward  toward 


934  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Trondheim  and  pushed  southeast  down  the  Gudbrandsdal 
in  order  to  aid  the  Norwegian  troops  which,  under  the 
energetic  command  of  Colonel  Ruge,  had  been  slowing 
up  the  main  German  drive  coming  up  the  valley  from  Oslo. 

At  Lillehammer,  north  of  Hamar,  the  first  engagement 
of  the  war  between  British  and  German  troops  took  place 
on  April  21,  but  it  was  no  match.  The  ship  laden  with  the 
British  brigade’s  artillery  had  been  sunk  and  there  were 
only  rifles  and  machine  guns  with  which  to  oppose  a 
strong  German  force  armed  with  artillery  and  light  tanks. 
Even  worse,  the  British  infantry,  lacking  air  support,  was 
incessantly  pounded  by  Luftwaffe  planes  operating  from 
nearby  Norwegian  airfields.  Lillehammer  fell  after  a 
twenty-four-hour  battle  and  the  British  and  Norwegian 
forces  began  a retreat  of  140  miles  up  the  valley  railway 
to  Andalsnes,  halting  here  and  there  to  fight  a rear-guard 
action  which  slowed  the  Germans  but  never  stopped  them. 
On  the  nights  of  April  30  and  May  1 the  British  forces 
were  evacuated  from  Andalsnes  and  on  May  2 the  Anglo- 
French  contingent  from  Namsos,  considerable  feats  in 
themselves,  for  both  harbors  were  blazing  shambles  from 
continuous  German  bombing.  On  the  night  of  April  29 
the  King  of  Norway  and  the  members  of  his  government 
were  taken  aboard  the  British  cruiser  Glasgow  at  Molde, 
across  the  Romsdalsfjord  from  Andalsnes,  itself  also  a 
shambles  from  Luftwaffe  bombing,  and  conveyed  to 
Tromso,  far  above  the  Arctic  Circle  and  north  of  Narvik, 
where  on  May  Day  the  provisional  capital  was  set  up. 

By  then  the  southern  half  of  Norway,  comprising  all 
the  cities  and  main  towns,  had  been  irretrievably  lost. 
But  northern  Norway  seemed  secure.  On  May  28  an  Allied 
force  of  25,000  men,  including  two  brigades  of  Norwe- 
gians, a brigade  of  Poles  and  two  battalions  of  the  French 
Foreign  Legion,  had  driven  the  greatly  outnumbered  Ger- 
mans out  of  Narvik.  There  seemed  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  Hitler  would  be  deprived  of  both  his  iron  ore  and 
his  objective  of  occupying  all  of  Norway  and  making  the 
Norwegian  government  capitulate.  But  by  this  time  the 
Wehrmacht  had  struck  with  stunning  force  on  the  Western 
front  and  every  Allied  soldier  was  needed  to  plug  the  gap. 
Narvik  was  abandoned,  the  Allied  troops  were  hastily  re- 
embarked,  and  General  Dietl,  who  had  held  out  in  a 
wild  mountainous  tract  near  the  Swedish  border,  re- 


935 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

occupied  the  port  on  June  8 and  four  days  later  accepted 
the  surrender  of  the  persevering  and  gallant  Colonel  Ruge 
and  his  bewildered,  resentful  Norwegian  troops,  who  felt 
they  had  been  left  in  the  lurch  by  the  British.  King 
Haakon  and  his  government  were  taken  aboard  the  cruiser 
Devonshire  at  Tromso  on  June  7 and  departed  for  Lon- 
don and  five  years  of  bitter  exile.*  In  Berlin  Dietl  was 
promoted  to  Major  General,  awarded  the  Ritterkreuz  and 
hailed  by  Hitler  as  the  Sieger  von  Narvik. 

Despite  his  amazing  successes  the  Fuehrer  had  had  his 
bad  moments  during  the  Norwegian  campaign.  General 
Jodi’s  diary  is  crammed  with  terse  entries  recounting  a 
succession  of  the  warlord’s  nervous  crises.  “Terrible  ex- 
citement,” he  noted  on  April  14  after  news  had  been 
received  of  the  wiping  out  of  the  German  naval  forces 
at  Narvik.  On  April  17  Hitler  had  a fit  of  hysteria  about 
the  loss  of  Narvik;  he  demanded  that  General  Dietl’s  troops 
there  be  evacuated  by  air — an  impossibility.  “Each  piece 
of  bad  news,”  Jodi  scribbled  that  day  in  his  diary,  “leads 
to  the  worst  fears.”  And  two  days  later:  “Renewed  crisis. 
Political  action  has  failed.  Envoy  Brauer  is  recalled. 
According  to  the  Fuehrer,  force  has  to  be  used  . . .t 

* Quisling  did  not  last  long  in  his  first  attempt  to  govern  Norway.  Six  days 
after  he  had  proclaimed  himself  Prime  Minister,  on  April  15,  the  Germans 
kicked  him  out  and  appointed  an  Administrative  Council  of  six  leading 
Norwegian  citizens,  including  Bishop  Eivind  Berggrav,  head  of  the  Lu- 
theran Church  of  Norway,  and  Paal  Berg,  the  President  of  the  Supreme 
Court.  It  was  mostly  the  doing  of  Berg,  an  eminent  and  scrappy  jurist  who 
later  became  the  secret  head  of  the  Norwegian  resistance  movement.  On 
April  24  Hitler  appointed  Josef  Terboven,  a tough  young  Nazi  gauleiter,  to 
be  Reich  Commissar  for  Norway,  and  it  was  he  who  actually  governed  the 
country,  with  increasing  brutality,  during  the  occupation.  Brauer,  who  had 
opposed  Quisling  from  the  beginning,  was  recalled  on  April  17,  retired  from 
the  diplomatic  service,  and  sent  to  the  Western  front  as  a soldier.  The  Ger- 
mans reinstated  Quisling  as  Prime  Minister  in  1942,  but  though  his  un- 
popularity among  the  people  was  immense,  his  power  was  nil  despite  his  best 
efforts  to  serve  his  German  masters. 

At  the  end  of  the  war  Quisling  was  tried  for  treason  and  after  an  ex- 
haustive trial  sentenced  to  death  and  executed  on  October  24,  1945.  Terboven 
committed  suicide  rather  than  face  capture.  Knut  Hamsun,  the  great  Nor- 
wegian novelist,  who  had  openly  collaborated  with  the  Germans,  singing  their 
praises,  was  indicted  for  treason,  but  the  charges  were  dropped  on  the 
grounds  of  his  old  age  and  senility.  He  was,  however,  tried  and  convicted 
for  “profiting  from  the  Nazi  regime,”  and  fined  $65,000.  He  died  on  Febru- 
ary 19,  1952,  at  the  age  of  ninety-three.  General  von  Falkenhorst  was  tried 
as  a war  criminal  before  a mixed  British  and  Norwegian  military  court  on 
charges  of  having  handed  over  captured  Allied  commandos  to  the  S.S.  for 
execution.  He  was  sentenced  to  death  on  August  2,  1946,  but  the  sentence 
was  commuted  to  life  imprisonment. 

t On  April  13,  General  von  Falkenhorst,  no  doubt  goaded  by  Hitler,  who 
was  in  a fury  because  of  Norwegian  resistance,  signed  an  order  providing 
for  taking  as  hostages  twenty  of  the  most  distinguished  citizens  of  Oslo, 


936 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


The  conferences  at  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  that  day, 
April  19,  became  so  embittered,  with  the  heads  of  the 
three  services  blaming  each  other  for  the  delays,  that  even 
the  lackey  Keitel  stalked  out  of  the  room.  “Chaos  of 
leadership  is  again  threatening,”  Jodi  noted.  And  on  April 
22  he  added:  “Fuehrer  is  increasingly  worried  about  the 
English  landings.” 

On  April  23  the  slow  progress  of  the  German  forces 
moving  up  from  Oslo  toward  Trondheim  and  Andalsnes 
caused  the  “excitement  to  grow,”  as  Jodi  put  it,  but  the 
next  day  the  news  was  better  and  from  that  day  it  con- 
tinued to  grow  more  rosy.  By  the  twenty-sixth  the  warlord 
was  in  such  fine  fettle  that  at  3:30  in  the  morning,  during 
an  all-night  session  with  his  military  advisers,  he  told 
them  he  intended  to  start  “Yellow”  between  May  1 and  7. 
“Yellow”  was  the  code  name  for  the  attack  in  the  West 
across  Holland  and  Belgium.  Though  on  April  29  Hitler 
was  again  “worried  about  Trondheim,”  the  next  day  he 
was  “happy  with  joy”  at  the  news  that  a battle  group 
from  Oslo  had  reached  the  city.  He  could  at  last  turn 
his  attention  back  to  the  West.  On  May  1 he  ordered  that 
preparations  for  the  big  attack  there  be  ready  by  May  5. 

The  Wehrmacht  commanders — Goering,  Brauchitsch, 
Haider,  Keitel,  Jodi,  Raeder  and  the  rest — had  for  the 
first  time  had  a foretaste  during  the  Norwegian  campaign 
of  how  their  demonic  Leader  cracked  under  the  strain  of 
even  minor  setbacks  in  battle.  It  was  a weakness  which 
would  grow  on  him  when,  after  a series  of  further  aston- 
ishing military  successes,  the  tide  of  war  changed,  and  it 
would  contribute  mightily  to  the  eventual  debacle  of  the 
Third  Reich. 

Still,  any  way  one  looked  at  it,  the  quick  conquest  of 
Denmark  and  Norway  had  been  an  important  victory  for 
Hitler  and  a discouraging  defeat  for  the  British.  It  se- 
cured the  winter  iron  ore  route,  gave  added  protection  to 
the  entrance  to  the  Baltic,  allowed  the  daring  German 
Navy  to  break  out  into  the  North  Atlantic  and  provided 
them  with  excellent  port  facilities  there  for  submarines 
and  surface  ships  in  the  sea  war  against  Britain.  It 
brought  Hitler  air  bases  hundreds  of  miles  closer  to  the 


including  Bishop  Berggrav  and  Paal  Berg,  who,  in  the  words  of  Minister 
Brauer,  “were  to  be  shot  in  the  event  of  the  continued  resistance  or  at- 
tempted sabotage.”44 


937 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

main  enemy.  And  perhaps  most  important  of  all  it  im- 
mensely enhanced  the  military  prestige  of  the  Third  Reich 
and  correspondingly  diminished  that  of  the  Western  Al- 
lies. Nazi  Germany  seemed  invincible.  Austria,  Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland  and  now  Denmark  and  Norway  had  suc- 
cumbed easily  to  Hitler’s  force,  or  threat  of  force,  and  not 
even  the  help  of  two  major  allies  in  the  West  had  been,  in 
the  latter  cases,  of  the  slightest  avail.  The  wave  of  the 
future,  as  an  eminent  American  woman  wrote,  seemed  to 
belong  to  Hitler  and  Nazism. 

For  the  remaining  neutral  states  Hitler’s  latest  conquest 
was  also  a terrifying  lesson.  Obviously  neutrality  no 
longer  offered  protection  to  the  little  democratic  nations 
trying  to  survive  in  a totalitarian-dominated  world.  Fin- 
land had  just  found  that  out,  and  now  Norway  and  Den- 
mark. They  had  themselves  to  blame  for  being  so  blind, 
for  declining  to  accept  in  good  time — before  the  actual 
aggression — the  help  of  friendly  world  powers. 

I trust  this  fact  [Churchill  told  Commons  on  April  11]  will 
be  meditated  upon  by  other  countries  who  may  tomorrow,  or 
a week  hence,  or  a month  hence,  find  themselves  the  victims 
of  an  equally  elaborately  worked-out  staff  plan  for  their 
destruction  and  enslavement.45 

He  was  obviously  thinking  of  Holland  and  Belgium, 
but  even  in  their  case,  though  there  would  be  a month 
of  grace,  no  such  meditation  began.* 

*The  Swedes,  caught  between  Russia  in  Finland  and  the  Baltic  countries 
and  Germany  in  possession  of  adjoining  Denmark  and  Norway,  meditated 
and  decided  there  was  no  choice  except  to  cling  to  their  precarious  neutrality 
and  go  down  fighting  if  they  were  attacked.  They  had  placated  the  Soviet 
Union  by  refusing  to  allow  Allied  troops  transit  to  Finland,  and  now  under 
great  pressure  they  placated  Germany.  Though  Sweden  had  sent  an  impres- 
sive stock  of  arms  to  Finland,  it  refused  to  sell  Norway  either  arms  or 
gasoline  when  it  was  attacked.  All  through  April  the  Germans  demanded 
that  Sweden  allow  the  transit  of  troops  to  Narvik  to  relieve  Dietl,  but  this 
was  refused  until  the  end  of  hostilities,  although  a train  of  medical  personnel 
and  supplies  was  allowed  through.  On  June  19,  fearing  a direct  attack  by 
Germany,  Sweden  gave  in  to  Hitler’s  pressure  and  agreed  to  permit  the 
transport  over  Swedish  railways  of  Nazi  troops  and  war  material  to  Norway 
on  condition  that  the  number  of  troops  moving  in  each  direction  should 
balance  so  that  the  German  garrisons  in  Norway  would  not  be  strengthened 
by  the  arrangement. 

This  was  of  immense  help  to  Germany.  By  transporting  fresh  troops  and 
war  material  by  land  through  Sweden  Hitler  avoided  the  risk  of  having 
them  sunk  at  sea  by  the  British.  In  the  first  six  months  of  the  accord,  some 
140,000  German  troops  in  Norway  were  exchanged  and  the  German  forces 
there  greatly  strengthened  by  supplies.  Later,  just  before  the  German  on- 
slaught on  Russia,  Sweden  permitted  the  Nazi  High  Command  to  transport 
an  entire  army  division,  fully  armed,  from  Norway  across  Sweden  to  Fin- 
land to  be  used  to  attack  the  Soviet  Union.  What  it  had  refused  the  Allies 


938 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

There  were  military  lessons,  too,  to  be  learned  from 
Hitler’s  lightning  conquest  of  the  two  Scandinavian 
countries.  The  most  significant  was  the  importance  of  air 
power  and  its  superiority  over  naval  power  when  land 
bases  for  bombers  and  fighters  were  near.  Hardly  less 
important  was  an  old  lesson,  that  victory  often  goes  to 
the  daring  and  the  imaginative.  The  German  Navy  and 
Air  Force  had  been  both,  and  Died  at  Narvik  had  shown 
a resourcefulness  of  the  German  Army  which  the  Allies 
had  lacked. 

There  was  one  military  result  of  the  Scandinavian  ad- 
venture which  could  not  be  evaluated  at  once,  if  only 
because  it  was  not  possible  to  look  very  far  into  the 
future.  The  losses  in  men  in  Norway  on  both  sides  were 
light.  The  Germans  suffered  1,317  killed,  2,375  missing 
and  1,604  wounded,  a total  of  5,296  casualties;  those  of 
the  Norwegians,  French  and  British  were  slightly  less 
than  5,000.  The  British  lost  one  aircraft  carrier,  one  cruis- 
er and  seven  destroyers  and  the  Poles  and  the  French 
one  destroyer  each.  German  naval  losses  were  comparably 
much  heavier:  ten  out  of  twenty  destroyers,  three  of  eight 
cruisers,  while  the  battle  cruisers  Scharnhorst  and 
Gneisenau  and  the  pocket  battleship  Luetzow  were  dam- 
aged so  severely  that  they  were  out  of  action  for  several 
months.  Hitler  had  no  fleet  worthy  of  mention  for  the 
coming  events  of  the  summer.  When  the  time  to  invade 
Britain  came,  as  it  did  so  shortly,  this  proved  to  be  an 
insurmountable  handicap. 

The  possible  consequences  of  the  severe  crippling  of 
the  German  Navy,  however,  did  not  enter  the  Fuehrer’s 
thoughts  as,  at  the  beginning  of  May,  with  Denmark  and 
Norway  now  added  to  his  long  list  of  conquests,  he 
worked  with  his  eager  generals — for  they  had  now  shed 
their  misgivings  of  the  previous  autumn — on  the  last- 
minute  preparations  for  what  they  were  confident  would 
be  the  greatest  conquest  of  all. 

the  year  before  it  accorded  to  Nazi  Germany.  For  details  of  German  pressure 
on  Sweden  and  for  the  text  of  the  exchange  of  letters  between  King  Gustav 
V and  Hitler,  see  Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy,  IX.  The  author 
has  covered  the  subject  more  thoroughly  in  The  Challenge  of  Scandinavia. 


21 


VICTORY  IN  THE  WEST 


shortly  after  dawn  on  the  fine  spring  day  of  May  10, 
1940,  the  ambassador  of  Belgium  and  the  minister  of 
the  Netherlands  in  Berlin  were  summoned  to  the  Wil- 
helmstrasse  and  informed  by  Ribbentrop  that  German 
troops  were  entering  their  countries  to  safeguard  their 
neutrality  against  an  imminent  attack  by  the  Anglo- 
French  armies — the  same  shabby  excuse  that  had  been 
made  just  a month  before  with  Denmark  and  Norway. 
A formal  German  ultimatum  called  upon  the  two  govern- 
ments to  see  to  it  that  no  resistance  was  offered.  If  it 
were,  it  would  be  crushed  by  all  means  and  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  bloodshed  would  “be  borne  exclusively  by 
the  Royal  Belgian  and  the  Royal  Netherlands  Govern- 
ment.” 

In  Brussels  and  The  Hague,  as  previously  in  Copen- 
hagen and  Oslo,  the  German  envoys  made  their  way  to 
the  respective  foreign  offices  with  similar  messages.  Ironi- 
cally enough,  the  bearer  of  the  ultimatum  in  The  Hague 
was  Count  Julius  von  Zech-Burkersroda,  the  German  min- 
ister, who  was  a son-in-law  of  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the 
Kaiser’s  Chancellor,  who  in  1914  had  publicly  called  Ger- 
many’s guarantee  of  Belgian  neutrality,  which  the  Hohen- 
zollern  Reich  had  just  violated,  “a  scrap  of  paper.” 

At  the  Foreign  Ministry  in  Brussels,  while  German 
bombers  roared  overhead  and  the  explosion  of  their  bombs 
on  nearby  airfields  rattled  the  windows,  Buelow- 
Schwante,  the  German  ambassador,  started  to  take  a paper 
from  his  pocket  as  he  entered  the  Foreign  Minister’s  of- 
fice. Paul-Henri  Spaak  stopped  him. 

“I  beg  your  pardon,  Mr.  Ambassador.  I will  speak  first.” 

The  German  Army  [Spaak  said,  not  attempting  to  hold 
back  his  feeling  of  outrage]  has  just  attacked  our  country. 

939 


940 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


This  is  the  second  time  in  twenty-five  years  that  Germany  has 
committed  a criminal  aggression  against  a neutral  and  loyal 
Belgium.  What  has  happened  is  perhaps  even  more  odious 
than  the  aggression  of  1914.  No  ultimatum,  no  note,  no  pro- 
test of  any  kind  has  ever  been  placed  before  the  Belgian 
Government.  It  is  through  the  attack  itself  that  Belgium 
has  learned  that  Germany  has  violated  the  undertakings 
given  by  her  . . . The  German  Reich  will  be  held  responsible 
by  history.  Belgium  is  resolved  to  defend  herself. 

The  unhappy  German  diplomat  then  began  to  read  the 
formal  German  ultimatum,  but  Spaak  cut  him  short. 
“Hand  me  the  document,”  he  said.  “I  should  like  to 
spare  you  so  painful  a task.”  1 

The  Third  Reich  had  given  the  two  small  Low  Countries 
guarantees  of  their  neutrality  almost  without  number.  The 
independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  had  been  guaran- 
teed “perpetually”  by  the  five  great  European  powers  in 
1839,  a pact  that  was  observed  for  seventy-five  years  until 
Germany  broke  it  in  1914.  The  Weimar  Republic  had 
promised  never  to  take  up  arms  against  Belgium,  and 
Hitler,  after  he  came  to  power,  continually  reaffirmed  that 
policy  and  gave  similar  assurances  to  the  Netherlands. 
On  January  30,  1937,  after  he  had  repudiated  the  Locarno 
Treaty,  the  Nazi  Chancellor  publicly  proclaimed: 

The  German  Government  has  further  given  the  assurance  to 
Belgium  and  Holland  that  it  is  prepared  to  recognize  and 
to  guarantee  the  inviolability  and  neutrality  of  these  ter- 
ritories. 

Frightened  by  the  remilitarization  of  the  Third  Reich 
and  its  reoccupation  of  the  Rhineland  in  the  spring  of 
1936,  Belgium,  which  wisely  had  abandoned  neutrality 
after  1918,  again  sought  refuge  in  it.  On  April  24,  1937, 
Britain  and  France  released  her  from  the  obligations  of 
Locarno  and  on  October  13  of  that  year  Germany  of- 
ficially and  solemnly  confirmed 

its  determination  that  in  no  circumstances  will  it  impair 
the  inviolability  and  integrity  [of  Belgium]  and  that  it 
will  at  all  times  respect  Belgian  territory  . . . and  [be]  pre- 
pared to  assist  Belgium  should  she  be  subjected  to  an  at- 
tack . . . 

From  that  day  on  there  is  a familiar  counterpoint  in 
Hitler’s  solemn  public  assurances  to  the  Low  Countries 
and  his  private  admonitions  to  his  generals.  On  August 


941 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

24,  1938,  in  regard  to  one  of  the  papers  drawn  up  for 
him  for  Case  Green,  the  plan  for  the  attack  on  Czechoslo- 
vakia, he  spoke  of  the  “extraordinary  advantage”  to  Ger- 
many if  Belgium  and  Holland  were  occupied  and  asked 
the  Army’s  opinion  “as  to  the  conditions  under  which 
an  occupation  of  this  area  could  be  carried  out  and  how 
long  it  would  take.”  On  April  28,  1939,  in  his  reply  to 
Roosevelt,  Hitler  again  stressed  the  “binding  declarations” 
which  he  had  given  to  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium, 
among  others.  Less  than  a month  later,  on  May  23,  the 
Fuehrer,  as  has  been  noted,  was  telling  his  generals  that 
“the  Dutch  and  Belgian  air  bases  must  be  occupied  by 
armed  force  . . . with  lightning  speed.  Declarations  of 
neutrality  must  be  ignored.” 

He  had  not  yet  started  his  war,  but  his  plans  were 
ready.  On  August  22,  a week  before  he  launched  the  war 
by  attacking  Poland,  he  conferred  with  his  generals  about 
the  “possibility”  of  violating  Dutch  and  Belgian  neutrality. 
“England  and  France,”  he  said,  “will  not  violate  the  neu- 
trality of  these  countries.”  Four  days  later,  on  August  26, 
he  ordered  his  envoys  in  Brussels  and  The  Hague  to  inform 
the  respective  governments  that  in  the  event  of  an  out- 
break of  war  “Germany  will  in  no  circumstances  impair 
the  inviolability  of  Belgium  and  Holland,”  an  assurance 
which  he  repeated  publicly  on  October  6,  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Polish  campaign.  The  very  next  day,  Octo- 
ber 7,  General  von  Brauchitsch  advised  his  army  group 
commanders,  at  Hitler’s  prompting, 

to  make  all  preparations  for  immediate  invasion  of  Dutch 
and  Belgian  territory,  if  the  political  situation  so  demands.2 

Two  days  later,  on  October  9,  in  Directive  No.  6, 
Hitler  ordered: 

Preparations  are  to  be  made  for  an  attacking  operation 
. . . through  Luxembourg,  Belgium  and  Holland.  This  attack 
must  be  carried  out  as  soon  and  as  forcefully  as  possible 
. . . The  object  of  this  attack  is  to  acquire  as  great  an  area 
of  Holland,  Belgium  and  northern  France  as  possible.3 

The  Belgians  and  Dutch,  of  course,  were  not  privy  to 
Hitler’s  secret  orders.  Nevertheless  they  did  receive  warn- 
ings of  what  was  in  store  for  them.  A number  of  them 
have  already  been  noted:  Colonel  Oster,  one  of  the  anti- 
Nazi  conspirators,  warned  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  military 


942  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

attaches  in  Berlin  on  November  5 to  expect  the  German 
attack  on  November  12,  which  was  then  the  target  date. 
At  the  end  of  October  Goerdeler,  another  one  of  the 
conspirators,  had  gone  to  Brussels  at  the  instigation  of 
Weizsaecker,  to  warn  the  Belgians  of  an  imminent  at- 
tack. And  shortly  after  the  New  Year,  on  January  10, 
1940,  Hitler’s  plans  for  the  offensive  in  the  West  had 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Belgians  when  an  officer  carry- 
ing them  had  made  a forced  landing  in  Belgium.* 

By  that  time  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  general  staffs  knew 
from  their  own  border  intelligence  that  the  Germans  were 
concentrating  some  fifty  divisions  on  their  frontiers.  They 
also  had  the  benefit  of  an  unusual  source  of  information 
in  the  German  capital.  This  “source”  was  Colonel  G.  J. 
Sas,  the  Netherland’s  military  attache  in  Berlin.  Sas 
was  a close  personal  friend  of  Colonel  Oster  and  often 
dined  with  him  at  the  latter’s  home  in  the  secluded  sub- 
urb of  Zehlendorf — a practice  facilitated,  once  the  war 
broke  out,  by  the  blackout,  whose  cover  enabled  a num- 
ber of  persons  in  Berlin  at  that  time,  German  and  foreign, 
to  get  about  on  various  subversive  missions  without  much 
fear  of  detection.  It  was  Sas  whom  Oster  tipped  off  early 
in  November  about  the  German  onslaught  then  set  for 
November  12,  and  he  gave  the  attache  a new  warning 
in  January.  The  fact  that  neither  attack  came  off  somewhat 
lessened  the  credibility  of  Sas  in  The  Hague  and  in  Brus- 
sels, where  the  fact  that  Hitler  had  actually  set  dates  for 
his  aggression  and  then  postponed  them  naturally  was  not 
known.  However  the  ten  days’  warning  that  Sas  got 
through  Oster  of  the  invasion  of  Norway  and  Denmark 
and  his  prediction  of  the  exact  date  seems  to  have  re- 
stored his  prestige  at  home. 

On  May  3,  Oster  told  Sas  flatly  that  the  German  attack 
in  the  West  through  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium  would 
begin  on  May  10,  and  the  military  attache  promptly  in- 
formed his  government.  The  next  day  The  Hague  received 
confirmation  of  this  from  its  envoy  at  the  Vatican.  The 
Dutch  immediately  passed  the  word  along  to  the  Bel- 
gians. May  5 was  a Sunday  and  as  the  week  began  to 
unfold  it  became  pretty  obvious  to  all  of  us  in  Berlin 
that  the  blow  in  the  West  would  fall  within  a few  days. 

* See  above,  pp.  861,  862,  863,  886-87,  respectively. 


943 


Wap:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Tension  mounted  in  the  capital.  By  May  8 I was  cabling 
my  New  York  office  to  hold  one  of  our  correspondents  in 
Amsterdam  instead  of  shipping  him  off  to  Norway,  where 
the  war  had  ended  anyway,  and  that  evening  the  military 
censors  allowed  me  to  hint  in  my  broadcast  that  there 
would  soon  be  action  in  the  West,  including  Holland  and 
Belgium. 

On  the  evening  of  May  9 Oster  and  Sas  dined  together 
for  what  would  prove  the  last  time.  The  German  officer 
confirmed  that  the  final  order  had  been  given  to  launch 
the  attack  in  the  West  at  dawn  the  next  day.  Just  to  make 
sure  that  there  were  no  last-minute  changes  Oster  dropped 
by  OKW  headquarters  in  the  Bendlerstrasse  after  dinner. 
There  had  been  no  changes.  “The  swine  has  gone  to  the 
Western  front,”  Oster  told  Sas.  The  “swine”  was  Hitler. 
Sas  informed  the  Belgian  military  attache  and  then  went 
to  his  own  legation  and  put  through  a call  to  The  Hague. 
A special  code  for  this  moment  already  had  been  ar- 
ranged and  Sas  spoke  some  seemingly  innocuous  words 
which  conveyed  the  message  “Tomorrow,  at  dawn.  Hold 
tight!”  4 

Strangely  enough,  the  two  Big  Powers  in  the  West,  Brit- 
ain and  France,  were  caught  napping.  Their  general  staffs 
discounted  the  alarming  reports  from  Brussels  and  The 
Hague.  London  itself  was  preoccupied  with  a three-day 
cabinet  crisis  which  was  resolved  only  on  the  evening  of 
May  10  by  the  replacement  of  Chamberlain  by  Church- 
ill as  Prime  Minister.  The  first  French  and  British  head- 
quarters heard  of  the  German  onslaught  was  when  the 
peace  of  the  spring  predawn  was  broken  by  the  roar  of 
German  bombers  and  the  screech  of  Stuka  dive  bombers 
overhead,  followed  shortly  afterward,  as  daylight  broke, 
by  frantic  appeals  for  help  from  the  Dutch  and  Belgian 
governments  which  had  held  the  Allies  at  arm’s  length 
for  eight  months  instead  of  concerting  with  them  for  a 
common  defense. 

Nevertheless  the  Allied  plan  to  meet  the  main  German 
attack  in  Belgium  went  ahead  for  the  first  couple  of  days 
almost  without  a hitch.  A great  Anglo-French  army 
rushed  northeastward  from  the  Franco-Belgian  border  to 
man  the  main  Belgian  defense  line  along  the  Dyle  and 
Meuse  rivers  east  of  Brussels.  As  it  happened,  this  was 
just  what  the  German  High  Command  wanted.  This  mas- 


944  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

sive  Allied  wheeling  movement  played  directly  into  its 
hands.  Though  they  did  not  know  it  the  Anglo-French 
armies  sped  directly  into  a trap  that,  when  sprung,  would 
soon  prove  to  be  utterly  disastrous. 

THE  RIVAL  PLANS 

The  original  German  plan  of  attack  in  the  West  had 
been  drastically  changed  since  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Belgians  and,  as  the  Germans  suspected,  of  the  French 
and  British,  in  January.  Fall  Gelb  (Case  Yellow),  as  the 
operation  was  called,  had  been  hastily  concocted  in  the 
fall  of  1939  by  the  Army  High  Command  under  the 
pressure  of  Hitler’s  order  to  launch  the  offensive  in  the 
West  by  mid-November.  There  is  much  dispute  among 
military  historians  and  indeed  among  the  German  generals 
themselves  whether  this  first  plan  was  a modified  version 
of  the  old  Schlieffen  plan  or  not;  Haider  and  Guderian 
have  maintained  that  it  was.  It  called  for  the  main  Ger- 
man drive  on  the  right  flank  through  Belgium  and  northern 
France,  with  the  object  of  occupying  the  Channel  ports.  It 
fell  short  of  the  famous  Schlieffen  plan,  which  had  failed 
by  an  ace  of  success  in  1914  and  which  provided  not 
only  for  the  capture  of  the  Channel  ports  but  for  a 
continuation  of  a great  wheeling  movement  which  would 
bring  the  German  right-wing  armies  through  Belgium  and 
northern  France  and  across  the  Seine,  after  which  they 
would  turn  east  below  Paris  and  encircle  and  destroy  the 
remaining  French  forces.  Its  purpose  had  been  to 
quickly  put  an  end  to  armed  French  resistance  so  that 
Germany,  in  1914,  could  then  turn  on  Russia  with  the 
great  bulk  of  its  military  might. 

But  in  1939—40  Hitler  did  not  have  to  worry  about  a 
Russian  front.  Nevertheless  his  objective  was  more  limited. 
In  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign,  at  any  rate,  he 
planned  not  to  knock  out  the  French  Army  but  to  roll  it 
back  and  occupy  the  Channel  coast,  thus  cutting  off  Brit- 
ain from  its  ally  and  at  the  same  time  securing  air  and 
naval  bases  from  which  he  could  harass  and  blockade  the 
British  Isles.  It  is  obvious  from  his  various  harangues  to 
the  generals  at  this  time  that  he  thought  that  after  such  a 
defeat  Britain  and  France  would  be  inclined  to  make  peace 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  945 

and  leave  him  free  to  turn  his  attention  once  more  to  the 
East. 

Even  before  the  original  plan  for  Fall  Gelb  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  it  was  anticipated  by  the 
Allied  Supreme  Command.  On  November  17  the  Allied 
Supreme  War  Council,  meeting  in  Paris,  had  adopted  “Plan 
D,”  which,  in  the  event  of  a German  attack  through  Bel- 
gium, called  for  the  French  First  and  Ninth  armies  and 
the  British  Expeditionary  Force  to  dash  forward  to 
the  principal  Belgian  defense  line  on  the  Dyle  and  Meuse 
rivers  from  Antwerp  through  Louvain,  Namur  and  Givet 
to  Mezieres.  A few  days  before,  the  French  and  British 
general  staffs,  in  a series  of  secret  meetings  with  the  Bel- 
gian High  Command,  had  received  the  latter’s  assurance 
that  it  would  strengthen  the  defenses  on  that  line  and 
make  its  main  stand  there.  But  the  Belgians,  still  clinging 
to  the  illusions  of  neutrality  which  fortified  their  hope 
that  they  yet  might  be  spared  involvement  in  war,  would 
not  go  further.  The  British  chiefs  of  staff  argued  that 
there  would  not  be  time  to  deploy  the  Allied  forces  so 
far  forward  once  the  Germans  had  attacked,  but  they  went 
along  with  Plan  D at  the  urging  of  General  Gamelin. 

At  the  end  of  November  the  Allies  added  a scheme  to 
rush  General  Henri  Giraud’s  Seventh  Army  up  the  Chan- 
nel coast  to  help  the  Dutch  north  of  Antwerp  in  case 
the  Netherlands  was  also  attacked.  Thus  a German  at- 
tempt to  sweep  through  Belgium — and  perhaps  Holland — 
to  flank  the  Maginot  Line  would  be  met  very  early  in 
the  game  by  the  entire  B.E.F.,  the  bulk  of  the  French 
Army,  the  twenty-two  divisions  of  the  Belgians  and  the 
ten  divisions  of  the  Dutch — a force  numerically  equal,  as 
it  turned  out,  to  that  of  the  Germans. 

It  was  to  avoid  such  a head-on  clash  and  at  the  same 
time  to  trap  the  British  and  French  armies  that  would 
speed  forward  so  far  that  General  Erich  von  Manstein 
(born  Lewinski),  chief  of  staff  of  Rundstedt’s  Army  Group 
A on  the  Western  front,  proposed  a radical  change  in  Fall 
Gelb.  Manstein  was  a gifted  and  imaginative  staff  officer 
of  relatively  junior  rank,  but  during  the  winter  he  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  his  bold  idea  put  before  Hitler  over  the 
initial  opposition  of  Brauchitsch,  Haider  and  a number  of 
other  generals.  Manstein’s  proposal  was  that  the  main 
German  assault  should  be  launched  in  the  center  through 


946 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  Ardennes  with  a massive  armored  force  which  would 
then  cross  the  Meuse  just  north  of  Sedan  and  break  out 
into  the  open  country  and  race  to  the  Channel  at  Abbe- 
ville. 

Hitler,  always  attracted  by  daring  and  even  reckless 
solutions,  was  interested.  Rundstedt  pushed  the  idea  re- 
lentlessly not  only  because  he  believed  in  it  but  because  it 
would  give  his  Army  Group  A the  decisive  role  in  the 
offensive.  Although  Haider’s  personal  dislike  of  Manstein 
and  certain  professional  jealousies  among  some  of  the 
generals  who  outranked  him  led  to  Manstein’s  transfer 
from  his  staff  post  to  the  command  of  an  infantry  corps 
at  the  end  of  January,  he  had  an  opportunity  to  expound 
his  unorthodox  views  to  Hitler  personally  at  a dinner 
given  for  a number  of  new  corps  commanders  in  Berlin 
on  February  17.  He  argued  that  an  armored  strike  through 
the  Ardennes  would  hit  the  Allies  where  they  least  ex- 
pected it,  since  their  generals  probably,  like  most  of  the 
Germans,  considered  this  hilly,  wooded  country  unsuit- 
able for  tanks.  A feint  by  the  right  wing  of  the  German 
forces  would  bring  the  British  and  French  armies  rushing 
pell-mell  into  Belgium.  Then  by  cracking  through  the 
French  at  Sedan  and  heading  west  along  the  north  bank 
of  the  Somme  for  the  Channel,  the  Germans  would  en- 
trap the  major  Anglo-French  forces  as  well  as  the  Bel- 
gian Army. 

It  was  a daring  plan,  not  without  its  risks,  as  several 
generals,  including  Jodi,  emphasized.  But  by  now  Hitler, 
who  considered  himself  a military  genius,  practically  be- 
lieved that  it  was  his  own  idea  and  his  enthusiasm  for 
it  mounted.  Haider,  who  had  at  first  dismissed  it  as  a 
crackpot  idea,  also  began  to  embrace  it  and  indeed,  with 
the  help  of  his  General  Staff  officers,  considerably  im- 
proved it.  On  February  24,  1940,  it  was  formally  adopted 
in  a new  OKW  directive  and  the  generals  were  told  to 
redeploy  their  troops  by  March  7.  Somewhere  along  the 
line,  incidentally,  the  plan  for  the  conquest  of  the  Nether- 
lands, which  had  been  dropped  from  Fall  Gelb  in  a re- 
vision on  October  29,  1939,  was  reinstated  on  November 
14  at  the  urging  of  the  Luftwaffe,  which  wanted  the 
Dutch  airfields  for  use  against  Britain  and  which  offered 
to  supply  a large  batch  of  airborne  troops  for  this  minor 


947 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

but  somewhat  complicated  operation.  On  such  considera- 
tions are  the  fates  of  little  nations  sometimes  decided.5 

And  so  as  the  campaign  in  Norway  approached  its  vic- 
torious conclusion  and  the  first  warm  days  of  the  begin- 
ning of  May  arrived,  the  Germans,  with  the  most  power- 
ful army  the  world  had  ever  seen  up  to  that  moment, 
stood  poised  to  strike  in  the  West.  In  mere  numbers  the 
two  sides  were  evenly  matched — 136  German  divisions 
against  135  divisions  of  the  French,  British,  Belgian  and 
Dutch.  The  defenders  had  the  advantage  of  vast  defen- 
sive fortifications:  the  impenetrable  Maginot  Line  in  the 
south,  the  extensive  line  of  Belgian  forts  in  the  middle 
and  fortified  water  lines  in  Holland  in  the  north.  Even 
in  the  number  of  tanks,  the  Allies  matched  the  Germans. 
But  they  had  not  concentrated  them  as  had  the  latter. 
And  because  of  the  aberration  of  the  Dutch  and  Belgians 
for  neutrality  there  had  been  no  staff  consultations  by 
which  the  defenders  could  pool  their  plans  and  resources 
to  the  best  advantage.  The  Germans  had  a unified  com- 
mand, the  initiative  of  the  attacker,  no  moral  scruples 
against  aggression,  a contagious  confidence  in  themselves 
and  a daring  plan.  They  had  had  experience  in  battle  in 
Poland.  There  they  had  tested  their  new  tactics  and  their 
new  weapons  in  combat.  They  knew  the  value  of  the  dive 
bomber  and  the  mass  use  of  tanks.  And  they  knew,  as  Hit- 
ler had  never  ceased  to  point  out,  that  the  French,  though 
they  would  be  defending  their  own  soil,  had  no  heart  in 
what  lay  ahead. 

Notwithstanding  their  confidence  and  determination, 
the  German  High  Command,  as  the  secret  records  make 
clear,  suffered  some  moments  of  panic  as  the  zero  hour 
drew  near — or  at  least  Hitler,  the  Supreme  Commander, 
did.  General  Jodi  jotted  them  down  in  his  diary.  Hitler 
ordered  several  last-minute  postponements  of  the  jump- 
off,  which  on  May  1 he  had  set  for  May  5.  On  May  3 he 
put  it  off  until  May  6 on  account  of  the  weather  but 
perhaps  also  in  part  because  the  Foreign  Office  didn’t 
think  his  proposed  justification  for  violating  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  and  Holland  was  good  enough.  The  next  day 
he  set  May  7 as  X Day  and  on  the  following  day  post- 
poned it  again  until  Wednesday,  May  8.  “Fuehrer  has 
finished  justification  for  Case  Yellow,”  Jodi  noted.  Bel- 


948  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

gium  and  the  Netherlands  were  to  be  accused  of  having 
acted  most  unneutrally. 

May  7.  Fuehrer  railroad  train  was  scheduled  to  leave 
Finkenkrug  at  16:38  hours  [Jodi’s  dairy  continued].  But 
weather  remains  uncertain  and  therefore  the  order  [for  the 
attack]  is  rescinded  . . . Fuehrer  greatly  agitated  about  new 
postponement  as  there  is  danger  of  treachery.  Talk  of  the 
Belgian  Envoy  to  the  Vatican  with  Brussels  permits  the  de- 
duction that  treason  has  been  committed  by  a German  per- 
sonality who  left  Berlin  for  Rome  on  April  29  . . 

May  8.  Alarming  news  from  Holland.  Canceling  of  fur- 
loughs, evacuations,  roadblocks,  other  mobilization  methods 
. . . Fuehrer  does  not  want  to  wait  any  longer.  Goering  wants 
postponement  until  the  10th,  at  least  . . . Fuehrer  is  very 
agitated;  then  he  consents  to  postponement  until  May  10, 
which  he  says  is  against  his  intuition.  But  not  one  day 
longer  . . . 

May  9.  Fuehrer  decides  on  attack  for  May  10  for  sure. 
Departure  with  Fuehrer  train  at  17:00  hours  from  Finken- 
krug. After  report  that  weather  situation  will  be  favorable 
on  the  10th,  the  code  word  “Danzig”  is  given  at  21:00  hours. 

Hitler,  accompanied  by  Keitel,  Jodi  and  others  of  the 
OKW  staff,  arrived  at  headquarters,  which  he  had  named 
Felsennest  (Eyrie),  near  Muenstereifel  just  as  dawn  was 
breaking  on  May  10.  Twenty-five  miles  to  the  west  Ger- 
man forces  were  hurtling  over  the  Belgian  frontier.  Along 
a front  of  175  miles,  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Maginot 
Line,  Nazi  troops  broke  across  the  borders  of  three  small 
neutral  states,  Holland,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg,  in  bru- 
tal violation  of  the  German  word,  solemnly  and  repeatedly 
given. 

THE  SIX  WEEKS’  WAR:  MAY  10-JUNE  25,  1940 

For  the  Dutch  it  was  a five-day  war,  and  indeed  in  that 
brief  period  the  fate  of  Belgium,  France  and  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  was  sealed.  For  the  Germans  every- 
thing went  according  to  the  book,  or  even  better  than  the 
book,  in  the  unfolding  both  of  strategy  and  of  tactics. 
Their  success  exceeded  the  fondest  hopes  of  Hitler.  His 
generals  were  confounded  by  the  lightning  rapidity  and 
the  extent  of  their  own  victories.  As  for  the  Allied  lead- 
ers, they  were  quickly  paralyzed  by  developments  they 
had  not  faintly  expected  and  could  not — in  the  utter  con- 
fusion that  ensued — comprehend. 


949 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Winston  Churchill  himself,  who  had  taken  over  as 
Prime  Minister  on  the  first  day  of  battle,  was  dum- 
founded.  He  was  awakened  at  half  past  seven  on  the 
morning  of  May  15  by  a telephone  call  from  Premier 
Paul  Reynaud  in  Paris,  who  told  him  in  an  excited  voice, 
“We  have  been  defeated!  We  are  beaten!”  Churchill  re- 
fused to  believe  it.  The  great  French  Army  vanquished  in 
a week?  It  was  impossible.  “I  did  not  comprehend,”  he 
wrote  later,  “the  violence  of  the  revolution  effected  since 
the  last  war  by  the  incursion  of  a mass  of  fast-moving 
armor.”  6 

Tanks — seven  divisions  of  them  concentrated  at  one 
point,  the  weakest  position  in  the  Western  defenses,  for 
the  big  breakthrough — that  was  what  did  it.  That  and  the 
Stuka  dive  bombers  and  the  parachutists  and  the  airborne 
troops  who  landed  far  behind  the  Allied  lines  or  on  the 
top  of  their  seemingly  impregnable  forts  and  wrought 
havoc. 

And  yet  we  who  were  in  Berlin  wondered  why  these 
German  tactics  should  have  come  as  such  a shattering 
surprise  to  the  Allied  leaders.  Had  not  Hitler’s  troops 
demonstrated  their  effectiveness  in  the  campaign  against 
Poland?  There  the  great  breakthroughs  which  had  sur- 
rounded or  destroyed  the  Polish  armies  within  a week 
had  been  achieved  by  the  massing  of  armor  after  the  Stu- 
kas  had  softened  up  resistance.  Parachutists  and  airborne 
troops  had  not  done  well  in  Poland  even  on  the  very 
limited  scale  with  which  they  were  used;  they  had  failed 
to  capture  intact  the  key  bridges.  But  in  Norway,  a month 
before  the  onslaught  in  the  West,  they  had  been  prodi- 
gious, capturing  Oslo  and  all  the  airfields,  and  reinforcing 
the  isolated  small  groups  that  had  been  landed  by  sea  at 
Stavanger,  Bergen,  Trondheim  and  Narvik  and  thereby 
enabling  them  to  hold  out.  Hadn’t  the  Allied  commanders 
studied  these  campaigns  and  learned  their  lessons? 

THE  CONQUEST  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS 

Only  one  division  of  panzers  could  be  spared  by  the 
Germans  for  the  conquest  of  the  Netherlands,  which  was 
accomplished  in  five  days  largely  by  parachutists  and  by 
troops  landed  by  air  transports  behind  the  great  flooded 
water  lines  which  many  in  Berlin  had  believed  would  hold 


9S0 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  Germans  up  for  weeks.  To  the  bewildered  Dutch  was 
reserved  the  experience  of  being  subjected  to  the  first 
large-scale  airborne  attack  in  the  history  of  warfare.  Con- 
sidering their  unpreparedness  for  such  an  ordeal  and  the 
complete  surprise  by  which  they  were  taken  they  did  bet- 
ter than  was  realized  at  the  time. 

The  first  objective  of  the  Germans  was  to  land  a strong 
force  by  air  on  the  flying  fields  near  The  Hague,  occupy 
the  capital  at  once  and  capture  the  Queen  and  the  govern- 
ment, as  they  had  tried  to  do  just  a month  before  with  the 
Norwegians.  But  at  The  Hague,  as  at  Oslo,  the  plan  failed,, 
though  due  to  different  circumstances.  Recovering  from 
their  initial  surprise  and  confusion,  Dutch  infantry,  sup- 
ported by  artillery,  was  able  to  drive  the  Germans — two 
regiments  strong — from  the  three  airfields  surrounding 
The  Hague  by  the  evening  of  May  10.  This  saved  the 
capital  and  the  government  momentarily,  but  it  tied  down 
the  Dutch  reserves,  which  were  desperately  needed  else- 
where. 

The  key  to  the  German  plan  was  the  seizure  by  air- 
borne troops  of  the  bridges  just  south  of  Rotterdam  over 
the  Nieuwe  Maas  and  those  farther  southeast  over  the  two 
estuaries  of  the  Maas  (Meuse)  at  Dordrecht  and  Moerdijk. 
It  was  over  these  bridges  that  General  Georg  von  Kuech- 
ler’s  Eighteenth  Army  driving  from  the  German  border 
nearly  a hundred  miles  away  hoped  to  force  his  way  into 
Fortress  Holland.  In  no  other  way  could  this  entrenched 
place,  lying  behind  formidable  water  barriers  and  com- 
prising The  Hague,  Amsterdam,  Utretcht,  Rotterdam  and 
Leyden,  be  taken  easily  and  quickly. 

The  bridges  were  seized  on  the  morning  of  May  10  by 
airborne  units — including  one  company  that  landed  on 
the  river  at  Rotterdam  in  antiquated  seaplanes — before 
the  surprised  Dutch  guards  could  blow  them.  Desperate 
efforts  were  made  by  improvised  Netherlands  units  to 
drive  the  Germans  away  and  they  almost  succeeded. 
But  the  Germans  hung  on  tenuously  until  the  morning  of 
May  12,  when  the  one  armored  division  assigned  to  Kuech- 
ler  arrived,  having  smashed  through  the  Grebbe-Peel 
Line,  a fortified  front  to  the  east  strengthened  by  a num- 
ber of  water  barriers,  on  which  the  Dutch  had  hoped  to 
hold  out  for  several  days. 

There  was  some  hope  that  the  Germans  might  be 


951 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

stopped  short  of  the  Moerdijk  bridges  by  General  Gir- 
aud’s  French  Seventh  Army,  which  had  raced  up  from  the 
Channel  and  reached  Tilburg  on  the  afternoon  of  May  11. 
But  the  French,  like  the  hard-pressed  Dutch,  lacked  air 
support,  armor,  and  antitank  and  antiaircraft  guns,  and 
were  easily  pushed  back  to  Breda.  This  opened  the  way 
for  the  German  9th  Panzer  Division  to  cross  the  bridges 
at  Moerdijk  and  Dordrecht  and,  on  the  afternoon  of  May 
12,  arrive  at  the  south  bank  of  the  Nieuwe  Maas  across 
from  Rotterdam,  where  the  German  airborne  troops  still 
held  the  bridges. 

But  the  tanks  could  not  get  across  the  Rotterdam 
bridges.  The  Dutch  in  the  meantime  had  sealed  them  off 
at  the  northern  ends.  By  the  morning  of  May  14,  then, 
the  situation  for  the  Netherlands  was  desperate  but  not 
hopeless.  Fortress  Holland  had  not  been  cracked.  The 
strong  German  airborne  forces  around  The  Hague  had 
been  either  captured  or  dispersed  into  nearby  villages. 
Rotterdam  still  held.  The  German  High  Command,  anx- 
ious to  pull  the  armored  division  and  supporting  troops 
out  of  Holland  to  exploit  a new  opportunity  which  had 
just  been  opened  to  the  south  in  France,  was  not  happy. 
Indeed,  on  the  morning  of  the  fourteenth  Hitler  issued 
Directive  No.  11  stating:  “The  power  of  resistance  of  the 
Dutch  Army  has  proved  to  be  stronger  than  was  antici- 
pated. Political  as  well  as  military  considerations  require 
that  this  resistance  be  broken  speedily.”  How?  He  com- 
manded that  detachments  of  the  Air  Force  be  taken  from 
the  Sixth  Army  front  in  Belgium  “to  facilitate  the  rapid 
conquest  of  Fortress  Holland.”  7 

Specifically  he  and  Goering  ordered  a heavy  bombing 
of  Rotterdam.  The  Dutch  would  be  induced  to  surrender 
by  a dose  of  Nazi  terror — the  kind  that  had  been  applied 
the  autumn  before  at  beleaguered  Warsaw. 

On  the  morning  of  May  14  a German  staff  officer  from 
the  XXXIXth  Corps  had  crossed  the  bridge  at  Rotter- 
dam under  a white  flag  and  demanded  the  surrender  of 
the  city.  He  warned  that  unless  it  capitulated  it  would  be 
bombed.  While  surrender  negotiations  were  under  way — a 
Dutch  officer  had  come  to  German  headquarters  near  the 
bridge  to  discuss  the  details  and  was  returning  with  the 
German  terms — bombers  appeared  and  wiped  out  the 
heart  of  the  great  city.  Some  eight  hundred  persons,  al- 


952 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

most  entirely  civilians,  were  massacred,  several  thousand 
wounded  and  78,000  made  homeless.*  This  bit  of  treach- 
ery, this  act  of  calculated  ruthlessness,  would  long  be  re- 
membered by  the  Dutch,  though  at  Nuremberg  both  Goer- 
ing  and  Kesselring  of  the  Luftwaffe  defended  it  on  the 
grounds  that  Rotterdam  was  not  an  open  city  but  stoutly 
defended  by  the  Dutch.  Both  denied  that  they  knew  that 
surrender  negotiations  were  going  on  when  they  dispatched 
the  bombers,  though  there  is  strong  evidence  from  Ger- 
man Army  archives  that  they  did.  t 9 At  any  rate,  OKW 
made  no  excuses  at  the  time.  I myself  heard  over  the 
Berlin  radio  on  the  evening  of  May  14  a special  OKW 
communique: 

Under  the  tremendous  impression  of  the  attacks  of  Ger- 
man dive  bombers  and  the  imminent  attack  of  German 
tanks,  the  city  of  Rotterdam  has  capitulated  and  thus  saved 
itself  from  destruction. 

Rotterdam  surrendered,  and  then  the  Dutch  armed  forces. 
Queen  Wilhelmina  and  the  government  members  had  fled 
to  London  on  two  British  destroyers.  At  dusk  on  May  14 
General  H.  G.  Winkelmann,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  Dutch  forces,  ordered  his  troops  to  lay  down  their 
arms  and  at  1 1 a.m.  on  the  next  day  he  signed  the  official 
capitulation.  Within  five  days  it  was  all  over.  The  fighting, 
that  is.  For  five  years  a night  of  savage  German  terror 
would  henceforth  darken  this  raped,  civilized  little  land. 

THE  FALL  OF  BELGIUM  AND  THE  TRAPPING 
OF  THE  ANGLO-FRENCH  ARMIES 

By  the  time  the  Dutch  had  surrendered,  the  die  was 
cast  for  Belgium,  France  and  the  British  Expeditionary 
Force.  May  14,  though  it  was  only  the  fifth  day  of  the 
attack,  was  the  fatal  day.  The  previous  evening  German 
armor  had  secured  four  bridgeheads  across  the  steeply 
banked  and  heavily  wooded  Meuse  River  from  Dinant  to 
Sedan,  captured  the  latter  city,  which  had  been  the 
scene  of  Napoleon  Ill’s  surrender  to  Moltke  in  1870  and 

* It  was  first  reported  and  long  believed  that  from  25,000  to  30,000  Dutch 
were  killed,  and  this  is  the  figure  given  in  the  1953  edition  of  the  Encyclo- 
paedia Bntannica.  However,  at  Nuremberg  the  Dutch  government  gave  the 
figure  as  814  killed.8 

t There  were  no  criminal  convictions  at  Nuremberg  for  the  bombing  of 
Rotterdam. 


953 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

the  end  of  the  Third  Empire,  and  gravely  threatened  the 
center  of  the  Allied  lines  and  the  hinge  on  which  the 
flower  of  the  British  and  French  armies  had  so  quickly 
wheeled  into  Belgium. 

The  next  day,  May  14,  the  avalanche  broke.  An  army 
of  tanks  unprecedented  in  warfare  for  size,  concentration, 
mobility  and  striking  power,  which  when  it  had  started 
through  the  Ardennes  Forest  from  the  German  frontier  on 
May  10  stretched  in  three  columns  back  for  a hundred 
miles  far  behind  the  Rhine,  broke  through  the  French 
Ninth  and  Second  armies  and  headed  swiftly  for  the 
Channel,  behind  the  Allied  forces  in  Belgium.  This  was 
a formidable  and  frightening  juggernaut.  Preceded  by 
waves  of  Stuka  dive  bombers,  which  softened  up  the 
French  defensive  positions,  swarming  with  combat  engi- 
neers who  launched  rubber  boats  and  threw  up  pontoon 
bridges  to  get  across  the  rivers  and  canals,  each  panzer 
division  possessed  of  its  own  self-propelled  artillery  and  of 
one  brigade  of  motorized  infantry,  and  the  armored  corps 
closely  followed  by  divisions  of  motorized  infantry  to 
hold  the  positions  opened  up  by  the  tanks,  this  phalanx  of 
steel  and  fire  could  not  be  stopped  by  any  means  in  the 
hands  of  the  bewildered  defenders.  On  both  sides  of 
Dinant  on  the  Meuse  the  French  gave  way  to  General 
Hermann  Hoth’s  XVth  Armored  Corps,  one  of  whose  two 
tank  divisions  was  commanded  by  a daring  young  brig- 
adier general,  Erwin  Rommel.  Farther  south  along  the 
river,  at  Montherme,  the  same  pattern  was  being  ex- 
ecuted by  General  Georg-Hans  Reinhardt’s  XLIst 
Armored  Corps  of  two  tank  divisions. 

But  it  was  around  Sedan,  of  disastrous  memory  to  the 
French,  that  the  greatest  blow  fell.  Here  on  the  morning 
of  May  14  two  tank  divisions  of  General  Heinz  Guderian’s 
XIXth  Armored  Corps  * poured  across  a hastily  con- 
structed pontoon  bridge  set  up  during  the  night  over  the 
Meuse  and  struck  toward  the  west.  Though  French 
armor  and  British  bombers  tried  desperately  to  destroy 
the  bridge — forty  of  seventy-one  R.A.F.  planes  were 
shot  down  in  one  single  attack,  mostly  by  flak,  and 
seventy  French  tanks  were  destroyed — they  could  not 


* The  two  armored  corps  of  Reinhardt  and  Guderian  made  up  General 
Ewald  von  Kleist’s  panzer  group,  which  consisted  of  five  tank  divisions  and 
three  motorized  infantry  divisions. 


954  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

damage  it.  By  evening  the  German  bridgehead  at  Sedan 
was  thirty  miles  wide  and  fifteen  miles  deep  and  the 
French  forces  in  the  vital  center  of  the  Allied  line  were 
shattered.  Those  who  were  not  surrounded  and  made 
prisoners  were  in  disorderly  retreat.  The  Franco-British 
armies  to  the  north,  as  well  as  the  twenty-two  divisions  of 
Belgians,  were  placed  in  dire  danger  of  being  cut  off. 

The  first  couple  of  days  had  gone  fairly  well  for  the 
Allies,  or  so  they  thought.  To  Churchill,  plunging  with 
new  zest  into  his  fresh  responsibilities  as  Prime  Minister, 
“up  until  the  night  of  the  twelfth,”  as  he  later  wrote, 
“there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  operations  were 
not  going  well.” 10  Gamelin,  the  generalissimo  of  the 
Allied  forces,  was  highly  pleased  with  the  situation. 
The  evening  before,  the  best  and  largest  part  of  the 
French  forces,  the  First,  Seventh  and  Ninth  armies,  along 
with  the  B.E.F.,  nine  divisions  strong  under  Lord  Gort, 
had  joined  the  Belgians,  as  planned,  on  a strong  defensive 
line  running  along  the  Dyle  River  from  Antwerp  through 
Louvain  to  Wavre  and  thence  across  the  Gembloux  gap 
to  Namur  and  south  along  the  Meuse  to  Sedan.  Be- 
tween the  formidable  Belgian  fortress  of  Namur  and 
Antwerp,  on  a front  of  only  sixty  miles,  the  Allies  ac- 
tually outnumbered  the  oncoming  Germans,  having  some 
thirty-six  divisions  against  the  twenty  in  Reichenau’s 
Sixth  Army. 

The  Belgians,  though  they  had  fought  well  along  the 
reaches  of  their  northeast  frontier,  had  not  held  out  there 
as  long  as  had  been  expected,  certainly  not  as  long  as  in 
1914.  They,  like  the  Dutch  to  the  north  of  them,  had 
simply  not  been  able  to  cope  with  the  revolutionary  new 
tactics  of  the  Wehrmacht.  Here,  as  in  Holland,  the  Ger- 
mans seized  the  vital  bridges  by  the  daring  use  of  a hand- 
ful of  specially  trained  troops  landed  silently  at  dawn 
in  gliders.  They  overpowered  the  guards  at  two  of  the 
three  bridges  over  the  Albert  Canal  behind  Maastricht  be- 
fore the  defenders  could  throw  the  switches  that  were  sup- 
posed to  blow  them. 

They  had  even  greater  success  in  capturing  Fort  Eben 
Emael,  which  commanded  the  junction  of  the  Meuse 
River  and  the  Albert  Canal.  This  modern,  strategically 
located  fortress  was  regarded  by  both  the  Allies  and  the 
Germans  as  the  most  impregnable  fortification  in  Europe, 


955 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

stronger  than  anything  the  French  had  built  in  the  Mag- 
inot  Line  or  the  Germans  in  the  West  Wall.  Constructed 
in  a series  of  steel-and-concrete  galleries  deep  under- 
ground, its  gun  turrets  protected  by  heavy  armor  and 
manned  by  1,200  men,  it  was  expected  to  hold  out  in- 
definitely against  the  pounding  of  the  heaviest  bombs  and 
artillery  sheels.  It  fell  in  thirty  hours  to  eighty  German 
soldiers  who  under  the  command  of  a sergeant  had 
landed  in  nine  gliders  on  its  roof  and  whose  total  cas- 
ualties amounted  to  six  killed  and  nineteen  wounded.  In 
Berlin,  I remember,  OKW  made  the  enterprise  look  very 
mysterious,  announcing  in  a special  communique  on  the 
evening  of  May  11  that  Fort  Eben  Emael  had  been  taken 
by  a “new  method  of  attack,”  an  announcement  that 
caused  rumors  to  spread — and  Dr.  Goebbels  was  delighted 
to  fan  them — that  the  Germans  had  a deadly  new  “secret 
weapon,”  perhaps  a nerve  gas  that  temporarily  paralyzed 
the  defenders. 

The  truth  was  much  more  prosaic.  With  their  usual  flair 
for  minute  preparation,  the  Germans  during  the  winter  of 
1939—40  had  erected  at  Hildesheim  a replica  of  the 
fort  and  of  the  bridges  across  the  Albert  Canal  and  had 
trained  some  four  hundred  glider  troops  on  how  to  take 
them.  Three  groups  were  to  capture  the  three  bridges, 
the  fourth  Eben  Emael.  This  last  unit  of  eighty  men 
landed  on  the  top  of  the  fortress  and  placed  a specially 
prepared  “hollow”  explosive  in  the  armored  gun  turrets 
which  not  only  put  them  out  of  action  but  spread  flames 
and  gas  in  the  chambers  below.  Portable  flame  throwers 
were  also  used  at  the  gun  portals  and  observation  openings. 
Within  an  hour  the  Germans  were  able  to  penetrate  the 
upper  galleries,  render  the  light  and  heavy  guns  of  the 
great  fort  useless  and  blind  its  observation  posts.  Belgian 
infantry  behind  the  fortification  tried  vainly  to  dislodge 
the  tiny  band  of  attackers  but  they  were  driven  off  by 
Stuka  attacks  and  by  reinforcements  of  parachutists.  By 
the  morning  of  May  11  advance  panzer  units,  which 
had  raced  over  the  two  intact  bridges  to  the  north,  arrived 
at  the  fort  and  surrounded  it,  and,  after  further  Stuka 
bombings  and  hand-to-hand  fighting  in  the  underground 
tunnels,  a white  flag  was  hoisted  at  noon  and  the  1,200 
dazed  Belgian  defenders  filed  out  and  surrendered.11 

This  feat,  along  with  the  capture  of  the  bridges  and  the 


956 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


violence  of  the  attack  mounted  by  General  von  Reich- 
enau’s  Sixth  Army,  which  was  sustained  by  General 
Hoepner’s  XVIth  Armored  Corps  of  two  tank  divisions 
and  one  mechanized  infantry  division,  convinced  the 
Allied  High  Command  that  now,  as  in  1914,  the  brunt  of 
the  German  offensive  was  being  carried  out  by  the 
enemy’s  right  wing  and  that  they  had  taken  the  proper 
means  to  stop  it.  In  fact,  as  late  as  the  evening  of  May  15 
the  Belgian,  British  and  French  forces  were  holding  firm 
on  the  Dyle  line  from  Antwerp  to  Namur. 

This  was  just  what  the  German  High  Command  wanted. 
It  had  now  become  possible  for  it  to  spring  the  Manstein 
plan  and  deliver  the  haymaker  in  the  center.  General 
Haider,  the  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff,  saw  the 
situation — and  his  opportunities — very  clearly  on  the  eve- 
ning of  May  13. 

North  of  Namur  [he  wrote  in  his  diary]  we  can  count 
on  a completed  concentration  of  some  24  British  and  French 
and  about  15  Belgian  divisions.  Against  this  our  Sixth  Army 
has  15  divisions  on  the  front  and  six  in  reserve  . . . We 
are  strong  enough  there  to  fend  off  any  enemy  attack.  No 
need  to  bring  up  any  more  forces.  South  of  Namur  we  face  a 
weaker  enemy.  About  half  our  strength.  Outcome  of  Meuse 
attack  will  decide  if,  when  and  where  we  will  be  able  to 
exploit  this  superiority.  The  enemy  has  no  force  worth  men- 
tioning behind  this  front. 

No  force  worth  mentioning  behind  this  front,  which, 
the  next  day,  was  broken? 

On  May  16  Prime  Minister  Churchill  flew  to  Paris  to 
find  out.  By  the  afternoon,  when  he  drove  to  the  Quai 
d’Orsay  to  see  Premier  Reynaud  and  General  Gamelin, 
German  spearheads  were  sixty  miles  west  of  Sedan,  roll- 
ing along  the  undefended  open  country.  Nothing  very 
much  stood  between  them  and  Paris,  or  between  them  and 
the  Channel,  but  Churchill  did  not  know  this.  “Where  is 
the  strategic  reserve?”  he  asked  Gamelin  and,  breaking 
into  French,  “Oil  est  la  masse  de  manoeuvre?”  The  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Allied  armies  turned  to  him  with 
a shake  of  the  head  and  a shrug  and  answered,  “Aucune 
— there  is  none.”  * 

“I  was  dumfounded,”  Churchill  later  related.  It  was  un- 


* After  the  war  Gamelin  stated  that  his  reply  was  not  “There  is  none,”  but 
“There  is  no  longer  any.”  ( L'Aurore , Paris,  November  21,  1949.) 


957 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

heard  of  that  a great  army,  when  attacked,  held  no 
troops  in  reserve.  “I  admit,”  says  Churchill,  “that  this 
was  one  of  the  greatest  surprises  I have  had  in  my  life.”  12 

It  was  scarcely  less  a surprise  to  the  German  High  Com- 
mand, or  at  least  to  Hitler  and  the  generals  at  OKW  if 
not  to  Haider.  Twice  during  this  campaign  in  the  West, 
which  the  Fuehrer  himself  directed,  he  hesitated.  The 
first  occasion  was  on  May  17  when  a crisis  of  nerves  over- 
came him.  That  morning  Guderian,  who  was  a third  of 
the  way  to  the  Channel  with  his  panzer  corps,  received 
an  order  to  halt  in  his  tracks.  Intelligence  had  been  re- 
ceived from  the  Luftwaffe  that  the  French  were  mount- 
ing a great  counterattack  to  cut  off  the  thin  armored  Ger- 
man wedges  which  extended  westward  from  Sedan.  Hitler 
conferred  hastily  with  his  Army  Commander  in  Chief, 
Brauchitsch,  and  with  Haider.  He  was  certain  that  a seri- 
ous French  threat  was  developing  from  the  south.  Rund- 
stedt,  commander  of  Army  Group  A,  the  main  force 
which  had  launched  the  breakthrough  over  the  Meuse, 
backed  him  up  when  they  conferred  later  in  the  day.  He 
expected,  he  said,  “a  great  surprise  counteroffensive  by 
strong  French  forces  from  the  Verdun  and  Chalons-sur- 
Mame  areas.”  The  specter  of  a second  Marne  rose  in  Hit- 
ler’s feverish  mind.  “I  am  keeping  an  eye  on  this,”  he 
wrote  Mussolini  the  next  day.  “The  miracle  of  the  Marne 
of  1914  will  not  be  repeated!”  13 

A very  unpleasant  day  [Haider  noted  in  his  diary  the  eve- 
ning of  May  17].  The  Fuehrer  is  terribly  nervous.  He  is  wor- 
ried over  his  own  success,  will  risk  nothing  and  insists  on 
restraining  us.  Puts  forward  the  excuse  that  it  is  all  because 
of  his  concern  with  the  left  flank  . . . [He]  has  brought 
only  bewilderment  and  doubts. 

The  Nazi  warlord  showed  no  improvement  during  the 
next  day  despite  the  avalanche  of  news  about  the  French 
collapse.  Haider  recorded  the  crisis  in  his  diary  of  the 
eighteenth: 

The  Fuehrer  has  an  unaccountable  worry  about  the  south 
flank.  He  rages  and  screams  that  we  are  on  the  way  to 
ruining  the  whole  operation  and  that  we  are  courting  the 
danger  of  a defeat.  He  won’t  have  any  part  in  continuing  the 
drive  westward,  let  alone  southwest,  and  clings  always  to  the 
idea  of  a thrust  to  the  northwest.  This  is  the  subject  of  a 
most  unpleasant  dispute  between  the  Fuehrer  on  the  one 


958 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


side  and  Brauchitsch  and  me  on  the  other. 

General  Jodi  of  OKW,  for  whom  the  Fuehrer  was  nearly 
always  right,  also  noted  the  discord  at  the  top. 

Day  of  great  tension  [he  wrote  on  the  eighteenth].  The 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  [Brauchitsch]  has  not 
carried  out  the  intention  of  building  up  as  quickly  as  possi- 
ble a new  flanking  position  to  the  south  . . . Brauchitsch  and 
Haider  are  called  immediately  and  ordered  peremptorily  to 
adopt  the  necessary  measures  immediately. 

But  Haider  had  been  right;  the  French  had  no  forces 
with  which  to  stage  a counterattack  from  the  south.  And 
though  the  panzer  divisions,  chafing  at  the  bit  as  they 
were,  received  orders  to  do  no  more  than  proceed  with 
“a  reconnaissance  in  force”  this  was  all  they  needed  to 
press  toward  the  Channel.  By  the  morning  of  May  19  a 
mighty  wedge  of  seven  armored  divisions,  driving  relent- 
lessly westward  north  of  the  Somme  River  past  the  storied 
scenes  of  battle  of  the  First  World  War,  was  only  some 
fifty  miles  from  the  Channel.  On  the  evening  of  May  20,  to 
the  surprise  of  Hitler’s  headquarters,  the  2nd  Panzer  Divi- 
sion reached  Abbeville  at  the  mouth  of  the  Somme.  The 
Belgians,  the  B.E.F.  and  three  French  armies  were  trapped. 

Fuehrer  is  beside  himself  with  joy  [Jodi  scribbled  in  his 
diary  that  night].  Talks  in  words  of  highest  appreciation  of 
the  German  Army  and  its  leadership.  Is  working  on  the  peace 
treaty,  which  shall  express  the  tenor:  return  of  territory 
robbed  over  the  last  400  years  from  the  German  people,  and 
of  other  values  . . . 

A special  memorandum  is  in  the  files  containing  the 
emotion-choked  words  of  the  Fuehrer  when  receiving  the 
telephone  report  from  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Army  about  the  capture  of  Abbeville. 

The  only  hope  of  the  Allies  to  extricate  themselves 
from  this  disastrous  encirclement  was  for  the  armies  in 
Belgium  to  immediately  turn  southwest,  disengage  them- 
selves from  the  German  Sixth  Army  attacking  them  there, 
fight  their  way  across  the  German  armored  wedge  that 
stretched  across  northern  France  to  the  sea  and  join  up 
with  fresh  French  forces  pushing  northward  from  the 
Somme.  This  was  in  fact  what  General  Gamelin  ordered 
on  the  morning  of  May  19,  but  he  was  replaced  that 
evening  by  General  Maxime  Weygand,  who  immediately 


959 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

canceled  the  order.  Weygand,  who  had  a formidable  mili- 
tary reputation  gained  in  the  First  World  War,  wanted 
to  confer  first  with  the  Allied  commanders  in  Belgium 
before  deciding  what  to  do.  As  a result,  three  days  were 
lost  before  Weygand  came  up  with  precisely  the  same  plan 
as  his  predecessor.  The  delay  proved  costly.  There  were 
still  forty  French,  British  and  Belgian  battle-tested 
divisions  in  the  north,  and  had  they  struck  south  across 
the  thin  armored  German  line  on  May  19  as  Gamelin  or- 
dered, they  might  have  succeeded  in  breaking  through. 
By  the  time  they  moved,  communications  between  the 
various  national  commands  had  become  chaotic  and  the 
several  Allied  armies,  hard  pressed  as  they  were,  began  to 
act  at  cross-purposes.  At  any  rate,  the  Weygand  plan 
existed  only  in  the  General’s  mind;  no  French  troops  ever 
moved  up  from  the  Somme. 

In  the  meantime  the  German  High  Command  had  thrown 
in  all  the  infantry  troops  that  could  be  rushed  up  to 
strengthen  the  armored  gap  and  enlarge  it.  By  May  24 
Guderian’s  tanks,  driving  up  the  Channel  from  Abbeville, 
had  captured  Boulogne  and  surrounded  Calais,  the  two 
main  ports,  and  reached  Gravelines,  some  twenty  miles 
down  the  coast  from  Dunkirk.  The  front  in  Belgium  had 
moved  southwestward  as  the  Allies  attempted  to  detach 
themselves  there.  By  the  24th,  then,  the  British,  French 
and  Belgian  armies  in  the  north  were  compressed  into  a 
relatively  small  triangle  with  its  base  along  the  Channel 
from  Gravelines  to  Terneuzen  and  its  apex  at  Valenciennes, 
some  seventy  miles  inland.  There  was  now  no  hope  of 
breaking  out  of  the  trap.  The  only  hope,  and  it  seemed 
a slim  one,  was  possible  evacuation  by  sea  from  Dunkirk. 

It  was  at  this  juncture,  on  May  24,  that  the  German 
armor,  now  within  sight  of  Dunkirk  and  poised  along  the 
Aa  Canal  between  Gravelines  and  St.-Omer  for  the 
final  kill,  received  a strange — and  to  the  soldiers  in  the 
field  inexplicable — order  to  halt  their  advance.  It  was 
the  first  of  the  German  High  Command’s  major  mistakes 
in  World  War  II  and  became  a subject  of  violent  contro- 
versy, not  only  between  the  German  generals  themselves 
but  among  the  military  historians,  as  to  who  was  re- 
sponsible and  why.  We  shall  return  to  that  question  in  a 
moment  in  the  light  of  a mass  of  material  now  available. 
Whatever  the  reasons  for  this  stop  order,  it  provided  a 


960  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

miraculous  reprieve  to  the  Allies,  and  especially  to  the 
British,  leading  as  it  did  to  the  miracle  of  Dunkirk.  But 
it  did  not  save  the  Belgians. 

THE  CAPITULATION  OF  KING  LEOPOLD 

King  Leopold  III  of  the  Belgians  surrendered  early  on 
the  morning  of  May  28.  The  headstrong  young  ruler,  who 
had  taken  his  country  out  of  its  alliance  with  France  and 
Britain  into  a foolish  neutrality,  who  had  refused  to 
restore  the  alliance  even  during  the  months  when  he  knew 
the  Germans  were  preparing  a massive  assault  across  his 
border,  who  at  the  last  moment,  after  Hitler  had  struck, 
called  on  the  French  and  British  for  military  succor  and 
received  it,  now  deserted  them  in  a desperate  hour, 
opening  the  dyke  for  German  divisions  to  pour  through  on 
the  flank  of  the  sorely  pressed  Anglo-French  troops.  More- 
over, he  did  it,  as  Churchill  told  the  Commons  on  lune  4, 
“without  prior  consultation,  with  the  least  possible  notice, 
without  the  advice  of  his  ministers  and  upon  his  own 
personal  act.” 

Actually  he  did  it  against  the  unanimous  advice  of 
his  government,  which  he  was  constitutionally  sworn  to 
follow.  At  5 a.m.  on  May  25  there  was  a showdown  meet- 
ing at  the  King’s  headquarters  between  the  monarch  and 
three  members  of  the  cabinet,  including  the  Prime 
Minister  and  the  Foreign  Minister.  They  urged  him  for 
the  last  time  not  to  surrender  personally  and  become  a 
prisoner  of  the  Germans,  for  if  he  did  he  “would  be 
degraded  to  the  role  of  Hacha”  in  Prague.  They  also 
reminded  him  that  he  was  head  of  state  as  well  as  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  and  that  if  matters  came  to  the  worst 
he  could  exercise  his  first  office  in  exile,  as  the  Queen 
of  Holland  and  the  King  of  Norway  had  decided  to  do, 
until  eventual  Allied  victory  came. 

“I  have  decided  to  stay,”  Leopold  answered.  “The  cause 
of  the  Allies  is  lost.”  14 

At  5 p.m.  on  May  27  he  dispatched  General  Derousseaux, 
Deputy  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  to  the  Germans 
to  ask  for  a truce.  At  10  o’clock  the  General  brought  back 
the  German  terms:  “The  Fuehrer  demands  that  arms  be 
laid  down  unconditionally.”  The  King  accepted  uncon- 
ditional surrender  at  11  p.m.  and  proposed  that  fighting 
cease  at  4 a.m.,  which  it  did. 


961 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Leopold’s  capitulation  was  angrily  denounced  by  Pre- 
mier Reynaud  of  France  in  a violent  broadcast,  and  Bel- 
gian Premier  Pierlot,  also  broadcasting  from  Paris  but 
in  a more  dignified  tone,  informed  the  Belgian  people  that 
the  King  had  acted  against  the  unanimous  advice  of  the 
government,  broken  his  links  with  the  people  and  was 
no  longer  in  a position  to  govern,  and  that  the  Belgian 
government  in  exile  would  continue  the  struggle.  Church- 
ill when  he  spoke  in  the  House  on  May  28  reserved 
judgment  on  Leopold’s  action  but  on  June  4 joined  in  the 
general  criticism. 

The  controversy  raged  long  after  the  war  was  over. 
Leopold’s  defenders,  and  there  were  many  in  and  outside 
Belgium,  believed  that  he  had  done  the  right  and  honorable 
thing  in  sharing  the  fate  of  his  soldiers  and  of  the  Belgian 
people.  And  they  made  much  of  the  claim  that  the  King 
acted  not  as  chief  of  state  but  as  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Belgian  Army  in  surrendering. 

That  the  battered  Belgian  troops  were  in  desperate 
straits  by  May  27  there  is  no  dispute.  Valiantly  they  had 
agreed  to  extend  their  front  in  order  to  free  the  British  and 
French  to  fight  their  way  south.  And  that  extended  front 
was  fast  collapsing  though  the  Belgians  fought  doggedly. 
Also  Leopold  was  not  told  that  on  May  26  Lord  Gort  had 
received  orders  from  London  to  withdraw  to  Dunkirk 
and  save  what  he  could  of  the  B.E.F.  That  is  one  side  of 
the  argument,  but  there  is  another.  The  Belgian  Army 
was  under  the  over-all  Allied  Command  and  Leopold 
made  a separate  peace  without  consulting  it.  In  his  defense 
it  has  been  pointed  out  that  on  May  27  at  12:30  p.m.  he 
telegraphed  Gort  that  he  soon  would  “be  forced  to 
capitulate  to  avoid  a collapse.”  But  the  British  commander, 
who  was  extremely  busy  and  constantly  on  the  move,  did 
not  receive  it.  He  later  testified  that  he  first  heard  of  the 
surrender  only  shortly  after  1 1 p.m.  on  May  27  and  found 
himself  “suddenly  faced  with  an  open  gap  of  twenty  miles 
between  Ypres  and  the  sea  through  which  enemy  ar- 
mored forces  might  reach  the  beaches.” 16  To  General 
Weygand,  who  was  the  King’s  superior  military  com- 
mander, the  news  arrived  by  telegram  from  French 
liaison  at  Belgian  headquarters  a little  after  6 P.M.  and  it 
hit  him,  he  later  said,  “like  a bolt  out  of  the  blue.  There 
had  been  no  warning  . . 16 


962 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Finally,  even  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  armed 
forces,  Leopold  in  this  constitutional,  democratic  mon- 
archy was  bound  to  accept  the  advice  of  his  government. 
Neither  in  that  role  nor  certainly  as  chief  of  state  did  he 
have  the  authority  to  surrender  on  his  own.  In  the  end 
the  Belgian  people,  as  was  proper,  passed  judgment  on 
their  sovereign.  He  was  not  recalled  to  the  throne  from 
Switzerland,  where  he  took  refuge  at  the  war’s  end,  until 
five  years  after  it  was  over.  When  the  call  came,  on  July 
20,  1950,  after  57  per  cent  of  those  voting  in  a referendum 
had  approved  it,  his  return  provoked  such  a violent  re- 
action among  the  populace  that  civil  war  threatened  to 
break  out.  He  soon  abdicated  in  favor  of  his  son. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  Leopold’s  behavior,  there 
should  be  no  dispute — though  there  has  been* — about 
the  magnificent  way  his  Army  fought.  For  a few  days  in 
May  I followed  Reichenau’s  Sixth  Army  through  Bel- 
gium and  saw  for  myself  the  tenacity  with  which  the 
Belgians  struggled  against  insuperable  odds.  Not  once  did 
they  break  under  the  unmerciful  and  unopposed  bombing 
of  the  Luftwaffe  or  when  the  German  armor  tried  to 
cut  through  them.  This  could  not  be  said  of  certain  other 
Allied  troops  in  that  campaign.  The  Belgians  held  out 
for  eighteen  days  and  would  have  held  out  much  longer 
had  not  they,  like  the  B.E.F.  and  the  French  northern 
armies,  been  caught  in  a trap  which  was  not  of  their 
making. 


MIRACLE  AT  DUNKIRK 


Ever  since  May  20,  when  Guderian’s  tanks  broke  through 
to  Abbeville  on  the  sea,  the  British  Admiralty,  on  the 
personal  orders  of  Churchill,  had  been  rounding  up  ship- 
ping for  a possible  evacuation  of  the  B.E.F.  and  other 
Allied  forces  from  the  Channel  ports.  Noncombatant 
personnel  and  other  “useless  mouths”  began  to  be  ferried 
across  the  narrow  sea  to  England  at  once.  By  May  24, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Belgian  front  to  the  north  was 
near  collapse,  and  to  the  south  the  German  armor,  strik- 
ing  up  the  coast  from  Abbeville,  after  taking  Boulogne 


• u r.0rm  J a"10ns  others.  General  Sir  Alan  Brooke,  who  commanded  the  Brit- 
ish llnd  Corps  and  later  became  Field  Marshal  Lord  Alanbrooke,  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff.  See  Sir  Arthur  Bryant,  The  Turn  of  the  Tide. 
based  on  Alanbrooke's  diaries. 


963 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

and  enveloping  Calais,  had  reached  the  Aa  Canal  only 
twenty  miles  from  Dunkirk.  In  between  were  caught  the 
Belgian  Army,  the  nine  divisions  of  the  B.E.F.  and  ten 
divisions  of  the  French  First  Army.  Though  the  terrain 
on  the  southern  end  of  the  pocket  was  bad  tank  country, 
being  crisscrossed  with  canals,  ditches  and  flooded  areas, 
Guderian’s  and  Reinhardt’s  panzer  corps  already  had 
five  bridgeheads  across  the  main  barrier,  the  Aa  Canal, 
between  Gravelines  on  the  sea  and  St.-Omer,  and  were 
poised  for  the  knockout  blow  which  would  hammer  the 
Allied  armies  against  the  anvil  of  the  advancing  German 
Sixth  and  Eighteenth  armies  pushing  down  from  the 
northeast  and  utterly  destroy  them. 

Suddenly  on  the  evening  of  May  24  came  the  per- 
emptory order  from  the  High  Command,  issued  at  the 
insistence  of  Hitler  with  the  prompting  of  Rundstedt 
and  Goering  but  over  the  violent  objections  of  Brau- 
chitsch  and  Haider,  that  the  tank  forces  should  halt  on 
the  canal  line  and  attempt  no  further  advance.  This  fur- 
nished Lord  Gort  an  unexpected  and  vital  reprieve  which 
he  and  the  British  Navy  and  Air  Force  made  the  most  of 
and  which,  as  Rundstedt  later  perceived  and  said,  led 
“to  one  of  the  great  turning  points  of  the  war.” 

How  did  this  inexplicable  stop  order  on  the  threshold 
of  what  seemed  certain  to  be  the  greatest  German  victory 
of  the  campaign  come  about?  What  were  the  reasons  for 
it?  And  who  was  responsible?  The  questions  have  pro- 
voked one  of  the  greatest  arguments  of  the  war,  among 
the  German  generals  involved  and  among  the  historians. 
The  generals,  led  by  Rundstedt  and  Haider,  have  put  the 
blame  exclusively  on  Hitler.  Churchill  added  further 
fuel  to  the  controversy  in  the  second  volume  of  his  war 
memoirs  by  contending  that  the  initiative  for  the  order 
came  from  Rundstedt  and  not  Hitler  and  citing  as  evidence 
the  war  diaries  of  Rundstedt’s  own  headquarters.  In  the 
maze  of  conflicting  and  contradictory  testimony  it  has 
been  difficult  to  ascertain  the  facts.  In  the  course  of 
preparing  this  chapter  the  author  wrote  General  Haider 
himself  for  further  elucidation  and  promptly  received  a 
courteous  and  detailed  reply.  On  the  basis  of  this  and 
much  other  evidence  now  in,  certain  conclusions  may  be 
drawn  and  the  controversy  settled,  if  not  conclusively,  at 
least  fairly  convincingly. 


964 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

As  for  responsibility  for  the  famous  order,  Rundstedt, 
despite  his  later  assertions  to  the  contrary,  must  share 
it  with  Hitler.  The  Fuehrer  visited  the  General’s  Army 
Group  A headquarters  at  Charleville  on  the  morning 
of  May  24.  Rundstedt  proposed  that  the  panzer  divisions 
on  the  canal  line  before  Dunkirk  be  halted  until  more 
infantry  could  be  brought  up.*  Hitler  agreed,  observing 
that  the  armor  should  be  conserved  for  later  operations 
against  the  French  south  of  the  Somme.  Moreover,  he 
declared  that  if  the  pocket  in  which  the  Allies  were  en- 
trapped became  too  small  it  would  hamper  the  activities 
of  the  Luftwaffe.  Probably  Rundstedt,  with  the  approval 
of  the  Fuehrer,  issued  the  stop  order  at  once,  for  Churchill 
notes  that  the  B.E.F.  intercepted  a German  radio  message 
giving  orders  to  that  effect  at  11:42  that  morning.17  Hitler 
and  Rundstedt  were  at  that  moment  in  conference. 

At  any  rate,  that  evening  Hitler  issued  the  formal  order 
from  OKW,  both  Jodi  and  Haider  noting  it  in  their  diaries. 
The  General  Staff  Chief  was  most  unhappy. 

Our  left  wing,  consisting  of  armor  and  motorized  forces 
[he  wrote  in  his  diary],  will  thus  be  stopped  dead  in  its 
tracks  on  the  direct  orders  of  the  Fuehrer!  Finishing  off 
the  encircled  enemy  army  is  to  be  left  to  the  Air  Force! 

This  exclamation  mark  of  contempt  indicates  that  Goer- 
ing  had  intervened  with  Hitler,  and  it  is  now  known  that 
he  did.  He  offered  to  liquidate  the  entrapped  enemy  troops 

* This  fact,  established  from  the  records  of  Rundstedt’s  own  headquarters, 
did  not  prevent  the  General  from  making  several  statements  after  the  war 
which  put  the  blame  entirely  on  Hitler.  “If  I had  had  my  way,”  he  told 
Major  Milton  Shulman,  a Canadian  intelligence  officer,  “the  English  would 
not  have  got  off  so  lightly  at  Dunkirk:  But  my  hands  were  tied  by  direct 
orders  from  Hitler  himself.  While  the  English  were  clambering  into  the 
ships  off  the  beaches,  1 was  kept  uselessly  outside  the  port  unable  to  move 
. . . I sat  outside  the  town,  watching  the  English  escape,  while  my  tanks 
and  infantry  were  prohibited  from  moving.  This  incredible  blunder  was  due 
to  Hitler’s  personal  idea  of  generalship.”  (Shulman,  Defeat  in  the  West, 
pp.  42-43.) 

To  a commission  of  the  International  Military  Tribunal  at  Nuremberg 
on  June  20,  1946  (mimeographed  transcript,  p.  1490),  Rundstedt  added: 

That  was  a very  big  mistake  of  the  Commander  . . . How  angry  we 
leaders  were  at  that  time  is  indescribable.”  Rundstedt  made  similar  declara- 
tions to  Liddell  Hart  ( The  German  Generals  Talk,  pp.  112-13)  and  to  the 
Nuremberg  Military  Tribunal  in  the  trial  of  United  States  v.  Leeb  (pp. 
3350—53,  3931—32,  of  the  mimeographed  transcript). 

Telford  Taylor  in  The  March  of  Conquest  and  Major  L.  F.  Ellis  in  The 
War  » n France  and  Flanders,  1939-40  have  analyzed  the  German  Army 
records  of  the  incident  and  drawn  conclusions  that  somewhat  differ.  Ellis’ 
book  is  the  official  British  account  of  the  campaign  and  contains  both  British 
and  German  documents.  Taylor,  who  spent  four  years  as  an  American 
prosecutor  at  the  Nuremberg  trials,  is  an  authority  on  the  German  documents. 


965 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

with  his  Air  Force  alone!  The  reasons  for  his  ambitious 
and  vain  proposal  were  given  the  writer  in  the  letter 
from  Haider  on  July  19,  1957. 

During  the  following  days  [i.e.,  after  May  24]  it  became 
known  that  Hitler’s  decision  was  mainly  influenced  by 
Goering.  To  the  dictator  the  rapid  movement  of  the  Army, 
whose  risks  and  prospects  of  success  he  did  not  understand 
because  of  his  lack  of  military  schooling,  became  almost 
sinister.  He  was  constantly  oppressed  by  a feeling  of  anx- 
iety that  a reversal  loomed  . . . 

Goering,  who  knew  his  Fuehrer  well,  took  advantage  of 
this  anxiety.  He  offered  to  fight  the  rest  of  the  great  battle 
of  encirclement  alone  with  his  Luftwaffe,  thus  eliminating 
the  risk  of  having  to  use  the  valuable  panzer  formations. 
He  made  this  proposal  ...  for  a reason  which  was  char- 
acteristic of  the  unscrupulously  ambitious  Goering.  He  wanted 
to  secure  for  his  Air  Force,  after  the  surprisingly  smooth  opera- 
tions of  the  Army  up  to  then,  the  decisive  final  act  in 
the  great  battle  and  thus  gain  the  glory  of  success  before 
the  whole  world. 

General  Haider  then  tells  in  his  letter  of  an  account 
given  him  by  Brauchitsch  after  a talk  which  the  latter  had 
with  the  Luftwaffe  Generals  Milch  and  Kesselring  in 
Nuremberg  jail  in  January  1946,  in  which  the  Air  Force 
officers  declared 

that  Goering  at  that  time  [May  1940]  emphasized  to  Hitler 
that  if  the  great  victory  in  battle  then  developing  could  be 
claimed  exclusively  by  the  Army  generals,  the  prestige  of  the 
Fuehrer  in  the  German  homeland  would  be  damaged  beyond 
repair.  That  could  be  prevented  only  if  the  Luftwaffe  and 
not  the  Army  carried  out  the  decisive  battle. 

It  is  fairly  clear,  then,  that  Hitler’s  idea,  prompted  by 
Goering  and  Rundstedt  but  strenuously  opposed  by  Brau- 
chitsch and  Haider,  was  to  let  the  Air  Force  and  Bock’s 
Army  Group  B,  which,  without  any  armor  to  speak  of, 
was  slowly  driving  back  the  Belgians  and  British  south- 
west to  the  Channel,  mop  up  the  enemy  troops  in  the 
pocket.  Rundstedt’s  Army  Group  A,  with  some  seven  tank 
divisions,  halted  on  the  water  lines  west  and  south  of 
Dunkirk,  would  merely  stand  pat  and  keep  the  enemy 
hemmed  in.  But  neither  the  Luftwaffe  nor  Bock’s  army 
group  proved  able  to  achieve  their  objectives.  On  the 
morning  of  May  26,  Haider  was  fuming  in  his  diary  that 


966 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“these  orders  from  the  top  just  make  no  sense  . . . The 
tanks  are  stopped  as  if  they  were  paralyzed.” 

Finally,  on  the  evening  of  May  26,  Hitler  rescinded  the 
stop  order  and  agreed  that,  in  view  of  Bock’s  slow  advance 
in  Belgium  and  the  movement  of  transports  off  the  coast, 
the  armored  forces  could  resume  their  advance  on  Dun- 
kirk. By  then  it  was  late;  the  cornered  enemy  had  had 
time  to  strengthen  his  defenses  and  behind  them  was 
beginning  to  slip  away  to  sea. 

We  now  know  that  there  were  political  reasons  too  for 
Hitler’s  fatal  order.  Haider  had  noted  in  his  diary  on  May 
25,  a day,  he  says,  that  started  “off  with  one  of  those 
painful  wrangles  between  Brauchitsch  and  the  Fuehrer 
on  the  next  moves  in  the  battle  of  encirclement,”  that 

now  political  command  has  formed  the  fixed  idea  that  the 
battle  of  decision  must  not  be  fought  on  Flemish  soil,  but 
rather  in  northern  France. 

This  entry  puzzled  me  and  when  I wrote  to  the  former 
General  Staff  Chief  1 asked  him  if  he  could  recall  Hitler’s 
political  reasons  for  wanting  to  finish  this  battle  in  northern 
France  rather  than  in  Belgium.  Haider  recalled  them 
very  well.  “According  to  my  still  quite  lively  memory,” 
he  replied,  “Hitler,  in  our  talks  at  the  time,  supported 
his  reasons  for  the  stop  order  with  two  main  lines  of 
thought.  The  first  were  military  reasons:  the  unsuitable 
nature  of  the  terrain  for  tanks,  the  resulting  high  losses 
which  would  weaken  the  impending  attack  on  the  rest 
of  France,  and  so  on.”  Then,  writes  Haider,  the  Fuehrer 
cited 

a second  reason  which  he  knew  that  we,  as  soldiers,  could 
not  argue  against  since  it  was  political  and  not  military. 

This  second  reason  was  that  for  political  reasons  he  did 
not  want  the  decisive  final  battle,  which  inevitably  would 
cause  great  damage  to  the  population,  to  take  place  in  terri- 
tory inhabited  by  the  Flemish  people.  He  had  the  intention, 
he  said,  of  making  an  independent  National  Socialist  region 
out  of  the  territory  inhabited  by  the  German-descended 
Flemish,  thereby  binding  them  close  to  Germany.  His  sup- 
porters on  Flemish  soil  had  been  active  in  this  direction  for 
a long  time;  he  had  promised  them  to  keep  their  land  free 
from  the  damage  of  war.  If  he  did  not  keep  this  promise 
now,  their  confidence  in  him  would  be  severely  damaged. 
That  would  be  a political  disadvantage  for  Germany  which  he, 
as  the  politically  responsible  leader,  must  avoid. 


967 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Absurd?  If  this  seems  to  be  another  of  Hitler’s  sudden 
aberrations  (Haider  writes  that  he  and  Brauchitsch  were 
“not  convinced  by  this  reasoning”) , other  political  consid- 
erations which  he  confided  to  other  generals  were  more 
sane — and  important.  Describing  after  the  war  Hitler’s 
meeting  with  Rundstedt  on  May  24,  General  Guenther 
Blumentritt,  the  latter’s  chief  of  operations,  told  Liddell 
Hart,  the  British  military  writer: 

Hitler  was  in  very  good  humor  . . . and  gave  us  his 
opinion  that  the  war  would  be  finished  in  six  weeks.  After 
that  he  wished  to  conclude  a reasonable  peace  with  France 
and  then  the  way  would  be  free  for  an  agreement  with 
Britain  . . . 

He  then  astonished  us  by  speaking  with  admiration  of  the 
British  Empire,  of  the  necessity  for  its  existence,  and  of  the 
civilization  that  Britain  had  brought  into  the  world  ...  He 
said  that  all  he  wanted  from  Britain  was  that  she  should 
acknowledge  Germany’s  position  on  the  continent.  The  re- 
turn of  Germany’s  colonies  would  be  desirable  but  not  es- 
sential ...  He  concluded  by  saying  that  his  aim  was  to  make 
peace  with  Britain  on  a basis  that  she  would  regard  as 
compatible  with  her  honor  to  accept.18 

Such  thoughts  Hitler  was  to  express  often  during  the 
next  few  weeks  to  his  generals,  to  Ciano  and  Mussolini 
and  finally  in  public.  Ciano  was  astonished  a month  later 
to  find  the  Nazi  dictator,  then  at  the  zenith  of  his  success, 
harping  about  the  importance  of  maintaining  the  British 
Empire  as  “a  factor  in  world  equilibrium,” 19  and  on 
July  13  Haider,  in  his  diary,  described  the  Fuehrer  as 
sorely  puzzled  over  Britain’s  failure  to  accept  peace.  To 
bring  England  to  her  knees  by  force,  he  told  his  generals 
that  day,  “would  not  benefit  Germany  . . . only  Japan, 
the  United  States  and  others.” 

It  may  be,  then,  though  some  doubt  it,  that  Hitler  re- 
strained his  armored  forces  before  Dunkirk  in  order  to 
spare  Britain  a bitter  humiliation  and  thereby  facilitate 
a peace  settlement.  It  would  have  to  be,  as  he  said,  a 
peace  in  which  the  British  left  Germany  free  to  turn 
once  more  eastward,  this  time  against  Russia,  London 
would  have  to  recognize,  as  he  also  said,  the  Third 
Reich’s  domination  of  the  Continent.  For  the  next 
couple  of  months  Hitler  would  be  confident  that  such  a 
peace  was  within  his  grasp.  No  more  now  than  in  all 


968  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  years  before  did  he  comprehend  the  character  of  the 
British  nation  or  the  kind  of  world  its  leaders  and  its 
people  were  determined  to  fight  for — to  the  end. 

Nor  did  he  and  his  generals,  ignorant  of  the  sea  as 
they  were — and  remained — dream  that  the  sea-minded 
British  could  evacuate  a third  of  a million  men  from  a 
small  battered  port  and  from  the  exposed  beaches  right 
under  their  noses. 

At  three  minutes  before  seven  on  the  evening  of  May 

26,  shortly  after  Hitler’s  stop  order  had  been  canceled, 
the  British  Admiralty  signaled  the  beginning  of  “Opera- 
tion Dynamo,”  as  the  Dunkirk  evacuation  was  called. 
That  night  the  German  armor  resumed  its  attack  on  the 
port  from  the  west  and  south,  but  now  the  panzers  found 
it  hard  going.  Lord  Gort  had  had  time  to  deploy  against 
them  three  infantry  divisions  with  heavy  artillery  support. 
The  tanks  made  little  progress.  In  the  meantime  the 
evacuation  began.  An  armada  of  850  vessels  of  all  sizes, 
shapes  and  methods  of  propulsion,  from  cruisers  and 
destroyers  to  small  sailboats  and  Dutch  skoots,  many  of 
them  manned  by  civilian  volunteers  from  the  English 
coastal  towns,  converged  on  Dunkirk.  The  first  day,  May 

27,  they  took  off  7,669  troops;  the  next  day,  17,804;  the 
following  day,  47,310;  and  on  May  30,  53,823,  for  a 
total  of  126,606  during  the  first  four  days.  This  was  far 
more  than  the  Admiralty  had  hoped  to  get  out.  When 
the  operation  began  it  counted  on  evacuating  only  about 
45,000  men  in  the  two  days’  time  it  then  thought  it  would 
have. 

It  was  not  until  this  fourth  day  of  Operation  Dynamo, 
on  May  30,  that  the  German  High  Command  woke  up  to 
what  was  happening.  For  four  days  the  communiques 
of  OKW  had  been  reiterating  that  the  encircled  enemy 
armies  were  doomed.  A communique  of  May  29,  which 
I noted  in  my  diary,  stated  flatly:  “The  fate  of  the  French 
army  in  Artois  is  sealed  . . . The  British  army,  which 
has  been  compressed  into  the  territory  . . . around 
Dunkirk,  is  also  going  to  its  destruction  before  our  con- 
centric attack.” 

But  it  wasn’t;  it  was  going  to  sea.  Without  its  heavy 
arms  and  equipment,  to  be  sure,  but  with  the  certainty 
that  the  men  would  live  to  fight  another  day. 

As  late  as  the  morning  of  May  30,  Haider  confided 


969 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

confidentially  in  his  diary  that  “the  disintegration  of  the 
enemy  which  we  have  encircled  continues.”  Some  of 
the  British,  he  conceded,  were  “fighting  with  tooth  and 
nail:”  the  others  were  “fleeing  to  the  coast  and  trying  to 
get  across  the  Channel  on  anything  that  floats.  Le  De- 
bacle,” he  concluded,  alluding  to  Zola’s  famous  novel  of 
the  French  collapse  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War. 

By  afternoon,  after  a session  with  Brauchitsch,  the 
General  Staff  Chief  had  awakened  to  the  significance 
of  the  swarms  of  miserable  little  boats  on  which  the 
British  were  fleeing. 

Brauchitsch  is  angry  . . . The  pocket  would  have  been 
closed  at  the  coast  if  only  our  armor  had  not  been  held  back. 
The  bad  weather  has  grounded  the  Luftwaffe  and  we  must 
now  stand  by  and  watch  countless  thousands  of  the  enemy 
get  away  to  England  right  under  our  noses. 

That  was,  in  fact,  what  they  watched.  Despite  increased 
pressure  which  was  immediately  applied  by  the  Germans 
on  all  sides  of  the  pocket,  the  British  lines  held  and  more 
troops  were  evacuated.  The  next  day.  May  31,  was  the 
biggest  day  of  all.  Some  68,000  men  were  embarked  for 
England,  a third  of  them  from  the  beaches,  the  rest  from 
the  Dunkirk  harbor.  A total  of  194,620  men  had  now  been 
taken  out,  more  than  four  times  the  number  originally 
hoped  for. 

Where  was  the  famed  Luftwaffe?  Part  of  the  time,  as 
Haider  noted,  it  was  grounded  by  bad  weather.  The  rest  of 
the  time  it  encountered  unexpected  opposition  from  the 
Royal  Air  Force,  which  from  bases  just  across  the  Channel 
successfully  challenged  it  for  the  first  time.*  Though 
outnumbered,  the  new  British  Spitfires  proved  more  than 
a match  for  the  Messerschmitts  and  they  mowed  down 
the  cumbersome  German  bombers.  On  a few  occasions 
Goering’s  planes  arrived  over  Dunkirk  between  British 
sorties  and  did  such  extensive  damage  to  the  port  that 
for  a time  it  was  unusable  and  the  troops  had  to  be  lifted 

* A good  many  of  the  exhausted  Tommies  on  the  beaches,  who  underwent 
severe  bombings,  were  not  aware  of  this,  since  the  air  clashes  were  often 
above  the  clouds  or  some  distance  away.  They  knew  only  that  they  had  been 
bombed  and  strafed  all  the  way  back  from  eastern  Belgium  to  Dunkirk,  and 
they  felt  their  Air  Force  had  let  them  down.  When  they  reached  the  home 
ports  some  of  them  insulted  men  in  the  blue  R.A.F.  uniforms.  Churchill 
was  much  aggrieved  at  this  and  went  out  of  his  way  to  put  them  right  when 
he  spoke  in  the  House  on  June  4.  The  deliverance  at  Dunkirk,  he  said,  “was 
gained  by  the  Air  Force.” 


970 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

exclusively  from  the  beaches.  The  Luftwaffe  also  pressed 
several  strong  attacks  on  the  shipping  and  accounted 
for  most  of  the  243 — out  of  861 — vessels  sunk.  But  it  failed 
to  achieve  what  Goering  had  promised  Hitler:  the  an- 
nihilation of  the  B.E.F.  On  June  1,  when  it  carried  out 
its  heaviest  attack  (and  suffered  its  heaviest  losses — 
each  side  lost  thirty  planes),  sinking  three  British  de- 
stroyers and  a number  of  small  transports,  the  second- 
highest  day’s  total  was  evacuated — 64,429  men.  By  dawn 
of  the  next  day,  only  4,000  British  troops  remained  in 
the  perimeter,  protected  by  100,000  French  who  now 
manned  the  defenses. 

Medium  German  artillery  had  in  the  meantime  come 
within  range  and  daytime  evacuation  operations  had  to 
be  abandoned.  The  Luftwaffe  at  that  time  did  not  operate 
after  dark  and  during  the  nights  of  June  2 and  3 the  re- 
mainder of  the  B.E.F.  and  60,000  French  troops  were 
successfully  brought  out.  Dunkirk,  still  defended  stub- 
bornly by  40,000  French  soldiers,  held  out  until  the 
morning  of  June  4.  By  that  day  338,226  British  and 
French  soldiers  had  escaped  the  German  clutches.  They 
were  no  longer  an  army;  most  of  them,  understandably, 
were  for  the  moment  in  a pitiful  shape.  But  they  were 
battle-tried;  they  knew  that  if  properly  armed  and 
adequately  covered  from  the  air  they  could  stand  up  to 
the  Germans.  Most  of  them,  when  the  balance  in  arma- 
ment was  achieved,  would  prove  it — and  on  beaches  not 
far  down  the  Channel  coast  from  where  they  had  been 
rescued. 

A deliverance  Dunkirk  was  to  the  British.  But  Churchill 
reminded  them  in  the  House  on  June  4 that  “wars  are 
not  won  by  evacuations.”  The  predicament  of  Great  Brit- 
ain was  indeed  grim,  more  dangerous  than  it  had  been 
smce  the  Norman  landings  nearly  a millennium  before. 
It  had  no  army  to  defend  the  islands.  The  Air  Force  had 
been  greatly  weakened  in  France.  Only  the  Navy  re- 
mained, and  the  Norwegian  campaign  had  shown  how 
vulnerable  the  big  fighting  ships  were  to  land-based  air- 
craft. Now  the  Luftwaffe  bombers  were  based  but  five  or 
ten  minutes  away  across  the  narrow  Channel.  France,  to 
be  sure,  still  held  out  below  the  Somme  and  the  Aisne. 
But  its  best  troops  and  armament  had  been  lost  in 
Belgium  and  in  northern  France,  its  small  and  obsolescent 


971 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Air  Force  had  been  largely  destroyed,  and  its  two  most 
illustrious  generals,  Marshal  Petain  and  General  Wey- 
gand,  who  now  began  to  dominate  the  shaky  govern- 
ment, had  no  more  stomach  for  battle  against  such  a 
superior  foe. 

These  dismal  facts  were  very  much  on  the  mind  of 
Winston  Churchill  when  he  rose  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons on  June  4,  1940,  while  the  last  transports  from 
Dunkirk  were  being  unloaded,  determined,  as  he  wrote 
later,  to  show  not  only  his  own  people  but  the  world — 
and  especially  the  U.S.A. — “that  our  resolve  to  fight  on 
was  based  on  serious  grounds.”  It  was  on  this  occasion 
that  he  uttered  his  famous  peroration,  which  will  be  long 
remembered  and  will  surely  rank  with  the  greatest  ever 
made  down  the  ages: 

Even  though  large  tracts  of  Europe  and  many  old  and 
famous  States  have  fallen  or  may  fall  into  the  grip  of  the 
Gestapo  and  all  the  odious  apparatus  of  Nazi  rule,  we  shall 

not  flag  or  fail.  We  shall  go  on  to  the  end,  we  shall  fight 

in  France,  we  shall  fight  in  the  seas  and  oceans,  we  shall 
fight  with  growing  confidence  and  growing  strength  in  the 
air,  we  shall  defend  our  island,  whatever  the  cost  may  be, 

we  shall  fight  on  the  beaches,  we  shall  fight  on  the 

landing  grounds,  we  shall  fight  in  the  fields  and  in  the 
streets,  we  shall  fight  in  the  hills;  we  shall  never  surrender, 
and  even  if,  which  I do  not  for  a moment  believe,  this 
island  or  a large  part  of  it  were  subjugated  and  starving, 
then  our  Empire  beyond  the  seas,  armed  and  guarded  by 
the  British  Fleet,  would  carry  on  the  struggle,  until,  in 
God’s  good  time,  the  New  World,  with  all  its  power  and 
might,  steps  forth  to  the  rescue  and  the  liberation  of  the 
Old. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  FRANCE 

The  determination  of  the  British  to  fight  on  does  not 
seem  to  have  troubled  Hitler’s  thoughts.  He  was  sure  they 
would  see  the  light  after  he  had  finished  off  France,  which 
he  now  proceeded  to  do.  The  morning  after  Dunkirk  fell, 
on  June  5,  the  Germans  launched  a massive  assault  on  the 
Somme  and  soon  they  were  attacking  in  overwhelming 
strength  all  along  a 400-mile  front  that  stretched  across 
France  from  Abbeville  to  the  Upper  Rhine.  The  French 
were  doomed.  Against  143  German  divisions,  including 


972 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ten  armored,  they  could  deploy  only  65  divisions,  most  of 
them  second-rate,  for  the  best  units  and  most  of  the 
armor  had  been  expended  in  Belgium.  Little  was  left  of 
the  weak  French  Air  Force.  The  British  could  contribute 
but  one  infantry  division,  which  had  been  in  the  Saar, 
and  parts  of  an  armored  division.  The  R.A.F.  could 
spare  few  planes  for  this  battle  unless  it  were  to  leave 
the  British  Isles  themselves  defenseless.  Finally,  the 
French  High  Command,  now  dominated  by  Petain  and 
Weygand,  had  become  sodden  with  defeatism.  Neverthe- 
less some  French  units  fought  with  great  bravery  and 
tenacity,  temporarily  stopping  even  the  German  armor 
here  and  there,  and  standing  up  resolutely  to  the  inces- 
sant pounding  of  the  Luftwaffe. 

But  it  was  an  unequal  struggle.  In  “victorious  confu- 
sion,” as  Telford  Taylor  has  aptly  put  it,  the  German 
troops  surged  across  France  like  a tidal  wave,  the  confu- 
sion coming  because  there  were  so  many  of  them  and 
they  were  moving  so  fast  and  often  getting  in  each  other’s 
way.20  On  June  10  the  French  government  hastily  de- 
parted Paris  and  on  June  14  the  great  city,  the  glory  of 
France,  which  was  undefended,  was  occupied  by  General 
von  Kuechler’s  Eighteenth  Army.  The  swastika  was  im- 
mediately hoisted  on  the  Eiffel  Tower.  On  June  16, 
Premier  Reynaud,  whose  government  had  fled  to  Bor- 
deaux, resigned  and  was  replaced  by  Petain,  who  the  next 
day  asked  the  Germans,  through  the  Spanish  ambassador, 
for  an  armistice.*  Hitler  replied  the  same  day  that  he 
would  first  have  to  consult  his  ally,  Mussolini.  For  this 

* On  this  day,  June  17,  1940,  the  exiled  Kaiser  sent  from  Doorn,  in  oc- 
cupied  Holland,  a telegram  of  congratulations  to  Hitler,  whom  he  had  for 
so  long  scorned  as  a vulgar  upstart.  It  was  found  among  the  captured  Nazi 
papers. 

Under  the  deeply  moving  impression  of  the  capitulation  of  France  I 
congratulate  you  and  the  whole  German  Wehrmacht  on  the  mighty  vic- 
tory granted  by  God,  in  the  words  of  the  Emperor  Wilhelm  the  Great  in 
1870:  “What  a turn  of  events  brought  about  by  divine  dispensation.” 

In  all  German  hearts  there  echoes  the  Leuthen  chorale  sung  by  the 
victors  of  Leuthen,  the  soldiers  of  the  Great  King:  “Now  thank  we  all 
our  God!” 

Hitler,  who  believed  that  the  mighty  victory  was  due  more  to  himself 
than  to  God,  drafted  a restrained  reply,  but  whether  it  was  ever  sent  is  not 
indicated  in  the  documents.21 

The  Fuehrer  had  been  furious  a little  earlier  when  he  learned  that  a 
German  unit  which  overran  Doom  had  posted  a guard  of  honor  around  the 
exiled  Emperor’s  residence.  Hitler  ordered  the  guard  removed  and  Doom 
posted  as  out  of  bounds  to  all  German  soldiers.  Wilhelm  II  died  at  Doorn 
on  June  4,  1941,  and  was  buried  there.  His  death,  Hassell  noted  in  his 
diary  (p.  200),  “went  almost  unnoticed”  in  Germany.  Hitler  and  Goebbels 
saw  to  that. 


973 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

strutting  warrior,  after  making  sure  that  the  French  armies 
were  hopelessly  beaten,  had,  like  a jackal,  hopped  into  the 
war  on  June  10,  to  try  to  get  in  on  the  spoils. 

THE  DUCE  PLUNGES  HIS  SMALL  DAGGER 
INTO  FRANCE’S  BACK 

Despite  his  preoccupation  with  the  unfolding  of  the 
Battle  of  the  West,  Hitler  had  found  time  to  write  Musso- 
lini at  surprisingly  frequent  intervals,  keeping  him  in- 
formed of  the  mounting  German  victories. 

After  the  first  letter  on  May  7,  apprising  the  Duce  that 
he  was  attacking  Belgium  and  Holland  “to  ensure  their 
neutrality”  and  saying  he  would  keep  his  friend  in- 
formed of  his  progress  so  that  the  Duce  could  make  his 
own  decisions  in  time,  there  were  further  ones  on  May 
13,  18  and  25,  each  more  detailed  and  enthusiastic  than 
the  other.22  Though  the  generals,  as  Haider’s  diary  con- 
firms, couldn’t  have  cared  less  what  Italy  did — whether 
it  came  into  the  war  or  not — the  Fuehrer  for  some  reason 
attached  importance  to  Italian  intervention.  As  soon  as 
the  Netherlands  and  Belgium  had  surrendered  and  the 
Anglo-French  northern  armies  had  been  smashed  and  the 
surviving  British  troops  began  taking  to  the  boats  at 
Dunkirk,  Mussolini  decided  to  slither  into  the  war.  He 
informed  Hitler  by  letter  on  May  30  that  the  date  would 
be  June  5.  Hitler  replied  immediately  that  he  was  “most 
profoundly  moved.” 

If  there  could  still  be  anything  which  could  strengthen 
my  unshakable  belief  in  the  victorious  outcome  of  this  war 
[Hitler  wrote  on  May  31]  it  was  your  statement  . . . 
The  mere  fact  of  your  entering  the  war  is  an  element  cal- 
culated to  deal  the  front  of  our  enemies  a staggering  blow. 

The  Fuehrer  asked  his  ally,  however,  to  postpone  his 
date  for  three  days — he  wanted  to  knock  out  the  rest  of 
the  French  Air  Force  first,  he  said — and  Mussolini  ob- 
liged by  setting  it  back  five  days,  to  June  10.  Hostilities, 
the  Duce  said,  would  begin  the  following  day. 

They  did  not  amount  to  much.  By  June  18,  when  Hitler 
summoned  his  junior  partner  to  Munich  to  discuss  an 
armistice  with  France,  some  thirty-two  Italian  divisions, 
after  a week  of  “fighting,”  had  been  unable  to  budge  a 
scanty  French  force  of  six  divisions  on  the  Alpine  front 


974 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


and  farther  south  along  the  Riviera,  though  the  defend- 
ers were  now  threatened  by  assault  in  the  rear  from  the 
Germans  sweeping  down  the  Rhone  Valley.*  On  June  21 
Ciano  noted  in  his  diary: 

Mussolini  is  quite  humiliated  because  our  troops  have 
not  moved  a step  forward.  Even  today  they  have  not  suc- 
ceeded in  advancing  and  have  halted  in  front  of  the  first 
French  fortification  which  put  up  some  resistance.23 

The  hollowness  of  Mussolini’s  boasted  military  might 
was  exposed  at  the  very  beginning  and  this  put  the  de- 
flated Italian  dictator  in  a dour  mood  as  he  and  Ciano 
set  out  by  train  on  the  evening  of  June  17  to  confer  with 
Hitler  about  the  armistice  with  France. 

Mussolini  dissatisfied  [Ciano  wrote  in  his  diary].  This 
sudden  peace  disquiets  him.  During  the  trip  we  speak  at 
length  in  order  to  clarify  conditions  under  which  the  ar- 
mistice is  to  be  granted  to  the  French.  The  Duce  . . . would 
like  to  go  so  far  as  the  total  occupation  of  French  terri- 
tory and  demands  the  surrender  of  the  French  fleet.  But  he 
is  aware  that  his  opinion  has  only  a consultative  value.  The 
war  has  been  won  by  Hitler  without  any  active  military 
participation  on  the  part  of  Italy,  and  it  is  Hitler  who  will 
have  the  last  word.  This  naturally  disturbs  and  saddens  Mus- 
solini. 

The  mildness  of  the  Fuehrer’s  “last  word”  came  as  a 
distinct  shock  to  the  Italians  when  they  conferred  with 
the  Nazi  warlord  at  the  Fuehrerhaus  at  Munich  where 
Chamberlain  and  Daladier  had  been  so  accommodating 
to  the  two  dictators  regarding  Czechoslovakia  less  than 
two  years  before.  The  secret  German  memorandum  of  the 
meeting  24  makes  clear  that  Hitler  was  determined  above 
all  not  to  allow  the  French  fleet  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  British.  He  was  also  concerned  lest  the  French  gov- 
ernment flee  to  North  Africa  or  to  London  and  continue 
the  war.  For  that  reason  the  armistice  terms — the  final 
terms  of  peace  might  be  something  else — would  have  to 
be  moderate,  designed  to  keep  “a  French  government 
functioning  on  French  soil”  and  “the  French  fleet  neu- 

* The  defeatist  French  High  Command  forbade  any  offensive  action  against 
Italy.  On  June  14  a French  naval  squadron  bombarded  factories,  oil  tanks 
and  refineries  near  Genoa,  but  Admiral  Darlan  prohibited  any  further  action 
of  this  kind.  When  the  R.A.F.  tried  to  send  bombers  from  the  airfield  at 
Marseilles  to  attack  Milan  and  Turin  the  French  drove  trucks  onto  the  field 
and  prevented  the  planes  from  taking  off. 


975 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

tralized.”  He  abruptly  dismissed  Mussolini’s  demands  for 
the  Italian  occupation  of  the  Rhone  Valley,  including 
Toulon  (the  great  French  Mediterranean  naval  base, 
where  most  of  the  fleet  was  concentrated)  and  Marseilles, 
and  the  disarmament  of  Corsica,  Tunisia  and  Djibouti. 
The  last  town,  the  gateway  to  Italian-held  Ethiopia,  was 
thrown  in  by  Ciano,  the  German  notes  say,  “in  an  under- 
tone.” 

Even  the  bellicose  Ribbentrop,  Ciano  found,  was  “ex- 
ceptionally moderate  and  calm,  and  in  favor  of  peace.” 
The  warrior  Mussolini  was  “very  much  embarrassed,”  his 
son-in-law  noted. 

He  feels  that  his  role  is  secondary  ...  In  truth,  the 
Duce  fears  that  the  hour  of  peace  is  growing  near  and  sees 
fading  once  again  that  unattainable  dream  of  his  life:  glory 
on  the  field  of  battle.25 

Mussolini  was  unable  even  to  get  Hitler  to  agree  to 
joint  armistice  negotiations  with  the  French.  The  Fueh- 
rer was  not  going  to  share  his  triumph  at  a very  historic 
spot  (he  declined  to  name  it  to  his  friend)  with  this 
lohnny-come-lately.  But  he  promised  the  Duce  that  his 
armistice  with  France  would  not  come  into  effect  until 
the  French  had  also  signed  one  with  Italy. 

Mussolini  left  Munich  bitter  and  frustrated,  but  Ciano 
had  been  very  favorably  impressed  by  a side  of  Hitler 
which  his  diaries  make  clear  he  had  not  previously  seen 
or  suspected. 

From  all  that  he  [Hitler]  says  [he  wrote  in  his  diary 
as  they  returned  to  Rome]  it  is  clear  that  he  wants  to  act 
quickly  to  end  it  all.  Hitler  is  now  the  gambler,  who  has 
made  a big  scoop  and  would  like  to  get  up  from  the  table, 
risking  nothing  more.  Today  he  speaks  with  a reserve  and  a 
perspicacity  which,  after  such  a victory,  are  really  astonish- 
ing. I cannot  be  accused  of  excessive  tenderness  toward 
him,  but  today  I truly  admire  him.26 

THE  SECOND  ARMISTICE  AT  COMPIEGNE 

I followed  the  German  Army  into  Paris  that  June,  al- 
ways the  loveliest  of  months  in  the  majestic  capital, 
which  was  now  stricken,  and  on  June  19  got  wind  of 
where  Hitler  was  going  to  lay  down  his  terms  for  the 
armistice  which  Petain  had  requested  two  days  before. 


976 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

It  was  to  be  on  the  same  spot  where  the  German  Empire 
had  capitulated  to  France  and  her  allies  on  November  11, 
1918:  in  the  little  clearing  in  the  woods  at  Compiegne. 
There  the  Nazi  warlord  would  get  his  revenge,  and  the 
place  itself  would  add  to  the  sweetness  of  it  for  him.  On 
May  20,  a bare  ten  days  after  the  great  offensive  in  the 
West  had  started  and  on  the  day  the  German  tanks 
reached  Abbeville,  the  idea  had  come  to  him.  Jodi  noted 
it  in  his  diary  that  day:  “Fuehrer  is  working  on  the  peace 
treaty  . . . First  negotiations  in  the  Forest  of  Compiegne.” 
Late  on  the  afternoon  of  June  19  I drove  out  there  and 
found  German  Army  engineers  demolishing  the  wall  of 
the  museum  where  the  old  wagon-lit  of  Marshal  Foch,  in 
which  the  1918  armistice  was  signed,  had  been  preserved. 
By  the  time  I left,  the  engineers,  working  with  pneumatic 
drills,  had  torn  the  wall  down  and  were  pulling  the  car 
out  to  the  tracks  in  the  center  of  the  clearing  on  the  exact 
spot,  they  said,  where  it  had  stood  at  5 a.m.  on  November 
II,  1918,  when  at  the  dictation  of  Foch  the  German  emis- 
saries put  their  signatures  to  the  armistice. 

And  so  it  was  that  on  the  afternoon  of  June  21  I stood 
by  the  edge  of  the  forest  at  Compiegne  to  observe  the 
latest  and  greatest  of  Hitler’s  triumphs,  of  which,  in  the 
course  of  my  work,  I had  seen  so  many  over  the  last 
turbulent  years.  It  was  one  of  the  loveliest  summer  days 
I ever  remember  in  France.  A warm  June  sun  beat 
down  on  the  stately  trees— elms,  oaks,  cypresses  and  pines 
" casting  pleasant  shadows  on  the  wooded  avenues  lead- 
ing to  the  little  circular  clearing.  At  3:15  p.m.  precisely, 
Hitler  arrived  in  his  big  Mercedes,  accompanied  by  Goer- 
ing,  Brauchitsch,  Keitel,  Raeder,  Ribbentrop  and  Hess,  all 
in  their  various  uniforms,  and  Goering,  the  lone  Field 
Marshal  of  the  Reich,  fiddling  with  his  field  marshal’s 
baton.  They  alighted  from  their  automobiles  some  two 
hundred  yards  away,  in  front  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
statue,  which  was  draped  with  German  war  flags  so  that 
the  Fuehrer  could  not  see  (though  I remembered  from 
previous  visits  in  happier  days)  the  large  sword,  the  sword 
of  the  victorious  Allies  of  1918,  sticking  through  a limp 
eagle  representing  the  German  Empire  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns.  Hitler  glanced  at  the  monument  and  strode  on. 

I observed  his  face  [I  wrote  in  my  diary].  It  was  grave, 


977 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

solemn,  yet  brimming  with  revenge.  There  was  also  in  it, 
as  in  his  springy  step,  a note  of  the  triumphant  conqueror, 
the  defter  of  the  world.  There  was  something  else  ...  a sort 
of  scornful,  inner  joy  at  being  present  at  this  great  reversal 
of  fate — a reversal  he  himself  had  wrought. 

When  he  reached  the  little  opening  in  the  forest  and 
his  personal  standard  had  been  run  up  in  the  center  of 
it,  his  attention  was  attracted  by  a great  granite  block 
which  stood  some  three  feet  above  the  ground. 

Hitler,  followed  by  the  others,  walks  slowly  over  to  it 
[I  am  quoting  my  diary],  steps  up,  and  reads  the  in- 
scription engraved  (in  French)  in  great  high  letters: 

“HERE  ON  THE  ELEVENTH  OF  NOVEMBER  1918  SUCCUMBED 

THE  CRIMINAL  PRIDE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE VANQUISHED 

BY  THE  FREE  PEOPLES  WHICH  IT  TRIED  TO  ENSLAVE.” 

Hitler  reads  it  and  Goering  reads  it.  They  all  read  it, 

standing  there  in  the  June  sun  and  the  silence.  I look  for 

the  expression  in  Hitler’s  face.  I am  but  fifty  yards  from 
him  and  see  him  through  my  glasses  as  though  he  were  di- 
rectly in  front  of  me.  I have  seen  that  face  many  times  at 

the  great  moments  of  his  life.  But  today!  It  is  afire  with 
scorn,  anger,  hate,  revenge,  triumph. 

He  steps  off  the  monument  and  contrives  to  make  even 
this  gesture  a masterpiece  of  contempt.  He  glances  back  at 
it,  contemptuous,  angry — angry,  you  almost  feel,  because  he 
cannot  wipe  out  the  awful,  provoking  lettering  with  one 
sweep  of  his  high  Prussian  boot.*  He  glances  slowly  around 
the  clearing,  and  now,  as  his  eyes  meet  ours,  you  grasp  the 
depth  of  his  hatred.  But  there  is  triumph  there  too — revenge- 
ful, triumphant  hate.  Suddenly,  as  though  his  face  were  not 
giving  quite  complete  expression  to  his  feelings,  he  throws 
his  whole  body  into  harmony  with  his  mood.  He  swiftly 
snaps  his  hands  on  his  hips,  arches  his  shoulders,  plants  his 
feet  wide  apart.  It  is  a magnificent  gesture  of  defiance,  of 
burning  contempt  for  this  place  now  and  all  that  it  has 
stood  for  in  the  twenty-two  years  since  it  witnessed  the 
humbling  of  the  German  Empire. 

Hitler  and  his  party  then  entered  the  armistice  railway 
car,  the  Fuehrer  seating  himself  in  the  chair  occupied 
by  Foch  in  1918.  Five  minutes  later  the  French  delega- 
tion arrived,  headed  by  General  Charles  Huntziger,  com- 
mander of  the  Second  Army  at  Sedan,  and  made  up  of 


It  was  blown  up  three  days  later,  at  Hitler’s  command. 


978  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

an  admiral,  an  Air  Force  general  and  one  civilian,  Leon 
Noel,  the  former  ambassador  to  Poland,  who  was  now 
witnessing  his  second  debacle  wrought  by  German  arms. 
They  looked  shattered,  but  retained  a tragic  dignity.  They 
had  not  been  told  that  they  would  be  led  to  this  proud 
French  shrine  to  undergo  such  a humiliation,  and  the 
shock  was  no  doubt  just  what  Hitler  had  calculated.  As 
Haider  wrote  in  his  diary  that  evening  after  being  given 
an  eyewitness  account  by  Brauchitsch: 

The  French  had  no  warning  that  they  would  be  handed 
the  terms  at  the  very  site  of  the  negotiations  in  1918.  They 
were  apparently  shaken  by  this  arrangement  and  at  first  in- 
clined to  be  sullen. 

Perhaps  it  was  natural,  even  for  a German  so  cultivated 
as  Haider,  or  Brauchitsch,  to  mistake  solemn  dignity  for 
sullenness.  The  French,  one  saw  at  once,  were  certainly 
dazed.  Yet,  contrary  to  the  reports  at  the  time,  they  tried, 
as  we  now  know  from  the  official  German  minutes  of  the 
meetings  found  among  the  captured  Nazi  secret  papers,27 
to  soften  the  harsher  portions  of  the  Fuehrer’s  terms  and 
to  eliminate  those  which  they  thought  were  dishonorable. 
But  they  tried  in  vain. 

Hitler  and  his  entourage  left  the  wagon-lit  as  soon  as 
General  Keitel  had  read  the  preamble  of  the  armistice 
terms  to  the  French,  leaving  the  negotiations  in  the  hands 
of  his  OKW  Chief,  but  allowing  him  no  leeway  in  depart- 
ing from  the  conditions  which  he  himself  had  laid  down. 

Huntziger  told  the  Germans  at  once,  as  soon  as  he  had 
read  them,  that  they  were  “hard  and  merciless,”  much 
worse  than  those  which  France  had  handed  Germany 
here  in  1918.  Moreover,  if  “another  country  beyond  the 
Alps,  which  had  not  defeated  France  (Huntziger  was  too 
contemptuous  of  Italy  even  to  name  her),  advanced  sim- 
ilar demands  France  would  in  no  circumstances  submit. 
She  would  fight  to  the  bitter  end  ...  It  was  therefore 
impossible  for  him  to  put  his  signature  to  the  German 
armistice  agreement . . .” 

General  Jodi,  the  Number  Two  officer  at  OKW,  who 
presided  temporarily  at  this  moment,  had  not  expected 
such  defiant  words  from  a hopelessly  beaten  foe  and  re- 
plied that  though  he  could  not  help  express  his  “under- 
standing” for  what  Huntziger  had  said  about  the  Italians 


979 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

nevertheless  he  had  no  power  to  change  the  Fuehrer’s 
terms.  All  he  could  do,  he  said,  was  “to  give  explanations 
and  clear  up  obscure  points.”  The  French  would  have  to 
take  the  armistice  document  or  leave  it,  as  it  was. 

The  Germans  had  been  annoyed  that  the  French  dele- 
gation had  arrived  without  authority  to  conclude  an  armi- 
stice except  with  the  express  agreement  of  the  government 
at  Bordeaux.  By  a miracle  of  engineering  and  perhaps 
with  some  luck  they  succeeded  in  setting  up  a telephone 
connection  from  the  old  sleeping  car  right  through  the 
battle  lines,  where  the  fighting  still  continued,  to  Bor- 
deaux. The  French  delegates  were  authorized  to  use  it  to 
transmit  the  text  of  the  armistice  terms  and  to  discuss  it 
with  their  government.  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  served  as  in- 
terpreter, was  directed  to  listen  in  on  the  tapped  conver- 
sations from  an  Army  communications  van  a few  yards 
away  behind  a clump  of  trees.  The  next  day  I myself 
contrived  to  hear  the  German  recording  of  part  of  the 
conversation  between  Huntziger  and  General  Weygand. 

To  the  credit  of  the  latter,  who  bears  a grave  responsi- 
bility for  French  defeatism  and  the  final  surrender  and 
the  break  with  Britain,  it  must  be  recorded  that  he  at  least 
strenuously  objected  to  many  of  the  German  demands. 
One  of  the  most  odious  of  them  obligated  the  French  to 
turn  over  to  the  Reich  all  anti-Nazi  German  refugees  in 
France  and  in  her  territories.  Weygand  called  this  dis- 
honorable in  view  of  the  French  tradition  of  the  right 
of  asylum,  but  when  it  was  discussed  the  next  day  the 
arrogant  Keitel  would  not  listen  to  its  being  deleted.  “The 
German  emigres,”  he  shouted,  were  “the  greatest 
warmongers.”  They  had  “betrayed  their  own  people.” 
They  must  be  handed  over  “at  all  costs.”  The  French  made 
no  protest  against  a clause  which  stated  that  all  their 
nationals  caught  fighting  with  another  country  against 
Germany  would  be  treated  as  “francs-tireurs” — that  is, 
immediately  shot.  This  was  aimed  against  De  Gaulle,  who 
was  already  trying  to  organize  a Free  French  force  in 
Britain,  and  both  Weygand  and  Keitel  knew  it  was  a 
crude  violation  of  the  primitive  rules  of  war.  Nor  did  the 
French  question  a paragraph  which  provided  for  all 
prisoners  of  war  to  remain  in  captivity  until  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace.  Weygand  was  sure  the  British  would  be 
conquered  within  three  weeks  and  the  French  POWs 


980  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

thereafter  released.  Thus  he  condemned  a million  and  a 
half  Frenchmen  to  war  prison  camps  for  five  years. 

The  crux  of  the  armistice  treaty  was  the  disposal  of  the 
French  Navy.  Churchill,  as  France  tottered,  had  offered 
to  release  her  from  her  pledge  not  to  make  a separate 
peace  if  the  French  Navy  were  directed  to  sail  for  British 
ports.  Hitler  was  determined  that  this  should  not  take 
place;  he  fully  realized,  as  he  told  Mussolini  on  June  18, 
that  it  would  immeasurably  strengthen  Britain.  With  so 
much  at  stake  he  had  to  make  a concession,  or  at  least  a 
promise,  to  the  beaten  foe.  The  armistice  agreement  stip- 
ulated that  the  French  fleet  would  be  demobilized  and  dis- 
armed and  the  ships  laid  up  in  their  home  ports.  In  return 
for  this 

the  German  Government  solemnly  declares  to  the  French 
Government  that  it  does  not  intend  to  use  for  its  own  pur- 
poses in  the  war  the  French  fleet  which  is  in  ports  under 
German  supervision.  Furthermore,  they  solemnly  and  ex- 
pressly declare  that  they  have  no  intention  of  raising  any 
claim  to  the  French  war  fleet  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion 
of  peace. 

Like  almost  all  of  Hitler’s  promises,  this  one  too  would 
be  broken. 

Finally,  Hitler  left  the  French  government  an  unoccu- 
pied zone  in  the  south  and  southeast  in  which  it  ostensi- 
bly was  free  to  govern.  This  was  an  astute  move.  It  would 
not  only  divide  France  itself  geographically  and  adminis- 
tratively; it  would  make  difficult  if  not  impossible  the 
formation  of  a French  government-in-exile  and  quash  any 
plans  of  the  politicians  in  Bordeaux  to  move  the  seat 
of  government  to  French  North  Africa — a design  which 
almost  succeeded,  being  defeated  in  the  end  not  by  the 
Germans  but  by  the  French  defeatists:  Petain,  Weygand, 
Laval  and  their  supporters.  Moreover,  Hitler  knew  that 
the  men  who  had  now  seized  control  of  the  French  gov- 
ernment at  Bordeaux  were  enemies  of  French  democracy 
and  might  be  expected  to  be  co-operative  in  helping  him 
set  up  the  Nazi  New  Order  in  Europe. 

Yet  on  the  second  day  of  the  armistice  negotiations  at 
Compiegne  the  French  delegates  continued  to  bicker 
and  delay.  One  reason  for  the  delay  was  that  Huntziger 
insisted  that  Weygand  give  him  not  an  authorization  to 
sign  but  an  order — no  one  in  France  wanted  to  take  the 


981 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

responsibility.  Finally,  at  6:30  p.m.  Keitel  issued  an  ulti- 
matum. The  French  must  accept  or  reject  the  German 
armistice  terms  within  an  hour.  Within  the  hour  the 
French  government  capitulated.  At  6:50  p.m.  on  June  22, 
1940,  Huntziger  and  Keitel  signed  the  armistice  treaty.* 

I listened  to  the  last  scene  as  it  was  picked  up  by  the 
hidden  microphones  in  the  wagon-lit.  Just  before  he 
signed,  the  French  General,  his  voice  quivering,  said  he 
wished  to  make  a personal  statement.  I took  it  down  in 
French,  as  he  spoke. 

I declare  that  the  French  Government  has  ordered  me  to 
sign  these  terms  of  armistice  . . . Forced  by  the  fate  of  arms 
to  cease  the  struggle  in  which  we  were  engaged  on  the  side 
of  the  Allies,  France  sees  imposed  on  her  very  hard  condi- 
tions. France  has  the  right  to  expect  in  the  future  negotia- 
tions that  Germany  show  a spirit  which  will  permit  the 
two  great  neighboring  countries  to  live  and  work  in  peace. 

Those  negotiations — for  a peace  treaty — would  never 
take  place,  but  the  spirit  which  the  Nazi  Third  Reich 
would  have  shown,  if  they  had,  soon  became  evident  as 
the  occupation  became  harsher  and  the  pressure  on  the 
servile  Petain  regime  increased.  France  was  now  destined 
to  become  a German  vassal,  as  Petain,  Weygand  and  Laval 
apparently  believed — and  accepted. 

A light  rain  began  to  fall  as  the  delegates  left  the  armi- 
stice car  and  drove  away.  Down  the  road  through  the 
woods  you  could  see  an  unbroken  line  of  refugees  making 
their  way  home  on  weary  feet,  on  bicycles,  on  carts,  a 
few  fortunate  ones  on  old  trucks.  I walked  out  to  the 
clearing.  A gang  of  German  Army  engineers,  shouting 
lustily,  had  already  started  to  move  the  old  wagon-lit. 

“Where  to?”  I asked. 

“To  Berlin,”  they  said,  t 

The  Franco-Italian  armistice  was  signed  in  Rome 
two  days  later.  Mussolini  was  able  to  occupy  only  what 
his  troops  had  conquered,  which  meant  a few  hundred 
yards  of  French  territory,  and  to  impose  a fifty-mile  de- 

* It  was  stipulated  that  it  would  go  into  effect  as  soon  as  the  Franco-Italian 
armistice  was  signed,  and  that  hostilities  would  cease  six  hours  after  that 
event. 

t It  arrived  there  July  8.  Ironically,  it  was  destroyed  in  an  Allied  bombing 
of  Berlin  later  in  the  war. 


982  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

militarized  zone  opposite  him  in  France  and  Tunisia.  The 
armistice  was  signed  at  7:35  p.m.  on  June  24.  Six  hours 
later  the  guns  in  France  lapsed  into  silence. 

France,  which  had  held  out  unbeaten  for  four  years  the 
last  time,  was  out  of  the  war  after  six  weeks.  German 
troops  stood  guard  over  most  of  Europe,  from  the  North 
Cape  above  the  Arctic  Circle  to  Bordeaux,  from  the  Eng- 
lish Channel  to  the  River  Bug  in  eastern  Poland.  Adolf 
Hitler  had  reached  the  pinnacle.  The  former  Austrian 
waif,  who  had  been  the  first  to  unite  the  Germans  in  a 
truly  national  State,  this  corporal  of  the  First  World  War, 
had  now  become  the  greatest  of  German  conquerors.  All 
that  stood  between  him  and  the  establishment  of  German 
hegemony  in  Europe  under  his  dictatorship  and  was  one 
indomitable  Englishman,  Winston  Churchill,  and  the  de- 
termined people  Churchill  led,  who  did  not  recognize 
defeat  when  it  stared  them  in  the  face  and  who  now  stood 
alone,  virtually  unarmed,  their  island  home  besieged  by 
the  mightiest  military  machine  the  world  had  ever  seen. 

HITLER  PLAYS  FOR  PEACE 

Ten  days  after  the  German  onslaught  on  the  West  be- 
gan, on  the  evening  German  tanks  reached  Abbeville, 
General  Jodi,  after  describing  in  his  diary  how  the  Fueh- 
rer was  “beside  himself  with  joy,”  added:  “.  . . is  working 
on  the  peace  treaty  . . . Britain  can  get  a separate  peace 
any  time  after  restitution  of  the  colonies.”  That  was 
May  20.  For  several  weeks  thereafter  Hitler  seems  to 
have  had  no  doubts  that,  with  France  knocked  out,  Britain 
would  be  anxious  to  make  peace.  His  terms,  from  the 
German  point  of  view,  seemed  most  generous,  consider- 
ing the  beating  the  British  had  taken  in  Norway  and  in 
France.  He  had  expounded  them  to  General  von  Rund- 
stedt  on  May  24,  expressing  his  admiration  of  the  British 
Empire  and  stressing  the  “necessity”  for  its  existence. 
All  he  wanted  from  London,  he  said,  was  a free  hand  on 
the  Continent. 

So  certain  was  he  that  the  British  would  agree  to  this 
that  even  after  the  fall  of  France  he  made  no  plans  for 
continuing  the  war  against  Britain,  and  the  vaunted  Gen- 
eral Staff,  which  supposedly  planned  with  Prussian  thor- 


983 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

oughness  for  every  contingency  far  in  advance,  did  not 
bother  to  furnish  him  any.  Haider,  the  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  made  no  mention  of  the  subject  at  this  time  in 
his  voluminous  diary  entries.  He  was  more  disturbed 
about  Russian  threats  in  the  Balkans  and  the  Baltic  than 
about  the  British. 

Indeed,  why  should  Great  Britain  fight  on  alone  against 
helpless  odds?  Especially  when  it  could  get  a peace  that 
would  leave  it,  unlike  France,  Poland  and  all  the  other 
defeated  lands,  unscathed,  intact  and  free?  This  was  a 
question  asked  everywhere  except  in  Downing  Street, 
where,  as  Churchill  later  revealed,  it  was  never  even  dis- 
cussed, because  the  answer  was  taken  for  granted.28  But 
the  German  dictator  did  not  know  this,  and  when 
Churchill  began  to  state  it  publicly — that  Britain  was  not 
quitting — Hitler  apparently  did  not  believe  it.  Not  even 
when  on  June  4,  after  the  evacuation  from  Dunkirk,  the 
Prime  Minister  had  made  his  resounding  speech  about 
fighting  on  in  the  hills  and  on  the  beaches;  not  even  when 
on  June  18,  after  Petain  had  asked  for  an  armistice, 
Churchill  reiterated  in  the  Commons  Britain’s  “inflexible 
resolve  to  continue  the  war”  and  in  another  one  of  his 
eloquent  and  memorable  perorations  concluded: 

Let  us  therefore  brace  ourselves  to  our  duties,  and  so  bear 
ourselves  that,  if  the  British  Empire  and  its  Commonwealth 
last  for  a thousand  years,  men  will  say:  “This  was  their 
finest  hour.” 

These  could  be  merely  soaring  words  from  a gifted 
orator,  and  so  Hitler,  a dazzling  orator  himself,  must  have 
thought.  He  must  have  been  encouraged  too  by  soundings 
in  neutral  capitals  and  by  the  appeals  for  ending  the  war 
that  now  emanated  from  them.  On  June  28  a confidential 
message  arrived  for  Hitler  from  the  Pope — analogous 
communications  were  addressed  to  Mussolini  and  Church- 
ill— offering  his  mediation  for  “a  just  and  honorable 
peace”  and  declaring  that  before  initiating  this  step  he 
wished  to  ascertain  confidentially  how  it  would  be 
received.29  The  King  of  Sweden  was  also  active  in  pro- 
posing peace  to  both  London  and  Berlin. 

In  the  United  States  the  German  Embassy,  under  the 
direction  of  Hans  Thomsen,  the  charge  d’affaires,  was 
spending  every  dollar  it  could  lay  its  hands  on  to  support 


984 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  isolationists  in  keeping  America  out  of  the  war  and  thus 
discourage  Britain  from  continuing  it.  The  captured  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  documents  are  full  of  messages  from 
Thomsen  reporting  on  the  embassy’s  efforts  to  sway  Amer- 
ican public  opinion  in  Hitler’s  favor.  The  party  conven- 
tions were  being  held  that  summer  and  Thomsen  was 
bending  every  effort  to  influence  their  foreign-policy 
planks,  especially  that  of  the  Republicans. 

On  June  12,  for  example,  he  cabled  Berlin  in  code  “most 
urgent,  top  secret”  that  a “well-known  Republican  congress- 
man,” who  was  working  “closely”  with  the  German  Em- 
bassy, had  offered,  for  $3,000,  to  invite  fifty  isolationist 
Republican  Congressmen  to  the  Republican  convention  “so 
that  they  may  work  on  the  delegates  in  favor  of  an  isola- 
tionist foreign  policy.”  The  same  individual,  Thomsen  re- 
ported, wanted  $30,000  to  help  pay  for  full-page  adver- 
tisements in  the  American  newspapers,  to  be  headed  “Keep 
America  Out  of  the  War!”  * 30 

The  next  day  Thomsen  was  wiring  Berlin  about  a new 
project  he  said  he  was  negotiating  through  an  American 
literary  agent  to  have  five  well-known  American  writers 
write  books  “from  which  I await  great  results.”  For  this 
project  he  needed  $20,000,  a sum  Ribbentrop  okayed  a 
few  days  later,  t 31 

One  of  Hitler’s  first  public  utterances  about  his  hopes  for 
peace  with  Britain  had  been  given  Karl  von  Wiegand,  a 
Hearst  correspondent,  and  published  in  the  New  York 
Journal- American  on  June  14.  A fortnight  later  Thomsen 
informed  the  German  Foreign  Office  that  he  had  printed 
100,000  extra  copies  of  the  interview  and  that 

I was  able  furthermore  through  a confidential  agent  to  in- 

* Such  an  advertisement  appeared  in  the  New  York  Times  June  25,  1940. 
t By  July  5,  1940,  Thomsen  had  become  so  apprenhensive  about  his  pay- 
ments that  he  cabled  Berlin  for  permission  to  destroy  all  receipts  and 
accounts : 

The  payments  . . . are  made  to  the  recipients  through  trusted  go- 
betweens,  but  in  the  circumstances  it  is  obvious  that  no  receipts  can  be 
expected  . . . Such  receipts  or  memoranda  would  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  American  Secret  Service  if  the  Embassy  were  suddenly  to  be 
seized  by  American  authorities,  and  despite  all  camouflage,  by  the  fact 
of  their  existence  alone,  they  would  mean  political  ruin  and  have  other 
grave  consequences  for  our  political  friends,  who  are  probably  known 
to  our  enemies  . . . 

I therefore  request  that  the  Embassy  be  authorized  to  destroy  these 
receipts  and  statements  and  henceforth  dispense  with  making  them,  as 
also  with  keeping  accounts  of  such  payments. 

This  telegraphic  report  has  been  destroyed.82 


985 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

duce  the  isolationist  Representative  Thorkelson  [Republican 
of  Montana]  to  have  the  Fuehrer  interview  inserted  in  the 
Congressional  Record  of  June  22.  This  assures  the  inter- 
view once  more  the  widest  distribution.33 

The  Nazi  Embassy  in  Washington  grasped  at  every  straw. 
At  one  point  during  the  summer  its  press  attache  was 
forwarding  what  he  said  was  a suggestion  of  Fulton 
Lewis,  Jr.,  the  radio  commentator,  whom  he  described  as 
an  admirer  of  “Germany  and  the  Fuehrer  and  a highly 
respected  American  journalist.” 

The  Fuehrer  should  address  telegrams  to  Roosevelt  . . . 
reading  approximately  as  follows:  “You,  Mr.  Roosevelt, 
have  repeatedly  appealed  to  me  and  always  expressed  the 
wish  that  a sanguinary  war  be  avoided.  I did  not  declare  war 
on  England;  on  the  contrary  I always  stressed  that  I did  not 
wish  to  destroy  the  British  Empire.  My  repeated  requests 
to  Churchill  to  be  reasonable  and  to  arrive  at  an  honorable 
peace  treaty  were  stubbornly  rejected  by  Churchill.  I am 
aware  that  England  will  suffer  severely  when  I order  total 
war  to  be  launched  against  the  British  Isles.  I ask  you  there- 
fore to  approach  Churchill  on  your  part  and  prevail  upon 
him  to  abandon  his  senseless  obstinacy.”  Lewis  added  that 
Roosevelt  would,  of  course,  make  a rude  and  spiteful  reply; 
that  would  make  no  difference.  Such  an  appeal  would  surely 
make  a profound  impression  on  the  North  American  people 
and  especially  in  South  America  . . ,34 

Adolf  Hitler  did  not  take  Mr.  Lewis’  purported  advice, 
but  the  Foreign  Office  in  Berlin  cabled  to  ask  how  impor- 
tant the  radio  commentator  was  in  America.  Thomsen 
replied  that  Lewis  had  “enjoyed  a particular  success  of  late 
. . . [but  that]  on  the  other  hand,  in  contrast  to  some 
leading  American  commentators,  no  political  importance 
is  to  be  attached  to  L.”  * 35 

* The  doings  of  the  German  Embassy  in  Washington  at  this  period,  as  dis- 
closed  in  its  own  dispatches  which  are  published  in  Documents  on  German 
Foreign  Policy,  would  furnish  the  material  for  a revealing  book.  One  is 
struck  by  the  tendency  of  the  German  diplomats  to  tell  the  Nazi  dictator 
pretty  much  what  he  wanted  to  hear — a practice  common  among  representa- 
tives of  totalitarian  lands.  Two  officers  of  OKW  told  me  in  Berlin  that  the 
High  Command,  or  at  least  the  General  Staff,  was  highly  suspicious  of  the 
objectivity  of  the  reports  from  the  Washington  embassy  and  that  they  had 
established  their  own  military  intelligence  in  the  United  States. 

They  were  not  served  very  well  by  General  Friedrich  von  Boetticher,  the 
German  military  attache  in  Washington,  if  one  can  judge  by  his  dispatches 
included  in  the  DGFP  volumes.  He  never  tired  of  warning  OKW  and  the 
general  staffs  of  the  Army  and  Air  Force  to  whom  his  messages  were 
addressed,  that  America  was  controlled  by  the  Jews  and  the  Freemasons, 
which  was  exactly  what  Hitler  thought.  Boetticher  also  overestimated  the 


986 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Churchill  himself,  as  he  related  later  in  his  memoirs, 
was  somewhat  troubled  by  the  peace  feelers  emanating 
through  Sweden,  the  United  States  and  the  Vatican  and, 
convinced  that  Hitler  was  trying  to  make  the  most  of 
them,  took  stern  measures  to  counter  them.  Informed  that 
the  Gennan  charge  in  Washington,  Thomsen,  had  been 
attempting  to  talk  with  the  British  ambassador  there,  he 
cabled  that  Lord  Lothian  should  be  told  on  no  account 
to  make  any  reply  to  the  German  Charge  d’Affaires’  mes- 
sage.” 36 

To  the  King  of  Sweden,  who  had  urged  Great  Britain 


inflnence  of  the  isolationists  in  American  politics,  especially  of  Colonel 
Lnarles  A.  Lindbergh,  who  emerges  in  his  dispatches  as  his  great  hero.  An 
extract  or  two  indicates  the  tenor  of  his  reports. 

1940  : ; \ VA\the  “tponent  of  the  Jews,  who  especially  through 
Freemasonry  control  the  broad  masses  of  the  American  people,  Roosevelt 
wants  England  to  continue  fighting  and  the  war  to  be  prolonged  . . 

?>rc|e  about  Lindbergh  has  become  aware  of  this  development  and 
now  tries  at  least  to  impede  the  fatal  control  of  American  policy  by  the 
jews  . . . 1 have  repeatedly  reported  on  the  mean  and  vicious  campaign 
?gai[DGFpdXrpp’  254-55  ]he  ^CWS  fear  38  their  most  Potent  adversary 

*,,MiZ'iStA6A.* 1 * * *'940 ! •••  ’ Th.e  background  of  Lindbergh’s  re-emergence  in 
public  and  the  campaign  against  him. 

f Jewish  element  now  controls  key  positions  in  the  American  armed 
haYlng  mr  last  weeks  filled  the  posts  of  Secretary  of  War, 
indi  War,  and  Secre5ary  of  the  Navy  with  subservient 

individuals  and  attached  a leading  and  very  influential  Jew,  “Colonel” 
Juhus  Ochs-Adler,  as  secretary  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

cfc58  °PP0Sftg  the  Jewish  element  and  the  present  policy  of  the 
United  states  have  been  mentioned  in  my  reports,  taking  account  also  of 
cmi!3Snre  °u  the  G*neral  Stafl’  The  greatly  gifted  Lindbergh,  whose 
SSSSft °1  *ch  vjer?.  far’  ls,  mruch  the  most  important  of  them  all.  The 
Jewish  element  and  Roosevelt  fear  the  spiritual  and,  particularly,  the 
moral  superiority  and  purity  of  this  man. 

T Gn  winday  4]  Lindbergh  delivered  a blow  that  will  hurt  the 

iSZaLu%  r * * stress?d  that.  America  should  strive  for  sincere  collabora- 
culWthwJS?n^  Wlth.a  Vlew  to  peace  and  the  preservation  of  Western 
Several  hours  later,  the  aged  General  Pershing,  who  has  long 
Sve?  fhJ’rHr*  lnihei  ha?ds  °!  Roosevelt,  which  means  of  the  Tews,  read 
tWA°  a.declara1ti°n,  foisted  upon  him  by  the  wire-pullers,  to  the 
^ Amenca  would.be  imperiled  by  England’s  defeat  ... 

vl he  Jewish  element  casting  suspicion  on  Lindbergh  in 
ftf : Pr.es?’.  j?d  ^ls  denunciation  by  a Senator  . . . Lucas,  who  spoke 
ga  n8ta  ,over.  ft?  Yadft  Monday  night  at  Roosevelt’s  behest 

I,  • as  a , “tth  columnist,  that  is,  a traitor,  merely  serve  to  underline 

reported  sinS'thTh^1  p0WeI  S?  this  man..about  whose  progress  I have 
r “ a ^ginning  of  the  war  and  in  whose  great  importance  for 
future  German-Amencan  relations  I believe.  VDGFP,  X,  pp.  413-15.] 
September  18,  Thomsen,  in  a further  report,  gave  an  account  of  a 
deintIa*  c?nver®atl°n  he  said  had  taken  place  f>etween  Lindbergh  and 
that  Enil^iTwmdd  enr^raI  SpafI  oiPc?rs-  Lindbergh  gave  it  as  his  opinion 
Staff  d r d s0°?  collapse  before  German  air  attacks.  The  General 

^orc^deci.iZ.7"c“fxtopltl'n?y)'8  * St™g‘h  n°‘ 

a 9Ctobef  three  weeks  after  Munich,  Lindbergh  had  been 

Star  ThiRniahadTa£ifptedTfte  “Seryme  Cross  of  tie  German  Eagle  with 
confer™?  L fte  ®econd  highest  German  decoration,  usually 

citations^  “deservecTwell^f^ th^Remln”3  Wh°*  “ ““  0fEcial  W°rds  of  *>“ 


987 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

to  accept  a peace  settlement,  the  grim  Prime  Minister  draft- 
ed a strong  reply. 

. . . Before  any  such  requests  or  proposals  could  even  be 
considered,  it  would  be  necessary  that  effective  guarantees 
by  deeds,  not  words,  should  be  forthcoming  from  Germany 
which  would  ensure  the  restoration  of  the  free  and  in- 
dependent life  of  Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  Norway,  Den- 
mark, Holland,  Belgium  and  above  all,  France  . . .*  37 

That  was  the  nub  of  Churchill’s  case  and  apparently  no 
one  in  London  dreamt  of  compromising  it  by  concluding 
a peace  that  would  preserve  Britain  but  permanently  en- 
slave the  countries  Hitler  had  conquered.  But  this  was  not 
comprehended  in  Berlin,  where,  as  I recall  those  summer 
days,  everyone,  especially  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the 
Bendlerstrasse,  was  confident  that  the  war  was  as  good  as 
over. 

All  through  the  last  fortnight  of  June  and  the  first  days 
of  July,  Hitler  waited  for  word  from  London  that  the  British 
government  was  ready  to  throw  in  the  sponge  and  conclude 
peace.  On  July  1 he  told  the  new  Italian  ambassador,  Dino 
Alfieri,  t that  he  “could  not  conceive  of  anyone  in  England 
still  seriously  believing  in  victory.”  38  Nothing  had  been 
done  in  the  High  Command  about  continuing  the  war 
against  Britain. 

But  the  next  day,  July  2,  the  first  directive  on  that 
subject  was  finally  issued  by  OKW.  It  was  a hesitant  order. 

The  Fuehrer  and  Supreme  Commander  has  decided: 


* There  are  in  the  DGFP  volumes  several  dispatches  to  the  German  Foreign 
Office  about  alleged  contacts  with  various  British  diplomats  and  personages, 
sometimes  direct,  sometimes  through  neutrals  such  as  the  Franco  Spaniards. 
Prince  Max  von  Hohenlohe,  the  Sudeten^German  Anglophile,  reported  to 
Berlin  on  his  conversations  with  the  British  minister  in  Switzerland,  Sir 
David  Kelly,  and  with  the  Aga  Khan.  He  claimed  the  latter  had  asked  him 
to  relay  the  following  message  to  the  Fuehrer: 

The  Khedive  of  Egypt,  who  is  also  here,  had  agreed  with  him  that  on 
the  day  when  the  Fuehrer  puts  up  for  the  night  in  Windsor,  thev  would 
drink  a bottle  of  champagne  together  ...  If  Germany  or  Italy  were 
thinking  of  taking  over  India,  he  would  place  himself  at  our  disposal 
. . . The  struggle  against  England  was  not  a struggle  against  the  English 
people  but  against  the  Jews.  Churchill  had  been  tor  years  in  their  pay 
and  the  King  was  too  weak  and  limited  . . . If  he  were  to  go  with 
these  ideas  to  England,  Churchill  would  lock  him  up.  . . . L DGFP,  X, 
pp.  294-95.]  • 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  these  are  German  reports  and  may  not  be 
true  at  all,  but  they  are  what  Hitler  had  to  go  on.  The  Nazi  plan  to  enjist 
the  Duke  of  Windsor,  indeed  the  plot  to  kidnap  him  and  then  try  to  use  him, 
as  disclosed  in  the  Foreign  Office  secret  papers,  is  noted  later, 
t Attolico  had  been  replaced  by  Alfieri  at  the  instigation  of  Ribbentrop  in 
May. 


988 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


That  a landing  in  England  is  possible,  providing  that  air 
superiority  can  be  attained  and  certain  other  necessary  con- 
ditions fulfilled.  The  date  of  commencement  is  still  un- 
decided. All  preparations  to  be  begun  immediately. 

Hitler’s  lukewarm  feeling  about  the  operation  and  his 
belief  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  is  reflected  in  the 
concluding  paragraph  of  the  directive. 

All  preparations  must  be  undertaken  on  the  basis  that 
the  invasion  is  still  only  a plan,  and  has  not  yet  been  de- 
cided upon.38 

When  Ciano  saw  the  Fuehrer  in  Berlin  on  July  7,  he 
got  the  impression,  as  he  noted  in  his  diary,  that  the  Nazi 
warlord  was  having  trouble  making  up  his  mind. 

He  is  rather  inclined  to  continue  the  struggle  and  to  un- 
leash a storm  of  wrath  and  of  steel  upon  the  English.  But 
the  final  decision  has  not  been  reached,  and  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  he  is  delaying  his  speech,  of  which,  as  he  him- 
self puts  it,  he  wants  to  weigh  every  word.40 

On  July  11  Hitler  began  assembling  his  military  chiefs 
on  the  Obersalzberg  to  see  how  they  felt  about  the  matter. 
Admiral  Raeder,  whose  Navy  would  have  to  ferry  an  in- 
vading army  across  the  Channel,  had  a long  talk  with  the 
Fuehrer  on  that  date.  Neither  of  them  was  eager  to  come 
to  grips  with  the  problem — in  fact,  they  spent  most  of 
their  time  together  discussing  the  matter  of  developing 
the  naval  bases  at  Trondheim  and  Narvik  in  Norway. 

The  Supreme  Commander,  judging  by  Raeder’s  confi- 
dential report  of  the  meeting,41  was  in  a subdued  mood. 
He  asked  the  Admiral  whether  he  thought  his  planned 
speech  to  the  Reichstag  “would  be  effective.”  Raeder  re- 
plied that  it  would  be,  especially  if  it  were  preceded  by  a 
“concentrated”  bombing  attack  on  Britain.  The  Admiral, 
who  reminded  his  chief  that  the  R.A.F.  was  carrying 
out  “damaging  attacks”  on  the  principal  German  naval 
bases  at  Wilhelmshaven,  Hamburg  and  Kiel,  thought  the 
Luftwaffe  ought  to  get  busy  immediately  on  Britain.  But 
on  the  question  of  invasion,  the  Navy  Commander  in  Chief 
was  distinctly  cool.  He  urgently  advised  that  it  be  at- 
tempted “only  as  a last  resort  to  force  Britain  to  sue  for 
peace.” 

He  [Raeder]  is  convinced  that  Britain  can  be  made  to 
ask  for  peace  simply  by  cutting  off  her  import  trade  by 


989 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

means  of  submarine  warfare,  air  attacks  on  convoys  and 
heavy  air  attacks  on  her  main  centers.  . . . 

The  C.  in  C.,  Navy  [Raeder],  cannot  for  his  part  there- 
fore advocate  an  invasion  of  Britain  as  he  did  in  the  case  of 
Norway  . . . 

Whereupon  the  Admiral  launched  into  a long  and  de- 
tailed explanation  of  all  the  difficulties  involved  in  such 
an  invasion,  which  must  have  been  most  discouraging 
to  Hitler.  Discouraging  but  perhaps  also  convincing.  For 
Raeder  reports  that  “the  Fuehrer  also  views  invasion  as 
a last  resort.” 

Two  days  later,  on  July  13,  the  generals  arrived  at 
the  Berghof  above  Berchtesgaden  to  confer  with  the  Su- 
preme Commander.  They  found  him  still  baffled  by  the 
British.  “The  Fuehrer,”  Haider  jotted  in  his  diary  that 
evening,  “is  obsessed  with  the  question  why  England  does 
not  yet  want  to  take  the  road  to  peace.”  But  now,  for  the 
first  time,  one  of  the  reasons  had  begun  to  dawn  on  him. 
Haider  noted  it 

He  sees,  just  as  we  do,  the  solution  of  this  question  in  the 
fact  that  England  is  still  setting  her  hope  in  Russia.  Thus  he 
too  expects  that  England  will  have  to  be  compelled  by  force 
to  make  peace.  He  does  not  like  to  do  such  a thing,  how- 
ever. Reasons:  If  we  smash  England  militarily,  the  British 
Empire  will  disintegrate.  Germany,  however,  would  not 
profit  from  this.  With  German  blood  we  would  achieve 
something  from  which  only  Japan,  America  and  others  will 
derive  profit. 

On  the  same  day,  July  13,  Hitler  wrote  Mussolini,  de- 
clining with  thanks  the  Duce’s  offer  to  furnish  Italian 
troops  and  aircraft  for  the  invasion  of  Britain.  It  is  clear 
from  this  letter  that  the  Fuehrer  was  at  last  beginning  to 
make  up  his  mind.  The  strange  British  simply  wouldn’t 
listen  to  reason. 

I have  made  to  Britain  so  many  offers  of  agreement,  even 
of  co-operation,  and  I have  been  treated  so  shabbily  [he 
wrote]  that  I am  now  convinced  that  any  new  appeal  to 
reason  would  meet  with  a similar  rejection.  For  in  that  coun- 
try at  present  it  is  not  reason  that  rules  . . .42 

Three  days  later,  on  July  16,  the  warlord  finally 
reached  a decision.  He  issued  “Directive  No.  16  on  the 
Preparation  of  a Landing  Operation  against  England.”  43 


990 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


TOP  SECRET 

Fuehrer’s  Headquarters 
July  16,  1940 

Since  England,  despite  her  militarily  hopeless  situation,  still 
shows  no  sign  of  willingness  to  come  to  terms,  I have  de- 
cided to  prepare  a landing  operation  against  England,  and  if 
necessary  to  carry  it  out. 

The  aim  of  this  operation  is  to  eliminate  the  English 
homeland  as  a base  for  the  carrying  on  of  the  war  against 
Germany,  and,  if  it  should  become  necessary,  to  occupy  it 
completely. 

The  code  name  for  the  assault  was  to  be  “Sea  Lion.” 
Preparations  for  it  were  to  be  completed  by  mid-August. 

“If  necessary  to  carry  it  out.”  Despite  his  growing 
instinct  that  it  would  be  necessary,  he  was  not  quite  sure, 
as  the  directive  shows.  The  “if”  was  still  a big  one  as 
Adolf  Hitler  rose  in  the  Reichstag  on  the  evening  of  July 
19  to  make  his  final  peace  offer  to  Britain.  It  was  the  last 
of  his  great  Reichstag  speeches  and  the  last  of  so  many 
in  this  place  down  the  years  that  this  writer  would  hear. 
It  was  also  one  of  his  best.  I put  down  my  impressions  of 
it  that  same  evening. 

The  Hider  we  saw  in  the  Reichstag  tonight  was  the  con- 
queror and  conscious  of  it,  and  yet  so  wonderful  an  actor, 
so  magnificent  a handler  of  the  German  mind,  that  he 
mixed  superbly  the  full  confidence  of  the  conqueror  with 
the  humbleness  which  always  goes  down  so  well  with  the 
masses  when  they  know  a man  is  on  top.  His  voice  was 
lower  tonight;  he  rarely  shouted  as  he  usually  does;  and  he 
did  not  once  cry  out  hysterically  as  I’ve  seen  him  do  so 
often  from  this  rostrum. 

To  be  sure,  his  long  speech  was  swollen  with  falsi- 
fications of  history  and  liberally  sprinkled  with  personal 
insults  of  Churchill.  But  it  was  moderate  in  tone,  consid- 
ering the  glittering  circumstances,  and  shrewdly  conceived 
to  win  the  support  not  only  of  his  own  people  but  of  the 
neutrals  and  to  give  the  masses  in  England  something  to 
think  about. 

From  Britain  [he  said]  I now  hear  only  a single  cry — 
not  of  the  people  but  of  the  politicians — that  the  war  must 
go  on!  I do  not  know  whether  these  politicians  already  have 
a correct  idea  of  what  the  continuation  of  this  struggle  will 
be  like.  They  do,  it  is  true,  declare  that  they  will  carry  on 


991 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

with  the  war  and  that,  even  if  Great  Britain  should  perish, 
they  would  carry  on  from  Canada.  I can  hardly  believe 
that  they  mean  by  this  that  the  people  of  Britain  are  to  go 
to  Canada.  Presumably  only  those  gentlemen  interested  in 
the  continuation  of  their  war  will  go  there.  The  people,  I am 
afraid,  will  have  to  remain  in  Britain  and  . . . will  cer- 
tainly regard  the  war  with  other  eyes  than  their  so-called 
leaders  in  Canada. 

Believe  me,  gentlemen,  I feel  a deep  disgust  for  this  type  of 
unscrupulous  politician  who  wrecks  whole  nations.  It  al- 
most causes  me  pain  to  think  that  I should  have  been 
selected  by  fate  to  deal  the  final  blow  to  the  structure  which 
these  men  have  already  set  tottering  . . . Mr.  Churchill  . . . 
no  doubt  will  already  be  in  Canada,  where  the  money  and 
children  of  those  principally  interested  in  the  war  have  al- 
ready been  sent.  For  millions  of  other  people,  however, 
great  suffering  will  begin.  Mr.  Churchill  ought  perhaps,  for 
once,  to  believe  me  when  I prophesy  that  a great  Empire 
will  be  destroyed — an  Empire  which  it  was  never  my  in- 
tention to  destroy  or  even  to  harm  . . . 

Having  thus  tilted  at  the  dogged  Prime  Minister  and 
attempted  to  detach  the  British  people  from  him,  Hitler 
came  to  the  point  of  his  lengthy  speech. 

In  this  hour  I feel  it  to  be  my  duty  before  my  own  con- 
science to  appeal  once  more  to  reason  and  common  sense  in 
Great  Britain  as  much  as  elsewhere.  I consider  myself  in 
a position  to  make  this  appeal  since  I am  not  the  vanquished 
begging  favors,  but  the  victor  speaking  in  the  name  of 
reason. 

I can  see  no  reason  why  this  war  must  go  on.* 

He  was  not  more  specific  than  that.  He  made  no  con- 
crete suggestions  for  peace  terms,  no  mention  of  what 

* There  was  a colorful  scene  and  one  unprecedented  in  German  history  when 
Hitler  suddenly  broke  off  his  speech  in  the  middle  to  award  field  marshals’ 
batons  to  twelve  generals  and  a special  king-size  one  to  Goering,  who  was 
given  the  newly  created  rank  of  Reich  Marshal  of  the  Greater  German 
Reich,  which  put  him  above  all  the  others.  He  was  also  awarded  the  Grand 
Cross  of  the  Iron  Cross,  the  only  one  given  during  the  entire  war.  Haider 
was  passed  over  in  this  avalanche  of  field  marshal  awards,  being  merely 
promoted  one  grade,  from  lieutenant  general  to  general.  This  promiscuous 
award  of  field-marshalships — the  Kaiser  had  named  only  five  field  marshals 
from  the  officer  corps  during  all  of  World  War  I and  not  even  Ludendorff 
had  been  made  one — undoubtedly  helped  to  stifle  any  latent  opposition  to 
Hitler  among  the  generals  such  as  had  threatened  to  remove  him  on  at  least 
three  occasions  in  the  past.  In  achieving  this  and  in  debasing  the  value  of 
the  highest  military  rank  by  raising  so  many  to  it.  Hitler  acted  shrewdly 
to  tighten  his  hold  over  the  generals.  Nin^  Army  generals  were  promoted  to 
field  marshal:  Brauchitsch,  Keitel,  Rundstedt,  Bock,  Leeb,  List,  Kluge, 
Witzleben  and  Reichenau;  and  three  Luftwaffe  officers;  Milch,  Kessel- 
ring  and  Sperrle. 


992 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


was  to  happen  to  the  hundred  million  people  now  under 
the  Nazi  yoke  in  the  conquered  countries.  But  there  were 
few  if  any  in  the  Reichstag  that  evening  who  believed  that 
it  was  necessary  at  this  stage  to  go  into  the  details.  I 
mingled  with  a good  many  officials  and  officers  at  the  close 
of  the  session  and  not  one  of  them  had  the  slightest  doubt, 
as  they  said,  that  the  British  would  accept  what  they  really 
believed  was  a very  generous  and  even  magnanimous  offer 
from  the  Fuehrer.  They  were  not  for  long  to  be  deceived. 

I drove  directly  to  the  Rundfunk  to  make  a broadcast 
report  of  the  speech  to  the  United  States.  I had  hardly  ar- 
rived at  Broadcasting  House  when  I picked  up  a BBC 
broadcast  in  German  from  London.  It  was  giving  the  Brit- 
ish answer  to  Hitler  already — within  the  hour.  It  was  a de- 
termined No!  * 

Junior  officers  from  the  High  Command  and  officials 
from  various  ministries  were  sitting  around  the  room  lis- 
tening with  rapt  attention.  Their  faces  fell.  They  could  not 
believe  their  ears.  “Can  you  make  it  out?”  one  of  them 
shouted  to  me.  He  seemed  dazed.  “Can  you  understand 
those  British  fools?”  he  continued  to  bellow.  “To  turn 
down  peace  now?  They’re  crazy!” 

The  same  evening  Ciano  t heard  the  reaction  to  the 
crazy  English  on  a much  higher  level  in  Berlin  than  mine. 
“Late  in  the  evening,”  he  noted  in  his  diary,  “when  the  first 
cold  English  reactions  to  the  speech  arrive,  a sense  of  ill- 
concealed  disappointment  spreads  among  the  Germans.” 
The  effect  on  Mussolini,  according  to  Ciano,  was  just  the 
opposite. 

He  . . . defines  it  “a  much  too  cunning  speech.”  He  fears 
that  the  English  may  find  in  it  a pretext  to  begin  negotiations. 
That  would  be  sad  for  Mussolini,  because  now  more  than 
ever  he  wants  war.44 

The  Duce,  as  Churchill  later  remarked,  “need  not  have 
fretted  himself.  He  was  not  to  be  denied  all  the  war  he 
wanted.”  46 

* Churchill  later  declared  that  this  immediate  and  brusque  rejection  of 
5i,:1irf’sc.peace  offer  was  made  “br  the  BBC  without  any  prompting  from 
H.  M.  Government  as  soon  as  Hitler’s  speech  was  heard  over  the  radio.” 
(Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour,  p.  260.) 

t The  Italian  Foreign  Minister  had  behaved  like  a clown  during  the  Reich- 
stag session,  bobbing  up  and  down  like  a jack-in-the-box  to  give  the  Fascist 
salute  every  time  Hitler  paused  for  breath.  I also  noticed  Quisling  a pig- 
eyed little  man,  crouching  in  a corner  seat  in  the  first  balcony  He  had 
come  to  Berlin  to  beg  the  Fuehrer  to  reinstate  him  in  power  in  Oslo 


993 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

“As  a manuever  calculated  to  rally  the  German  people 
for  the  fight  against  Britain,”  I wrote  in  my  diary  that 
night,  “Hider’s  speech  was  a masterpiece.  For  the  German 
people  will  now  say:  ‘Hitler  offers  England  peace,  and  no 
strings  attached.  He  says  he  sees  no  reason  why  this  war 
should  go  on.  If  it  does,  it’s  England’s  fault.’  ” 

And  was  that  not  the  principal  reason  for  giving  it, 
three  days  after  he  had  issued  Directive  No.  16  to  prepare 
the  invasion  of  Britain?  He  admitted  as  much — before- 
hand— to  two  Italian  confidants,  Alfieri  and  Ciano.  On 
July  1 he  had  told  the  ambassador: 

...  It  was  always  a good  tactic  to  make  the  enemy  re- 
sponsible in  the  eyes  of  public  opinion  in  Germany  and 
abroad  for  the  future  course  of  events.  This  strengthened 
one’s  own  morale  and  weakened  that  of  the  enemy.  An 
operation  such  as  the  one  Germany  was  planning  would 
be  very  bloody  . . . Therefore  one  must  convince  public 
opinion  that  everything  had  first  been  done  to  avoid  this 
horror  . . . 

In  his  speech  of  October  6 [when  he  had  offered  peace 
to  the  West  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Polish  campaign — W.L.S.] 
he  had  likewise  been  guided  by  the  thought  of  making  the 
opposing  side  responsible  for  all  subsequent  developments. 
He  had  thereby  won  the  war,  as  it  were,  before  it  had 
really  started.  Now  again  he  intended  for  psychological  rea- 
sons to  buttress  morale,  so  to  speak,  for  the  action  about 
to  be  taken.46 

A week  later,  on  July  8,  Hitler  confided  to  Ciano  that 

he  would  stage  another  demonstration  so  that  in  case  the 
war  should  continue — which  he  thought  was  the  only  real 
possibility  that  came  into  question — he  might  achieve  a 
psychological  effect  among  the  English  people  . . . Perhaps 
it  would  be  possible  by  a skillful  appeal  to  the  English  people 
to  isolate  the  English  Government  still  further  in  England.47 

It  did  not  prove  possible.  The  speech  of  July  19 
worked  with  the  German  people,  but  not  with  the  British. 
On  July  22  Lord  Halifax  in  a broadcast  made  the  rejection 
of  Hitler’s  peace  offer  official.  Though  it  had  been  expect- 
ed, it  somehow  jolted  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  where  I found 
many  angry  faces  that  afternoon.  “Lord  Halifax,”  the 
official  government  spokesman  told  us,  “has  refused  to 
accept  the  peace  offer  of  the  Fuehrer.  Gentlemen,  there 
will  be  war!” 


994 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


It  was  easier  said  than  done.  In  truth  neither  Hitler, 
the  High  Command  nor  the  general  staffs  of  the  Army, 
Navy  and  Air  Force  had  even  seriously  considered  how  a 
war  with  Great  Britain  could  be  fought  and  won  Now 
in  the  midsummer  of  1940  they  did  not  know  what  to  do 
with  their  glittering  success;  they  had  no  plans  and  scarcely 
any  will  for  exploiting  the  greatest  military  victories  in  the 
history  of  their  soldiering  nation.  This  is  one  of  the  great 
paradoxes  of  the  Third  Reich.  At  the  very  moment  when 
Hitler  stood  at  the  zenith  of  his  military  power,  with  most 
of  the  European  Continent  at  his  feet,  his  victorious 
armies  stretched  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Arctic  Circle, 
from  the  Atlantic  to  beyond  the  Vistula,  rested  now  and 
ready  for  further  action,  he  had  no  idea  how  to  go  on  and 
bring  the  war  to  a victorious  conclusion.  Nor  had  his 
generals,  twelve  of  whom  now  bandied  field  marshals’ 
batons. 

There  is,  of  course,  a reason  for  this,  although  it  was 
not  clear  to  us  at  the  time.  The  Germans,  despite  their 
vaunted  military  talents,  lacked  any  grand  strategic  con- 
cept. Their  horizons  were  limited — they  had  always  been 
limited — to  land  warfare  against  the  neighboring  nations 
on  the  European  Continent.  Hitler  himself  had  a horror 
of  the  sea  * and  his  great  captains  almost  a total  ignorance 
of  it.  They  were  land-minded,  not  sea-minded.  And  though 
their  armies  could  have  crushed  in  a week  the  feeble  land 
forces  of  Britain  if  they  had  only  been  able  to  come  to 
grips  with  them,  even  the  narrow  waters  of  the  Dover 
Straits  which  separated  the  two — so  narrow  that  you  can 
see  across  to  the  opposite  shore — loomed  in  their  minds, 
as  the  splendid  summer  began  to  wane,  as  an  obstacle 
they  knew  not  how  to  overcome. 

There  was  of  course  another  alternative  open  to  the 
Germans.  They  might  bring  Britain  down  by  striking  across 
the  Mediterranean  with  their  Italian  ally,  taking  Gibraltar 
at  its  western  opening  and  in  the  east  driving  on  from 
Italy’s  bases  in  North  Africa  through  Egypt  and  over  the 
canal  to  Iran,  severing  one  of  the  Empire’s  main  life  lines. 
But  this  necessitated  vast  operations  overseas  at  distances 
far  from  home  bases,  and  in  1940  it  seemed  beyond  the 
scope  of  the  German  imagination. 


* “On  land  I am  a hero,  but  on  water  I 
once.  (Shulman,  Defeat  in  the  West,  p.  50. 


am  a coward,”  he  told  Rundstedt 


995 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Thus  at  the  height  of  dizzy  success  Hitler  and  his  cap- 
tains hesitated.  They  had  not  thought  out  the  next  step 
and  how  it  was  to  be  carried  through.  This  fateful  neglect 
would  prove  to  be  one  of  the  great  turning  points  of  the 
war  and  indeed  of  the  short  life  of  the  Third  Reich  and 
of  the  meteoric  career  of  Adolf  Hitler.  Failure,  after  so 
many  stupendous  victories,  was  now  to  set  in.  But  this,  to 
be  sure,  could  not  be  foreseen  as  beleaguered  Britain, 
now  holding  out  alone,  girded  herself  with  what  small 
means  she  had  for  the  German  onslaught  at  the  summer’s 
end. 


22 


OPERATION  SEA  LION: 
THE  THWARTED  INVASION 
OF  RRITAIN 


the  final  german  victory  over  England  is  now  only 
a question  of  time,”  General  Jodi,  Chief  of  Operations  at 
OKW,  wrote  on  June  30,  1940.  “Enemy  offensive  opera- 
tions on  a large  scale  are  no  longer  possible.” 

Hitler’s  favorite  strategist  was  in  a confident  and  com- 
placent mood.  France  had  capitulated  the  week  before, 
leaving  Britain  alone  and  apparently  helpless.  On  June  15 
Hitler  had  informed  the  generals  that  he  wanted  the 
Army  partially  demobilized — from  160  to  120  divisions. 
“The  assumption  behind  this,”  Haider  noted  in  his  diary 
that  day,  “is  that  the  task  of  the  Army  is  fulfilled.  The 
Air  Force  and  Navy  will  be  given  the  mission  of  carrying 
on  alone  the  war  against  England.” 

In  truth,  the  Army  showed  little  interest  in  it.  Nor  was 
the  Fuehrer  himself  much  concerned.  On  June  17  Colonel 
Walter  Warlimont,  Jodi’s  deputy,  informed  the  Navy  that 
“with  regard  to  the  landing  in  Britain,  the  Fuehrer  . . . 
has  not  up  to  now  expressed  such  an  intention  . . . There- 
fore, even  at  this  time,  no  preparatory  work  of  any  kind 
[has]  been  carried  out  in  OKW.”  1 Four  days  later,  on 
June  21,  at  the  very  moment  Hitler  was  entering’  the 
armistice  car  at  Compiegne  to  humble  the  French,  the 
Navy  was  informed  that  the  “Army  General  Staff  is  not 
concerning  itself  with  the  question  of  England.  Considers 
execution  impossible.  Does  not  know  how  operation  is 
to  be  conducted  from  southern  area  . . . General  Staff 
rejects  the  operation.”  2 

None  of  the  gifted  planners  in  any  of  the  three  German 

996 


997 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

armed  services  knew  how  Britain  was  to  be  invaded, 
though  it  was  the  Navy,  not  unnaturally,  which  had  first 
given  the  matter  some  thought.  As  far  back  as  November 
15,  1939,  when  Hitler  was  trying  vainly  to  buck  up  his 
generals  to  launch  an  attack  in  the  West,  Raeder  instructed 
the  Naval  War  Staff  to  examine  “the  possibility  of  invading 
England,  a possibility  arising  if  certain  conditions  are  ful- 
filled by  the  further  course  of  the  war.”  3 It  was  the  first 
time  in  history  that  any  German  military  staff  had  been 
asked  even  to  consider  such  an  action.  It  seems  likely  that 
Raeder  took  this  step  largely  because  he  wanted  to  antici- 
pate any  sudden  aberration  of  his  unpredictable  Leader. 
There  is  no  record  that  Hitler  was  consulted  or  knew  any- 
thing about  it.  The  furthest  his  thoughts  went  at  this  time 
was  to  get  airfields  and  naval  bases  in  Holland,  Belgium 
and  France  for  the  tightening  of  the  blockade  against  the 
British  Isles. 

By  December  1939,  the  Army  and  Luftwaffe  high  com- 
mands were  also  giving  some  thought  to  the  problem  of 
invading  Britain.  Rather  nebulous  ideas  of  the  three  serv- 
ices were  exchanged,  but  they  did  not  get  very  far.  In 
January  1940,  the  Navy  and  Air  Force  rejected  an  Army 
plan  as  unrealistic.  To  the  Navy  it  did  not  take  into  ac- 
count British  naval  power;  to  the  Luftwaffe  it  underesti- 
mated the  R.A.F.  “In  conclusion,”  remarked  the  Luft- 
waffe General  Staff  in  a communication  to  OKH,  “a  com- 
bined operation  with  a landing  in  England  as  its  object 
must  be  rejected.”  4 Later,  as  we  shall  see,  Goering  and  his 
aides  were  to  take  a quite  contrary  view. 

The  first  mention  in  the  German  records  that  Hitler 
was  even  facing  the  possibility  of  invading  Britain  was  on 
May  21,  the  day  after  the  armored  forces  drove  through 
to  the  sea  at  Abbeville.  Raeder  discussed  “in  private”  with 
the  Fuehrer  “the  possibility  of  a later  landing  in  England.” 
The  source  of  this  information  is  Admiral  Raeder,5 
whose  Navy  was  not  sharing  in  the  glory  of  the  astounding 
victories  of  the  Army  and  Air  Force  in  the  West  and 
who,  understandably,  was  seeking  means  of  bringing  his 
service  back  into  the  picture.  But  Hitler’s  thoughts  were  on 
the  battle  of  encirclement  to  the  north  and  on  the  Somme 
front  then  forming  to  the  south.  He  did  not  trouble  his 
generals  with  matters  beyond  these  two  immediate  tasks. 

The  naval  officers,  however,  with  little  else  to  do,  con- 


998 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tinued  to  study  the  problem  of  invasion,  and  by  May  27 
Rear  Admiral  Kurt  Fricke,  Chief  of  the  Naval  War  Staff 
Operations  Division,  came  up  with  a fresh  plan  entitled 
Studie  England.  Preliminary  work  was  also  begun  on 
rounding  up  shipping  and  developing  landing  craft,  the 
latter  of  which  the  German  Navy  was  entirely  bereft.  In 
this  connection  Dr.  Gottfried  Feder,  the  economic  crank 
who  had  helped  Hitler  draft  the  party  program  in  the 
early  Munich  days  and  who  was  now  a State  Secretary  in 
the  Ministry  of  Economics,  where  his  crackpot  ideas  were 
given  short  shrift,  produced  plans  for  what  he  called  a 
“war  crocodile.”  This  was  a sort  of  self-propelled  barge 
made  of  concrete  which  could  carry  a company  of  two 
hundred  men  with  full  equipment  or  several  tanks  or  pieces 
of  artillery,  roll  up  on  any  beach  and  provide  cover  for  the 
disembarking  troops  and  vehicles.  It  was  taken  quite  seri- 
ously by  the  Naval  Command  and  even  by  Haider,  who 
mentioned  it  in  his  diary,  and  was  discussed  at  length 
by  Hitler  and  Raeder  on  June  20.  But  nothing  came  of  it 
in  the  end. 

To  the  admirals  nothing  seemed  to  be  coming  of  an 
invasion  of  the  British  Isles  as  June  approached  its  end. 
Following  his  appearance  at  Compiegne  on  June  21, 
Hitler  went  off  with  some  old  cronies  to  do  the  sights  of 
Paris  briefly  * and  then  to  visit  the  battlefields,  not  of  this 
war  but  of  the  first  war,  where  he  had  served  as  a dis- 
patch runner.  With  him  was  his  tough  top  sergeant  of 
those  days,  Max  Amann,  now  a millionaire  Nazi  publisher. 
The  future  course  of  the  war — specifically,  how  to  con- 
tinue the  fight  against  Britain — seemed  the  least  of  his 
concerns,  or  perhaps  it  was  merely  that  he  believed  that 
this  little  matter  was  already  settled,  since  the  British 
would  now  come  to  “reason”  and  make  peace. 

Hitler  did  not  return  to  his  new  headquarters,  Tannen- 
berg,  west  of  Freudenstadt  in  the  Black  Forest,  until  the 
twenty-ninth  of  June.  The  next  day,  coming  down  to 
earth,  he  mulled  over  Jodi’s  paper  on  what  to  do  next.  It 
was  entitled  “The  Continuation  of  the  War  against  Eng- 
land.” 6 Though  Jodi  was  second  only  to  Keitel  at  OKW 
in  his  fanatical  belief  in  the  Fuehrer’s  genius,  he  was, 


* And  to  gaze  down  at  the  tomb  of  Napoleon  at  the  Invalides.  “That,”  he 
told  his  faithful  photographer,  Heinrich  Hoffmann,  “was  the  greatest  and 
finest  moment  of  my  life.” 


999 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

when  left  alone,  usually  a prudent  strategist.  But  now  he 
ihared  the  general  view  at  Supreme  Headquarters  that 
the  war  was  won  and  almost  over.  If  Britain  didn’t  realize 
it,  a little  more  force  would  have  to  be  supplied  to  remind 
her.  For  the  “seige”  of  England,  his  memorandum  pro- 
posed three  steps:  intensification  of  the  German  air  and 
sea  war  against  British  shipping,  storage  depots,  factories 
and  the  R.A.F.;  “terror  attacks  against  the  centers  of  popu- 
lation”; “a  landing  of  troops  with  the  objective  of  occupy- 
ing England.” 

Jodi  recognized  that  “the  fight  against  the  British  Air 
Force  must  have  top  priority.”  But,  on  the  whole,  he 
thought  this  as  well  as  other  aspects  of  the  assault  could 
be  carried  out  with  little  trouble. 

Together  with  propaganda  and  periodic  terror  attacks,  an- 
nounced as  reprisals,  this  increasing  weakening  of  the  basis 
of  food  supply  will  paralyze  and  finally  break  the  will  of 
the  people  to  resist,  and  thereby  force  its  government  to 
capitulate  * 

As  for  a landing,  it  could 

only  be  contemplated  after  Germany  has  gained  control  of 
the  air.  A landing,  therefore,  should  not  have  as  its  ob- 
jective the  military  conquest  of  England,  a task  that  could 
be  left  to  the  Air  Force  and  Navy.  Its  aim  should  rather  be  to 
administer  the  deathblow  [ Todesstoss ] to  an  England  al- 
ready economically  paralyzed  and  no  longer  capable  of  fight- 
ing in  the  air,  if  this  is  still  necessary .t 

However,  thought  Jodi,  all  this  might  not  be  necessary. 

Since  England  can  no  longer  fight  for  victory,  but  only 
for  the  preservation  of  its  possessions  and  its  world  prestige 
she  should,  according  to  all  predictions,  be  inclined  to  make 
peace  when  she  learns  that  she  can  still  get  it  now  at  rela- 
tively little  cost 

This  was  what  Hitler  thought  too  and  he  immediately 
set  to  work  on  his  peace  speech  for  the  Reichstag.  In 
the  meantime,  as  we  have  seen,  he  ordered  (July  2)  some 
preliminary  planning  for  a landing  and  on  July  16,  when 
no  word  of  “reason”  had  come  from  London,  issued  Di- 
rective No.  16  for  Sea  Lion.  At  last,  after  more  than  six 

* The  emphasis  is  Jodi’s.  _ 

t Jodi  also  suggested  the  possibility  of  “extending  the  war  to  the  periphery 
— that  is,  attacking  the  British  Empire  with  the  help  not  only  of  Italy  but 
of  Japan,  Spain  and  Russia. 


1000 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


weeks  of  hesitation,  it  was  decided  to  invade  Britain,  “if 
necessary.”  This,  as  Hitler  and  his  generals  belatedly  began 
to  realize,  would  have  to  be  a major  military  operation, 
not  without  its  risks  and  depending  for  success  on  wheth- 
er the  Luftwaffe  and  the  Navy  could  prepare  the  way  for 
the  troops  against  a far  superior  British  Navy  and  a by 
no  means  negligible  enemy  Air  Force. 

Was  Sea  Lion  a serious  plan?  And  was  it  seriously  in- 
tended that  it  should  be  carried  out? 

To  this  day  many  have  doubted  it  and  they  have  been 
reinforced  in  their  opinions  by  the  chorus  from  the  Ger- 
man generals  after  the  war.  Rundstedt,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  invasion,  told  Allied  investigators  in  1945: 

The  proposed  invasion  of  England  was  nonsense,  because 
adequate  ships  were  not  available  . . . We  looked  upon  the 
whole  thing  as  a sort  of  game  because  it  was  obvious  that 
no  invasion  was  possible  when  our  Navy  was  not  in  a posi- 
tion to  cover  a crossing  of  the  Channel  or  carry  reinforce- 
ments. Nor  was  the  German  Air  Force  capable  of  taking  on 
these  functions  if  the  Navy  failed  ...  I was  always  very 
skeptical  about  the  whole  affair  ...  I have  a feeling  that 
the  Fuehrer  never  really  wanted  to  invade  England.  He 
never  had  sufficient  courage  . . . He  definitely  hoped  that 
the  English  would  make  peace  . . .7 

Blumentritt,  Rundstedt’s  chief  of  operations,  expressed 
similar  views  to  Liddell  Hart  after  the  war,  claiming  that 
“among  ourselves  we  talked  of  it  [Sea  Lion]  as  a bluff.”  8 

I myself  spent  a few  days  at  the  middle  of  August  on 
the  Channel,  snooping  about  from  Antwerp  to  Boulogne 
in  search  of  the  invasion  army.  On  August  15,  at  Calais 
and  at  Cap  Gris-Nez,  we  saw  swarms  of  German  bomb- 
ers and  fighters  heading  over  the  Channel  toward  Eng- 
land on  what  turned  out  to  be  the  first  massive  air  as- 
sault. And  while  it  was  evident  that  the  Luftwaffe  was 
going  all  out,  the  lack  of  shipping  and  especially  of  in- 
vasion barges  in  the  ports  and  in  the  canals  and  rivers 
behind  them  left  me  with  the  impression  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  bluffing.  They  simply  did  not  have  the  means, 
so  far  as  I could  see,  of  getting  their  troops  across  the 
Channel. 

But  one  reporter  can  see  very  little  of  a war  and  we 
know  now  that  the  Germans  did  not  begin  to  assemble 
the  invasion  fleet  until  September  1.  As  for  the  generals, 


1001 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

anyone  who  read  their  interrogations  or  listened  to  them 
on  cross-examination  at  the  Nuremberg  trials  learned  to 
take  their  postwar  testimony  with  more  than  a grain  of 
salt.*  The  trickiness  of  man’s  memory  is  always  consid- 
erable and  the  German  generals  were  no  exception  to  this 
rule.  Also  they  had  many  axes  to  grind,  one  of  the  fore- 
most being  to  discredit  Hitler’s  military  leadership.  In- 
deed, their  principal  theme,  expounded  at  dreary  length 
in  their  memoirs  and  in  their  interrogations  and  trial 
testimony,  was  that  if  they  had  been  left  to  make  the  deci- 
sions Hitler  never  would  have  led  the  Third  Reich  to 
defeat. 

Unfortunately  for  them,  but  fortunately  for  posterity 
and  the  truth,  the  mountainous  secret  German  military 
files  leave  no  doubt  that  Hitler’s  plan  to  invade  Britain  in 
the  early  fall  of  1940  was  deadly  serious  and  that,  though 
■given  to  many  hesitations,  the  Nazi  dictator  seriously  in- 
tended to  carry  it  out  if  there  were  any  reasonable  chance 
of  success.  Its  ultimate  fate  was  settled  not  by  any  lack  of 
determination  or  effort  but  by  the  fortunes  of  war,  which 
now,  for  the  first  time,  began  to  turn  against  him. 

On  July  17,  the  day  after  Directive  No.  16  was  issued 
to  prepare  the  invasion  and  two  days  before  the  Fuehrer’s 
“peace”  speech  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Army  High  Com- 
mand (OKH)  allocated  the  forces  for  Sea  Lion  and  or- 
dered thirteen  picked  divisions  to  the  jumping-off  places 
on  the  Channel  coast  for  the  first  wave  of  the  invasion. 
On  the  same  day  the  Army  Command  completed  its  de- 
tailed plan  for  a landing  on  a broad  front  on  the  south 
coast  of  England. 

The  main  thrust  here,  as  in  the  Battle  of  France,  would 
be  carried  out  by  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt  (as  he 
would  be  titled  on  July  19)  as  commander  of  Army  Group 
A.  Six  infantry  divisions  of  General  Ernst  Busch’s  Six- 
teenth Army  were  to  embark  from  the  Pas  de  Calais  and 
hit  the  beaches  between  Ramsgate  and  Bexhill.  Four  di- 
visions of  General  Adolf  Strauss’s  Ninth  Army  would 
cross  the  Channel  from  the  area  of  Le  Havre  and  land 
between  Brighton  and  the  Isle  of  Wight.  Farther  to  the 

* Even  so  astute  a military  critic  as  Liddell  Hart  neglected  always  to  do  so, 
and  this  neglect  mars  his  book  The  German  Generals  Talk.  Talk  they  did, 
but  not  always  with  very  good  memories  or  even  very  truthfully. 


1002 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


west  three  divisions  of  Field  Marshal  von  Reichenau’s 
Sixth  Army  (from  Field  Marshal  von  Bock’s  Army  Group 
B),  taking  off  from  the  Cherbourg  peninsula,  would  be 
put  ashore  in  Lyme  Bay,  between  Weymouth  and  Lyme 
Regis.  Altogether  90,000  men  would  form  the  first  wave; 
by  the  third  day  the  High  Command  planned  on  putting 
ashore  a total  of  260,000  men.  Airborne  forces  would 
help  out  after  being  dropped  at  Lyme  Bay  and  other 
areas.  An  armored  force  of  no  less  than  six  panzer  divi- 
sions, reinforced  by  three  motorized  divisions,  would  fol- 
low in  the  second  wave  and  in  a few  days  it  was  planned 
to  have  ashore  a total  of  thirty-nine  divisions  plus  two 
airborne  divisions. 

Their  task  was  as  follows.  After  the  bridgeheads  had 
been  secured,  the  divisions  of  Army  Group  A in  the 
southeast  would  push  forward  to  the  first  objective,  a 
line  running  between  Gravesend  and  Southampton. 
Reichenau’s  Sixth  Army  would  advance  north  to  Bristol, 
cutting  off  Devon  and  Cornwall.  The  second  objective 
would  be  a line  between  Maldon  on  the  east  coast  north  of 
the  Thames  estuary  to  the  Severn  River,  blocking  off 
Wales.  “Heavy  battles  with  strong  British  forces”  were 
expected  to  develop  at  about  the  time  the  Germans 
reached  their  first  objective.  But  they  would  be  quickly 
won,  London  surrounded,  and  the  drive  northward  re- 
sumed.9 Brauchitsch  told  Raeder  on  July  17  that  the 
whole  operation  would  be  finished  in  a month  and  would 
be  relatively  easy.*  10 

* German  intelligence  overestimated  British  strength  on  the  ground  through- 
out July,  August  and  September  by  about  eight  divisions.  Early  in  July  the 
German  General  Staff  estimated  British  strength  at  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
divisions  “of  fighting  value.”  Actually  there  were  twenty-nine  divisions  in 
England  at  this  time  but  not  more  than  half  a dozen  of  much  “fighting 
value,”  as  they  had  practically  no  armor  or  artillery.  But  contrary  to  wide- 
spread belief  at  the  time,  which  has  lingered  to  this  day,  the  British  Army 
by  the  middle  of  September  would  have  been  a match  for  the  German 
divisions  then  allocated  for  the  first  wave  of  invasion.  By  that  time  it  had 
ready  to  meet  an  attack  on  the  south  coast  a force  of  sixteen  well-trained 
divisions,  of  which  three  were  armored,  with  four  divisions  plus  an  armored 
brigade  covering  the  east  coast  from  the  Thames  to  the  Wash.  This  repre- 
sented a remarkable  recovery  after  the  debacle  at  Dunkirk,  which  had  left 
Britain  virtually  defenseless  on  land  in  June. 

British  intelligence  of  the  German  plans  was  extremely  faulty  and  for  the 
first  three  months  of  the  invasion  threat  almost  completely  wrong.  Through- 
out the  summer,  Churchill  and  his  military  advisers  remained  convinced 
that  the  Germans  would  make  their  main  landing  attempt  on  the  east  coast 
and  it  was  here  that  the  bulk  of  the  British  land  forces  were  concentrated 
until  September. 


1003 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

But  Raeder  and  the  Naval  High  Command  were  skepti- 
cal. An  operation  of  such  size  on  such  a broad  front — it 
stretched  over  two  hundred  miles  from  Ramsgate  to  Lyme 
Bay — was  simply  beyond  the  means  of  the  German  Navy 
to  convoy  and  protect.  Raeder  so  informed  OKW  two 
days  later  and  brought  it  up  again  on  July  21  when  Hitler 
summoned  him,  Brauchitsch  and  General  Hans  Jeschon- 
nek  (Chief  of  the  Luftwaffe  General  Staff)  to  a meeting  in 
Berlin.  The  Fuehrer  was  still  confused  about  “what  is 
going  on  in  England.”  He  appreciated  the  Navy’s  difficul- 
ties but  stressed  the  importance  of  ending  the  war  as 
soon  as  possible.  For  the  invasion  forty  divisions  would 
be  necessary,  he  said,  and  the  “main  operation”  would 
have  to  be  completed  by  September  15.  On  the  whole  the 
warlord  was  in  an  optimistic  mood  despite  Churchill’s  re- 
fusal at  that  very  moment  to  heed  his  peace  appeal. 

England’s  situation  is  hopeless  [Haider  noted  Hitler  as 
saying].  The  war  has  been  won  by  us.  A reversal  of  the 
prospects  of  success  is  impossible.11 

But  the  Navy,  faced  with  the  appalling  task  of  trans- 
porting a large  army  across  the  choppy  Channel  in  the 
face  of  a vastly  stronger  British  Navy  and  of  an  enemy 
Air  Force  that  seemed  still  rather  active,  was  not  so  sure. 
On  July  29  the  Naval  War  Staff  drew  up  a memorandum 
advising  “against  undertaking  the  operation  this  year” 
and  proposing  that  “it  be  considered  in  May  1941  or  there- 
after.” 12 

Hitler,  however,  insisted  on  considering  it  on  July  31, 
1940,  when  he  again  summoned  his  military  chiefs,  this 
time  to  his  villa  on  the  Obersalzberg.  Besides  Raeder, 
Keitel  and  Jodi  were  there  from  OKW  and  Brauchitsch 
and  Haider  from  the  Army  High  Command.  The  Grand 
Admiral,  as  he  now  was,  did  most  of  the  talking.  He  was 
not  in  a very  hopeful'  mood. 

September  15,  he  said,  would  be  the  earliest  date  for 
Sea  Lion  to  begin,  and  then  only  if  there  were  no  “un- 
foreseen circumstances  due  to  the  weather  or  the  enemy.” 
When  Hitler  inquired  about  the  weather  problem  Raeder 
responded  with  a lecture  on  the  subject  that  grew  quite 
eloquent  and  certainly  forbidding.  Except  for  the  first 
fortnight  in  October  the  weather,  he  explained,  was  “gen- 
erally bad”  in  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea;  light  fog 


1004 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


came  in  the  middle  of  that  month  and  heavy  fog  at  the 
end.  But  that  was  only  part  of  the  weather  problem.  “The 
operation,”  he  declared,  “can  be  carried  out  only  if  the 
sea  is  calm.”  If  the  water  were  rough,  the  barges  would 
sink  and  even  the  big  ships  would  be  helpless,  since  they 
could  not  unload  supplies.  The  Admiral  grew  gloomier 
with  every  minute  that  he  contemplated  what  lay  ahead. 

Even  if  the  first  wave  crosses  successfully  [he  went  on] 
under  favorable  weather  conditions,  there  is  no  guarantee 
that  the  same  favorable  weather  will  carry  through  the  sec- 
ond and  third  waves  ...  As  a matter  of  fact,  we  must  realize 
that  no  traffic  worth  mentioning  will  be  able  to  cross  for  several 
days,  until  certain  harbors  can  be  utilized. 

That  would  leave  the  Army  in  a fine  pickle,  stranded 
on  the  beaches  without  supplies  and  reinforcements.  Rae- 
der  now  came  to  the  main  point  of  the  differences  be- 
tween the  Army  and  the  Navy.  The  Army  wanted  a broad 
front  from  the  Straits  of  Dover  to  Lyme  Bay.  But  the 
Navy  simply  couldn’t  provide  the  ships  necessary  for  such 
an  operation  against  the  expected  strong  reaction  of  the 
British  Navy  and  Air  Force.  Raeder  therefore  argued 
strongly  that  the  front  be  shortened — to  run  only  from 
the  Dover  Straits  to  Eastbourne.  The  Admiral  saved  his 
clincher  for  the  end. 

"All  things  considered,”  he  said,  “the  best  time  for  the 
operation  would  be  May  1941.” 

But  Hitler  did  not  want  to  wait  that  long.  He  conceded 
that  “naturally”  there  was  nothing  they  could  do  about 
the  weather.  But  they  had  to  consider  the  consequences 
of  losing  time.  The  German  Navy  would  not  be  any 
stronger  vis-a-vis  the  British  Navy  by  spring.  The  British 
Army  at  the  moment  was  in  poor  shape.  But  give  it  an- 
other eight  to  ten  months  and  it  would  have  from  thirty 
to  thirty-five  divisions,  which  was  a considerable  force  in 
the  restricted  area  of  the  proposed  invasion.  Therefore 
his  decision  (according  to  the  confidential  notes  made  by 
both  Raeder  and  Haider)  13  was  as  follows: 

Diversions  in  Africa  should  be  studied.  But  the  decisive  result 
can  be  achieved  only  by  an  attack  on  England.  An  attempt  must 
therefore  be  made  to  prepare  the  operation  for  September  15, 
1940  . . . The  decision  as  to  whether  the  operation  is  to  take 
place  in  September  or  is  to  be  delayed  until  May  1941,  will  be 
made  after  the  Air  Force  has  made  concentrated  attacks  on 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1005 

southern  England  for  one  week.  If  the  effect  of  the  air  attacks 
is  such  that  the  enemy  air  force,  harbors  and  naval  forces,  etc. 
are  heavily  damaged.  Operation  Sea  Lion  will  be  carried  out  in 
1940.  Otherwise  it  is  to  be  postponed  until  May  1941. 

All  now  depended  on  the  Luftwaffe. 

The  next  day,  August  1,  Hitler  issued  as  a consequence 
two  directives  from  OKW,  one  signed  by  himself  the 
other  by  KeiteL 

Fuehrer’s  Headquarters 
August  1,  1940 

TOP  SECRET 

Directive  No.  17  for  the  Conduct  of  Air  and  Naval 
Warfare  against  England 

In  order  to  establish  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  final 
conquest  of  England,  I intend  to  continue  the  air  and  naval 
war  against  the  English  homeland  more  intensively  than 
heretofore. 

To  this  end  I issue  the  following  orders: 

1.  The  German  Air  Force  is  to  overcome  the  British  Air 
Force  with  all  means  at  its  disposal  and  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble . . . 

2.  After  gaining  temporary  or  local  air  superiority  the  air 
war  is  to  be  carried  out  against  harbors,  especially  against 
establishments  connected  with  food  supply  . . . Attacks  on 
the  harbors  of  the  south  coast  are  to  be  undertaken  on  the 
smallest  scale  possible,  in  view  of  our  intended  opera- 
tions. . . . 

4.  The  Luftwaffe  is  to  stand  by  in  force  for  Operation  Sea 
Lion. 

5.  I reserve  for  myself  the  decision  on  terror  attacks  as 
means  of  reprisal. 

6.  The  intensified  air  war  may  commence  on  or  after 
August  6 . . . The  Navy  is  authorized  to  begin  the  pro- 
jected intensified  naval  warfare  at  the  same  time. 

Adolf  Hitler  14 

The  directive  signed  by  Keitel  on  behalf  of  Hitler  the 
same  day  read  in  part: 

TOP  SECRET 

Operation  Sea  Lion 

The  C.  in  C.,  Navy,  having  reported  on  July  31  that  the 
necessary  preparations  for  Sea  Lion  could  not  be  completed 
before  September  15,  the  Fuehrer  has  ordered: 


1006 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Preparations  for  Sea  Lion  are  to  be  continued  and  com- 
pleted by  the  Army  and  Air  Force  by  September  15. 

Eight  to  fourteen  days  after  the  launching  of  the  air  of- 
fensive against  Britain,  scheduled  to  begin  about  August  5, 
the  Fuehrer  will  decide  whether  the  invasion  will  take  place 
this  year  or  not;  his  decision  will  depend  largely  on  the  out- 
come of  the  air  offensive  . . . 

In  spite  of  the  Navy’s  warning  that  it  can  guarantee  only 
the  defense  of  a narrow  strip  of  coast  (as  far  west  as 
Eastbourne),  preparations  are  to  be  continued  for  the  at- 
tack on  a broad  basis,  as  originally  planned  . . .1B 

The  last  paragraph  only  served  to  inflame  the  feud  be- 
tween the  Army  and  Navy  over  the  question  of  a long 
or  a short  invasion  front.  A fortnight  before,  the  Naval 
War  Staff  had  estimated  that  to  fulfill  the  demands  of  the 
Army  for  landing  100,000  men  with  equipment  and  sup- 
plies in  the  first  wave,  along  a 200-mile  front  from  Rams- 
gate to  Lyme  Bay,  would  necessitate  rounding  up  1,722 
barges,  1,161  motorboats,  471  tugs  and  155  transports. 
Even  if  it  were  possible  to  assemble  such  a vast  amount 
of  shipping,  Raeder  told  Hitler  on  July  25,  it  would  wreck 
the  German  economy,  since  taking  away  so  many  barges 
and  tugs  would  destroy  the  whole  inland-waterway  trans- 
portation system,  on  which  the  economic  life  of  the  coun- 
try largely  depended.16  At  any  rate,  Raeder  made  it  clear, 
the  protection  of  such  an  armada  trying  to  supply  such  a 
broad  front  against  the  certain  attacks  of  the  British  Navy 
and  Air  Force  was  beyond  the  powers  of  the  German 
naval  forces.  At  one  point  the  Naval  War  Staff  warned  the 
Army  that  if  it  insisted  on  the  broad  front,  the  Navy 
might  lose  all  of  its  ships. 

But  the  Army  persisted.  Overestimating  British  strength 
as  it  did,  it  argued  that  to  land  on  a narrow  front  would 
confront  the  attackers  with  a “superior”  British  land 
force.  On  August  7 there  was  a showdown  between  the 
two  services  when  Haider  met  his  opposite  number  in  the 
Navy,  Admiral  Schniewind,  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  War 
Staff.  There  was  a sharp  and  dramatic  clash. 

“I  utterly  reject  the  Navy’s  proposal,”  the  Army  Gen- 
eral Staff  Chief,  usually  a very  calm  man,  fumed.  “From 
the  point  of  view  of  the  Army  I regard  it  as  complete  sui- 
cide. I might  just  as  well  put  the  troops  that  have  landed 
straight  through  a sausage  machinel” 


1007 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

According  to  the  Naval  War  Staff’s  record  of  the  meet- 
ing * Schniewind  replied  that  it  would  be  “equally  sui- 
cidal” to  attempt  to  transport  the  troops  for  such  a broad 
front  as  the  Army  desired,  “in  view  of  British  naval  su- 
premacy.” 

It  was  a cruel  dilemma.  If  a broad  front  with  the  large 
number  of  troops  to  man  it  was  attempted,  the  whole 
German  expedition  might  be  sunk  at  sea  by  the  British 
Navy.  If  a short  front,  with  correspondingly  fewer 
troops,  was  adopted,  the  invaders  might  be  huried  back 
into  the  sea  by  the  British  Army.  On  August  10  Brau- 
chitsch,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army,  informed 
OKW  that  he  “could  not  accept”  a landing  between  Folke- 
stone and  Eastbourne.  However,  he  was  willing,  albeit 
“very  reluctantly,”  to  abandon  the  landing  at  Lyme  Bay 
in  order  to  shorten  the  front  and  meet  the  Navy  halfway. 

This  was  not  enough  for  the  hardheaded  admirals,  and 
their  caution  and  stubbornness  were  beginning  to  have  an 
effect  at  OKW.  On  August  13  Jodi  drafted  an  “apprecia- 
tion” of  the  situation,  laying  down  five  conditions  for  the 
success  of  Sea  Lion  that  seemingly  would  have  struck  the 
generals  and  admirals  as  almost  ludicrous  had  their  di- 
lemma not  been  so  serious.  First,  he  said,  the  British  Navy 
would  have  to  be  eliminated  from  the  south  coast,  and 
second,  the  R.A.F.  would  have  to  be  eliminated  from  the 
British  skies.  The  other  conditions  concerned  the  landing 
of  troops  in  a strength  and  with  a rapidity  that  were  ob- 
viously far  beyond  the  Navy’s  powers.  If  these  conditions 
were  not  fulfilled,  he  considered  the  landing  “an  act  of 
desperation  which  would  have  to  be  carried  out  in  a des- 
perate situation,  but  which  we  have  no  cause  to  carry  out 
now.”  17 

If  the  Navy’s  fears  were  spreading  to  Jodi,  the  OKW 
Operations  Chief’s  hesitations  were  having  their  effect  on 
Hitler.  All  through  the  war  the  Fuehrer  leaned  much 
more  heavily  on  Jodi  than  on  the  Chief  of  OKW,  the 
spineless,  dull-minded  Keitel.  It  is  not  surprising,  then, 
that  on  August  13,  when  Raeder  saw  the  Supreme  Com- 

* In  his  diary  entry  that  evening  Haider  did  not  quote  himself  as  above.  He 
declared,  however,  that  “the  talk  led  only  to  the  confirmation  of  an  un- 
bridgeable gap.”  The  Navy,  he  said,  was  “afraid  of  the  British  High  Seas 
Fleet  and  maintained  that  a defense  against  this  danger  by  the  Luftwaffe 
was  impossible.”  Obviously  by  this  time  the  German  Navy,  if  not  the  Army, 
had  few  illusions  about  the  striking  power  of  Goering’s  Air  Force. 


1008 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


mander  in  Berlin  and  requested  a decision  on  the  broad 
versus  the  narrow  front,  Hitler  was  inclined  to  agree  with 
the  Navy  on  the  smaller  operation.  He  promised  to  make 
a definite  ruling  the  next  day  after  he  had  seen  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Army.18  After  hearing  Brau- 
chitsch’s  views  on  the  fourteenth,  Hitler  finally  made  up 
his  mind,  and  on  the  sixteenth  an  OKW  directive  signed 
by  Keitel  declared  that  the  Fuehrer  had  decided  to  aban- 
don the  landing  in  Lyme  Bay,  which  Reichenau’s  Sixth 
Army  was  to  have  made.  Preparations  for  landings  on 
the  narrower  front  on  September  15  were  to  be  contin- 
ued, but  now,  for  the  first  time,  the  Fuehrer’s  own  doubts 
crept  into  a secret  directive.  “Final  orders,”  it  added,  “will 
not  be  given  until  the  situation  is  clear.”  The  new  order, 
however,  was  somewhat  of  a compromise.  For  a further 
directive  that  day  enlarged  the  narrower  front. 

Main  crossing  to  be  on  narrow  front.  Simultaneous  land- 
ing of  four  to  five  thousand  troops  at  Brighton  by  motor- 
boats  and  the  same  number  of  airborne  troops  at  Deal- 
Ramsgate.  In  addition,  on  D-minus-1  Day  the  Luftwaffe  is 
to  make  a strong  attack  on  London,  which  would  cause  the 
population  to  flee  from  the  city  and  block  the  roads.19 

Although  Haider  on  August  23  was  scribbling  a short- 
hand note  in  his  diary  that  “on  this  basis,  an  attack  has 
no  chance  of  success  this  year,”  a directive  on  August  27 
over  Keitel’s  signature  laid  down  final  plans  for  landings 
in  four  main  areas  on  the  south  coast  between  Folkestone 
and  Selsey  Bill,  just  east  of  Portsmouth,  with  the  first 
objective,  as  before,  a line  running  between  Portsmouth 
and  the  Thames  east  of  London  at  Gravesend,  to  be 
reached  as  soon  as  the  beachheads  had  been  connected 
and  organized  and  the  troops  could  strike  north.  At  the 
same  time  orders  were  given  to  get  ready  to  carry  out 
certain  deception  maneuvers,  of  which  the  principal  one 
was  “Autumn  Journey”  ( Herbstreise ).  This  called  for  a 
large-scale  feint  against  Britain’s  east  coast,  where,  as 
has  been  noted,  Churchill  and  his  military  advisers  were 
still  expecting  the  main  invasion  blow  to  fall.  For  this 
purpose  four  large  liners,  including  Germany’s  largest, 
Europa  and  Bremen,  and  ten  additional  transports,  es- 
corted by  four  cruisers,  were  to  put  out  from  the  southern 
Norwegian  ports  and  the  Heligoland  Bight  on  D-minus-2 
Day  and  head  for  the  English  coast  between  Aberdeen 


1009 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

and  Newcastle.  The  transports  would  be  empty  and  the 
whole  expedition  would  turn  back  as  darkness  fell,  repeat- 
ing the  maneuver  the  next  day.20 

On  August  30  Brauchitsch  gave  out  a lengthy  order  of 
instructions  for  the  landings,  but  the  generals  who  re- 
ceived it  must  have  wondered  how  much  heart  their  Army 
chief  now  had  in  the  undertaking.  He  entitled  it  “Instruc- 
tion for  the  Preparation  of  Operation  Sea  Lion” — rather 
late  in  the  game  to  be  ordering  preparations  for  an  opera- 
tion that  he  commanded  must  be  carried  out  from  Sep- 
tember 15.  “The  order  for  execution,”  he  added,  “depends 
on  the  political  situation” — a condition  that  must  have 
puzzled  the  unpolitical  generals.21 

On  September  1 the  movement  of  shipping  from  Ger- 
many’s North  Sea  ports  toward  the  embarkation  harbors 
on  the  Channel  began,  and  two  days  later,  on  September 
3,  came  a further  directive  from  OKW. 

The  earliest  day  for  the  sailing  of  the  invasion  fleet  has 
been  fixed  as  September  20,  and  that  of  the  landing  for 
September  21. 

Orders  for  the  launching  of  the  attack  will  be  given  D- 
minus-10  Day,  presumably  therefore  on  September  11. 

Final  commands  will  be  given  at  the  latest  on  D-minus-3 
Day,  at  midday. 

All  preparations  must  remain  liable  to  cancellation  24 
hours  before  zero  hour. 

Keitel  22 

This  sounded  like  business.  But  the  sound  was  decep- 
tive. On  September  6 Raeder  had  another  long  session 
with  Hitler.  “The  Fuehrer’s  decision  to  land  in  England,” 
the  Admiral  recorded  in  the  Naval  Staff  War  Diary  that 
night,  “is  still  by  no  means  settled,  as  he  is  firmly  con- 
vinced that  Britain’s  defeat  will  be  achieved  even  without 
the  ‘landing.’  ” Actually,  as  Raeder’s  long  recording  of 
the  talk  shows,  the  Fuehrer  discoursed  at  length  about 
almost  everything  except  Sea  Lion:  about  Norway,  Gibral- 
tar, Suez,  “the  problem  of  the  U.S.A.,”  the  treatment  of 
the  French  colonies  and  his  fantastic  views  about  the  es- 
tablishment of  a “North  Germanic  Union.”  20 

If  Churchill  and  his  military  chiefs  had  only  got  wind 
of  this  remarkable  conference  the  code  word  “Cromwell” 
might  not  have  been  sent  out  in  England  on  the  evening 
of  the  next  day,  September  7,  signifying  “Invasion  immi- 


1010 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

nent”  and  causing  no  end  of  confusion,  the  endless  ring- 
ing of  church  bells  by  the  Home  Guard,  the  blowing  of 
several  bridges  by  Royal  Engineers  and  the  needless  cas- 
ualties suffered  by  those  stumbling  over  hastily  laid 
mines.  * 

But  on  the  late  afternoon  of  Saturday,  September  7, 
the  Germans  had  begun  their  first  massive  bombing  of 
London,  carried  out  by  625  bombers  protected  by  648 
fighters.  It  was  the  most  devastating  attack  from  the  air 
ever  delivered  up  to  that  day  on  a city — the  bombings  of 
Warsaw  and  Rotterdam  were  pinpricks  beside  it — and  by 
early  evening  the  whole  dockside  area  of  the  great  city 
was  a mass  of  flames  and  every  railway  line  to  the  south, 
so  vital  to  the  defense  against  invasion,  was  blocked.  In 
the  circumstances,  many  in  London  believed  that  this 
murderous  bombing  was  the  prelude  to  immediate  Ger- 
man landings,  and  it  was  because  of  this  more  than  any- 
thing else  that  the  alert,  “Invasion  imminent,”  was  sent 
out.  As  will  shortly  be  seen,  this  savage  bombing  of  Lon- 
don on  September  7,  though  setting  off  a premature  warn- 
ing and  causing  much  damage,  marked  a decisive  turn- 
ing point  in  the  Battle  of  Britain,  the  first  great  decisive 
struggle  in  the  air  the  earth  had  ever  experienced,  which 
was  now  rapidly  approaching  its  climax. 

The  time  for  Hitler  to  make  his  fatal  decision  to  launch 
the  invasion  or  not  to  launch  it  was  also  drawing  near.  It 
was  to  be  made,  as  the  September  3 directive  stipulated, 
on  September  11,  giving  the  armed  services  ten  days  to 
carry  out  the  preliminaries.  But  on  the  tenth  Hitler  de- 
cided to  postpone  his  decision  until  the  fourteenth.  There 
seem  to  have  been  at  least  two  reasons  for  the  delay.  One 
was  the  belief  at  OKW  that  the  bombing  of  London  was 
causing  so  much  destruction,  both  to  property  and  to 
British  morale,  that  an  invasion  might  not  be  necessary.t 

* Churchill  says  that  neither  he  nor  the  chiefs  of  staff  were  “aware”  that 
the  decisive  code  word  Cromwell  had  been  given.  It  was  sent  out  by  Head- 
quarters of  the  Home  Forces.  ( Their  Finest  Hour,  p.  312.)  But  four  days 
later,  on  September  11,  the  Prime  Minister  did  broadcast  a warning  that 
if  the  invasion  were  going  to  take  place  it  could  not  “be  long  delayed. 
Therefore,  he  said,  “we  must  regard  the  next  week  or  so  as  a very 
important  period  in  our  history.  It  ranks  with  the  days  when  the  Spanish 
Armada  was  approaching  the  Channel,  and  Drake  was  finishing  his  game 
of  bowls;  or  when  Nelson  stood  between  us  and  Napoleon's  Grand  Army  at 
Boulogne." 

J„Th® . Germans  were  greatly  impressed  by  reports  from  the  embassy  in 
Washington,  which  relayed  information  received  there  from  London  and 
embroidered  on  it.  The  American  General  Staff  was  said  to  believe  that 


1011 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

The  other  reason  arose  from  the  difficulties  the  Ger- 
man Navy  was  beginning  to  experience  in  assembling  its 
shipping.  Besides  the  weather,  which  the  naval  authorities 
reported  on  September  10  as  being  “completely  abnormal 
and  unstable,”  the  R.A.F.,  which  Goering  had  promised 
to  destroy,  and  the  British  Navy  were  increasingly  inter- 
fering with  the  concentration  of  the  invasion  fleet.  That 
same  day  the  Naval  War  Staff  warned  of  the  “danger”  of 
British  air  and  naval  attacks  on  German  transport  move- 
ments, which  it  said  had  “undoubtedly  been  successful.” 
Two  days  later,  on  September  12,  H.Q.  of  Naval  Group 
West  sent  an  ominous  message  to  Berlin: 

Interruptioni  caused  by  the  enemy’s  air  forces,  long-range 
artillery  and  light  naval  forces  have,  for  the  first  time,  as- 
sumed major  significance.  The  harbors  at  Ostend,  Dunkirk, 
Calais  and  Boulogne  cannot  be  used  as  night  anchorages  for 
shipping  because  of  the  danger  of  English  bombings  and 
shelling.  Units  of  the  British  Fleet  are  now  able  to  operate 
almost  unmolested  in  the  Channel.  Owing  to  these  diffi- 
culties further  delays  are  expected  in  the  assembly  of  the 
invasion  fleet 

The  next  day  matters  grew  worse.  British  light  naval 
forces  bombarded  the  chief  Channel  invasion  ports, 
Ostend,  Calais,  Boulogne  and  Cherbourg,  while  the 
R.A.F.  sank  eighty  barges  in  Ostend  Harbor.  In  Berlin 
that  day  Hitler  conferred  with  his  service  chiefs  at  lunch. 
He  thought  the  air  war  was  going  very  well  and  declared 
that  he  had  no  intention  of  running  the  risk  of  invasion.24 
In  fact,  Jodi  got  the  impression  from  the  Fuehrer’s  re- 
marks that  he  had  “apparently  decided  to  abandon  Sea 
Lion  completely,”  an  impression  which  was  accurate  for 
that  day,  as  Hitler  confirmed  the  following  day — when, 
however,  he  again  changed  his  mind. 

Both  Raeder  and  Haider  have  left  confidential  notes  of 
the  meeting  of  the  Fuehrer  with  his  commanders  in  chief 
in  Berlin  on  September  14.25  The  Admiral  managed  to 
slip  Hitler  a memorandum  before  the  session  opened,  set- 
ting forth  the  Navy’s  opinion  that 

the  present  air  situation  does  not  provide  conditions  for 

Britain  couldn’t  hold  out  much  longer.  According  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  von 
Lossberg  (Im  Wehrmacht  Fuehrungsstab,  p.  91)  Hitler  seriously  expected 
a revolution  to  break  out  in  Britain.  Lossberg  was  an  Army  representative 
on  OKW. 


1012  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

carrying  out  the  operation  [Sea  Lion],  as  the  risk  is  still 
too  great. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  conference,  the  Nazi  warlord 
displayed  a somewhat  negative  mood  and  his  thoughts 
were  marred  by  contradictions.  He  would  not  give  the 
order  to  launch  the  invasion,  but  neither  would  he  call 
it  off  as,  Raeder  noted  in  the  Naval  War  Diary,  “he  appar- 
ently had  planned  to  do  on  September  13.” 

What  were  the  reasons  for  his  latest  change  of  mind? 
Haider  recorded  them  in  some  detail. 

A successful  landing  [the  Fuehrer  argued]  followed  by 
an  occupation  would  end  the  war  in  a short  time.  England 
would  starve.  A landing  need  not  necessarily  be  carried  out 
within  a specified  time  . . . But  a long  war  is  not  desirable. 
We  have  already  achieved  everything  that  we  need. 

British  hopes  in  Russia  and  America,  Hitler  said,  had 
not  materialized.  Russia  was  not  going  to  bleed  for  Britain. 
America’s  rearmament  would  not  be  fully  effective  until 
1945.  As  for  the  moment,  the  “quickest  solution  would  be 
a landing  in  England.  The  Navy  has  achieved  the  necessary 
conditions.  The  operations  of  the  Luftwaffe  are  above  all 
praise.  Four  or  five  days  of  decent  weather  would  bring 
the  decisive  results  . . . We  have  a good  chance  of  bring- 
ing England  to  her  knees.” 

What  was  wrong,  then?  Why  hesitate  any  longer  in 
launching  the  invasion? 

The  trouble  was,  Hitler  conceded: 

The  enemy  recovers  again  and  again  . . . Enemy  fighters 
have  not  yet  been  completely  eliminated.  Our  own  reports  of 
successes  do  not  give  a completely  reliable  picture,  al- 
though the  enemy  has  been  severely  damaged. 

On  the  whole,  then,  Hitler  declared,  “in  spite  of  all  of 
our  successes  the  prerequisite  conditions  jor  Operation  Sea 
Lion  have  not  yet  been  realized.”  (The  emphasis  is 
Haider’s.) 

Hitler  summed  up  his  reflections. 

1.  Successful  landing  means  victory,  but  for  this  we  must 
obtain  complete  air  superiority. 

2.  Bad  weather  has  so  far  prevented  our  attaining  com- 
plete air  superiority. 

3.  All  other  factors  are  in  order. 


1013 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Decision  therefore:  The  operation  will  not  be  renounced 
yet. 

Having  come  to  that  negative  conclusion,  Hitler  there- 
upon gave  way  to  soaring  hopes  that  the  Luftwaffe  might 
still  bring  off  the  victory  that  so  tantalizingly  and  so 
narrowly  continued  to  evade  him.  “The  air  attacks  up  to 
now,’’  he  said,  “have  had  a tremendous  effect,  though 
perhaps  chiefly  on  the  nerves.  Even  if  victory  in  the  air 
is  only  achieved  in  ten  or  twelve  days  the  English  may  yet 
be  seized  by  mass  hysteria.” 

To  help  bring  that  about,  Jeschonnek  of  the  Air  Force 
begged  to  be  allowed  to  bomb  London’s  residential  districts, 
since,  he  said,  there  was  no  sign  of  “mass  panic”  in  London 
while  these  areas  were  being  spared.  Admiral  Raeder  en- 
thusiastically supported  some  terror  bombing.  Hitler,  how- 
ever, thought  concentration  on  military  objectives  was 
more  important.  “Bombing  with  the  object  of  causing  a 
mass  panic,”  he  said,  “must  be  left  to  the  last.” 

Admiral  Raeder’s  enthusiasm  for  terror  bombing  seems 
to  have  been  due  mainly  to  his  lack  of  enthusiasm  for 
the  landings.  He  now  intervened  to  stress  again  the  “great 
risks”  involved.  The  situation  in  the  air,  he  pointed  out, 
could  hardly  improve  before  the  projected  dates  of  Septem- 
ber 24-27  for  the  landing;  therefore  they  must  be  aban- 
doned “until  October  8 or  24.” 

But  this  was  practically  to  call  off  the  invasion  alto- 
gether, as  Hitler  realized,  and  he  ruled  that  he  would 
hold  up  his  decision  on  the  landings  only  until  September 
17 — three  days  hence — so  that  they  still  might  take  place 
on  September  27.  If  not  feasible  then,  he  would  have  to 
think  about  the  October  dates.  A Supreme  Command  di- 
rective was  thereupon  issued. 

Berlin 

September  14,  1940 

TOP  SECRET 

. . . The  Fuehrer  has  decided: 

The  start  of  Operation  Sea  Lion  is  again  postponed.  A 
new  order  follows  September  17.  All  preparations  are  to  be 
continued. 

The  air  attacks  against  London  are  to  be  continued  and 
the  target  area  expanded  against  military  and  other  vital  in- 
stallations (e.g.,  railway  stations). 


1014 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Terror  attacks  against  purely  residential  areas  are  reserved 
for  use  as  an  ultimate  means  of  pressure.26 

Thus  though  Hitler  had  put  off  for  three  days  a deci- 
sion on  the  invasion  he  had  by  no  means  abandoned  it. 
Give  the  Luftwaffe  another  few  days  to  finish  off  the  R.A.F. 
and  demoralize  London,  and  the  landing  then  could  take 
place.  It  would  bring  final  victory.  So  once  again  all  de- 
pended on  Goering’s  vaunted  Air  Force.  It  would  make,  in 
fact,  its  supreme  effort  the  very  next  day. 

The  Navy’s  opinion  of  the  Luftwaffe,  however,  grew 
hourly  worse.  On  the  evening  of  the  crucial  conference  in 
Berlin  the  German  Naval  War  Staff  reported  severe  R.A.F. 
bombings  of  the  invasion  ports,  from  Antwerp  to  Boulogne. 

...  In  Antwerp  . . . considerable  casualties  are  inflicted 
on  transports — five  transport  steamers  in  port  heavily  dam- 
aged; one  barge  sunk,  two  cranes  destroyed,  an  ammunition 
train  blown  up,  several  sheds  burning. 

The  next  night  was  even  worse,  the  Navy  reporting 
“strong  enemy  air  attacks  on  the  entire  coastal  area  be- 
tween Le  Havre  and  Antwerp.”  An  S.O.S.  was  sent  out  by 
the  sailors  for  more  antiaircraft  protection  of  the  inva- 
sion ports.  On  September  17  the  Naval  Staff  reported: 

The  R.A.F.  are  still  by  no  means  defeated:  on  the  con- 
trary they  are  showing  increasing  activity  in  their  attacks 
on  the  Channel  ports  and  in  their  mounting  interference 
with  the  assembly  movements.*  27 

That  night  there  was  a full  moon  and  the  British  night 
bombers  made  the  most  of  it.  The  German  Naval  War  Staff 
reported  “very  considerable  losses”  of  the  shipping  which 
now  jammed  the  invasion  ports.  At  Dunkirk  eighty-four 
barges  were  sunk  or  damaged,  and  from  Cherbourg  to 

* On  September  16,  according  to  a German  authority,  R.A.F.  bombers  sur- 
prised a large  invasion  training  exercise  and  inflicted  heavy  losses  in  men 
and  landing  vessels.  This  gave  rise  to  many  reports  in  Germany  and  else- 
where  on  the  Continent  that  the  Germans  had  actually  attempted  a landing 
and  had  been  repulsed  by  the  British.  (Georg  W.  Feuchter,  Geschichte  des 
Luftkrtegs,  p.  176).  I heard  such  a “report”  on  the  night  of  September  16 
in  Geneva,  Switzerland,  where  I was  taking  a few  days  off.  On  September 
18  and  again  on  the  next  day  I saw  two  long  ambulance  trains  unloading 
wounded  soldiers  in  the  suburbs  of  Berlin.  From  the  bandages,  I concluded 
the  wounds  were  mostly  burns.  There  had  been  no  fighting  anywhere  for 
three  months  on  land. 

On  September  21,  confidential  German  Navy  papers  recorded  that  21 
transports  and  214  barges — some  12  per  cent  of  the  total  assembled  for  the 
— had  been  lost  or  damaged.  ( Fuehrer  Conferences  on  Naval  Affairs, 


1015 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Den  Helder  the  Navy  reported,  among  other  depressing 
items,  a 500-ton  ammunition  store  blown  up,  a rations 
depot  burned  out,  various  steamers  and  torpedo  boats 
sunk  and  many  casualties  to  personnel  suffered.  This  se- 
vere bombing  plus  bombardment  from  heavy  guns  across 
the  Channel  made  it  necessary,  the  Navy  Staff  reported, 
to  disperse  the  naval  and  transport  vessels  already  con- 
centrated on  the  Channel  and  to  stop  further  movement  of 
shipping  to  the  invasion  ports. 

Otherwise  [it  said]  with  energetic  enemy  action  such  cas- 
ualties will  occur  in  the  course  of  time  that  the  execution  of 
the  operation  on  the  scale  previously  envisaged  will  in  any 
case  be  problematic.28 

It  had  already  become  so. 

In  the  German  Naval  War  Diary  there  is  a laconic  entry 
for  September  17. 

The  enemy  Air  Force  is  still  by  no  means  defeated.  On  the 
contrary,  it  shows  increasing  activity.  The  weather  situation 
as  a whole  does  not  permit  us  to  expect  a period  of  calm 
. . . The  Fuehrer  therefore  decides  to  postpone  "Sea  Lion” 
indefinitely ,29 

The  emphasis  is  the  Navy’s. 

Adolf  Hitler,  after  so  many  years  of  dazzling  successes, 
had  at  last  met  failure.  For  nearly  a month  thereafter 
the  pretense  was  kept  up  that  the  invasion  might  still  take 
place  that  autumn,  but  it  was  a case  of  whistling  in  the 
dark.  On  September  19  the  Fuehrer  formally  ordered  the 
further  assembling  of  the  invasion  fleet  to  be  stopped  and 
the  shipping  already  in  the  ports  to  be  dispersed  “so  that 
the  loss  of  shipping  space  caused  by  enemy  air  attacks 
may  be  reduced  to  a minimum.” 

But  it  was  impossible  to  maintain  even  a dispersed 
armada  and  all  the  troops  and  guns  and  tanks  and 
supplies  that  had  been  assembled  to  cross  over  the  Channel 
for  an  invasion  that  had  been  postponed  indefinitely.  “This 
state  of  affairs,”  Haider  exclaimed  in  his  diary  September 
28,  “dragging  out  the  continued  existence  of  Sea  Lion,  is 
unbearable.”  When  Ciano  and  Mussolini  met  the  Fuehrer 
on  the  Brenner  on  October  4,  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister 
observed  in  his  diary  that  “there  is  no  longer  any  talk 


1016 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

about  a landing  in  the  British  Isles.”  Hitler’s  setback 
put  his  partner,  Mussolini,  in  the  best  mood  he  had  been 
in  for  ages.  “Rarely  have  I seen  the  Duce  in  such  good 
humor  ...  as  at  the  Brenner  Pass  today,”  Ciano  noted.30 

Already  both  the  Navy  and  the  Army  were  pressing  the 
Fuehrer  for  a decision  to  call  off  Sea  Lion  altogether.  The 
Army  General  Staff  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  holding  of 
the  troops  on  the  Channel  “under  constant  British  air  at- 
tacks led  to  continual  casualties.” 

Finally  on  October  12,  the  Nazi  warlord  formally  ad- 
mitted failure  and  called  off  the  invasion  until  spring, 
if  then.  A formal  directive  was  issued. 

Fuehrer’s  Headquarters 
October  12,  1940 

TOP  SECRET 

The  Fuehrer  has  decided  that  from  now  on  until  the 
spring,  preparations  for  “Sea  Lion”  shall  be  continued  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  political  and  military  pres- 
sure on  England. 

Should  the  invasion  be  reconsidered  in  the  spring  or  early 
summer  of  1941,  orders  for  a renewal  of  operational  readi- 
ness will  be  issued  later  . . . 

The  Army  was  commanded  to  release  its  Sea  Lion  for- 
mations “for  other  duties  or  for  employment  on  other 
fronts.”  The  Navy  was  instructed  to  “take  all  measures  to 
release  personnel  and  shipping  space.”  But  both  services 
were  to  camouflage  their  moves.  “The  British,”  Hitler  laid 
it  down,  “must  continue  to  believe  that  we  are  preparing 
an  attack  on  a broad  front.”  31 

What  had  happened  to  make  Adolf  Hitler  finally  give 
in?  Two  things:  the  fatal  course  of  the  Battle  of  Britain  in 
the  air,  and  the  turning  of  his  thoughts  once  more  east- 
ward, to  Russia. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BRITAIN 

Goering’s  great  air  offensive  against  Britain,  Operation 
Eagle  (Adlerangriffe) , had  been  launched  on  August  15 
with  the  objective  of  driving  the  British  Air  Force  from 
the  skies  and  thus  achieving  the  one  condition  on  which 
the  launching  of  the  invasion  depended.  The  fat  Reich 
Marshal,  as  he  now  was,  had  no  doubts  about  victory.  By 
mid-July  he  was  confident  that  British  fighter  defenses  in 


1017 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

southern  England  could  be  smashed  within  four  days  by 
an  all-out  assault,  thus  opening  the  way  for  the  invasion. 
To  destroy  the  R.A.F.  completely  would  take  a little  long- 
er, Goering  told  the  Army  High  Command:  from  two  to 
four  weeks.32  In  fact,  the  bemedaled  German  Air  Force 
chief  thought  that  the  Luftwaffe  alone  could  bring  Britain 
to  her  knees  and  that  an  invasion  by  land  forces  prob- 
ably would  not  be  necessary. 

To  obtain  this  mighty  objective  he  had  three  great  air 
fleets  ( Luftflotten ) : Number  2 under  Field  Marshal  Kessel- 
ring,  operating  from  the  Low  Countries  and  northern 
France,  Number  3 under  Field  Marshal  Sperrle,  based  on 
northern  France,  and  Number  5 under  General  Stumpff, 
stationed  in  Norway  and  Denmark.  The  first  two  had  a total 
of  929  fighters,  875  bombers  and  316  dive  bombers; 
Number  5 was  much  smaller,  with  123  bombers  and  34 
twin-engined  ME-110  fighters.  Against  this  vast  force  the 
R.A.F.  had  for  the  air  defense  of  the  realm  at  the  begin- 
ning of  August  between  700  and  800  fighters. 

Throughout  July  the  Luftwaffe  gradually  stepped  up  its 
attacks  on  British  shipping  in  the  Channel  and  on  Britain’s 
southern  ports.  This  was  a probing  operation.  Though  it 
was  necessary  to  clear  the  narrow  waters  of  British  ships 
before  an  invasion  could  begin,  the  main  object  of  these 
preliminary  air  assaults  was  to  lure  the  British  fighters  to 
battle.  This  failed.  The  R.A.F.  Command  shrewdly  de- 
clined to  commit  more  than  a fraction  of  its  fighters, 
and  as  a result  considerable  damage  was  done  to  shipping 
and  to  some  of  the  ports.  Four  destroyers  and  eighteen 
merchant  ships  were  sunk,  but  this  preliminary  sparring 
cost  the  Luftwaffe  296  aircraft  destroyed  and  135  dam- 
aged. The  R.A.F.  lost  148  fighters. 

On  August  12,  Goering  gave  orders  to  launch  Eagle 
the  next  day.  As  a curtain  raiser  heavy  attacks  were  made 
on  the  twelfth  on  enemy  radar  stations,  five  of  which  were 
actually  hit  and  damaged  and  one  knocked  out,  but  the 
Germans  at  this  stage  did  not  realize  how  vital  to  Brit- 
ain’s defenses  radar  was  and  did  not  pursue  the  attack. 
On  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  the  Germans  put  in  the 
air  some  1,500  aircraft,  mostly  against  R.A.F.  fighter 
fields,  and  though  they  claimed  five  of  them  had  been 
“completely  destroyed”  the  damage  was  actually  negligi- 


1018  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ble  and  the  Luftwaffe  lost  forty-seven  planes  against 
thirteen  for  the  R.A.F.* 

August  15  brought  the  first  great  battle  in  the  skies. 
The  Germans  threw  in  the  bulk  of  their  planes  from  all 
three  air  fleets,  flying  801  bombing  and  1,149  fighter 
sorties.  Luftflotten  5,  operating  from  Scandinavia,  met 
disaster.  By  sending  some  800  planes  in  a massive  attack 
on  the  south  coast  the  Germans  had  expected  to  find  the 
northeast  coast  defenseless.  But  a force  of  a hundred 
bombers,  escorted  by  thirty-four  twin-engined  ME-110 
fighters,  was  surprised  by  seven  squadrons  of  Hurricanes 
and  Spitfires  as  it  approached  the  Tyneside  and  severely 
mauled.  Thirty  German  planes,  mostly  bombers,  were  shot 
down  without  loss  to  the  defenders.  That  was  the  end  of 
Air  Fleet  5 in  the  Battle  of  Britain.  It  never  returned  to  it 

In  the  south  of  England  that  day  the  Germans  were 
more  successful.  They  launched  four  massive  attacks,  one 
of  which  was  able  to  penetrate  almost  to  London.  Four 
aircraft  factories  at  Croydon  were  hit  and  five  R.A.F. 
fighter  fields  damaged.  In  all,  the  Germans  lost  seventy-five 
planes,  against  thirty-four  for  the  R.A.F.  t At  this  rate, 
despite  their  numerical  superiority,  the  Germans  could 
scarcely  hope  to  drive  the  R.A.F.  from  the  skies. 

Now  Goering  made  the  first  of  his  two  tactical  errors. 
The  skill  of  British  Fighter  Command  in  committing  its 
planes  to  battle  against  vastly  superior  attacking  forces 
was  based  on  its  shrewd  use  of  radar.  From  the  moment 
they  took  off  from  their  bases  in  Western  Europe  the 
German  aircraft  were  spotted  on  British  radar  screens, 
and  their  course  so  accurately  plotted  that  Fighter  Com- 
mand knew  exactly  where  and  when  they  could  best  be 
attacked.  This  was  something  new  in  warfare  and  it  puz- 
zled the  Germans,  who  were  far  behind  the  British  in  the 
development  and  use  of  this  electronic  device. 

We  realized  [Adolf  Galland,  the  famous  German  fighter 
ace,  later  testified]  that  the  R.A.F.  fighter  squadrons  must 
be  controlled  from  the  ground  by  some  new  procedure  be- 

* The  Luftwaffe  claimed  134  British  craft  against  a loss  of  34.  From  that 
date  on  both  sides  grossly  overestimated  the  damage  they  did  the  other. 

T In  London  that  evening  an  official  communique  reported  182  German 
planes  shot  down  and  43  more  probably  destroyed.  This  gave  a great  fillip 
to  British  morale  in  general  and  to  that  of  the  hard-pressed  fighter  pilots 
in  particular. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1019 

cause  we  heard  commands  skillfully  and  accurately  directing 
Spitfires  and  Hurricanes  on  to  German  formations  . . . For 
us  this  radar  and  fighter  control  was  a surprise  and  a very 
bitter  one.33 

Yet  the  attack  on  British  radar  stations  which  on  August 
12  had  been  so  damaging  had  not  been  continued  and  on 
August  15,  the  day  of  his  first  major  setback,  Goering 
called  them  off  entirely,  declaring:  “It  is  doubtful  whether 
there  is  any  point  in  continuing  the  attacks  on  radar  sta- 
tions, since  not  one  of  those  attacked  has  so  far  been 
put  out  of  action.” 

A second  key  to  the  successful  defense  of  the  skies  over 
southern  England  was  the  sector  station.  This  was  the  un- 
derground nerve  center  from  which  the  Hurricanes  and 
Spitfires  were  guided  by  radiotelephone  into  battle  on 
tbe  basis  of  the  latest  intelligence  from  radar,  from  ground 
observation  posts  and  from  pilots  in  the  air.  The  Germans, 
as  Galland  noted,  could  hear  the  constant  chatter  over  the 
air  waves  between  the  sector  stations  and  the  pilots  aloft 
and  finally  began  to  understand  the  importance  of  these 
ground  control  centers.  On  August  24  they  switched  their 
tactics  to  the  destruction  of  the  sector  stations,  seven  of 
which  on  the  airfields  around  London  were  crucial  to  the 
protection  of  the  south  of  England  and  of  the  capital  itself. 
This  was  a blow  against  the  very  vitals  of  Britain’s  air 
defenses. 

Until  that  day  the  battle  had  appeared  to  be  going 
against  the  Luftwaffe.  On  August  17  it  lost  seventy-one 
aircraft  against  the  R.A.F.’s  twenty-seven.  The  slow  Stuka 
dive  bomber,  which  had  helped  to  pave  the  way  for  the 
Army’s  victories  in  Poland  and  in  the  West,  was  proving 
to  be  a sitting  duck  for  British  fighters  and  on  that  day, 
August  17,  was  withdrawn  by  Goering  from  the  battle, 
reducing  the  German  bombing  force  by  a third.  Between 
August  19  and  23  there  was  a five-day  lull  in  the  air 
due  to  bad  weather.  Goering,  reviewing  the  situation  at 
Karinhall,  his  country  show  place  near  Berlin,  on  the  nine- 
teenth, ordered  that  as  soon  as  the  weather  improved, 
the  Luftwaffe  was  to  concentrate  its  attacks  exclusively 
on  the  Royal  Air  Force. 

“We  have  reached  the  decisive  period  of  the  air  war 
against  England,”  he  declared.  “The  vital  task  is  the 


1020  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

defeat  of  the  enemy  air  force.  Our  first  aim  is  to  destroy 
the  enemy’s  fighters.”  34 

From  August  24  to  September  6 the  Germans  sent  over 
an  average  of  a thousand  planes  a day  to  achieve  this 
end.  For  once  the  Reich  Marshal  was  right.  The  Battle  of 
Britain  had  entered  its  decisive  stage.  Though  the  R.A.F. 
pilots,  already  strained  from  a month  of  flying  several 
sorties  a day,  put  up  a valiant  fight,  the  German  pre- 
ponderance in  sheer  numbers  began  to  tell.  Five  forward 
fighter  fields  in  the  south  of  England  were  extensively 
damaged  and,  what  was  worse,  six  of  the  seven  key  sector 
stations  were  so  severely  bombed  that  the  whole  communi- 
cations system  seemed  to  be  on  the  verge  of  being 
knocked  out.  This  threatened  disaster  to  Britain. 

Worst  of  all,  the  pace  was  beginning  to  tell  on  the 
R.A.F.  fighter  defense.  In  the  crucial  fortnight  between 
August  23  and  September  6 the  British  lost  466  fighters 
destroyed  or  badly  damaged,  and  though  they  did  not 
know  it  at  the  time  the  Luftwaffe  losses  were  less:  385  air- 
craft, of  which  214  were  fighters  and  138  bombers.  More- 
over, the  R.A.F.  had  lost  103  pilots  killed  and  128  seri- 
ously wounded — a quarter  of  all  those  available. 

“The  scales,”  as  Churchill  later  wrote,  “had  tilted 
against  Fighter  Command  . . . There  was  much  anxiety.” 
A few  more  weeks  of  this  and  Britain  would  have  had  no 
organized  defense  of  its  skies.  The  invasion  would  almost 
certainly  succeed. 

And  then  suddenly  Goering  made  his  second  tactical 
error,  this  one  comparable  in  its  consequences  to  Hitler’s 
calling  off  the  armored  attack  on  Dunkirk  on  May  24.  It 
saved  the  battered,  reeling  R.A.F.  and  marked  one  of  the 
major  turning  points  of  history’s  first  great  battle  in  the 
air. 

With  the  British  fighter  defense  suffering  losses  in  the 
air  and  on  the  ground  which  it  could  not  for  long  sustain, 
the  Luftwaffe  switched  its  attack  on  September  7 to  mas- 
sive night  bombings  of  London.  The  R.A.F.  fighters  were 
reprieved. 

What  had  happened  in  the  German  camp  to  cause  this 
change  in  tactics  which  was  destined  to  prove  so  fatal 
to  the  ambitions  of  Hitler  and  Goering?  The  answer  is  full 
of  irony. 


1021 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

To  begin  with,  there  was  a minor  navigational  error 
by  the  pilots  of  a dozen  German  bombers  on  the  night  of 
August  23.  Directed  to  drop  their  loads  on  aircraft  fac- 
tories and  oil  tanks  on  the  outskirts  of  London,  they 
missed  their  mark  and  dropped  bombs  on  the  center  of  the 
capital,  blowing  up  some  homes  and  killing  some  civilians. 
The  British  thought  it  was  deliberate  and  as  retaliation 
bombed  Berlin  the  next  evening. 

It  didn’t  amount  to  much.  There  was  a dense  cloud 
cover  over  Berlin  that  night  and  only  about  half  of  the 
eighty-one  R.A.F.  bombers  dispatched  found  the  target. 
Material  damage  was  negligible.  But  the  effect  on  German 
morale  was  tremendous.  For  this  was  the  first  time  that 
bombs  had  ever  fallen  on  Berlin. 

The  Berliners  are  stunned  [1  wrote  in  my  diary  the  next 
day,  August  26].  They  did  not  think  it  could  ever  happen. 
When  this  war  began,  Goering  assured  them  it  couldn’t  . . . 
They  believed  him.  Their  disillusionment  today  therefore  is 
all  the  greater.  You  have  to  see  their  faces  to  measure  it. 

Berlin  was  well  defended  by  two  great  rings  of  antiair- 
craft and  for  three  hours  while  the  visiting  bombers  droned 
above  the  clouds,  which  prevented  the  hundreds  of  search- 
light batteries  from  picking  them  up,  the  flak  fire  was 
the  most  intense  I had  ever  seen.  But  not  a single  plane 
was  brought  down.  The  British  also  dropped  a few  leaflets 
saying  that  “the  war  which  Hitler  started  will  go  on,  and 
it  will  last  as  long  as  Hitler  does.”  This  was  good  propa- 
ganda, but  the  thud  of  exploding  bombs  was  better. 

The  R.A.F.  came  over  in  greater  force  on  the  night  of 
August  28-29  and,  as  I noted  in  my  diary,  ‘‘for  the  first 
time  killed  Germans  in  the  capital  of  the  Reich.”  The 
official  count  was  ten  killed  and  twenty-nine  wounded.  The 
Nazi  bigwigs  were  outraged.  Goebbels,  who  had  ordered 
the  press  to  publish  only  a few  lines  on  the  first  attack, 
now  gave  instructions  to  cry  out  at  the  “brutality”  of  the 
British  flyers  in  attacking  the  defenseless  women  and 
children  of  Berlin.  Most  of  the  capital’s  dailies  carried  the 
same  headline:  cowardly  British  attack.  Two  nights 
later,  after  the  third  raid,  the  headlines  read:  British  air 

PIRATES  OVER  BERLIN! 

The  main  effect  of  a week  of  constant  British  night  bomb- 


1022 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ings  [I  wrote  in  my  diary  on  September  1]  has  been  to 
spread  great  disillusionment  among  the  people  and  sow 
doubt  in  their  minds  . . . Actually  the  bombings  have  not 
been  very  deadly. 

September  1 was  the  first  anniversary  of  the  beginning 
of  the  war.  I noted  the  mood  of  the  people,  aside  from 
their  frayed  nerves  at  having  been  robbed  of  their  sleep 
and  frightened  by  the  surprise  bombings  and  the  terrific 
din  of  the  flak. 

In  this  year  German  arms  have  achieved  victories  never 
equaled  even  in  the  brilliant  military  history  of  this  ag- 
gressive, militaristic  nation.  And  yet  the  war  is  not  yet  over 
or  won.  And  it  was  on  this  aspect  that  people’s  minds  were 
concentrated  today.  They  long  for  peace.  And  they  want  it 
before  the  winter  comes. 

Hitler  deemed  it  necessary  to  address  them  on  Septem- 
ber 4 on  the  occasion  of  the  opening  of  the  Winterhilfe 
campaign  at  the  Sportpalast.  His  appearance  there  was 
kept  secret  to  the  last  moment,  apparently  out  of  fear  that 
enemy  planes  might  take  advantage  of  the  cloud  cover 
and  break  up  the  meeting,  though  it  was  held  in  the  after- 
noon, an  hour  before  dark. 

I have  rarely  seen  the  Nazi  dictator  in  a more  sarcastic 
mood  or  so  given  to  what  the  German  people  regarded  as 
humor,  though  Hitler  was  essentially  a humorless  man. 
He  described  Churchill  as  “that  noted  war  correspondent.” 
For  “a  character  like  Duff  Cooper,”  he  said,  “there  is  no 
word  in  conventional  German.  Only  the  Bavarians  have  a 
word  that  adequately  describes  this  type  of  man,  and 
that  is  Krampfhenne,”  which  might  be  translated  as  “a 
nervous  old  hen.” 

The  babbling  of  Mr.  Churchill  or  of  Mr.  Eden  pie  said] — 
reverence  for  old  age  forbids  the  mention  of  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain— doesn’t  mean  a thing  to  the  German  people.  At 
best,  it  makes  them  laugh. 

And  Hitler  proceeded  to  make  his  audience,  which 
consisted  mostly  of  women  nurses  and  social  workers, 
laugh — and  then  applaud  hysterically.  He  was  faced  with 
the  problem  of  answering  two  questions  uppermost  in  the 
minds  of  the  German  people:  When  would  Britain  be  in- 
vaded, and  what  would  be  done  about  the  night  bombings 
of  Berlin  and  other  German  cities?  As  to  the  first: 


1023 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

In  England  they’re  filled  with  curiosity  and  keep  asking, 
“Why  doesn’t  he  come?”  Be  calm.  Be  calm.  He’s  coming! 
He’s  coming! 

His  listeners  found  that  crack  very  funny,  but  they  also 
believed  that  it  was  an  unequivocal  pledge.  As  to  the 
bombings,  he  began  by  a typical  falsification  and  ended 
with  a dire  threat: 

Just  now  . . . Mr.  Churchill  is  demonstrating  his  new 
brain  child,  the  night  air  raid.  Mr.  Churchill  is  carrying  out 
these  raids  not  because  they  promise  to  be  highly  effective, 
but  because  his  Air  Force  cannot  fly  over  Germany  in  day- 
light . . . whereas  German  planes  are  over  English  soil  every 
day  . . . Whenever  the  Englishman  sees  a light,  he  drops  a 
bomb  ...  on  residential  districts,  farms  and  villages. 

And  then  came  the  threat. 

For  three  months  I did  not  answer  because  I believed 
that  such  madness  would  be  stopped.  Mr.  Churchill  took 
this  for  a sign  of  weakness.  We  are  now  answering  night 
for  night. 

When  the  British  Air  Force  drops  two  or  three  or  four 
thousand  kilograms  of  bombs,  then  we  will  in  one  night 
drop  150-,  230-,  300-  or  400,000  kilograms. 

At  this  point,  according  to  my  diary,  Hitler  had  to 
pause  because  of  the  hysterical  applause  of  the  German 
women  listeners. 

“When  they  declare,”  Hitler  continued,  “that  they  will 
increase  their  attacks  on  our  cities,  then  we  will  raze  their 
cities  to  the  ground.”  At  this,  I noted,  the  young  ladies 
were  quite  beside  themselves  and  applauded  phrenetically. 
When  they  had  recovered,  he  added,  “We  will  stop  the 
handiwork  of  these  night  air  pirates,  so  help  us  God!” 

On  hearing  this,  I also  noted,  “the  young  German 
women  hopped  to  their  feet  and,  their  breasts  heaving, 
screamed  their  approval!” 

“The  hour  will  come,”  Hitler  concluded,  “when  one  of 
us  will  break,  and  it  will  not  be  National  Socialist  Ger- 
many!” At  this,  I finally  noted,  “the  raving  maidens  kept 
their  heads  sufficiently  to  break  their  wild  shouts  of  joy 
with  a chorus  of  ‘Never!  Never!’  ” 

Ciano  in  Rome,  listening  to  the  broadcast,  which  was 
made  from  records  some  hours  later,  confessed  to  being 
perplexed.  “Hitler  must  be  nervous,”  he  concluded.35 


1024  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

His  nerves  were  a factor  in  the  fatal  decision  to  switch 
the  Luftwaffe’s  winning  daylight  attacks  on  the  R.A.F.  to 
massive  night  bombings  of  London.  This  was  a political 
as  well  as  a military  decision,  made  in  part  to  revenge  the 
bombings  of  Berlin  and  other  German  cities  (which  were 
but  pinpricks  compared  to  what  the  Luftwaffe  was  doing 
to  Britain’s  cities)  and  to  destroy  the  will  of  the  British  to 
resist  by  razing  their  capital.  If  it  succeeded,  and  Hitler 
and  Goebbels  had  no  doubt  it  would,  an  invasion  might 
not  be  necessary. 

And  so  on  the  late  afternoon  of  September  7 the  great 
air  attack  on  London  began.  The  Germans  threw  in,  as 
we  have  seen,*  625  bombers  and  648  fighters.  At  about 
5 p.m.  that  Saturday  the  first  wave  of  320  bombers,  pro- 
tected by  every  fighter  the  Germans  had,  flew  up  the 
Thames  and  began  to  drop  their  bombs  on  Woolwich 
Arsenal,  various  gas  works,  power  stations,  depots  and 
mile  upon  mile  of  docks.  The  whole  vast  area  was  soon  a 
mass  of  flames.  At  one  locality,  Silvertown,  the  population 
was  surrounded  by  fire  and  had  to  be  evacuated  by  water. 
At  8:10  p.m.  after  dark,  a second  wave  of  250  bombers 
arrived  and  resumed  the  attack,  which  was  kept  up  by 
successive  waves  until  dawn  at  4:30  on  Sunday  morn- 
ing. The  next  evening  at  7:30,  the  attack  was  renewed  by 
two  hundred  bombers  and  continued  throughout  the  night. 
Some  842  persons  were  killed  and  2,347  wounded,  ac- 
cording to  the  official  British  historian,  during  these  first 
two  nights,  and  vast  damage  was  inflicted  on  the  sprawling 
city.38  The  assault  went  on  all  the  following  week,  night 
after  night,  t 

And  then,  stimulated  by  its  successes,  or  what  it  thought 
were  such,  the  Luftwaffe  decided  to  carry  out  a great 
daylight  assault  on  the  battered,  burning  capital.  This  led 
on  Sunday,  September  15,  to  one  of  the  decisive  battles  of 
the  war. 

Some  two  hundred  German  bombers,  escorted  by  three 
times  as  many  fighters,  appeared  over  the  Channel  about 
midday,  headed  for  London.  Fighter  Command  had 
watched  the  assembling  of  the  attackers  on  its  radar 


* Above,  p.  1010.  , , _ 

t At  this  time  night  defenses  had  not  yet  been  perfected  and  the  uerman 
losses  were  negligible. 


1025 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

screens  and  was  ready.  The  Germans  were  intercepted 
before  they  approached  the  capital,  and  though  some 
planes  got  through,  many  were  dispersed  and  others  shot 
down  before  they  could  deliver  their  bomb  load.  Two 
hours  later  an  even  stronger  German  formation  returned 
and  was  routed.  Though  the  British  claimed  to  have  shot 
down  185  Luftwaffe  planes,  the  actual  figure,  as  learned 
after  the  war  from  the  Berlin  archives,  was  much  lower — 
fifty-six,  but  thirty-four  of  these  were  bombers.  The 
R.A.F.  lost  only  twenty-six  aircraft. 

The  day  had  shown  that  the  Luftwaffe  could  not  for  the 
moment,  anyway,  now  that  it  had  given  Fighter  Com- 
mand a week  to  recover,  carry  out  a successful  major  day- 
light attack  on  Britain.  That  being  so,  the  prospect  of  an 
effective  landing  was  dim.  September  15  therefore  was  a 
turning  point,  “the  crux,”  as  Churchill  later  judged,  of  the 
Battle  of  Britain.  Though  Goering  the  next  day,  in  ordering 
a change  of  tactics  that  provided  for  the  use  of  bombers 
in  daylight  no  longer  to  bomb  but  merely  to  serve  as  de- 
coys for  British  fighters,  boasted  that  the  enemy’s  fighters 
“ought  to  be  finished  off  within  four  or  five  days,” 37 
Hitler  and  the  Army  and  Navy  commanders  knew  better 
and  two  days  after  the  decisive  air  battle,  on  September 
17,  as  has  been  noted,  the  Fuehrer  called  off  Sea  Lion  in- 
definitely. 

Although  London  was  to  take  a terrible  pounding  for 
fifty-seven  consecutive  nights  from  September  7 to  No- 
vember 3 from  a daily  average  of  two  hundred  bombers, 
so  that  it  seemed  certain  to  Churchill,  as  he  later  revealed, 
that  the  city  would  soon  be  reduced  to  a rubble  heap,  and 
though  most  of  Britain’s  other  cities,  Conventry  above  all, 
were  to  suffer  great  damage  throughout  that  grim  fall  and 
winter,  British  morale  did  not  collapse  nor  armament 
production  fall  off,  as  Hitler  had  so  confidently  expected. 
Just  the  opposite.  Aircraft  factories  in  England,  one  of  the 
prime  targets  of  the  Luftwaffe  bombers,  actually  outpro- 
duced the  Germans  in  1940  by  9,924  to  8,070  planes. 
Hitler’s  bomber  losses  over  England  had  been  so  severe 
that  they  could  never  be  made  up,  and  in  fact  the  Luft- 
waffe, as  the  German  confidential  records  make  clear, 
never  fully  recovered  from  the  blow  it  received  in  the  skies 
over  Britain  that  late  summer  and  fall. 


1026 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


The  German  Navy,  crippled  by  the  losses  off  Norway  in 
the  early  spring,  was  unable,  as  its  chiefs  admitted  all 
along,  to  provide  the  sea  power  for  an  invasion  of  Britain. 
Without  this,  and  without  air  supremacy,  the  German 
Army  was  helpless  to  move  across  the  narrow  Channel 
waters.  For  the  first  time  in  the  war  Hitler  had  been 
stopped,  his  plans  of  further  conquest  frustrated,  and 
just  at  the  moment,  as  we  have  seen,  when  he  was  certain 
that  final  victory  had  been  achieved. 

He  had  never  conceived — nor  had  anyone  else  up  to 
that  time — that  a decisive  battle  could  be  decided  in  the 
air.  Nor  perhaps  did  he  yet  realize  as  the  dark  winter 
settled  over  Europe  that  a handful  of  British  fighter 
pilots,  by  thwarting  his  invasion,  had  preserved  England 
as  a great  base  for  the  possible  reconquest  of  the  Conti- 
nent from  the  west  at  a later  date.  His  thoughts  were 
perforce  turning  elsewhere;  in  fact,  as  we  shall  see,  had 
already  turned. 

Britain  was  saved.  For  nearly  a thousand  years  it  had 
successfully  defended  itself  by  sea  power.  Just  in  time,  its 
leaders,  a very  few  of  them,  despite  all  the  bungling  (of 
which  these  pages  have  been  so  replete)  in  the  interwar 
years,  had  recognized  that  air  power  had  become  decisive 
in  the  mid-twentieth  century  and  the  little  fighter  plane 
and  its  pilot  the  chief  shield  for  defense.  As  Churchill 
told  the  Commons  in  another  memorable  peroration  on 
August  20,  when  the  battle  in  the  skies  still  raged  and  its 
outcome  was  in  doubt,  “never  in  the  field  of  human 
conflict  was  so  much  owed  by  so  many  to  so  few.” 

IF  THE  INVASION  HAD  SUCCEEDED 

The  Nazi  German  occupation  of  Britain  would  not  have 
been  a gentle  affair.  The  captured  German  papers  leave 
no  doubt  of  that.  On  September  9 Brauchitsch,  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Army,  signed  a directive  pro- 
viding that  “the  able-bodied  male  population  between  the 
ages  of  seventeen  and  forty-five  [in  Britain]  will,  unless 
the  local  situation  calls  for  an  exceptional  ruling,  be  in- 
terned and  dispatched  to  the  Continent.”  Orders  to  this 
effect  were  sent  out  a few  days  later  by  the  Quartermaster 
General,  in  OKW,  to  the  Ninth  and  Sixteenth  armies, 
which  were  assembled  for  the  invasion.  In  no  other  con- 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1027 

quered  country,  not  even  in  Poland,  had  the  Germans 
begun  with  such  a drastic  step.  Brauchitsch’s  instructions 
were  headed  “Orders  Concerning  the  Organization  and 
Function  of  Military  Government  in  England”  and  went 
into  considerable  detail.  They  seem  designed  to  ensure 
the  systematic  plunder  of  the  island  and  the  terroriza- 
tion of  its  inhabitants.  A special  “Military  Economic  Staff 
England”  was  set  up  on  July  27  to  achieve  the  first  aim. 
Everything  but  normal  household  stocks  was  to  be  con- 
fiscated at  once.  Hostages  would  be  taken.  Anybody  post- 
ing a placard  the  Germans  didn’t  like  would  be  liable  to 
immediate  execution,  and  a similar  penalty  was  provided 
for  those  who  failed  to  turn  in  firearms  or  radio  sets  within 
twenty-four  hours. 

But  the  real  terror  was  to  be  meted  out  by  Himmler  and 
the  S.S.  For  this  the  dreaded  R.S.H.A.,*  under  Heydrich, 
was  put  in  charge.  The  man  who  was  designated  to  direct 
its  activities  on  the  spot  from  London  was  a certain  S.S. 
colonel,  Professor  Dr.  Franz  Six,  another  of  the  peculiar 
intellectual  gangsters  who  in  the  Nazi  time  were  somehow 
attracted  to  the  service  of  Himmler’s  secret  police.  Pro- 
fessor Six  had.  left  his  post  as  dean  of  the  economic 
faculty  of  Berlin  University  to  join  Heydrich’s  S.D.,  where 
he  specialized  in  “scientific  matters,”  the  weirder  side  of 
which  cast  such  a spell  over  the  bespectacled  Heinrich 
Himmler  and  his  fellow  thugs.  What  the  British  people 
missed  by  not  having  Dr.  Six  in  their  presence  may  be 
judged  by  his  later  career  in  Russia,  where  he  was  active 
in  the  S.S.  Einsatzgruppen,  which  distinguished  themselves 
in  wholesale  massacres  there,  one  of  the  professor’s  spe- 
cialties being  to  ferret  out  captured  Soviet  political  com- 
missars for  execution,  t 

On  August  1,  the  R.S.H.A.  captured  archives  reveal, 
Goering  told  Heydrich  to  get  busy.  The  S.S.  Security 
Police  and  the  S.D.  (Security  Service)  were  to 

commence  their  activities  simultaneously  with  the  military 
invasion  in  order  to  seize  and  combat  effectively  the  numer- 
ous important  organizations  and  societies  in  England  which 
are  hostile  to  Germany. 

* R.S.H.A.,  the  initials  of  the  Reich  Central  Security  Office  (Reichssicher- 
neitshauptamt),  which,  as  has  been  noted,  took  over  control  in  1939  of  the 
Oestapo,  the  Criminal  Police  and  the  Security  Service,  or  S.D 
T Dr.  Six  was  sentenced  in  1948  at  Nuremberg  as  a war  criminal  to  twenty 
years  in  prison,  but  was  released  in  1952. 


1028 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

On  September  17,  which,  ironically,  was  the  date  on 
which  Hitler  postponed  the  invasion  indefinitely,  Professor 
Six  was  formally  appointed  to  his  new  post  in  England  by 
Heydrich  and  told: 

Your  task  is  to  combat,  with  the  requisite  means,  all  anti- 
German  organizations,  institutions,  and  opposition  groups 
which  can  be  seized  in  England,  to  prevent  the  removal  of 
all  available  material  and  to  centralize  and  safeguard  it  for 
future  exploitation.  I designate  London  as  the  location  of 
your  headquarters  . . . and  I authorize  you  to  set  up  small 
Einsatzgruppen  in  other  parts  of  Great  Britain  as  the  situa- 
tion dictates  and  the  necessity  arises. 

Actually,  already  in  August  Heydrich  had  organized 
six  Einsatzkommando  for  Britain  which  were  to  operate 
from  headquarters  in  London,  Bristol,  Birmingham,  Liver- 
pool, Manchester  and  Edinburgh — or  in  Glasgow,  if  the 
Forth  Bridge  was  found  blown  up.  They  were  to  carry  out 
Nazi  terror;  to  begin  with,  they  were  to  arrest  all  those 
on  the  “Special  Search  List,  G.B.  [Great  Britain],”  which 
in  May  had  been  hurriedly  and  carelessly  compiled  by 
Walter  Schellenberg,  another  one  of  Himmler’s  bright 
young  university  graduates,  who  was  then  chief  of  Amt 
(Bureau)  IV  E — Counterespionage — of  R.S.H.A.  Or  so 
Schellenberg  later  claimed,  though  at  this  time  he  was 
mainly  occupied  in  Lisbon,  Portugal,  on  a bizarre  mission 
to  kidnap  the  Duke  of  Windsor. 

The  Special  Search  List,  G.B.  ( die  Sonderfahndungsliste, 
G.B.)  is  among  the  more  amusing  “invasion”  documents 
found  in  the  Himmler  papers,  though  of  course  it  was 
not  meant  to  be.  It  contains  the  names  of  some  2,300 
prominent  persons  in  Great  Britain,  not  all  of  them  Eng- 
lish, whom  the  Gestapo  thought  it  important  to  incarcerate 
at  once.  Churchill  is  there,  naturally,  along  with  members 
of  the  cabinet  and  other  well-known  politicians  of  all 
parties.  Leading  editors,  publishers  and  reporters,  includ- 
ing two  former  Times  correspondents  in  Berlin,  Norman 
Ebbutt  and  Douglas  Reed,  whose  dispatches  had  displeased 
the  Nazis,  are  on  the  list.  British  authors  claim  special 
attention.  Shaw’s  name  is  conspicuously  absent,  but  H.  G. 
Wells  is  there  along  with  such  writers  as  Virginia  Woolf, 
E.  M.  Forster,  Aldous  Huxley,  J.  B.  Priestley,  Stephen 
Spender,  C.  P.  Snow,  Noel  Coward,  Rebecca  West,  Sir 


1029 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Philip  Gibbs  and  Norman  Angell.  The  scholars  were  not 
omitted  either.  Among  them:  Gilbert  Murray,  Bertrand 
Russell,  Harold  Laski,  Beatrice  Webb  and  J.  B.  S.  Haldane. 

The  Gestapo  also  intended  to  take  advantage  of  its 
sojourn  in  England  to  round  up  both  foreign  and  German 
emigres.  Paderewski,  Freud*  and  Chaim  Weizmann 
were  on  its  list,  as  well  as  BeneS,  the  President,  and  Jan 
Masaryk,  the  Foreign  Minister,  of  the  Czechoslovak  gov- 
ernment in  exile.  Of  the  German  refugees  there  were, 
among  many  others,  two  former  personal  friends  of  Hit- 
ler who  had  turned  on  him:  Hermann  Rauschning  and  Putzi 
Hanfstaengl.  Many  English  names  were  so  badly  misspelled 
as  to  make  them  almost  unrecognizable  and  sometimes 
bizarre  identifications  were  attached,  as  the  one  for  Lady 
Bonham  Carter,  who  was  also  listed  as  “Lady  Carter- 
Bonham”  and  described  not  only  as  “born,  Violet 
Asquith,”  but  as  “an  Encirclement  lady  politician.”  After 
each  name  was  marked  the  bureau  of  R.S.H.A.  which 
was  to  handle  that  person.  Churchill  was  to  be  placed  in 
the  hands  of  Amt  VI — Foreign  Intelligence — but  most 
were  to  be  handed  over  to  Amt  IV — the  Gestapo.t 

This  Nazi  Black  Book  actually  formed  a supplement  to 
a supposedly  highly  sefret  handbook  called  Information- 
sheft,  which  Schellenberg  also  claims  to  have  written, 
and  whose  purpose  seems  to  have  been  to  aid  the  con- 
querors in  looting  Britain  and  stamping  out  anti-German 
institutions  there.  It  is  even  more  amusing  than  the 
Search  List.  Among  the  dangerous  institutions,  besides 
the  Masonic  lodges  and  Jewish  organizations,  which  de- 
served “special  attention”  by  R.S.H.A.,  were  the  “public 
schools”  (in  England,  the  private  schools),  the  Church  of 
England,  which  was  described  as  “a  powerful  tool  of 
British  imperial  politics,”  and  the  Boy  Scouts,  which  was 
put  down  as  “an  excellent  source  of  information  for  the 
British  Intelligence  Service.”  Its  revered  leader  and 
founder.  Lord  Baden-Powell,  was  to  be  immediately 
arrested. 

* The  famous  psychoanalyst  had  died  in  London  in  1939. 
t £ °*  Americans  are  on  the  arrest  list,  including  Bernard  Baruch, 

John  Gunther,  Paul.  Robeson,  Louis  Fischer,  Daniel  de  Luce  (the  A.P. 
correspondent,  who  is  listed  under  the  D's  as  “Daniel,  de  Luce — U.S.A. 
correspondent”)  and  M.  W.  Fodor,  the  Chicago  Daily  News  correspondent, 
who  was  well  known  for  his  anti-Nazi  writings. 


1030  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Had  the  invasion  been  attempted  the  Germans  would  not 
have  been  received  gently  by  the  British.  Churchill  later 
confessed  that  he  had  often  wondered  what  would  have 
happened.  Of  this  much  he  was  certain: 

The  massacre  would  have  been  on  both  sides  grim  and 
great.  There  would  have  been  neither  mercy  nor  quarter. 
They  would  have  used  terror,  and  we  were  prepared  to  go  all 
lengths.38 

He  does  not  say  specifically  to  what  lengths,  but  Peter 
Fleming  in  his  book  on  Sea  Lion  gives  one  of  them.  The 
British  had  decided,  he  says,  as  a last  resort  and  if  all 
other  conventional  methods  of  defense  failed,  to  attack 
the  German  beachheads  with  mustard  gas,  sprayed  from 
low-flying  airplanes.  It  was  a painful  decision,  taken  not 
without  much  soul  searching  at  the  highest  level;  and 
as  Fleming  comments,  the  decision  was  “surrounded  by 
secrecy  at  the  time  and  ever  since.”  39 

This  particular  massacre  on  which  Churchill  speculates, 
the  unleashing  of  this  kind  of  terror  which  the  Gestapo 
planned,  did  not  take  place  at  this  time  in  this  place — for 
reasons  which  have  been  set  down  in  this  chapter.  But 
in  less  than  a year,  in  another  part  of  Europe,  the  Ger- 
mans were  to  unleash  horrors  on  a scale  never  before 
experienced. 

Already,  even  before  the  invasion  of  Britain  was  aban- 
doned, Adolf  Hitler  had  come  to  a decision.  He  would 
turn  on  Russia  in  the  following  spring. 

POSTSCRIPT:  THE  NAZI  PLOT  TO  KIDNAP  THE 
DUKE  AND  DUCHESS  OF  WINDSOR 

More  amusing  than  important,  but  not  without  its  in- 
sight into  the  ludicrous  side  of  the  rulers  of  the  Third 
Reich  that  summer  of  their  great  conquests,  is  the  story 
of  the  Nazi  plot  to  kidnap  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of 
Windsor  and  induce  the  former  King  of  England  to  work 
with  Hitler  for  a peace  settlement  with  Great  Britain.  The 
evolution  of  the  fantastic  plan  is  told  at  length  in  the 
captured  German  Foreign  Office  documents  40  and  touched 
on  by  Walter  Schellenberg,  the  youthful  S.S.-S.D.  chief 
who  was  designated  to  carry  it  out,  in  his  memoirs.41 


1031 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

The  idea,  Schellenberg  was  told  by  Ribbentrop,  was 
Hitler’s.  The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  embraced  it  with  all 
the  enthusiasm  to  which  his  abysmal  ignorance  often 
drove  him,  and  the  German  Foreign  Office  and  its  diplo- 
matic representatives  in  Spain  and  Portugal  were  forced 
to  waste  a great  deal  of  time  on  it  during  the  climactic 
summer  of  1940. 

After  the  fall  of  France 'in  June  1940,  the  Duke,  who 
had  been  a member  of  the  British  military  mission  with  the 
French  Army  High  Command,  made  his  way  with  the 
Duchess  to  Spain  to  escape  capture  by  the  Germans. 
On  June  23  the  German  ambassador  in  Madrid,  Eberhard 
von  Stohrer,  a career  diplomat,  telegraphed  Berlin: 

The  Spanish  Foreign  Minister  requests  advice  with  re- 
gard to  the  treatment  of  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Windsor 
who  were  to  arrive  in  Madrid  today,  apparently  en  route  to 
England  by  way  of  Lisbon.  The  Foreign  Minister  assumes 
that  we  might  perhaps  be  interested  in  detaining  the  Duke 
here  and  possibly  establishing  contact  with  him.  Please  tele- 
graph instructions. 

Ribbentrop  shot  back  instructions  by  wire  the  next  day. 
He  suggested  that  the  Windsors  be  “detained  for  a 
couple  of  weeks  in  Spain”  but  warned  that  it  must  not 
appear  “that  the  suggestion  came  from  Germany.”  On  the 
following  day,  June  25,  Stohrer  replied:  “The  [Spanish] 
Foreign  Minister  promised  me  to  do  everything  possible 
to  detain  Windsor  here  for  a time.”  The  Foreign  Minister, 
Colonel  Juan  Beigbeder  y Atienza,  saw  the  Duke  and 
reported  on  his  talk  to  the  German  ambassador,  who  in- 
formed Berlin  by  “top  secret”  telegram  of  July  2 that 
Windsor  would  not  return  to  England  unless  his  wife 
were  recognized  as  a member  of  the  royal  family  and  he 
himself  given  a position  of  importance.  Otherwise  he 
would  settle  in  Spain  in  a castle  promised  him  by  the 
Franco  government. 

Windsor  has  expressed  himself  to  the  Foreign  Minister 
and  other  acquaintances  [the  ambassador  added]  against 
Churchill  and  against  this  war. 

The  Windsors  proceeded  to  Lisbon  early  in  July  and 
on  July  11  the  German  minister  there  informed  Ribben- 
trop that  the  Duke  had  been  named  Governor  of  the 
Bahamas  but  “intends  to  postpone  his  departure  there  as 


1032  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

long  as  possible  ...  in  hope  of  a turn  of  events  favorable 
to  him.” 

He  is  convinced  [the  minister  added]  that  if  he  had  re- 
mained on  the  throne  war  would  have  been  avoided,  and  he 
characterized  himself  as  a firm  supporter  of  a peaceful  ar- 
rangement with  Germany.  The  Duke  definitely  believes  that 
continued  severe  bombing  would  make  England  ready  for 
peace. 

This  intelligence  spurred  the  arrogant  German  Foreign 
Minister  to  get  off  from  his  special  train  at  Fuschl  a 
telegram  marked  “Very  Urgent,  Top  Secret”  to  the  Ger- 
man Embassy  in  Madrid  late  on  the  evening  of  the  same 
day,  July  11.  He  wanted  the  Duke  to  be  prevented  from 
going  to  the  Bahamas  by  being  brought  back  to  Spain, 
preferably  by  his  Spanish  friends.  “After  their  return  to 
Spain,”  Ribbentrop  advised,  “the  Duke  and  his  wife  must 
be  persuaded  or  compelled  to  remain  on  Spanish  Terri- 
tory.” If  necessary  Spain  could  “intern”  him  as  an  English 
officer  and  treat  him  “as  a military  fugitive.” 

At  a suitable  occasion  [Ribbentrop  further  advised]  the 
Duke  must  be  informed  that  Germany  wants  peace  with  the 
English  people,  that  the  Churchill  clique  stands  in  the  way  of 
it,  and  that  it  would  be  a good  thing  if  the  Duke  would 
hold  himself  in  readiness  for  further  developments.  Ger- 
many is  determined  to  force  England  to  peace  by  every 
means  of  power  and  upon  this  happening  would  be  prepared 
to  accommodate  any  desire  expressed  by  the  Duke,  especially 
with  a view  to  the  assumption  of  the  English  throne  by  the 
Duke  and  Duchess.  If  the  Duke  should  have  other  plans,  but 
be  prepared  to  co-operate  in  the  establishment  of  good  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  England,  we  would  likewise  be 
prepared  to  assure  him  and  his  wife  of  a subsistence 
which  would  permit  him  ...  to  lead  a life  suitable  for  a 
king.* 

The  fatuous  Nazi  Minister,  whose  experience  as  German 
ambassador  in  London  had  taught  him  little  about  the 
English,  added  that  he  had  information  that  the  “British 
Secret  Service”  was  going  to  “do  away”  with  the  Duke  as 
soon  as  it  got  him  to  the  Bahamas. 

The  next  day,  July  12,  the  German  ambassador  in  Ma- 

•Fifty  million  Swiss  francs,  deposited  in  Switzerland,  Ribbentrop  told 
Schellenberg,  adding  that  “the  Fuehrer  is  quite  ready  to  go  to  a higher 
figure.” 


1033 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

drid  saw  Ramon  Serrano  Suner,  Spanish  Minister  of  the 
Interior  and  brother-in-law  of  Franco,  who  promised  to 
get  the  Generalissimo  in  on  the  plot  and  carry  out  the 
following  plan.  The  Spanish  government  would  send  to 
Lisbon  an  old  friend  of  the  Duke,  Miguel  Primo  de 
Rivera,  Madrid  leader  of  the  Falange  and  son  of  a former 
Spanish  dictator.  Rivera  would  invite  the  Duke  to  Spain 
for  some  hunting  and  also  to  confer  with  the  govern- 
ment about  Anglo-Spanish  relations.  Suner  would  in- 
form the  Duke  about  the  British  secret-service  plot  to 
bump  him  off. 

The  Minister  [the  German  ambassador  informed  Berlin] 
will  then  add  an  invitation  to  the  Duke  and  Duchess  to  accept 
Spanish  hospitality,  and  possibly  financial  assistance  as  well. 
Possibly  also  the  departure  of  the  Duke  could  be  prevented 
in  some  other  way.  In  this  whole  plan  we  remain  completely 
in  the  background. 

Rivera,  according  to  the  German  papers,  returned  from 
Lisbon  to  Madrid  after  his  first  visit  with  the  Windsors  on 
July  16  and  brought  a message  to  the  Spanish  Foreign 
Minister,  who  passed  it  along  to  the  German  ambassador, 
who,  in  turn,  flashed  it  to  Berlin.  Churchill,  the  message 
said,  had  designated  the  Duke  as  Governor  of  the  Ba- 
hamas “in  a very  cool  and  categorical  letter”  and  ordered 
him  to  proceed  to  his  post  at  once.  Should  he  fail  to  do 
so,  “Churchill  has  threatened  Windsor  with  a court- 
martial.”  The  Spanish  government  agreed,  the  dispatch 
added,  “to  warn  the  Duke  most  urgently  once  more 
against  taking  up  the  post.” 

Rivera  was  back  from  a second  visit  to  Lisbon  on  July 
22,  and  the  next  day  the  German  ambassador  in 
Madrid  duly  reported  on  his  findings  in  a “most  urgent, 
top  secret”  telegram  to  Ribbentrop. 

He  had  two  long  conversations  with  the  Duke  of  Windsor; 
at  the  last  one  the  Duchess  was  present  also.  The  Duke  ex- 
pressed himself  very  freely  . . . Politically  he  was  more  and 
more  distant  from  the  King  and  the  present  British  Govern- 
ment. The  Duke  and  Duchess  have  less  fear  of  the  King,  who 
was  quite  foolish,  than  of  the  shrewd  Queen,  who  was  in- 
triguing skillfully  against  the  Duke  and  particularly  against 
the  Duchess. 

The  Duke  was  considering  making  a public  statement  . . . 
disavowing  present  English  policy  and  breaking  with  his 


1034  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

brother  . . . The  Duke  and  Duchess  said  they  very  much  de- 
sired to  return  to  Spain. 

To  facilitate  this,  the  ambassador  had  arranged  with 
Suner,  the  telegram  added,  to  send  another  Spanish 
emissary  to  Portugal  “to  persuade  the  Duke  to  leave 
Lisbon,  as  if  for  a long  excursion  in  an  automobile,  and 
then  to  cross  the  border  at  a place  which  has  been  arranged, 
where  the  Spanish  secret  police  will  see  that  there  is  a safe 
crossing  of  the  frontier.” 

Two  days  later  the  ambassador  added  further  infor- 
mation from  Rivera  in  an  “urgent  and  strictly  confidential” 
telegram  to  Ribbentrop. 

When  he  gave  the  Duke  the  advice  not  to  go  to  the 
Bahamas,  but  to  return  to  Spain,  since  the  Duke  was  likely 
to  be  called  upon  to  play  an  important  role  in  English 
policy  and  possibly  to  ascend  the  English  throne,  both  the 
Duke  and  Duchess  gave  evidence  of  astonishment.  Both  . . . 
replied  that  according  to  the  English  constitution  this  would 
not  be  possible  after  the  abdication.  When  the  confidential 
emissary  then  expressed  his  expectation  that  the  course  of 
the  war  might  bring  about  changes  even  in  the  English  con- 
stitution, the  Duchess  especially  became  very  pensive. 

In  this  dispatch  the  German  ambassador  reminded 
Ribbentrop  that  Rivera  did  not  know  of  “any  German 
interest  in  the  matter.”  The  young  Spaniard  apparently 
believed  he  was  acting  for  his  own  government. 

By  the  last  week  in  July,  the  Nazi  plan  to  kidnap  the 
Windsors  had  been  drawn  up.  Walter  Schellenberg  was 
assigned  personally  by  Hitler  to  carry  it  out.  He  had  flown 
from  Berlin  to  Madrid,  conferred  with  the  German  am- 
bassador there,  and  gone  on  to  Portugal  to  begin  work. 
On  July  26  the  ambassador  was  able  to  file  a long  “most 
urgent  and  top  secret”  dispatch  to  Ribbentrop  outlining 
the  plot. 

...  A firm  intention  by  the  Duke  and  Duchess  to  return  to 
Spam  can  be  assumed.  To  strengthen  this  intention  the  second 
confidential  emissary  was  sent  off  today  with  a letter  to  the 
Duke  very  skillfully  composed;  as  an  enclosure  to  it  was 
attached  the  very  precisely  prepared  plan  for  carrying  out 
the  crossing  of  the  frontier. 

According  to  this  plan  the  Duke  and  his  wife  should  set 
out  officially  for  a summer  vacation  in  the  mountains  at  a 
place  near  the  Spanish  frontier,  in  order  to  cross  over  at  a 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1035 

precisely  designated  place  at  a particular  time  in  the  course 
of  a hunting  trip.  Since  the  Duke  is  without  passports,  the 
Portuguese  frontier  official  in  charge  there  will  be  won  over. 

At  the  time  set  according  to  plan,  the  first  confidential 
emissary  [Primo  de  Rivera]  is  to  be  staying  at  the  frontier 
with  Spanish  forces  suitably  placed  in  order  to  guarantee 
safety. 

Schellenberg,  with  his  group,  is  operating  out  of  Lisbon 
in  closest  relation  to  the  same  purpose. 

For  this  purpose,  the  journey  to  the  place  of  the  summer 
vacation,  as  well  as  the  vacation  itself,  will  be  shadowed 
with  the  help  of  a trustworthy  Portuguese  police  chief  . . . 

At  the  exact  moment  of  the  crossing  of  the  frontier  as 
scheduled  the  Schellenberg  group  is  to  take  over  the  se- 
curity arrangements  on  the  Portuguese  side  of  the  fron- 
tier and  continue  thus  into  Spain  as  a direct  escort  which  is 
to  be  unobtrusively  changed  from  time  to  time. 

For  the  security  of  the  entire  plan,  the'  [Spanish]  Minister 
has  selected  another  confidential  agent,  a woman,  who  can 
make  contact  if  necessary  with  the  second  confidential  agent 
and  can  also,  if  necessary,  get  information  to  the  Schellen- 
berg group. 

In  case  there  should  be  an  emergency  as  a result  of  action 
by  the  British  Intelligence  Service  preparations  are  being 
made  whereby  the  Duke  and  Duchess  can  reach  Spain  by 
plane.  In  this  case,  as  in  the  execution  of  the  first  plan,  the 
chief  requisite  is  to  obtain  willingness  to  leave  by  psycho- 
logically adroit  influence  upon  the  pronounced  English  men- 
tality of  the  Duke,  without  giving  the  impression  of  flight, 
through  exploiting  anxiety  about  the  British  Intelligence 
Service  and  the  prospect  of  free  political  activity  from  Span- 
ish soil. 

In  addition  to  the  protection  in  Lisbon,  it  is  being  con- 
sidered in  case  of  necessity  to  induce  willingness  to  leave 
by  a suitable  scare  maneuver  to  be  charged  to  the  British 
Intelligence  Service. 

Such  was  the  Nazi  plan  to  kidnap  the  Windsors.  It  had  a 
typical  German  clumsiness,  and  it  was  handicapped  by 
the  customary  German  inability  to  understand  “the  Eng- 
lish mentality  of  the  Duke.” 

The  “scare  maneuvers”  were  duly  carried  out  by 
Schellenberg.  One  night  he  arranged  for  some  stone- 
throwing  against  the  windows  of  the  Windsors’  villa  and 
then  circulated  rumors  among  the  servants  that  it  had  been 
done  by  the  “British  Secret  Service.”  He  had  a bouquet 
delivered  to  the  Duchess  with  a card:  “Beware  of  the 


1036 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

machinations  of  the  British  Secret  Service.  From  a Portu- 
guese friend  who  has  your  interests  at  heart.”  And  in  an 
official  report  to  Berlin  he  reported  that  “a  firing  of  shots 
(harmless  breaking  of  the  bedroom  window)  scheduled  for 
the  night  of  July  30  was  omitted,  since  the  psychological 
effect  on  the  Duchess  would  only  have  been  to  increase 
her  desire  to  depart.” 

Time  was  getting  short.  On  July  30  Schellenberg  re- 
ported the  arrival  in  Lisbon  of  Sir  Walter  Monckton,  an 
old  friend  of  the  Duke  and  an  important  official  in  the 
British  government.  His  mission  was  obviously  to  get  the 
Windsors  speeding  toward  the  Bahamas  as  soon  as 
possible.  On  the  same  day  the  German  ambassador  in 
Madrid  was  telegraphing  Ribbentrop  “most  urgent,  top 
secret”  that  a German  agent  in  Lisbon  had  just  informed 
him  that  the  Duke  and  Duchess  were  planning  to  depart 
on  August  1 — two  days  hence.  In  view  of  this  information 
he  asked  Ribbentrop  “whether  we  should  not,  to  some 
extent,  emerge  from  our  reserve.”  According  to  German 
intelligence,  the  ambassador  continued,  the  Duke  had  ex- 
pressed to  his  host,  the  Portuguese  banker  Ricardo  do 
Espirito  Santo  Silva,  “a  desire  to  come  in  contact  with  the 
Fuehrer.”  Why  not  arrange  for  a meeting  between  Wind- 
sor and  Hitler? 

The  next  day,  July  31,  the  ambassador  was  again 
wiring  Ribbentrop  “most  urgent  and  top  secret,”  telling 
him  that  according  to  the  Spanish  emissary,  who  had  just 
returned  from  seeing  the  Windsors  in  Lisbon,  the  Duke 
and  Duchess,  while  “strongly  impressed  by  reports  of 
English  intrigues  against  them  and  the  danger  of  their 
personal  safety,”  apparently  were  planning  to  sail  on 
August  1,  though  Windsor  was  trying  “to  conceal  the  true 
date.”  The  Spanish  Minister  of  the  Interior,  the  ambassa- 
dor added,  was  going  to  make  “a  last  effort  to  prevent 
the  Duke  and  Duchess  from  leaving.” 

The  news  that  the  Windsors  might  be  leaving  so  soon 
alarmed  Ribbentrop  and  from  his  special  train  at  Fuschl 
he  got  off  a “most  urgent,  top  secret”  telegram  to  the 
German  minister  in  Lisbon  late  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
same  day,  July  31.  He  asked  that  the  Duke  be  informed 
through  his  Portuguese  banker  host  of  the  following: 

Basically  Germany  wants  peace  with  the  English  people. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1037 

The  Churchill  clique  stands  in  the  way  of  this  peace.  Follow- 
ing the  rejection  of  the  Fuehrer’s  last  appeal  to  reason,  Ger- 
many is  now  determined  to  force  England  to  make  peace  by 
every  means  in  her  power.  It  would  be  a good  thing  if  the 
Duke  were  to  keep  himself  prepared  for  further  develop- 
ments. In  such  case  Germany  would  be  willing  to  co-operate 
most  closely  with  the  Duke  and  to  clear  the  way  for  any  de- 
sire expressed  by  the  Duke  and  Duchess  . . . Should  the  Duke 
and  Duchess  have  other  intentions,  but  be  ready  to  col- 
laborate in  the  establishment  of  a good  relationship  between 
Germany  and  England,  Germany  is  likewise  prepared  to  co- 
operate with  the  Duke  and  to  arrange  the  future  of  the 
Ducal  couple  in  accordance  with  their  wishes.  The  Portu- 
guese confidant,  with  whom  the  Duke  is  living,  should  make 
the  most  earnest  effort  to  prevent  his  departure  tomorrow, 
since  reliable  reports  are  in  our  possession  to  the  effect  that 
Churchill  intends  to  get  the  Duke  into  his  power  in  the  Ba- 
hamas in  order  to  keep  him  there  permanently,  and  also  be- 
cause the  establishment  of  contact  at  an  appropriate  mo- 
ment with  the  Duke  on  the  Bahama  Islands  would  present 
the  greatest  difficulty  for  us  . . . 

The  German  Foreign  Minister’s  urgent  message  reached 
the  legation  in  Lisbon  shortly  before  midnight.  The  Ger- 
man minister  saw  Senhor  Espirito  Santo  Silva  during  the 
course  of  the  night  and  urged  him  to  pass  the  word  on  to 
his  distinguished  guest.  This  the  banker  did  on  the  morn- 
ing of  August  1 and  according  to  a dispatch  of  the  lega- 
tion the  Duke  was  deeply  impressed. 

The  Duke  paid  tribute  to  the  Fuehrer’s  desire  for  peace, 
which  was  in  complete  agreement  with  his  own  point  of 
view.  He  was  firmly  convinced  that  if  he  had  been  King  it 
would  never  have  come  to  war.  To  the  appeal  made  to  him 
to  co-operate  a V a suitable  time  in  the  establishment  of  peace 
he  agreed  gladly.  However,  at  the  present  time  he  must  fol- 
low the  official  orders  of  his  Government.  Disobedience 
would  disclose  his  intentions  prematurely,  bring  about  a 
scandal,  and  deprive  him  of  his  prestige  in  England.  He  was 
also  convinced  that  the  present  moment  was  too  early  for 
him  to  come  forward,  since  there  was  as  yet  no  inclination 
in  England  for  an  approach  to  Germany.  However,  as  soon  as 
this  frame  of  mind  changed  he  would  be  ready  to  return  im- 
mediately . . . Either  England  would  yet  call  upon  him,  which 
he  considered  to  be  entirely  possible,  or  Germany  would 
express  the  desire  to  negotiate  with  him.  In  both  cases  he 
was  prepared  for  any  personal  sacrifice  and  would  make 
himself  available  without  the  slightest  personal  ambition. 


1038  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

He  would  remain  in  continuing  communication  with  his 
previous  host  and  had  agreed  with  him  upon  a code  word, 
upon  receiving  which  he  would  immediately  come  back 
over. 

To  the  consternation  of  the  Germans,  the  Duke  and 
Duchess  sailed  on  the  evening  of  August  1 on  the  Ameri- 
can liner  Excalibur.  In  a final  report  on  the  failure  of  his 
mission  made  in  a long  telegram  “to  the  Foreign  Minister 
[Ribbentrop]  personally”  on  the  following  day,  Schel- 
lenberg  declared'  that  he  had  done  everything  possible 
right  up  to  the  last  moment  to  prevent  the  departure.  A 
brother  of  Franco,  who  was  the  Spanish  ambassador  in 
Lisbon,  was  prevailed  upon  to  make  a last-minute  appeal 
to  the  Windsors  not  to  go.  The  automobile  carrying  the 
ducal  baggage  was  “sabotaged,”  Schellenberg  claimed,  so 
that  the  luggage  arrived  at  the  ship  late.  The  Germans 
spread  rumors  that  a time  bomb  had  been  planted  aboard 
the  ship.  Portuguese  officials  delayed  the  sailing  time 
until  they  had  searched  the  liner  from  top  to  bottom. 

Nevertheless,  the  Windsors  departed  that  evening.  The 
Nazi  plot  had  failed.  Schellenberg,  in  his  final  report  to 
Ribbentrop,  blamed  it  on  the  influence  of  Monckton,  on  the 
collapse  of  “the  Spanish  plan”  and  on  “the  Duke’s  men- 
tality.” 

There  is  one  last  paper  on  the  plot  in  the  captured  files 
of  the  German  Foreign  Minister.  On  August  15  the  Ger- 
man minister  in  Lisbon  wired  Berlin:  “The  confidant  has 
just  received  a telegram  from  the  Duke  from  Bermuda, 
asking  him  to  send  a communication  as  soon  as  action 
was  advisable.  Should  any  answer  be  made?” 

No  answer  has  been  found  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  papers. 
By  the  middle  of  August,  Hitler  had  decided  to  conquer 
Great  Britain  by  armed  force.  There  was  no  need  to 
find  a new  King  for  England.  The  island,  like  all  the  other 
conquered  territory,  would  be  ruled  from  Berlin.  Or  so 
Hitler  thought. 

So  much  for  this  curious  tale,  as  told  by  the  secret 
German  documents  and  added  to  by  Schellenberg,  who 
was  the  least  reliable  of  men — though  it  is  difficult  to 
believe  that  he  invented  his  own  role,  which  he  admits 
was  a ridiculous  one,  out  of  whole  cloth. 

In  a statement  made  through  his  London  solicitors  on 


1039 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

August  1,  1957,  after  the  German  documents  were  re- 
leased for  publication,  the  Duke  branded  the  communica- 
tions between  Ribbentrop  and  the  German  ambassadors 
in  Spain  and  Portugal  as  “complete  fabrications  and,  in 
part,  gross  distortions  of  the  truth.”  Windsor  explained 
that  while  in  Lisbon  in  1940,  waiting  to  sail  for  the 
Bahamas,  “certain  people,”  whom  he  discovered  to  be 
pro-Nazi  sympathizers,  made  definite  efforts  to  persuade 
him  to  return  to  Spain  and  not  assume  his  post  as  gover- 
nor. 

“It  was  even  suggested  to  me  that  there  would  be  a 
personal  risk  to  the  Duchess  and  myself  if  we  were  to 
proceed  to  the  Bahamas,”  he  said.  “At  no  time  did  I ever 
entertain  any  thought  of  complying  with  such  a sugges- 
tion, which  I treated  with  the  contempt  it  deserved.” 

The  British  Foreign  Office  issued  a formal  statement 
declaring  that  the  Duke  never  wavered  in  his  loyalty  to 
Great  Britain  during  the  war.43 


23 


BARBAROSSA:  THE  TURN  OF  RUSSIA 


while  hitler  was  busy  that  summer  of  1940  directing 
the  conquest  of  the  West,  Stalin  was  taking  advantage  of 
the  Fuehrer’s  preoccupations  by  moving  into  the  Baltic 
States  and  reaching  down  into  the  Balkans. 

On  the  surface  all  was  friendly  between  the  two  great 
dictatorships.  Molotov,  acting  for  Stalin,  lost  no  oppor- 
tunity to  praise  and  flatter  the  Germans  on  every  occa- 
sion of  a new  act  of  aggression  or  a fresh  conquest.  When 
Germany  invaded  Norway  and  Denmark  on  April  9,  1940, 
the  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar  hastened  to  tell  Ambassa- 
dor von  der  Schulenburg  in  Moscow  that  very  morning 
that  “the  Soviet  Government  understood  the  measures 
which  were  forced  on  Germany.”  “We  wish  Germany,” 
said  Molotov,  “complete  success  in  her  defensive  meas- 
ures.” 1 

A month  later,  when  the  German  ambassador  called  on 
Molotov  to  inform  him  officially  of  the  Wehrmacht’s  at- 
tack in  the  West,  which  Ribbentrop  had  instructed  his 
envoy  to  explain  “was  forced  upon  Germany  by  the  im- 
pending Anglo-French  push  on  the  Ruhr  by  way  of  Bel- 
gium and  Holland,”  the  Soviet  statesman  again  expressed 
his  pleasure.  “Molotov  received  the  communication  in  an 
understanding  spirit,”  Schulenburg  wired  Berlin,  “and 
added  that  he  realized  that  Germany  must  protect  herself 
against  Anglo-French  attack.  He  had  no  doubt  of  our 
success.”  2 

On  June  17,  the  day  France  asked  for  an  armistice, 
Molotov  summoned  Schulenburg  to  his  office  “and 
expressed  the  warmest  congratulations  of  the  Soviet 
Government  on  the  splendid  success  of  the  German 
Wehrmacht.” 

1040 


1041 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

The  Foreign  Commissar  had  something  else  to  say, 
and  this  did  not  sound  quite  so  pleasant  in  German  ears. 
He  informed  the  German  envoy,  as  the  latter  wired  Ber- 
lin “most  urgent,”  of  “the  Soviet  action  against  the  Baltic 
States,”  adding — and  one  can  almost  see  the  gleam  in 
Molotov’s  eyes — “that  it  had  become  necessary  to  put  an 
end  to  all  the  intrigues  by  which  England  and  France 
had  tried  to  sow  discord  and  mistrust  between  Germany 
and  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  Baltic  States.”  3 To  put  an 
end  to  such  “discord”  the  Soviet  government,  Molotov 
added,  had  dispatched  “special  emissaries”  to  the  three 
Baltic  countries.  They  were,  in  fact,  three  of  Stalin’s  best 
hatchetmen:  Dekanozov,  who  was  sent  to  Lithuania;  Vi- 
shinsky,  to  Latvia;  Zhdanov,  to  Estonia. 

They  carried  out  their  assignments  with  the  thorough- 
ness which  one  would  expect  from  this  trio,  especially 
the  latter  two  individuals.  Already  on  June  14,  the  day 
German  troops  entered  Paris,  the  Soviet  government  had 
sent  a nine-hour  ultimatum  to  Lithuania  demanding  the 
resignation  of  its  government,  the  arrest  of  some  of  its 
key  officials  and  the  right  to  send  in  as  many  Red  Army 
troops  as  it  pleased.  Though  the  Lithuanian  government 
accepted  the  ultimatum,  Moscow  deemed  its  acceptance 
“unsatisfactory,”  and  the  next  day,  June  15,  Soviet  troops 
occupied  the  country,  the  only  one  of  the  Baltic  States  to 
border  on  Germany.  During  the  next  couple  of  days  simi- 
lar Soviet  ultimatums  were  dispatched  to  Latvia  and  Es- 
tonia, after  which  they  were  similarly  overrun  by  the 
Red  Army. 

Stalin  could  be  as  crude  and  as  ruthless  in  these  mat- 
ters as  Hitler — and  even  more  cynical.  The  press  having 
been  suppressed,  the  political  leaders  arrested  and  all 
parties  but  the  Communist  declared  illegal,  “elections” 
were  staged  by  the  Russians  in  all  three  countries  on  July 
14,  and  after  the  respective  parliaments  thus  “elected” 
had  voted  for  the  incorporation  of  their  lands  into  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  Supreme  Soviet  (Parliament)  of  Russia 
“admitted”  them  into  the  motherland:  Lithuania  on  Au- 
gust 3,  Latvia  on  August  5,  Estonia  on  August  6. 

Adolf  Hitler  was  humiliated,  but,  busy  as  he  was  trying 
to  organize  the  invasion  of  Britain,  could  do  nothing 
about  it.  The  letters  from  the  envoys  of  the  three  Baltic 


■1042  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

States  in  Berlin  protesting  Russian  aggression  were  re- 
turned to  them  by  order  of  Ribbentrop.  To  further  hum- 
ble the  Germans  Molotov  brusquely  told  them  on  August 
11  to  “liquidate”  their  legations  in  Kaunas,  Riga  and 
Tallinn  within  a fortnight  and  close  down  their  Baltic 
consulates  by  September  1. 

The  seizure  of  the  Baltic  States  did  not  satisfy  Stalin’s 
appetite.  The  surprisingly  quick  collapse  of  the  Anglo- 
French  armies  spurred  him  on  to  get  as  much  as  he  could 
while  the  getting  was  good.  He  obviously  thought  there 
was  little  time  to  lose.  On  June  23,  the  day  after  the 
French  formally  capitulated  and  signed  the  armistice  at 
Compiegne,  Molotov  again  called  in  the  Nazi  ambassa- 
dor in  Moscow  and  told  him  that  “the  solution  of  the 
Bessarabian  question  brooked  no  further  delay.  The  So- 
viet government  was  determined  to  use  force,  should  the 
Rumanian  government  decline  a peaceful  agreement.”  It 
expected  Germany,  Molotov  added,  “not  to  hinder  but  to 
support  the  Soviets  in  their  action.”  Moreover,  “the  Soviet 
claim  likewise  extended  to  Bucovina.”  * Bessarabia  had 
been  taken  by  Rumania  from  Russia  at  the  end  of  the 
First  World  War,  but  Bucovina  had  never  belonged  to  it, 
having  been  under  Austria  until  Rumania  grabbed  it  in 
1919.  At  the  negotiations  in  Moscow  for  the  Nazi-Soviet 
Pact,  Ribbentrop,  as  he  now  reminded  Hitler,  who  had 
questioned  him  about  it,  had  been  forced  to  give  Bess- 
arabia to  the  Russian  sphere  of  interest.  But  he  had  never 
given  away  Bucovina. 

There  was  some  alarm  in  Berlin,  which  spread  to  OKW 
headquarters  in  the  West.  The  Wehrmacht  was  desperate- 
ly dependent  on  Rumanian  oil  and  Germany  needed  the 
foodstuffs  and  fodder  it  also  got  from  this  Balkan  coun- 
try- These  would  be  lost  if  the  Red  Army  occupied  Ru- 
mania. Some  time  back,  on  May  23,  at  the  height  of  the 
Battle  of  France,  the  Rumanian  General  Staff  had  sent 
an  S.O.S.  to  OKW  informing  it  that  Soviet  troops  were 
concentrating  on  the  border.  Jodi  summed  up  the  reac- 
tion at  Hitler’s  headquarters  in  his  diary  the  next  day:  “Sit- 
uation in  East  becomes  threatening  because  of  Russian 
concentration  of  force  against  Bessarabia.” 

On  the  night  of  June  26  Russia  delivered  an  ultimatum 
to  Rumania  demanding  the  ceding  to  it  of  Bessarabia  and 
northern  Bticovina  and  insisting  on  a reply  the  next  day. 


1043 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Ribbentrop,  in  panic,  dashed  off  instructions  from  his 
special  train  to  his  minister  in  Bucharest  telling  him  to 
advise  the  Rumanian  government  to  yield,  which  it  did  on 
June  27.  Soviet  troops  marched  into  the  newly  acquired 
territories  the  next  day  and  Berlin  breathed  a sigh  of  re- 
lief that  at  least  the  rich  sources  of  oil  and  food  had  not 
been  cut  off  by  Russia’s  grabbing  the  whole  of  Rumania. 

It  is  clear  from  his  acts  and  from  the  secret  German  pa- 
pers that  though  Stalin  was  out  to  get  all  he  could  in 
Eastern  Europe  while  the  Germans  were  tied  down  in  the 
West,  he  did  not  wish  or  contemplate  a break  with  Hitler. 

Toward  the  end  of  June  Churchill  had  tried  to  warn 
Stalin  in  a personal  letter  of  the  danger  of  the  German 
conquests  to  Russia  as  well  as  to  Britain.5  The  Soviet 
dictator  did  not  bother  to  answer;  probably,  like  almost 
everyone  else,  he  thought  Britain  was  finished.  So  he  tat- 
tled to  the  Germans  what  the  British  government  was  up 
to.  Sir  Stafford  Cripps,  a left-wing  Labor  Party  leader, 
whom  the  Prime  Minister  had  rushed  to  Moscow  as  the 
new  British  ambassador  in  the  hope  of  striking  a more 
responsive  chord  among  the  Bolsheviks — a forlorn  hope, 
as  he  later  ruefully  admitted — was  received  by  Stalin 
early  in  July  in  an  interview  that  Churchill  described  as 
“formal  and  frigid.”  On  July  13  Molotov,  on  Stalin’s  in- 
structions, handed  the  German  ambassador  a written 
memorandum  of  this  confidential  conversation. 

It  is  an  interesting  document.  It  reveals,  as  no  other 
source  does,  the  severe  limitations  of  the  Soviet  dictator 
in  his  cold  calculations  of  foreign  affairs.  Schulenburg 
sped  it  to  Berlin  “most  urgent”  and,  of  course,  “secret,” 
and  Ribbentrop  was  so  grateful  for  its  contents  that  he 
told  the  Soviet  government  he  “greatly  appreciated  this 
information.”  Cripps  had  pressed  Stalin,  the  memoran- 
dum said,  for  his  attitude  on  this  principal  question, 
among  others: 

The  British  Government  was  convinced  that  Germany  was 
striving  for  hegemony  in  Europe  . . . This  was  dangerous  to 
the  Soviet  Union  as  well  as  England.  Therefore  both  countries 
ought  to  agree  on  a common  policy  of  self-protection  against 
Germany  and  on  the  re-establishment  of  the  European  bal- 
ance of  power  . . . 

Stalin’s  answers  are  given  as  follows: 


1044 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

He  did  not  see  any  danger  of  the  hegemony  of  any  one 
country  in  Europe  and  still  less  any  danger  that  Europe 
might  be  engulfed  by  Germany.  Stalin  observed  the  policy  of 
Germany,  and  knew  several  leading  German  statesmen  well. 
He  had  not  discovered  any  desire  on  their  part  to  engulf 
European  countries.  Stalin  was  not  of  the  opinion  that  Ger- 
man military  successes  menaced  the  Soviet  Union  and  her 
friendly  relations  with  Germany  . . .* 

Such  staggering  smugness,  such  abysmal  ignorance 
leave  one  breathless.  The  Russian  tyrant  did  not  know, 
of  course,  the  secrets  of  Hitler’s  turgid  mind,  but  the 
Fuehrer’s  past  behavior,  his  known  ambitions  and  the 
unexpectedly  rapid  Nazi  conquests  ought  to  have  been 
enough  to  warn  him  of  the  dire  danger  the  Soviet  Union 
was  now  in.  But,  incomprehensibly,  they  were  not  enough. 

From  the  captured  Nazi  documents  and  from  the  testi- 
mony of  many  leading  German  figures  in  the  great  drama 
that  was  being  played  over  the  vast  expanse  of  Western 
Europe  that  year,  it  is  plain  that  at  the  very  moment  of 
Stalin’s  monumental  complacency  Hitler  had  in  fact  been 
mulling  over  in  his  mind  the  idea  of  turning  on  the  Soviet 
Union  and  destroying  her. 

The  basic  idea  went  back  much  further,  at  least  fifteen 
years — to  Mein  Kampf. 

And  so  we  National  Socialists  [Hitler  wrote]  take  up  where 
we  broke  off  six  hundred  years  ago.  We  stop  the  endless 
German  movement  toward  the  south  and  west  of  Europe 
and  turn  our  gaze  toward  the  lands  of  the  East  . . . When 
we  speak  of  new  territory  in  Europe  today  we  must  think 
principally  of  Russia  and  her  border  vassal  states.  Destiny 
itself  seems  to  wish  to  point  out  the  way  to  us  here  . . . 
This  colossal  empire  in  the  East  is  ripe  for  dissolution,  and 
the  end  of  the  Jewish  domination  in  Russia  will  also  be  the 
end  of  Russia  as  a state.7 

This  idea  lay  like  bedrock  in  Hitler’s  mind,  and  his 
pact  with  Stalin  had  not  changed  it  at  all,  but  merely 
postponed  acting  on  it.  And  but  briefly.  In  fact,  less  than 
two  months  after  the  deal  was  signed  and  had  been  uti- 
lized to  destroy  Poland  the  Fuehrer  instructed  the  Army 
that  the  conquered  Polish  territory  was  to  be  regarded 
“as  an  assembly  area  for  future  German  operations.”  The 
date  was  October  18,  1939,  and  Haider  recorded  it  that 
day  in  his  diary. 


1045 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Five  weeks  later,  on  November  23,  when  he  harangued 
his  reluctant  generals  about  attacking  in  the  West,  Russia 
was  by  no  means  out  of  his  mind.  “We  can  oppose  Rus- 
sia,” he  declared,  “only  when  we  are  free  in  the  West.” 
At  that  time  the  two-front  war,  the  nightmare  of  Ger- 
man generals  for  a century,  was  very  much  on  Hitler’s 
mind,  and  he  spoke  of  it  at  length  on  this  occasion.  He 
would  not  repeat  the  mistake  of  former  German  rulers; 
he  would  continue  to  see  to  it  that  the  Army  had  one 
front  at  a time. 

It  was  only  natural,  then,  that  with  the  fall  of  France, 
the  chasing  of  the  British  Army  across  the  Channel  and 
the  prospects  of  Britain’s  imminent  collapse,  Hitler’s 
thoughts  should  turn  once  again  to  Russia.  For  he  now 
supposed  himself  to  be  free  in  the  West  and  thereby  to 
have  achieved  the  one  condition  he  had  laid  down  in 
order  to  be  in  a position  to  “oppose  Russia.”  The  rapidity 
with  which  Stalin  seized  the  Baltic  States  and  the  two 
Rumanian  provinces  in  June  spurred  Hitler  to  a decision. 

The  moment  of  its  making  can  now  be  traced.  Jodi 
says  that  the  “fundamental  decision”  was  taken  “as  far 
back  as  during  the  Western  Campaign.”  8 Colonel  Walter 
Warlimont,  Jodi’s  deputy  at  OKW,  remembers  that  on 
July  29  Jodi  announced  at  a meeting  of  Operations  Staff 
officers  that  “Hitler  intended  to  attack  the  U.S.S.R.  in  the 
spring  of  1941.”  Sometime  previous  to  this  meeting,  Jodi 
related,  Hitler  had  told  Keitel  “that  he  intended  to  launch 
the  attack  against  the  U.S.S.R.  during  the  fall  of  1940.” 
But  this  was  too  much  even  for  Keitel  and  he  had  ar- 
gued Hitler  out  of  it  by  contending  that  not  only  the 
bad  weather  in  the  autumn  but  the  difficulties  of  trans- 
ferring the  bulk  of  the  Army  from  the  West  to  the  East 
made  it  impossible.  By  the  time  of  this  conference  on 
July  29,  Warlimont  relates,  “the  date  for  the  intended 
attack  [against  Russia]  had  been  moved  back  to  the 
spring  of  1941.”  8 

Only  a week  before,  we  know  from  Haider’s  diary,10 
the  Fuehrer  had  still  held  to  a possible  campaign  in  Rus- 
sia for  the  autumn  if  Britain  were  not  invaded.  At  a mili- 
tary conference  in  Berlin  on  July  21  he  told  Brauchitsch 
to  get  busy  on  the  preparations  for  it.  That  the  Army 
Commander  in  Chief  and  his  General  Staff  already  had 
given  the  problem  some  thought — but  not  enough  thought 


1046 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


— is  evident  from  his  response  to  Hitler.  Brauchitsch  told 
the  Leader  that  the  campaign  “would  last  four  to  six 
weeks”  and  that  the  aim  would  be  “to  defeat  the  Russian 
Army  or  at  least  to  occupy  enough  Russian  territory  so 
that  Soviet  bombers  could  not  reach  Berlin  or  the  Silesian 
industrial  area  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Luftwaffe 
bombers  could  reach  all  important  objectives  in  the  So- 
viet Union.”  Brauchitsch  thought  that  from  eighty  to  a 
hundred  German  divisions  could  do  the  job;  he  assessed 
Russian  strength  as  “fifty  to  seventy-five  good  divisions.” 
Haider’s  notes  on  what  Brauchitsch  told  him  of  the  meet- 
ing show  that  Hitler  had  been  stung  by  Stalin’s  grabs  in 
the  East,  that  he  thought  the  Soviet  dictator  was  “coquet- 
ting with  England”  in  order  to  encourage  her  to  hold  out, 
but  that  he  had  seen  no  signs  that  Russia  was  preparing 
to  enter  the  war  against  Germany. 

At  a further  conference  at  the  Berghof  on  the  last  day 
of  July  1940,  the  receding  prospects  of  an  invasion  of 
Britain  prompted  Hitler  to  announce  for  the  first  time  to 
his  Army  chiefs  his  decision  on  Russia.  Haider  was  per- 
sonally present  this  time  and  jotted  down  his  shorthand 
notes  of  exactly  what  the  warlord  said.11  They  reveal  not 
only  that  Hitler  had  made  a definite  decision  to  attack  Rus- 
sia in  the  following  spring  but  that  he  had  already  worked 
out  in  his  mind  the  major  strategic  aims. 

Britain’s  hope  [Hitler  said]  lies  in  Russia  and  America.  If 
that  hope  in  Russia  is  destroyed  then  it  will  be  destroyed 
for  America  too  because  elimination  of  Russia  will  enor- 
mously increase  Japan’s  power  in  the  Far  East 

The  more  he  thought  of  it  the  more  convinced  he  was, 
Hitler  said,  that  Britain’s  stubborn  determination  to  con- 
tinue the  war  was  due  to  its  counting  on  the  Soviet  Union. 

Something  strange  [he  explained]  has  happened  in  Britain! 
The  British  were  already  completely  down.*  Now  they  are 
back  on  their  feet.  Intercepted  conversations.  Russia  un- 
pleasantly disturbed  by  the  swift  developments  in  Western 
Europe. 

Russia  needs  only  to  hint  to  England  that  she  does  not 
wish  to  see  Germany  too  strong  and  the  English,  like  a 
drowning  man,  will  regain  hope  that  the  situation  in  six  to 
eight  months  will  have  completely  changed. 

* Haider  uses  the  English  word  “down”  here  in  the  German  text. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1047 

But  if  Russia  is  smashed,  Britain’s  last  hope  will  be  shat- 
tered. Then  Germany  will  be  master  of  Europe  and  the 
Balkans. 

Decision:  In  view  of  these  considerations  Russia  must  be 
liquidated.  Spring,  1941. 

The  sooner  Russia  is  smashed,  the  better.* 

The  Nazi  warlord  then  elaborated  on  his  strategic  plans 
which,  it  was  obvious  to  the  generals,  had  been  ripening 
in  his  mind  for  some  time  despite  all  his  preoccupations 
with  the  fighting  in  the  West.  The  operation,  he  said, 
would  be  worth  carrying  out  only  if  its  aim  was  to  shat- 
ter the  Soviet  nation  in  one  great  blow.  Conquering  a lot 
of  Russian  territory  would  not  be  enough.  “Wiping  out  of 
the  very  power  to  exist  of  Russia!  That  is  the  goal!”  Hit- 
ler emphasized.  There  would  be  two  initial  drives:  one  in 
the  south  to  Kiev  and  the  Dnieper  River,  the  second  in 
the  north  up  through  the  Baltic  States  and  then  toward 
Moscow.  There  the  two  armies  would  make  a junction. 
After  that  a special  operation,  if  necessary,  to  secure  the 
Baku  oil  fields.  The  very  thought  of  such  new  conquests 
excited  Hitler;  he  already  had  in  mind  what  he  would  do 
with  them.  He  would  annex  outright,  he  said,  the  Ukraine, 
White  Russia  and  the  Baltic  States  and  extend  Finland’s 
territory  to  the  White  Sea.  For  the  whole  operation  he 
would  allot  120  divisions,  keeping  sixty  divisions  for  the 
defense  of  the  West  and  Scandinavia.  The  attack,  he  laid 
it  down,  would  begin  in  May  1941  and  would  take  five 
months  to  carry  through.  It  would  be  finished  by  winter. 
He  would  have  preferred,  he  said,  to  do  it  this  year  but 
this  had  not  proved  possible. 

The  next  day,  August  1,  Haider  went  to  work  on  the 
plans  with  his  General  Staff.  Though  he  would  later  claim 
to  have  opposed  the  whole  idea  of  an  attack  on  Russia 
as  insane,  his  diary  entry  for  this  day  discloses  him  full 
of  enthusiasm  as  he  applied  himself  to  the  challenging 
new  task. 

Planning  now  went  ahead  with  typical  German  thor- 
oughness on  three  levels:  that  of  the  Army  General  Staff, 
of  Warlimont’s  Operations  Staff  at  OKW,  of  General 
Thomas’  Economic  and  Armaments  Branch  of  OKW. 
Thomas  was  instructed  on  August  14  by  Goering  that 


The  emphasis  in  the  report  is  Haider’s. 


1048 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hitler  desired  deliveries  of  ordered  goods  to  the  Russians 
“only  till  spring  of  1941.”  * In  the  meantime  his  office 
was  to  make  a detailed  survey  of  Soviet  industry,  trans- 
portation and  oil  centers  both  as  a guide  to  targets  and 
later  on  as  an  aid  for  administering  Russia. 

A few  days  before,  on  August  9,  Warlimont  had  got 
out  his  first  directive  for  preparing  the  deployment  areas 
in  the  East  for  the  jump-off  against  the  Russians.  The 
code  name  for  this  was  Aufbau  Ost — “Build-up  East.”  On 
August  26,  Hitler  ordered  ten  infantry  and  two  armored 
divisions  to  be  sent  from  the  West  to  Poland.  The  panzer 
units,  he  stipulated,  were  to  be  concentrated  in  south- 
eastern Poland  so  that  they  could  intervene  to  protect 
the  Rumanian  oil  fields.13  The  transfer  of  large  bodies  of 
troops  to  the  East  f could  not  be  done  without  exciting 
Stalin’s  easily  aroused  suspicions  if  he  learned  of  it,  and 
the  Germans  went  to  great  lengths  to  see  that  he  didn’t. 
Since  some  movements  were  bound  to  be  detected,  Gen- 
eral Erast  Koestring,  the  German  military  attache  in 
Moscow,  was  instructed  to  inform  the  Soviet  General 
Staff  that  it  was  merely  a question  of  replacing  older 
men,  who  were  being  released  to  industry,  by  younger 
men.  On  September  6,  Jodi  got  out  a directive  outlining 
in  considerable  detail  the  means  of  camouflage  and  de- 
ception. “These  regroupings,”  he  laid  it  down,  “must  not 
create  the  impression  in  Russia  that  we  are  preparing  an 
offensive  in  the  East.”  14 

So  that  the  armed  services  should  not  rest  on  their  lau- 
rels after  the  great  victories  of  the  summer,  Hitler  issued 
on  November  12,  1940,  a comprehensive  top-secret  di- 
rective outlining  new  military  tasks  all  over  Europe  and 
beyond.  We  shall  come  back  to  some  of  them.  What  con- 
cerns us  here  is  that  portion  dealing  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 

* In  his  report  on  this  Thomas  stresses  how  punctual  Soviet  deliveries  of 
goods  to  Germany  were  at  this  time.  In  fact,  he  says,  they  continued  to  be 
Aif1?  <<  *°,*  . start  of  the  attack,”  and  observes,  not  without  amusement, 

that  even  during  the  last  few  days,  shipments  of  India  rubber  from  the 
.bar  h,ast  were  completed  Lby  the  Russians]  over  express  transit  trains” — 
presumably  over  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway.12 

T The  Germans  had  kept  only  seven  divisions  in  Poland,  two  of  which  were 
transferred  to  the  West  during  the  spring  campaign.  The  troops  there, 
iLalder  cracked,  were  scarcely  enough  to  maintain  the  customs  service.  If 
btalin  had  attacked  Germany  in  June  1940,  the  Red  Army  probably  could 
nave  got  to  Berlin  before  any  serious  resistance  was  organized. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1049 

Political  discussions  have  been  initiated  with  the  aim  of 
clarifying  Russia  s attitude  for  the  time  being.  Irrespective 
of  the  results  of  these  discussions,  all  preparations  for  the 
East  which  have  already  been  verbally  ordered  will  be 
continued.  Instructions  on  this  will  follow,  as  soon  as  the 
general  outline  of  the  Army’s  operational  plans  have  been  sub- 
mitted to,  and  approved  by,  me.15 

As  a matter  of  fact,  on  that  very  day,  November  12, 
Molotov  arrived  in  Berlin  to  continue  with  Hitler  himself 
those  political  discussions. 

MOLOTOV  IN  BERLIN 

Relations  between  Berlin  and  Moscow  had  for  some 
months  been  souring.  It  was  one  thing  for  Stalin  and  Hit- 
ler to  double-cross  third  parties,  but  quite  another  when 
they  began  to  double-cross  each  other.  Hitler  had  been 
helpless  to  prevent  the  Russians  from  grabbing  the  Baltic 
States  and  the  two  Rumanian  provinces  of  Bessarabia  and 
northern  Bucovina,  and  his  frustration  only  added  to  his 
growing  resentment.  The  Russian  drive  westward  would 
have  to  be  stopped  and  first  of  all  in  Rumania,  whose  oil 
resources  were  of  vital  importance  to  a Germany  which, 
because  of  the  British  blockade,  could  no  longer  import 
petroleum  by  sea. 

To  complicate  Hitler’s  problem,  Hungary  and  Bulgaria 
too  demanded  slices  of  Rumanian  territory.  Hungary  in 
fact,  as  the  summer  of  1940  approached  its  end,  prepared 
to  go  to  war  in  order  to  win  back  Transylvania,  which 
Rumania  had  taken  from  her  after  the  First  World  War. 
Such  a war,  Hitler  realized,  would  cut  off  Germany  from 
her  main  source  of  crude  oil  and  probably  bring  the  Rus- 
sians in  to  occupy  all  of  Rumania  and  rob  the  Reich  per- 
manently of  Rumanian  oil. 

By  August  28  the  situation  had  become  so  threatening 
that  Hitler  ordered  five  panzer  and  three  motorized  di- 
visions plus  parachute  and  airborne  troops  to  make  ready 
to  seize  the  Rumanian  oil  fields  on  September  1.1S  That 
same  day  he  conferred  with  Ribbentrop  and  Ciano  at  the 
Berghof  and  then  dispatched  them  to  Vienna,  where  they 
were  to  lay  down  the  law  to  the  foreign  ministers  of 
Hungary  and  Rumania  and  make  them  accept  Axis 
arbitration.  This  mission  was  accomplished  without  much 


1050 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


trouble  after  Ribbentrop  had  browbeaten  both  sides.  On  Au- 
gust 30  at  the  Belvedere  Palace  in  Vienna  the  Hungarians 
and  Rumanians  accepted  the  Axis  settlement.  When 
Mihai  Manoilescu,  the  Rumanian  Foreign  Minister,  saw 
the  map  stipulating  that  about  one  half  of  Transylvania 
should  go  to  Hungary,  he  fainted,  falling  across  the  table 
at  which  the  signing  of  the  agreement  was  taking  place, 
and  regaining  consciousness  only  after  physicians  had 
worked  over  him  with  camphor.*  17  Ostensibly  for  her 
reasonableness  but  really  to  give  Hitler  a legal  excuse  for 
his  further  plans,  Rumania  received  from  Germany  and 
Italy  a guarantee  of  what  was  left  of  her  territory,  f 

Light  on  the  Fuehrer’s  further  plans  came  to  his  inti- 
mates three  weeks  later.  On  September  20,  in  a top-secret 
directive,  Hitler  ordered  the  sending  of  “military  mis- 
sions” to  Rumania. 

To  the  world  their  tasks  will  be  to  guide  friendly  Rumania 
in  organizing  and  instructing  her  forces. 

The  real  tasks — which  must  not  become  apparent  either 
to  the  Rumanians  or  to  our  own  troops — will  be: 

To  protect  the  oil  district . . . 

To  prepare  for  deployment  from  Rumanian  bases  of  Ger- 
man and  Rumanian  forces  in  case  a war  with  Soviet  Russia 
is  forced  upon  us.18 

That  would  take  care  of  the  southern  flank  of  a new 
front  he  was  beginning  to  picture  in  his  mind. 

The  Vienna  award  and  especially  the  German  guaran- 
tee of  Rumania’s  remaining  territory  went  down  badly  in 
Moscow,  which  had  not  been  consulted.  When  Schulen- 
burg  called  on  Molotov  on  September  1 to  present  a windy 
memorandum  from  Ribbentrop  attempting  to  explain — 
and  justify — what  had  taken  place  in  Vienna,  the  Foreign 
Commissar,  the  ambassador  reported,  “was  reserved,  in 
contrast  to  his  usual  manner.”  He  was  not  too  reserved, 
however,  to  lodge  a strong  verbal  protest.  He  accused  the 
German  government  of  violating  Article  HI  of  the  Nazi- 
Soviet  Pact,  which  called  for  consultation,  and  of  pre- 
senting Russia  with  “accomplished  facts”  which  conflicted 

It  cost  King  Carol  his  throne.  On  September  6 he  abdicated  in  favor  of 
his  eighteen-year-old  son,  Michael,  and  fled  with  his  red-haired  mistress, 
Magda  Lupescu,  in  a ten-car  special  train  filled  with  what  might  be  de- 
scnbed  as  ‘loot”  across  Yugoslavia  to  Switzerland.  General  Ion  Antonescu, 
chief  of  the  fascist  "Iron  Guard”  and  a friend  of  Hitler,  became  dictator. 

T Minus  southern  Dobrudja,  which  Rumania  was  forced  to  cede  to  Bulgaria 


1051 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

with  German  assurances  about  “questions  of  common  in- 
terests.” 19  The  thieves,  as  is  almost  inevitable  in  such 
cases,  had  begun  to  quarrel  over  the  spoils. 

Recriminations  became  more  heated  in  the  following 
days.  On  September  3 Ribbentrop  telegraphed  a long 
memorandum  to  Moscow  denying  that  Germany  had  vio- 
lated the  Moscow  Pact  and  accusing  Russia  of  having 
done  just  that  by  gobbling  up  the  Baltic  States  and  two 
Rumanian  provinces  without  consulting  Berlin.  The  memo- 
randum was  couched  in  strong  language  and  the  Russians 
replied  to  it  on  September  21  with  equally  stern 
words — by  this  time  both  sides  were  putting  their  cases  in 
writing.  The  Soviet  answer  reiterated  that  Germany  had 
broken  the  pact,  warned  that  Russia  still  had  many  inter- 
ests in  Rumania  and  concluded  with  a sarcastic  proposal 
that  if  the  article  calling  for  consultation  involved  “cer- 
tain inconveniences  and  restrictions”  for  the  Reich  the 
Soviet  government  was  ready  to  amend  or  delete  this 
clause  of  the  treaty.20 

The  Kremlin’s  suspicions  of  Hitler  were  further 
aroused  by  two  events  in  September.  On  the  sixteenth, 
Ribbentrop  wired  Schulenburg  to  call  on  Molotov  and 
“casually”  inform  him  that  German  reinforcements  for 
northern  Norway  were  going  to  be  sent  by  way  of  Fin- 
land. A few  days  later,  on  September  25,  the  Nazi  For- 
eign Minister  got  off  another  telegram  to  the  embassy  in 
Moscow,  this  time  addressed  to  the  charge,  Schulenburg 
having  returned  to  Germany  on  leave.  It  was  a most  con- 
fidential message,  being  marked  “Strictly  Secret — State 
Secret,”  and  directing  that  its  instructions  were  to  be  car- 
ried out  only  if  on  the  next  day  the  charge  received  from 
Berlin  by  wire  or  telephone  a special  code  word.21 

He  was  to  inform  Molotov  that  “in  the  next  few  days” 
Japan,  Italy  and  Germany  were  going  to  sign  in  Berlin  a 
military  alliance.  It  was  not  to  be  directed  against  Russia 
— a specific  article  would  say  that. 

This  alliance  [Ribbentrop  stated]  is  directed  exclusively 
against  American  warmongers.  To  be  sure  this  is,  as  usual, 
not  expressly  stated  in  the  treaty,  but  can  be  unmistakably 
inferred  from  its  terms  ...  Its  exclusive  purpose  is  to 
bring  the  elements  pressing  for  America’s  entry  into  the  war 
to  their  senses  by  conclusively  demonstrating  to  them  that 


1052 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


if  they  enter  the  present  struggle  they  will  automatically 
have  to  deal  with  the  three  great  powers  as  adversaries.22 


The  chilly  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar,  whose  suspicions 
of  the  Germans  were  now  growing  like  flowers  in  June, 
was  highly  skeptical  when  Werner  von  Tippelskirch,  the 
charge,  brought  him  this  news  on  the  evening  of  Septem- 
ber 26.  He  said  immediately,  with  that  pedantic  attention 
to  detail  which  so  annoyed  all  with  whom  he  negotiated, 
friend  or  foe,  that  according  to  Article  IV  of  the  Moscow 
Pact  the  Soviet  government  was  entitled  to  see  the  text  of 
this  tripartite  military  alliance  before  it  was  signed,  in- 
cluding, he  added,  the  text  of  “any  secret  protocols.” 

Molotov  also  wanted  to  know  more  about  the  German 
agreement  with  Finland  for  the  transport  of  troops 
through  that  country,  which  he  had  heard  of  mostly 
through  the  press,  he  said,  including  a United  Press  dis- 
patch from  Berlin.  During  the  last  three  days,  Molotov 
added,  Moscow  had  received  reports  of  the  landing  of 
German  forces  in  at  least  three  Finnish  ports,  “without 
having  been  informed  thereof  by  Germany.” 

The  Soviet  Government  [Molotov  continued]  wished  to 
receive  the  text  of  the  agreement  on  the  passage  of  troops 
through  Finland,  including  its  secret  portions  ...  and  to 
be  informed  as  to  the  object  of  the  agreement,  against  whom 
it  was  directed,  and  the  purposes  that  were  being  served 
thereby.28 

The  Russians  had  to  be  mollified — even  the  obtuse 
Ribbentrop  could  see  that — and  on  October  2 he  tele- 
graphed to  Moscow  what  he  said  was  the  text  of  the 
agreement  with  Finland.  He  also  reiterated  that  the  Tri- 
partite Pact,  which  in  the  meantime  had  been  signed,* 
was  not  directed  against  the  Soviet  Union  and  solemnly 
declared  that  “there  were  no  secret  protocols  nor  any 


It  was  signed  in  Berlin  on  September  27,  1940,  in  a comic-opera  setting 

whiCS  1 have  described  elsewhere  (Berlin  Diary,  pp.  532-37)® 
Ti  Iai?d  S JaPan  ^cognized  “the  leadership  of  Ger- 

many and  Italy  in  the  establishment  of  a new  order  in  Europe,”  and  the  two 
countries  recognized  Japan  s leadership  for  the  same  in  Greater  East  Asia 
■^tlCueApr<irdeTd,  for  ™utual  assistance  should  any  one  of  the  powers  be 
tionednidv  States  though  America  was  not  specifical^  men- 

defined.  To  me,  as  I wrote  in  my  diary  that  day  in  Berlin  the 
re?nueneHlftCanVhlng  abol£.the  Pact  was  that  it  meant  that  Hitler  was ’now 
reconciled  to  a long  war.  Ciano,  who  signed  the  pact  for  Italy  came  to  the 
pact6 was* C!U^I 0X1  ( Clone  Dioner,  p.  296).  Also,  despite  the  disclaimer,  the 
pact  was,  and  was  meant  to  be,  a warning  to  the  Soviet  Union. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1053 

other  secret  agreements.”  24  After  instructing  Tippelskirch 
on  October  7 to  inform  Molotov  “incidentally”  that  a 
German  “military  mission”  was  being  sent  to  Rumania 
and  after  receiving  Molotov’s  skeptical  reaction  to  this 
further  news  (“How  many  troops  are  you  sending  to  Ru- 
mania?” the  Foreign  Commissar  had  demanded  to 
know),25  Ribbentrop  on  October  13  got  off  a long  letter 
to  Stalin  in  an  attempt  to  quiet  Soviet  uneasiness  about 
Germany.26 

It  is,  as  might  be  expected,  a fatuous  and  at  the  same 
time  arrogant  epistle,  abounding  in  nonsense  and  lies 
and  subterfuge.  England  is  blamed  for  the  war  and  all 
its  aftermaths  thus  far,  but  one  thing  is  sure:  “The  war  as 
such  has  been  won  by  us.  It  is  only  a question  of  how 
long  it  will  be  before  England  . . . admits  to  collapse.” 
The  German  moves  against  Russia  in  Finland  and 
Rumania  as  well  as  the  Tripartite  Pact  are  explained  as 
really  a boon  to  Russia.  In  the  meantime  British  diplo- 
macy and  British  secret  agents  are  trying  to  stir  up  trou- 
ble between  Russia  and  Germany.  To  frustrate  them, 
why  not  send  Molotov  to  Berlin,  Ribbentrop  asked  Stalin, 
so  that  the  Fuehrer  could  “explain  personally  his  views 
regarding  the  future  molding  of  relations  between  our  two 
countries”? 

Ribbentrop  gave  a sly  hint  what  those  views  were: 
nothing  less  than  dividing  up  the  world  among  the  four 
totalitarian  powers. 

It  appears  to  be  the  mission  of  the  Four  Powers  [he  said] 
— the  Soviet  Union,  Italy,  Japan  and  Germany — to  adopt  a 
long-range  policy  ...  by  delimitation  of  their  interests  on  a 
world-wide  scale. 

The  emphasis  is  Ribbentrop’s. 

There  was  some  delay  in  the  German  Embassy  in 
Moscow  in  getting  this  letter  to  its  destination,  which 
made  Ribbentrop  livid  with  rage  and  inspired  an  angry 
telegram  from  him  to  Schulenburg  demanding  to  know 
why  his  letter  had  not  been  delivered  until  the  seven- 
teenth and  why,  “in  keeping  with  the  importance  of  its 
contents,”  it  was  not  delivered  to  Stalin  personally — 
Schulenburg  had  handed  it  to  Molotov.27  Stalin  replied 
on  October  22,  in  a remarkably  cordial  tone.  “Molotov 
admits,’  he  wrote,  “that  he  is  under  obligation  to  pay  you 


1054 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

a visit  in  Berlin.  He  hereby  accepts  your  invitation.” 28 
Stalin’s  geniality  must  have  been  only  a mask.  Schulen- 
burg  wired  Berlin  a few  days  later  that  the  Russians 
were  protesting  the  refusal  of  Germany  to  deliver  war 
material  while  at  the  same  time  shipping  arms  to  Fin- 
land. “This  is  the  first  time,”  Schulenburg  advised  Berlin, 
“that  our  deliveries  of  arms  to  Finland  have  been  men- 
tioned by  the  Soviets.”  29 

A dark,  drizzling  day,  and  Molotov  arrived,  his  reception 
being  extremely  stiff  and  formal.  Driving  up  the  Linden  to 
the  Soviet  Embassy,  he  looked  to  me  like  a plugging,  pro- 
vincial schoolmaster.  But  to  have  survived  in  the  cutthroat 
competition  of  the  Kremlin  he  must  have  something.  The 
Germans  talk  glibly  of  letting  Moscow  have  that  old  Russian 
dream,  the  Bosporus  and  the  Dardanelles,  while  they  will 
take  the  rest  of  the  Balkans:  Rumania,  Yugoslavia  and 
Bulgaria  . . . 

Thus  began  my  diary  entry  in  Berlin  on  November  12, 
1940.  The  glib  talk  of  the  Germans  was  accurate  enough, 
as  far  as  it  went.  Today  we  know  much  more  about  this 
strange  and — as  it  turned  out — fateful  meeting,  thanks  to 
the  capture  of  the  Foreign  Office  documents,  in  which  one 
finds  the  confidential  German  minutes  of  the  two-day 
sessions,  all  but  one  of  them  kept  by  the  ubiquitous  Dr. 
Schmidt.*  30 

At  the  first  meeting  between  the  two  foreign  ministers, 
during  the  forenoon  of  November  12,  Ribbentrop  was  in 
one  of  his  most  vapid  and  arrogant  moods  but  Molotov 
quickly  saw  through  him  and  sized  up  what  the  German 
game  was.  “England,”  Ribbentrop  began,  “is  beaten  and 
it  is  only  a question  of  time  when  she  will  finally  admit 
her  defeat  . . . The  beginning  of  the  end  has  now  arrived 
for  the  British  Empire.”  The  British,  it  was  true,  were 
hoping  for  aid  from  America,  but  “the  entry  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war  is  of  no  consequence  at  all  for 
Germany.  Germany  and  Italy  will  never  again  allow  an 
Anglo-Saxon  to  land  on  the  European  Continent  . . . This 
is  no  military  problem  at  all  . . . The  Axis  Powers  are, 
therefore,  not  considering  how  they  can  win  the  war,  but 

* Their  accuracy  on  this  occasion  was  later  confirmed  by  Stalin,  though  not 
intentionally.  Churchill  says  he  received  an  account  of  Molotov’s  talks  in 
merlin  from  Stalin  in  August  1942  “which  in  no  essential  differs  from  the 
German  record  though  it  was  “more  pithy.”  (Churchill,  Their  Finest 
flour,  pp.  585-86.) 


1055 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

rather  how  rapidly  they  can  end  the  war  which  is  already 
won.” 

This  being  so,  Ribbentrop  explained,  the  time  had 
come  for  the  four  powers,  Russia,  Germany,  Italy  and 
Japan,  to  define  their  “spheres  of  interest.”  The  Fuehrer, 
he  said,  had  concluded  that  all  four  countries  would 
naturally  expand  “in  a southerly  direction.”  Japan  had 
already  turned  south,  as  had  Italy,  while  Germany,  after 
the  establishment  of  the  “New  Order”  in  Western  Europe, 
would  find  her  additional  Lebensraum  in  (of  all  places!) 
“Central  Africa.”  Ribbentrop  said  he  “wondered”  if 
Russia  would  also  not  “turn  to  the  south  for  the  natural 
outlet  to  the  open  sea  which  was  so  important  for  her.” 

“Which  sea?”  Molotov  interjected  icily. 

This  was  an  awkward  but  crucial  question,  as  the  Ger- 
mans would  learn  during  the  next  thirty-six  hours  of 
ceaseless  conversations  with  this  stubborn,  prosaic,  pre- 
cise Bolshevik.  The  interruption  floored  Ribbentrop  for  a 
moment  and  he  could  not  think  of  an  answer.  Instead,  he 
rambled  on  about  “the  great  changes  that  would  take 
place  all  over  the  world  after  the  war”  and  gabbled  that 
the  important  thing  was  that  “both  partners  to  the 
German-Russian  pact  had  together  done  some  good 
business”  and  “would  continue  to  do  some  business.” 
But  when  Molotov  insisted  on  an  answer  to  his  simple 
question,  Ribbentrop  finally  replied  by  suggesting  that 
“in  the  long  run  the  most  advantageous  access  to  the  sea 
for  Russia  could  be  found  in  the  direction  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  the  Arabian  Sea.” 

Molotov  sat  there,  says  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  was  present 
taking  notes,  “with  an  impenetrable  expression.” 31  He 
said  very  little,  except  to  comment  at  the  end  that  “preci- 
sion and  vigilance”  were  necessary  in  delimiting  spheres 
of  interest,  “particularly  between  Germany  and  Russia.” 
The  wily  Soviet  negotiator  was  saving  his  ammunition 
for  Hitler,  whom  he  saw  in  the  afternoon.  For  the  all- 
powerful  Nazi  warlord  it  turned  out  to  be  quite  a sur- 
prising, nerve-racking,  frustrating  and  even  unique  experi- 
ence. 

Hitler  was  just  as  vague  as  his  Foreign  Minister  and 
even  more  grandiose.  As  soon  as  the  weather  improved, 
he  began  by  saying,  Germany  would  strike  “the  final 


1056 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

blow  against  England.”  There  was,  to  be  sure,  “the  prob- 
lem of  America.”  But  the  United  States  could  not  “en- 
danger the  freedom  of  other  nations  before  1970  or 
1980  ...  It  had  no  business  either  in  Europe,  in  Africa 
or  in  Asia” — an  assertion  which  Molotov  broke  in  to 
say  he  was  in  agreement  with.  But  he  was  not  in  agree- 
ment with  much  else  that  Hitler  said.  After  the  Nazi 
leader  had  finished  a lengthy  exposition  of  pleasant  gen- 
eralities, stressing  that  there  were  no  fundamental  differ- 
ences between  the  two  countries  in  the  pursuit  of  their 
respective  aspirations  and  in  their  common  drive  toward 
“access  to  the  ocean,”  Molotov  replied  that  “the  state- 
ments of  the  Fuehrer  had  been  of  a general  nature.”  He 
would  now,  he  said,  set  forth  the  ideas  of  Stalin,  who  on 
his  departure  from  Moscow  had  given  him  “exact  instruc- 
tions.” Whereupon  he  hurled  the  book  at  the  German 
dictator  who,  as  the  minutes  make  clear,  was  scarcely 
prepared  for  it. 

“The  questions  hailed  down  upon  Hitler,”  Schmidt 
afterward  recalled.  “No  foreign  visitor  had  ever  spoken 
to  him  in  this  way  in  my  presence.”  32 

What  was  Germany  up  to  in  Finland?  Molotov  wanted 
to  know.  What  was  the  meaning  of  the  New  Order  in 
Europe  and  in  Asia,  and  what  role  would  the  U.S.S.R. 
be  given  in  it?  What  was  the  “significance”  of  the  Tripar- 
tite Pact?  “Moreover,”  he  continued,  “there  are  issues 
to  be  clarified  regarding  Russia’s  Balkan  and  Black  Sea 
interests  with  respect  to  Bulgaria,  Rumania  and  Turkey.” 
He  would  like,  he  said,  to  hear  some  answers  and  “ex- 
planations.” 

Hitler,  perhaps  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  was  too 
taken  aback  to  answer.  He  proposed  that  they  adjourn 
“in  view  of  a possible  air-raid  alarm,”  promising  to  go 
into  a detailed  discussion  the  next  day. 

A showdown  had  been  postponed  but  not  prevented, 
and  the  next  morning  when  Hitler  and  Molotov  resumed 
their  talks  the  Russian  Commissar  was  relentless.  To 
begin  with,  about  Finland,  over  which  the  two  men  soon 
became  embroiled  in  a bitter  and  caustic  dispute.  Molotov 
demanded  that  Germany  get  its  troops  out  of  Finland. 
Hitler  denied  that  “Finland  was  occupied  by  German 
troops.”  They  were  merely  being  sent  through  Finland 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1057 

to  Norway.  But  he  wanted  to  know  “whether  Russia  in- 
tended to  go  to  war  against  Finland.”  According  to  the 
German  minutes,  Molotov  “answered  this  question  some- 
what evasively,”  and  Hitler  was  not  satisfied. 

“There  must  be  no  war  in  the  Baltic,”  Hitler  insisted. 
“It  would  put  a heavy  strain  on  German-Russian  rela- 
tions,” a threat  which  he  added  to  a moment  later  by 
saying  that  such  a strain  might  bring  “unforeseeable  con- 
sequences.” What  more  did  the  Soviet  Union  want  in 
Finland,  anyway?  Hitler  wanted  to  know,  and  his  visitor 
answered  that  it  wanted  a “settlement  on  the  same  scale 
as  in  Bessarabia” — which  meant  outright  annexation. 
Hitler’s  reaction  to  this  must  have  perturbed  even  the 
imperturbable  Russian,  who  hastened  to  ask  the  Fueh- 
rer’s “opinion  on  that.” 

The  dictator  in  turn  was  somewhat  evasive,  replying 
that  he  could  only  repeat  that  “there  must  be  no  war  with 
Finland  because  such  a conflict  might  have  far-reaching 
repercussions.” 

“A  new  factor  has  been  introduced  into  the  discussion 
by  this  position,”  Molotov  retorted. 

So  heated  had  the  dispute  become  that  Ribbentrop,  who 
must  have  become  thoroughly  frightened  by  this  time, 
broke  in  to  say,  according  to  the  German  minutes, 
“that  there  was  actually  no  reason  at  all  for  making  an 
issue  of  the  Finnish  question.  Perhaps  it  was  merely  a 
misunderstanding.  ” 

Hitler  took  advantage  of  this  timely  intervention  to 
quickly  change  the  subject.  Could  not  the  Russians  be 
tempted  by  the  unlimited  plunder  soon  to  be  available 
with  the  collapse  of  the  British  Empire? 

“Let  us  turn  to  more  important  problems,”  he  said. 

After  the  conquest  of  England  [he  declared]  the  British 
Empire  would  be  apportioned  as  a gigantic  world-wide  estate 
in  bankruptcy  of  forty  million  square  kilometers.  In  this 
bankrupt  estate  there  would  be  for  Russia  access  to  the  ice- 
free  and  really  open  ocean.  Thus  far,  a minority  of  forty- 
five  million  Englishmen  had  ruled  six  hundred  million  in- 
habitants of  the  British  Empire.  He  was  about  to  crush  this 
minority  . . . Under  these  circumstances  there  arose  world- 
wide perspectives  . . . All  the  countries  which  could  pos- 
sibly be  interested  in  the  bankrupt  estate  would  have  to  stop 
all  controversies  among  themselves  and  concern  themselves 


1058 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


exclusively  with  the  partition  of  the  British  Empire.  This 
applied  to  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Russia  and  Japan. 

The  chilly,  impassive  Russian  guest  did  not  appear  to 
be  moved  by  such  glittering  “world-wide  perspectives,” 
nor  was  he  as  convinced  as  the  Germans — a point  he 
later  rubbed  in — that  the  British  Empire  would  soon  be 
there  for  the  taking.  He  wanted,  he  said,  to  discuss  prob- 
lems “closer  to  Europe.”  Turkey,  for  instance,  and  Bul- 
garia and  Rumania. 

“The  Soviet  Government,”  he  said,  “is  of  the  opinion 
that  the  German  guarantee  of  Rumania  is  aimed  against 
the  interests  of  Soviet  Russia — if  one  may  express  one- 
self so  bluntly.”  He  had  been  expressing  himself  bluntly 
all  day,  to  the  growing  annoyance  of  his  hosts,  and  now 
he  pressed  on.  He  demanded  that  Germany  “revoke”  this 
guarantee.  Hitler  declined. 

All  right,  Molotov  persisted,  in  view  of  Moscow’s  inter- 
est in  the  Straits,  what  would  Germany  say  “if  Russia 
gave  Bulgaria  ...  a guarantee  under  exactly  the  same 
conditions  as  Germany  and  Italy  had  given  one  to  Ru- 
mania”? 

One  can  almost  see  Hitler’s  dark  frown.  He  inquired 
whether  Bulgaria  had  asked  for  such  a guarantee,  as  had 
Rumania?  “He  (the  Fuehrer),”  the  German  memorandum 
quotes  him  as  adding,  “did  not  know  of  any  request  by 
Bulgaria.”  At  any  rate,  he  would  first  have  to  consult 
Mussolini  before  giving  the  Russians  a more  definite  an- 
swer to  their  question.  And  he  added  ominously  that  if 
Germany  “were  perchance  looking  for  sources  of  friction 
with  Russia,  she  would  not  need  the  Straits  for  that.” 

But  the  Fuehrer,  usually  so  talkative,  had  no  more 
stomach  for  talk  with  this  impossible  Russian. 

“At  this  point  in  the  conversation,”  say  the  German 
minutes,  “the  Fuehrer  called  attention  to  the  late  hour 
and  stated  that  in  view  of  the  possibility  of  English  air 
attacks  it  would  be  better  to  break  off  the  talk  now,  since 
the  main  issues  had  probably  been  sufficiently  discussed.” 

That  night  Molotov  gave  a gala  banquet  to  his  hosts  at 
the  Russian  Embassy  on  Unter  den  Linden.  Hitler,  appar- 
ently exhausted  and  still  irritated  by  the  afternoon’s  or- 
deal, did  not  put  in  an  appearance. 

The  British  did.  I had  wondered  why  their  bombers 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1059 

had  not  appeared  over  Berlin,  as  they  had  almost  every 
recent  night,  to  remind  the  Soviet  Commissar  on  his  first 
evening  in  the  capital  that,  whatever  the  Germans  told 
him,  Britain  was  still  in  the  war,  and  kicking.  Some  of 
us,  I confess,  had  waited  hopefully  for  the  planes,  but 
they  had  not  come.  Officials  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  who 
had  feared  the  worst,  were  visibly  relieved.  But  not  for 
long. 

On  the  evening  of  November  13,  the  British  came  over 
early.*  It  gets  dark  in  Berlin  about  4 p.m.  at  this  time  of 
year,  and  shortly  after  9 o’clock  the  air-raid  sirens  began 
to  whine  and  then  you  could  hear  the  thunder  of  the  flak 
guns  and,  in  between,  the  hum  of  the  bombers  overhead. 
According  to  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  was  at  the  banquet  in  the 
Soviet  Embassy,  Molotov  had  just  proposed  a friendly 
toast  and  Ribbentrop  had  risen  to  his  feet  to  reply  when 
the  air-raid  warning  was  sounded  and  the  guests  scattered 
to  shelter.  I remember  the  hurrying  and  scurrying  down 
the  Linden  and  around  the  corner  at  the  Wilhelmstrasse 
as  Germans  and  Russians  made  for  the  underground  shel- 
ter of  the  Foreign  Ministry.  Some  of  the  officials,  Dr. 
Schmidt  among  them,  ducked  into  the  Adlon  Hotel,  from 
in  front  of  which  some  of  us  were  watching,  and  were  un- 
able to  get  to  the  impromptu  meeting  which  the  two  for- 
eign ministers  now  held  in  the  underground  depths  of  the 
Foreign  Office.  The  minutes  of  this  meeting  were  there- 
fore taken,  in  the  enforced  absence  of  Dr.  Schmidt,  by 
Gustav  Hilger,  counselor  of  the  German  Embassy  in 
Moscow,  who  had  acted  as  one  of  the  interpreters  during 
the  conference. 

While  the  British  bombers  cruised  overhead  in  the  night 
and  the  antiaircraft  guns  fired  away  ineffectively  at  them, 
the  slippery  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  tried  one  last  time  to 
take  the  Russians  in.  Out  of  his  pocket  he  pulled  a draft 
of  an  agreement  which,  in  substance,  transformed  the 
Tripartite  Pact  into  a four-power  pact,  with  Russia  as 
the  fourth  member.  Molotov  listened  patiently  while  Rib- 
bentrop read  it  through. 

Article  II  was  the  core.  In  it  Germany,  Italy,  Japan 

• Churchill  says  the  air  raid  was  timed  for  this  occasion.  "We  had  heard  of 
the  conference  beforehand,”  he  later  wrote,  “and  though  not  invited  to  join 
'A.  e discussion  did  not  wish  to  be  entirely  left  out  of  the  proceedings." 
(Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour,  p.  584.) 


1060  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

and  the  Soviet  Union  undertook  “to  respect  each  other’s 
natural  spheres  of  influence.’’  Any  disputes  concerning 
them  would  be  settled  “in  an  amicable  way.”  The  two 
fascist  countries  and  Japan  agreed  to  “recognize  the  pres- 
ent extent  of  the  possessions  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  will 
respect  it.  All  four  countries,  in  Article  III,  agreed  not 
to  join  or  support  any  combination  “directed  against  one 
of  the  Four  Powers.” 

The  agreement  itself,  Ribbentrop  proposed,  would  be 
made  public,  but  not,  of  course,  its  secret  protocols, 
which  he  next  proceeded  to  read.  The  most  important 
one  defined  each  country’s  “territorial  aspirations.”  Rus- 
sia’s was  to  “center  south  of  the  national  territory  of  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  direction  of  the  Indian  Ocean.” 

Molotov  did  not  rise  to  the  bait.  The  proposed  treaty 
was  obviously  an  attempt  to  divert  Russia  from  its  his- 
toric pressure  westward,  down  the  Baltic,  into  the  Balkans 
and  through  the  Straits  to  the  Mediterranean,  where  in- 
evitably it  would  clash  with  the  greedy  designs  of  Ger- 
many and  Italy.  The  U.S.S.R.  was  not,  at  least  at  the 
moment,  interested  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  which  lay  far 
away.  What  it  was  interested  in  at  the  moment,  Molotov 
replied,  was  Europe  and  the  Turkish  Straits.  “Conse- 
quently,” he  added,  “paper  agreements  will  not  suffice  for 
the  Soviet  Union;  she  would  have  to  insist  on  effective 
guarantees  of  her  security.” 

The  questions  which  interested  the  Soviet  Union  [he  elabo- 
rated] concerned  not  only  Turkey  but  Bulgaria  ...  But  the 
fate  of  Rumania  and  Hungary  was  also  of  interest  to  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  could  not  be  immaterial  to  her  under  any 
circumstances.  It  would  further  interest  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment to  learn  what  the  Axis  contemplated  with  regard  to 
Yugoslavia  and  Greece,  and  likewise,  what  Germany  in- 
tended with  regard  to  Poland  . . . The  Soviet  Government 
was  also  interested  in  the  question  of  Swedish  neutrality  . . . 
Besides,  there  existed  the  question  of  the  passages  out  of  the 
Baltic  Sea  . . . 

The  untiring,  poker-faced  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar 
left  nothing  out  and  Ribbentrop,  who  felt  himself  being 
buried  under  the  avalanche  of  questions — for  at  this  point 
Molotov  said  he  would  “appreciate  it”  if  his  guest  made 
answer  to  them — protested  that  he  was  being  “interro- 
gated too  closely.” 


1061 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

He  could  only  repeat  again  and  again  [he  replied  weakly] 
that  the  decisive  question  was  whether  the  Soviet  Union  was 
prepared  and  in  a position  to  co-operate  with  us  in  the 
great  liquidation  of  the  British  Empire. 

Molotov  was  ready  with  a cutting  retort.  Hilger  duly 
noted  it  in  the  minutes. 

In  his  reply  Molotov  stated  that  the  Germans  were  assum- 
ing that  the  war  against  England  had  already  actually  been 
won.  If  therefore  [as  Hitler  had  maintained]  Germany  was 
waging  a life-and-death  struggle  against  England,  he  could 
only  construe  this  as  meaning  that  Germany  was  fighting 
“for  life”  and  England  “for  death.” 

This  sarcasm  may  have  gone  over  the  head  of  Ribben- 
trop,  a man  of  monumental  denseness,  but  Molotov  took 
no  chances.  To  the  German’s  constant  reiteration  that 
Britain  was  finished,  the  Commissar  finally  replied,  “If 
that  is  so,  why  are  we  in  this  shelter,  and  whose  are 
these  bombs  which  fall?”  * 

From  this  wearing  experience  with  Moscow’s  tough 
bargainer  and  from  further  evidence  that  came  a fort- 
night later  of  Stalin’s  increasingly  rapacious  appetite, 
Hitler  drew  his  final  conclusions. 

It  must  be  set  down  here  that  the  Soviet  dictator,  his 
subsequent  claims  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  now 
accepted  Hitler’s  offer  to  join  the  fascist  camp,  though  at 
a stiffer  price  than  had  been  offered  in  Berlin.  On  Novem- 
ber 26,  scarcely  two  weeks  after  Molotov  had  returned 
from  Germany,  he  informed  the  German  ambassador  in 
Moscow  that  Russia  was  prepared  to  join  the  four-power 
pact,  subject  to  the  following  conditions: 

1.  That  German  troops  are  immediately  withdrawn  from 
Finland,  which  . . . belongs  to  the  Soviet  Union’s  sphere  of 
influence  . . . 

2.  That  within  the  next  few  months  the  security  of  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  Straits  is  assured  by  the  conclusion  of  a 
mutual-assistance  pact  between  the  U.S.S.R.  and  Bulgaria 
. . . and  by  the  establishment  of  a base  for  land  and  naval 
forces  by  the  Soviet  Union  within  range  of  the  Bosporus 
and  the  Dardanelles  by  means  of  a long-term  lease. 

3.  That  the  area  south  of  Batum  and  Baku  in  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  the  Persian  Gulf  is  recognized  as  the  center 
of  the  aspirations  of  the  Soviet  Union. 


* Molotov’s  parting  shot  is  given  by  Churchill,  to  whom  it  was  related  by 
Stalin  later  in  the  war.  (Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour,  p.  586.) 


1062 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


4.  That  Japan  renounce  her  rights  to  concessions  for  coal 
and  oil  in  northern  Sakhalin.33 

In  all  Stalin  asked  for  five,  instead  of  two,  secret 
protocols  embodying  his  new  proposals  and,  for  good 
measure,  asked  that,  should  Turkey  prove  difficult  about 
Russian  bases  controlling  the  Straits,  the  four  powers  take 
military  measures  against  her. 

The  proposals  constituted  a price  higher  than  Hitler 
was  willing  even  to  consider.  He  had  tried  to  keep  Russia 
out  of  Europe,  but  now  Stalin  was  demanding  Finland, 
Bulgaria,  control  of  the  Straits  and,  in  effect,  the  Arabian 
and  Persian  oil  fields,  which  normally  supplied  Europe 
with  most  of  its  oil.  The  Russians  did  not  even  mention 
the  Indian  Ocean,  which  the  Fuehrer  had  tried  to  fob  off 
as  the  center  of  “aspirations”  for  the  U.S.S.R. 

“Stalin  is  clever  and  cunning,”  Hitler  told  his  top 
military  chiefs.  “He  demands  more  and  more.  He’s  a cold- 
blooded blackmailer.  A German  victory  has  become 
unbearable  for  Russia.  Therefore:  she  must  be  brought  to 
her  knees  as  soon  as  possible.”  34 

The  great  cold-blooded  Nazi  blackmailer  had  met  his 
match,  and  the  realization  infuriated  him.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  December  he  told  Haider  to  bring  him  the  Army 
General  Staff’s  plan  for  the  onslaught  on  the  Soviet  Union. 
On  December  5 Haider  and  Brauchitsch  dutifully  brought 
it  to  him,  and  at  the  end  of  a four-hour  conference  he 
approved  it.  Both  the  captured  OKW  War  Diary  and 
Haider’s  own  confidential  journal  contain  a report  on 
this  crucial  meeting.35  The  Nazi  warlord  stressed  that 
the  Red  Army  must  be  broken  through  both  north  and 
south  of  the  Pripet  Marshes,  surrounded  and  annihilated 
as  in  Poland.”  Moscow,  he  told  Haider,  “was  not  im- 
portant.” The  important  thing  was  to  destroy  the  “life 
force”  of  Russia.  Rumania  and  Finland  were  to  join  in 
the  attack,  but  not  Hungary.  General  Dietl’s  mountain 
division  at  Narvik  was  to  be  transported  across  northern 
Sweden  to  Finland  for  an  attack  on  the  Soviet  arctic 
region.*  Altogether  some  “120  to  130  divisions”  were 
allotted  for  the  big  campaign. 


♦Sweden,  which  had  refused  transit  to  the  Allies  during  the  Russo-Finnish 
War,  permitted  this  fully  armed  division  to  pass  through.  Hungary  of 
course,  later  joined  in  the  war  against  Russia.  ' 


1063 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

In  its  report  on  this  conference,  as  in  previous  refer- 
ences to  the  plan  to  attack  Russia,  General  Haider’s  diary 
employs  the  code  name  “Otto.”  Less  than  a fortnight 
later,  on  December  18,  1940,  the  code  name  by  which  it 
will  go  down  in  history  was  substituted.  On  this  day 
Hitler  crossed  the  Rubicon.  He  issued  Directive  No.  21. 
It  was  headed  “Operation  Barbarossa.”  It  began: 

TOP  SECRET 

The  Fuehrer’s  Headquarters 
December  18,  1940 

The  German  Armed  Forces  must  be  prepared  to  crush 
Soviet  Russia  in  a quick  campaign  before  the  end  of  the 
war  against  England.*  For  this  purpose  the  Army  will  have 
to  employ  all  available  units  with  the  reservation  that  the 
occupied  territories  will  have  to  be  safeguarded  against  sur- 
prise attacks  . . . 

Preparations  ...  are  to  be  completed  by  May  15,  1941. 
Great  caution  has  to  be  exercised  that  the  intention  of  an  at- 
tack will  not  be  recognized. 

So  the  target  date  was  mid-May  of  the  following  spring. 
The  “general  purpose”  of  Operation  Barbarossa  Hitler 
laid  down  as  follows: 

The  mass  of  the  Russian  Army  in  western  Russia  is  to  be 
destroyed  in  daring  operations  by  driving  forward  deep 
armored  wedges,  and  the  retreat  of  intact,  battle-ready 
troops  into  the  wide  spaces  of  Russia  is  to  be  prevented.  The 
ultimate  objective  of  the  operation  is  to  establish  a defense 
line  against  Asiatic  Russia  from  a line  running  from  the 
Volga  River  to  Archangel. 

Hitler’s  directive  then  went  into  considerable  detail 
about  the  main  lines  of  attack,  f The  roles  of  Rumania 
and  Finland  were  defined.  They  were  to  provide  the 
jumping-off  areas  for  attacks  on  the  extreme  north  and 
south  flanks  as  well  as  troops  to  aid  the  German  forces  in 
these,  operations.  Finland’s  position  was  especially  im- 
portant. Various  Finnish-German  armies  were  to  advance 
on  Leningrad  and  the  Lake  Ladoga  area,  cut  the 

* The  italics  are  Hitler's. 

t A good  many  historians  have  contended  that  Hitler  in  this  first  Barbarossa 
directive  did  not  go  into  detail,  a misunderstanding  due  probably  to  the 
extremely  abbreviated  version  given  in  English  translation  in  the  NCA 
volumes.  But  the  complete  German  text  given  in  TMIVC,  XXVI,  pp.  47-52 
discloses  the  full  details,  thus  revealing  how  far  advanced  the  German 
military  plans  were  at  this  early  date.80 


1064 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Murmansk  rail  line,  secure  the  Petsamo  nickel  mines  and 
occupy  the  Russian  ice-free  ports  on  the  Arctic  Ocean. 
Much  depended,  Hitler  admitted,  on  whether  Sweden 
would  permit  the  transit  of  German  troops  from  Norway, 
but  he  correctly  predicted  that  the  Swedes  would  be  ac- 
commodating in  this. 

The  main  operations  were  to  be  divided,  Hitler  ex- 
plained, by  the  Pripet  Marshes.  The  major  blow  would  be 
delivered  north  of  the  swamps  with  two  whole  army 
groups.  One  would  advance  up  the  Baltic  States  to  Lenin- 
grad. The  other,  farther  south,  would  drive  through 
White  Russia  and  then  swing  north  to  join  the  first  group, 
thus  trapping  what  was  left  of  the  Soviet  forces  trying  to 
retreat  from  the  Baltic.  Only  then,  Hitler  laid  it  down, 
must  an  offensive  against  Moscow  be  undertaken.  The 
Russian  capital,  which  a fortnight  before  had  seemed 
^unimportant”  to  Hitler,  now  assumed  more  significance. 
The  capture  of  this  city,”  he  wrote,  “means  a decisive 
political  and  economic  victory,  beyond  the  fall  of  the 
country’s  most  important  railroad  junction.”  And  he 
pointed  out  that  Moscow  was  not  only  the  main  commu- 
nications center  of  Russia  but  its  principal  producer  of 
armaments. 

A third  army  group  would  drive  south  of  the  marshes 
through  the  Ukraine  toward  Kiev,  its  principal  objective 
being  to  roll  up  and  destroy  the  Soviet  forces  there  west 
of  the  Dnieper  River.  Farther  south  German-Rumanian 
troops  would  protect  the  flank  of  the  main  operation  and 
advance  toward  Odessa  and  thence  along  the  Black  Sea. 
Thereafter  the  Donets  basin,  where  60  per  cent  of  Soviet 
industry  was  concentrated,  would  be  taken. 

Such  was  Hitler’s  grandiose  plan,  completed  just  before 
the  Christmas  holidays  of  1940,  and  so  well  prepared  that 
no  essential  changes  would  be  made  in  it.  In  order  to 
secure  secrecy,  only  nine  copies  of  the  directive  were 
made,  one  for  each  of  the  three  armed  services  and  the 
rest  to  be  guarded  at  OKW  headquarters.  Even  the  top 
field  commanders,  the  directive  makes  clear,  were  to  be 
told  that  the  plan  was  merely  for  “precaution,  in  case 
Russia  should  change  her  previous  attitude  toward  us.” 
And  Hitler  instructed  that  the  number  of  officers  in  the 
secret  “be  kept  as  small  as  possible.  Otherwise  the  danger 


1065 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

exists  that  our  preparations  will  become  known  and  the 
gravest  political  and  military  disadvantages  result.” 

There  is  no  evidence  that  the  generals  in  the  Army’s 
High  Command  objected  to  Hitler’s  decision  to  turn  on 
the  Soviet  Union,  whose  loyal  fulfillment  of  the  pact 
with  Germany  had  made  possible  their  victories  in  Poland 
and  the  West.  Later  Haider  would  write  derisively  of 
“Hitler’s  Russian  adventure”  and  claim  the  Army  leaders 
were  against  it  from  the  beginning.37  But  there  is  not  a 
word  in  his  voluminous  diary  entries  for  December  1940 
which  supports  him  in  this.  Indeed,  he  gives  the  impres- 
sion of  being  full  of  genuine  enthusiasm  for  the  “adven- 
ture,” which  he  himself,  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
had  the  main  responsibility  for  planning. 

At  any  rate,  for  Hitler  the  die  was  cast,  and,  though 
he  did  not  know  it,  his  ultimate  fate  sealed,  by  this  deci- 
sion of  December  18,  1940.  Relieved  to  have  made  up  his 
mind  at  last,  as  he  later  revealed,  he  went  off  to  celebrate 
the  Christmas  holidays  with  the  troops  and  flyers  along 
the  English  Channel — as  far  as  it  was  possible  for  him 
to  get  from  Russia.  Out  of  his  mind  too — as  far  as  possi- 
ble—must  have  been  any  thoughts  of  Charles  XII  of 
Sweden  and  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  who  after  so  many 
glorious  conquests  not  unlike  his  own,  had  met  disaster 
in  the  vast  depths  of  the  Russian  steppes.  How  could 
they  be  much  in  his  mind?  By  now,  as  the  record  shortly 
will  show,  the  one-time  Vienna  waif  regarded  himself  as 
the  greatest  conqueror  the  world  had  ever  seen.  Egomania, 
that  fatal  disease  of  all  conquerors,  was  taking  hold. 

SIX  MONTHS  OF  FRUSTRATION 

And  yet,  after  all  the  tumultuous  victories  of  the  spring 
and  early  summer  of  1940,  there  had  been  a frustrating 
six  months  for  the  Nazi  conqueror.  Not  only  the  final 
triumph  over  Britain  eluded  him  but  opportunities  to  deal 
her  a mortal  blow  in  the  Mediterranean  had  been  thrown 
away. 

Two  days  after  Christmas  Grand  Admiral  Raeder  saw 
Hitler  in  Berlin,  but  he  had  little  Yuletide  cheer  to  offer. 
“The  threat  to  Britain  in  the  entire  eastern  Mediter- 
ranean, the  Near  East  and  in  North  Africa,”  he  told  the 
Fuehrer,  “has  been  eliminated  . . . The  decisive  action  in 


1066  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  Mediterranean  for  which  we  had  hoped  therefore  is 
no  longer  possible.”  38 

Adolf  Hitler,  balked  by  a shifty  Franco,  by  the  inepti- 
tude of  Mussolini  and  even  by  the  senility  of  Marshal 

etain,  had  really  missed  the  bus  in  the  Mediterranean 
Disaster  had  struck  the  Italian  ally  in  the  Egyptian 
desert  and  now  in  December  confronted  it  in  the  snowy 
mountains  of  Albania.  These  untoward  happenings  were 
also  turning  points  in  the  war  and  in  the  course  of  his- 
tory of  the  Third  Reich.  They  had  come  about  not  only 
because  of  the  weaknesses  of  Germany’s  friends  and  allies, 
but,  in  part,  because  of  the  Nazi  warlord’s  incapacity  to 
grasp  the  larger,  intercontinental  strategy  that  was  called 
for  and  that  Raeder  and  even  Goering  had  urged  upon 
him. 

Twice  in  September  1940,  on  the  sixth  and  the  twenty- 
sixth,  the  Grand  Admiral  attempted  to  open  up  new  vistas 
in  the  Fuehrer’s  mind  now  that  the  direct  attack  on  Eng- 
land seemed  out  of  the  question.  For  the  second  confer- 
ence Raeder  cornered  Hitler  alone  and,  without  the  Army 
and  Air  Force  officers  to  muddle  the  conversation,  gave 
his  chief  a lengthy  lecture  on  naval  strategy  and  the  im- 
portance of  getting  at  Britain  in  other  places  than  over  the 
English  Channel. 

British  [Raeder  said]  have  always  considered  the 
Mediterranean  the  pivot  of  their  world  Empire  . . . Italy 
surrounded  by  British  power,  is  fast  becoming  the  main 
target  of  attack  . . . The  Italians  have  not  yet  realized  the 
danger  when  they  refuse  our  help.  Germany,  however,  must 
wage  war  against  Great  Britain  with  all  the  means  at  her 
disposal  and  without  delay,  before  the  United  States  is  able 
to  intervene  effectively.  For  this  reason  the  Mediterranean 
question  must  be  cleared  up  during  the  winter  months. 

Cleared  up  how?  The  Admiral  then  got  down  to  brass 
tacks. 

Gibraltar  must  be  taken.  The  Canary  Islands  must  be  se- 
cured by  the  Air  Force. 

The  Suez  Canal  must  be  taken. 

After  Suez,  Raeder  painted  a rosy  picture  of  what  then 
would  logically  ensue. 

An  advance  from  Suez  through  Palestine  and  Syria  as  far 


1067 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

as  Turkey  is  necessary.  If  we  reach  that  point,  Turkey  will 
be  in  our  power.  The  Russian  problem  will  then  appear  in  a 
different  light  ...  It  is  doubtful  whether  an  advance  against 
Russia  from  the  north  will  be  necessary. 

Having  in  his  mind  driven  the  British  out  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  put  Turkey  and  Russia  in  Germany’s 
power,  Raeder  went  on  to  complete  the  picture.  Correctly 
predicting  that  Britain,  supported  by  the  U.S.A.  and  the 
Gaullist  forces,  eventually  would  try  to  get  a foothold  on 
Northwest  Africa  as  a basis  for  subsequent  war  against  the 
Axis,  the  Admiral  urged  that  Germany  and  Vichy  France 
forestall  this  by  securing  this  strategically  important 
region  themselves. 

According  to  Raeder,  Hitler  agreed  with  his  “general 
trend  of  thought”  but  added  that  he  would  have  to  talk 
matters  over  first  with  Mussolini,  Franco  and  Petain.39  This 
he  proceeded  to  do,  though  only  after  much  time  was 
lost.  He  arranged  to  see  the  Spanish  dictator  on  October 
23,  Petain,  who  was  now  the  head  of  a collaborationist 
government  at  Vichy,  the  next  day,  and  the  Duce  a few 
days  thereafter. 

Franco,  who  owed  his  triumph  in  the  Spanish  Civil 
War  to  the  massive  military  aid  of  Italy  and  Germany, 
had,  like  all  his  fellow  dictators,  an  inordinate  appetite  for 
spoils,  especially  if  they  could  be  gained  cheaply.  In 
June,  at  the  moment  of  France’s  fall,  he  had  hastily  in- 
formed Hitler  that  Spain  would  enter  the  war  in  return 
for  being  given  most  of  the  vast  French  African  empire, 
including  Morocco  and  western  Algeria,  and  provided 
that  Germany  supplied  Spain  liberally  with  arms,  gaso- 
line and  foodstuffs.40  It  was  to  give  Franco  the  opportu- 
nity to  redeem  this  promise  that  the  Fuehrer  arrived  in 
his  special  train  at  the  Franco-Spanish  border  town  of 
Hendaye  on  October  23.  But  much  had  happened  in  the 
intervening  months — Britain  had  stoutly  held  out,  for 
one  thing — and  Hitler  was  in  for  an  unpleasant  surprise. 

The  crafty  Spaniard  was  not  impressed  by  the  Fueh- 
rer’s boast  that  “England  already  is  decisively  beaten,” 
nor  was  he  satisfied  with  Hitler’s  promise  to  give  Spain 
territorial  compensation  in  French  North  Africa  “to  the 
extent  to  which  it  would  be  possible  to  cover  France’s 
losses  from  British  colonies.”  Franco  wanted  the  French 
African  empire,  with  no  strings  attached.  Hitler’s  proposal 


1068  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

was  that  Spain  enter  the  war  in  January  1941,  but  Franco 
pointed  out  the  dangers  of  such  precipitate  action.  Hitler 
Wa"ted  tbe  Spaniards  to  attack  Gibraltar  on  January  10, 
wdh  the  help  of  German  specialists  who  had  taken  the 
Be,lglan  fo“  °f  Eben  Emael  from  the  air.  Franco  replied, 
with  typical  Spanish  pride,  that  Gibraltar  would  have  to 

f SpamaIudS  “al0Ane-”  And  80  the  tW0  dict^ors 
wrangled— for  nine  hours.  According  to  Dr.  Schmidt,  who 

was  present  here  too,  Franco  spoke  on  and  on  in  a mo- 

r8S°ng  V°ice  and  Hit,er  became  increasingly 
exasperated,  once  springing  up,  as  he  had  done  with 
Chamberlain,  to  exclaim  that  there  was  no  point  in  con- 
tinuing the  conversations.41 

“Rather  than  go  through  that  again,”  he  later  told 
Mussolini  in  recounting  his  ordeal  with  the  Caudillo  “I 
would  prefer  to  have  three  or  four  teeth  yanked  out.”  42 
Alter  nine  hours,  with  time  out  for  dinner  in  Hitler’s 
apecial  dining  car,  the  talks  broke  up  late  in  the  evening 
without  Franco’s  having  definitely  committed  himself  to 
come  into  the  war.  Hitler  left  Ribbentrop  behind  that 
night  to  continue  the  parley  with  Serrano  Suner  the 
Spanish  Foreign  Minister,  and  to  try  to  get  the  Spaniards 
to  sign  something,  at  least  an  agreement  to  drive  the 
British  out  of  Gibraltar  and  close  to  them  the  western 
Mediterranean — but  to  no  avail.  “That  ungrateful 
coward!”  Ribbentrop  cursed  to  Schmidt  about  Frlnco 

• 6 De  “ormng-  He  owes  us  everything  and  now  won’t 
join  usi 

Hitler’s  meeting  with  Petain  at  Montoire  the  next 
day  went  off  better.  But  this  was  because  the  aging  de- 
featist Marshal,  the  hero  of  Verdun  in  the  First  World 
ar  and  the  perpetrator  of  the  French  surrender  in  the 
Second,  agreed  to  France’s  collaboration  with  her  con- 
queror in  one  last  effort  to  bring  Britain,  the  late  ally  to 
her  knees.  In  fact,  he  assented  to  put  down  in  writing  this 
odious  deal.  6 

seeing  the'defeTnf  ^ haVe  an  identical  Merest  m 

Wo  8r-th  defeat,  of  England  accomplished  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble  Consequently,  the  French  Government  will  support 
wi  in  the  limits  of  its  ability,  the  measures  which  the  Axis’ 
Powers  may  take  to  this  end.44 

In  return  for  this  treacherous  act,  France  was  to  be 


1069 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

given  in  the  “New  Europe”  “the  place  to  which  she  is 
entitled,”  and  in  Africa  she  was  to  receive  from  the 
fascist  dictators  compensation  from  the  British  Empire 
for  whatever  territory  she  was  forced  to  cede  to  others. 
Both  parties  agreed  to  keep  the  pact  “absolutely  secret.”* 

Despite  Petain’s  dishonorable  but  vital  concessions, 
Hitler  was  not  satisfied.  According  to  Dr.  Schmidt,  he 
had  wanted  more — nothing  less  than  France’s  active  parti- 
cipation in  the  war  against  Britain.  On  the  long  journey 
back  to  Munich  the  official  interpreter  found  the  Fuehrer 
disappointed  and  depressed  with  the  results  of  his  trip.  He 
was  to  become  even  more  so  in  Florence,  where  he  ar- 
rived on  the  morning  of  October  28  to  see  Mussolini. 

They  had  conferred  but  three  weeks  before,  on  October 
4,  at  the  Brenner  Pass.  Hitler,  as  usual,  had  done  most  of 
the  talking,  giving  one  of  his  dazzling  tours  d’horizon  in 
which  was  not  included  any  mention  that  he  was  sending 
troops  to  Rumania,  which  Italy  also  coveted.  When  the 
Duce  learned  of  this  a few  days  later  he  was  indignant. 

Hitler  always  faces  me  with  a fait  accompli  [he  fumed  to 
Ciano],  This  time  I am  going  to  pay  him  back  in  his  own 
coin.  He  will  find  out  from  the  newspapers  that  I have  oc- 
cupied Greece.  In  this  way  the  equilibrium  will  be  re- 
established.45 

The  Duce’s  ambitions  in  the  Balkans  were  as  rabid  as 
Hitler’s  and  cut  across  them  so  that  as  far  back  as  the 
middle  of  August  the  Germans  had  warned  Rome  against 
any  adventures  in  Yugoslavia  and  Greece.  “It  is  a com- 
plete order  to  halt  all  along  the  line,”  Ciano  noted  in 
his  diary  on  August  17.  Mussolini  scrapped,  for  the  mo- 
ment anyway,  his  plans  for  further  martial  glory  in  the 
Balkans  and  confirmed  this  in  a humble  letter  to  Hitler 
of  August  27.  But  the  prospect  of  a quick,  easy  conquest 
of  Greece,  which  would  compensate  to  some  extent  for 
his  partner’s  glittering  victories,  proved  too  big  a tempta- 

* Although  they  did  not  learn  the  contents  of  the  secret  accord  at  Montoire, 
both  Churchill  and  Roosevelt  suspected  the  worst.  The  King  of  England  sent 
through  American  channels  a personal  appeal  to  Petain  asking  him  not  to 
take  sides  against  Britain.  President  Roosevelt’s  message  to  the  Marshal  was 
stern  and  toughly  worded  and  warned  him  of  the  dire  consequences  of  Vichy 
France’s  betraying  Britain.  (See  William  L.  Langer,  Our  Vichy  Gamble,  p. 
97.  To  write  this  book,  Professor  Langer  had  access  to  German  documents 
that  eleven  years  later  have  not  been  released  by  the  British  and  American 
governments. ) 


1070  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tion  for  the  strutting  Fascist  Caesar  to  resist,  false  though 
the  prospect  was. 

On  October  22  he  set  the  date  for  a surprise  Italian  as- 
sault on  Greece  for  October  28  and  on  the  same  day 
wrote  Hitler  a letter  (predated  October  19)  alluding  to 
his  contemplated  action  but  making  it  vague  as  to  the 
exact  nature  and  date.  He  feared,  Ciano  noted  that  day  in 
his  diary,  that  the  Fuehrer  might  “order”  him  to  halt. 
Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  got  wind  of  the  Duce’s  plans  while 
they  were  returning  in  their  respective  special  trains 
from  France,  and  at  the  Fuhrer’s  orders  the  Nazi  Foreign 
Minister  stopped  at  the  first  station  in  Germany  to  tele- 
phone Ciano  in  Rome  and  urge  an  immediate  meeting  of 
the  Axis  leaders.  Mussolini  suggested  October  28  at 
Florence  and,  when  his  German  visitor  alighted  from  the 
train  on  the  morning  of  that  day,  greeted  him,  his  chin  up 
and  his  eyes  full  of  glee:  “Fuehrer,  we  are  on  the  march! 
Victorious  Italian  troops  crossed  the  Greco- Albanian 
frontier  at  dawn  today!”  46 

According  to  all  accounts,  Mussolini  greatly  enjoyed 
this  revenge  on  his  friend  for  all  the  previous  occasions 
when  the  Nazi  dictator  had  marched  into  a country  without 
previously  confiding  to  his  Italian  ally.  Hitler  was  furious. 
This  rash  act  against  a sturdy  foe  at  the  worst  possible 
time  of  year  threatened  to  upset  the  applecart  in  the  Bal- 
kans. The  Fuehrer,  as  he  wrote  Mussolini  a little  later, 
had  sped  to  Florence  in  the  hope  of  preventing  it,  but  he 
had  arrived  too  late.  According  to  Schmidt,  who  was 
present,  the  Nazi  leader  managed  to  control  his  rage. 

Hitler  went  north  that  afternoon  [Schmidt  later  wrote] 
with  bitterness  in  his  heart.  He  had  been  frustrated  three 
times — at  Hendaye,  at  Montoire,  and  now  in  Italy.  In  the 
lengthy  winter  evenings  of  the  next  few  years  these  long, 
exacting  journeys  were  a constantly  recurring  theme  of  bit- 
ter reproaches  against  ungrateful  and  unreliable  friends. 
Axis  partners  and  “deceiving”  Frenchmen.47 

Nevertheless  he  had  to  do  something  to  prosecute  the 
war  against  the  British,  now  that  the  invasion  of  Britain 
had  proved  impossible.  Hardly  had  the  Fuehrer  returned 
to  Berlin  before  the  need  to  act  was  further  impressed 
upon  him  by  the  fiasco  of  the  Duce’s  armies  in  Greece. 
Within  a week,  the  “victorious”  Italian  attack  there  had 
been  turned  into  a rout.  On  November  4 Hitler  called  a 


1071 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

war  conference  at  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  to  which  he 
summoned  Brauchitsch  and  Haider  from  the  Army  and 
Keitel  and  Jodi  from  OKW.  Thanks  to  Haider’s  diary  and 
a captured  copy  of  Jodi’s  report  to  the  Navy  on  the  con- 
ference, we  know  the  warlord’s  decisions,  which  were 
embodied  in  Directive  No.  18  issued  by  Hitler  on  Novem- 
ber 12,  the  text  of  which  is  among  the  Nuremberg  rec- 
ords.48 

The  German  Navy’s  influence  on  Hitler’s  strategy  be- 
came evident,  as  did  the  necessity  for  doing  something 
about  the  faltering  Italian  ally.  Haider  noted  the  Fuehrer’s 
“lack  of  confidence”  in  Italian  leadership.  As  a result  it 
was  decided  not  to  send  any  German  troops  to  Libya 
until  Marshal  Rodolfo  Graziani’s  army,  which  in  Septem- 
ber had  advanced  sixty  miles  into  Egypt  to  Sidi  Barrani, 
had  reached  Mersa  Matruh,  a further  seventy-five  miles 
along  the  coast,  which  was  not  expected  before  Christmas, 
if  then.  In  the  meantime  plans  were  to  be  made  to  send  a 
few  dive  bombers  to  Egypt  to  attack  the  British  fleet 
in  Alexandria  and  mine  the  Suez  Canal. 

As  for  Greece,  the  Italian  attack  there,  Hitler  admitted 
to  his  generals,  had  been  a “regrettable  blunder”  and  un- 
fortunately had  endangered  Germany’s  position  in  the 
Balkans.  The  British  by  occupying  Crete  and  Lemnos  had 
achieved  air  bases  from  which  they  could  easily  bomb 
the  Rumanian  oil  fields  and  by  sending  troops  to  the 
Greek  mainland  threatened  the  whole  German  position 
in  the  Balkans.  To  counter  this  danger  Hitler  ordered  the 
Army  to  prepare  immediately  plans  to  invade  Greece 
through  Bulgaria  with  a force  of  at  least  ten  divisions 
which  would  be  sent  first  to  Rumania.  “It  is  anticipated,” 
he  said,  “that  Russia  will  remain  neutral.” 

But  it  was  in  regard  to  destroying  Britain’s  position  in 
the  western  Mediterranean  that  most  of  the  conference  of 
November  4 and  most  of  the  ensuing  Directive  No. 

1 8 was  devoted. 

Gibraltar  will  be  taken  [said  the  directive]  and  the  Straits 
closed. 

The  British  will  be  prevented  from  gaining  a foothold  at 
another  point  of  the  Iberian  peninsula  or  the  Atlantic 
islands. 

“Felix”  was  to  be  the  code  name  for  the  taking  of  Gi- 


1072 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

braltar  and  the  Spanish  Canary  Islands  and  the  Portuguese 
Cape  Verde  Islands.  The  Navy  was  also  to  study  the  possi- 
bility of  occupying  Portugal’s  Madeira  and  the  Azores. 
Portugal  itself  might  have  to  be  occupied.  “Operation 
Isabella”  would  be  the  cover  name  for  that,  and  three 
German  divisions  would  be  assembled  on  the  Spanish- 
Portuguese  frontier  to  carry  it  out. 

Finally,  units  of  the  French  fleet  and  some  troops  were 
to  be  released  so  that  France  could  defend  her  possessions 
in  Northwest  Africa  against  the  British  and  De  Gaulle. 
“From  this  initial  task,”  Hitler  said  in  his  directive, 
“France’s  participation  in  the  war  against  England  can 
develop  fully.” 

Hitler’s  new  plans,  as  enunciated  to  the  generals  on 
November  4 and  laid  down  in  the  directive  a week 
later,  went  into  considerable  military  detail — especially 
on  how  Gibraltar  was  to  be  taken  by  a daring  German 
stroke — and  apparently  they  impressed  his  Army  chiefs 
as  bold  and  shrewd.  But  in  reality  they  were  half  measures 
which  could  not  possibly  achieve  their  objectives,  and 
they  were  based  partly  on  his  deceiving  his  own  generals. 
He  assured  them  on  November  4,  Haider  noted,  that  he 
had  just  received  Franco’s  renewed  promise  to  join 
Germany  in  the  war,  but  this,  as  we  have  seen,  was  not 
quite  true.  The  objectives  of  driving  the  British  out  of 
the  Mediterranean  were  sound,  but  the  forces  allotted 
to  the  task  were  quite  insufficient,  especially  in  view  of 
Italy’s  weaknesses. 

The  Naval  War  Staff  pointed  this  out  in  a toughly 
worded  memorandum  which  Raeder  gave  Hitler  on  No- 
vember 14.49  The  Italian  disaster  in  Greece — Mussolini’s 
troops  had  now  been  hurled  back  into  Albania  and  were 
still  retreating — had  not  only  greatly  improved  Britain’s 
strategic  position  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  sailors  pointed 
out,  but  enhanced  British  prestige  throughout  the  world. 
As  for  the  Italian  attack  on  Egypt,  the  Navy  told  Hitler 
flatly:  “Italy  will  never  carry  out  the  Egyptian  offensive.* 
The  Italian  leadership  is  wretched.  They  have  no  under- 
standing of  the  situation.  The  Italian  armed  forces 
have  neither  the  leadership  nor  the  military  efficiency  to 
carry  the  required  operations  in  the  Mediterranean  area 


The  Navy’s  italics. 


1073 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 


to  a successful  conclusion  with  the  necessary  speed  and 
decision.” 

Therefore,  the  Navy  concluded,  this  task  must  be  car- 
ried out  by  Germany.  The  “fight  for  the  African  area,”  it 
warned  Hitler,  is  “the  foremost  strategic  objective  of  Ger- 
man warfare  as  a whole  ...  It  is  of  decisive  importance 
for  the  outcome  of  the  war.” 

But  the  Nazi  dictator  was  not  convinced.  He  had  never 
been  able  to  envisage  the  war  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
North  Africa  as  anything  but  secondary  to  his  main 
objective.  As  Admiral  Raeder  elaborated  to  him  the  Navy’s 
strategic  conceptions  in  their  meeting  on  November  14, 
Hitler  retorted  that  he  was  “still  inclined  toward  a 
demonstration  with  Russia.”  50  In  fact,  he  was  more  in- 
clined than  ever,  for  Molotov  had  just  departed  Berlin 
that  morning  after  so  arousing  the  Fuehrer’s  ire.  When 
the  Admiral  next  saw  his  chief  a couple  of  days  after 
Christmas  to  report  on  how  the  bus  had  been  missed  in 
the  Mediterranean,  Hitler  was  not  unduly  perturbed.  To 
Raeder’s  argument  that  the  victory  of  Britain  over  the 
Italians  in  Egypt  * and  the  increasing  material  aid  which 
she  was  receiving  from  America  necessitated  the  concen- 
tration of  all  German  resources  to  bring  the  British  down, 
and  that  Barbarossa  ought  to  be  postponed  until  “the 
overthrow  of  Britain,”  Hitler  turned  an  almost  deaf  ear. 

“In  view  of  the  present  political  developments  and  espe- 
cially Russia’s  interference  in  Balkan  affairs,”  Hitler  said, 
“it  is  necessary  to  eliminate  at  all  costs  the  last  enemy 
remaining  on  the  Continent  before  coming  to  grips  with 


By  this  time  a ramshackle  British  desert  force  of  one  armored  division,  an 

Indian  inf a"try  division,  two  infantry  brigades  and  a Royai  Tank  regiment 

31,000  men  in  all — had  driven  an  Italian  force  three  times  as  large  out  of 

Egypt  and  captured  38,000  prisoners  at  a cost  of  133  killed,  387  wounded  and 

8 missing.  The  British  counteroffensive,  under  the  over-all  command  of 
General  Sir  Archibald  Wavell,  had  begun  on  December  7 and  in  four  days 
Marshal  Graziam  s army  was  routed.  What  had  started  as  a five-day  limited 
counterattack  continued  until  February  7,  by  which  time  the  British  had 
pushed  clear  across  Cyrenaica,  a distance  of  500  miles,  annihilated  the  entire 
j of  ‘fi  divisions  in  Libya,  taken  130,000  prisoners,  1,240  guns 

and  500  tanks  and  lost  themselves  500  killed,  1,373  wounded  and  55  missing, 

lo  the  skeptical  British  military  writer  General  J.  F.  Fuller  it  was  “one  of 
the  most  audacious  campaigns  ever  fought.  (Fuller,  The  Second  World  War. 
p.  98.) 

The  Italian  Navy  had  also  been  dealt  a lethal  blow.  On  the  night  of 
November  ll-;^  bombers  from  the  British  carrier  Illustrious  (which  the 
Sa5tJaimfd  *,°  5avei.sunG  attacked  the  Italian  fleet  at  anchor  at 
" a,°9  P"4 * * * 8 * lo  °u‘  of  ,?ct'?n  {»r  many  months  three  battleships  and  two 
t ' uu  b ?ck  day’  piano  began  his  diary  on  November  12.  “The 

and  seriously 


1074  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Britain.”  From  now  on  to  the  bitter  end  he  would  stick 
fanatically  to  this  fundamental  strategy. 

As  a sop  to  his  naval  chief.  Hitler  promised  to  “try 
once  more  to  influence  Franco”  so  that  the  attack  against 
Gibraltar  could  be  made  and  the  Mediterranean  closed 
to  the  British  fleet.  Actually,  he  had  already  dropped  the 
whole  idea.  On  December  11  he  had  quietly  ordered, 
“Operation  Felix  will  not  be  carried  out  as  the  political 
conditions  no  longer  exist.”  Nagged  by  his  own  Navy  and 
by  the  Italians  to  keep  after  Franco,  Hitler  made  one  final 
effort,  though  it  was  painful  to  him.  On  February  6,  1941, 
he  addressed  a long  letter  to  the  Spanish  dictator. 

. . . About  one  thing,  Caudillo,  there  must  be  clarity:  we 
are  fighting  a battle  of  life  and  death  and  cannot  at  this 
time  make  any  gifts  . . . 

The  battle  which  Germany  and  Italy  are  fighting  will  de- 
termine the  destiny  of  Spain  as  well.  Only  in  the  case  of  our 
victory  will  your  present  regime  continue  to  exist.51 

Unfortunately  for  the  Axis,  the  letter  reached  the  Cau- 
dillo on  the  very  day  that  Marshal  Graziani’s  last  forces 
in  Cyrenaica  had  been  wiped  out  by  the  British  south  of 
Benghazi.  Little  wonder  that  when  Franco  got  around  to 
replying — on  February  26,  1941 — though  protesting  his 
“absolute  loyalty”  to  the  Axis,  he  reminded  the  Nazi 
leader  that  recent  developments  had  left  “the  circum- 
stances of  October  far  behind”  and  that  their  under- 
standing of  that  time  had  become  “outmoded.” 

For  one  of  the  very  few  times  in  his  stormy  life,  Adolf 
Hitler  conceded  defeat.  “The  long  and  short  of  the 
tedious  Spanish  rigmarole,”  he  wrote  Mussolini,  “is  that 
Spain  does  not  want  to  enter  the  war  and  will  not 
enter  it.  This  is  extremely  tiresome  since  it  means  that  for 
the  moment  the  possibility  of  striking  at  Britain  in  the 
simplest  manner,  in  her  Mediterranean  possessions,  is 
eliminated.” 

Italy,  not  Spain,  however,  was  the  key  to  defeating 
Britain  in  the  Mediterranean,  but  the  Duce’s  creaky  em- 
pire was  not  equal  to  the  task  of  doing  it  alone  and  Hit- 
ler was  not  wise  enough  to  give  her  the  means,  which  he 
had,  to  accomplish  it.  The  possibility  of  striking  at  Britain 
either  directly  across  the  Channel  or  indirectly  across  the 
broader  Mediterranean,  he  now  confessed,  had  been  elim- 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1075 

inated  “for  the  moment.”  Though  this  was  frustrating, 
the  acknowledgment  of  it  brought  Hitler  relief.  He  could 
now  turn  to  matters  nearer  his  heart  and  mind. 

On  January  8-9,  1941,  he  held  a council  of  war  at  the 
Berghof  above  Berchtesgaden,  which  now  lay  deep  in  the 
winter’s  snow.  The  mountain  air  seems  to  have  cleared 
his  mind,  and  once  more,  as  the  lengthy  confidential 
reports  of  the  meeting  by  Admiral  Raeder  and  General 
Haider  52  disclose,  his  thoughts  ranged  far  and  wide  as 
he  outlined  his  grand  strategy  to  his  military  chiefs.  His 
optimism  had  returned. 

The  Fuehrer  [Raeder  noted]  is  firmly  convinced  that  the 
situation  in  Europe  can  no  longer  develop  unfavorably  for 
Germany  even  if  we  should  lose  the  whole  of  North  Africa. 
Our  position  in  Europe  is  so  firmly  established  that  the  out- 
come cannot  possibly  be  to  our  disadvantage  . . . The 
British  can  hope  to  win  the  war  only  by  beating  us  on  the 
Continent.  The  Fuehrer  is  convinced  that  this  is  impossible. 

It  was  true,  he  conceded,  that  the  direct  invasion  of 
Britain  was  “not  feasible  unless  she  is  crippled  to  a 
considerable  degree  and  Germany  has  complete  air  su- 
periority.” The  Navy  and  Air  Force,  he  said,  must  con- 
centrate on  attacking  her  shipping  lanes  and  thereby  cut 
off  her  supplies.  Such  attacks,  he  thought,  “might  lead  to 
victory  as  early  as  July  or  August.”  In  the  meantime,  he 
said,  “Germany  must  make  herself  so  strong  on  the  Con- 
tinent that  we  can  handle  a further  war  against  England 
(and  America).”  The  parentheses  are  Haider’s  and  their 
enclosure  is  significant.  This  is  the  first  mention  in  the 
captured  German  records  that  Hitler — at  the  beginning 
of  1941— is  facing  up  to  the  possibility  of  the  entry  of 
the  United  States  into  the  war  against  him. 

The  Nazi  warlord  then  took  up  the  various  strategic  areas 
and  problems  and  outlined  what  he  intended  to  do  about 
them. 

The  Fuehrer  is  of  the  opinion  [Raeder  wrote]  that  it  is 
vital  for  the  outcome  of  the  war  that  Italy  does  not  collapse 
...  He  is  determined  to  . . . prevent  Italy  from  losing  North 
Africa  ...  It  would  mean  a great  loss  of  prestige  to  the 
Axis  powers  . . . He  is  [therefore]  determined  to  give 
them  support. 


1076 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


At  this  point  he  cautioned  his  military  leaders  about 
divulging  German  plans. 

He  does  not  wish  to  inform  the  Italians  of  our  plans. 
There  is  great  danger  that  the  Royal  Family  is  transmitting 
intelligence  to  Britain!!  * 

Support  for  Italy,  Hitler  declared,  would  consist  of  anti- 
tank formations  and  some  Luftwaffe  squadrons  for  Libya. 
More  important,  he  would  dispatch  an  army  corps  of 
two  and  a half  divisions  to  buck  up  the  retreating  Italians 
in  Albania — into  which  the  Greeks  had  now  pushed  them. 
In  connection  with  this,  “Operation  Marita”  t would  be 
pushed.  The  transfer  of  troops  from  Rumania  to  Bulgaria, 
he  ordered,  must  begin  at  once  so  that  Marita  could  com- 
mence on  March  26.  Hitler  also  spoke  at  some  length 
of  the  need  to  be  ready  to  carry  out  “Operation  Attila” — 
the  German  cover  names  seem  almost  endless — which  he 
had  outlined  in  a directive  of  December  10,  1940.  This 
was  a plan  to  occupy  the  rest  of  France  and  seize  the 
French  fleet  at  Toulon.  He  thought  now  it  might  have  to 
be  carried  out  soon.  “If  France  becomes  troublesome,” 
he  declared,  “she  will  have  to  be  crushed  completely.”  This 
would  have  been  a crude  violation  of  the  Compiegne 
armistice,  but  no  general  or  admiral,  so  far  as  Haider  and 
Raeder  noted — or  at  least  recorded — raised  the  question. 

It  was  at  this  war  conference  that  Hitler  described  Stalin 
as  “a  cold-blooded  blackmailer”  and  informed  his  com- 
manders that  Russia  would  have  to  be  brought  to  her 
knees  “as  soon  as  possible.” 

If  the  U.S.A.  and  Russia  should  enter  the  war  against 
Germany  [Hitler  said,  and  it  was  the  second  time  he  men- 
tioned that  possibility  for  America],  the  situation  would  be- 
come very  complicated.  Hence  any  possibility  for  such  a 
threat  to  develop  must  be  eliminated  at  the  very  beginning. 
If  the  Russian  threat  were  removed,  we  could  wage  war  on 
Britain  indefinitely.  If  Russia  collapsed,  Japan  would  be  greatly 
relieved:  this  in  turn  would  mean  increased  danger  to  the 
U.S.A. 

Such  were  the  thoughts  of  the  German  dictator  on 
global  strategy  as  1941  got  under  way.  Two  days  after 

* The  italics  and  double  exclamation  points  are  Raeder’s. 
t Operation  Marita  was  promulgated  in  Directive  No.  20  on  December  13, 
1940.  It  called  for  an  army  of  twenty-four  divisions  to  be  assembled  in 
Rumania  and  to  descend  on  Greece  through  Bulgaria  as  soon  as  favorable 
weather  set  in.  It  was  signed  by  Hitler.53 


1077 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

the  war  council,  on  January  11,  he  embodied  them  in 
Directive  No.  22.  German  reinforcements  for  Tripoli 
were  to  move  under  “Operation  Sunflower”;  those  for 
Albania  under  “Operation  Alpine  Violets.”  64 

“THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH!” 

Mussolini  was  summoned  by  Hitler  to  the  Berghof  for 
January  19  and  20.  Shaken  and  humiliated  bi'  the  Italian 
debacles  in  Egypt  and  Greece,  he  had  no  stomach  for  this 
journey.  Ciano  found  him  “frowning  and  nervous”  when 
he  boarded  his  special  train,  fearful  that  Hitler,  Ribbentrop 
and  the  German  generals  would  be  insultingly  condes- 
cending. To  make  matters  worse  the  Duce  took  along  Gen- 
eral Alfredo  Guzzoni,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  whom 
Ciano  in  his  diary  described  as  a mediocre  man  with  a 
big  paunch  and  a little  dyed  wig  and  whom,  he  thought, 
it  would  be  positively  humiliating  to  present  to  the  Ger- 
mans. 

To  his  surprise  and  relief,  Mussolini  found  Hitler,  who 
came  down  to  the  snow-covered  platform  of  the  little  sta- 
tion at  Puch  to  greet  him,  both  tactful  and  cordial  and 
there  were  no  reproaches  for  Italy’s  sorry  record  on  the 
battlefields.  He  also  found  his  host,  as  Ciano  noted  in  his 
diary,  in  a very  anti-Russian  mood.  For  more  than  two 
hours  on  the  second  day  Hitler  lectured  his  Italian 
guests  and  an  assembly  of  generals  from  both  countries, 
and  a secret  report  on  it  prepared  by  General  Jodi 56  con- 
firms that  while  the  Fuehrer  was  anxious  to  be  helpful  to 
the  Italians  in  Albania  and  Libya,  his  principal  thoughts 
were  on  Russia. 

I don’t  see  great  danger  coming  from  America  [Hitler 
said]  even  if  she  should  enter  the  war.  The  much  greater 
danger  is  the  gigantic  block  of  Russia.  Though  we  have 
very  favorable  political  and  economic  agreements  with 
Russia,  I prefer  to  rely  on  powerful  means  at  my  disposal. 

Though  he  hinted  at  what  he  intended  to  do  with  his 
“powerful  means,”  he  did  not  disclose  his  plans  to  his 
partner.  These,  however,  were  sufficiently  far  along  to 
enable  the  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff,  who  was 
responsible  for  working  out  the  details,  to  present  them 
to  the  Supreme  Commander  at  a meeting  in  Berlin  a 
fortnight  later. 


1078 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

This  war  conference,  attended  by  the  top  generals  of 
OKW  and  of  the  Army  High  Command  (OKH),  lasted 
from  noon  until  6 p.m.  on  February  3.  And  though  Gen- 
eral Haider,  who  outlined  the  Army  General  Staff's  plans, 
contended  later  in  his  book 56  that  he  and  Brauchitsch 
raised  doubts  about  their  own  assessment  of  Soviet  mili- 
tary strength  and  in  general  opposed  Barbarossa  as  an 
“adventure,”  there  is  not  a word  in  his  own  diary  entry 
made  the  same  evening  or  in  the  highly  secret  OKW  mem- 
orandum of  the  meeting57  that  supports  this  contention. 
Indeed,  they  disclose  Haider  to  have  made  at  first  a busi- 
nesslike estimate  of  the  opposing  forces,  calculating  that 
while  the  enemy  would  have  approximately  155  divisions, 
German  strength  would  be  about  the  same  and,  as  Haider 
reported,  “far  superior  in  quality.”  Later,  when  catastrophe 
set  in,  Haider  and  his  fellow  generals  realized  that  their 
intelligence  on  the  Red  Army  had  been  fantastically  faulty. 
But  on  February  3,  1941,  they  did  not  suspect  that.  In 
fact,  so  convincing  was  Haider’s  report  on  respective 
strengths  and  on  the  strategy  to  be  employed  to  annihilate 
the  Red  armies  * that  Hitler  at  the  end  not  only  ex- 
pressed agreement  “on  the  whole”  but  was  so  excited  by 
the  prospects  which  the  General  Staff  Chief  had  raised 
that  he  exclaimed: 

"When  Barbarossa  commences,  the  world  will  hold  its 
breath  and  make  no  comment!" 

He  could  scarcely  wait  for  it  to  commence.  Impatiently 
he  ordered  the  operation  map  and  the  plan  of  deploy- 
ment of  forces  to  be  sent  to  him  “as  soon  as  possible.” 

BALKAN  PRELUDE 

Before  Barbarossa  could  get  under  way  in  the  spring 
the  southern  flank,  which  lay  in  the  Balkans,  had  to  be 
secured  and  built  up.  By  the  third  week  in  February  1941, 
the  Germans  had  massed  a formidable  army  of  680,000 
troops  in  Rumania,  which  bordered  the  Ukraine  for  three 
hundred  miles  between  the  Polish  border  and  the  Black 
Sea.58  But  to  the  south,  Greece  still  held  the  Italians  at  bay 

* The  strategy  was  essentially  that  laid  down  in  Directive  No.  21  of  Decern- 
F,,18'  If-  , (See  pp.  1063-64.)  Again  in  comments  to  Brauchitsch  and 
nalder,  Hitler  emphasized  the  importance  of  “wiping  out  large  sections  of 
the  enemy  instead  of  forcing  them  to  retreat.  And  he  stressed  that  “the 
main  atm  [his  emphasis]  is  to  gain  possession  of  the  Baltic  States  and 
Leningrad.” 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1079 

and  Berlin  had  reason  to  believe  that  British  troops 
from  Libya  would  soon  be  landed  there.  Hitler,  as  the 
minutes  of  his  numerous  conferences  at  this  period  make 
clear,  feared  that  an  Allied  front  above  Salonika  might 
be  formed  which  would  be  more  troublesome  to  Germany 
than  a similar  one  had  been  in  the  First  World  War,  since 
it  would  give  the  British  a base  from  which  to  bomb  the 
Rumanian  oil  fields.  Moreover,  it  would  jeopardize 
Barbarossa.  In  fact,  the  danger  had  been  foreseen  as  far 
back  as  December  1940,  when  the  first  directive  for  Oper- 
ation Marita  had  been  issued  providing  for  a strong 
German  attack  on  Greece  through  Bulgaria  with  troops 
assembled  in  Rumania. 

Bulgaria,  whose  wrong  guess  as  to  the  victors  in  the 
first  war  had  cost  her  dearly,  now  made  a similar  mis- 
calculation. Believing  Hitler’s  assurances  that  he  had 
already  won  the  war  and  bedazzled  by  the  prospect  of 
obtaining  Greek  territory  to  the  south  which  would  give 
her  access  to  the  Aegean  Sea,  her  government  agreed  to 
participate  in  Marita — at  least  to  the  extent  of  allowing 
passage  of  German  troops.  An  agreement  to  this  effect 
was  made  secretly  on  February  8,  1941,  between  Field 
Marshal  List  and  the  Bulgarian  General  Staff.59  On  the 
night  of  February  28  German  Army  units  crossed  the 
Danube  from  Rumania  and  took  up  strategic  positions  in 
Bulgaria,  which  the  next  day  joined  the  Tripartite  Pact. 

The  hardier  Yugoslavs  were  not  quite  so  accommodat- 
ing. But  their  stubbornness  only  spurred  on  the  Germans 
to  bring  them  into  camp  too.  On  March  4-5,  the  Regent, 
Prince  Paul,  was  summoned  in  great  secrecy  to  the  Berg- 
hof  by  the  Fuehrer,  given  the  usual  threats  and,  in  addi- 
tion, offered  the  bribe  of  Salonika.  On  March  25,  the 
Yugoslav  Premier,  Dragisha  Cvetkovic,  and  Foreign 
Minister  Aleksander  Cincar-Markovic,  having  slipped 
surreptitiously  out  of  Belgrade  the  night  before  to  avoid 
hostile  demonstrations  or  even  kidnaping,  arrived  at 
Vienna,  where  in  the  presence  of  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop 
they  signed  up  Yugoslavia  to  the  Tripartite  Pact.  Hitler 
was  highly  pleased  and  told  Ciano  that  this  Would  facili- 
tate his  attack  on  Greece.  Before  leaving  Vienna  the 
Yugoslav  leaders  were  given  two  letters  from  Ribbentrop 
confirming  Germany’s  “determination”  to  respect  “the 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  Yugoslavia  at  all 


1080  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

times”  and  promising  that  the  Axis  would  not  demand 
transit  rights  for  its  troops  across  Yugoslavia  “during  this 
war.”  60  Both  agreements  were  broken  by  Hitler  in  what 
even  for  him  was  record  time. 

The  Yugoslav  ministers  had  no  sooner  returned  to 
Belgrade  than  they,  the  government  and  the  Prince  Regent 
were  overthrown  on  the  night  of  March  26-27,  by  a pop- 
ular uprising  led  by  a number  of  top  Air  Force  officers 
and  supported  by  most  of  the  Army.  The  youthful  heir  to 
the  throne,  Peter,  who  had  escaped  from  the  surveillance 
of  regency  officials  by  sliding  down  a rain  pipe,  was 
declared  King,  and  though  the  new  regime  of  General 
Dusan  Simovic  immediately  offered  to  sign  a nonag- 
gression pact  with  Germany,  it  was  obvious  in  Berlin  that 
it  would  not  accept  the  puppet  status  for  Yugoslavia  which 
the  Fuehrer  had  assigned.  During  the  delirious  cele- 
brations in  Belgrade,  in  which  a crowd  spat  on  the  Ger- 
man minister’s  car,  the  Serbs  had  shown  where  their 
sympathies  lay. 

The  coup  in  Belgrade  threw  Adolf  Hitler  into  one  of 
the  wildest  rages  of  his  entire  life.  He  took  it  as  a personal 
affront  and  in  his  fury  made  sudden  decisions  which  would 
prove  utterly  disastrous  to  the  fortunes  of  the  Third 
Reich. 

He  hurriedly  summoned  his  military  chieftains  to  the 
Chancellery  in  Berlin  on  March  27 — the  meeting  was  so 
hastily  called  that  Brauchitsch,  Haider  and  Ribbentrop 
arrived  late — and  raged  about  the  revenge  he  would  take 
on  the  Yugoslavs.  The  Belgrade  coup,  he  said,  had  en- 
dangered both  Marita  and,  even  more,  Barbarossa.  He 
was  therefore  determined,  “without  waiting  for  possible 
declarations  of  loyalty  of  the  new  government,  to  destroy 
Yugoslavia  militarily  and  as  a nation.  No  diplomatic  in- 
quiries will  be  made,”  he  ordered,  “and  no  ultimatums 
presented.”  Yugoslavia,  he  added,  would  be  crushed  with 
“unmerciful  harshness.”  He  ordered  Goering  then  and 
there  to  “destroy  Belgrade  in  attacks  by  waves,”  with 
bombers  operating  from  Hungarian  air  bases.  He  issued 
Directive  No.  25  61  for  the  immediate  invasion  of  Yu- 
goslavia and  told  Keitel  and  Jodi  to  work  out  that  very 
evening  the  military  plans.  He  instructed  Ribbentrop  to 
advise  Hungary,  Rumania  and  Italy  that  they  would  all 


1081 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

get  a slice  of  Yugoslavia,  which  would  be  divided  up  among 
them,  except  for  a small  Croatian  puppet  state.* 

And  then,  according  to  an  underlined  passage  in  the 
top-secret  OKW  notes  of  the  meeting,62  Hitler  announced 
the  most  fateful  decision  of  all. 

“The  beginning  of  the  Barbarossa  operation,"  he  told 
his  generals,  “will  have  to  be  postponed  up  to  four 
weeks."  t 

This  postponement  of  the  attack  on  Russia  in  order 
that  the  Nazi  warlord  might  vent  his  personal  spite  against 
a small  Balkan  country  which  had  dared  to  defy  him  was 
probably  the  most  catastrophic  single  decision  in  Hitler’s 
career.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  by  making  it 
that  March  afternoon  in  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin  during 
a moment  of  convulsive  rage  he  tossed  away  his  last 
golden  opportunity  to  win  the  war  and  to  make  of  the 
Third  Reich,  which  he  had  created  with  such  stunning 
if  barbarious  genius,  the  greatest  empire  in  German  his- 
tory and  himself  the  master  of  Europe.  Field  Marshal 
von  Brauchitsch,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German 
Army,  and  General  Haider,  the  gifted  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  were  to  recall  it  with  deep  bitterness  but  also 
with  more  understanding  of  its  consequences  than  they 
showed  at  the  moment  of  its  making,  when  later  the  deep 
snow  and  subzero  temperatures  of  Russia  hit  them  three 
or  four  weeks  short  of  what  they  thought  they  needed  for 
final  victory.  For  ever  afterward  they  and  their  fellow 
generals  would  blame  that  hasty,  ill-advised  decision  of 
a vain  and  infuriated  man  for  all  the  disasters  that  en- 
sued. 

Military  Directive  No.  25,  which  the  Supreme  Com- 
mander issued  to  his  generals  before  the  meeting  broke 
up,  was  a typical  Hitlerian  document. 

The  military  putsch  in  Yugoslavia  has  altered  the  po- 
litical situation  in  the  Balkans.  Yugoslavia,  in  spite  of  her 
protestations  of  loyalty,  must  be  considered  for  the  time 
being  as  an  enemy  and  therefore  crushed  as  speedily  as 
possible. 

* “The  war  against  Yugoslavia  should  be  very  popular  in  Italy,  Hungary 
and  Bulgaria,”  Hitler  sneered.  He  said  he  would  give  the  Banat  to  Hungary, 
Macedonia  to  Bulgaria  and  the  Adriatic  coast  to  Italy. 

t It  had  originally  been  set  for  May  15  in  the  first  Barbarossa  directive  of 
December  18,  1940. 


1082 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


It  is  my  intention  to  force  my  way  into  Yugoslavia  . . . 
and  to  annihilate  the  Yugoslav  Army  . . . 

Jodi,  as  Chief  of  the  Operations  Staff  of  OKW,  was 
told  to  prepare  the  plans  that  very  night.  “I  worked  the 
whole  night  at  the  Reich  Chancellery,”  Jodi  later  told 
the  Nuremberg  tribunal.  “At  four  o’clock  in  the  morning 
of  March  28,  I put  an  aide-memoire  into  the  hand  of 
General  von  Rintelen,  our  liaison  officer  with  the  Italian 
High  Command.”  63 

For  Mussolini,  whose  sagging  armies  in  Albania  were  in 
danger  of  being  taken  in  the  rear  by  the  Yugoslavs,  had  to 
be  told  immediately  of  the  German  operational  plans  and 
asked  to  co-operate  with  them.  To  make  sure  that  the 
Duce  understood  what  was  expected  of  him  and  without 
waiting  for  General  Jodi  to  concoct  the  military  plans, 
Hitler  dashed  off  a letter  at  midnight  of  the  twenty-seventh 
and  ordered  it  wired  to  Rome  immediately  so  that  it 
would  reach  Mussolini  that  same  night.64 

Duce,  events  force  me  to  give  you  by  this  quickest  means 
my  estimation  of  the  situation  and  the  consequences  which 
may  result  from  it. 

From  the  beginning  I have  regarded  Yugoslavia  as  a dan- 
gerous factor  in  the  controversy  with  Greece  . . . For  this 
reason  I have  done  everything  honestly  to  bring  Yugoslavia 
into  our  community  . . . Unfortunately  these  endeavors  did 
not  meet  with  success  . . . Today’s  reports  leave  no  doubt 
as  to  the  imminent  turn  in  the  foreign  policy  of  Yugoslavia. 

Therefore  I have  already  arranged  for  all  necessary  meas- 
ures . . . with  military  means.  Now,  I would  cordially  re- 
quest you,  Duce,  not  to  undertake  any  further  operations  in 
Albania  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  days.  I consider  it 
necessary  that  you  should  cover  and  screen  the  most  im- 
portant passes  from  Yugoslavia  into  Albania  with  all  avail- 
able forces. 

...  I also  consider  it  necessary,  Duce,  that  you  should 
reinforce  your  forces  on  the  Italian-Yugoslav  front  with 
all  available  means  and  with  utmost  speed. 

I also  consider  it  necessary,  Duce,  that  everything  which 
we  do  and  order  be  shrouded  in  absolute  secrecy  . . . These 
measures  will  completely  lose  their  value  should  they  be- 
come known  . . . Duce,  should  secrecy  be  observed,  then 
...  I have  no  doubt  that  we  will  both  achieve  a success 
no  less  than  the  success  in  Norway  a year  ago.  This  is  my 
unshaken  conviction. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1083 

Accept  my  heartfelt  and  friendly  greetings, 

Yours, 

Adolf  Hitler 

For  this  short-range  objective,  the  Nazi  warlord  was 
again  right  in  his  prediction,  but  he  seems  to  have  had 
no  inkling  how  costly  his  successful  revenge  on  Yugo- 
slavia would  be  in  the  long  run.  At  dawn  on  April  6, 
his  armies  in  overwhelming  strength  fell  on  Yugoslavia 
and  Greece,  smashing  across  the  frontiers  of  Bulgaria, 
Hungary  and  Germany  itself  with  all  their  armor  and 
advancing  rapidly  against  poorly  armed  defenders  dazed 
by  the  usual  preliminary  bombing  from  the  Luftwaffe. 

Belgrade  itself,  as  Hitler  ordered,  was  razed  to  the 
ground.  For  three  successive  days  and  nights  Goering’s 
bombers  ranged  over  the  little  capital  at  rooftop  level — for 
the  city  had  no  antiaircraft  guns — killing  17,000  civilians, 
wounding  many  more  and  reducing  the  place  to  a mass 
of  smouldering  rubble.  “Operation  Punishment,”  Hitler 
called  it,  and  he  obviously  was  satisfied  that  his  commands 
had  been  so  effectively  carried  out.  The  Yugoslavs,  who 
had  not  had  time  to  mobilize  their  tough  little  army  and 
whose  General  Staff  made  the  mistake  of  trying  to  defend 
the  whole  country,  were  overwhelmed.  On  April  13  Ger- 
man and  Hungarian  troops  entered  what  was  left  of  Bel- 
grade and  on  the  seventeenth  the  remnants  of  the  Yugo- 
slav Army,  still  twenty-eight  divisions  strong,  surrendered 
at  Sarajevo,  the  King  and  the  Prime  Minister  escaping  by 
plane  to  Greece. 

The  Greeks,  who  had  humiliated  the  Italians  in  six 
months  of  fighting,  could  not  stand  up  to  Field  Marshal 
List’s  Twelfth  Army  of  fifteen  divisions,  four  of  which 
were  armored.  The  British  had  hurriedly  sent  to  Greece 
some  four  divisions  from  Libya — 53,000  men  in  all — 
but  they,  like  the  Greeks,  were  overwhelmed  by  the  German 
panzers  and  by  the  murderous  strikes  of  the  Luftwaffe. 
The  northern  Greek  armies  surrendered  to  the  Germans 
and — bitter  pill — to  the  Italians  on  April  23.  Four  days 
later  Nazi  tanks  rattled  into  Athens  and  hoisted  the 
swastika  over  the  Acropolis.  By  this  time  the  British  were 
desperately  trying  once  again  to  evacuate  their  troops 
by  sea — a minor  Dunkirk  and  almost  as  successful. 


1084 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


By  the  end  of  April — in  three  weeks — it  was  all  over 
except  for  Crete,. which  was  taken  by  the  Germans  from 
the  British  in  an  airborne  assault  toward  the  end  of  May. 
Where  Mussolini  had  failed  so  miserably  all  winter,  Hitler 
had  succeeded  in  a few  days  in  the  spring.  Though  the 
Duce  was  relieved  to  be  pulled  off  the  hook,  he  was  hu- 
miliated that  it  had  to  be  done  by  the  Germans.  Nor 
were  his  feelings  assuaged  by  Italy’s  disappointing  share  in 
the  Yugoslav  spoils,  which  Hitler  now  began  to  divide 
up.* 

The  Balkans  was  not  the  only  place  where  the  Fuehrer 
pulled  his  muddling  junior  partner  off  the  hook.  After 
the  annihilation  of  the  Italian  armies  in  Libya  Hitler,  al- 
though reluctantly,  had  finally  consented  to  sending  a 
light  armored  division  and  some  Luftwaffe  units  to  North 
Africa,  where  he  arranged  for  General  Erwin  Rommel  to 
be  in  over-all  command  of  the  Italo-German  forces. 
Rommel,  a dashing,  resourceful  tank  officer,  who  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  as  commander  of  a panzer  division  in 
the  Battle  of  France,  was  a type  of  general  whom  the 
British  had  not  previously  met  in  the  North  African  des- 
ert and  he  was  to  prove  an  immense  problem  to  them  for 
two  years.  But  he  was  not  the  only  problem.  The  sizable 
army  and  air  force  which  the  British  had  sent  to  Greece 
from  Libya  had  greatly  weakened  them  in  the  desert.  At 
first  they  were  not  unduly  worried,  not  even  after  their 
intelligence  reported  the  arrival  of  German  armored  units 
in  Tripolitania  at  the  end  of  February.  But  they  should 
have  been. 


Rommel,  with  his  German  panzer  division  and  two  Ital- 
ian divisions,  one  of  which  was  armored,  struck  suddenly 
at  Cyrenaica  on  the  last  day  of  March.  In  twelve  days  he 
recaptured  the  province,  invested  Tobruk  and  reached 
Bardia,  a few  miles  from  the  Egyptian  border.  The  en- 
tire British  position  in  Egypt  and  the  Suez  was  again 
threatened;  in  fact,  with  the  Germans  and  Italians  in 
Greece  the  British  hold  on  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
had  become  gravely  endangered. 

* ^ fprj!  I2:-  194h  *“  days  after  the  launching  of  his  attack,  Hitler  issued 

i dividing  up  Yugoslavia  among  Germany,  Italy,  Hungary 

FlSehitr  ga7a'a  vg°atIir  uLas  f,rea^d  as  an  autonomous  puppet  state.  The 
old' AmI*  ■ PCdj hilmS'  f ''berally  Germany  taking  territory  contiguous  to  the 
and  keeping  under  its  occupation  all  of  old  Serbia  as  well  as  the 
Sr'and  coalmining  districts.  Italy's  grab  was  left  somewhat  vague,  but 
it  am  not  amount  to  much.86 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1085 

Another  spring,  the  second  of  the  war,  had  brought 
more  dazzling  German  victories,  and  the  predicament  of 
Britain,  which  now  held  out  alone,  battered  at  home  by 
nightly  Luftwaffe  bombings,  its  armies  overseas  chased 
out  of  Greece  and  Cyrenaica,  seemed  darker  and  more 
hopeless  than  ever  before.  Its  prestige,  so  important  in  a 
life-and-death  struggle  where  propaganda  was  so  potent  a 
weapon,  especially  in  influencing  the  United  States  and 
Russia,  had  sunk  to  a new  low  point.* 

Hitler  was  not  slow  or  backward  in  taking  advantage 
of  this  in  a victory  speech  to  the  Reichstag  in  Berlin  on 
May  4.  It  consisted  mostly  of  a venomous  and  sarcastic 
personal  attack  on  Churchill  as  the  instigator  (along  with 
the  Jews)  of  the  war  and  as  the  man  who  was  master- 
minding the  losing  of  it. 

He  is  the  most  bloodthirsty  or  amateurish  strategist  in  his- 
tory . . . For  over  five  years  this  man  has  been  chasing 
around  Europe  like  a madman  in  search  of  something  that 
he  could  set  on  fire  ...  As  a soldier  he  is  a bad  politician 
and  as  a politician  an  equally  bad  soldier  . . . The  gift  Mr. 
Churchill  possesses  is  the  gift  to  lie  with  a pious  expres- 
sion on  his  face  and  to  distort  the  truth  until  finally 
glorious  victories  are  made  of  the  most  terrible  defeats  . . . 
Churchill,  one  of  the  most  hopeless  dabblers  in  strategy, 
thus  managed  [in  Yugoslavia  and  Greece]  to  lose  two 
theaters  of  war  at  one  single  blow.  In  any  other  country  he 
would  be  court-martialed  . . . His  abnormal  state  of  mind 
can  only  be  explained  as  symptomatic  either  of  a paralytic 
disease  or  of  a drunkard’s  ravings  . . . 

As  to  the  Yugoslavian  coup  which  had  provoked  him 

* Charles  A.  Lindbergh,  the  hero  flyer,  who  had  seemed  to  this  writer  to 
have  fallen  with  startling  naivete,  during  his  visits  to  Germany,  to  Nazi 
propaganda  boasts,  was  already  consigning  Britain  to  defeat  in  his  speeches 
to  large  and  enthusiastic  audiences  in  America.  On  April  23,  1941,  at  the 
moment  of  the  Nazi  victories  in  the  Balkans  and  North  Africa,  he  addressed 
30,000  persons  in  New  York  at  the  first  mass  meeting  of  the  newly  formed 
America  First  Committee.  “The  British  government,”  he  said,  “has  one 
last  desperate  plan:  . . . To  persuade  us  to  send  another  American  Expedi- 
tionary f orce  to  Europe  and  to  share  with  England  militarily,  as  well  as 
financially,  the  fiasco  of  this  war.”  He  condemned  England  for  having  “en- 
couraged the  smaller  nations  of  Europe  to  fight  against  hopeless  odds.”  Ap- 
parently it  did  not  occur  to  this  man  that  Yugoslavia  and  Greece,  which 
Hitler  had  just  crushed,  were  brutally  attacked  without  provocation,  and 
that  they  had  instinctively  tried  to  defend  themselves  because  they  had  a 
sense  of  honor  and  because  they  had  courage  even  in  the  face  of  hopeless 
odds.  On  April  28  Lindbergh  resigned  his  commission  as  a colonel  in  the 
U.b.  Army  Air  Corps  Reserve  after  President  Roosevelt  on  the  twenty-fifth 
had  publicly  branded  him  as  a defeatist  and  an  appeaser.  The  Secretary  of 
War  accepted  the  resignation. 


1086  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  such  fury,  Hitler  made  no  attempt  to  hide  his  true 
feelings. 

We  were  all  stunned  by  that  coup,  carried  through  by  a 
handful  of  bribed  conspirators  . . . You  will  understand, 
gentlemen,  that  when  I heard  this  I at  once  gave  orders  to  at- 
tack Yugoslavia.  To  treat  the  German  Reich  in  this  way  is 
impossible  . . . 

Arrogant  though  he  was  over  his  spring  victories  and 
especially  those  over  the  British,  Hitler  did  not  fully  re- 
alize what  a blow  they  had  been  to  Britain  nor  how  des- 
perate was  the  predicament  of  the  Empire.  On  the  very 
day  he  was  addressing  the  Reichstag,  Churchill  was  writ- 
ing President  Roosevelt  about  the  grave  consequences  of 
the  loss  of  Egypt  and  the  Middle  East  and  pleading  for 
America  to  enter  the  war.  The  Prime  Minister  was  in 
one  of  the  darkest  moods  he  was  to  know  throughout 
the  war. 

I adjure  you,  Mr.  President  [he  wrote],  not  to  underesti- 
mate the  gravity  of  the  consequences  which  may  follow 
from  a Middle-East  collapse.66 

The  German  Navy  urged  the  Fuehrer  to  make  the  most 
of  this  situation.  To  further  improve  matters  for  the  Axis, 
the  newly  appointed  premier  of  Iraq,  Rashid  Ali,  who  was 
pro-German,  had  led  an  attack  against  the  British  airbase 
of  Habbaniya,  outside  Bagdad,  and  appealed  to  Hitler 
for  aid  in  driving  the  British  out  of  the  country.  This  was 
at  the  beginning  of  May.  With  Crete  conquered  on  May 
27,  Admiral  Raeder,  who  had  always  been  lukewarm  to 
Barbarossa,  appealed  to  Hitler  on  May  30  to  prepare  a 
decisive  offensive  against  Egypt  and  Suez,  and  Rommel, 
eager  to  continue  his  advance  as  soon  as  he  had  received 
reinforcements,  sent  similar  pleas  from  North  Africa. 
“This  stroke,”  Raeder  told  the  Fuehrer,  “would  be  more 
deadly  to  the  British  Empire  than  the  capture  of  Lon- 
don!” A week  later  the  Admiral  handed  Hitler  a memo- 
randum prepared  by  the  Operations  Division  of  the  Naval 
War  Staff  which  warned  that,  while  Barbarossa  “naturally 
stands  in  the  foreground  of  the  OKW  leadership,  it  must 
under  no  circumstances  lead  to  the  abandonment  of,  or 
to  delay  in,  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean.” 67 


1087 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

But  the  Fuehrer  already  had  made  up  his  mind;  in 
fact,  he  had  not  changed  it  since  the  Christmas  holidays 
when  he  had  promulgated  Barbarossa  and  told  Admiral 
Raeder  that  Russia  must  be  “eliminated  first.”  His  land- 
locked mind  simply  did  not  comprehend  the  larger  strat- 
egy advocated  by  the  Navy.  Even  before  Raeder  and  the 
Naval  Staff  pleaded  with  him  at  the  end  of  May  he  laid 
down  the  law  in  Directive  No.  30  issued  on  May  25. 68 
He  ordered  a military  mission,  a few  planes  and  some 
arms  to  be  dispatched  to  Bagdad  to  help  Iraq.  “I  have 
decided,”  he  said,  “to  encourage  developments  in  the 
Middle  East  by  supporting  Iraq.”  But  he  saw  no  further 
than  this  small,  inadequate  step.  As  for  the  larger,  bold 
strategy  championed  by  the  admirals  and  Rommel,  he 
declared: 

Whether — and  if  so,  by  what  means — it  would  be  possible 
afterward  to  launch  an  offensive  against  the  Suez  Canal  and 
eventually  oust  the  British  finally  from  their  position  be- 
tween the  Mediterranean  and  the  Persian  Gulf  cannot  be 
decided  until  Operation  Barbarossa  is  completed. 

The  destruction  of  the  Soviet  Union  came  first;  all  else 
must  wait.  This,  we  can  now  see,  was  a staggering  blun- 
der. At  this  moment,  the  end  of  May  1941,  Hitler,  with 
the  use  of  only  a fraction  of  his  forces,  could  have  dealt 
the  British  Empire  a crushing  blow,  perhaps  a fatal  one. 
No  one  realized  this  better  than  the  hard-pressed  Church- 
ill. In  his  message  to  President  Roosevelt  on  May  4,  he  had 
admitted  that,  were  Egypt  and  the  Middle  East  to  be  lost, 
the  continuation  of  the  war  “would  be  a hard,  long  and 
bleak  proposition,”  even  if  the  United  States  entered  the 
conflict.  But  Hitler  did  not  understand  this.  His  blindness 
is  all  the  more  incomprehensible  because  his  Balkan  cam- 
paign had  delayed  the  commencement  of  Barbarossa  by 
several  weeks  and  thereby  jeopardized  it.  The  conquest  of 
Russia  would  have  to  be  accomplished  in  a shorter  space 
of  time  than  originally  planned.  For  there  was  an  inexo- 
rable deadline:  the  Russian  winter,  which  had  defeated 
Charles  XII  and  Napoleon.  That  gave  the  Germans  only 
six  months  to  overrun,  before  the  onset  of  winter,  an  im- 
mense country  that  had  never  been  conquered  from  the 
west.  And  though  June  had  arrived,  the  vast  army  which 
had  been  turned  southeast  into  Yugoslavia  and  Greece 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

had  to  be  brought  back  great  distances  to  the  Soviet  fron- 
tier over  unpaved  roads  and  run-down  single-track  rail- 
way lines  that  were  woefully  inadequate  to  handle  so 
swarming  a traffic. 

The  delay,  as  things  turned  out,  was  fatal.  Defenders 
of  Hitler’s  military  genius  have  contended  that  the  Balkan 
campaign  did  not  set  back  the  timetable  for  Barbarossa 
appreciably  and  that  in  any  case  the  postponement  was 
largely  due  to  the  late  thaw  that  year  which  left  the  roads 
in  Eastern  Europe  deep  in  mud  until  mid-June.  But  the 
testimony  of  the  key  German  generals  is  otherwise.  Field 
Marshal  Friedrich  Paulus,  whose  name  will  always  be  as- 
sociated with  Stalingrad,  and  who  at  this  time  was  the 
chief  planner  of  the  Russian  campaign  on  the  Army  Gen- 
eral Staff,  testified  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  that  Hitler’s 
decision  to  destroy  Yugoslavia  postponed  the  beginning 
of  Barbarossa  by  “about  five  weeks.”  69  The  Naval  War 
Diary  gives  the  same  length  of  time.70  Field  Marshal  von 
Rundstedt,  who  led  Army  Group  South  in  Russia,  told 
Allied  interrogators  after  the  war  that  because  of  the 
Balkan  campaign  “we  began  at  least  four  weeks  late. 
That,”  he  added,  “was  a very  costly  delay."  71 

At  any  rate,  on  April  30,  when  his  armies  had  com- 
pleted their  conquest  of  Yugoslavia  and  Greece,  Hitler  set 
the  new  date  for  Barbarossa.  It  was  to  begin  on  June  22, 
1941. 72 

THE  PLANNING  OF  THE  TERROR 

No  holds  were  to  be  barred  in  the  taking  of  Russia. 
Hitler  insisted  that  the  generals  understand  this  very 
clearly.  Early  in  March  1941,  he  convoked  the  chiefs  of 
the  three  armed  services  and  the  key  Army  field  Com- 
manders and  laid  down  the  law.  Haider  took  down  his 
words.73 

The  war  against  Russia  [Hitler  said]  wifi  be  such  that  it 
cannot  be  conducted  in  a knightly  fashion.  This  struggle  is 
one  of  ideologies  and  racial  differences  and  will  have  to  be 
conducted  with  unprecedented,  unmerciful  and  unrelenting 
harshness.  All  officers  will  have  to  rid  themselves  of  obsolete 
ideologies.  I know  that  the  necessity  for  such  means  of  wag- 
ing war  is  beyond  the  comprehension  of  you  generals  but 
• • • I insist  absolutely  that  my  orders  be  executed  without 


1089 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

contradiction.  The  commissars  are  the  bearers  of  ideologies 
directly  opposed  to  National  Socialism.  Therefore  the  com- 
missars will  be  liquidated.  German  soldiers  guilty  of  breaking 
international  law  . . . will  be  excused.  Russia  has  not  par- 
ticipated in  the  Hague  Convention  and  therefore  has  no  rights 
under  it 

Thus  was  the  so-called  “Commissar  Order”  issued;  it 
was  to  be  much  discussed  at  the  Nuremberg  trial  when 
the  great  moral  question  was  posed  to  the  German  gen- 
erals whether  they  should  have  obeyed  the  orders  of  the 
Fuehrer  to  commit  war  crimes  or  obeyed  their  own  con- 
sciences.* 

According  to  Haider,  as  he  later  remembered  it,  the 
generals  were  outraged  at  this  order  and,  as  soon  as  the 
meeting  was  over,  protested  to  their  Commander  in  Chief, 
Brauchitsch.  This  spineless  Field  Marshal  t promised  that 
he  would  “fight  against  this  order  in  the  form  it  was 
given.”  Later,  Haider  swears,  Brauchitsch  informed  OKW 
in  writing  that  the  officers  of  the  Army  “could  never  ex- 
ecute such  orders.”  But  did  he? 

In  his  testimony  on  direct  examination  at  Nuremberg 
Brauchitsch  admitted  that  he  took  no  such  action  with 
Hitler  “because  nothing  in  the  world  could  change  his  at- 
titude.” What  the  head  of  the  Army  did,  he  told  the  tri- 
bunal, was  to  issue  a written  order  that  “discipline  in  the 
Army  was  to  be  strictly  observed  along  the  lines  and  reg- 
ulations that  applied  in  the  past.” 

“You  did  not  give  any  order  directly  referring  to  the 
Commissar  Order?”  Lord  Justice  Lawrence,  the  peppery 
president  of  the  tribunal,  asked  Brauchitsch. 

“No,”  he  replied.  “I  could  not  rescind  the  order  di- 
rectly.” 75 

The  old-line  Army  officers,  with  their  Prussian  tradi- 
tions, were  given  further  occasion  to  struggle  with  their 
consciences  by  subsequent  directives  issued  in  the  name 

* “It  was  the  first  time  I found  myself  involved  in  a conflict  between  my 
soldierly  conceptions  and  my  duty  to  obey,”  Field  Marshal  von  Manstein 
declared  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  in  discussing  the  Commissar  Order. 
“Actually,  I ought  to  have  obeyed,  but  I said  to  myself  that  as  a soldier  I 
could  not  possibly  co-operate  in  a thing  like  that.  I told  the  Commander  of 
the  Army  Group  under  which  I served  at  that  time  . . . that  I would  not 
carry  out  such  an  order,  which  was  against  the  honor  of  a soldier.”74 

As  a matter  of  record,  the  order,  of  course,  was  carried  out  on  a large 
scale. 

t “A  man  of  straw,”  Hitler  later  called  him.  ( Hitler's  Secret  Conversations , 
p.  153.) 


1090 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  the  Fuehrer  by  General  Keitel  on  May  13.  The  princi- 
pal one  limited  the  functions  of  German  courts-martial. 
They  were  to  give  way  to  a more  primitive  form  of  law. 

Punishable  offenses  committed  by  enemy  civilians  [in 
Russia]  do  not,  until  further  notice,  come  any  longer  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts-martial  . . . 

Persons  suspected  of  criminal  action  will  be  brought  at 
once  before  an  officer.  This  officer  will  decide  whether  they 
are  to  be  shot. 

With  regard  to  offenses  committed  against  enemy  civilians 
by  members  of  the  Wehrmacht,  prosecution  is  not  obligatory 
even  where  the  deed  is  at  the  same  time  a military  crime  or 
offense.* 

The  Army  was  told  to  go  easy  on  such  offenders,  re- 
membering in  each  case  all  the  harm  done  to  Germany 
since  1918  by  the  “Bolsheviki.”  Courts-martial  of  Ger- 
man soldiers  would  be  justified  only  if  “maintenance  of 
discipline  or  security  of  the  Forces  call  for  such  a meas- 
ure.” At  any  rate,  the  directive  concluded,  “only  those 
court  sentences  are  confirmed  which  are  in  accordance 
with  the  political  intentions  of  the  High  Command.” 76 
The  directive  was  to  “be  treated  as  ‘most  secret.’  ” t 
A second  directive  of  the  same  date  signed  by  Keitel 
on  behalf  of  Hitler  entrusted  Himmler  with  “special 
tasks”  for  the  preparation  of  the  political  administration 
in  Russia — “tasks,”  it  said,  “which  result  from  the  strug- 
gle which  has  to  be  carried  out  between  two  opposing  po- 
litical systems.”  The  Nazi  secret-police  sadist  was  dele- 
gated to  act  “independently”  of  the  Army,  “under  his  own 
responsibility.”  The  generals  well  knew  what  the  designa- 
tion of  Himmler  for  “special  tasks”  meant,  though  they 
denied  that  they  did  when  they  took  the  stand  at  Nurem- 

* The  emphasis  is  in  the  original  order. 

t On  July  27,  1941,  Keitel  ordered  all  copies  of  this  directive  of  May  13 
concerning  courts-martial  destroyed,  though  “the  validity  of  the  directive,” 
he  stipulated,  “is  not  affected  by  the  destruction  of  the  copies.”  The  July  27 
order,  he  added,  “would  itself  be  destroyed.”  But  copies  of  both  survived  and 
turned  up  at  Nuremberg  to  haunt  the  High  Command. 

Four  days  before,  on  July  23,  Keitel  had  issued  another  order  marked  “Top 
Secret”: 

On  July  22,  the  Fuehrer  after  receiving  the  Commander  of  the  Army 
[Brauchitsch]  issued  the  following  order: 

In  view  of  the  vast  size  of  the  occupied  areas  in  the  East,  the  forces 
available  for  establishing  security  will  be  sufficient  only  if  all  resistance 
is  punished  not  by  legal  prosecution  of  the  guilty,  but  by  the  spreading  of 
such  terror  by  the  occupying  forces  as  is  alone  appropriate  to  eradicate 
every  inclination  to  resist  amongst  the  population.77 


1091 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

berg.  Furthermore,  the  directive  said,  the  occupied 
areas  in  Russia  were  to  be  sealed  off  while  Himmler  went 
to  work.  Not  even  the  “highest  personalities  of  the  Gov- 
ernment and  Party,”  Hitler  stipulated,  were  to  be  allowed 
to  have  a look.  The  same  directive  named  Goering  for 
the  “exploitation  of  the  country  and  the  securing  of  its 
economic  assets  for  use  by  German  industry.”  Inciden- 
tally, Hitler  also  declared  in  this  order  that  as  soon  as 
military  operations  were  concluded  Russia  would  be  “di- 
vided up  into  individual  states  with  governments  of  their 
own.”  78 

Just  how  this  would  be  done  was  to  be  worked  out  by 
Alfred  Rosenberg,  the  befuddled  Balt  and  officially  the 
leading  Nazi  thinker,  who  had  been,  as  we  have  seen,  one 
of  Hitler’s  early  mentors  in  the  Munich  days.  On  April 
20  the  Fuehrer  appointed  him  “Commissioner  for  the 
Central  Control  of  Questions  Connected  with  the  East- 
European  Region”  and  immediately  this  Nazi  dolt,  with 
a positive  genius  for  misunderstanding  history,  even  the 
history  of  Russia,  where  he  was  born  and  educated,  went 
to  work  to  build  his  castles  in  his  once  native  land.  Rosen- 
berg’s voluminous  files  were  captured  intact;  like  his 
books,  they  make  dreary  reading  and  will  not  be  allowed 
to  impede  this  narrative,  though  occasionally  they  must 
be  referred  to  because  they  disclose  some  of  Hitler’s  plans 
for  Russia. 

By  early  May,  Rosenberg  had  drawn  up  his  first  wordy 
blueprint  for  what  promised  to  be  the  greatest  German 
conquest  in  history.  To  begin  with,  European  Russia  was 
to  be  divided  up  into  so-called  Reich  Commissariats.  Rus- 
sian Poland  would  become  a German  protectorate  called 
Ostland,  the  Ukraine  “an  independent  state  in  alliance  with 
Germany,”  Caucasia,  with  its  rich  oil  fields,  would  be 
ruled  by  a German  “plenipotentiary,”  and  the  three  Bal- 
tic States  and  White  Russia  would  form  a German  pro- 
tectorate preparatory  to  being  annexed  outright  to  the 
Greater  German  Reich.  This  last  feat,  Rosenberg  ex- 
plained in  one  of  the  endless  memoranda  which  he  show- 
ered on  Hitler  and  the  generals  in  order,  as  he  said,  to 
elucidate  “the  historical  and'  racial  conditions”  for  his 
decisions,  would  be  accomplished  by  Germanizing  the 
racially  assimilable  Balts  and  “banishing  the  undesirable 


1092  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

elements.”  In  Latvia  and  Estonia,  he  cautioned,  “banish- 
ment on  a large  scale  will  have  to  be  envisaged.”  Those 
driven  out  would  be  replaced  by  Germans,  preferably 
war  veterans.  “The  Baltic  Sea,”  he  ordained,  “must  be- 
come a Germanic  inland  sea.”  79 

Two  days  before  the  troops  jumped  off,  Rosenberg  ad- 
dressed his  closest  collaborators  who  were  to  take  over 
the  rule  of  Russia. 

The  job  of  feeding  the  German  people  [he  said]  stands  at 
the  top  of  the  list  of  Germany’s  claims  on  the  East.  The 
southern  [Russian]  territories  will  have  to  serve  ...  for 
the  feeding  of  the  German  people. 

We  see  absolutely  no  reason  for  any  obligation  on  our  part 
to  feed  also  the  Russian  people  with  the  products  of  that 
surplus  territory.  We  know  that  this  is  a harsh  necessity, 
bare  of  any  feelings  . . . The  future  will  hold  very  hard 
years  in  store  for  the  Russians.80 

Very  hard  years  indeed,  since  the  Germans  were  de- 
liberately planning  to  starve  to  death  millions  of  them! 

Goering,  who  had  been  placed  in  charge  of  the  eco- 
nomic exploitation  of  the  Soviet  Union,  made  this  even 
clearer  than  Rosenberg  did.  In  a long  directive  of  May 
23,  1941,  his  Economic  Staff,  East,  laid  it  down  that  the 
surplus  food  from  Russia’s  black-earth  belt  in  the  south 
must  not  be  diverted  to  the  people  in  the  industrial  areas, 
where,  in  any  case,  the  industries  would  be  destroyed. 
The  workers  and  their  families  in  these  regions  would 
simply  be  left  to  starve — or,  if  they  could,  to  emigrate  to 
Siberia.  Russia’s  great  food  production  must  go  to  the 
Germans. 

The  German  Administration  in  these  territories  [the  di- 
rective declared]  may  well  attempt  to  mitigate  the  conse- 
quences of  the  famine  which  undoubtedly  will  take  place 
and  to  accelerate  the  return  to  primitive  agricultural  condi- 
tions. However,  these  measures  will  not  avert  famine.  Any 
attempt  to  save  the  population  there  from  death  by  starva- 
tion by  importing  surpluses  from  the  black-soil  zone  would 
be  at  the  expense  of  supplies  to  Europe.  It  would  reduce 
Germany  s staying  power  in  the  war,  and  would  undermine 
Germany’s  and  Europe’s  power  to  resist  the  blockade  This 
must  be  clearly  and  absolutely  understood.81 

How  many  Russian  civilians  would  die  as  the  result  of 
this  deliberate  German  policy?  A meeting  of  state  secre- 


1093 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

taries  on  May  2 had  already  given  a general  answer. 
“There  is  no  doubt,”  a secret  memorandum  of  the  con- 
ference declared,  “that  as  a result,  many  millions  of  per- 
sons will  be  starved  to  death  if  we  take  out  of  the  country 
the  things  necessary  for  us.” 82  And  Goering  had  said, 
and  Rosenberg,  that  they  would  be  taken  out — that  much 
had  to  be  “clearly  and  absolutely  understood.” 

Did  any  German,  even  one  single  German,  protest 
against  this  planned  ruthlessness,  this  well-thought-out 
scheme  to  put  millions  of  human  beings  to  death  by  star- 
vation? In  all  the  memoranda  concerning  the  German  di- 
rectives for  the  spoliation  of  Russia,  there  is  no  mention 
of  anyone’s  objecting — as  at  least  some  of  the  generals  did 
in  regard  to  the  Commissar  Order.  These  plans  were  not 
merely  wild  and  evil  fantasies  of  distorted  minds  and 
souls  of  men  such  as  Hitler,  Goering,  Himmler  and  Rosen- 
berg. For  weeks  and  months,  it  is  evident  from  the  rec- 
ords, hundreds  of  German  officials  toiled  away  at  their 
desks  in  the  cheerful  light  of  the  warm  spring  days,  add- 
ing up  figures  and  composing  memoranda  which  coldly 
calculated  the  massacre  of  millions.  By  starvation,  in  this 
case.  Heinrich  Himmler,  the  mild-faced  ex-chicken  farm- 
er, also  sat  at  his  desk  at  S.S.  headquarters  in  Berlin  those 
days,  gazing  through  his  pince-nez  at  plans  for  the  mas- 
sacre of  other  millions  in  a quicker  and  more  violent  way. 

Well  pleased  with  the  labors  of  his  busy  minions,  both 
military  and  civilian,  in  planning  the  onslaught  on  the 
Soviet  Union,  her  destruction,  her  exploitation  and  the 
mass  murder  of  her  citizenry,  Hitler  on  April  30  set  the 
date  for  the  attack — June  22 — made  his  victory  speech  in 
the  Reichstag  on  May  4 and  then  retired  to  his  favorite 
haunt,  the  Berghof  above  Berchtesgaden,  where  he  could 
gaze  at  the  splendor  of  the  Alpine  mountains,  their  peaks 
still  covered  with  spring  snow,  and  contemplate  his  next 
conquest,  the  greatest  of  all,  at  which,  as  he  had  told  his 
generals,  the  world  would  hold  its  breath. 

It  was  here  on  the  night  of  Saturday,  May  10,  1941, 
that  he  received  strange  and  unexpected  news  which 
shook  him  to  the  bone  and  forced  him,  as  it  did  almost 
everyone  else  in  the  Western  world,  to  take  his  mind  for 
the  moment  off  the  war.  His  closest  personal  confidant, 
the  deputy  leader  of  the  Nazi  Party,  the  second  in  line  to 


1094 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


succeed  him  after  Goering,  the  man  who  had  been  his  de- 
voted and  fanatically  loyal  follower  since  1921  and, 
since  Roehm’s  murder,  the  nearest  there  was  to  a friend, 
had  literally  flown  the  coop  and  on  his  own  gone  to  par- 
ley with  the  enemy! 

THE  FLIGHT  OF  RUDOLF  HESS 

The  first  report  late  that  evening  of  May  10  that  Rudolf 
Hess  had  taken  off  alone  for  Scotland  in  a Messerschmitt- 
110  fighter  plane  hit  Hitler,  as  Dr.  Schmidt  recalled,  “as 
though  a bomb  had  struck  the  Berghof.”  83  General  Keitel 
found  the  Fuehrer  pacing  up  and  down  his  spacious  study 
pointing  a finger  at  his  forehead  and  mumbling  that  Hess 
must  have  been  crazy.84  “I’ve  got  to  talk  to  Goering  right 
away,”  Hitler  shouted.  The  next  morning  there  was  an 
agitated  powwow  with  Goering  and  all  the  party  gauleiter 
as  they  sought  to  “figure  out” — the  words  are  Keitel’s — 
how  to  present  this  embarrassing  event  to  the  German 
public  and  to  the  world.  Their  task  was  not  made  easier, 
Keitel  later  testified,  by  the  British  at  first  keeping  silent 
about  their  visitor,  and  for  a time  Hitler  and  his  con- 
ferees hoped  that  perhaps  Hess  had  run  out  of  gasoline 
and  fallen  into  the  chilly  North  Sea  and  drowned. 

The  Fuehrer’s  first  information  had  come  in  a some- 
what incoherent  letter  from  Hess  which  was  delivered  by 
courier  a few  hours  after  he  took  off  at  5:45  p.m.  on 
May  10  from  Augsburg.  “I  can’t  recognize  Hess  in  it.  It’s 
a different  person.  Something  must  have  happened  to  him 
— some  mental  disturbance,”  Hitler  told  Keitel.  But  the 
Fuehrer  was  also  suspicious.  Messerschmitt,  from  whose 
company  airfield  Hess  had  taken  off,  was  ordered  arrested, 
as  were  dozens  of  men  on  the  deputy  leader’s  staff. 

If  Hitler  was  mystified  by  Hess’s  abrupt  departure,  so 
was  Churchill  by  his  unexpected  arrival.*  Stalin  was  high- 
ly suspicious.  For  the  duration  of  the  war,  the  bizarre 
incident  remained  a mystery,  and  it  was  cleared  up  only 
at  the  Nuremberg  trial,  in  which  Hess  was  one  of  the  de- 
fendants. The  facts  may  be  briefly  set  down. 

Hess,  always  a muddled  man  though  not  so  doltish  as 
Rosenberg,  flew  on  his  own  to  Britain  under  the  delusion 


* Churchill  has  graphically  described  how  he  received  the  news  late  that 
Saturday  night  while  visiting  in  the  country  and  how  at  first  he  thought  it 
too  fantastic  to  believe.  ( The  Grand  Alliance,  pp.  50-55.) 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1095 

that  he  could  arrange  a peace  settlement.  Though  de- 
luded, he  was  sincere — there  seems  to  be  no  reason  to 
doubt  that.  He  had  met  the  Duke  of  Hamilton  at  the 
Olympic  games  in  Berlin  in  1936,  and  it  was  within  twelve 
miles  of  the  Duke’s  home  in  Scotland — so  efficient  was 
his  navigation — that  he  baled  out  of  his  Messerschmitt, 
parachuted  safely  to  the  ground  and  asked  a farmer  to 
take  him  to  the  Scottish  lord.  As  it  happened,  Hamilton, 
a wing  commander  in  the  R.A.F.,  was  on  duty  that  Satur- 
day evening  at  a sector  operations  room  and  had  spotted 
the  Messerschmitt  plane  off  the  coast  as  it  came  in  to 
make  a landfall  shortly  after  10  p.m.  An  hour  later  it  was 
reported  to  him  that  the  plane  had  crashed  in  flames, 
that  the  pilot,  who  had  baled  out  and  who  gave  his  name 
as  Alfred  Horn,  had  claimed  to  be  on  a “special  mission” 
to  see  the  Duke  of  Hamilton.  This  meeting  was  arranged 
by  British  authorities  for  the  next  morning. 

To  the  Duke,  Hess  explained  that  he  was  on  “a  mis- 
sion of  humanity  and  that  the  Fuehrer  did  not  want  to 
defeat  England  and  wished  to  stop  the  fighting.”  The 
fact,  Hess  said,  that  this  was  his  fourth  attempt  to  fly  to 
Britain — on  the  three  other  tries,  he  had  had  to  turn  back 
because  of  weather — and  that  he  was,  after  all,  a Reich 
cabinet  minister,  showed  “his  sincerity  and  Germany’s 
willingness  for  peace.”  In  this  interview,  as  in  later  ones 
with  others,  Hess  was  not  backward  in  asserting  that  Ger- 
many would  win  the  war  and  that  if  it  continued  the 
plight  of  the  British  would  be  terrible.  Therefore,  his 
hosts  had  better  take  advantage  of  his  presence  and  ne- 
gotiate peace.  So  confident  was  this  Nazi  fanatic  that  the 
British  would  sit  down  and  parley  with  him,  that  he  asked 
the  Duke  to  request  “the  King  to  give  him  ‘parole,’  as  he 
had  come  unarmed  and  of  his  own  free  will.”  86  Later  he 
demanded  that  he  be  treated  with  the  respect  due  to  a 
cabinet  member. 

The  subsequent  talks,  with  one  exception,  were  con- 
ducted on  the  British  side  by  Ivone  Kirkpatrick,  the 
knowing  former  First  Secretary  of  the  British  Embassy  in 
Berlin,  whose  confidential  reports  were  later  made  avail- 
able at  Nuremberg.86  To  this  sophisticated  student  of  Nazi 
Germany  Hess,  after  parroting  Hitler’s  explanations  of  all 
the  Nazi  aggressions,  from  Austria  to  Scandinavia  and 


1096 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  Lowlands,  and  having  insisted  that  Britain  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  war  and  would  certainly  lose  it  if  she 
didn’t  bring  a stop  to  it  now,  divulged  his  proposals  for 
peace.  They  were  none  other  than  those  which  Hitler  had 
urged  on  Chamberlain — unsuccessfully — on  the  eve  of 
his  attack  on  Poland:  namely,  that  Britain  should  give 
Germany  a free  hand  in  Europe  in  return  for  Germany’s 
giving  Britain  “a  completely  free  hand  in  the  Empire.” 
The  former  German  colonies  would  have  to  be  returned 
and  of  course  Britain  would  have  to  make  peace  with 
Italy. 

Finally,  as  we  were  leaving  the  room  [Kirkpatrick  re- 
ported], Hess  delivered  a parting  shot.  He  had  forgotten, 
he  declared,  to  emphasize  that  the  proposal  could  only  be 
considered  on  the  understanding  that  it  was  negotiated  by 
Germany  with  an  English  government  other  than  the  present 
one.  Mr.  Churchill,  who  had  planned  the  war  since  1936, 
and  his  colleagues  who  had  lent  themselves  to  his  war 
policy,  were  not  persons  with  whom  the  Fuehrer  could  ne- 
gotiate. 

For  a German  who  had  got  so  far  in  the  jungle  warfare 
within  the  Nazi  Party  and  then  within  the  Third  Reich, 
Rudolf  Hess,  as  all  who  knew  him  could  testify,  was  sin- 
gularly naive.  He  had  expected,  it  is  evident  from  the 
record  of  these  interviews,  to  be  received  immediately  as 
a serious  negotiator — if  not  by  Churchill,  then  by  the  “op- 
position party,”  of  which  he  thought  the  Duke  of  Hamil- 
ton was  one  of  the  leaders.  When  his  contacts  with  Brit- 
ish officialdom  continued  to  be  restricted  to  Kirkpatrick, 
he  grew  bellicose  and  threatening.  At  an  interview  on 
May  14,  he  pictured  to  the  skeptical  diplomat  the  dire  con- 
sequences to  Britain  if  she  continued  the  war.  There 
would  soon  be,  he  said,  a terrible  and  absolutely  complete 
blockade  of  the  British  Isles. 

It  was  fruitless  [Kirkpatrick  was  told  by  Hess]  for  any- 
one here  to  imagine  that  England  could  capitulate  and  that 
the  war  could  be  waged  from  the  Empire.  It  was  Hitler’s 
intention,  in  such  an  eventuality,  to  continue  the  blockade  of 
England  ...  so  that  we  would  have  to  face  the  deliberate 
starvation  of  the  population  of  these  islands. 

Hess  urged  that  the  conversations,  which  he  had  risked 
so  much  to  bring  about,  get  under  way  at  once.  “His  own 
flight,”  as  explained  to  Kirkpatrick,  “was  intended  to  give 


1097 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

us  a chance  of  opening  conversations  without  loss  of  pres- 
tige. If  we  rejected  this  chance  it  would  be  clear  proof 
that  we  desire  no  understanding  with  Germany,  and  Hit- 
ler would  be  entitled — in  fact,  it  would  be  his  duty — to 
destroy  us  utterly  and  to  keep  us  after  the  war  in  a state 
of  permanent  subjection.”  Hess  insisted  that  the  number 
of  negotiators  be  kept  small. 

As  a Reich  Minister  he  could  not  place  himself  in  the 
position  of  being  a lone  individual  subjected  to  a crossfire 
of  comment  and  questions  from  a large  number  of  persons. 

On  this  ridiculous  note,  the  conversations  ended,  so 
far  as  Kirkpatrick  was  concerned.  But — surprisingly — the 
British  cabinet,  according  to  Churchill,87  “invited”  Lord 
Simon  to  interview  Hess  on  June  10.  According  to  the 
Nazi  deputy  leader’s  lawyer  at  Nuremberg,  Simon  prom- 
ised that  he  would  bring  Hess’s  peace  proposals  to  the  at- 
tention of  the  British  government.*  88 

Hess’s  motives  are  clear.  He  sincerely  wanted  peace 
with  Britain.  He  had  not  the  shadow  of  doubt  that  Ger- 
many would  win  the  war  and  destroy  the  United  King- 
dom unless  peace  were  concluded  at  once.  There  were,  to 
be  sure,  other  motives.  The  war  had  brought  his  personal 
eclipse.  Running  the  Nazi  Party  as  Hitler’s  deputy  during 
the  war  was  dull  business  and  no  longer  very  impor- 
tant. What  mattered  in  Germany  now  was  running  the 
war  and  foreign  affairs.  These  were  the  things  which  en- 
gaged the  attention  of  the  Fuehrer  to  the  exclusion  of 
almost  all  else,  and  which  put  the  limelight  on  Goering, 
Ribbentrop,  Himmler,  Goebbels  and  the  generals.  Hess  felt 
frustrated  and  jealous.  How  better  restore  his  old  position 
with  his  beloved  Leader  and  in  the  country  than  by  pull- 
ing off  a brilliant  and  daring  stroke  of  statesmanship  such 
as  singlehandedly  arranging  peace  between  Germany  and 
Britain? 

Finally,  the  beetle-browed  deputy  leader,  like  some  of 
the  other  Nazi  bigwigs — Hitler  himself  and  Himmler — had 
come  to  have  an  abiding  belief  in  astrology.  At  Nuremberg 
he  confided  to  the  American  prison  psychiatrist,  Dr.  Doug- 

* At  Nuremberg  Hess  told  the  tribunal  that  Lord  Simon  had  introduced  him- 
self to  him  as  “Dr.  Guthrie”  and  had  declared,  “I  come  with  the  authority 
of  the  Government  and  I shall  be  willing  to  discuss  with  you  as  far  as  seems 
good  anything  you  would  wish  to  state  for  the  information  of  the  Govern- 
ment.” 88 


1098 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


las  M.  Kelley,  that  late  in  1940  one  of  his  astrologers 
had  read  in  the  stars  that  he  was  ordained  to  bring  about 
peace.  He  also  related  how  his  old  mentor,  Professor 
Haushofer,  the  Munich  Geopolitiker,  had  seen  him  in  a 
dream  striding  through  the  tapestried  halls  of  English 
castles,  bringing  peace  between  the  two  great  “Nordic” 
nations.90  For  a man  who  had  never  escaped  from  mental 
adolescence,  this  was  heady  stuff  and  no  doubt  helped 
impel  Hess  to  undertake  his  weird  mission  to  England. 

At  Nuremberg  one  of  the  British  prosecutors  suggested 
still  another  reason:  that  Hess  flew  to  England  to  try  to 
arrange  a peace  settlement  so  that  Germany  would 
have  only  a one-front  war  to  fight  when  she  attacked 
the  Soviet  Union.  The  Russian  prosecutor  told  the  tri- 
bunal that  he  was  sure  of  it.  And  so  was  Joseph  Stalin, 
whose  mighty  suspicions  at  this  critical  time  seem  to  have 
been  concentrated  not  on  Germany,  as  they  should  have 
been,  but  on  Great  Britain.  The  arrival  of  Hess,  in  Scot- 
land convinced  him  that  there  was  some  deep  plot  being 
hatched  between  Churchill  and  Hitler  which  would  give 
Germany  the  same  freedom  to  strike  the  Soviet  Union 
which  the  Russian  dictator  had  given  her  to  assault  Poland 
and  the  West.  When  three  years  later  the  British  Prime 
Minister,  then  on  his  second  visit  to  Moscow,  tried  to  con- 
vince Stalin  of  the  truth,  he  simply  did  not  believe  it.  It 
is  fairly  clear  from  the  interrogations  conducted  by  Kirk- 
patrick, who  tried  to  draw  the  Nazi  leader  out  on  Hitler’s 
intentions  regarding  Russia,  that  either  Hess  did  not 
know  of  Barbarossa  or,  if  he  did,  did  not  know  that  it 
was  imminent. 

The  days  following  Hess’s  sudden  departure  were  among 
the  most  embarrassing  of  Hitler’s  life.  He  realized  that 
the  prestige  of  his  regime  had  been  severely  damaged  by 
the  flight  of  his  closest  collaborator.  How  was  it  to  be 
explained  to  the  German  people  and  the  outside  world? 
The  questioning  of  the  arrested  members  of  Hess’s  entour- 
age convinced  the  Fuehrer  that  there  had  been  no  dis- 
loyalty toward  him  and  certainly  no  plot,  and  that  his 
trusted  lieutenant  had  simply  cracked  up.  It  was  decided 
at  the  Berghof,  after  the  British  had  confirmed  Hess’s 
arrival,  to  offer  this  explanation  to  the  public.  Soon  the 
German  press  was  dutifully  publishing  brief  accounts  that 
this  once  great  star  of  National  Socialism  had  become 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1099 

“a  deluded,  deranged  and  muddled  idealist,  ridden  with 
hallucinations  traceable  to  World  War  [I]  injuries.” 

It  seemed  [said  the  official  press  communique]  that  Party 
Comrade  Hess  lived  in  a state  of  hallucination,  as  a result 
of  which  he  felt  he  could  bring  about  an  understanding  be- 
tween England  and  Germany  . . . This,  however,  will  have 
no  effect  on  the  continuance  of  the  war,  which  has  been 
forced  on  the  German  people. 

Privately,  Hitler  gave  orders  to  have  Hess  shot  at  once 
if  he  returned,*  and  publicly  he  stripped  his  old  com- 
rade of  all  his  offices,  replacing  him  as  deputy  leader  of 
the  party  by  Martin  Bormann,  a more  sinister  and  conniv- 
ing character.  The  Fuehrer  hoped  that  the  bizarre  episode 
would  be  forgotten  as  soon  as  possible;  his  own  thoughts 
quickly  turned  again  to  the  attack  on  Russia,  which  was 
not  far  off. 

THE  PLIGHT  OF  THE  KREMLIN 

Despite  all  the  evidence  of  Hitler’s  intentions — the 
build-up  of  German  forces  in  eastern  Poland,  the  pres- 
ence of  a million  Nazi  troops  in  the  nearby  Balkans,  the 
Wehrmacht’s  conquest  of  Yugoslavia  and  Greece  and  its 
occupation  of  Rumania,  Bulgaria  and  Hungary — the  men 
in  the  Kremlin,  Stalin  above  all,  stark  realists  though  they 
were  reputed  to  be  and  had  been,  blindly  hoped  that 
Russia  somehow  would  still  escape  the  Nazi  tyrant’s 
wrath.  Their  natural  suspicions,  of  course,  could  not 
help  but  feed  on  the  bare  facts,  nor  could  their  growing 
resentment  at  Hitler’s  moves  in  southeastern  Europe  be 
suppressed.  There  is,  however,  something  unreal,  almost 
unbelievable,  quite  grotesque,  in  the  diplomatic  exchanges 
between  Moscow  and  Berlin  in  these  spring  weeks  (exhaust- 
ively recorded  in  the  captured  Nazi  documents),  in  which 
the  Germans  tried  clumsily  to  deceive  the  Kremlin  to  the 

* Hess,  a sorry,  broken  figure  at  Nuremberg,  where  for  a part  of  the  trial  he 
faked  total  amnesia  (his  mind  had  certainly  been  shattered),  outlived  Hitler, 
He  was  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment  by  the  International  Tribunal, 
escaping  the  death  sentence  largely  due  to  his  mental  collapse.  I have  de- 
scribed his  appearance  there  in  End,  of  a Berlin  Diary. 

i«7?e  BriJish  treated  him  as  a prisoner  of  war,  releasing  him  ort  October  10, 
1945,  so  that  he  could’  stand  trial  at  Nuremberg.  During  his  captivity  in 

l l’  "e  comPlained  bitterly  at  being  denied  “full  diplomatic  privileges  ” 
which  he  constantly  demanded,  and  his  none  too  balanced  mind  began  to 
deteriorate  and  he  had  long  stretches  of  amnesia.  He  told  Dr.  Kelley  how- 
ever, that  he  twice  tried  to  kill  himself  during  his  internment.  He  became 
convinced,  he  said,  that  the  British  were  trying  to  poison  him. 


1100 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

last  and  the  Soviet  leaders  seemed  unable  to  fully  grasp 
reality  and  act  on  it  in  time. 

Though  they  several  times  protested  the  entry  of  Ger- 
man troops  into  Rumania  and  Bulgaria  and  then  the 
attack  on  Yugoslavia  and  Greece  as  a violation  of  the 
Nazi-Soviet  Pact  and  a threat  to  Russian  “security  inter- 
ests, the  Soviets  went  out  of  their  way  to  appease  Berlin 
as  the  date  for  the  German  attack  approached  Stalin 
personally  took  the  lead  in  this.  On  April  13,  1941,  Am- 
bassador von  der  Schulenburg  telegraphed  an  interesting 
dispatch  to  Berlin  recounting  how  on  the  departure  of  the 
Japanese  Foreign  Minister,  Yosuke  Matsuoka,  that  eve- 
ning from  Moscow,  Stalin  had  shown  “a  remarkably 

friendly  manner”  not  only  to  the  Japanese  but  to  the  Ger- 
mans. At  the  railroad  station 

Stalin  publicly  asked  for  me  [Schulenburg  wired]  . . and 
threw  his  arm  around  my  shoulders:  “We  must  remain 
mends  and  you  must  now  do  everything  to  that  end!”  Some- 
^ teter  Stalin  turned  to  the  acting  German  Military 

Attache,  Colonel  Krebs,  first  made  sure  that  he  was  a Ger- 
man, and  then  said  to  him:  “We  will  remain  friends  with 

you — through  thick  and  thin!”  91 

Three  days  later  the  German  charge  in  Moscow,  Tip- 
pelskirch,  wired  Berlin  stressing  that  the  demonstration 
at  the  station  showed  Stalin’s  friendliness  toward  Germany 
and  that  this  was  especially  important  “in  view  of  the 
persistently  circulating  rumors  of  an  imminent  conflict  be- 
tween Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union.” 92  The  day 
before,  Tippelskirch  had  informed  Berlin  that  the  Kremlin 
had  accepted  “unconditionally,”  after  months  of  wran- 
gling, the  German  proposals  for  the  settlement  of  the 
border  between  the  two  countries  from  the  Igorka  River 
to  the  Baltic  Sea.  “The  compliant  attitude  of  the  Soviet 
Government,”  he  said,  “seems  very  remarkable.” 93  In 
view  of  what  was  brewing  in  Berlin,  it  surely  was. 

In  supplying  blockaded  Germany  with  important  raw 
materials,  the  Soviet  government  continued  to  be  equally 
compliant.  On  April  5,  1941,  Schnurre,  in  charge  of  trade 
negotiations  with  Moscow,  reported  jubilantly  to  his  Nazi 
masters  that  after  the  slowdown  in  Russian  deliveries  in 
January  and  February  1941,  due  to  the  “cooling  off  of 
political  relations,”  they  had  risen  “by  leaps  and  bounds 


1101 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

in  March,  especially  in  grains,  petroleum,  manganese  ore 
and  the  nonferrous  and  precious  metals.” 

Transit  traffic  through  Siberia  [he  added]  is  proceeding 
favorably  as  usual.  At  our  request  the  Soviet  Government 
even  put  a special  freight  train  for  rubber  at  our  disposal 
at  the  Manchurian  border.94 

Six  weeks  later,  on  May  15,  Schnurre  was  reporting 
that  the  obliging  Russians  had  put  on  several  special 
freight  trains  so  that  4,000  tons  of  badly  needed  raw 
rubber  could  be  delivered  to  Germany  over  the  Siberian 
railway. 

The  quantities  of  raw  materials  contracted  for  are  being 
delivered  punctually  by  the  Russians,  despite  the  heavy  bur- 
den this  imposes  on  them  ...  I am  under  the  impression 
that  we  could  make  economic  demands  on  Moscow  which 
would  even  go  beyond  the  scope  of  the  treaty  of  January 
10,  demands  designed  to  secure  German  food  and  raw- 
material  requirements  beyond  the  extent  now  contracted 
for.95 

German  deliveries  of  machinery  to  Russia  were  falling 
behind,  Schnurre  observed,  but  he  did  not  seem  to  mind, 
if  the  Russians  didn’t.  However,  he  was  disturbed  on  May 
15  by  another  factor.  “Great  difficulties  are  created,”  he 
complained,  “by  the  countless  rumors  of  an  imminent 
German-Russian  conflict,”  for  which  he  blamed  German 
official  sources.  Amazingly,  the  “difficulties,”  Schnurre 
explained  in  a lengthy  memorandum  to  the  Foreign  Office, 
did  not  come  from  Russia  but  from  German  industrial 
firms,  which,  he  said,  were  trying  “to  withdraw”  from  their 
contracts  with  the  Russians. 

Hitler,  it  must  be  noted  here,  was  doing  his  best  to 
contradict  the  rumors,  but  at  the  same  time  he  was  busy 
trying  to  convince  his  generals  and  top  officials  that  Ger- 
many was  in  growing  danger  of  being  attacked  by  Russia. 
Though  the  generals,  from  their  own  military  intelligence, 
knew  better,  so  hypnotic  was  Hitler’s  spell  over  them  that 
even  after  the  war  Haider,  Brauchitsch,  Manstein  and 
others  (though  not  Paulus,  who  seems  to  have  been  more 
honest)  contended  that  a Soviet  military  build-up  on  the 
Polish  frontier  had  become  very  threatening  by  the  be- 
ginning of  the  summer. 

Count  von  der  Schulenburg,  who  had  come  home  from 


1102 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Moscow  on  a brief  leave,  saw  Hitler  in  Berlin  on  April 
28  and  tried  to  convince  him  of  Russia’s  peaceful  inten- 
tions. “Russia,”  he  attempted  to  explain,  “is  very  appre- 
hensive at  the  rumors  predicting  a German  attack  on 
Russia.  I cannot  believe,”  he  added,  “that  Russia  will  ever 
attack  Germany  ...  If  Stalin  was  unable  to  go  with 
England  and  France  in  1939  when  both  were  still  strong, 
he  will  certainly  not  make  such  a decision  today,  when 
France  is  destroyed  and  England  badly  battered.  On  the 
contrary,  I am  convinced  that  Stalin  is  prepared  to  make 
even  further  concessions  to  us.” 

The  Fuehrer  feigned  skepticism.  He  had  been  “fore- 
warned,” he  said,  “by  events  in  Serbia  . . . What  devil 
had  possessed  the  Russians,”  he  asked,  “to  conclude  the 
friendship  pact  with  Yugoslavia?”  * He  did  not  believe,  it 
was  true,  he  said,  that  “Russia  could  be  brought  to  attack 
Germany.”  Nevertheless,  he  concluded,  he  was  obliged 
“to  be  careful.”  Hitler  did  not  tell  his  ambassador  to  the 
Soviet  Union  what  plans  he  had  in  store  for  that  country, 
and  Schulenburg,  an  honest,  decent  German  of  the  old 
school,  remained  ignorant  of  them  to  the  last. 

Stalin,  too,  but  not  of  the  signs,  or  of  the  warnings,  of 
what  Hitler  was  up  to.  On  April  22  the  Soviet  government 
formally  protested  eighty  instances  of  border  violations  by 
Nazi  planes  which  it  said  had  taken  place  between  March 
27  and  April  18,  providing  detailed  accounts  of  each.  In 
one  case,  it  said,  in  a German  reconnaissance  plane  which 
landed  near  Rovno  on  April  15  there  was  found  a camera, 
rolls  of  exposed  film  and  a torn  topographical  map  of  the 
western  districts  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  “all  of  which  give 
evidence  of  the  purpose  of  the  crew  of  this  airplane.” 
Even  in  protesting  the  Russians  were  conciliatory.  They 
had  given  the  border  troops,  the  note  said,  “the  order 
not  to  fire  on  German  planes  flying  over  Soviet  territory 
so  long  as  such  flights  do  not  occur  frequently.”  97 

Stalin  made  further  conciliatory  moves  early  in  May.  To 
please  Hitler  he  expelled  the  diplomatic  representatives  in 
Moscow  of  Belgium,  Norway,  Greece  and  even  Yugoslavia 

* On  April  5,  the  day  before  the  German  attack  on  Yugoslavia,  the  Soviet 
government  had  hastily  concluded  a “Treaty  of  Nonaggression  and  Friend- 
ship with  the  new  Yugoslav  government,  apparently  in  a frantic  attempt 
to  head  off  Hitler.  Molotov  had  informed  Schulenburg  of  it  the  night  before 
ailj  £ j ambassador  had  exclaimed  that  “the  moment  was  very  unfortunate” 
and  had  tried,  unsuccessfully,  to  argue  the  Russians  into  at  least  postponing 
the  signing  of  the  treaty.88 


1103 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

and  closed  their  legations.  He  recognized  the  pro-Nazi 
government  of  Rashid  Ali  in  Iraq.  He  kept  the  Soviet  press 
under  the  strictest  restraint  in  order  to  avoid  provoking 
Germany. 

These  manifestations  [Schulenburg  wired  Berlin  on  May 
12]  of  the  intention  of  the  Stalin  Government  are  calcu- 
lated ...  to  relieve  the  tension  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Germany  and  to  create  a better  atmosphere  for  the  future. 
We  must  bear  in  mind  that  Stalin  personally  has  always  ad- 
vocated a friendly  relationship  between  Germany  and  the 
Soviet  Union.98 

Though  Stalin  had  long  been  the  absolute  dictator  of 
the  Soviet  Union  this  was  the  first  mention  by  Schulen- 
burg in  his  dispatches  of  the  term  “Stalin  Government.” 
There  was  good  reason.  On  May  6 Stalin  had  personally 
taken  over  as  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  People’s  Com- 
missars, or  Prime  Minister,  replacing  Molotov,  who  re- 
mained as  Foreign  Commissar.  This  was  the  first  time 
the  all-powerful  secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  had 
taken  government  office  and  the  general  world  reaction 
was  that  it  meant  the  situation  had  become  so  serious  for 
the  Soviet  Union,  especially  in  its  relations  with  Nazi 
Germany,  that  only  Stalin  could  deal  with  it  as  the  nomi- 
nal as  well  as  the  actual  head  of  government.  This  interpre- 
tation was  obvious,  but  there  was  another  which  was  not  so 
clear  but  which  the  astute  German  ambassador  in  Moscow 
promptly  pointed  out  to  Berlin. 

Stalin,  he  reported,  was  displeased  with  the  deteriora- 
tion of  German-Soviet  relations  and  blamed  Molotov’s 
clumsy  diplomacy  for  much  of  it. 

In  my  opinion  [Schulenburg  said]  it  may  be  assumed  with 
certainty  that  Stalin  has  set  himself  a foreign-policy  goal  of 
overwhelming  importance  . . . which  he  hopes  to  attain  by 
his  personal  efforts.  I firmly  believe  that  in  an  international 
situation  which  he  considers  serious,  Stalin  has  set  himself 
the  goal  of  preserving  the  Soviet  Union  from  a conflict 
with  Germany.99 

Did  the  crafty  Soviet  dictator  not  realize  by  how — the 
middle  of  May  1941 — that  this  was  an  impossible  goal,  that 
there  was  nothing,  short  of  an  abject  surrender  to  Hitler, 
that  he  could  do  to  attain  it?  He  surely  knew  the  sig- 
nificance of  Hitler’s  conquest  of  Yugoslavia  and  Greece, 


1104 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

of  the  presence  of  large  masses  of  German  troops  in  Ru- 
mania and  Hungary  on  his  southwest  borders,  of  the 
Wehrmacht  build-up  on  his  western  frontier  in  Poland. 
The  persistent  rumors  in  Moscow  itself  surely  reached 
him.  By  the  beginning  of  May  what  Schulenburg  called  in 
a dispatch  on  the  second  day  of  that  month  “rumors  of 
an  imminent  German-Russian  military  showdown”  were  so 
rife  in  the  Soviet  capital  that  he  and  his  officials  in  the 
German  Embassy  were  having  difficulty  in  combating  them. 

Please  bear  in  mind  [he  advised  Berlin]  that  attempts  to 
counteract  these  rumors  here  in  Moscow  must  necessarily 
remain  ineffectual  if  such  rumors  incessantly  reach  here 
from  Germany,  and  if  every  traveler  who  comes  to  Mos- 
cow, or  travels  through  Moscow,  not  only  brings  these 
rumors  along,  but  can  even  confirm  them  by  citing  facts.100 

The  veteran  ambassador  was  getting  suspicious  himself. 
He  was  instructed  by  Berlin  to  continue  to  deny  the 
rumors,  and  to  spread  it  about  that  not  only  was  there 
no  concentration  of  German  troops  on  Russia’s  frontiers 
but  that  actually  considerable  forces  (eight  divisions,  he 
was  told  for  his  “personal  information”)  were  being  trans- 
ferred from  “east  to  west.”  101  Perhaps  these  instructions 
only  confirmed  the  ambassador’s  uneasiness,  since  by 
this  time  the  press  throughout  the  world  was  beginning  to 
trumpet  the  German  military  build-up  along  the  Soviet 
borders. 

But  long  before  this,  Stalin  had  received  specific  warn- 
ings of  Hitler’s  plans,  and  apparently  paid  no  attention 
to  them.  The  most  serious  one  came  from  the  government 
of  the  United  States. 

Early  in  January  1941,  the  U.S.  commercial  attache 
in  Berlin,  Sam  E.  Woods,  had  sent  a confidential  report 
to  the  State  Department  stating  that  he  had  learned  from 
trustworthy  German  sources  that  Hitler  was  making  plans 
to  attack  Russia  in  the  spring.  It  was  a long  and  detailed 
message,  outlining  the  General  Staff  plan  of  attack  (which 
proved  to  be  quite  accurate)  and  the  preparations  being 
made  for  the  economic  exploitation  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
once  it  was  conquered.* 

* Sam  Woods,  a genial  extrovert  whose  grasp  of  world  politics  and  history 
was  not  striking,  seems  to  those  of  us  who  knew  him  and  liked  him  the  last 
man  in  the  American  Embassy  in  Berlin  likely  to  have  come  by  such  crucial 
intelligence.  Some  of  his  colleagues  in  the  embassy  still  doubt  that  he  did. 
But  Cordell  Hull  has  confirmed  it  in  his  memoirs  and  disclosed  the  details. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1105 


Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Huil  thought  at  first  that 
Woods  had  been  victim  of  a German  “plant.”  He  called  in 
J.  Edgar  Hoover.  The  F.B.I.  head  read  the  report  and 
judged  it  authentic.  Woods  had  named  some  of  his  sources, 
both  in  various  ministries  in  Berlin  and  in  the  German 
General  Staff,  and  on  being  checked  they  were  adjudged 
in  Washington  to  be  men  who  ought  to  know  what  was 
up  and  anti-Nazi  enough  to  tattle.  Despite  the  strained 
relations  then  existing  between  the  American  and  So- 
viet governments  Hull  decided  to  inform  the  Russians,  re- 
questing Undersecretary  of  State  Sumner  Welles  to  com- 
municate the  substance  of  the  report  to  Ambassador  Con- 
stantine Oumansky.  This  was  done  on  March  20. 

Mr.  Oumansky  turned  very  white  [Welles  later  wrote].  He 
was  silent  for  a moment  and  then  merely  said:  “I  fully 
realize  the  gravity  of  the  message  you  have  given  me.  My 
government  will  be  grateful  for  your  confidence  and  I will 
inform  it  immediately  of  our  conversation.” 102 


If  it  was  grateful,  indeed  if  it  ever  believed  this  timely 
intelligence,  it  never  communicated  any  inkling  to  the 
American  government.  In  fact,  as  Secretary  Hull  has  re- 
lated in  his  memoirs,  Moscow  grew  more  hostile  and 
truculent  because  America’s  support  of  Britain  made  it 
impossible  to  supply  Russia  with  all  the  materials  it 
demanded.  Nevertheless,  according  to  Hull,  the  State  De- 
partment, having  received  dispatches  from  its  legations  in 
Bucharest  and  Stockholm  the  first  week  in  June  stating 
that  Germany  would  invade  Russia  within  a fortnight, 
forwarded  copies  of  them  to  Ambassador  Steinhardt  in 
Moscow,  who  turned  them  over  to  Molotov. 

Churchill  too  sought  to  warn  Stalin.  On  April  3 he 
asked  his  ambassador  in  Moscow,  Sir  Stafford  Cripps,  to 


Woods,  the  late  Secretary  of  State  relates,  had  a German  friend,  an  anti- 

IVazi,  who  had  contacts  high  in  the  ministries,  the  Reichsbank  and  the  Nazi 
Party.  As  early  as  August  1940,  this  friend  informed  Woods  of  conferences 
taking  place  at  Hitler  s headquarters  concerning  preparations  for  an  attack 
on  the  Soviet  Union  From  then  on  this  informant  kept  the  commercial  at- 
tache au  courant  of  what  was  transpiring  both  at  the  General  Staff  and  among 
those  planning  the  economic  spoliation  of  Russia.  To  avoid  detection,  Woods 
met  his  informant  in  various  movie  houses  in  Berlin  and  in  the  darkness 
received  scribbled  notes  from  him.  (See  The  Memoirs  of  Cordell  Hull  II, 
pp.  967-68.) 

I left  Berlin  in  December  1940.  George  Kennan,  the  most  brilliant  Foreign 
service  officer  at  the  embassy,  who  remained  there,  informs  me  that  the 
embassy  learned  from  several  sources  of  the  coming  attack  on  Russia.  Two  or 
three  weeks  before  the  assault,  he  says,  our  consul  at  Koenigsberg,  Kuy- 
kendall, relayed  a report  specifying  correctly  the  exact  day  it  would  begin. 


1106 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

deliver  a personal  note  to  the  dictator  pointing  out  the 
significance  to  Russia  of  German  troop  movements  in 
southern  Poland  which  he  had  learned  of  through  a 
British  agent.  Cripps’  delay  in  delivering  the  message  still 
vexed  Churchill  when  he  wrote  about  the  incident  years 
later  in  his  memoirs.103 

Before  the  end  of  April,  Cripps  knew  the  date  set  for 
the  German  attack,  and  the  Germans  knew  he  knew  it.  On 
April  24,  the  German  naval  attache  in  Moscow  sent  a 
curt  message  to  the  Navy  High  Command  in  Berlin: 

The  British  Ambassador  predicts  June  22  as  the  day  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.10* 

This  message,  which  is  among  the  captured  Nazi  papers, 
was  recorded  in  the  German  Naval  Diary  on  the  same  day, 
with  an  exclamation  point  added  at  the  end.105  The  ad- 
mirals were  surprised  at  the  accuracy  of  the  British  envoy’s 
prediction.  The  poor  naval  attache,  who,  like  the  ambas- 
sador in  Moscow,  had  not  been  let  in  on  the  secret, 
added  in  his  dispatch  that  it  was  “manifestly  absurd.” 

Molotov  must  have  thought  so  too.  A month  later,  on 
May  22,  he  received  Schulenburg  to  discuss  various  mat- 
ters. “He  was  as  amiable,  self-assured  and  well-informed 
as  ever,”  the  ambassador  reported  to  Berlin,  and  again 
emphasized  that  Stalin  and  Molotov,  “the  two  strongest 
men  in  the  Soviet  Union,”  were  striving  “above  all”  to 
avoid  a conflict  with  Germany.106 

On  one  point  the  usually  perspicacious  ambassador 
couldn’t  have  been  more  wrong.  Molotov,  at  this  junc- 
ture, was  certainly  not  “well-informed.”  But  neither  was 
the  ambassador. 

The  extent  to  which  the  Russian  Foreign  Commissar 
was  ill-informed  was  given  public  expression  on  June  14, 
1941,  just  a week  before  the  German  blow  fell.  Molotov 
called  in  Schulenburg  that  evening  and  handed  him  the 
text  of  a Tass  statement  which,  he  said,  was  being  broad- 
cast that  very  night  and  published  in  the  newspapers  the 
next  morning.107  Blaming  Cripps  personally  for  the  “wide- 
spread rumors  of  ‘an  impending  war  between  the  U.S.S.R. 
and  Germany’  in  the  English  and  foreign  press,”  this  of- 
ficial statement  of  the  Soviet  government  branded  them  as 
an  “obvious  absurdity  ...  a clumsy  propaganda  maneuver 


1107 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

of  the  forces  arrayed  against  the  Soviet  Union  and  Ger- 
many.” It  added: 

In  the  opinion  of  Soviet  circles  the  rumors  of  the  inten- 
tion of  Germany  ...  to  launch  an  attack  against  the  Soviet 
Union  are  completely  without  foundation. 

Even  the  recent  German  troop  movements  from  the 
Balkans  to  the  Soviet  frontiers  were  explained  in  the  com- 
munique as  “having  no  connection  with  Soviet-German 
relations.”  As  for  the  rumors  saying  that  Russia  would  at- 
tack Germany,  they  were  “false  and  provocative.” 

The  irony  of  the  Tass  communique  on  behalf  of  the 
Soviet  government  is  enhanced  by  two  German  moves,  one 
on  the  day  of  its  publication,  June  15,  the  other  on  the 
next  day. 

From  Venice,  where  he  was  conferring  with  Ciano,  Rib- 
bentrop  sent  a secret  message  on  June  15  to  Budapest 
warning  the  Hungarian  government  “to  take  steps  to  se- 
cure its  frontiers.” 

In  view  of  the  heavy  concentration  of  Russian  troops  at 
the  German  eastern  border,  the  Fuehrer  will  probably  be 
compelled,  by  the  beginning  of  July  at  the  latest,  to  clarify 
German-Russian  relations  and  in  this  connection  to  make 
certain  demands.108 

The  Germans  were  tipping  off  the  Hungarians,  but  not 
their  principal  ally.  When  Ciano  the  next  day,  during  a 
gondola  ride  on  the  canals  of  Venice,  asked  Ribbentrop 
about  the  rumors  of  a German  attack  on  Russia,  the  Nazi 
Foreign  Minister  replied: 

“Dear  Ciano,  I cannot  tell  you  anything  as  yet  because 
every  decision  is  locked  in  the  impenetrable  bosom  of  the 
Fuehrer.  However,  one  thing  is  certain:  if  we  attack  them, 
the  Russia  of  Stalin  will  be  erased  from  the  map  within 
eight  weeks.”  * 

While  the  Kremlin  was  smugly  preparing  to  broadcast 
to  the  world  on  June  14,  1941,  that  the  rumors  of  a Ger- 
man attack  on  Russia  were  an  “obvious  absurdity,”  Adolf 
Hitler  that  very  day  was  having  his  final  big  war  con- 
ference on  Barbarossa  with  the  leading  officers  of  the 

•This  is  from  the  last  diary  entry  of  Ciano,  made  on  December  23,  1943,  in 
Cell  27  of  the  Verona  jail,  a few  days  before  he  was  executed.  He  added  that 
the  Italian  government  learned  of  the  German  invasion  of  Russia  a half  hour 
after  it  began.  ( Ciano  Diaries,  p.  583.) 


1108 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Wehrmacht.  The  timetable  for  the  massing  of  troops  in  the 
East  and  their  deployment  to  the  jumping-off  positions 
had  been  put  in  operation  on  May  22.  A revised  version 
of  the  timetable  was  issued  a few  days  later.109  It  is  a 
long  and  detailed  document  and  shows  that  by  the  begin- 
ning of  June  not  only  were  all  plans  for  the  onslaught^  on 
Russia  complete  but  the  vast  and  complicated  movement 
of  troops,  artillery,  armor,  planes,  ships  and  supplies  was 
well  under  way  and  on  schedule.  A brief  item  in  the  Naval 
War  Diary  for  May  29  states:  “The  preparatory  movements 
of  warships  for  Barbarossa  has  begun.”  Talks  with  the 
general  staffs  of  Rumania,  Hungary  and  Finland— the  last 
country  anxious  now  to  win  back  what  had  been  taken 
from  her  by  the  Russians  in  the  winter  war — were  com- 
pleted. On  June  9 from  Berchtesgaden  Hitler  sent  out  an 
order  convoking  the  commanders  in  chief  of  the  three 
Armed  Services  and  the  top  field  generals  for  a final  all- 
day meeting  on  Barbarossa  in  Berlin  on  June  14. 

Despite  the  enormity  of  the  task,  not  only  Hitler  but 
his  generals  were  in  a confident  mood  as  they  went  over 
last-minute  details  of  the  most  gigantic  military  operation 
in  history  an  all-out  attack  on  a front  stretching  some 
1,500  miles  from  the  Arctic  Ocean  at  Petsamo  to  the 
Black  Sea.  The  night  before,  Brauchitsch  had  returned  to 
Berlin  from  an  inspection  of  the  build-up  in  the  Fast. 
Haider  noted  in  his  diary  that  the  Army  Commander  in 
Chief  was  highly  pleased.  Officers  and  men,  he  said, 
were  in  top  shape  and  ready. 

This  last  military  powwow  on  June  14  lasted  from  11 
A.M.  until  6:30  p.m.  It  was  broken  by  lunch  at  2 p.m., 
at  which  Hitler  gave  his  generals  yet  another  of  his  fiery’ 
eve-of-the-battle  pep  talks.110  According  to  Haider,  it  was 
“a  comprehensive  political  speech,”  with  Hitler  stressing 
that  he  had  to  attack  Russia  because  her  fall  would  force 
England  to  give  up.”  But  the  bloodthirsty  Fuehrer  must 
have  emphasized  something  else  even  more.  Keitel  told 
about  it  during  direct  examination  on  the  stand  at  Nu- 
remberg. 

The  main  theme  was  that  this  was  the  decisive  battle  be- 
tween two  ideologies  and  that  the  practices  which  we  knew 
as  soldiers  the  only  correct  ones  under  international  law — 
had  to  be  measured  by  completely  different  standards. 


1109 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Hitler  thereupon,  said  Keitel,  gave  various  orders  for 
carrying  out  an  unprecedented  terror  in  Russia  by  “brutal 
means.” 

“Did  you,  or  did  any  other  generals,  raise  objections  to 
these  orders?”  asked  Keitel’s  own  attorney. 

“No.  I personally  made  no  remonstrances,”  the  General 
replied.  Nor  did  any  of  the  other  generals,  he  added.* 

It  is  almost  inconceivable  but  nevertheless  true  that  the 
men  in  the  Kremlin,  for  all  the  reputation  they  had  of  being 
suspicious,  crafty  and  hardheaded,  and  despite  all  the  evi- 
dence and  all  the  warnings  that  stared  them  in  the  face, 
did  not  realize  right  up  to  the  last  moment  that  they 
were  to  be  hit,  and  with  a force  which  would  almost  de- 
stroy their  nation. 

At  9:30  on  the  pleasant  summer  evening  of  June  21, 
1941,  nine  hours  before  the  German  attack  was  scheduled 
to  begin,  Molotov  received  the  German  ambassador  at 
his  office  in  the  Kremlin  and  delivered  his  “final  fatuity.”  t 
After  mentioning  further  border  violations  by  German  air- 
craft, which  he  said  he  had  instructed  the  Soviet  ambas- 
sador in  Berlin  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  Ribbentrop, 
Molotov  turned  to  another  subject,  which  Schulenburg  de- 
scribed in  an  urgent  telegram  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  that 
same  night: 

There  were  a number  of  indications  [Molotov  had  told 
him]  that  the  German  Government  was  dissatisfied  with 
the  Soviet  Government.  Rumors  were  even  current  that  a 
war  was  impending  between  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union 
. . . The  Soviet  Government  was  unable  to  understand  the 

* Hassell  confirms  this.  Writing  in  his  diary  two  days  later,  June  16,  he 
remarks:  "Brauchitsch  and  Haider  have  already  agreed  to  Hitler’s  tactics 
bn  Russia].  Thus  the  Army  must  assume  the  onus  of  the  murders  and  burn- 
ings which  up  to  now  have  been  confined  to  the  S.S.” 

At  first  the  anti-Nazi  “conspirators”  had  naively  believed  that  Hitler’s 
terror  orders  for  Russia  might  shock  the  generals  into  joining  an  anti-Nazi 
revolt.  But  by  June  16  Hassell  himself  is  disillusioned.  His  diary  entry  for 
that  date  begins : 

A series  of  conferences  with  Popitz,  Goerdeler,  Beck  and  Oster  to  con- 
sider whether  certain  orders  which  the  Army  commanders  have  received 
(but  which  they  have  not  as  yet  issued)  might  suffice  to  open  the  eyes  of 
the  military  leaders  to  the  nature  of  the  regime  for  which  they  are  fight- 
ing. These  orders  concern  brutal  . . . measures  the  troops  are  to  take 
against  the  Bolsheviks  when  Russia  is  invaded. 

We  came  to  the  conclusion  that  nothing  was  to  be  hoped  for  now  . . . 
7"^  [the  generals]  delude  themselves  . . . Hopeless  sergeant  majors! 
L The  Von  Hassell  Dianes,  pp.  198-99.] 
t The  expression  is  Churchill’s. 


1110 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


reasons  for  Germany’s  dissatisfaction  ...  He  would  ap- 
preciate it  if  I could  tell  him  what  had  brought  about  the 
present  situation  in  German-Soviet  relations. 

I replied  [Schulenburg  added]  that  I could  not  answer 
his  questions,  as  I lacked  the  pertinent  information.111 

He  was  soon  to  get  it. 

For  on  its  way  to  him  over  the  air  waves  between  Ber- 
lin and  Moscow  was  a long  coded  radio  message  from 
Ribbentrop,  dated  June  21,  1941,  marked  “Very  Urgent, 
State  Secret,  For  the  Ambassador  Personally,”  which  be- 
gan: 

Upon  receipt  of  this  telegram,  all  of  the  cipher  material 
still  there  is  to  be  destroyed.  The  radio  set  is  to  be  put  out 
of  commission. 

Please  inform  Herr  Molotov  at  once  that  you  have  an 
urgent  communication  to  make  to  him  . . . Then  please 
make  the  following  declaration  to  him. 

It  was  a familiar  declaration,  strewn  with  all  the  shop- 
worn lies  and  fabrications  at  which  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop 
had  become  so  expert  and  which  they  had  concocted  so 
often  before  to  justify  each  fresh  act  of  unprovoked  ag- 
gression. Perhaps — at  least  such  is  the  impression  this 
writer  gets  in  rereading  it — it  somewhat  topped  all  the 
previous  ones  for  sheer  effrontery  and  deceit.  While  Ger- 
many had  loyally  abided  by  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact,  it  said, 
Russia  had  repeatedly  broken  it.  The  U.S.S.R.  had  prac- 
ticed “sabotage,  terrorism  and  espionage”  against  Ger- 
many. It  had  “combated  the  German  attempt  to  set  up  a 
stable  order  in  Europe.”  It  had  conspired  with  Britain 
“for  an  attack  against  the  German  troops  in  Rumania  and 
Bulgaria.”  By  concentrating  “all  available  Russian  forces 
on  a long  front  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea,”  it  had 
“menaced”  the  Reich. 

Reports  received  the  last  few  days  [it  went  on]  eliminate 
the  last  remaining  doubts  as  to  the  aggressive  character  of 
this  Russian  concentration  ...  In  addition,  there  are  reports 
from  England  regarding  the  negotiations  of  Ambassador 
Cripps  for  still  closer  political  and  military  collaboration 
between  England  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

To  sum  up,  the  Government  of  the  Reich  declares,  there- 
fore, that  the  Soviet  Government,  contrary  to  the  obligations 
it  assumed, 


1111 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

1.  has  not  only  continued,  but  even  intensified  its  attempts 
to  undermine  Germany  and  Europe; 

2.  has  adopted  a more  and  more  anti-German  foreign 
policy; 

3.  has  concentrated  all  its  forces  in  readiness  -at  the  Ger- 
man border.  Thereby  the  Soviet  Government  has  broken  its 
treaties  with  Germany  and  is  about  to  attack  Germany  from 
the  rear  in  its  struggle  for  life.  The  Fuehrer  has  therefore 
ordered  the  German  Armed  Forces  to  oppose  this  threat 
with  all  the  means  at  their  disposal.112 

“Please  do  not  enter  into  any  discussion  of  this  com- 
munication,” Ribbentrop  advised  his  ambassador  at  the 
end.  What  could  the  shaken  and  disillusioned  Schulen- 
burg,  who  had  devoted  the  best  years  of  his  life  to  im- 
proving German-Russian  relations  and  who  knew  that 
the  attack  on  the  Soviet  Union  was  unprovoked  and  with- 
out justification,  say?  Arriving  back  at  the  Kremlin  just  as 
dawn  was  breaking,  he  contented  himself  with  reading  the 
German  declaration.*  Molotov,  stunned  at  last,  listened 
in  silence  to  the  end  and  then  said: 

“It  is  war.  Do  you  believe  that  we  deserved  that?” 

At  the  same  hour  of  daybreak  a similar  scene  was  tak- 
ing place  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  in  Berlin.  All  afternoon  on 
June  21,  the  Soviet  ambassador,  Vladimir  Dekanozov,  had 
been  telephoning  the  Foreign  Office  asking  for  an  ap- 
pointment with  Ribbentrop  so  that  he  could  deliver  his 
little  protest  against  further  border  violations  by  German 
planes.  He  was  told  that  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  was 
“out  of  town.”  Then  at  2 a.m.  on  the  twenty-second  he 
was  informed  that  Ribbentrop  would  receive  him  at  4 A.M. 
at  the  Foreign  Office.  There  the  envoy,  who  had  been  a 
deputy  foreign  commissar,  a hatchetman  for  Stalin  and 
the  troubleshooter  who  had  arranged  the  taking  over  of 
Lithuania,  received,  like  Molotov  in  Moscow,  the  shock  of 
his  life.  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  was  present,  has  described  the 
scene. 

* Thus  ended  the  veteran  ambassador’s  diplomatic  career.  Returning  to 
Germany  and  forced  to  retire,  he  joined  the  opposition  circle  led  by  General 
Beck,  Goerdeler,  Hassell  and  others  and  for  a time  was  marked  to  become 
Foreign  Minister  of  an  anti-Hitler  regime.  Hassell  reported  Schulenburg  in 
1943  as  being  willing  to  cross  the  Russian  lines  in  order  to  talk  with  Stalin 
about  a negotiated  peace  with  an  anti-Nazi  government  in  Germany.  ( The 
Von  Hassell  Diaries,  pp.  321-22.)  Schulenburg  was  arrested  and  imprisoned 
after  the  July  1944  plot  against  Hitler  and  executed  by  the  Gestapo  on 
November  10. 


1112 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

I had  never  seen  Ribbentrop  so  excited  as  he  was  in  the 
five  minutes  before  Dekanozov’s  arrival.  He  walked  up  and 
down  his  room  like  a caged  animal  . 

DekanOzov  was  shown  in  and,  obviously  not  guessing  any- 
thing was  amiss,  held  out  his  hand  to  Ribbentrop.  We  sat 
down  and  . . . Dekanozov  proceeded  to  put  on  behalf  of  his 
Government  certain  questions  that  needed  clarification.  But 
he  had  hardly  begun  before  Ribbentrop,  with  a stony  ex- 
pression, interrupted,  saying:  “That’s  not  the  question 
now”  ... 

The  arrogant  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  thereupon  ex- 
plained what  the  question  was,  gave  the  ambassador  a 
copy  of  the  memorandum  which  Schulenburg  at  that  mo- 
ment was  reading  out  to  Molotov,  and  informed  him  that 
German  troops  were  at  that  instant  taking  “military  coun- 
termeasures” on  the  Soviet  frontier.  The  startled  Soviet 
envoy,  says  Schmidt,  “recovered  his  composure  quickly 
and  expressed  his  deep  regret”  at  the  developments,  for 
which  he  blamed  Germany.  “He  rose,  bowed  perfunc- 
torily and  left  the  room  without  shaking  hands.”  113 

The  Nazi-Soviet  honeymoon  was  over.  At  3:30  a.m.  on 
June  22,  1941,  a half  hour  before  the  closing  diplomatic 
formalities  in  the  Kremlin  and  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  the 
roar  of  Hitler’s  guns  along  hundreds  of  miles  of  front 
had  blasted  it  forever. 

There  was  one  other  diplomatic  prelude  to  the  can- 
nonade. On  the  afternoon  of  June  21,  Hitler  sat  down  at 
his  desk  in  his  new  underground  headquarters,  Wolfs- 
schanze  (Wolfs  Lair),  near  Rastenburg  in  a gloomy 
forest  of  East  Prussia,  and  dictated  a long  letter  to  Musso- 
lini. As  in  the  preparation  of  all  his  other  aggressions  he 
had  not  trusted  his  good  friend  and  chief  ally  enough  to 
let  him  in  on  his  secret  until  the  last  moment.  Now,  at 
the  eleventh  hour,  he  did.  His  letter  is  the  most  revealing 
and  authentic  evidence  we  have  of  the  reasons  for  his 
taking  this  fatal  step,  which  for  so  long  puzzled  the  out- 
side world  and  which  was  to  pave  the  way  for  his  end 
and  that  of  the  Third  Reich.  The  letter,  to  be  sure,  is  full 
of  Hitler’s  customary  lies  and  evasions  which  he  tried  to 
fob  off  even  on  his  friends.  But  beneath  them,  and  be- 
tween them,  there  emerges  his  fundamental  reasoning  and 
his  true— if  mistaken— estimate  of  the  world  situation  as 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1113 

the  summer  of  1941,  the  second  of  the  war,  officially 
began. 

Duce! 

I am  writing  this  letter  to  you  at  a moment  when  months 
of  anxious  deliberation  and  continuous  nerve-racking  wait- 
ing are  ending  in  the  hardest  decision  of  my  life. 

The  situation:  * England  has  lost  this  war.  Like  a drown- 
ing person,  she  grasps  at  every  straw.  Nevertheless,  some  of 
her  hopes  are  naturally  not  without  a certain  logic  . . . The 
destruction  of  France  . . . has  directed  the  glances  of  the 
British  warmongers  continually  to  the  place  from  which 
they  tried  to  start  the  war:  to  Soviet  Russia. 

Both  countries,  Soviet  Russia  and  England,  are  equally  in- 
terested in  a Europe  . . . rendered  prostrate  by  a long  war. 
Behind  these  two  countries  stands  the  North  American 
Union  goading  them  on.  . . . 

Hitler  next  explained  that  with  large  Soviet  military 
forces  in  his  rear  he  could  never  assemble  the  strength — 
“particularly  in  the  air” — to  make  the  all-out  attack  on 
Britain  which  would  bring  her  down. 

Really,  all  available  Russian  forces  are  at  our  border  . . . 
If  circumstances  should  give  me  cause  to  employ  the  German 
Air  Force  against  England,  there  is  danger  that  Russia  will 
then  begin  its  strategy  of  extortion,  to  which  I would  have 
to  yield  in  silence  simply  from  a feeling  of  air  inferiority 
. . . England  will  be  all  the  less  ready  for  peace  for  it  will 
be  able  to  pin  its  hopes  on  the  Russian  partner.  Indeed  this 
hope  must  naturally  grow  with  the  progress  in  prepared- 
ness of  the  Russian  armed  forces.  And  behind  this  is  the 
mass  delivery  of  war  material  from  America  which  they 
hope  to  get  in  1942  . . . 

I have  therefore,  after  constandy  racking  my  brains,  fi- 
nally reached  the  decision  to  cut  the  noose  before  it  can  be 
drawn  tight  . . . My  over-all  view  is  now  as  follows: 

1.  France  is,  as  ever,  not  to  be  trusted. 

2.  North  Africa  itself,  insofar  as  your  colonies,  Duce,  are 
concerned,  is  probably  out  of  danger  until  fall. 

3.  Spain  is  irresolute  and — I am  afraid — will  take  sides 
only  when  the  outcome  of  the  war  is  decided  . . 

5.  An  attack  on  Egypt  before  autumn  is  out  of  the  ques- 
tion . . . 

6.  Whether  or  not  America  enters  the  war  is  a matter  of 
indifference,  inasmuch  as  she  supports  our  enemy  with  all 
the  power  she  is  able  to  mobilize. 


Hitler’s  emphasis. 


1114 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

7.  The  situation  in  England  itself  is  bad;  the  provision  of 
food  and  raw  materials  is  growing  steadily  more  difficult. 
The  martial  spirit  to  make  war,  after  all,  lives  only  on  hopes. 
These  hopes  are  based  solely  on  two  assumptions:  Russia  and 
America.  We  have  no  chance  of  eliminating  America.  But  it 
does  lie  in  our  power  to  exclude  Russia.  The  elimination  of 
Russia  means,  at  the  same  time,  a tremendous  relief  for  Japan  in 
East  Asia,  and  thereby  the  possibility  of  a much  stronger 
threat  to  American  activities  through  Japanese  intervention. 

I have  decided  under  these  circumstances  to  put  an  end 
to  the  hypocritical  performance  in  the  Kremlin. 

Germany,  Hitler  said,  would  not  need  any  Italian 
troops  in  Russia.  (He  was  not  going  to  share  the  glory  of 
conquering  Russia  any  more  than  he  had  shared  the  con- 
quest of  France.)  But  Italy,  he  declared,  could  “give  de- 
cisive aid”  by  strengthening  its  forces  in  North  Africa 
and  by  preparing  “to  march  into  France  in  case  of  a 
French  violation  of  the  treaty.”  This  was  a fine  bait  for 
the  land-hungry  Duce. 

So  far  as  the  air  war  on  England  is  concerned,  we  shall, 
for  a time,  remain  on  the  defensive  . . . 

As  for  the  war  in  the  East,  Duce,  it  will  surely  be  difficult, 
but  I do  not  entertain  a second’s  doubt  as  to  its  great  suc- 
cess. I hope,  above  all,  that  it  will  then  be  possible  for  us  to 
secure  a common  food-supply  base  in  the  Ukraine  which 
will  furnish  us  such  additional  supplies  as  we  may  need  in 
the  future. 

Then  came  the  excuse  for  not  tipping  off  his  partner 
earlier. 

If  I waited  until  this  moment,  Duce,  to  send  you  this  in- 
formation, it  is  because  the  final  decision  itself  will  not  be 
made  until  7 o’clock  tonight . . . 

Whatever  may  come,  Duce,  our  situation  cannot  become 
worse  as  a result  of  this  step;  it  can  only  improve  . . . 
Should  England  nevertheless  not  draw  any  conclusions  from 
the  hard  facts,  then  we  can,  with  our  rear  secured,  apply 
ourselves  with  increased  strength  to  the  dispatching  of  our 
enemy. 

Finally  Hitler  described  his  great  feeling  of  relief  at 
having  finally  made  up  his  mind. 

...  Let  me  say  one  more  thing,  Duce.  Since  I struggled 
through  to  this  decision,  I again  feel  spiritually  free.  The 
partnership  with  the  Soviet  Union,  in  spite  of  the  complete 
sincerity  of  our  efforts  to  bring  about  a final  conciliation. 


1115 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

was  nevertheless  often  very  irksome  to  me,  for  in  some  way 
or  other  it  seemed  to  me  to  be  a break  with  my  whole 
origin,  my  concepts  and  my  former  obligations.  I am  happy 
now  to  be  relieved  of  these  mental  agonies. 

With  hearty  and  comradely  greetings, 

Your 

Adolf  Hitler114 

At  3 o’clock  in  the  morning  of  June  22,  a bare  half 
hour  before  the  German  troops  jumped  off,  Ambassador 
von  Bismarck  awakened  Ciano  in  Rome  to  deliver  Hitler’s 
long  missive,  which  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister  then 
telephoned  to  Mussolini,  who  was  resting  at  his  summer 
place  at  Riccione.  It  was  not  the  first  time  that  the  Duce 
had  been  wakened  from  his  sleep  in  the  middle  of  the 
night  by  a message  from  his  Axis  partner,  and  he  resent- 
ed it.  “Not  even  I disturb  my  servants  at  night,”  Musso- 
lini fretted  to  Ciano,  “but  the  Germans  make  me  jump 
out  of  bed  at  any  hour  without  the  least  consideration.”  115 
Nevertheless,  as  soon  as  Mussolini  had  rubbed  the  sleep 
from  his  eyes  he  gave  orders  for  an  immediate  declara- 
tion of  war  on  the  Soviet  Union.  He  was  now  completely 
a prisoner  of  the  Germans.  He  knew  it  and  resented  it. 
“I  hope  for  only  one  thing,”  he  told  Ciano,  “that  in  this 
war  in  the  East  the  Germans  lose  a lot  of  feathers.”116  Still, 
he  realized  that  his  own  future  now  depended  wholly  on 
German  arms.  The  Germans  would  win  in  Russia,  he 
was  sure,  but  he  hoped  that  at  least  they  would  get  a 
bloody  nose. 

He  could  not  know,  nor  did  he  suspect,  nor  did  anyone 
else  in  the  West,  on  either  side,  that  they  would  get  much 
worse.  On  Sunday  morning,  June  22,  the  day  Napoleon 
had  crossed  the  Niemen  in  1812  on  his  way  to  Moscow, 
and  exactly  a year  after  Napoleon’s  country,  France,  had 
capitulated  at  Compiegne,  Adolf  Hitler’s  armored,  mech- 
anized and  hitherto  invincible  armies  poured  across  the 
Niemen  and  various  other  rivers  and  penetrated  swiftly 
into  Russia.  The  Red  Army,  despite  all  the  warnings  and 
the  warning  signs,  was,  as  General  Haider  noted  in  his 
diary  the  first  day,  “tactically  surprised  along  the  entire 
front.”  * All  the  first  bridges  were  captured  intact.  In  fact, 

* There  is  a curious  notation  in  Haider’s  diary  that  first  day.  After  mention- 
ing that  at  noon  the  Russian  radio  stations,  which  the  Germans  were  moni- 
toring, had  come  back  on  the  air  he  writes:  “They  have  asked  Japan  to 
mediate  the  political  and  economic  differences  between  Russia  and  Germany, 


1116 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

says  Haider,  at  most  places  along  the  border  the  Russians 
were  not  even  deployed  for  action  and  were  overrun  be- 
fore they  could  organize  resistance.  Hundreds  of  Soviet 
planes  were  destroyed  on  the  flying  fields.* *  Within  a few 
days  tens  of  thousands  of  prisoners  began  to  pour  in; 
whole  armies  were  quickly  encircled.  It  seemed  like  the 
Feldzug  in  Polen  all  over  again. 

“It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say,”  the  usually  cautious 
Haider  noted  in  his  diary  on  July  3 after  going  over  the 
latest  General  Staff  reports,  “that  the  Feldzug  against  Rus- 
sia has  been  won  in  fourteen  days.”  In  a matter  of  weeks, 
he  added,  it  would  all  be  over. 

and  remain  in  active  contact  with  the  German  Foreign  Office.”  Did  Stalin 
believe — nine  hours  after  the  attack — that  he  somehow  might  get  it  called 
off? 

* General  Guenther  Blumentritt,  chief  of  staff  of  the  Fourth  Army,  later 
recalled  that  a little  after  midnight  on  the  twenty-first,  when  the  German 
artillery  had  already  zeroed  on  its  targets,  the  Berlin-Moscow  express  train 
chugged  through  the  German  lines  on  the  Bug  and  across  the  river  into 
Brest  Litovsk  “without  incident.”  It  struck  him  as  a “weird  moment.” 
Almost  equally  weird  to  him  was  that  the  Russian  artillery  did  not  respond 
even  when  the  assault  began.  “The  Russians,”  he  subsequently  wrote,  “were 
taken  entirely  by  surprise  on  our  front.”  As  dawn  broke  German  signal  sta- 
tions  picked  up  the  Red  Army  radio  networks.  “We  are  being  fired  on.  What 
shall  we  do?  Blumentritt  quotes  one  Russian  message  as  saying.  Back  came 
the  answer  from  headquarters:  “You  must  be  insane.  And  why  is  your  signal 
not  in  code?”  {The  Fatal  Decisions , edited  by  Seymour  Freidin  and  William 
Richardson.) 


i 


24 


A TURN  OF  THE  TIDE 


by  the  beginning  of  autumn  1941,  Hitler  believed  that 
Russia  was  finished. 

Within  three  weeks  of  the  opening  of  the  campaign, 
Field  Marshal  von  Bock’s  Army  Group  Center,  with 
thirty  infantry  divisions  and  fifteen  panzer  or  motorized 
divisions,  had  pushed  450  miles  from  Bialystok  to  Smo- 
lensk. Moscow  lay  but  200  miles  farther  east  along  the 
high  road  which  Napoleon  had  taken  in  1812.  To  the 
north  Field  Marshal  von  Leeb’s  army  group,  twenty-one 
infantry  and  six  armored  divisions  strong,  was  moving 
rapidly  up  through  the  Baltic  States  toward  Leningrad. 
To  the  south  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt’s  army  group 
of  twenty-five  infantry,  four  motorized,  four  mountain 
and  five  panzer  divisions  was  advancing  toward  the  Dnie- 
per River  and  Kiev,  capital  of  the  fertile  Ukraine,  which 
Hitler  coveted. 

So  planmaessig  (according  to  plan),  as  the  OKW  com- 
muniques put  it,  was  the  German  progress  along  a thou- 
sand-mile front  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea,  and  so 
confident  was  the  Nazi  dictator  that  it  would  continue  at 
an  accelerated  pace  as  one  Soviet  army  after  another  was 
surrounded  or  dispersed,  that  on  July  14,  a bare  three 
weeks  after  the  invasion  had  begun,  he  issued  a directive 
advising  that  the  strength  of  the  Army  could  be  “consid- 
erably reduced  in  the  near  future”  and  that  armament 
production  would  be  concentrated  on  naval  ships  and 
Luftwaffe  planes,  especially  the  latter,  for  the  conduct  of 
the  war  against  the  last  remaining  enemy,  Britain,  and — 
he  added — “against  America  should  the  case  arise.”  1 By 
the  end  of  September  he  instructed  the  High  Command  to 
prepare  to  disband  forty  infantry  divisions  so  that  this 
additional  manpower  could  be  utilized  by  industry.2 

1117 


1118 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Russia’s  two  greatest  cities,  Leningrad,  which  Peter  the 
Great  had  built  as  the  capital  on  the  Baltic,  and  Moscow, 
the  ancient  and  now  Bolshevik  capital,  seemed  to  Hitler 
about  to  fall.  On  September  18  he  issued  strict  orders: 
“A  capitulation  of  Leningrad  or  Moscow  is  not  to  be  ac- 
cepted, even  if  offered.”  3 What  was  to  happen  to  them 
he  made  clear  to  his  commanders  in  a directive  of  Sep- 
tember 29: 

The  Fuehrer  has  decided  to  have  St.  Petersburg  [Lenin- 
grad] wiped  off  the  face  of  the  earth.*  The  further  existence 
of  this  large  city  is  of  no  interest  once  Soviet  Russia  is 
overthrown . . . 

The  intention  is  to  close  in  on  the  city  and  raze  it  to  the 
ground  by  artillery  and  by  continuous  air  attack  . . . 

Requests  that  the  city  be  taken  over  will  be  turned  down, 
for  the  problem  of  the  survival  of  the  population  and  of 
supplying  it  with  food  is  one  which  cannot  and  should  not 
be  solved  by  us.  In  this  war  for  existence  we  have  no  in- 
terest in  keeping  even  part  of  this  great  city’s  population,  f * 

That  same  week,  on  October  3,  Hitler  returned  to  Ber- 
lin and  in  an  address  to  the  German  people  proclaimed 
the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  “I  declare  today,  and  I 
declare  it  without  any  reservation,”  he  said,  “that  the 
enemy  in  the  East  has  been  struck  down  and  will  never 
rise  again  . . . Behind  our  troops  there  already  lies  a ter- 
ritory twice  the  size  of  the  German  Reich  when  I came 
to  power  in  1933.” 

When  on  October  8,  Orel,  a key  city  south  of  Moscow, 
fell,  Hitler  sent  his  press  chief,  Otto  Dietrich,  flying  back 
to  Berlin,  to  tell  the  correspondents  of  the  world’s  leading 
newspapers  there  the  next  day  that  the  last  intact  Soviet 
armies,  those  of  Marshal  Timoshenko,  defending  Mos- 
cow, were  locked  in  two  steel  German  pockets  before  the 
capital;  that  the  southern  armies  of  Marshal  Budenny 
were  routed  and  dispersed;  and  that  sixty  to  seventy  di- 
visions of  Marshal  Voroshilov’s  army  were  surrounded 
in  Leningrad. 

“For  all  military  purposes,”  Dietrich  concluded  smugly, 


prisoners  tney  nave  begun  to  eat  ead 
Diplomatic  Papers,  pp.  464-65.) 


But  even  if  it  were 
f humanity  is  con- 
>eoples  ...  In  the 
ch  other."  ( Ciano's 


1119 


War:  Early  Victories  And  The  Turning  Point 

“Soviet  Russia  is  done  with.  The  British  dream  of  a two- 
front  war  is  dead.” 

These  public  boasts  of  Hitler  and  Dietrich  were,  to  say 
the  least,  premature.*  In  reality  the  Russians,  despite  the 
surprise  with  which  they  were  taken  on  June  22,  their 
subsequent  heavy  losses  in  men  and  equipment,  their 
rapid  withdrawal  and  the  entrapment  of  some  of  their 
best  armies,  had  begun  in  July  to  put  up  a mounting  re- 
sistance such  as  the  Wehrmacht  had  never  encountered 
before.  Haider’s  diary  and  the  reports  of  such  front-line 
commanders  as  General  Guderian,  who  led  a large  pan- 
zer group  on  the  central  front,  began  to  be  peppered — and 
then  laden — with  accounts  of  severe  fighting,  desperate 
Russian  stands  and  counterattacks  and  heavy  casualties 
to  German  as  well  as  Soviet  troops. 

“The  conduct  of  the  Russian  troops,”  General  Blumen- 
tritt  wrote  later,  “even  in  this  first  battle  [for  Minsk] 
was  in  striking  contrast  to  the  behavior  of  the  Poles  and 
the  Western  Allies  in  defeat.  Even  when  encircled  the 
Russians  stood  their  ground  and  fought.” 5 And  there 
proved  to  be  more  of  them,  and  with  better  equipment, 
than  Adolf  Hitler  had  dreamed  was  possible.  Fresh  So- 
viet divisions  which  German  intelligence  had  no  inkling 
of  were  continually  being  thrown  into  battle.  “It  is  be- 
coming ever  clearer,”  Haider  wrote  in  his  diary  on  Au- 
gust 11,  “that  we  underestimated  the  strength  of  the  Rus- 
sian colossus  not  only  in  the  economic  and  transportation 
sphere  but  above  all  in  the  military.  At  the  beginning  we 
reckoned  with  some  200  enemy  divisions  and  we  have 
already  identified  360.  When  a dozen  of  them  are  de- 
stroyed the  Russians  throw  in  another  dozen.  On  this 
broad  expanse  our  front  is  too  thin.  It  has  no  depth.  As  a 
result,  the  repeated  enemy  attacks  often  meet  with  some 
success.”  Rundstedt  put  it  bluntly  to  Allied  interrogators 
after  the  war.  “I  realized,”  he  said,  “soon  after  the  attack 
was  begun  that  everything  that  had  been  written  about 
Russia  was  nonsense.” 

Several  generals,  Guderian,  Blumentritt  and  Sepp  Diet- 

*Not  as  premature,  however,  as  the  warnings  of  the  American  General  Staff, 
which  in  July  had  confidentially  informed  American  editors  and  Washington 
correspondents  that  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  only  a matter  of  a 
few  weeks.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  declarations  of  Hitler  and  Dr. 
Dietrich  early  in  October  1941  were  widely  believed  in  the  United  States 
and  Britain  as  well  as  in  Germany  and  elsewhere. 


1120 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


rich  among  them,  have  left  reports  expressing  astonish- 
ment at  their  first  encounter  with  the  Russian  T-34  tank, 
of  which  they  had  not  previously  heard  and  which  was 
so  heavily  armored  that  the  shells  from  the  German  anti- 
tank guns  bounced  harmlessly  off  it.  The  appearance  of 
this  panzer,  Blumentritt  said  later,  marked  the  beginning 
of  what  came  to  be  called  the  “tank  terror.”  Also,  for  the 
first  time  in  the  war;  the  Germans  did  not  have  the  bene- 
fit of  overwhelming  superiority  in  the  air  to  protect  their 
ground  troops  and  scout  ahead.  Despite  the  heavy  losses 
on  the  ground  in  the  first  day  of  the  campaign  and  in 
early  combat,  Soviet  fighter  planes  kept  appearing,  like 
the  fresh  divisions,  out  of  nowhere.  Moreover,  the  swift- 
ness of  the  German  advance  and  the  lack  of  suitable  air- 
fields in  Russia  left  the  German  fighter  bases  too  far  back 
to  provide  effective  cover  at  the  front.  “At  several  stages 
in  the  advance,”  General  von  Kleist  later  reported,  “my 
panzer  forces  were  handicapped  through  lack  of  cover 
overhead.”  6 


There  was  another  German  miscalculation  about  the 
Russians  which  Kleist  mentioned  to  Liddell  Hart  and 
which,  of  course,  was  shared  by  most  of  the  other  peo- 
ples of  the  West  that  summer. 

Hopes  of  victory,”  Kleist  said,  “were  largely  built  on 
the  prospect  that  the  invasion  would  produce  a political 
upheaval  in  Russia  . . . Too  high  hopes  were  built  on  the 
belief  that  Stalin  would  be  overthrown  by  his  own  people 
if  he  suffered  heavy  defeats.  The  belief  was  fostered  by 
the  Fuehrer’s  political  advisers.”  7 
Indeed  Hitler  had  told  Jodi,  “We  have  only  to  kick  in 
the  door  and  the  whole  rotten  structure  will  come  crash- 
ing down.” 

The  opportunity  to  kick  in  the  door  seemed  to  the 
Fuehrer  to  be  at  hand  halfway  through  July  when  there 
occurred  the  first  great  controversy  over  strategy  in  the 
German  High  Command  and  led  to  a decision  by  the 
™ureI>  °7er  ,the  Protests  of  most  of  the  top  generals, 
wmeh  Haider  thought  proved  to  be  “the  greatest  strategic 
blunder  of  the  Eastern  campaign.”  The  issue  was  simple 
but  fundamental.  Should  Bock’s  Army  Group  Center  the 
most  powerful  and  so  far  the  most  successful  of  the  three 
main  German  armies,  push  on  the  two  hundred  miles  to 
Moscow  from  Smolensk,  which  it  had  reached  on  July 


1121 


Wars  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

16?  Or  should  the  original  plan,  which  Hitler  had  laid 
down  in  the  December  18  directive,  and  which  called  for 
the  main  thrusts  on  the  north  and  south  flanks,  be  ad- 
hered to?  In  other  words,  was  Moscow  the  prize  goal,  or 
Leningrad  and  the  Ukraine? 

The  Army  High  Command,  led  by  Brauchitsch  and  Hai- 
der and  supported  by  Bock,  whose  central  army  group 
was  moving  up  the  main  highway  to  Moscow,  and  by 
Guderian,  whose  panzer  forces  were  leading  it,  insisted 
on  an  all-out  drive  for  the  Soviet  capital.  There  was  much 
more  to  their  argument  than  merely  stressing  the  psycho- 
logical value  of  capturing  the  enemy  capital.  Moscow, 
they  pointed  out  to  Hitler,  was  a vital  source  of  arma- 
ment production  and,  even  more  important,  the  center  of 
the  Russian  transportation  and  communications  system. 
Take  it,  and  the  Soviets  would  not  only  be  deprived  of 
an  essential  source  of  arms  but  would  be  unable  to  move 
troops  and  supplies  to  the  distant  fronts,  which  thereafter 
would  weaken,  wither  and  collapse. 

But  there  was  a final  conclusive  argument  which  the 
generals  advanced  to  the  former  corporal  who  was  now 
their  Supreme  Commander.  All  their  intelligence  reports 
showed  that  the  main  Russian  forces  were  now  being 
concentrated  before  Moscow  for  an  all-out  defense  of  the 
capital.  Just  east  of  Smolensk  a Soviet  army  of  half  a 
million  men,  which  had  extricated  itself  from  Bock’s  dou- 
ble envelopment,  was  digging  in  to  bar  further  German 
progress  toward  the  capital. 

The  center  of  gravity  of  Russian  strength  [Haider  wrote  in 
a report  prepared  for  the  Allies  immediately  after  the  war]8 
was  therefore  in  front  of  Army  Group  Center  . . . 

The  General  Staff  had  been  brought  up  with  the  idea  that  it 
must  be  the  aim  of  an  operation  to  defeat  the  military 
power  of  the  enemy,  and  it  therefore  considered  the  next 
and  most  pressing  task  to  be  to  defeat  the  forces  of  Timo- 
shenko by  concentrating  all  available  forces  at  Army  Group 
Center,  to  advance  on  Moscow,  to  take  this  nerve  center  of 
enemy  resistance  and  to  destroy  the  new  enemy  formations. 
The  assembly  for  this  attack  had  to  be  carried  out  as  soon 
as  possible  because  the  season  was  advanced.  Army  Group 
North  was  in  the  meantime  to  fulfill  its  original  mission 
and  to  try  to  contact  the  Finns.  Army  Group  South  was  to 
advance  farther  East  to  tie  down  the  strongest  possible  enemy 
force. 


1122 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


. . . After  oral  discussions  between  the  General  Staff  and 
the  Supreme  Command  [OKW]  had  failed,  the  Commander 
in  Chief  of  the  Army  [Brauchitsch]  submitted  a memoran- 
dum of  the  General  Staff  to  Hitler. 

weiearn  fr°m  Haider’s  diary,  was  done  on  August 
lo.  The  effect,  says  Haider,  “was  explosive.”  Hitler  had 
his  hungry  eyes  on  the  food  belt  and  industrial  areas  of 
the  Ukraine  and  on  the  Russian  oil  fields  just  beyond  in 
the  Caucasus.  Besides,  he  thought  he  saw  a golden  oppor- 
tunity to  entrap  Budenny’s  armies  east  of  the  Dnieper 
beyond  Kiev,  which  still  held  out.  He  also  wanted  to 
capture  Leningrad  and  join  up  with  the  Finns  in  the  north. 
To  accomplish  these  twin  aims,  several  infantry  and  pan- 
zer divisions  from  Army  Group  Center  would  have  to  be 
detached  and  sent  north  and  especially  south.  Moscow 
could  wait. 

August  21,  Hitler  hurled  a new  directive  at  his  re- 
bellious General  Staff.  Haider  copied  it  out  word  for  word 
in  his  diary  the  next  day. 

Pr°P°saJs  of  the  Army  for  the  continuation  of  the 
operations  in  the  East  do  not  accord  with  my  intentions 
• most  important  objective  to  attain  before  the  onset  of 

PWm V\h0t- l5e  Cap,lure  of  Moscow  but  the  taking  of  the 
Crimea,  the  industrial  and  coal-mining  areas  of  the  Donets 

rw  ^ the  cuttm8  off  of  Russian  oil  supplies  from  the 
Caucasus.  In  the  north  it  is  the  locking  up  of  Leningrad  and 
the  union  with  the  Finns. 

The  Soviet  Fifth  Army  on  the  Dnieper  In  the  south, 
whose  stubborn  resistance  had  annoyed  Hitler  for  several 
days,  must,  he  laid  it  down,  be  utterly  destroyed,  the 
Ukraine  and  the  Crimea  occupied,  Leningrad  surrounded 
and  a junction  with  the  Finns  achieved.  “Only  then  ” he 
concluded,  “will  the  conditions  be  created  whereby  Tim- 

featTd” S almy  CaD  bC  attacked  and  successfully  de- 

Thus  [commented  Haider  bitterly]  the  aim  of  defeating 
decmvely  the  Russian  armies  in  front  of  Moscow  was 

ar^anTm  ‘d  **“  d?sirell  t0,.obtam  a valuable  industrial 
area  and  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  Russian  oil 

Hitler  now  became  obsessed  with  the  idea  of  capturing  both 
ih,T8,  “hd|  Sta  in8rad’  for  he  persuaded  himself  that  if 
would  collapse!  7 C°mmUnism”  were  fafi,  Russia 


1123 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

To  add  insult  to  injury  to  the  field  marshals  and  the 
generals  who  did  not  appreciate  his  strategic  genius,  Hit- 
ler sent  what  Haider  called  a “countermemorandum”  (to 
that  of  the  Army  of  the  eighteenth),  which  the  General 
Staff  Chief  described  as  “full  of  insults,”  such  as  stating 
that  the  Army  High  Command  was  full  of  “minds  fos- 
silized in  out-of-date  theories.” 

“Unbearable!  Unheard  of!  The  limit!”  Haider  snorted 
in  his  diary  the  next  day.  He  conferred  all  afternoon  and 
evening  with  Field  Marshal  von  Brauchitsch  about  the 
Fuehrer’s  “inadmissible”  mixing  into  the  business  of  the 
Army  High  Command  and  General  Staff,  finally  propos- 
ing that  the  head  of  the  Army  and  he  himself  resign  their 
posts.  “Brauchitsch  refused,”  Haider  noted,  “because  it 
wouldn’t  be  practical  and  would  change  nothing.”  The 
gutless  Field  Marshal  had  already,  as  on  so  many  other 
occasions,  capitulated  to  the  onetime  corporal. 

When  General  Guderian  arrived  at  the  Fuehrer’s  head- 
quarters the  next  day,  August  23,  and  was  egged  on  by 
Haider  to  try  to  talk  Hitler  out  of  his  disastrous  decision, 
though  the  hard-bitten  panzer  leader  needed  no  urging, 
he  was  met  by  Brauchitsch.  “I  forbid  you,”  the  Army 
Commander  in  Chief  said,  “to  mention  the  question  of 
Moscow  to  the  Fuehrer.  The  operation  to  the  south  has 
been  ordered.  The  problem  now  is  simply  how  it  is  to  be 
carried  out.  Discussion  is  pointless.” 

Nevertheless,  when  Guderian  was  ushered  into  the 
presence  of  Hitler — neither  Brauchitsch  nor  Haider  ac- 
companied him — he  disobeyed  orders  and  argued  as 
strongly  as  he  could  for  the  immediate  assault  on  Mos- 
cow. 

Hitler  let  me  speak  to  the  end  [Guderian  later  wrote]. 
He  then  described  in  detail  the  considerations  which  had 
led  him  to  make  a different  decision.  He  said  that  the  raw 
materials  and  agriculture  of  the  Ukraine  were  vitally  neces- 
sary for  the  future  prosecution  of  the  war.  He  spoke  of 
the  need  of  neutralizing  the  Crimea,  “that  Soviet  aircraft 
carrier  for  attacking  the  Roumanian  oil  fields.”  For  the  first 
time  I heard  him  use  the  phrase:  “My  generals  know  noth- 
ing about  the  economic  aspects  of  war.”  ...  He  had  given 
strict  orders  that  the  attack  on  Kiev  was  to  be  the  im- 
mediate strategic  objective  and  all  actions  were  to  be  car- 
ried out  with  that  in  mind.  I here  saw  for  the  first  time 
a spectacle  with  which  I was  later  to  become  very  familiar: 


1124 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

all  those  present — Keitel,  Jodi  and  others — nodded  in  agree- 
ment with  every  sentence  that  Hitler  uttered,  while  1 was 
left  alone  with  my  point  of  view  . . .» 

But  Haider  had  at  no  point  in  the  previous  discussions 
nodded  his  agreement.  When  Guderian  saw  him  the  next 
day  and  reported  his  failure  to  get  Hitler  to  change  his 
mind,  he  says  the  General  Staff  Chief  “to  my  amazement 
suffered  a complete  nervous  collapse,  which  led  him  to 
make  accusations  and  imputations  which  were  utterly  un- 
justified.” * 

This  was  the  most  severe  crisis  in  the  German  military 
High  Command  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Worse 
were  to  follow,  with  adversity. 

In  itself  Rundstedt’s  offensive  in  the  south,  made  pos- 
sible by  the  reinforcement  of  Guderian’s  panzer  forces 
and  infantry  divisions  withdrawn  from  the  central  front, 
was,  as  Guderian  put  it,  a great  tactical  victory.  Kiev  itself 
fell  on  September  19 — German  units  had  already  pene- 
trated 150  miles  beyond  it — and  on  the  twenty-sixth  the 
Battle  of  Kiev  ended  with  the  encirclement  and  surrender 
of  665,000  Russian  prisoners,  according  to  the  German 
claim.  To  Hitler  it  was  “the  greatest  battle  in  the  history 
of  the  world,”  but  though  it  was  a singular  achievement 
some  of  his  generals  were  more  skeptical  of  its  strategic 
significance.  Bock’s  armorless  army  group  in  the  center 
had  been  forced  to  cool  its  heels  for  two  months  along 
the  Desna  River  just  beyond  Smolensk.  The  autumn  rains, 
which  would  turn  the  Russian  roads  into  quagmires,  were 
drawing  near.  And  after  them — the  winter,  the  cold  and 
the  snow. 


THE  GREAT  DRIVE  ON  MOSCOW 

Reluctantly  Hitler  gave  in  to  the  urging  of  Brauchitsch, 
Haider  and  Bock  and  consented  to  the  resumption  of  the 
drive  on  Moscow.  But  too  late!  Haider  saw  him  on  the 
afternoon  of  September  5 and  now  the  Fuehrer,  his  mind 
made  up,  was  in  a hurry  to  get  to  the  Kremlin.  “Get  start- 
ed on  the  central  front  within  eight  to  ten  days,”  the  Su- 

* Haider,  in  his  diary  of  August  24,  gives  quite  a different  version.  He 
accuses  Guderian  of  “irresponsibly’’  changing  his  mind  after  seeing  Hitler 
and  muses  how  useless  it  is  to  try  to  change  a man’s  character.  If  he  suffered, 
as  Guderian  alleges,  “a  complete  nervous  collapse,”  his  pedantic  diary  notes 
that  day  indicate  that  he  quickly  recovered. 


1125 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

preme  Commander  ordered.  (“Impossible!”  Haider  ex- 
claimed in  his  diary.)  “Encircle  them,  beat  and  destroy 
them,”  Hitler  added,  promising  to  return  to  Army  Group 
Center  Guderian’s  panzer  group,  then  still  heavily  en- 
gaged in  the  Ukraine,  and  add  Reinhardt’s  tank  corps 
from  the  Leningrad  front.  But  it  was  not  until  the  be- 
ginning of  October  that  the  armored  forces  could  be 
brought  back,  refitted  and  made  ready.  On  October  2 the 
great  offensive  was  finally  launched.  “Typhoon”  was  the 
code  name.  A mighty  wind,  a cyclone,  was  to  hit  the  Rus- 
sians, destroy  their  last  fighting  forces  before  Moscow 
and  bring  the  Soviet  Union  tumbling  down. 

But  here  again  the  Nazi  dictator  became  a victim  of  his 
megalomania.  Taking  the  Russian  capital  before  winter 
came  was  not  enough.  He  gave  orders  that  Field  Marshal 
von  Leeb  in  the  north  was  at  the  same  time  to  capture 
Leningrad,  make  contact  with  the  Finns  beyond  the  city 
and  drive  on  and  cut  the  Murmansk  railway.  Also,  at  the 
same  time,  Rundstedt  was  to  clear  the  Black  Sea  coast, 
take  Rostov,  seize  the  Maikop  oil  fields  and  push  for- 
ward to  Stalingrad  on  the  Volga,  thus  severing  Stalin’s  last 
link  with  the  Caucasus.  When  Rundstedt  tried  to  explain 
to  Hitler  that  this  meant  an  advance  of  more  than  four 
hundred  miles  beyond  the  Dnieper,  with  his  left  flank 
dangerously  exposed,  the  Supreme  Commander  told  him 
that  the  Russians  in  the  south  were  now  incapable  of  of- 
fering serious  resistance.  Rundstedt,  who  says  that  he 
“laughed  aloud”  at  such  ridiculous  orders,  was  soon  to 
find  the  contrary. 

The  German  drive  along  the  old  road  which  Napoleon 
had  taken  to  Moscow  at  first  rolled  along  with  all  the  fury 
of  a typhoon.  In  the  first  fortnight  of  October,  in  what 
later  Blumentritt  called  a “textbook  battle,”  the  Germans 
encircled  two  Soviet  armies  between  Vyazma  and  Bryansk 
and  claimed  to  have  taken  650,000  prisoners  along  with 
5,000  guns  and  1,200  tanks.  By  October  20  German  ar- 
mored spearheads  were  within  forty  miles  of  Moscow 
and  the  Soviet  ministries  and  foreign  embassies  were  has- 
tily evacuating  to  Kuibyshev  on  the  Volga.  Even  the  sober 
Haider,  who  had  fallen  off  his  horse  and  broken  a collar- 
bone and  was  temporarily  hospitalized,  now  believed  that 
with  bold  leadership  and  favorable  weather  Moscow  could 
be  taken  before  the  severe  Russian  winter  set  in. 


1126 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  fall  rains,  however,  had  commenced.  Rasputitza, 
the  period  of  mud,  set  in.  The  great  army,  moving  on 
wheels,  was  slowed  down  and  often  forced  to  halt.  Tanks 
had  to  be  withdrawn  from  battle  to  pull  guns  and  ammu- 
nition trucks  out  of  the  mire.  Chains  and  couplings  for 
this  job  were  lacking  and  bundles  of  rope  had  to  be 
dropped  by  Luftwaffe  transport  planes  which  were  badly 
needed  for  lifting  other  military  supplies.  The  rains  began 
in  mid-October  and,  as  Guderian  later  remembered,  “the 
next  few  weeks  were  dominated  by  the  mud.”  General 
Blumentritt,  chief  of  staff  of  Field  Marshal  von  Kluge’s 
Fourth  Army,  which  was  in  the  thick  of  the  battle  for 
Moscow,  has  vividly  described  the  predicament. 

The  infantryman  slithers  in  the  mud,  while  many  teams 
of  horses  are  needed  to  drag  each  gun  forward.  All  wheeled 
vehicles  sink  up  to  their  axles  in  the  slime.  Even  tractors 
can  only  move  with  great  difficulty.  A large  portion  of  our 
heavy  artillery  was  soon  stuck  fast  . . . The  strain  that  all 
this  caused  our  already  exhausted  troops  can  perhaps  be 
imagined.10 

For  the  first  time  there  crept  into  the  diary  of  Haider 
and  the  reports  of  Guderian,  Blumentritt  and  other  Ger- 
man generals  signs  of  doubt  and  then  of  despair.  It  spread 
to  the  lower  officers  and  the  troops  in  the  field — or  per- 
haps it  stemmed  from  them.  “And  now,  when  Moscow 
was  already  almost  in  sight,”  Blumentritt  recalled,  “the 
mood  both  of  commanders  and  troops  began  to  change. 
Enemy  resistance  stiffened  and  the  fighting  became  more 
bitter  . . . Many  of  our  companies  were  reduced  to  a mere 
sixty  or  seventy  men.”  There  was  a shortage  of  service- 
able artillery  and  tanks.  “Winter,”  he  says,  “was  about  to 
begin,  but  there  was  no  sign  of  winter  clothing  . . . Far 
behind  the  front  the  first  partisan  units  were  beginning  to 
make  their  presence  felt  in  the  vast  forests  and  swamps. 
Supply  columns  were  frequently  ambushed  . . .” 

Now,  Blumentritt  remembered,  the  ghosts  of  the  Grand 
Army,  which  had  taken  this  same  road  to  Moscow,  and 
the  memory  of  Napoleon’s  fate  began  to  haunt  the 
dreams  of  the  Nazi  conquerors.  The  German  generals 
began  to  read,  or  reread,  Caulaincourt’s  grim  account  of 
the  French  conqueror’s  disastrous  winter  in  Russia  in 
1812. 

Far  to  the  south,  where  the  weather  was  a little  warmer 


1127 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

but  the  rain  and  the  mud  were  just  as  bad,  things  were 
not  going  well  either.  Kleist’s  tanks  had  entered  Rostov 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Don  on  November  21  amidst  much 
fanfare  from  Dr.  Goebbels’  propaganda  band  that  the 
“gateway  to  the  Caucasus”  had  been  opened.  It  did  not 
remain  open  very  long.  Both  Kleist  and  Rundstedt  real- 
ized that  Rostov  could  not  be  held.  Five  days  later  the 
Russians  retook  it  and  the  Germans,  attacked  on  both  the 
northern  and  southern  flanks,  were  in  headlong  retreat 
back  fifty  miles  to  the  Mius  River  where  Kleist  and  Rund- 
stedt had  wished  in  the  first  place  to  establish  a winter 
line. 

The  retreat  from  Rostov  is  another  little  turning  point 
in  the  history  of  the  Third  Reich.  Here  was  the  first  time 
that  any  Nazi  army  had  ever  suffered  a major  setback. 
“Our  misfortunes  began  with  Rostov,”  Guderian  after- 
ward commented;  “that  was  the  writing  on  the  wall.”  It 
cost  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt,  the  senior  officer  in  the 
German  Army,  his  command.  As  he  was  retreating  to  the 
Mius: 

Suddenly  an  order  came  to  me  [he  subsequently  told  Al- 
lied interrogators]  from  the  Fuehrer:  “Remain  where  you 
are,  and  retreat  no  further.”  I immediately  wired  back:  “It 
is  madness  to  attempt  to  hold.  In  the  first  place  the  troops 
cannot  do  it  and  in  the  second  place  if  they  do  not  retreat 
they  will  be  destroyed.  I repeat  that  this  order  be  rescinded 
or  that  you  find  someone  else.”  That  same  night  the  Fueh- 
rer’s reply  arrived:  “I  am  acceding  to  your  request.  Please 
give  up  your  command.” 

“I  then,”  said  Rundstedt,  “went  home.”  * 11 

This  mania  for  ordering  distant  troops  to  stand  fast  no 

* “Groesste  Aufregung  (greatest  excitement)  by  the  Fuehrer,"  Haider  noted 
in  his  diary  on  November  30  in  describing  Rundstedt's  retreat  to  the  Mius 
and  Hitler’s  dismissal  of  the  Field  Marshal.  “The  Fuehrer  calls  in  Brau- 
chitsch  and  hurls  reproaches  and  abuse  at  him."  Haider  had  begun  his  diary 
that  day  by  noting  the  figures  of  German  casualties  up  to  November  26. 
“Total  losses  of  the  Eastern  armies  (not  counting  the  sick),  743,112  officers 
and  men — 23  per  cent  of  the  entire  force  of  3.2  million." 

On  December  1,  Haider  recorded  the  replacement  of  Rundstedt  by  Reich- 
enau,  who  still  commanded  the  Sixth  Army,  which  he  had  led  in  France  and 
which  had  been  having  a hard  time  of  it  to  the  north  of  Kleist’s  armored 
divisions,  which  were  retreating  from  Rostov. 

“Reichenau  phones  the  Fuehrer,"  Haider  wrote,  “and  asks  permission  to 
withdraw  tonight  to  the  Mius  line.  Permission  is  given.  So  we  are  exactly 
were  we  were  yesterday.  But  time  and  strength  have  been  sacrificed  and 
Rundstedt  lost. 

“The  health  of  Brauchitsch,”  he  added,  “as  the  result  of  the  continuing 
excitement  is  again  causing  anxiety.”  On  November  10  Haider  had  recorded 
that  the  Army  chief  had  suffered  a severe  heart  attack. 


1128  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

matter  what  their  peril  perhaps  saved  the  German  Army 
from  complete  collapse  in  the  shattering  months  ahead, 
though  many  generals  dispute  it,  but  it  was  to  lead  to 
Stalingrad  and  other  disasters  and  to  help  seal  Hitler’s 
fate. 

Heavy  snows  and  subzero  temperatures  came  early  that 
winter  in  Russia.  Guderian  noted  the  first  snow  on  the 
night  of  October  6—7,  just  as  the  drive  on  Moscow  was 
being  resumed.  It  reminded  him  to  ask  headquarters 
again  for  winter  clothing,  especially  for  heavy  boots  and 
heavy  wool  socks.  On  October  12  he  recorded  the  snow  as 
still  falling.  On  November  3 came  the  first  cold  wave,  the 
thermometer  dropping  below  the  freezing  point  and  con- 
tinuing to  fall.  By  the  seventh  Guderian  was  reporting  the 
first  “severe  cases  of  frostbite”  in  his  ranks  and  on  the 
thirteenth  that  the  temperature  had  fallen  to  8 degrees 
below  zero,  Fahrenheit,  and  that  the  lack  of  winter  cloth- 
ing “was  becoming  increasingly  felt.”  The  bitter  cold  af- 
fected guns  and  machines  as  well  as  men. 

Ice  was  causing  a lot  of  trouble  [Guderian  wrote]  since 
the  calks  for  the  tank  tracks  had  not  yet  arrived.  The  cold 
made  the  telescopic  sights  useless.  In  order  to  start  the  en- 
gines of  the  tanks  fires  had  to  be  lit  beneath  them.  Fuel  was 
freezing  on  occasions  and  the  oil  became  viscous  . . . Each 
regiment  [of  the  112th  Infantry  Division]  had  already  lost 
some  500  men  from  frostbite.  As  a result  of  the  cold  the 
machine  guns  were  no  longer  able  to  fire  and  our  37-mm. 
antitank  guns  had  proved  ineffective  against  the  [Russian! 
T-34  tank.12  1 J 

The  result,”  says  Guderian,  “was  a panic  which 
reached  as  far  back  as  Bogorodsk.  This  was  the  first  time 
that  such  a thing  had  occurred  during  the  Russian  cam- 
paign, and  it  was  a warning  that  the  combat  ability  of  our 
infantry  was  at  an  end.” 

But  not  only  of  the  infantry.  On  November  21  Haider 
scribbled  in  his  diary  that  Guderian  had  telephoned  to 
say  that  his  panzer  troops  “had  reached  their  end.”  This 
tough,  aggressive  tank  commander  admits  that  on  this 
very  day  he  decided  to  visit  the  commander  of  Army 
Group  Center,  Bock,  and  request  that  the  orders  he  had 
received  be  changed,  since  he  “could  see  no  way  of  carry- 


1129 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

ing  them  out.”  He  was  in  a deep  mood  of  depression, 
writing  on  the  same  day: 

The  icy  cold,  the  lack  of  shelter,  the  shortage  of  clothing, 
the  heavy  losses  of  men  and  equipment,  the  wretched  state 
of  our  fuel  supplies — all  this  makes  the  duties  of  a command- 
er a misery,  and  the  longer  it  goes  on  the  more  I am 
crushed  by  the  enormous  responsibility  I have  to  bear.13 

In  retrospect  Guderian  added: 

Only  he  who  saw  the  endless  expanse  of  Russian  snow 
during  this  winter  of  our  misery  and  felt  the  icy  wind  that 
blew  across  it,  burying  in  snow  every  object  in  its  path;  who 
drove  for  hour  after  hour  through  that  no-man-’s  land  only 
at  last  to  find  too  thin  shelter  with  insufficiently  clothed, 
half-starved  men;  and  who  also  saw  by  contrast  the  well- 
fed,  warmly  clad  and  fresh  Siberians,  fully  equipped  for 
winter  fighting  . . . can  truly  judge  the  events  which  now 
occurred.14 

Those  events  may  now  be  briefly  narrated,  but  not 
without  first  stressing  one  point:  terrible  as  the  Russian 
winter  was  and  granted  that  the  Soviet  troops  were  nat- 
urally better  prepared  for  it  than  the  German,  the  main 
factor  in  what  is  now  to  be  set  down  was  not  the  weather 
but  the  fierce  fighting  of  the  Red  Army  troops  and  their 
indomitable  will  not  to  give  up.  The  diary  of  Haider  and 
the  reports  of  the  field  commanders,  which  constantly 
express  amazement  at  the  extent  and  severity  of  Russian 
attacks  and  counterattacks  and  despair  at  the  German  set- 
backs and  losses,  are  proof  of  that.  The  Nazi  generals 
could  not  understand  why  the  Russians,  considering  the 
nature  of  their  tyrannical  regime  and  the  disastrous  ef- 
fects of  the  first  German  blows,  did  not  collapse,  as  had 
the  French  and  so  many  others  with  less  excuse. 

“With  amazement  and  disappointment,”  Blumentrift 
wrote,  “we  discovered  in  late  October  and  early  November 
that  the  beaten  Russians  seemed  quite  unaware  that  as  a 
military  force  they  had  almost  ceased  to  exist.”  Guderian 
tells  of  meeting  an  old  retired  Czarist  general  at  Orel  on 
the  road  to  Moscow. 

“If  only  you  had  come  twenty  years  ago  [he  told  the 
panzer  General],  we  should  have  welcomed  you  with  open 
arms.  But  now  it’s  too  late.  We  were  just  beginning  to  get  on 
our  feet,  and  now  you  arrive  and  throw  us  back  twenty 
years  so  that  we  will  have  to  start  from  the  beginning  all 


1130  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

over  again.  Now  we  are  fighting  for  Russia  and  in  that 
cause  we  are  all  united.”  16 

Yet,  as  .November  approached  its  end  amidst  fresh  bliz- 
zards and  continued  subzero  temperatures,  Moscow  seemed 
within  grasp  to  Hitler  and  most  of  his  generals.  North, 
south  and  west  of  the  capital  German  armies  had  reached 
points  within  twenty  to  thirty  miles  of  their  goal.  To 
Hitler  poring  over  the  map  at  his  headquarters  far  off  in 
East  Prussia  the  last  stretch  seemed  no  distance  at  all. 
His  armies  had  advanced  five  hundred  miles;  they  had  only 
twenty  to  thirty  miles  to  go.  “One  final  heave,”  he  told 
Jodi  in  mid-November,  “and  we  shall  triumph.”  On  the 
telephone  to  Haider  on  November  22,  Field  Marshal  von 
Bock,  directing  Army  Group  Center  in  its  final  push  for 
Moscow,  compared  the  situation  to  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne,  “where  the  last  battalion  thrown  in  decided  the 
battle.”  Despite  increased  enemy  resistance  Bock  told  the 
General  Staff  Chief  he  believed  “everything  was  attain- 
able.” By  the  last  day  of  November  he  was  literally  throw- 
ing in  his  last  battalion.  The  final  all-out  attack  on  the 
heart  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  set  for  the  next  day, 
December  1,  1941. 

It  stumbled  on  a steely  resistance.  The  greatest  tank 
force  ever  concentrated  on  one  front;  General  Hoepner’s 
Fourth  Tank  Group  and  General  Hermann  Hoth’s  Third 
Tank  Group  just  north  of  Moscow  and  driving  south,  Gu- 
derian’s  Second  Panzer  Army  just  to  the  south  of  the 
capital  and  pushing  north  from  Tula,  Kluge’s  great  Fourth 
Army  in  the  middle  and  fighting  its  way  due  east  through 
the  forests  that  surrounded  the  city — on  this  formidable 
array  were  pinned  Hitler’s  high  hopes.  By  December  2 
a.  reconnaissance  battalion  of  the  258th  Infantry  Division 
had  penetrated  to  Khimki,  a suburb  of  Moscow,  within 
sight  of  the  spires  of  the  Kremlin,  but  was  driven  out 
the  next  morning  by  a few  Russian  tanks  and  a motley 
force  of  hastily  mobilized  workers  from  the  city’s  fac- 
tories. This  was  the  nearest  the  German  troops  ever  got  to 
Moscow;  it  was  their  first  and  last  glimpse  of  the  Kremlin. 

Already  on  the  evening  of  December  1,  Bock,  who  was 
now  suffering  severe  stomach  cramps,  had  telephoned 
Haider  to  say  that  he  could  no  longer  “operate”  with  his 
weakened  troops.  The  General  Staff  Chief  had  tried  to 


1131 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

cheer  him  on.  “One  must  try,”  he  said,  “to  bring  the 
enemy  down  by  a last  expenditure  of  force.  If  that  proves 
impossible  then  we  will  have  to  draw  new  conclusions.” 
The  next  day  Haider  jotted  in  his  diary:  “Enemy  resist- 
ance has  reached  its  peak.”  On  the  following  day,  Decem- 
ber 3,  Bock  was  again  on  the  phone  to  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  who  noted  his  message  in  his  diary: 

Spearheads  of  the  Fourth  Army  again  pulled  back  because 
the  flanks  could  not  come  forward  . . . The  moment  must  be 
faced  when  the  strength  of  our  troops  is  at  an  end. 

When  Bock  spoke  for  the  first  time  of  going  over  to 
the  defensive  Haider  tried  to  remind  him  that  “the  best 
defense  was  to  stick  to  the  attack.” 

It  was  easier  said  then  done,  in  view  of  the  Russians 
and  the  weather.  The  next  day,  December  4,  Guderian, 
whose  Second  Panzer  Army  had  been  halted  in  its  attempt 
to  take  Moscow  from  the  south,  reported  that  the  ther- 
mometer had  fallen  to  31  degrees  below  zero.  The  next 
day  it  dropped  another  five  degrees.  His  tanks,  he  said, 
were  “almost  immobilized”  and  he  was  threatened  on  his 
flanks  and  in  the  rear  north  of  Tula. 

December  5 was  the  critical  day.  Everywhere  along  the 
200-mile  semicircular  front  around  Moscow  the  Germans 
had  been  stopped.  By  evening  Guderian  was  notifying 
Bock  that  he  was  not  only  stopped  but  must  pull  back, 
and  Bock  was  telephoning  Haider  that  “his  strength  was 
at  an  end,”  and  Brauchitsch  was  telling  his  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  in  despair  that  he  was  quitting  as  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Army.  It  was  a dark  and  bitter 
day  for  the  German  generals. 

This  was  the  first  time  [Guderian  later  wrote]  that  I had 
to  take  a decision  of  this  sort,  and  none  was  more  difficult 
. . . Our  attack  on  Moscow  had  broken  down.  All  the 
sacrifices  and  endurance  of  our  brave  troops  had  been  in 
vain.  We  had  suffered  a grievous  defeat.16 

At  Kluge’s  Fourth  Army  headquarters,  Blumentritt, 
the  chief  of  staff,  realized  that  the  turning  point  had  been 
reached.  Recalling  it  later,  he  wrote:  “Our  hopes  of  knock- 
ing Russia  out  of  the  war  in  1941  had  been  dashed  at  the 
very  last  minute.” 

The  next  day,  December  6,  General  Georgi  Zhukov,  who 
had  replaced  Marshal  Timoshenko  as  commander  of  the 


1132  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

central  front  but  six  weeks  before,  struck.  On  the  200- 
mile  front  before  Moscow  he  unleashed  seven  armies 
and  two  cavalry  corps — 100  divisions  in  all — consisting  of 
troops  that  were  either  fresh  or  battle-tried  and  were 
equipped  and  trained  to  fight  in  the  bitter  cold  and 
the  deep  snow.  The  blow  which  this  relatively  unknown 
general  now  delivered  with  such  a formidable  force  of 
infantry,  artillery,  tanks,  cavalry  and  planes,  which  Hitler 
had  not  faintly  suspected  existed,  was  so  sudden  and 
so  shattering  that  the  German  Army  and  the  Third  Reich 
never  fully  recovered  from  it.  For  a few  weeks  during  the 
rest  of  that  cold  and  bitter  December  and  on  into  January 
it  seemed  that  the  beaten  and  retreating  German  armies, 
their  front  continually  pierced  by  Soviet  breakthroughs, 
might  disintegrate  and  perish  in  the  Russian  snows,  as 
had  Napoleon’s  Grand  Army  just  130  years  before.  At 
several  crucial  moments  it  came  very  close  to  that.  Per- 
haps it  was  Hitler’s  granite  will  and  determination  and 
certainly  it  was  the  fortitude  of  the  German  soldier  that 
saved  the  armies  of  the  Third  Reich  from  a complete 
debacle. 

But  the  failure  was  great.  The  Red  armies  had  been 
crippled  but  not  destroyed.  Moscow  had  not  been  taken, 
nor  Leningrad  nor  Stalingrad  nor  the  oil  fields  of  the 
Caucasus;  and  the  lifelines  to  Britain  and  America,  to  the 
north  and  to  the  south,  remained  open.  For  the  first 
time  in  more  than  two  years  of  unbroken  military  vic- 
tories the  armies  of  Hitler  were  retreating  before  a su- 
perior force. 

That  was  not  all.  The  failure  was  greater  than  that. 
Haider  realized  this,  at  least  later.  “The  myth  of  the  in- 
vincibility of  the  German  Army,”  he  wrote,  “was  broken. 
There  would  be  more  German  victories  in  Russia  when 
another  summer  came  around,  but  they  could  never  restore 
the  myth.  December  6,  1941,  then,  is  another  turning  point 
in  the  short  history  of  the  Third  Reich  and  one  of  the 
most  fateful  ones.  Hitler’s  power  had  reached  its  zenith; 
from  now  on  it  was  to  decline,  sapped  by  the  growing 
counterblows  of  the  nations  against  which  he  had  chosen 
to  make  aggressive  war. 

A drastic  shake-up  in  the  German  High  Command  and 
among  the  field  commanders  now  took  place.  As  the  armies 


1133 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

fell  back  over  the  icy  roads  and  snowy  fields  before  the 
Soviet  counteroffensive,  the  heads  of  the  German  gen- 
erals began  to  roll.  Rundstedt,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
was  relieved  of  command  of  the  southern  armies  because 
he  had  been  forced  to  retreat  from  Rostov.  Field  Marshal 
von  Bock’s  stomach  pains  became  worse  with  the  set- 
backs in  December  and  he  was  replaced  on  December  18 
by  Field  Marshal  von  Kluge,  whose  battered  Fourth  Army 
was  being  pushed  back,  forever,  from  the  vicinity  of 
Moscow.  Even  the  dashing  General  Guderian,  the  origina- 
tor of  massive  armored  warfare  which  had  so  revolution- 
ized modern  battle,  was  cashiered — on  Christmas  Day — for 
ordering  a retreat  without  permission  from  above.  Gen- 
eral Hoepner,  an  equally  brilliant  tank  commander,  whose 
Fourth  Armored  Group  had  come  within  sight  of  Mos- 
cow on  the  north  and  then  been  pushed  back,  was  abruptly 
dismissed  by  Flitler  on  the  same  grounds,  stripped  of  his 
rank  and  forbidden  to  wear  a uniform.  General  Hans 
Count  von  Sponeck,  who  had  received  the  Ritterkreuz  for 
leading  the  airborne  landings  at  The  Hague  the  year  before, 
received  a severer  chastisement  for  pulling  back  one  divi- 
sion of  his  corps  in  the  Crimea  on  December  29  after 
Russian  troops  had  landed  by  sea  behind  him.  He  was 
not  only  summarily  stripped  of  his  rank  but  imprisoned, 
court-martialed  and,  at  the  insistence  of  Hitler,  sentenced 
to  death.* 

Even  the  obsequious  Keitel  was  in  trouble  with  the 
Supreme  Commander.  Even  he  had  enough  sense  to  see 
during  the  first  days  of  December  that  a general  with- 
drawal around  Moscow  was  necessary  in  order  to  avert 
disaster.  But  when  he  got  up  enough  courage  to  say  so  to 
Hitler  the  latter  turned  on  him  and  gave  him  a tongue- 
lashing,  shouting  that  he  was  a “blockhead.”  Jodi  found 
the  unhappy  OKW  Chief  a little  later  sitting  at  a desk 
writing  out  his  resignation,  a revolver  at  one  side.  Jodi 
quietly  removed  the  weapon  and  persuaded  Keitel — ap- 
parently without  too  much  difficulty — to  stay  on  and  to 
continue  to  swallow  the  Fuehrer’s  insults,  which  he 
did,  with  amazing  endurance,  to  the  very  end.17 

The  strain  of  leading  an  army  which  could  not  always 
win  under  a Supreme  Commander  who  insisted  that  it 


* He  was  not  executed  until  after  the  July  1944  plot  against  Hitler,  in  which 
he  was  in  no  way  involved. 


1134 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

always  do  had  brought  about  renewed  heart  attacks  for 
Field  Marshal  von  Brauchitsch,  and  by  the  time  Zhukov’s 
counteroffensive  began  he  was  determined  to  step  down 
as  Commander  in  Chief.  He  returned  to  headquarters 
from  a trip  to  the  receding  front  on  December  15  and 
Haider  found  him  “very  beaten  down.”  “Brauchitsch  no 
longer  sees  any  way  out,”  Haider  noted  in  his  diary,  “for 
the  rescue  of  the  Army  from  its  desperate  position.” 
The  head  of  the  Army  was  at  the  end  of  his  rope.  He 
had  asked  Hitler  on  December  7 to  relieve  him  and  he 
renewed  the  request  on  December  17.  It  was  formally 
granted  two  days  later.  What  the  Fuehrer  really  thought 
of  the  man  he  himself  had  named  to  head  the  Army 
he  told  to  Goebbels  three  months  later. 

The  Fuehrer  spoke  of  him  [Brauchitsch]  only  in  terms 
of  contempt  [Goebbels  wrote  in  his  diary  on  March  20,  1942], 
A vain,  cowardly  wretch  . . . and  a nincompoop.18 

To  his  cronies  Hitler  said  of  Brauchitsch,  “He’s  no  sol- 
dier; he’s  a man  of  straw.  If  Brauchitsch  had  remained 
at  his  post  only  for  another  few  weeks,  things  would 
have  ended  in  catastrophe.”  19 

There  was  some  speculation  in  Army  circles  as  to  who 
would  succeed  Brauchitsch,  but  it  was  as  wide  of  the 
mark  as  the  speculation  years  before  as  to  who  would 
succeed  Hindenburg.  On  December  19  Hitler  called  in 
Haider  and  informed  him  that  he  himself  was  taking  over 
as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army.  Haider  could  stay 
on  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  if  he  wanted  to — and 
he  wanted  to.  But  from  now  on,  Hitler  made  it  clear,  he 
was  personally  running  the  Army,  as  he  ran  almost  every- 
thing else  in  Germany. 

This  little  matter  of  operational  command  [Hitler  told 
him]  is  something  anyone  can  do.  The  task  of  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  of  the  Army  is  to  train  the  Army  in  a 
National  Socialist  way.  I know  of  no  general  who  could  do 
that,  as  I want  it  done.  Consequently,  I’ve  decided  to  take 
over  command  of  the  Army  myself.20 

Hitler’s  triumph  over  the  Prussian  officer  corps  was 
thus  completed.  The  former  Vienna  vagabond  and  ex- 
corporal  was  now  head  of  state.  Minister  of  War,  Su- 
preme Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces  and  Commander 
in  Chief  of  the  Army.  The  generals,  as  Haider  complained 


1135 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

— in  his  diary — were  now  merely  postmen  purveying  Hit- 
ler’s orders  based  on  Hitler’s  singular  conception  of 
strategy. 

Actually  the  megalomaniacal  dictator  soon  would 
make  himself  something  even  greater,  legalizing  a power 
never  before  held  by  any  man — emperor,  king  or  presi- 
dent— in  the  experience  of  the  German  Reichs.  On  April 
26,  1942,  he  had  his  rubber-stamp  Reichstag  pass  a law 
which  gave  him  absolute  power  of  life  and  death  over 
every  German  and  simply  suspended  any  laws  which 
might  stand  in  the  way  of  this.  The  words  of  the  law 
have  to  be  read  to  be  believed. 

...  In  the  present  war,  in  which  the  German  people  are 
faced  with  a struggle  for  their  existence  or  their  annihilation, 
the  Fuehrer  must  have  all  the  rights  postulated  by  him 
which  serve  to  further  or  achieve  victory.  Therefore — with- 
out being  bound  by  existing  legal  regulations — in  his  ca- 
pacity as  Leader  of  the  nation,  Supreme  Commander  of  the 
Armed  Forces,  Head  of  Government  and  supreme  executive 
chief,  as  Supreme  Justice  and  Leader  of  the  Party — the  Fueh- 
rer must  be  in  a position  to  force  with  all  means  at  his  dis- 
posal every  German,  if  necessary,  whether  he  be  common 
soldier  or  officer,  low  or  high  official  or  judge,  leading  or 
subordinate  official  of  the  party,  worker  or  employer — to  ful- 
fill his  duties.  In  case  of  violation  of  these  duties,  the  Fueh- 
rer is  entitled  after  conscientious  examination,  regardless  of 
so-called  well-deserved  rights,  to  mete  out  due  punishment 
and  to  remove  the  offender  from  his  post,  rank  and  position 
without  introducing  prescribed  procedures.21 

Truly  Adolf  Hitler  had  become  not  only  the  Leader 
of  Germany  but  the  Law.  Not  even  in  medieval  times 
nor  further  back  in  the  barbarous  tribal  days  had  any 
German  arrogated  such  tyrannical  power,  nominal  and 
legal  as  well  as  actual,  to  himself. 

But  even  without  this  added  authority,  Hitler  was  ab- 
solute master  of  the  Army,  of  which  he  had  now  as- 
sumed direct  command.  Ruthlessly  he  moved  that  bitter 
winter  to  stem  the  retreat  of  his  beaten  armies  and  to 
save  them  from  the  fate  of  Napoleon’s  troops  along  the 
same  frozen,  snow-bound  roads  back  from  Moscow.  He 
forbade  any  further  withdrawals.  The  German  generals 
have  long  debated  the  merits  of  his  stubborn  stand — 
whether  it  saved  the  troops  from  complete  disaster  or 
whether  it  compounded  the  inevitable  heavy  losses.  Most 


1136 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


of  the  commanders  have  contended  that  if  they  had  been 
given  freedom  to  pull  back  when  their  position  became 
untenable  they  could  have  saved  many  men  and  much 
equipment  and  been  in  a better  position  to  re-form  and 
even  counterattack.  As  it  was,  whole  divisions  were  fre- 
quently overrun  or  surrounded  and  cut  to  pieces  when  a 
timely  withdrawal  would  have  saved  them. 

And  yet  some  of  the  generals  later  reluctantly  admitted 
that  Hitler’s  iron  will  in  insisting  that  the  armies  stand 
and  fight  was  his  greatest  accomplishment  of  the  war  in 
that  it  probably  did  save  his  armies  from  completely  dis- 
integrating in  the  snow.  This  view  is  best  summed  up  by 
General  Blumentritt. 

Hitler’s  fanatical  order  that  the  troops  must  hold  fast  re- 
gardless in  every  position  and  in  the  most  impossible  cir- 
cumstances was  undoubtedly  correct.  Hitler  realized  instinc- 
tively that  any  retreat  across  the  snow  and  ice  must,  within  a 
few  days,  lead  to  the  dissolution  of  the  front  and  that  if 
this  happened  the  Wehrmacht  would  suffer  the  same  fate 
that  had  befallen  the  Grande  Armee  . . . The  withdrawal 
could  only  be  carried  out  across  the  open  country  since  the 
roads  and  tracks  were  blocked  with  snow.  After  a few  nights 
this  would  prove  too  much  for  the  troops,  who  would  simply 
lie  down  and  die  wherever  they  found  themselves.  There 
were  no  prepared  positions  in  the  rear  into  which  they  could 
be  withdrawn,  nor  any  sort  of  line  to  which  they  could  hold 
on.22 

General  von  Tippelskirch,  a corps  commander,  agreed. 

It  was  Hitler’s  one  great  achievement.  At  that  critical  mo- 
ment the  troops  were  remembering  what  they  had  heard 
about  Napoleon’s  retreat  from  Moscow,  and  living  under 
the  shadow  of  it.  If  they  had  once  begun  a retreat,  it  might 
have  turned  into  a panic  flight.23 

There  was  panic  in  the  German  Army,  not  only  at  the 
front  but  far  in  the  rear  at  headquarters,  and  it  is  graphi- 
cally recorded  in  Haider’s  diary.  “Very  difficult  day!”  he 
begins  his  journal  on  Christmas  Day,  1941,  and  there- 
after into  the  new  year  he  repeats  the  words  at  the  head 
of  many  a day’s  entry  as  he  describes  each  fresh  Russian 
breakthrough  and  the  serious  situation  of  the  various 
armies. 

December  29.  Another  critical  day!  . . . Dramatic  long- 
distance telephone  talk  between  Fuehrer  and  Kluge.  Fuehrer 


1137 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

forbids  further  withdrawal  of  northern  wing  of  4th  Army. 
Very  bad  crisis  by  9th  Army  where  apparently  the  com- 
manders have  lost  their  heads.  At  noon  an  excited  call  from 
Kluge.  9th  Army  wishes  to  withdraw  behind  Rzhev  . . . 

January  2,  1942.  A day  of  wild  fighting!  . . . Grave  crisis 
by  4th  and  9th  Armies  . . . Russian  breakthrough  north  of 
Maloyaroslavets  tears  the  front  wide  open  and  it’s  difficult 
to  see  at  the  moment  how  front  can  be  restored  . . . This 
situation  leads  Kluge  to  demand  withdrawal  of  sagging  front. 
Very  stormy  argument  with  Fuehrer,  who  however  holds 
to  his  stand:  the  front  will  remain  where  it  is  regardless  of 
consequences  . . . 

January  3.  The  situation  has  become  more  critical  as  the 
result  of  the  breakthrough  between  Maloyaroslavets  and 
Borovsk.  Kuebler  * and  Bock  very  excited  and  demand  with- 
drawal on  the  north  front,  which  is  crumbling.  Again  a dra- 
matic scene  by  Fuehrer,  who  doubts  courage  of  generals  to 
make  hard  decisions.  But  troops  simply  don’t  hold  their 
ground  when  it’s  30  below  zero.  Fuehrer  orders:  He  will 
personally  decide  if  any  more  withdrawals  necessary.  . . . 

Not  the  Fuehrer  but  the  Russian  Army  was  by  now 
deciding  such  matters.  Hitler  could  force  the  German 
troops  to  stand  fast  and  die,  but  he  could  no  more  stop 
the  Soviet  advance  than  King  Canute  could  prevent  the 
tides  from  coming  in.  At  one  moment  of  panic  some  of 
the  High  Command  officers  suggested  that  perhaps  the 
situation  could  be  retrieved  by  the  employment  of  poison 
gas.  “Colonal  Ochsner  tries  to  talk  me  into  beginning  gas 
warfare  against  the  Russians,”  Haider  noted  in  his  diary 
on  January  7.  Perhaps  it  was  too  cold.  At  any  rate  nothing 
came  of  the  suggestion. 

January  8 was  “a  very  critical  day,”  as  Haider  noted 
in  his  journal.  “The  breakthrough  at  Sukhinichi  [south- 
west of  Moscow]  is  becoming  unbearable  for  Kluge. 
He  is  consequently  insisting  on  withdrawing  the  4th  Army 
front.”  All  day  long  the  Field  Marshal  was  on  the  phone 
to  Hitler  and  Haider  insisting  on  it.  Finally,  in  the  evening 
the  Fuehrer  reluctantly  consented.  Kluge  was  given  per- 
mission to  withdraw  “step  by  step  in  order  to  protect  his 
communications.” 

Step  by  step  and  sometimes  more  rapidly  throughout 

* General  Kuebler  had  replaced  Kluge  on  December  26  as  commander  of  the 
Fourth  Army  when  the  latter  took  over  Army  Group  Center.  Though  a tough 
soldier,  he  stood  the  strain  only  three  weeks  and  then  was  relieved  by 
General  Heinrici. 


1138 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

that  grim  winter  the  German  armies,  which  had  planned 
to  celebrate  Christmas  in  Moscow,  were  driven  back  or 
forced  by  Russian  encirclements  and  breakthroughs  to  re- 
treat. By  the  end  of  February  they  found  themselves  from 
75  to  200  miles  from  the  capital.  By  the  end  of  that 
freezing  month  Haider  was  noting  in  his  diary  the  cost 
in  men  of  the  misfired  Russian  adventure.  Total  losses 
up  to  February  28,  he  wrote  down,  were  1,005,636  or 
31  per  cent  of  his  entire  force.  Of  these  202,251  had  been 
killed,  725,642  wounded  and  46,511  were  missing.  (Casual- 
ties from  frostbite  were  112,627.)  This  did  not  include  the 
heavy  losses  among  the  Hungarians,  Rumanians  and  Ital- 
ians in  Russia. 

With  the  coming  of  the  spring  thaws  a lull  came  over 
the  long  front  and  Hitler  and  Haider  began  making 
plans  for  bringing  up  fresh  troops  and  more  tanks  and 
guns  to  resume  the  offensive — at  least  on  part  of  the  front. 
Never  again  would  they  have  the  strength  to  attack  all 
along  the  vast  battle  line.  The  bitter  winter’s  toll  and 
above  all  Zhukov’s  counteroffensive  doomed  that  hope. 

But  Hitler,  we  now  know,  had  realized  long  before  that 
his  gamble  of  conquering  Russia — not  only  in  six  months 
but  ever — had  failed.  In  a diary  entry  of  November  19, 
1941,  General  Haider  notes  a long  “lecture”  of  the  Fueh- 
rer to  several  officers  of  the  High  Command.  Though  his 
armies  are  only  a few  miles  from  Moscow  and  still  driv- 
ing hard  to  capture  it,  Hitler  has  abandoned  hopes  of 
striking  Russia  down  this  year  and  has  already  turned  his 
thoughts  to  next  year.  Haider  jotted  down  the  Leader’s 
ideas. 

Goals  for  next  year.  First  of  all  the  Caucasus.  Objective: 
Russia’s  southern  borders.  Time:  March  to  April.  In  the  north 
after  the  close  of  this  year’s  campaign,  Vologda  or  Gorki,* 
but  only  at  the  end  of  May. 

Further  goals  for  next  year  must  remain  open.  They  will 
depend  on  the  capacity  of  our  railroads.  The  question  of  later 
building  an  “East  Wall”  also  remains  open. 


No  East  Wall  would  be  necessary  if  the  Soviet  Union 
were  to  be  destroyed.  Haider  seems  to  have  mulled  over 
that  as  he  listened  to  the  Supreme  Commander  go  on. 


1139 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

On  the  whole  [he  concluded]  one  gets  the  impression 
that  Hitler  recognizes  now  that  neither  side  can  destroy  the 
other  and  that  this  will  lead  to  peace  negotiations. 

This  must  have  been  a rude  awakening  for  the  Nazi 
conqueror  who  six  weeks  before  in  Berlin  had  made  a 
broadcast  declaring  “without  any  reservation”  that  Russia 
had  been  “struck  down  and  would  never  rise  again.”  His 
plans  had  been  wrecked,  his  hopes  doomed.  They  were 
further  dashed  a fortnight  later,  on  December  6,  when 
his  troops  began  to  be  beaten  back  from  the  suburbs  of 
Moscow. 

The  next  day,  Sunday,  December  7,  1941,  an  event 
occurred  on  the  other  side  of  the  round  earth  that  trans- 
formed the  European  war,  which  he  had  so  lightly 
provoked,  into  a world  war,  which,  though  he  could  not 
know  it,  would  seal  his  fate  and  that  of  the  Third  Reich. 
Japanese  bombers  attacked  Pearl  Harbor.  The  next  day* 
Hitler  hurried  back  by  train  to  Berlin  from  his  head- 
quarters at  Wolfsschanze.  He  had  made  a solemn  secret 
promise  to  Japan  and  the  time  had  come  to  keep  it — or 
break  it. 


* Hitler’s  movements  and  whereabouts  are  noted  in  his  daily  calendar  book, 
which  is  among  the  captured  documents. 


25 


THE  TURN  OF 


THE  UNITED  STATES 


Adolf  Hitler’s  reckless  promise  to  Japan  had  been  made 
during  a series  of  talks  in  Berlin  with  Yosuke  Matsuoka, 
the  pro- Axis  Japanese  Foreign  Minister,  in  the  spring  of 
1941  just  before  the  German  attack  on  Russia.  The  cap- 
tured German  minutes  of  the  meetings  enable  us  to  trace 
the  development  of  another  one  of  Hitler’s  monumen- 
tal miscalculations.  They  and  other  Nazi  documents  of 
the  period  show  the  Fuehrer  too  ignorant,  Goering  too 
arrogant  and  Ribbentrop  too  stupid  to  comprehend  the 
potential  military  strength  of  the  United  States — a blunder 
which  had  been  made  in  Germany  during  the  First  World 
War  by  Wilhelm  II,  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff. 

There  was  a basic  contradiction  from  the  beginning  in 
Hitler  s policy  toward  America.  Though  he  had  only  con- 
tempt for  her  military  prowess  he  endeavored  during  the 
first  two  years  of  the  conflict  to  keep  her  out  of  the  war. 
This,  as  we  have  seen,  was  the  main  task  of  the  German 
Embassy  in  Washington,  which  went  to  great  lengths,  in- 
cluding the  bribing  of  Congressmen,  attempting  to  sub- 
sidize writers  and  aiding  the  America  First  Committee,  to 
support  the  American  isolationists  and  thus  help  to  keep 
America  from  joining  Germany’s  enemies  in  the  war. 

That  the  United  States,  as  long  as  it  was  led  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt,  stood  in  the  way  of  Hitler’s  grandiose 
plans  for  world  conquest  and  the  dividing  up  of  the  planet 
among  the  Tripartite  powers  the  Nazi  dictator  fully  under- 
stood, as  his  various  private  utterances  make  clear.  The 
American  Republic,  he  saw,  would  have  to  be  dealt  with 
eventually  and,  as  he  said,  “severely.”  But  one  nation  at 
a time.  That  had  been  the  secret  of  his  successful  strategy 
thus  far.  The  turn  of  America  would  come,  but  only 
after  Great  Britain  and  the  Soviet  Union  had  been  struck 

1140 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1141 

down.  Then,  with  the  aid  of  Japan  and  Italy,  he  would 
deal  with  the  upstart  Americans,  who,  isolated  and  alone, 
would  easily  succumb  to  the  power  of  the  victorious  Axis. 

Japan  was  the  key  to  Hitler’s  efforts  to  keep  America 
out  of  the  war  until  Germany  was  ready  to  take  her  on. 
Japan,  as  Ribbentrop  pointed  out  to  Mussolini  on  March 
11,  1940,  possessed  the  counterweight  to  the  United 
States  which  would  prevent  the  Americans  from  trying  to 
intervene  in  Europe  against  Germany  as  they  had  in  the 
first  war.1 

In  their  wartime  dealings  with  the  Japanese,  Hitler  and 
Ribbentrop  at  first  stressed  the  importance  of  not  provok- 
ing the  United  States  to  abandon  her  neutrality.  By  the 
beginning  of  1941  they  were  exceedingly  anxious  to  draw 
Japan  into  the  war,  not  against  America,  not  even  against 
Russia,  which  they  were  shortly  to  attack,  but  against 
Britain,  which  had  refused  to  give  in  even  when  apparent- 
ly beaten.  Early  in  1941  German  pressure  on  Japan 
was  stepped  up.  On  February  23,  Ribbentrop  received  at 
his  stolen  estate  at  Fuschl,  near  Salzburg,  the  fiery  and 
hot-tempered  Japanese  ambassador,  General  Hiroshi  Oshi- 
ma,  who  had  often  impressed  this  observer  as  more  Nazi 
than  the  Nazis.  Though  the  war,  Ribbentrop  told  his  guest, 
was  already  won,  Japan  should  come  in  “as  soon  as 
possible — in  its  own  interest,”  and  seize  Britain’s  empire 
in  Asia. 

A surprise  intervention  by  Japan  [he  continued]  was 
bound  to  keep  America  out  of  the  war.  America,  which  at 
present  is  not  armed  and  would  hesitate  to  expose  her  Navy 
to  any  risks  west  of  Hawaii,  could  do  this  even  less  in  such  a 
case.  If  Japan  would  otherwise  respect  the  American  interests, 
there  would  not  even  be  the  possibility  for  Roosevelt  to  use 
the  argument  of  lost  prestige  to  make  war  plausible  to  the 
Americans.  It  was  very  unlikely  that  America  would  declare 
war  if  it  had  to  stand  by  while  Japan  took  the  Philippines. 

But  even  if  the  United  States  did  get  involved,  Ribben- 
trop declared,  “this  would  not  endanger  the  final  victory 
of  the  countries  of  the  Three-Power  Pact.”  The  Japanese 
fleet  would  easily  defeat  the  American  fleet  and  the  war 
would  be  brought  rapidly  to  an  end  with  the  fall  of  both 
Britain  and  America.  This  was  heady  stuff  for  the  fire- 
eating Japanese  envoy  and  Ribbentrop  poured  it  on.  He 


1142 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

advised  the  Japanese  to  be  firm  and  “use  plain  language” 
in  their  current  negotiations  in  Washington. 

Only  if  the  U.S.  realized  that  they  were  confronting  firm 
determination  would  they  hold  back.  The  people  in  the 
U.S.  . . . were  not  willing  to  sacrifice  their  sons,  and  there- 
fore were  against  any  entry  into  the  war.  The  American  peo- 
ple felt  instinctively  that  they  were  being  drawn  into  war 
for  no  reason  by  Roosevelt  and  the  Jewish  wire-pullers. 
Therefore  our  policies  with  the  U.S.  should  be  plain  and 
firm  . . . 

The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  had  one  warning  to  give, 
the  one  that  had  failed  so  dismally  with  Franco. 

If  Germany  should  ever  weaken,  Japan  would  find  itself 
confronted  by  a world  coalition  within  a short  time.  We 
were  all  in  the  same  boat.  The  fate  of  both  countries  was 
being  determined  now  for  centuries  to  come  ...  A defeat 
of  Germany  would  also  mean  the  end  of  the  Japanese  im- 
perialist idea.2 

To  acquaint  his  military  commanders  and  the  top  men 
in  the  Foreign  Office  with  his  new  Japanese  policy.  Hitler 
issued  on  March  5,  1941,  a top-secret  directive  entitled 
“Basic  Order  No.  24  Regarding  Collaboration  with  Ja- 
pan.” 3 

It  must  be  the  aim  of  the  collaboration  based  on  the 
Three-Power  Pact  to  induce  Japan  as  soon  as  possible  to  take 
active  measures  in  the  Far  East.  Strong  British  forces  will 
thereby  be  tied  down,  and  the  center  of  gravity  of  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  will  be  diverted  to  the  Pa- 
cific . . . 

The  common  aim  of  the  conduct  of  war  is  to  be  stressed 
as  forcing  England  to  her  knees  quickly  and  thereby  keeping 
the  United  States  out  of  the  war. 

The  seizure  of  Singapore  as  the  key  British  position  in 
the  Far  East  would  mean  a decisive  success  for  the  entire 
conduct  of  war  of  the  Three  Powers.* 

Hitler  also  urged  the  Japanese  seizure  of  other  British 
naval  bases  and  even  American  bases  “if  the  entry  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war  cannot  be  prevented.”  He  con- 
cluded by  ordering  that  “the  Japanese  must  not  be  given 
any  intimation  of  the  Barbarossa  operation.”  The  Japanese 
ally,  like  the  Italian  ally,  was  to  be  used  to  further  German 
ambitions,  but  neither  government  would  be  taken  into 


The  italics  are  Hitler's. 


1143 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

the  Fuehrer’s  confidence  regarding  his  intention  to  attack 
Russia. 

A fortnight  later,  on  March  18,  at  a conference  with 
Hitler,  Keitel  and  Jodi,  Admiral  Raeder  strongly  urged 
that  Japan  be  pressed  to  attack  Singapore.  The  oppor- 
tunity would  never  again  be  so  favorable,  Raeder  ex- 
plained, what  with  “the  whole  English  fleet  contained,  the 
unpreparedness  of  the  U.S.A.  for  war  against  Japan  and 
the  inferiority  of  the  U.S.  fleet  compared  to  the  Japanese.” 
The  capture  of  Singapore,  the  Admiral  said,  would  “solve 
all  the  other  Asiatic  questions  regarding  the  U.S.A.  and 
England”  and  would  of  course  enable  Japan  to  avoid  war 
with  America,  if  she  wished.  There  was  only  one  hitch, 
the  Admiral  opined,  and  mention  of  it  must  have  made 
Hitler  frown.  According  to  naval  intelligence,  Raeder 
warned,  Japan  would  move  against  the  British  in  South- 
east Asia  only  “if  Germany  proceeds  to  land  in  England.” 
There  is  no  record  in  the  Navy  minutes  of  this  meeting 
indicating  what  reply  Hitler  made  to  this  remark.  Raeder 
certainly  knew  that  the  Supreme  Commander  had  neither 
plans  nor  hopes  for  a landing  in  England  this  year.  Raeder 
said  something  else  that  the  Fuehrer  did  not  respond  to. 
He  “recommended”  that  Matsuoka  “be  advised  regarding 
the  designs  on  Russia.”  4 

The  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  was  now  on  his  way 
to  Berlin  via  Siberia  and  Moscow,  uttering  bellicose  pro- 
Axis  statements,  as  Secretary  of  State  Hull  put  it,*  along 
the  route.  His  arrival  in  the  German  capital  on  March  26 
came  at  an  awkward  moment  for  Hitler,  for  that  night 
the  pro-German  Yugoslav  government  was  overthrown  in 
the  Belgrade  coup  and  the  Fuehrer  was  so  busy  impro- 
vising plans  to  crush  the  obstreperous  Balkan  country 
that  he  had  to  postpone  seeing  the  Japanese  visitor  until 
the  afternoon  of  the  twenty-seventh. 

Ribbentrop  saw  him  in  the  morning,  playing  over,  so 
to  speak,  the  old  gramophone  records  reserved  for  such 
guests  on  such  occasions,  though  managing  to  be  even 
more  fatuous  than  usual  and  not  allowing  the  dapper 
little  Matsuoka  to  get  in  a word.  The  lengthy  confidential 

* Hull  made  the  remark  to  the  new  Japanese  ambassador  in  Washington, 
Admiral  Nomura,  in  the  presence  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  on  March  14.  Nomura 
replied  that  Matsuoka  “talked  loudly  for  home  consumption  because  he  was 
ambitious  politically.”  ( The  Memoirs  of  Cordell  Hull , II,  pp.  900-01.) 


1144 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


minutes  drawn  up  by  Dr.  Schmidt  (and  now  among  the 
captured  Foreign  Office  papers)  leave  no  doubt  of  that.5 
“The  war  has  already  been  definitely  won  by  the  Axis,” 
Ribbentrop  announced,  “and  it  is  only  a question  of  time 
before  England  admits  it.”  In  the  next  breath  he  was 
urging  a “quick  attack  upon  Singapore”  because  it  would 
be  “a  very  decisive  factor  in  the  speedy  overthrow  of 
England.”  In  the  face  of  such  a contradiction  the  di- 
minutive Japanese  visitor  did  not  bat  an  eye.  “He  sat 
there  inscrutably,”  Schmidt  later  remembered,  “in  no  way 
revealing  how  these  curious  remarks  impressed  him.” 6 

As  to  America — 

There  was  no  doubt  [Ribbentrop  said]  that  the  British 
would  long  since  have  abandoned  the  war  if  Roosevelt  had 
not  always  given  Churchill  new  hope  . . . The  Three-Power 
Pact  had  above  all  had  the  goal  of  frightening  America  . . . 
and  of  keeping  it  out  of  the  war  . . . America  had  to  be  pre- 
vented by  all  possible  means  from  taking  an  active  part  in 
the  war  and  from  making  its  aid  to  England  too  effective 
. . . The  capture  of  Singapore  would  perhaps  be  most  likely 
to  keep  America  out  of  the  war  because  the  United  States 
could  scarcely  risk  sending  its  fleet  into  Japanese  waters  . . . 
Roosevelt  would  be  in  a very  difficult  position  . . . 

Though  Hitler  had  laid  it  down  that  Matsuoka  must 
not  be  told  about  the  impending  German  attack  on  Rus- 
sia— a necessary  precaution  to  keep  the  news  from  leak- 
ing out,  but  nevertheless,  as  we  shall  see,  one  that  would 
have  disastrous  consequences  for  Germany — Ribbentrop 
did  drop  several  broad  hints.  Relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  he  told  his  visitor,  were  correct  but  not  very  friend- 
ly. Moreover,  should  Russia  threaten  Germany,  “the  Fueh- 
rer would  crush  Russia.”  The  Fuehrer  was  convinced,  he 
added,  that  if  it  came  to  war  “there  would  be  in  a few 
months  no  more  Russia.” 

Matsuoka,  says  Schmidt,  blinked  at  this  and  looked 
alarmed,  whereupon  Ribbentrop  hastened  to  assure  him 
that  he  did  not  believe  that  “Stalin  would  pursue  an  un- 
wise policy.”  At  this  juncture,  says  Schmidt,  Ribbentrop 
was  called  away  by  Hitler  to  discuss  the  Yugoslav  crisis 
and  failed  even  to  return  for  the  official  lunch  which  he 
was  supposed  to  tender  the  distinguished  visitor. 

In  the  afternoon  Hitler,  having  determined  to  smash 


1145 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

another  country  (Yugoslavia),  worked  on  the  Japanese 
Foreign  Minister.  “England  has  already  lost  the  war,”  he 
began.  “It  is  only  a matter  of  having  the  intelligence  to 
admit  it.”  Still,  the  British  were  grasping  at  two  straws: 
Russia  and  America.  Toward  the  Soviet  Union  Hitler 
was  more  circumspect  than  Ribbentrop  had  been.  He  did 
not  believe,  he  said,  that  the  danger  of  a war  with  Russia 
would  arise.  After  all,  Germany  had  some  160  to  170 
divisions  “for  defense  against  Russia.”  As  to  the  United 
States: 

America  was  confronted  by  three  possibilities:  she  could 
arm  herself,  she  could  assist  England,  or  she  could  wage  war 
on  another  front.  If  she  helped  England  she  could  not  arm 
herself.  If  she  abandoned  England  the  latter  would  be  de- 
stroyed and  America  would  then  find  herself  fighting  the 
powers  of  the  Three-Power  Pact  alone.  In  no  case,  however, 
could  America  wage  war  on  another  front. 

Therefore,  the  Fuehrer  concluded,  “never  in  the  human 
imagination”  could  there  be  a better  opportunity  for  the 
Japanese  to  strike  in  the  Pacific  than  now.  “Such  a mo- 
ment,” he  said,  laying  it  on  as  thickly  as  he  could,  “would 
never  return.  It  was  unique  in  history.”  Matsuoka  agreed, 
but  reminded  Hitler  that  unfortunately  he  “did  not  control 
Japan.  At  the  moment  he  could  make  no  pledge  on  behalf 
of  the  Japanese  Empire  that  it  would  take  action.” 

But  Hitler,  being  absolute  dictator,  could  make  a pledge 
and  he  made  it  to  Japan — quite  casually  and  without  being 
asked  to — on  April  4,  after  Matsuoka  had  returned  to  Ber- 
lin from  seeing  Mussolini.*  This  second  meeting  took 
place  on  the  eve  of  the  Nazi  attack  on  two  more  innocent 
countries,  Yugoslavia  and  Greece,  and  the  Fuehrer,  thirst- 
ing for  further  easy  conquests  and  for  revenge  on 
Belgrade,  was  in  one  of  his  warlike  moods.  While  he  con- 
sidered war  with  the  United  States  “undesirable,”  he  said, 
he  had  “already  included  it  in  his  calculations.”  But  he 
did  not  think  much  of  America’s  military  power,  t 

* Mussolini  had  told  him,  he  informed  Hitler,  that  “America  was  the  Num- 
ber One  enemy,  and  Soviet  Russia  came  only  in  second  place.” 
t Or  of  anything  else  about  the  United  States.  His  weird  conception  of 
America— by  this  time  Hitler  had  come  to  believe  his  own  Nazi  propaganda 
— was  given  further  exposition  in  a talk  he  had  with  Mussolini  at  the 
Russian  front  late  in  August  1941.  “The  Fuehrer,”  the  Italian  records  quote 
him  indirectly  as  saying,  “gave  a detailed  account  of  the  Jewish  clique 
which  surrounds  Roosevelt  and  exploits  the  American  people.  He  stated  that 


1146 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Germany  had  made  her  preparations  so  that  no  American 
could  land  in  Europe.  Germany  would  wage  a vigorous  war 
against  America  with  U-boats  and  the  Luftwaffe,  and  with 
her  greater  experience  . . . would  be  more  than  a match  for 
America,  entirely  apart  from  the  fact  that  German  soldiers 
were,  obviously,  far  superior  to  the  Americans. 

This  boast  led  him  to  make  the  fateful  pledge.  Schmidt 
recorded  it  in  his  minutes: 

If  Japan  got  into  a conflict  with  the  United  States,  Ger- 
many on  her  part  would  take  the  necessary  steps  at  once. 

From  Schmidt’s  notes  it  is  evident  that  Matsuoka  did 
not  quite  grasp  the  significance  of  what  the  Fuehrer  was 
promising,  so  Hitler  said  it  again. 

Germany,  as  he  had  said,  would  promptly  take  part  in 
case  of  a conflict  between  Japan  and  America.* * 

Hitler  paid  dearly  not  only  for  this  assurance,  so 
casually  given,  but  for  his  deceit  in  not  telling  the  Japanese 
about  his  intention  to  attack  Russia  as  soon  as  the 
Balkans  were  occupied.  Somewhat  coyly  Matsuoka  had 
asked  Ribbentrop  during  a talk  on  March  28  whether  on 
his  return  trip  he  “should  remain  in  Moscow  in  order  to 
negotiate  with  the  Russians  on  the  Nonaggression  Pact  or 
the  Treaty  of  Neutrality.”  The  dull-witted  Nazi  Foreign 
Minister  had  replied  smugly  that  Matsuoka  “if  possible 
should  not  bring  up  the  question  in  Moscow  since  it 
probably  would  not  altogether  fit  into  the  framework  of 
the  present  situation.”  He  did  not  quite  grasp  the  signifi- 
cance of  what  was  up.  But  by  the  next  day  it  had  pene- 
trated his  wooden  mind  and  he  began  the  conversations 
that  day  by  referring  to  it.  First  of  all  he  threw  in,  as 
casually  as  Hitler  would  do  on  April  4,  a German  guaran- 
tee that  if  Russia  attacked  Japan  “Germany  would  strike 
immediately.”  He  wanted  to  give  this  assurance,  he  said, 
“so  that  Japan  could  push  southward  toward  Singapore 
without  fear  of  any  complications  with  Russia.”  When 
Matsuoka  finally  admitted  that  while  in  Moscow  on  his 
way  to  Berlin  he  himself  had  proposed  a nonaggression 

he  could  not,  for  anything  in  the  world,  live  in  a country  like  the  U.S.A., 
whose  conceptions  of  life  are  inspired  by  the  most  grasping  commercialism 
and  which  does  not  love  any  of  the  loftiest  expressions  of  the  human  spirit 
such  as  music.”  ( Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers,  pp.  449-52.) 

* The  author’s  italics. 


1147 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

pact  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  hinted  that  the  Russians 
were  favorable  inclined  toward  it,  Ribbentrop’s  mind  again 
became  somewhat  of  a blank.  He  merely  advised  that 
Matsuoka  handle  the  problem  in  a “superficial  way.” 

But  as  soon  as  the  Nipponese  Foreign  Minister  was  back 
in  Moscow  on  his  trip  home,  he  signed  a treaty  of 
neutrality  with  Stalin  which,  as  Ambassador  von  der 
Schulenburg,  who  foresaw  its  consequences,  wired  Ber- 
lin, provided  for  each  country  to  remain  neutral  in  case 
the  other  got  involved  in  the  war.  This  was  one  treaty — 
it  was  signed  on  April  13 — which  Japan  honored  to  the 
very  last  despite  subsequent  German  exhortations  that  she 
disregard  it.  For  before  the  summer  of  1941  was  out  the 
Nazis  would  be  begging  the  Japanese  to  attack  not  Singa- 
pore or  Manila  but  Vladivostok! 

At  first,  however,  Hitler  did  not  grasp  the  significance  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  Neutrality  Pact.  On  April  20  he  told 
Admiral  Raeder,  who  inquired  about  it,  that  it  had  been 
made  “with  Germany’s  acquiescence”  and  that  he  wel- 
comed it  “because  Japan  is  now  restrained  from  taking 
action  against  Vladivostok  and  should  be  induced  to  attack 
Singapore  instead.”*7  At  this  stage  Hitler  was  confident 
Germany  could  destroy  Russia  during  the  summer.  He  did 
not  want  Japan  to  share  in  this  mighty  feat  any  more  than 
he  had  desired  that  Italy  should  share  in  the  conquest  of 
France.  And  he  was  absolutely  confident  that  Japanese 
help  would  not  be  needed.  Ribbentrop,  echoing  his  mas- 
ter’s thoughts,  had  told  Matsuoka  on  March  29  that  if 
Russia  forced  Germany  “to  strike”  he  would  “consider  it 
proper  if  the  Japanese  Army  were  prevented  from  attack- 
ing Russia.” 

But  the  views  of  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  on  this  matter 

* News  of  the  signing  in  Moscow  of  the  Soviet-Japanese  neutrality  pact 
caused  considerable  alarm  in  Washington,  where  Roosevelt  and  Hull  were 
inclined  to  take  a view  similar  to  Hitler’s — namely,  that  the  treaty  would 
release  Japanese  forces  earmarked  for  a possible  war  with  Russia  for  action 
farther  south  against  British  and  perhaps  American  possessions.  Sherwood 
discloses  that  on  April  13,  when  the  news  of  the  conclusion  of  the  pact  was 
received,  the  President  scrapped  a plan  for  launching  aggressive  action  by 
U.S.  naval  ships  against  German  U-boats  in  the  western  Atlantic.  A new 
order  called  merely  for  American  warships  to  report  movements  of  German 
naval  vessels  west  of  Iceland,  not  to  shoot  at  them.  It  was  considered  that 
the  new  Japanese— Soviet  neutrality  agreement  made  the  situation  in  the 
Pacific  too  dangerous  to  risk  too  much  in  the  Atlantic.  (Robert  E.  Sherwood, 
Roosevelt  and  Hopkins,  p.  291.) 


1148  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

changed  very  suddenly  and  quite  drastically  scarcely  three 
months  later.  Six  days  after  the  Nazi  armies  were  flung  into 
Russia,  on  June  28,  1941,  Ribberftrop  was  cabling  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  in  Tokyo,  General  Eugen  Ott,  to  do 
everything  he  could  to  get  the  Japanese  to  promptly  at- 
tack Soviet  Russia  in  the  rear.  Ott  was  advised  to  appeal  to 
the  Japanese  appetite  for  spoils  and  also  to  argue  that  this 
was  the  best  way  of  keeping  America  neutral. 

It  may  be  expected  [Ribbentrop  explained]  that  the  rapid 
defeat  of  Soviet  Russia — especially  should  Japan  take  action 
in  the  East — will  prove  the  best  argument  to  convince  the 
United  States  of  the  utter  futility  of  entering  the  war  on  the 
side  of  a Great  Britain  entirely  isolated  and  confronted  by 
the  most  powerful  alliance  in  the  world.8 

Matsuoka  was  in  favor  of  immediately  turning  on  Rus- 
sia, but  his  views  were  not  accepted  by  the  government 
in  Tokyo,  whose  attitude  seemed  to  be  that  if  the  Ger- 
mans were  rapidly  defeating  the  Russians,  as  they  claimed, 
they  needed  no  help  from  the  Japanese.  However,  Tokyo 
was  not  so  sure  about  a lightning  Nazi  victory  and  this  was 
the  real  reason  for  its  stand. 

But  Ribbentrop  persisted.  On  July  10,  when  the  German 
offensive  in  Russia  was  really  beginning  to  roll  and  even 
Haider,  as  we  have  seen,  thought  that  victory  already  had 
been  won,  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  got  off  from  his  spe- 
cial train  on  the  Eastern  front  a new  and  stronger  cable 
to  his  ambassador  in  Tokyo. 

Since  Russia,  as  reported  by  the  Japanese  ambassador  in 
Moscow,  is  in  effect  close  to  collapse  ...  it  is  simply  im- 
possible that  Japan  does  not  solve  the  matter  of  Vladivostok 
and  the  Siberian  area  as  soon  as  her  military  preparations 
are  completed  . . . 

I ask  you  to  employ  all  available  means  in  further  in- 
sisting upon  Japan’s  entry  into  the  war  against  Russia  at 
the  soonest  possible  date  . . . The  sooner  this  entry  is  ef- 
fected,  the  better  it  is.  The  natural  objective  still  remains 
that  we  and  Japan  join  hands  on  the  Trans-Siberian  railroad 
before  winter  starts.9 

Such  a giddy  prospect  did  not  turn  the  head  of  even 
the  militaristic  Japanese  government.  Four  days  later  Am- 
bassador Ott  replied  that  he  was  doing  his  best  to  per- 
suade the  Japanese  to  attack  Russia  as  soon  as  possible 
that  Matsuoka  was  all  for  it,  but  that  he,  Ott,  had  to  fight 


1149 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

against  “great  obstacles”  in  the  Tokyo  cabinet.10  As  a mat- 
ter of  fact  the  fire-eating  Matsuoka  was  soon  forced  out 
of  the  cabinet.  With  his  departure,  Germany  lost,  for  the 
time  being,  its  best  friend,  and  though,  as  we  shall  see, 
closer  relations  were  later  restored  between  Berlin  and 
Tokyo  they  never  became  close  enough  to  convince  the 
Japanese  of  the  wisdom  of  helping  Germany  in  the  war 
against  Russia.  Once  more  Hitler  had  been  bested  at  his 
own  game  by  a wily  ally.* 

“AVOID  INCIDENTS  WITH  THE  U.S.A.!” 

With  Japan  stubbornly  refusing  to  help  pull  Hitler’s 
chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  in  Russia — the  Japanese  had  their 
own  chestnuts  roasting — it  became  all  the  more  important 
to  Germany  that  the  United  States  be  kept  out  of  the  war 
until  the  Soviet  Union  had  been  conquered,  as  the  Fuehrer 
was  confident  that  summer  of  1941  it  would  be  before 
winter  came. 

The  German  Navy  had  long  chafed  under  the  restraints 
which  Hitler  had  imposed  on  its  efforts  to  curtail  Ameri- 
can shipments  to  Britain  and  to  cope  with  the  increasing 
belligerency  of  U.S.  warships  toward  German  U-boats  and 
surface  craft  operating  in  the  Atlantic.  The  Nazi  admirals, 
looking  further  afield  than  Hitler’s  landlocked  mind  was 
capable  of  doing,  had  almost  from  the  first  regarded 
America’s  entry  into  the  war  as  inevitable  and  they  had 
urged  the  Supreme  Commander  to  prepare  for  it.  Im- 
mediately after  the  fall  of  France  in  June  1940,  Admiral 
Raeder,  backed  by  Goering,  had  urged  Hitler  to  seize 
not  only  French  West  Africa  but,  more  important,  the 

* Ribbentrop  kept  trying  all  that  fall  and  several  times  during  the  next  two 
years  to  induce  the  Japanese  to  fall  upon  Russia  from  the  rear,  but  each 
time  the  Tokyo  government  replied  politely  in  effect,  “So  sorry,  please.” 

Hitler  himself  remained  hopeful  all  through  the  summer.  On  August  26 
he  told  Raeder  he  was  “convinced  that  Japan  will  carry  out  the  attack  on 
Vladivostok  as  soon  as  forces  have  been  assembled.  The  present  aloofness 
can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  assembling  of  forces  is  to  be  accom- 
plished undisturbed,  and  the  attack  is  to  come  as  a surprise.”  11 

The  Japanese  archives  reveal  how  Tokyo  evaded  the  Germans  on  this 
embarrassing  question.  When,  for  instance,  on  August  19  Ambassador  Ott 
asked  the  Japanese  Vice-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  about  Japan’s  inter- 
vention against  Russia,  the  latter  replied.  “For  Japan  to  do  a thing  like  at- 
tacking Russia  would  be  a very  serious  question  and  would  require  profound 
reflection.”  When  on  August  30  Ott,  who  by  now  was  a very  irritated  am- 
bassador, asked  Foreign  Minister  Admiral  Toyoda,  “Is  there  any  possibility 
that  Japan  may  participate  in  the  Russo-German  war?”  Toyoda  replied, 
“Japan’s  preparations  are  now  making  headway,  and  it  will  take  more  time 
for  their  completion.”  u 


11S0 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Atlantic  islands,  including  Iceland,  the  Azores  and  the 
Canaries,  to  prevent  the  United  States  from  occupying 
them.  Hitler  had  expressed  interest,  but  he  first  wanted  to 
invade  England  and  conquer  Russia.  Then  the  upstart 
Americans,  their  position  rendered  hopeless,  would  be 
taken  care  of.  A top-secret  memorandum  of  Major  Freiherr 
von  Falkenstein,  of  the  General  Staff,  discloses  Hitler’s 
views  at  the  end  of  the  summer  in  1940. 

The  Fuehrer  is  at  present  occupied  with  the  question  of 
the  occupation  of  the  Atlantic  Islands  with  a view  to  the 
prosecution  of  war  against  America  at  a later  date.  Delibera- 
tions on  this  subject  are  being  embarked  on  here.13 

It  was  not  a question,  then,  of  whether  or  not  Hitler 
intended  to  go  to  war  against  the  United  States  but  of  the 
date  he  would  choose  to  embark  on  it.  By  the  following 
spring  the  date  was  beginning  to  sprout  in  the  Fuehrer’s 
mind.  On  May  22,  1941,  Admiral  Raeder  conferred  with 
the  Supreme  Commander  and  reported  ruefully  that  the 
Navy  “must  reject  the  idea  of  occupying  the  Azores.”  It 
simply  didn’t  have  the  strength.  But  by  this  time  Hitler 
had  warmed  to  the  project  and,  according  to  Raeder’s 
confidential  notes,14  replied: 

The  Fuehrer  is  still  in  favor  of  occupying  the  Azores 
in  order  to  be  able  to  operate  long-range  bombers  from 
there  against  the  U.S.A.  The  occasion  for  this  may  arise 
by  autumn.* 

After  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union,  that  is.  The  turn  of 
the  United  States  would  come  then.  He  put  this  clearly  to 
Raeder  when  the  Admiral  saw  him  just  two  months  later, 
on  July  25,  when  the  offensive  in  Russia  was  in  full  swing. 
“After  the  Eastern  campaign,”  Raeder  notes  him  as  saying, 
“he  reserves  the  right  to  take  severe  action  against  the 
U.S.A.” 15  But  until  then,  Hitler  emphasized  to  his  Navy 
chief,  he  wanted  “to  avoid  having  the  U.S.A.  declare  war 
. . . out  of  consideration  for  the  Army,  which  is  involved 
in  heavy  combat.” 

Raeder  was  not  satisfied  with  this  stand.  In  fact,  his 
diary  accounts  of  his  meetings  with  Hitler,  which  one  can 

* The  Germans  had  no  long-range  bombers  capable  of  reaching  the  American 
coast  from  the  Azores — much  less  getting  back — and  it  is  a sign  of  the 
warping  of  Hitler’s  mind  by  this  time  that  he  conjured  up  the  nonexistent 
long-range  bombers.” 


1151 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

now  peruse  in  the  captured  documents,  show  his  growing 
impatience  at  the  wraps  which  the  Fuehrer  had  placed  on 
the  German  Navy.  At  every  interview  he  sought  to  change 
the  Leader’s  mind. 

Early  that  year,  on  February  4,  Raeder  submitted  a 
memorandum  to  Hitler  in  which  the  Navy  expressed  strong 
doubts  about  the  value  of  continued  American  neutrality, 
as  it  was  working  out,  to  Germany.  In  fact  the  admirals 
argued  that  America’s  entry  into  the  war  might  even 
prove  “advantageous  for  the  German  war  effort”  if  Japan 
thereby  became  a belligerent  on  the  side  of  the  Axis.14 
But  the  Nazi  dictator  was  not  impressed  by  the  argument. 

Raeder  was  greatly  discouraged.  The  Battle  of  the  At- 
lantic was  at  its  height  and  Germany  was  not  winning  it. 
American  supplies  under  the  Lend-Lease  agreement  were 
pouring  into  Britain.  The  Pan-American  Neutrality  Patrol 
was  making  it  more  and  more  difficult  for  the  U-boats  to 
be  effective.  All  this  Raeder  pointed  out  to  Hitler,  but 
without  much  effect.  He  saw  the  Leader  again  on  March 
18  and  reported  that  U.S.  warships  were  escorting  Ameri- 
can convoys  bound  for  Britain  as  far  as  Iceland.  He  de- 
manded authority  to  attack  them  without  warning.  He 
asked  that  something  be  done  to  prevent  the  U.S.A.  from 
gaining  a foothold  in  French  West  Africa.  This  possibility, 
he  said,  “was  most  dangerous.”  Hitler  listened  and  said  he 
would  discuss  these  matters  with  the  Foreign  Office  (of  all 
places!),  which  was  one  way  of  putting  the  admirals  off.17 

All  through  the  spring  and  early  summer  he  continued 
to  put  them  off.  On  April  20  he  refused  to  listen  to 
Raeder’s  pleas  “for  warfare  against  merchant  ships  of  the 
U.S.A.,  according  to  prize  regulations.” 18  The  first  re- 
corded clash  between  American  and  German  war  vessels 
had  occurred  on  April  10  when  the  U.S.  destroyer  Nib- 
lack  dropped  depth  charges  on  a German  U-boat  which 
showed  signs  of  attacking.  On  May  22  Raeder  was  back 
at  the  Berghof  with  a long  memorandum  suggesting  coun- 
termeasures to  President  Roosevelt’s  unfriendly  acts,  but 
he  could  not  move  his  Supreme  Commander. 

The  Fuehrer  [the  Admiral  noted]  considers  the  attitude 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States  still  undecided.  Under 
no  circumstances  does  he  wish  to  cause  incidents  which 
would  result  in  U.S.  entry  into  the  war.19 


1152  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

There  was  all  the  more  reason  to  avoid  such  incidents 
when  the  campaign  in  Russia  began,  and  on  June  21,  the 
day  before  the  attack  commenced,  Hitler  emphasized  this 
to  Raeder.  The  Grand  Admiral  had  given  him  a glowing 
account  of  how  the  U-253,  spotting  the  U.S.  battleship 
Texas  and  an  accompanying  destroyer  within  the  block- 
ade zone  in  the  "North  Atlantic  proclaimed  by  Germany, 
had  “chased  and  attempted  to  attack  them”  and  had  added 
that  “where  the  U.S.A.  is  concerned  firm  measures  are  al- 
ways more  effective  than  apparent  yielding.”  The  Fuehrer 
agreed  with  the  principle  but  not  with  the  specific  action 
and  once  more  he  admonished  the  Navy. 

The  Fuehrer  declares  in  detail  that  until  Operation  Bar- 
barossa  is  well  under  way  he  wishes  to  avoid  any  incident 
with  the  U.S.A.  After  a few  weeks  the  situation  will  become 
clearer,  and  can  be  expected  to  have  a favorable  effect  on 
the  U.S. A.  and  Japan.  America  will  have  less  inclination  to 
enter  the  war  due  to  the  threat  from  Japan  which  will  then 
increase.  If  possible,  therefore,  in  the  next  weeks  all  attacks 
on  naval  vessels  in  the  closed  area  should  cease. 

When  Raeder  attempted  to  argue  that  at  night  it  was 
difficult  to  distinguish  enemy  from  neutral  warships  Hitler 
cut  him  short  by  instructing  him  to  issue  new  orders  to 
avoid  incidents  with  America.  As  a result  the  Navy  chief 
sent  out  orders  the  same  night  calling  off  attacks  on  any 
naval  vessels  “inside  or  outside  the  closed  area”  unless  they 
were  definitely  identified  as  British.  A similar  order  was 
given  the  Luftwaffe.20 

On  July  9,  President  Roosevelt  announced  that  Ameri- 
can forces  were  taking  over  the  occupation  of  Iceland 
from  the  British.  The  reaction  in  Berlin  was  immediate 
and  violent.  Ribbentrop  cabled  Tokyo  that  “this  intrusion 
of  American  military  forces  in  support  of  England  into  a 
territory  which  has  been  officially  proclaimed  by  us  to  be 
a combat  area  is  in  itself  an  aggression  against  Germany 
and  Europe.”21 

Raeder  hurried  to  Wolfsschanze,  from  where  the  Fueh- 
rer was  directing  his  armies  in  Russia.  He  wanted  a de- 
cision, he  said,  on  “whether  the  occupation  of  Iceland  by 
the  U.S.A.  is  to  be  considered  as  an  entry  into  the  war, 
or  as  an  act  of  provocation  which  should  be  ignored.” 
As  for  the  German  Navy,  it  considered  the  American  land- 


1153 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

ings  in  Iceland  an  act  of  war  and  in  a two-page  memo- 
randum it  reminded  the  Fuehrer  of  all  the  other  acts  of 
“aggression”  against  Germany  committed  by  the  Roosevelt 
government.  Moreover,  the  Navy  demanded  the  right  to 
sink  American  freighters  in  the  convoy  area  and  to  attack 
U.S.  warships  if  the  occasion  required  it.*  Hitler  refused. 

The  Fuehrer  explains  in  detail  [Raeder’s  report  on  the 
meeting  declares]  that  he  is  most  anxious  to  postpone  the 
United  States’  entry  into  the  war  for  another  one  or  two 
months.  On  the  one  hand  the  Eastern  campaign  must  be 
carried  on  with  the  entire  Air  Force  . . . which  he  does  not 
wish  to  divert  even  in  part;  on  the  other  hand,  a victorious 
campaign  on  the  Eastern  front  will  have  a tremendous  effect 
on  the  whole  situation  and  probably  on  the  attitude  of  the 
U.S.A.  Therefore  for  the  time  being  he  does  not  wish  the 
existing  instructions  changed,  but  rather  wants  to  be  sure 
that  incidents  will  be  avoided. 

When  Raeder  argued  that  his  naval  commanders  could 
not  be  held  responsible  for  “a  mistake”  if  American  ships 
were  hit.  Hitler  retorted  that  at  least  in  regard  to  war 
vessels  the  Navy  had  better  “definitely  establish”  that  they 
were  enemy  craft  before  attacking.  To  make  sure  that  the 
admirals  understood  him  correctly  the  Fuehrer  issued  a 
specific  order  on  July  19  stipulating  that  “in  the  extended 
zone  of  operations  U.S.  merchant  ships,  whether  single  or 
sailing  in  English  or  American  convoys  and  if  recognized 
as  such  before  resort  to  arms,  are  not  to  be  attacked.” 
Within  the  blockade  area,  which  was  also  recognized  by 
the  United  States  as  being  out  of  bounds,  American  vessels 
could  be  attacked,  but  Hitler  specifically  laid  it  down  in 
this  order  that  this  war  zone  “did  not  include  the  U.S.A.- 
Iceland  sea  route.”  The  underlining  was  Hitler’s.22 

But  “mistakes,”  as  Raeder  said,  were  bound  to  occur. 
On  May  21  a U-boat  had  sunk  the  American  freighter 
Robin  Moor  en  route  to  South  Africa  and  at  a place  well 
outside  the  German  blockade  zone.  Two  more  American 
merchant  vessels  were  torpedoed  toward  the  end  of  the 
summer.  On  September  4 a German  submarine  fired  two 
torpedoes  at  the  U.S.  destroyer  Greer,  both  missing.  A 
week  later,  on  September  11,  Roosevelt  reacted  to  this 

* It  might  be  noted  here  that  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  Admiral  Raeder 
insisted  that  he  did  everything  possible  to  avoid  provoking  the  United  States 
into  war. 


1154  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

attack  in  a speech  in  which  he  announced  that  he  had 
given  orders  to  the  Navy  to  “shoot  on  sight”  and  warned 
that  Axis  warships  entering  the  American  defense  zone 
did  so  “at  their  peril.” 

The  speech  incensed  Berlin.  In  the  Nazi  press  Roosevelt 
was  attacked  as  “Warmonger  Number  One.”  Ribbentrop 
recalled  at  Nuremberg  that  Hitler  “was  greatly  excited.” 
However,  by  the  time  Admiral  Raeder  arrived  at  the 
Wolfsschanze  headquarter?  on  the  Eastern  front  on  the 
afternoon  of  September  17  to  urge  a drastic  retaliation  to 
the  shoot-on-sight”  order,  the  Fuehrer  had  calmed  down. 
To  the  Admiral’s  plea  that  the  German  Navy  at  last  be 
released  from  the  restrictions  against  attacking  American 
ships  the  Supreme  Commander  again  gave  a firm  No. 

[Since]  it  appears  that  the  end  of  September  will  bring 
the  great  decision  in  the  Russian  campaign  [Raeder’s  record 
of  the  conversation  declares],  the  Fuehrer  requests  that  care 
be  taken  to  avoid  any  incidents  in  the  war  on  merchant 
shipping  before  about  the  middle  of  October. 

“Therefore,”  Raeder  noted  sadly,  “the  Commander  in 
Chief,  Navy,  and  the  Commanding  Admiral,  Submarines 
[Doenitz],  withdraw  their  suggestions.  The  submarines 
are  to  be  informed  of  the  reason  for  temporarily  keeping 
to  the  old  orders.”  23  In  view  of  the  circumstances,  Hitler 
was  certainly  behaving  with  unaccustomed  restraint.  But 
admittedly  it  was  more  difficult  for  the  young  U-boat 
commanders,  operating  in  the  stormy  waters  of  the  North 
Atlantic  and  constantly  harassed  by  increasingly  effective 
British  antisubmarine  measures  in  which  U.S.  war  vessels 
sometimes  joined,  to  restrain  themselves.  Hitler  had  told 
Raeder  in  July  that  he  would  never  call  a submarine  skip- 
per to  account  if  he  sank  an  American  ship  “by  mistake.” 
On  November  9,  in  his  annual  address  to  the  Nazi  Old 
Guard  at  the  familiar  beer  cellar  in  Munich,  he  answered 
Roosevelt’s  speech. 

President  Roosevelt  has  ordered  his  ships  to  shoot  the 
moment  they  sight  German  ships.  I have  ordered  German 
ships  not  to  shoot  when  they  sight  American  vessels,  but  to 
defend  themselves  when  attacked.  I will  have  any  German 
officer  court-martialed  who  fails  to  defend  himself. 

And  on  November  13  he  issued  a new  directive  ordering 
that  while  engagements  with  American  warships  were  to 


1155 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

be  avoided  as  far  as  possible  German  submarines  must 
defend  themselves  against  attack.24 

They  had,  of  course,  already  done  that.  On  the  night  of 
October  16-17,  the  U.S.  destroyer  Kearny,  coming  to 
the  aid  of  a convoy  which  was  being  attacked  by  German 
submarines,  dropped  depth  charges  on  one  of  them,  which 
retaliated  by  torpedoing  it.  Eleven  men  of  the  crew  were 
killed.  These  were  the  first  American  casualties  in  the  un- 
declared war  with  Germany.*  More  were  to  quickly  follow. 
On  October  31,  the  U.S.  destroyer  Reuben  James  was 
torpedoed  and  sunk  while  on  convoy  duty,  with  the  loss 
of  100  men  of  145  in  its  crew,  including  all  its  seven 
officers.  Thus,  long  before  the  final  formalities  of  declaring 
war,  a shooting  war  had  begun. 

JAPAN  PLAYS  ITS  OWN  GAME 

Japan,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  assigned  by  Hitler  the 
role  not  of  bringing  the  United  States  into  the  war  but  of 
keeping  her,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  out  of  it.  He 
knew  that  if  the  Japanese  took  Singapore  and  threatened 
India  this  would  not  only  be  a severe  blow  to  the  British 
but  would  divert  America’s  attention — and  some  of  her 
energies — from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific.  Even  after  he 
began  begging  the  Japanese  to  attack  Vladivostok  he  saw 
in  this  a means  not  only  to  help  him  bring  Russia  down 
but  to  further  pressure  the  United  States  into  remaining 
neutral.  Strangely  enough,  it  never  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  him  or  to  anyone  else  in  Germany  until  very  late  that 
Japan  had  her  own  fish  to  fry  and  that  the  Japanese 
might  be  fearful  of  embarking  on  a grand  offensive  in 
Southeast  Asia  against  the  British  and  Dutch,  not  to  men- 
tion attacking  Russia  in  the  rear,  until  they  had  secured 
their  own  rear  by  destroying  the  United  States  Pacific 
Fleet.  True,  the  Nazi  conqueror  had  promised  Matsuoka 
that  Germany  would  go  to  war  with  America  if  Japan  did, 
but  Matsuoka  was  no  longer  in  the  government,  and,  be- 
sides, Hitler  had  constantly  nagged  the  Japanese  to  avoid 

* “History  has  recorded  who  fired  the  first  shot,”  Roosevelt  declared  in 
reference  to  this  incident  in  a Navy  Day  speech  on  October  27.  In  all  fair- 
ness it  would  seem  that  in  dropping  depth  charges  the  United  States  fired 
the  first  shot.  According  to  thfe  confidential  German  Navy  records  this  was 
not  the  first  such  occasion.  The  official  U.S.  naval  historian  confirms  that  as 
early  as  April  10  the  Niblack  (see  above,  p.  1151)  attacked  a U-boat  with 
depth  charges.  (Samuel  Eliot  Morison,  History  of  the  United  States  Naval 
Operations  in  World  War  II,  Vol.  I,  p.  57.) 


1156 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

a direct  conflict  with  America  and  concentrate  on  Britain 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  whose  resistance  was  preventing 
him  from  winning  the  war.  It  did  not  dawn  on  the  Nazi 
rulers  that  Japan  might  give  first  priority  to  a direct  chal- 
lenge to  the  United  States. 

Not  that  Berlin  wanted  the  Japanese  and  Americans  to 
reach  an  understanding.  That  would  defeat  the  main  pur- 
pose of  the  Tripartite  Pact,  which  was  to  frighten  the 
Americans  into  staying  out  of  the  war.  For  once  Ribben- 
trop  probably  gave  an  honest  and  accurate  appraisal  of  the 
Fuehrer’s  thoughts  on  this  when  he  told  an  interrogator 
at  Nuremberg: 

He  [Hitler]  was  afraid  that  if  an  arrangement  were  made 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan  this  would  mean,  so  to 
speak,  the  back  free  for  America,  and  the  unexpected  attack 
or  entry  into  the  war  by  the  United  States  would  come 
quicker  . . . He  was  worried  about  an  agreement  because 
there  were  certain  groups  in  Japan  who  wanted  to  come  to 
an  arrangement  with  America.25 

One  member  of  such  a group  was  Admiral  Kichisaburo 
Nomura,  who  arrived  in  Washington  in  February  1941  as 
the  new  Japanese  ambassador  and  whose  series  of  confi- 
dential conversations  with  Cordell  Hull  which  began  in 
March,  with  the  aim  of  settling  peacefully  the  differences 
between  the  two  countries,  and  which  continued  right  up 
to  the  end,  gave  considerable  worry  to  Berlin.* 

In  fact,  the  Germans  did  their  best  to  sabotage  the 
Washington  talks.  As  early  as  May  15,  1941,  Weizsaecker 
submitted  a memorandum  to  Ribbentrop  pointing  out  that 
“any  political  treaty  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
is  undesirable  at  the  present”  and  arguing  that  unless  it 
were  prevented  Japan  might  be  lost  to  the  Axis.28  General 
Ott,  the  Nazi  ambassador  in  Tokyo,  called  frequently  at 
the  Foreign  Office,  to  warn  against  the  Hull-Nomura 
negotiations.  When,  in  spite  of  this,  they  continued,  the 
Germans  switched  to  a new  maneuver  of  trying  to  induce 
the  Japanese  to  make  as  a condition  for  their  continuation 
that  the  United  States  abandon  its  aid  to  Britain  and  its 
hostile  policies  toward  Germany.27 

* “I  credit  Nomura,”  Hull  wrote  later  in  his  memoirs,  “with  having  been 
honestly  sincere  in  trying  to  avoid  war  between  his  country  and  mine.’7  (The 
Memoirs  of  Cordell  Hull , II,  p.  987.) 


1157 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

That  was  in  May.  The  summer  brought  a change.  In 
July  Hitler  was  concerned  mainly  with  badgering  Japan 
into  attacking  the  Soviet  Union,  and  that  month  Secretary 
Hull  broke  off  the  talks  with  Nomura  because  the  Japanese 
had  invaded  French  Indochina.  They  were  resumed  toward 
the  middle  of  August  when  the  Japanese  government  pro- 
posed a personal  meeting  between  Premier  Prince  Konoye 
and  President  Roosevelt  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  a 
peaceful  settlement.  This  did  not  please  Berlin  at  all  and 
the  indefatigable  Ott  was  soon  at  the  Tokyo  Foreign  Of- 
fice expressing  Nazi  displeasure  with  this  turn  of  events. 
Both  Foreign  Minister  Admiral  Toyoda  and  Vice-Minister 
Amau  told  him  blandly  that  the  proposed  Konoye-Roose- 
velt  talks  would  merely  advance  the  purpose  Of  the 
Tripartite  Pact,  which  they  reminded  him  was  “to  prevent 
American  participation  in  the  war.”  28 

In  the  autumn,  as  the  Hull-Nomura  talks  continued, 
the  Wilhelmstrasse  switched  back  to  the  old  tactics  of  the 
spring.  It  insisted  in  Tokyo  that  Nomura  be  instructed  to 
warn  the  United  States  that  if  it  continued  its  unfriendly 
acts  toward  the  European  Axis  Germany  and  Italy  might 
have  to  declare  war,  and  that  in  this  case  Japan,  under  the 
terms  of  the  Tripartite  Pact,  would  have  to  join  them. 
Hitler  still  did  not  want  America  in  the  war;  the  move 
was  made,  in  fact,  to  bluff  Washington  into  staying  out 
while  at  the  same  time  affording  some  relief  from  Ameri- 
can belligerency  in  the  Atlantic. 

Secretary  Hull  learned  immediately  of  this  new  Ger- 
man pressure,  thanks  to  “Magic,”  as  it  was  called,  which 
since  the  end  of  1940  had  enabled  the  American  govern- 
ment to  decode  intercepted  Japanese  cable  and  wireless 
messages  in  Tokyo’s  most  secret  ciphers — not  only  those 
sent  to  and  from  Washington  but  those  to  and  from  Berlin 
and  other  capitals.  The  German  demand  was  cabled  by 
Toyoda  to  Nomura  on  October  16,  1941,  along  with  in- 
structions to  present  a watered-down  version  to  Hull.29 

That  day  the  Konoye  government  fell  and  was  replaced 
by  a military  cabinet  headed  by  the  hotheaded,  belligerent 
General  Hideki  Tojo.  In  Berlin  General  Oshima,  a warrior 
of  similar  cast,  hastened  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  to  ex- 
plain the  good  news  to  the  German  government.  Tojo’s 
appearance  at  the  post  as  Premier  meant,  the  ambassador 
said,  that  Japan  would  draw  closer  to  its  Axis  partners  and 


1158 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

that  the  talks  in  Washington  would  cease.  Whether  on 
purpose  or  not,  he  neglected  to  tell  his  Nazi  friends  what 
the  consequences  of  the  cessation  of  those  talks  must  be, 
and  that  Tojo’s  appointment  therefore  meant  a good  deal 
more  than  they  suspected:  namely,  that  his  new  govern- 
ment was  determined  to  go  to  war  with  the  United  States 
unless  the  Washington  negotiations  swiftly  ended  with 
President  Roosevelt  accepting  the  Japanese  terms  for  a free 
hand  not  to  attack  Russia  but  to  occupy  Southeast  Asia. 
This  course  had  never  entered  the  minds  of  Ribbentrop 
and  Hitler,  who  still  envisaged  Japan  as  useful  and  helpful 
to  German  interests  only  if  she  attacked  Siberia  and  Sing- 
apore and  frightened  Washington  into  worrying  about  the 
Pacific  and  staying  out  of  the  war.  The  Fuehrer  and,  of 
course,  his  doltish  Foreign  Minister  had  never  understood 
that  the  failure  of  the  Nomura-Hull  negotiations  in  Wash- 
ington, which  they  so  greatly  desired,  would  bring  the  very 
result  they  had  been  trying  to  avoid  until  the  time  was 
ripe:  America’s  entry  into  the  world  conflict.* 

The  sands  were  now  rapidly  running  out. 

On  November  15  Saburo  Kurusu  arrived  in  Washington 
as  a special  ambassador  to  aid  Nomura  in  the  negotiations, 
but  Secretary  Hull  soon  sensed  that  the  diplomat,  who  as 
the  Japanese  envoy  in  Berlin  had  signed  the  Tripartite 
Pact  and  was  somewhat  pro-German,  had  brought  no  fresh 
proposals  with  him.  His  purpose,  Hull  thought,  was  to  try 
to  persuade  Washington  to  accept  the  Japanese  terms  at 
once  or,  if  that  failed,  to  lull  the  American  government 
with  talk  until  Japan  was  ready  to  strike  a heavy  surprise 
blow.30  On  November  19  came  the  ominous  “Winds”  mes- 
sage to  Nomura  from  Tokyo,  which  Hull’s  cryptographers 
promptly  deciphered.  If  the  Japanese  newscaster  on  the 
short-wave  Tokyo  broadcast,  which  the  Embassy  picked 
up  daily,  inserted  the  words  “East  wind,  rain,”  that  would 
mean  that  the  Japanese  government  had  decided  on  war 
with  America.  Nomura  was  instructed,  on  receipt  of  the 
‘Winds”  warning,  to  destroy  all  his  codes  and  confidential 
papers. 

Now  Berlin  awoke  to  what  was  up.  The  day  before  the 

* Prince  Konoye’s  postwar  memoirs  reveal  that  as  early  as  August  4 he  was 
forced  to  agree  to  a demand  of  the  Army  that  if,  in  his  proposed  meeting 
with  Roosevelt,  the  President  did  not  accept  Japan’s  terms,  he  would  walk 
9Vi  „ t!’.e  meeting  “with  a determination  to  make  war  on  the  United  States.” 
(Hull,  Memoirs,  pp.  1025-26.) 


1159 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

“Winds”  message,  on  November  18,  Ribbentrop  was  some- 
what surprised  to  receive  a request  from  Tokyo  asking 
Germany  to  sign  a treaty  in  which  the  two  nations  would 
agree  not  to  conclude  a separate  peace  with  common  ene- 
mies. Just  which  enemies  the  Japanese  meant  was  not  clear, 
but  the  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  obviously  hoped  that  Rus- 
sia was  the  first  of  them.  He  agreed  “in  principle”  to 
the  proposal,  apparently  in  the  comforting  belief  that 
Japan  at  last  was  about  to  honor  its  vague  promises  to  hit 
the  Soviet  Union  in  Siberia.  This  was  most  welcome  and 
timely,  for  the  resistance  of  the  Red  Army  on  the  broad 
front  was  becoming  formidable  and  the  Russian  winter 
was  setting  in — much  earlier  than  had  been  anticipated. 
A Japanese  attack  on  Vladivostok  and  the  Pacific  mari- 
time provinces  might  provide  that  extra  ounce  of  pressure 
which  would  bring  a Soviet  collapse. 

Ribbentrop  was  swiftly  disillusioned.  On  November  23 
Ambassador  Ott  wired  him  from  Tokyo  that  all  indications 
were  that  the  Japanese  were  moving  south  with  the  inten- 
tion of  occupying  Thailand  and  the  Dutch-held  Borneo 
oil  fields,  and  that  the  Japanese  government  wanted  to 
know  if  Germany  would  make  common  cause  with  her 
if  she  were  to  start  a war.  This  information  plainly 
meant  that  Japan  would  not  strike  against  Russia  but  was 
contemplating  “starting  a war”  with  the  Netherlands  and 
Britain  in  the  South  Pacific  which  well  might  embroil 
her  in  an  armed  conflict  with  the  United  States.  But  Rib- 
bentrop and  Ott  did  not  grasp  the  last  point.  Their  ex- 
changes of  telegrams  during  these  days  show  that  though 
they  now  realized,  to  their  disappointment,  that  Japan 
would  not  attack  Russia  they  believed  that  her  move  south- 
ward would  be  against  the  possessions  of  the  Dutch  and 
British  and  not  those  of  the  United  States.  Uncle  Sam,  as 
Hitler  desired,  would  be  kept  on  the  sidelines  until  his 
time  came.31 

Nazi  misapprehensions  were  due  in  large  part  to  the 
failure  at  this  juncture  of  the  Japanese  to  take  the  German 
government  into  their  confidence  as  to  their  fateful  deci- 
sions regarding  America.  Secretary  Hull,  thanks  to  the 
“Magic”  code  breaker,  was  much  better  informed.  As  early 
as  November  5 he  knew  that  the  new  Foreign  Minister, 
Shigenori  Togo,  had  wired  Nomura  setting  a deadline  of 


1160  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

November  25  for  the  signing  of  an  agreement — on  Japan’s 
terms — with  the  American  government.  The  final  Japanese 
proposals  were  delivered  in  Washington  on  November  20. 
Hull  and  Roosevelt  knew  they  were  final  because  two 
days  later  Magic”  decoded  for  them  a message  from 
Togo  to  Nomura  and  Kurusu  which  said  so,  while  ex- 
tending the  deadline  to  November  29. 

There  are  reasons  beyond  your  ability  to  guess  [Togo 
wired  his  ambassadors]  why  we  wanted  to  settle  Japanese— 
American  relations  by  the  25th.  But  if  the  signing  can  be 
completed  by  the  29th  . . . we  have  decided  to  wait  until 
that  date.  This  time  we  mean  it,  that  the  deadline  absolutely 
cannot  be  changed.  After  that  things  are  automatically  going 
to  happen.32 

November  25,  1941,  is  a crucial  date. 

On  that  day  the  Japanese  carrier  task  force  sailed  for 
Pearl  Harbor.  In  Washington  Hull  went  to  the  White 
House  to  warn  the  War  Council  of  the  danger  confront- 
ing the  country  from  Japan  and  to  stress  to  the  U.S.  Army 
and  Navy  chiefs  the  possibility  of  Japanese  surprise  at- 
tacks. In  Berlin  that  day  there  was  a somewhat  grotesque 
ceremony  in  which  the  three  Axis  Powers,  amid  much 
pomp  and  ceremony,  renewed  the  Anti-Comintern  Pact 
of  1936 — an  empty  gesture  which,  as  some  Germans 
noted,  did  absolutely  nothing  to  get  Japan  into  the  war 
against  Russia  but  which  afforded  the  pompous  Ribben- 
trop  an  opportunity  to  denounce  Roosevelt  as  the  “chief 
culprit  of  this  war”  and  to  shed  crocodile  tears  for  the 
truthful,  religious  . . . American  people”  betrayed  by 
such  an  irresponsible  leader. 

The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  seems  to  have  become  in- 
toxicated by  his  own  words.  He  called  in  Oshima  on  the 
evening  of  November  28,  following  a lengthy  council  of 
war  earlier  that  day  presided  over  by  Hitler,  and  gave 
the  Japanese  ambassador  the  impression  that  the  German 
attitude  toward  the  United  States,  as  Oshima  promptly  ra- 
dioed  Tokyo,  had  “considerably  stiffened.”  Hitler’s  policy 
of  doing  everything  possible  to  keep  America  out  of  the 
war  until  Germany  was  ready  to  take  her  on  seemed 
about  to  be  jettisoned.  Suddenly  Ribbentrop  was  urging 
the  Japanese  to  go  to  war  against  the  United  States  as 
well  as  Britain  and  promising  the  backing  of  the  Third 
Reich.  After  warning  Oshima  that  “if  Japan  hesitates  . . , 


1161 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

all  the  military  might  of  Britain  and  the  United  States 
will  be  concentrated  against  Japan” — a rather  silly  thesis 
as  long  as  the  European  war  continued — Ribbentrop 
added: 

As  Hitler  said  today,  there  are  fundamental  differences  in 
the  very  right  to  exist  between  Germany  and  Japan  and  the 
United  States.  We  have  received  advice  to  the  effect  that 
there  is  practically  no  hope  of  the  Japanese-U.S.  negotia- 
tions being  concluded  successfully  because  the  United  States 
is  putting  up  a stiff  front. 

If  this  is  indeed  the  fact  of  the  case,  and  if  Japan  reaches 
a decision  to  fight  Britain  and  the  United  States,  I am  con- 
fident that  that  not  only  will  be  in  the  interest  of  Germany 
and  Japan  jointly,  but  would  bring  about  favorable  results 
for  Japan  herself. 

The  ambassador,  a tense  little  man,  was  agreeably  sur- 
prised. But  he  wanted  to  be  sure  he  understood  correctly. 

“Is  Your  Excellency,”  he  asked,  “indicating  that  a state 
of  actual  war  is  to  be  established  between  Germany  and 
the  United  States?” 

Ribbentrop  hesitated.  Perhaps  he  had  gone  too  far. 
“Roosevelt  is  a fanatic,”  he  replied,  “so  it  is  impossible  to 
tell  what  he  would  do.” 

This  seemed  a strange  and  unsatisfactory  answer  to 
Oshima  in  view  of  what  the  Foreign  Minister  had  said 
just  before,  and  toward  the  end  of  the  talk  he  insisted  on 
coming  back  to  the  main  point.  What  would  Germany  do 
if  the  war  were  actually  extended  to  “countries  which 
have  been  aiding  Britain”? 

Should  Japan  become  engaged  in  a war  against  the  United 
States  [Ribbentrop  replied]  Germany,  of  course,  would  join 
the  war  immediately.  There  is  absolutely  no  possibility  of 
Germany’s  entering  into  a separate  peace  with  the  United 
States  under  such  circumstances.  The  Fuehrer  is  determined 
on  that  point.33 

This  was  the  flat  guarantee  for  which  the  Japanese 
government  had  been  waiting.  True,  Hitler  had  given  a 
similar  one  in  the  spring  to  Matsuoka,  but  it.  seemed  to 
have  been  forgotten  during  the  intervening  period  when 
he  had  become  vexed  at  Japan’s  refusal  to  join  in  the  war 
on  Russia.  All  that  remained  now,  so  far  as  the  Japanese 
were  concerned,  was  to  get  the  Germans  to  put  their  as- 


1162 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


surance  in  writing.  General  Oshima  joyfully  filed  his  re- 
port to  Tokyo  on  November  29.  Fresh  instructions 
reached  him  in  Berlin  the  next  day.  The  Washington 
talks,  he  was  informed,  “now  stand  ruptured — broken.” 

Will  Your  Honor  [the  message  directed]  therefore  im- 
mediately interview  Chancellor  hitler  and  Foreign  Minister 
ribbentrop  and  confidentially  communicate  to  them  a sum- 
mary of  developments.  Say  to  them  that  lately  England  and 
the  United  States  have  taken  a provocative  attitude,  both  of 
them.  Say  that  they  are  planning  to  move  military  forces  into 
various  places  in  East  Asia  and  that  we  will  inevitably  have 
to  counter  by  also  moving  troops.  Say  very  secretly  to  them 
that  there  is  extreme  danger  that  war  may  suddenly  break 
out  between  Japan  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  through 
some  clash  of  arms  and  add  that  the  time  of  the  breaking 
out  of  that  war  may  come  quicker  than  anyone  dreams.*  34 

The  Japanese  carrier  fleet  was  now  well  on  its  way  to 
Pearl  Harbor.  Tokyo  was  in  a hurry  to  get  Germany  to 
sign.  On  the  same  day  that  Oshima  was  receiving  his  new 
instructions,  November  30,  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister 
was  conferring  with  the  German  ambassador  in  Tokyo,  to 
whom  he  emphasized  that  the  Washington  talks  had  bro- 
ken down  because  Japan  refused  to  accede  to  American 
demands  that  she  abandon  the  Tripartite  Pact.  The  Japa- 
nese hoped  the  Germans  would  appreciate  this  sacrifice 
in  a common  cause. 

“Grave  decisions  are  at  stake,”  Togo  told  General  Ott. 
“The  United  States  is  seriously  preparing  for  war  . . . 
Japan  is  not  afraid  of  a breakdown  in  negotiations  and 
she  hopes  that  in  that  case  Germany  and  Italy,  according 
to  the  Three-Power  Agreement,  will  stand  at  her  side.” 

I answered  [Ott  radioed  Berlin]  that  there  could  be  no 
doubt  about  Germany’s  future  position.  Japanese  Foreign 
Minister  thereupon  stated  that  he  understood  from  my  words 
that  Germany  in  such  a case  would  consider  her  relation- 
ship to  Japan  as  that  of  a community  of  fate.  I answered, 
according  to  my  opinion,  Germany  was  certainly  ready  to  have 
mutual  agreement  between  the  two  countries  on  this  situa- 
tion.35 

* Hull  says  that  he  received  a copy  of  this  message  through  “Magic.”  Thus 
Washington,  as  well  as  Berlin,  knew  by  the  last  day  of  November  that  the 
Japanese  might  strike  against  the  United  States  “quicker  than  anyone 
dreamt.”  (Hull,  Memoirs,  p.  1092.) 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 


1163 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  PEARL  HARBOR 

General  Oshima  was  a great  lover  of  German-Austrian 
classical  music  and  despite  the  gravity  and  tenseness  of 
the  situation  he  took  off  for  Austria  to  enjoy  a Mozart 
festival.  But  he  was  not  permitted  to  listen  to  the  great 
Austrian  composer’s  lovely  music  for  long.  An  urgent  call 
on  December  1 brought  him  rushing  back  to  his  embassy 
in  Berlin,  where  he  found  new  instructions  to  get  busy 
and  sign  up  Germany  on  the  dotted  line.  There  was  no 
time  to  lose. 

And  now,  when  cornered,  Ribbentrop  stalled.  Appar- 
ently realizing  fully  for  the  first  time  the  consequences  of 
his  rash  promises  to  the  Japanese,  the  Nazi  Foreign  Min- 
ister grew  exceedingly  cool  and  evasive.  He  told  Oshima 
late  on  the  evening  of  December  1 that  he  would  first 
have  to  consult  the  Fuehrer  before  making  any  definite 
commitment.  The  Japanese  ambassador  returned  to  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  on  Wednesday,  the  third,  to  press  his  case 
but  again  Ribbentrop  put  him  off.  To  Oshima’s  pleas 
that  the  situation  had  become  extremely  critical  the  For- 
eign Minister  replied  that  while  he  personally  was  for  a 
written  agreement  the  matter  would  have  to  wait  until 
the  Fuehrer  returned  from  headquarters  later  in  the  week. 
Actually,  as  Ciano  noted  in  his  diary,  not  without  a sign 
of  glee.  Hitler  had  flown  to  the  southern  front  in  Russia 
to  see  General  von  Kleist,  “whose  armies  continue  to  fall 
back  under  the  pressure  of  an  unexepcted  offensive.” 

The  Japanese,  by  this  time,  had  also  turned  to  Musso- 
lini, who  was  not  at  any  front.  On  December  3 the 
Japanese  ambassador  in  Rome  called  on  the  Duce  and 
formally  asked  Italy  to  declare  war  on  the  United  States, 
in  accordance  with  the  Tripartite  Pact,  as  soon  as  the  con- 
flict with  America  should  begin.  The  ambassador  also 
wanted  a treaty  specifying  that  there  would  be  no  separate 
peace.  The  Japanese  interpreter,  Ciano  noted  in  his  diary, 
"was  trembling  like  a leaf.”  As  for  the  Duce,  he  was 
“pleased”  to  comply,  after  consultation  with  Berlin. 

The  German  capital,  Ciano  found  the  next  day,  had 
grown  extremely  cautious. 

Maybe  they  will  go  ahead  [he  began  his  diary  on  Decern- 


1164 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ber  4]  because  they  can’t  do  otherwise,  but  the  idea  of  pro- 
voking American  intervention  is  less  and  less  liked  by  the 
Germans.  Mussolini,  on  the  other  hand,  is  happy  about  it 

Regardless  of  Ribbentrop’s  opinion,  which  Hitler,  sur- 
prisingly, still  paid  some  attention  to,  the  decision  as  to 
whether  Germany  would  give  a formal  guarantee  to  Japan 
could  be  taken  only  by  the  Nazi  warlord  himself.  During 
the  night  of  December  4-5  the  Foreign  Minister  ap- 
parently got  the  Fuehrer’s  go-ahead  and  at  3 a.m.  he  handed 
General  Oshima  a draft  of  the  requested  treaty  in  which 
Germany  would  join  Japan  in  war  against  the  United  States 
and  agree  not  to  make  a separate  peace.  Having  taken 
the  fateful  plunge  and  followed  his  Leader  in  reversing 
a policy  that  had  been  clung  to  stubbornly  for  two  years, 
he  could  not  refrain  from  seeing  that  his  Italian  ally 
promptly  followed  suit. 

A night  interrupted  by  Ribbentrop’s  restiveness  [Ciano 
began  his  diary  on  December  5],  After  having  delayed  two 
days  he  now  hasn’t  a minute  to  lose  in  answering  the  Japa- 
nese, and  at  3 o’clock  in  the  morning  he  sends  [Ambas- 
sador] Mackensen  to  my  house  to  submit  a plan  for  a 
Tripartite  Pact  of  Japanese  intervention  and  the  promise  not 
to  make  a separate  peace.  They  wanted  me  to  wake  up  the 
Duce,  but  I did  not  do  it,  and  the  Duce  was  very  pleased. 

The  Japanese  had  a draft  treaty,  approved  by  both 
Hitler  and  Mussolini,  but  they  did  not  yet  have  it  signed, 
and  this  worried  them.  They  suspected  that  the  Fuehrer 
was  stalling  because  he  wanted  a quid  pro  quo:  if  Ger- 
many joined  Japan  in  the  war  against  the  United  States, 
Japan  would  have  to  join  Germany  in  the  war  against 
Russia.  In  his  telegram  of  instructions  to  Oshima  on 
November  30,  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  had  given 
some  advice  on  how  to  handle  this  ticklish  problem  if 
the  Germans  and  Italians  raised  it. 

If  [they]  question  you  about  our  attitude  toward  the 
Soviet,  say  that  we  have  already  clarified  our  attitude  toward 
the  Russians  in  our  statement  of  last  July.  Say  that  by  our 
present  moves  southward  we  do  not  mean  to  relax  our  pres- 
sure against  the  Soviet  and  that  if  Russia  joins  hands  tighter 
with  England  and  the  United  States  and  resists  us  with  hos- 
tilities, we  are  ready  to  turn  upon  her  with  all  our  might. 
However,  right  now,  it  is  to  our  advantage  to  stress  the 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1165 

south  and  for  the  time  being  we  would  prefer  to  refrain 
from  any  direct  moves  in  the  north.36 

December  6 came.  Zhukov  that  very  day  launched  his 
counteroffensive  in  front  of  Moscow  and  the  German 
armies  reeled  back  in  the  snow  and  bitter  cold.  There  was 
all  the  more  reason  for  Hitler  to  demand  his  quid  pro  quo . 
On  this  question  there  was  great  uneasiness  in  the  Foreign 
Office  in  Tokyo.  The  naval  task  force  was  now  within 
flying  distance  of  Pearl  Harbor  for  its  carrier  planes.  So 
far  miraculously — it  had  not  been  discovered  by  Ameri- 
can ships  or  aircraft.  But  it  might  be  any  moment.  A 
long  message  was  being  radioed  from  Tokyo  to  Nomura 
and  Kurusu  in  Washington  instructing  them  to  call  on 
Secretary  Hull  at  precisely  1 p.m.  the  next  day,  Sunday, 
December  7,  to  present  Japan’s  rejection  of  the  latest 
American  proposals,  and  stressing  that  the  negotiations 
were  “de  facto  ruptured.”  In  desperation  Tokyo  turned 
to  Berlin  for  a written  guarantee  of  German  support.  The 
Japanese  warlords  still  did  not  trust  the  Germans  enough 
to  inform  them  of  the  blow  against  the  United  States 
which  would  fall  the  next  day.  But  they  were  more  worried 
than  ever  that  Hitler  would  refrain  from  giving  his  guar- 
antee unless  Japan  agreed  to  take  on  not  only  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  but  the  Soviet  Union  as  well. 
In  this  predicament  Togo  got  off  a long  message  to  Am- 
bassador Oshima  in  Berlin  urging  him  to  somehow  stall 
the  Germans  on  the  Russian  matter  and  not  to  give  in 
unless  it-  became  absolutely  necessary.  Deluded  though 
they  were  about  their  ability  to  deal  with  the  Americans 
and  the  British,  the  Japanese  generals  and  admirals  re- 
tained enough  sense  to  realize  that  they  could  not  fight 
the  Russians  at  the  same  time — even  with  German  help. 
Togo's  instructions  to  Oshima  on  that  fateful  Saturday, 
December  6,  which  are  among  the  intercepted  messages 
decoded  by  Secretary  Hull’s  expert  decipherers,  give  an  in- 
teresting insight  into  the  diplomacy  practiced  by  the  Nip- 
ponese with  the  Third  Reich  at  the  eleventh  hour. 

We  would  like  to  avoid  ...  an  armed  clash  with  Russia 
until  strategic  circumstances  permit  it;  so  get  the  German 
government  to  understand  this  position  of  ours  and  negotiate 
with  them  so  that  at  least  for  the  present  they  will  not  in- 
sist  upon  exchanging  diplomatic  notes  on  this  question. 


1166  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Explain  to  them  at  considerable  length  that  insofar  as 
American  materials  being  shipped  to  Soviet  Russia  . . . they 
are  neither  of  high  quality  nor  of  large  quantity,  and  that 
in  case  we  start  our  war  with  the  United  States  we  will 
capture  all  American  ships  destined  for  Soviet  Russia.  Please 
endeavor  to  come  to  an  understanding  on  this  line. 

However,  should  Ribbentrop  insist  upon  our  giving  a 
guarantee  in  this  matter,  since  in  that  case  we  shall  have 
no  other  recourse,  make  a . . . statement  to  the  effect  that 
we  would,  as  a matter  of  principle,  prevent  war  materials 
from  being  shipped  from  the  United  States  to  Soviet  Russia 
via  Japanese  waters,  and  get  them  to  agree  to  a procedure 
permitting  the  addition  of  a statement  to  the  effect  that  so 
long  as  strategic  reasons  continue  to  make  it  necessary  for 
us  to  keep  Soviet  Russia  from  fighting  Japan  (what  I mean  is 
that  we  cannot  capture  Soviet  ships)  we  cannot  carry  this 
out  thoroughly. 

In  case  the  German  government  refuses  to  agree  with 
[the  above]  and  makes  their  approval  of  this  question 
absolutely  conditional  upon  our  participation  in  the  war 
and  upon  our  concluding  a treaty  against  making  a separate 
peace,  we  have  no  way  but  to  postpone  the  conclusion  of 
such  a treaty.37 

The  Japanese  need  not  have  worried  so  much.  For  re» 
sons  unknown  to  the  Tokyo  militarists,  or  to  anyone  else, 
and  which  defy  logic  and  understanding,  Hitler  did  not 
insist  on  Japan’s  taking  on  Russia  along  with  the  United 
States  and  Britain,  though  if  he  had  the  course  of  the 
war  conceivably  might  have  been  different. 

At  any  rate,  the  Japanese  on  this  Saturday  evening  of 
December  6,  1941,  were  determined  to  strike  a telling 
blow  against  the  United  States  in  the  Pacific,  though  no 
one  in  Washington  or  Berlin  knew  just  where  or  even 
exactly  when.  That  morning  the  British  Admiralty  had 
tipped  off  the  American  government  that  a large  Japanese 
invasion  fleet  had  been  observed  heading  across  the  Gulf 
of  Siam  for  the  Isthmus  of  Kra,  which  indicated  that 
the  Nipponese  were  striking  first  at  Thailand  and  perhaps 
Malaya.  At  9 p.m.  President  Roosevelt  got  off  a personal 
message  to  the  Emperor  of  Japan  imploring  him  to  join 
him  in  finding  “ways  of  dispelling  the  dark  clouds”  and 
at  the  same  time  warning  him  that  a thrust  of  the  Jap- 
anese military  forces  into  Southeast  Asia  would  create 
a situation  that  was  “unthinkable.”  At  the  Navy  Depart- 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1167 

ment,  intelligence  officers  drew  up  their  latest  report  on 
the  location  of  the  major  warships  of  the  Japanese  Navy. 
It  listed  most  of  them  as  being  in  home  ports,  including 
all  the  carriers  and  other  warships  of  the  task  force  which 
at  that  very  moment  had  steamed  to  within  three  hundred 
miles  of  Pearl  Harbor  and  was  tuning  up  its  bombers  to 
take  off  at  dawn. 

On  that  Saturday  evening  too  the  Navy  Department  in- 
formed the  President  and  Mr.  Hull  that  the  Japanese 
Embassy  was  destroying  its  codes.  It  had  first  had  to 
decipher  Togo’s  long  message,  which  had  dribbled  in  all 
afternoon  in  fourteen  parts.  The  Navy  decoders  were  also 
deciphering  it  as  fast  as  it  came  in  and  by  9:30  p.m.  a 
naval  officer  was  at  the  White  House  with  translations  of 
the  first  thirteen  parts.  Mr.  Roosevelt,  who  was  with  Harry 
Hopkins  in  the  study,  read  it  and  said,  “This  means  war.” 
But  exactly  when  and  just  where,  the  message  did  not 
say  and  the  President  did  not  know.  Even  Admiral  Nomura 
did  not  know.  Nor  far  off  in  Eastern  Europe  did  Adolf 
Hitler.  He  knew  less  than  Roosevelt. 

HITLER  DECLARES  WAR 

The  Japanese  onslaught  on  the  U.S.  Pacific  Fleet  at 
Pearl  Harbor  at  7:30  a.m.  (local  time)  on  Sunday,  Decem- 
ber 7,  1941,  caught  Berlin  as  completely  by  surprise  as  it 
did  Washington.  Though  Hitler  had  made  an  oral  promise 
to  Matsuoka  that  Germany  would  join  Japan  in  a war 
against  the  United  States  and  Ribbentrop  had  made  an- 
other to  Ambassador  Oshima,  the  assurance  had  not  yet 
been  signed  and  the  Japanese  had  not  breathed  a word 
to  the  Germans  about  Pearl  Harbor.*  Besides,  at  this 
moment,  Hitler  was  fully  occupied  trying  to  rally  his 
faltering  generals  and  retreating  troops  in  Russia. 

Night  had  fallen  in  Berlin  when  the  foreign-broadcast 
monitoring  service  first  picked  up  the  news  of  the  sneak 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.  When  an  official  of  the  Foreign 
Office  Press  Department  telephoned  Ribbentrop  the 
world-shaking  news  he  at  first  refused  to  believe  it  and  was 
extremely  angry  at  being  disturbed.  The  report  was  “prob- 
ably a propaganda  trick  of  the  enemy,”  he  said,  and  or- 


* I*  was  long  believed  by  many  that  Hitler  knew  in  advance  the  exact  hour 
of  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  but  I have  been  unable  to  find  a single  scrap 
of  evidence  in  the  secret  German  papers  to  substantiate  it. 


1168 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


dered  that  he  be  left  undisturbed  until  morning.38  So  prob- 
ably Ribbentrop,  for  once,  told  the  truth  when  he  testified 
on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  that  “this  attack  came  as  a 
complete  surprise  to  us.  We  had  considered  the  possi- 
bility of  Japan’s  attacking  Singapore  or  perhaps  Hong  Kong, 
but  we  never  considered  an  attack  on  the  United  States 
as  being  to  our  advantage.”  39  However,  contrary  to  what 
he  told  the  tribunal,  he  was  exceedingly  happy  about  it. 
Or  so  he  struck  Ciano. 

A night  telephone  call  from  Ribbentrop  [Ciano  began  his 
diary  on  December  8],  He  is  joyful  over  the  Japanese  at- 
tack on  the  United  States.  He  is  so  happy,  in  fact,  that  I 
can’t  but  congratulate  him,  even  though  I am  not  so  sfife 
about  the  advantage  . . . Mussolini  was  [also]  happy.  For 
a long  time  now  he  has  been  in  favor  of  clarifying  the  posi- 
tion between  America  and  the  Axis. 

At  1 p.m.  on  Monday,  December  8,  General  Oshima 
went  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse  to  get  Ribbentrop  to  clarify 
Germany’s  position.  He  demanded  a formal  declaration 
of  war  on  the  United  States  “at  once.” 

Ribbentrop  replied  [Oshima  radioed  Tokyo]  that  Hitler 
was  then  in  the  midst  of  a conference  at  general  head- 
quarters discussing  how  the  formalities  of  declaring  war 
could  be  carried  out  so  as  to  make  a good  impression  on  the 
German  people,  and  that  he  would  transmit  your  wish  to 
him  at  once  and  do  whatever  he  was  able  to  have  it  car- 
ried out  promptly. 

The  Nazi  Foreign  Minister  also  informed  the  ambas- 
sador, according  to  the  latter’s  message  to  Tokyo,  that 
on  that  very  morning  of  the  eighth  “Hitler  issued  orders 
to  the  Germany  Navy  to  attack  American  ships  whenever 
and  wherever  they  may  meet  them.”  40  But  the  dictator 
stalled  on  a declaration  of  war.* 

The  Fuehrer,  according  to  the  notation  in  his  daily 
calendar  book,  hurried  back  to  Berlin  on  the  night  of 
December  8,  arriving  there  at  11  o’clock  the  next  morn- 
ing. Ribbentrop  claimed  at  Nuremberg  that  he  pointed  out 
to  the  Leader  that  Germany  did  not  necessarily  have  to 
declare  war  on  America  under  the  terms  of  the  Tripartite 
Pact,  since  Japan  was  obviously  the  aggressor. 

* In  Tokyo  at  the  same  time  Foreign  Minister  Togo  was  telling  Ambassador 
Ott,  “The  Japanese  Government  expects  that  now  Germany  too  will  speedily 
declare  war  on  the  United  States.”  41 


1169 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

The  text  of  the  Tripartite  Pact  bound  us  to  assist  Japan 
only  in  case  of  an  attack  against  Japan  herself.  I went  to 
see  the  Fuehrer,  explained  the  legal  aspect  of  the  situation 
and  told  him  that,  although  we  welcomed  a new  ally  against 
England,  it  meant  we  had  a new  opponent  to  deal  with  as 
well  ...  if  we  declared  war  on  the  United  States. 

I told  him  that  according  to  the  stipulation  of  the  Three- 
Power  Pact,  since  Japan  had  attacked,  we  would  not  have 
to  declare  war,  formally.  The  Fuehrer  thought  this  matter 
over  quite  a while  and  then  he  gave  me  a very  clear  de- 
cision. “If  we  don’t  stand  on  the  side  of  Japan,”  he  said, 
“the  Pact  is  politically  dead.  But  that  is  not  the  main  reason. 
The  chief  reason  is  that  the  United  States  already  is  shoot- 
ing against  our  ships.  They  have  been  a forceful  factor  in 
this  war  and  through  their  actions  have  already  created  a 
situation  of  war.” 

The  Fuehrer  was  of  the  opinion  at  that  moment  that  it 
was  quite  evident  that  the  United  States  would  now  make 
war  against  Germany.  Therefore  he  ordered  me  to  hand 
over  the  passports  to  the  American  representative.42 

This  was  a decision  that  Roosevelt  and  Hull  in  Wash- 
ington had  been  confidently  waiting  for.  There  had  been 
some  pressure  on  them  to  have  Congress  declare  war  on 
Germany  and  Italy  on  December  8 when  that  step  was 
taken  against  Japan.  But  they  had  decided  to  wait.  The 
bombing  at  Pearl  Harbor  had  taken  them  off  one  hook  and 
certain  information  in  their  possession  led  them  to  be- 
lieve that  the  headstrong  Nazi  dictator  would  take  them  off 
a second  hook.*  They  had  pondered  the  intercepted  mes- 

* My  own  impression  in  Washington  at  that  moment  was  that  it  might  be 
difficult  for  President  Roosevelt  to  get  Congress  to  declare  war  on  Germany. 
There  seemed  to  be  a strong  feeling  in  both  Houses  as  well  as  in  the  Army 
and  Navy  that  the  country  ought  to  concentrate  its  efforts  on  defeating  Japan 
and  not  take  on  the  additional  burden  of  fighting  Germany  at  the  same  time. 

Hans  Thomsen,  the  German  charge  in  Washington,  who,  like  all  the  other 
Nazi  envoys  abroad,  was  usually  kept  ignorant  of  what  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop 
were  conniving,  reported  this  sentiment  to  Berlin.  Immediately  after  the 
President’s  speech  to  Congress  on  the  morning  of  December  8 calling  for  a 
declaration  of  war  on  Japan  Thomsen  radioed  Berlin:  “The  fact  that  he 
L Roosevelt]  did  not  mention  Germany  and  Italy  with  one  word  shows  that 
he  will  try  at  first  to  avoid  sharpening  the  situation  in  the  Atlantic.”  On  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  Thomsen  got  off  another  dispatch  on  the  subject: 
“Whether  Roosevelt  will  demand  declaration  of  war  on  Germany  and.  Italy 
is  uncertain.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  American  military  leaders  it  would 
be  logical  to  avoid  everything  which  could  lead  to  a two-front  war.”  In 
several  dispatches  just  prior  to  Pearl  Harbor  the  German  charge  had 
emphasized  that  the  United  States  simply  was  not  prepared  for  a two-front 
war.  On  December  4 he  had  radioed  the  revelations  in  the  Chicago  Tribune 
of  the  ‘‘war  plans  of  the  American  High  Command  on  preparations  and 
prospects  for  defeating  Germany  and  her  allies.” 

Report  confirms  [he  said]  that  full  participation  of  America  in  war  is 


1170 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


sage  of  Ambassador  Oshima  from  Berlin  to  Tokyo  on 
November  29  * in  which  Ribbentrop  had  assured  the  Jap- 
anese that  Germany  would  join  Japan  if  she  became 
“engaged”  in  a war  against  the  United  States.  There  was 
nothing  in  that  assurance  which  made  German  aid  condition- 
al upon  who  was  the  aggressor.  It  was  a blank  check  and  the 
Americans  had  no  doubt  that  the  Japanese  were  now  clam- 
oring in  Berlin  that  it  be  honored. 

It  was  honored,  but  only  after  the  Nazi  warlord  again 
hesitated.  He  had  convoked  the  Reichstag  to  meet  on 
December  9,  the  day  of  his  arrival  in  Berlin,  but  he  post- 
poned it  for  two  days,  until  the  eleventh.  Apparently,  as 
Ribbentrop  later  reported,  he  had  made  up  his  mind.  He 
was  fed  up  with  the  attacks  made  by  Roosevelt  on  him 
and  on  Nazism;  his  patience  was  exhausted  by  the  warlike 
acts  of  the  U.S.  Navy  against  German  U-boats  in  the 
Atlantic,  about  which  Raeder  had  continually  nagged  him 
for  nearly  a year.  He  had  a growing  hatred  for  America 
and  Americans  and,  what  was  worse  for  him  in  the  long 
run,  a growing  tendency  to  disastrously  underestimate  the 
potential  strength  of  the  United  States,  f 

At  the  same  time  he  grossly  overestimated  Japan’s  mili- 
tary power.  In  fact,  he  seems  to  have  believed  that  once 
the  Japanese,  whose  Navy  he  believed  to  be  the  most  power- 
ful in  the  world,  had  disposed  of  the  British  and  Ameri- 
cans in  the  Pacific,  they  would  turn  t>n  Russia  and  thus 


not  to  be  expected  before  July,  1943.  Military  measures  against  Japan  are 

of  defensive  character. 

*n  *?is  message  to  Berlin  on  the  evening  of  December  8,  Thomsen  stressed 
that  Pearl  Harbor  was  certain  to  bring  relief  to  Germany  from  America's 
belligerent  activities  in  the  Atlantic. 

War  with  Japan  [he  reported]  means  transferring  of  all  energy  to 
America  s own  rearmament,  a corresponding  shrinking  of  Lend-Lease  help 
and  a shifting  of  all  activity  to  the  Pacific. 

For  the  exchange  of  dispatches,  between  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the  Ger- 
man n.mbassy  in  Washington  during  this  period,  I am  indebted  to  the  State 
Department,  which  gave  me  access  to  them.  They  will  be  published  later  in 
the  Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy  series 
* See  above,  p.  1162. 

t “I  don't  see  much  future  for  the  Americans,"  he  told  his  cronies  a month 
later  during  a monologue  at  headquarters  on  January  7,  1942  “It’s  a de- 

i?»n,llSimtIT'  AiSd  tjle?  have  the,r  ra.cial  problem,  and  the  problem  of  social 
inequalities  ...  My  feelings  against  Americanism  are  feelings  of  hatred  and 

reveals  thfri?Cei,'  If  'T  ^.vSr5r'hlnK  ,ab®ut  the  behavior  of  American  society 
e^,eel  ,hQ,  , ,hi.a  f.i?U.da'zeu',!;nd  the  other  half  Negrified.  How  can  one 
Imdi  L,3,!,  a' n .?  JSS*,  4°  h°ld  together — a country  where  everything  is 
built  on  the  dollar.  (. HxtleP s Secret  Conversations,  p.  155.) 


1171 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

help  him  finish  his  great  conquest  in  the  East.  He  actually 
told  some  of  his  followers  a few  months  later  that  he 
thought  Japan’s  entry  into  the  war  had  been  “of  excep- 
tional value  to  us,  if  only  because  of  the  date  chosen.” 

It  was,  in  effect,  at  the  moment  when  the  surprises  of  the 
Russian  winter  were  pressing  most  heavily  on  the  morale  of 
our  people,  and  when  everybody  in  Germany  was  oppressed 
by  the  certainty  that  sooner  or  later  the  United  States  would 
come  into  the  conflict.  Japanese  intervention  therefore  was, 
from  our  point  of  view,  most  opportune.43 

There  is  also  no  doubt  that  Japan’s  sneaky  and  mighty 
blow  against  the  American  fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  kindled 
his  admiration — and  all  the  more  so  because  it  was  the 
kind  of  “surprise”  he  had  been  so  proud  of  pulling  off  so 
often  himself.  He  expressed  this  to  Ambassador  Oshima 
on  December  14  when  he  awarded  him  the  Grand  Cross 
of  the  Order  of  Merit  of  the  German  Eagle  in  gold: 

You  gave  the  right  declaration  of  war!  This  method  is  the 
only  proper  one. 

It  corresponded,  he  said,  to  his  “own  system.” 

That  is,  to  negotiate  as  long  as  possible.  But  if  one  sees 
that  the  other  is  interested  only  in  putting  one  off,  in 
shaming  and  humiliating  one,  and  is  not  willing  to  come  to 
an  agreement,  then  one  should  strike — indeed,  as  hard  as 
possible — and  not  waste  time  declaring  war.  It  was  heart- 
warming to  him  to  hear  of  the  first  operations  of  the  Japa- 
nese. He  himself  negotiated  with  infinite  patience  at  times, 
for  example,  with  Poland  and  also  with  Russia.  When  he 
then  realized  that  the  other  did  not  want  to  come  to  an 
agreement,  he  struck  suddenly  and  without  formalities.  He 
would  continue  to  go  this  way  in  the  future.44 

There  was  one  other  reason  for  Hitler’s  deciding  in 
such  haste  to  add  the  United  States  to  the  formidable 
list  of  his  enemies.  Dr.  Schmidt,  who  was  in  and  out  of 
the  Chancellery  and  Foreign  Office  that  week,  put  his 
finger  on  it:  “I  got  the  impression,”  he  later  wrote,  “that, 
with  his  inveterate  desire  for  prestige,  Hitler,  who  was 
expecting  an  American  declaration  of  war,  wanted  to  get 
his  declaration  in  first.” 45  The  Nazi  warlord  confirmed 
this  in  his  speech  to  the  Reichstag  on  December  11. 

“We  will  always  strike  first,”  he  told  the  cheering  depu- 
ties. “We  will  always  deal  the  first  blowl” 


1172 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Indeed,  Berlin  was  so  fearful  on  December  10  that 
America  might  declare  war  first  that  Ribbentrop  sternly 
admonished  Thomsen,  the  German  charge  in  Washing- 
ton, about  committing  any  indiscretion  which  might  tip 
off  the  State  Department  to  what  Hitler  planned  to  do  on 
the  following  day.  In  a long  radiogram  on  the  tenth  the 
Nazi  Foreign  Minister  filed  the  text  of  the  declaration  he 
would  make  in  Berlin  to  the  U.S.  charge  d’affaires  at 
precisely  2:30  p.m.  on  December  11.  Thomsen  was  in- 
structed to  call  on  Hull  exactly  one  hour  later,  at  3:30 
p.m.  (Berlin  time),  hand  the  Secretary  of  State  a copy  of 
the  declaration,  ask  for  his  passport  and  turn  over  Ger- 
many’s diplomatic  representation  to  Switzerland.  At  the 
end  of  the  message  Ribbentrop  warned  Thomsen  not  to 
have  any  contact  with  the  State  Department  before  de- 
livering his  note.  “We  wish  to  avoid  under  all  circum- 
stances,” the  warning  said,  “that  the  Government  there 
beats  us  to  such  a step.” 

Whatever  hesitations  led  Hitler  to  postpone  the  Reich- 
stag session  by  two  days,  it  is  evident  from  the  captured 
exchange  of  messages  between  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and 
the  German  Embassy  in  Washington,  and  from  other 
Foreign  Office  papers,  that  the  Fuehrer  actually  made 
his  fateful  decision  to  declare  war  on  the  United  States 
on  December  9,  the  day  he  arrived  in  the  capital  from 
headquarters  on  the  Russian  front.  The  Nazi  dictator  ap- 
pears to  have  wanted  the  two  extra  days  not  for  further 
reflection  but  to  prepare  carefully  his  Reichstag  speech  so 
that  it  would  make  the  proper  impression  on  the  German 
people,  of  whose  memories  of  America’s  decisive  role  in 
the  First  World  War  Hitler  was  quite  aware. 

Hans  Dieckhoff,  who  was  still  officially  the  German  am- 
bassador to  the  United  States  but  who  had  been  cooling 
his  heels  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  ever  since  both  countries 
withdrew  their  chief  envoys  in  the  autumn  of  1938,  was 
put  to  work  on  December  9 to  draw  up  a long  list  of 
Roosevelt’s  anti-German  activities  for  the  Fuehrer’s  Reich- 
stag address.* 


Dieckhoff,  whom  Hassell  thought  “temperamentally  submissive,"  had 
“rK5n.jn?.iu?t  a-  ^eek  before  at  the  request  of  Ribbentrop  a long  memorandum 
entitled  Principles  for  Influencing  American  Public  Opinion."  Among  his 
eleven  principles  were:  ‘ Real  danger  to  America  is  Roosevelt  himself 
Influence  of  Jews  on  Roosevelt  (Frankfurter,  Baruch,  Benjamin  Cohen! 
Samuel  Kosenman,  Henry  Morgenthau,  etc.)  . . . The  slogan  for  every 


1173 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Also  on  December  9 Thomsen  in  Washington  was  in- 
structed to  burn  his  secret  codes  and  confidential  papers. 
“Measures  carried  out  as  ordered,”  he  flashed  to  Berlin 
at  11:30  a.m.  on  that  day.  For  the  first  time  he  became 
aware  of  what  was  going  on  in  Berlin  and  during  the 
evening  tipped  the  Wilhelmstrasse  that  apparently  the 
American  government  knew  too.  “Believed  here,”  he  said, 
“that  within  twenty-four  hours  Germany  will  declare  war 
on  the  United  States  or  at  least  break  off  diplomatic  re- 
lations.” * * 

HITLER  IN  THE  REICHSTAG:  DECEMBER  11 

Hitler’s  address  on  December  1 1 to  the  robots  of  the 
Reichstag  in  defense  of  his  declaration  of  war  on  the 
United  States  was  devoted  mainly  to  hurling  personal  in- 
sults at  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  to  charging  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  provoked  war  in  order  to  cover  up  the  failures 
of  the  New  Deal  and  to  thundering  that  “this  man  alone,” 
backed  by  the  millionaires  and  the  Jews,  was  “responsible 
for  the  Second  World  War.”  All  the  accumulated,  pent- 
up  resentment  at  a man  who  had  stood  from  the  first  in 
his  way  toward  world  dominion,  who  had  continually 
taunted  him,  who  had  provided  massive  aid  to  Britain  at 
a moment  when  it  seemed  that  battered  island  nation 
would  fall,  and  whose  Navy  was  frustrating  him  in  the 
Atlantic  burst  forth  in  violent  wrath. 

Permit  me  to  define  my  attitude  to  that  other  world, 
which  has  its  representative  in  that  man  who,  while  our  sol- 
diers are  fighting  in  snow  and  ice,  very  tactfully  likes  to 
make  his  chats  from  the  fireside,  the  man  who  is  the  main 
culprit  of  this  war  . . . 

I will  pass  over  the  insulting  attacks  made  by  this  so- 

American  mother  must  be:  “I  didn’t  raise  my  boy  to  die  for  Britain  I”  (From 
the  Foreign  Office  papers,  not  yet  published.)  Some  Americans  in  the  State 
Department  and  in  our  embassy  in  Berlin  thought  rather  highly  of  Dieckhoff 
and  believed  him  to  be  anti-Nazi.  My  own  feeling  was  that  he  lacked  the 
guts  to  be.  He  served  Hitler  to  the  end — from  1943  to  1945  as  the  Nazi 
ambassador  to  Franco  Spain. 

* Thomsen  also  urged  Berlin  to  arrest  the  American  correspondents  there  in 
retaliation  for  the  arrest  of  a handful  of  German  newsmen  in  the  United 
States.  A Foreign  Office  memorandum  signed  by  Undersecretary  Ernst 
Woermann  on  December  10  declares  that  all  American  correspondents  in 
Germany  were  ordered  arrested  as  “a  reprisal.”  Excepted  was  Guido  Enderis, 
chief  correspondent  in  Berlin  of  the  New  York  Times,  “because,”  Woer- 
mann wrote,  “of  his  proved  friendliness  to  Germany.”  This  may  be  unfair 
to  the  late  Enderis,  who  was  in  ill  health  at  the  time  and  who  mainly  for 
that  reason  perhaps  was  not  arrested. 


1174 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

called  President  against  me.  That  he  calls  me  a gangster  is 
uninteresting.  After  all,  this  expression  was  not  coined  in 
Europe  but  in  America,  no  doubt  because  such  gangsters  are 
lacking  here.  Apart  from  this,  I cannot  be  insulted  by 
Roosevelt,  for  I consider  him  mad,  just  as  Wilson  was 
First  he  incites  war,  then  falsifies  the  causes,  then  odiously 
wraps  himself  in  a cloak  of  Christian  hypocrisy  and  slowly 
but  surely  leads  mankind  to  war,  not  without  calling  God  to 
witness  the  honesty  of  his  attack — in  the  approved  manner 
of  an  old  Freemason  . . . 

Roosevelt  has  been  guilty  of  a series  of  the  worst  crimes 
against  international  law.  Illegal  seizure  of  ships  and  other 
property  of  German  and  Italian  nationals  was  coupled  with 
the  threat  to,  and  looting  of,  those  who  were  deprived  of 
their  liberty  by  being  interned.  Roosevelt’s  ever  increasing 
attacks  finally  went  so  far  that  he  ordered  the  American 
Navy  to  attack  everywhere  ships  under  the  German  and 
Italian  flags,  and  to  sink  them — this  in  gross  violation  of  in- 
ternational law.  American  ministers  boasted  of  having  de- 
stroyed German  submarines  in  this  criminal  way.  German  and 
Italian  merchant  ships  were  attacked  by  American  cruisers, 
captured  and  their  crews  imprisoned. 

In  this  way  the  sincere  efforts  of  Germany  and  Italy  to 
prevent  an  extension  of  the  war  and  to  maintain  relations 
with  the  United  States  in  spite  of  the  unbearable  provoca- 
tions which  have  been  carried  on  for  years  by  President 
Roosevelt  have  been  frustrated  . . . 

What  was  Roosevelt’s  motive  “to  intensify  anti-German 
feeling  to  the  pitch  of  war”?  Hitler  asked.  He  gave  two 
explanations. 

I understand  only  too  well  that  a world-wide  distance 
separates  Roosevelt’s  ideas  and  my  ideas.  Roosevelt  comes 
from  a rich  family  and  belongs  to  the  class  whose  path  is 
smoothed  in  the  democracies.  I was  only  the  child  of  a 
small,  poor  family  and  had  to  fight  my  way  by  work  and 
industry.  When  the  Great  War  came  Roosevelt  occupied  a 
position  where  he  got  to  know  only  its  pleasant  conse- 
quences, enjoyed  by  those  who  do  business  while  others 
bleed.  I was  only  one  of  those  who  carried  out  orders  as  an 
ordinary  soldier,  and  naturally  returned  from  the  war  just 
as  poor  as  I was  in  the  autumn  of  1914.  I shared  the  fate 
of  millions,  and  Franklin  Roosevelt  only  the  fate  of  the 
so-called  Upper  Ten  Thousand. 

After  the  war  Roosevelt  tried  his  hand  at  financial  specu- 
lations. He  made  profits  out  of  inflation,  out  of  the  misery  of 
others,  while  I ...  lay  in  a hospital  . . . 


1175 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Hitler  continued  at  some  length  with  this  singular  com- 
parison before  he  reached  his  second  point,  that  Roose- 
velt had  reverted  to  war  to  escape  the  consequences  of 
his  failure  as  President. 

National  Socialism  came  to  power  in  Germany  in  the 
same  year  as  Roosevelt  was  elected  President  ...  He  took 
over  a state  in  a very  poor  economic  condition,  and  I took 
over  the  Reich  faced  with  complete  ruin,  thanks  to  democ- 
racy ... 

While  an  unprecedented  revival  of  economic  life,  culture 
and  art  took  place  in  Germany  under  National  Socialist 
leadership.  President  Roosevelt  did  not  succeed  in  bringing 
about  even  the  slightest  improvement  in  his  own  country 
. . . This  is  not  surprising  if  one  bears  in  mind  that  the  men 
he  had  called  to  support  him,  or  rather,  the  men  who  had 
called  him,  belonged  to  the  Jewish  element,  whose  in- 
terests are  all  for  disintegration  and  never  for  order  . . . 

Roosevelt’s  New  Deal  legislation  was  all  wrong.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  a continuation  of  this  economic  policy 
would  have  undone  this  President  in  peacetime,  in  spite  of 
all  his  dialectical  skill.  In  a European  state  he  would  surely 
have  come  eventually  before  a state  court  on  a charge  of 
deliberate  waste  of  the  national  wealth;  and  he  would 
scarcely  have  escaped  at  the  hands  of  a civil  court  on  a 
charge  of  criminal  business  methods. 

Hitler  knew  that  this  assessment  of  the  New  Deal  was 
shared,  in  part  at  least,  by  the  American  isolationists 
and  a considerable  portion  of  the  business  community 
and  he  sought  to  make  the  most  of  it,  ignorant  of  the 
fact  that  on  Pearl  Harbor  Day  these  groups,  like  all  others 
in  America,  had  rallied  to  the  support  of  their  country. 

This  fact  was  realized  [he  continued,  alluding  to  these 
groups]  and  fully  appreciated  by  many  Americans,  in- 
cluding some  of  high  standing.  A threatening  opposition  was 
gathering  over  the  head  of  this  man.  He  guessed  that  the 
only  salvation  for  him  lay  in  diverting  public  attention  from 
home  to  foreign  policy  ...  He  was  strengthened  in  this  by 
the  Jews  around  him  . . . The  full  diabolical  meanness  of 
Jewry  rallied  around  this  man,  and  he  stretched  out  his 
hands. 

Thus  began  the  increasing  efforts  of  the  American  Presi- 
dent to  create  conflicts  . . . For  years  this  man  harbored 
one  desire — that  a conflict  should  break  out  somewhere  in 
the  world. 


1176 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

There  followed  a long  recital  of  Roosevelt’s  efforts  in 
this  direction,  beginning  with  the  “quarantine”  speech  in 
Chicago  in  1937.  “Now  he  [Roosevelt]  is  seized,”  Hit- 
ler cried  at  one  point,  “with  fear  that  if  peace  is  brought 
about  in  Europe  his  squandering  of  millions  of  money 
on  armaments  will  be  looked  upon  as  plain  fraud,  since 
nobody  will  attack  America — and  then  he  himself  must 
provoke  this  attack  upon  his  country.” 

The  Nazi  dictator  seemed  relieved  that  the  break  had 
come  and  he  sought  to  share  his  sense  of  relief  with  the 
German  people. 

I think  you  have  all  found  it  a relief  now  that,  at  last, 

one  State  has  been  the  first  to  take  the  step  of  protesting 

against  this  historically  unique  and  shameless  ill  treatment 
of  truth  and  of  right  ...  The  fact  that  the  Japanese 

Government,  which  has  been  negotiating  for  years  with  this 
man,  has  at  last  become  tired  of  being  mocked  by  him  in 
such  an  unworthy  way  fills  us  all,  the  German  people  and  I 
think,  all  other  decent  people  in  the  world,  with  deep  satis- 
faction . . . The  President  of  the  United  States  ought 

finally  to  understand— I say  this  only  because  of  his  limited 
intellect— that  we  know  that  the  aim  of  his  struggle  is  to 
destroy  one  state  after  another  . . . 

As  for  the  German  nation,  it  needs  charity  neither  from 
Mr.  Roosevelt  nor  from  Mr.  Churchill,  let  alone  from  Mr. 
Eden.  It  wants  only  its  rights!  It  will  secure  for  itself  this 
right  to  live  even  if  thousands  of  Churchills  and  Roosevelts 
conspire  against  it . . . 

I have  therefore  arranged  for  passports  to  be  handed  to 
the  American  charge  d’affaires  today,  and  the  follow- 
ing— 46 

At  this  point  the  deputies  of  the  Reichstag  leaped  to 
their  feet  cheering,  and  the  Fuehrer’s  words  were  drowned 
in  the  bedlam. 

Shortly  afterward,  at  2:30  p.m.,  Ribbentrop,  in  one  of 
his  most  frigid  poses,  received  Leland  Morris,  the 
American  charge  d’affaires  in  Berlin,  and  while  keeping 
him  standing  read  out  Germany’s  declaration  of  war, 
handed  him  a copy  and  icily  dismissed  him. 

...  Although  Germany  for  her  part  [said  the  declare- 
tion]  has  always  strictly  observed  the  rules  of  international 
law  in  her  dealings  with  the  United  States  throughout  the 
present  war,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  finally 


1177 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

proceeded  to  overt  acts  of  war  against  Germany.  It  has, 
therefore,  virtually  created  a state  of  war. 

The  Reich  Government  therefore  breaks  off  all  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  United  States  and  declares  that  under 
these  circumstances  brought  about  by  President  Roosevelt, 
Germany  too  considers  herself  to  be  at  war  with  the 
United  States,  as  from  today.47 

The  final  act  in  the  day’s  drama  was  the  signing  of  a 
tripartite  agreement  by  Germany,  Italy  and  Japan  de- 
claring “their  unshakable  determination  not  to  lay  down 
arms  until  the  joint  war  against  the  United  States  and 
England  reaches  a successful  conclusion”  and  not  to 
conclude  a separate  peace. 

Adolf  Hitler,  who  a bare  six  months  before  had  faced 
only  a beleaguered  Britain  in  a war  which  seemed  to  him 
as  good  as  won,  now,  by  deliberate  choice,  had  arrayed 
against  him  the  three  greatest  industrial  powers  in  the 
world  in  a struggle  in  which  military  might  depended 
largely,  in  the  long  run,  on  economic  strength.  Those  three 
enemy  countries  together  also  had  a great  preponderance 
of  manpower  overthe  three  Axis  nations.  Neither  Hitler 
nor  his  generals  nor  his  admirals  seem  to  have  weighed 
those  sobering  facts  on  that  eventful  December  day  as 
the  year  1941  drew  toward  a close. 

General  Haider,  the  intelligent  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  did  not  even  note  in  his  diary  on  December  11  that 
Germany  had  declared  war  on  the  United  States.  He 
mentioned  only  that  in  the  evening  he  attended  a lecture 
by  a naval  captain  on  the  “background  of  the  Japanese- 
American  sea  war.”  The  rest  of  his  diary,  understandably 
perhaps,  was  taken  up  with  the  continued  bad  news  from 
most  sectors  of  the  hard-pressed  Russian  front.  There  was 
no  room  in  his  thoughts  for  an  eventual  day  when  his 
weakened  armies  might  also  have  to  confront  fresh  troops 
from  the  New  World. 

Admiral  Raeder  actually  welcomed  Hitler’s  move.  He 
conferred  with  the  Fuehrer  on  the  following  day,  December 
12.  “The  situation  in  the  Atlantic,”  he  assured  him, 
“will  be  eased  by  Japan’s  successful  intervention.”  And 
warming  up  to  his  subject  he  added: 

Reports  have  already  been  received  of  the  transfer  of 
some  [American]  battleships  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific.  It  is  certain  that  light  forces,  especially  destroyers. 


1178 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

will  be  required  in  increased  numbers  in  the  Pacific.  The 
need  for  transport  ships  will  be  very  great,  so  that  a with- 
drawal of  American  merchant  ships  from  the  Atlantic  can 
be  expected.  The  strain  on  British  merchant  shipping  will  in- 
crease. 

Hitler,  having  taken  his  plunge,  and  with  such  reckless 
bravado,  now  suddenly  was  prey  to  doubts.  He  had  some 
questions  to  put  to  the  Grand  Admiral.  Did  he  “believe 
that  the  enemy  will  in  the  near  future  take  steps  to 
occupy  the  Azores,  the  Cape  Verdes  and  perhaps  even  to 
attack  Dakar,  in  order  to  win  back  prestige  lost  as  the 
result  of  the  setbacks  in  the  Pacific?”  Raeder  did  not 
think  so. 

The  U.S.  [he  answered]  will  have  to  concentrate  all  her 
strength  in  the  Pacific  during  the  next  few  months.  Britain 
will  not  want  to  run  any  risks  after  her  severe  losses  of  big 
ships.*  It  is  hardly  likely  that  transport  tonnage  is  available 
for  such  occupation  tasks  or  for  bringing  up  supplies. 

Hitler  had  a more  important  question  to  pose.  “Is  there 
any  possibility,”  he  asked,  “that  the  U.S.A.  and  Britain 
will  abandon  East  Asia  for  a time  in  order  to  crush  Ger- 
many and  Italy  first?”  Here  again  the  Grand  Admiral  was 
reassuring. 

It  is  improbable  [he  answered]  that  the  enemy  will  give 
up  East  Asia  even  temporarily;  by  so  doing  Britain  would 
endanger  India  very  seriously,  and  the  U.S.  cannot  with- 
draw her  fleet  from  the  Pacific  as  long  as  the  Japanese  fleet 
has  the  upper  hand. 

Raeder  further  tried  to  cheer  up  the  Fuehrer  by  in- 
forming him  that  six  “large”  submarines  were  to  proceed 
“as  quickly  as  possible”  to  the  east  coast  of  the  United 
States.48 

With  the  situation  in  Russia  being  what  it  was,  not  to 
mention  that  in  North  Africa,  where  Rommel  was  also 
retreating,  the  thoughts  of  the  German  Supreme  Command- 
er and  his  military  chiefs  quickly  turned  from  the  new 
enemy,  which  they  were  sure  would  have  its  hands  full 

* Two  days  before,  on  December  10,  Japanese  planes  had  sunk  two  British 
battleships,  the  Prince  of  Wales  and  the  Repulse,  off  the  coast  of  Malaya. 
Coupled  with  the  crippling  American  losses  in  battleships  at  Pearl  Harbor 
on  December  7,  this  blow  gave  the  Japanese  fleet  complete  supremacy  in  the 
•racinc,  the  China  Sea  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  “In  all  the  war,”  Churchill 
wr°te  later  of  the  loss  of  the  two  great  ships,  “I  never  received  a more  direct 
shock.’* 


1179 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

in  the  Pacific  far  away.  Their  thoughts  were  not  to  return 
to  it  before  another  year  had  passed,  the  most  fateful  year 
of  the  war,  in  which  the  great  turning  point  would  come 
— irrevocably  deciding  not  only  the  outcome  of  the  con- 
flict which  all  through  1941  the  Germans  had  believed 
almost  over,  almost  won,  but  the  fate  of  the  Third  Reich, 
whose  astounding  early  victories  had  raised  it  so  quickly 
to  such  a giddy  height  and  which  Hitler  sincerely  be- 
lieved— and  said — would  flourish  for  a thousand  years. 

Haider’s  scribblings  in  his  diary  grew  ominous  as  New 
Year’s,  1942,  drew  near. 

“Another  dark  day!”  he  began  his  journal  on  Decem- 
ber 30,  1941,  and  again  on  the  last  day  of  the  year.  The 
Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff  had  a presentiment  of 
terrible  things  to  come. 


26 


THE  GREAT  TURNING  POINT:  1942- 
ST  ALIN  GRAD  AND  EL  ALAMEIN 


THE  CONSPIRATORS  COME  BACK  TO  LIFE 

the  severe  setback  to  Hitler’s  armies  in  Russia  during 
the  winter  of  1941—42  and  the  cashiering  of  a number 
of  field  marshals  and  top  generals  ignited  the  hopes  of 
the  anti-Nazi  conspirators  again. 

They  had  been  unable  to  interest  the  leading  command- 
ers in  a revolt  as  long  as  their  armies  were  smashing  to 
one  easy  victory  after  another  and  the  glory  of  German 
arms  and  of  the  German  Reich  was  soaring  to  the  heavens. 
But  now  the  proud  and  hitherto  invincible  soldiers  were 
falling  back  in  the  snow  and  bitter  cold  before  an  enemy 
which  had  proved  their  match;  casualties  in  six  months 
had  passed  the  million  mark;  and  a host  of  the  most  re- 
nowned generals  were  being  summarily  dismissed,  some  of 
them,  such  as  Hoepner  and  Sponeck,  publicly  disgraced, 
and  most  of  the  others  humiliated  and  made  scapegoats 
of  by  the  ruthless  dictator.* 


* Among  those  retired,  it  will  be  recalled,  were  Field  Marshal  von  Brau- 
chitsch,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army,  and  Field  Marshals  von 
Rundstedt  and  von  Bock,  who  led  the  southern  and  central  army  groups, 
respectively,  and  General  Guderian,  the  genius  of  the  panzer  corps.  The 
commander  of  the  army  group  in  the  north,  Field  Marshal  von  Leeb,  soon 
followed,  being  relieved  of  his  post  on  January  18,  1942.  The  day  before. 
Field  Marshal  von  Reichenau,  who  had  taken  over  Rundstedt’s  command, 
died  of  a stroke.  General  Udet  of  the  Luftwaffe  shot  himself  to  death  on 
November  17,  1941.  Moreover,  some  thirty-five  corps  and  divisional  com- 
manders were  replaced  during  the  winter  retreat. 

This,  of  course,  was  only  a beginning.  Field  Marshal  von  Manstein 
summed  up  at  Nuremberg  what  happened  to  the  generals  when  they  started 
losing  battles  or  finally  got  up  enough  courage  to  oppose  Hitler.  “Of  seven- 
teen field  marshals,"  he  told  the  tribunal,  “ten  were  sent  home  during  the 
war  and  three  lost  their  lives  as  a result  of  July  20,  1944  [the  plot  against 
Hitler  W.L.S.L  Only  one.  field,  marshal  managed  to  get  through  the  war 
and  keep  his  position.  Of  thirty-six  full  generals  [ Generalobersten ] eighteen 
were  sent  home,  and  five  died  as  a result  of  July  20  or  were  dishonorably 
discharged.  Only  three  full  generals  survived  the  war  in  their  positions."  1 
1180 


1181 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

“The  time  is  almost  ripe,”  Hassell  concluded  hopefully 
in  his  diary  on  December  21,  1941.  He  and  his  fellow 
conspirators  were  sure  that  the  Prussian  officer  corps 
would  react  not  only  to  their  shabby  treatment  but  to 
the  madness  of  their  Supreme  Commander  in  leading  them 
and  their  armies  to  the  brink  of  disaster  in  the  Russian 
winter.  The  plotters  had  long  been  convinced,  as  we 
have  seen,  that  only  the  generals,  in  command  of  troops, 
had  the  physical  power  to  overthrow  the  Nazi  tyrant.  Now 
was  their  chance  before  it  was  too  late.  Timing  was  all- 
important.  The  war,  they  saw,  after  the  reverses  in  Russia 
and  the  entry  of  America  into  the  conflict,  could  no 
longer  be  won.  But  neither  was  it  yet  lost.  An  anti-Nazi 
government  in  Berlin  could  still  get  peace  terms,  they 
thought,  which  would  leave  Germany  a major  power  and, 
perhaps,  with  at  least  some  of  Hitler’s  gains,  such  as 
Austria,  the  Sudetenland  and  western  Poland. 

These  thoughts  had  been  very  much  in  their  minds  at 
the  end  of  the  summer  of  1941,  even  when  the  prospect 
of  destroying  the  Soviet  Union  was  still  good.  The  text 
of  the  Atlantic  Charter,  which  Churchill  and  Roosevelt 
had  drawn  up  on  August  19,  had  come  as  a heavy  blow 
to  them,  especially  Point  8,  which  had  stipulated  that 
Germany  would  have  to  be  disarmed  after  the  war  pend- 
ing a general  disarmament  agreement.  To  Hassell,  Goer- 
deler,  Beck  and  the  other  members  of  their  opposition 
circle  this  meant  that  the  Allies  had  no  intention  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  Nazi  and  anti-Nazi  Germans  and 
was  “proof,”  as  Hassell  put  it,  “that  Englahd  and  America 
are  not  fighting  only  against  Hitler  but  also  "want  to 
smash  Germany  and  render  her  defenseless.”  Indeed,  to 
this  aristocratic  former  ambassador,  now  deep  in  treason 
against  Hitler  but  determined  to  get  as  much  as  possible 
for  a Germany  without  Hitler,  Point  8,  as  he  noted  in 
his  journal,  “destroys  every  reasonable  chance  for  peace.”  2 

Disillusioned  though  they  were  by  the  Atlantic  Charter, 
the  conspirators  seem  to  have  been  spurred  to  action  by 
its  promulgation,  if  only  because  it  impressed  them  with 
the  necessity  of  doing  away  with  Hitler  while  there  was 
yet  time  for  an  anti-Nazi  regime  to  bargain  advantageously 
for  peace  for  a Germany  which  still  held  most  of  Europe. 
They  were  not  adverse  to  using  Hitler’s  conquests  to  ob- 
tain the  most  favorable  terms  for  their  country.  The  up- 


1182  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

shot  of  a series  of  talks  in  Berlin  during  the  last  days  of 
August  between  Hassell,  Popitz,  Oster,  Dohnanyi  and  Gen- 
eral Friedrich  Olbricht,  chief  of  staff  of  the  Home  Army, 
was  that  the  “German  patriots,”  as  they  called  them- 
selves, would  make  “very  moderate  demands”  of  the  Al- 
lies but,  to  quote  Hassell  again,  “there  are  certain  claims 
from  which  they  could  not  desist.”  What  the  demands 
and  claims  were  he  does  not  say;  one  gathers  from 
other  entries  in  his  diary  that  they  amounted  to  an  in- 
sistence on  Germany’s  1914  frontiers  in  the  East  plus 
Austria  and  the  Sudetenland. 

But  time  pressed.  After  a final  conference  with  his 
confederates  at  the  end  of  August,  Hassell  wrote  in  his 
diary:  “They  were  unanimously  convinced  that  it  would 
soon  be  too  late.  When  our  chances  for  victory  are  ob- 
viously gone  or  only  very  slim,  there  will  be  nothing 
more  to  be  done.”  3 

There  had  been  some  effort  to  induce  key  generals  on 
the  Eastern  front  to  arrest  Hitler  during  the  summer 
campaign  in  Russia.  But  though  it  inevitably  proved  in- 
effectual because  the  great  captains  were  naturally  too 
absorbed  in  their  initial  stunning  victories  to  give  any 
thought  to  overthrowing  the  man  who  had  given  them 
the  opportunity  to  achieve  them,  it  did  plant  some  seeds 
among  the  military  minds  that  would  eventually  sprout. 

The  center  of  the  conspiracy  in  the  Army  that  sum- 
mer was  in  the  headquarters  of  Field  Marshal  von  Bock, 
whose  Army  Group  Center  was  driving  on  Moscow. 
Major  General  Henning  von  Tresckow  of  Bock’s  staff, 
whose  early  enthusiasm  for  National  Socialism  had  so 
, soured  as  to  land  him  in  the  ranks  of  the  plotters,  was  the 
ringleader,  and  he  was  assisted  by  Fabian  von  Schlabren- 
dorff,  his  A.D.C.,  and  by  two  fellow  conspirators  whom 
they  had  planted  on  Bock  as  A.D.C.s,  Count  Hans  von 
Hardenberg  and  Count  Heinrich  von  Lehndorff,  both 
scions  of  old  and  prominent  German  families.*  One  of 
their  self-appointed  tasks  was  to  work  on  the  Field  Mar- 
shal and  to  persuade  him  to  arrest  Hitler  on  one  of  his 
visits  to  the  army  group’s  headquarters.  But  Bock  was  hard 
to  work  on.  Though  professing  to  loathe  Nazism  he  had 
advanced  too  far  under  it  and  was  much  too  vain  and  am- 

* Lehndorff  was  executed  by  the  Nazis  on  September  4,  1944. 


1183 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

bitious  to  take  any  chances  at  this  stage  of  the  game.  Once 
when  Tresckow  tried  to  point  out  to  him  that  the  Fuehrer 
was  leading  the  country  to  disaster,  Bock  shouted,  “I  do 
not  allow  the  Fuehrer  to  be  attacked!” 4 

Tresckow  and  his  young  aide  were  discouraged  but  not 
daunted.  They  decided  to  act  on  their  own.  When  on 
August  4,  1941,  the  Fuehrer  visited  the  army  group’s  head- 
quarters at  Borisov  they  planned  to  seize  him  as  he  was 
driving  from  the  airfield  to  Bock’s  quarters.  But  the  plot- 
ters were  still  amateurs  at  this  time  and  had  not  counted 
on  the  Fuehrer’s  security  arrangements.  Surrounded  by 
his  own  S.S.  bodyguards  and  declining  to  use  one  of 
the  army  group’s  automobiles  to  drive  in  from  the  air- 
field— he  had  sent  ahead  his  own  fleet  of  cars  for  this 
purpose — he  gave  the  two  officers  no  opportunity  of  get- 
ting near  him.  This  fiasco — apparently  there  were  others 
like  it — taught  the  plotters  who  were  in  the  Army  some 
lessons.  The  first  was  that  to  get  their  hands  on  Hitler 
was  no  easy  job;  he  was  always  well  guarded.  Another 
was  that  to  seize  him  and  arrest  him  might  not  solve  the 
problem,  since  the  key  generals  were  too  cowardly  or  too 
confused  about  their  oaths  of  allegiance  to  help  the  op- 
position to  carry  on  from  there.  It  was  about  this  time,  the 
fall  of  1941,  that  some  of  the  young  officers  in  the  Army, 
many  of  them  civilians  in  uniform  like  Schlabrendorff, 
reluctantly  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  simplest  and 
perhaps  the  only  solution  was  to  kill  Hitler.  Then  the 
timid  generals,  released  from  their  personal  oaths  to  the 
Leader,  would  go  along  with  the  new  regime  and  give  it 
the  support  of  the  Army. 

But  the  ringleaders  in  Berlin  were  not  yet  ready  to  go 
so  far.  They  were  concocting  an  idiotic  plan  called 
“isolated  action,”  which  for  some  reason  they  thought 
would  satisfy  the  consciences  of  the  generals  about  break- 
ing their  personal  oaths  to  the  Fuehrer  and  at  the  same 
time  enable  them  to  rid  the  Reich  of  Hitler.  It  is  dif- 
ficult, even  today,  to  follow  their  minds  in  this,  but  the 
idea  was  that  the  top  military  commanders,  both  in  the 
East  and  in  the  West,  would  simply,  on  a prearranged 
signal,  refuse  to  obey  the  orders  of  Hitler  as  Command- 
er in  Chief  of  the  Army.  This  of  course  would  have  been 
breaking  their  oath  of  obedience  to  the  Fuehrer,  but  the 
sophists  in  Berlin  pretended  not  to  see  that.  They  ex- 


1184 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


plained,  at  any  event,  that  the  real  purpose  of  the  scheme 
was  to  create  confusion,  in  the  midst  of  which  Beck, 
with  the  help  of  detachments  of  the  Home  Army  in  Ber- 
lin, would  seize  power,  depose  Hitler  and  outlaw  National 
Socialism. 

The  Home  Army,  however,  was  scarcely  a military 
force  but  more  a motley  collection  of  recruits  doing  a 
little  basic  training  before  being  shipped  as  replacements 
to  the  front.  Some  top  generals  in  Russia  or  in  the  occupa- 
tion zones  who  had  seasoned  troops  at  their  command 
would  have  to  be  won  over  if  the  venture  were  really  to 
succeed.  One  of  them,  who  had  been  in  on  the  Haider 
plot  to  arrest  Hitler  at  the  time  of  Munich,  seemed  a 
natural  choice.  This  was  Field  Marshal  von  Witzleben, 
who  was  now  Commander  in  Chief  in  the  West.  To  initiate 
him  and  also  General  Alexander  von  Falkenhausen,  the 
military  commander  in  Belgium,  into  the  new  scheme  of 
things  Hassell  was  sent  by  the  conspirators  in  mid-January 
1942  to  confer  with  the  two  generals.  Already  under  sur- 
veillance by  the  Gestapo,  the  former  ambassador  used  the 
“cover”  of  a lecture  tour,  addressing  groups  of  German 
officers  and  occupation  officials  on  the  subject  of  “Living 
Space  and  Imperialism.”  In  between  lectures  he  conferred 
privately  with  Falkenhausen  in  Brussels  and  Witzleben  in 
Paris,  receiving  a favorable  impression  of  both  of  them, 
especially  of  the  latter. 

Shunted  to  the  sidelines  in  France  while  his  fellow 
field  nrrshals  were  fighting  great  battles  in  Russia,  Witzle- 
ben was  thirsting  for  action.  He  told  Hassell  that  the  idea 
of  “isolated  action”  was  utopian.  Direct  action  to  over- 
throw Hitler  was  the  only  solution  and  he  was  willing 
to  play  a leading  part.  Probably  the  best  time  to  strike 
would  be  during  the  summer  of  1942  when  the  German 
offensive  in  Russia  was  resumed.  To  prepare  for  The  Day 
he  intended  to  be  in  top  physical  trim  and  would  have 
a minor  operation  to  put  him  in  shape.  Unfortunately 
for  the  Field  Marshal  and  his  co-conspirators  this  de- 
cision had  disastrous  consequences.  Like  Frederick  the 
Great— and  many  others — Witzleben  was  troubled  by 
hemorrhoids.*  The  operation  to  correct  this  painful  and 
annoying  condition  was  a routine  case  of  surgery,  to  be 


Lmhrtt-?iUvSian  °fte?  complained  about  this  malady,  which  he  found 

hampered  his  mental  facilities  as  well  as  his  physical  activities. 


1185 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

sure,  but  when  Witzleben  took  a brief  sick  leave  in  the 
spring  to  have  it  done,  Hitler  took  advantage  of  the  situa- 
tion to  retire  the  Field  Marshal  from  active  service,  re- 
placing him  with  Rundstedt,  who  had  no  stomach  for 
conspiring  against  the  Leader  who  had  so  recently  treated 
him  so  shabbily.  Thus  the  plotters  found  their  chief  hope 
in  the  Army  to  be  a Field  Marshal  without  any  troops 
at  his  command.  Without  soldiers  no  new  regime  could 
be  established. 

The  leaders  of  the  conspiracy  were  greatly  disheartened. 
They  kept  meeting  clandestinely  and  plotting,  but  they 
could  not  overcome  their  discouragement.  “It  seems  at 
the  moment,”  Hassell  noted  at  the  end  of  February  1942, 
after  one  of  the  innumerable  meetings,  “that  nothing  can 
be  done  about  Hitler.”  5 

A great  deal  could  be  done,  however,  about  straighten- 
ing out  their  ideas  concerning  the  kind  of  government 
they  wanted  for  Germany  after  Hitler  finally  was  deposed 
and  about  strengthening  their  helter-skelter  and  so  far 
quite  ineffectual  organization  so  that  it  could  take  over 
that  government  when  the  time  came. 

Most  of  the  resistance  leaders,  being  conservative  and 
well  on  in  years,  wanted,  for  one  thing,  a restoration  of 
the  Hohenzollem  monarchy.  But  for  a long  time  they 
could  not  agree  on  which  Hohenzollem  prince  to  hoist 
on  the  throne.  Popitz,  one  of  the  leading  civilians  in  the 
ring,  wanted  the  Crown  Prince,  who  was  anathema  to 
most  of  the  others.  Schacht  favored  the  oldest  son  of  the 
Crown  Prince,  Prince  Wilhelm,  and  Goerdeler  the  young- 
est surviving  son  of  Wilhelm  II,  Prince  Oskar  of  Prussia. 
All  were  in  accord  that  the  Kaiser’s  fourth  son,  Prince 
August  Wilhelm,  or  “Auwi,”  as  he  was  nicknamed,  was 
out  of  the  question  since  he  was  a fanatical  Nazi  and  a 
Gruppenfuehrer  in  the  S.S. 

By  the  summer  of  1941,  however,  there  was  more  or 
less  agreement  that  the  most  suitable  candidate  for  the 
throne  was  Louis-Ferdinand,  the  second  and  oldest  sur- 
viving son  of  the  Crown  Prince.*  Then  just  thirty-three, 
a veteran  of  five  years  in  the  Ford  factory  at  Dearborn, 
a working  employee  of  the  Lufthansa  airlines  and  in  con- 
tact and  in  sympathy  with  the  plotters,  this  personable 

* ■ Prince  Wilhelm,  the  oldest  son,  had  died  of  battle  wounds  in  France  on 
May  26,  1940. 


1186 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

young  man  had  finally  emerged  as  the  most  desirable  of  the 
Hohenzollerns.  He  understood  the  twentieth  century  was 
democratic  and  intelligent.  Moreover,  he  had  an  attractive 
sensible  and  courageous  wife  in  Princess  Kira,  a former 
Russian  Grand  Duchess,  and — an  important  point  for  the 
conspirators  at  this  stage — he  was  a personal  friend  of 
President  Roosevelt,  who  had  invited  the  couple  to  stay 

P /n  f o House  during  their  American  honeymoon 

ID  1SJ38. 

Hassell  and  some  of  his  friends  were  not  absolutely 
convinced  that  Louis-Ferdinand  was  an  ideal  choice. 

He  lacks  many  qualities  he  cannot  get  along  without,” 
Hassell  commented  wryly  in  his  diary  at  Christmas  time, 
1941.  But  he  went  along  with  the  others. 

Hassell's  chief  interest  was  in  the  form  and  nature  of 
the  future  German  government,  and  early  the  year  be- 
fore  he  had  drawn  up,  after  consultation  with  General 
Beck,  Goerdeler  and  Popitz,  a program  for  its  interim 

iof?V  r lch  he  refined  in  a further  draft  at  the  end  of 
1941.  It  restored  individual  freedom  and  pending  the 
adoption  of  a permanent  constitution  provided  for  the 
supreme  power  to  rest  in  the  hands  of  a regent,  who,  as 
head  of  state,  would  appoint  a government  and  a Coun- 
cWtate-  11  was  all  rather  authoritarian  and  Goerdeler 
and  the  few  trade-union  representatives  among  the  con- 
spuators  didn’t  like  it,  proposing  instead  an  immediate 
plebiscite  so  that  the  interim  regime  would  have  popular 
backing  and  give  proof  of  its  democratic  character  But 
for  the  lack  of  something  better  Hassell's  plan  was  gen- 
erally accepted  at  least  as  a statement  of  principles  until 
it  was  superseded  by  a liberal  and  enlightened  program 
drawn  up  m 1943  under  pressure  from  the  Kreisau 
Circle,  led  by  Count  Helmuth  von  Moltke. 

Finally  that  spring  of  1942  the  conspirators  formally 
adopted  a leader.  They  had  all  acknowledged  General 
Beck  as  such  not  only  because  of  his  intelligence  and 
character  but  also  because  of  his  prestige  among  the  gen- 
erals,  his  good  name  in  the  country  and  his  reputation 
abroad.  However,  they  had  been  so  lackadaiscal  in  or- 
ganizing that  they  had  never  actually  put  him  in  charge. 
A few,  like  Hassell,  though  full  of  admiration  and  re- 
sped  for  the  former  General  Staff  Chief,  had  some  doubts 
about  him. 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1187 

“The  principal  difficulty  with  Beck,”  Hassell  wrote  in 
his  diary  shortly  before  Christmas,  1941,  “is  that  he  is 
very  theoretical.  As  Popitz  says,  a man  of  tactics  but 
little  will  power.”  This  judgment,  as  it  turned  out,  was 
not  an  ungrounded  one  and  this  quirk  in  the  General’s 
temperament  and  character,  this  surprising  lack  of  a will 
to  act,  was  to  prove  tragic  and  disastrous  in  the  end. 

Nevertheless  in  March  1942,  after  a good  many  secret 
meetings,  the  plotters  decided,  as  Hassell  reported,  that 
“Beck  must  hold  the  strings,”  and  at  the  end  of  the 
month,  as  the  ambassador  further  noted,  “Beck  was  for- 
mally adopted  as  the  head  of  our  group.”  7 

Still,  the  conspiracy  remained  nebulous  and  the  air  of 
unreality  which  surrounded  even  the  most  active  mem- 
bers of  it  from  the  first  hangs  over  their  endless  talk  as 
one  tries  to  follow  it  at  this  stage  in  the  records  they 
have  left.  Hitler,  they  knew  that  spring,  was  planning  to 
resume  the  offensive  in  Russia  as  soon  as  the  ground  was 
dry.  This,  they  felt,  could  only  plunge  Germany  farther 
toward  the  abyss.  And  yet,  though  they  talked  much,  they 
did  nothing  On  March  28,  1942,  Hassell  sat  in  his  country 
house  at  Ebenhausen  and  began  his  diary: 

During  the  last  days  in  Berlin  I had  detailed  discussions 
with  lessen,*  Beck  and  Goerdeler.  Prospects  not  very  good.8 

How  could  they  be  very  good?  Without  even  any  plans 
to  act.  Now.  While  there  was  still  time. 

It  was  Adolf  Hitler  who  at  this  unfolding  of  spring, 
the  third  of  the  war,  had  plans — and  the  fierce  will  to  try 
to  carry  them  out 

THE  LAST  GREAT  GERMAN  OFFENSIVES 
OF  THE  WAR 

Although  the  Fuehrer’s  folly  in  refusing  to  allow  the 
German  armies  in  Russia  to  retreat  in  time  had  led  to 
heavy  losses  in  men  and  arms,  to  the  demoralization  of 
many  commands  and  to  a situation  which  for  a few 

* Jens  Peter  Jessen,  a professor  of  economics  at  the  University  of  Berlin, 
was  one  of  the  brains  of  the  circle.  He  had  become  an  ardent  Nazi  during 
the  period  between  1931  and  1933  and  was  one  of  the  few  genuine  in- 
tellectuals in  the  party.  He  was  quickly  disillusioned  after  1933  and  soon 
became  a fanatical  anti-Nazi.  Arrested  for  complicity  in  the  July  20,  1944, 

Slot  against  Hitler,  he  was  executed  at  the  Ploetzensee  prison  in  Berlin  in 
Jovember  of  that  year. 


1188  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

weeks  in  January  and  February  1942  threatened  to  end 
in  utter  catastrophe,  there  is  little  doubt  that  Hitler’s  fanati- 
cal determination  to  hold  on  and  to  stand  and  fight  also 
helped  to  stem  the  Soviet  tide.  The  traditional  courage 
and  endurance  of  the  German  soldiers  did  the  rest. 

By  February  20  the  Russian  offensive  from  the  Baltic 
to  the  Black  Sea  had  run  out  of  steam  and  at  the  end 
of  March  the  season  of  deep  mud  set  in,  bringing  a rela- 
tive quiet  to  the  long  and  bloody  front.  Both  sides  were 
exhausted.  A German  Army  report  of  March  30,  1942, 
revealed  what  a terrible  toll  had  been  paid  in  the  winter 
fighting.  Of  a total  of  162  combat  divisions  in  the  East, 
only  eight  were  ready  for  offensive  missions.  The  sixteen 
armored  divisions  had  between  them  only  140  service- 
able tanks — less  than  the  normal  number  for  one  division.9 

While  the  troops  were  resting  and  refitting — -indeed  long 
before  that,  while  they  were  still  retreating  in  the  mid- 
winter snows — Hitler,  who  was  now  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Army  as  well  as  Supreme  Commander  of 
the  Armed  Forces,  had  been  busy  with  plans  for  the 
coming  summer’s  offensive.  They  were  not  as  ambitious  as 
those  of  the  previous  year.  By  now  he  had  sense  enough 
to  see  that  he  could  not  destroy  all  of  the  Red  armies  in 
a single  campaign.  This  summer  he  would  concentrate 
the  bulk  of  his  forces  in  the  south,  conquer  the  Caucasus 
oil  fields,  the  Donets  industrial  basin  and  the  wheat 
fields  of  the  Kuban  and  take  Stalingrad  on  the  Volga. 
This  would  accomplish  several  prime  objectives.  It  would 
deprive  the  Soviets  of  the  oil  and  much  of  the  food  and 
industry  they  desperately  needed  to  carry  on  the  war, 
while  giving  the  Germans  the  oil  and  the  food  resources 
they  were  almost  as  badly  in  need  of. 

“If  I do  not  get  the  oil  of  Maikop  and  Grozny,”  Hit- 
ler told  General  Paulus,  the  commander  of  the  ill-fated 
Sixth  Army,  just  before  the  summer  offensive  began, 
“then  I must  end  this  war.”  10 

Stalin  could  have  said  almost  the  same  thing.  He  too 
had  to  have  the  oil  of  the  Caucasus  to  stay  in  the  war. 
That  was  where  the  significance  of  Stalingrad  came  in. 
German  possession  of  it  would  block  the  last  main  route 
via  the  Caspian  Sea  and  the  Volga  River  over  which  the 
oil,  as  long  as  the  Russians  held  the  wells,  could  reach 
central  Russia. 


1189 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Besides  oil  to  propel  his  planes  and  tanks  and  trucks, 
Hitler  needed  men  to  fill  out  his  thinned  ranks.  Total 
casualties  at  the  end  of  the  winter  fighting  were  1,167,835, 
exclusive  of  the  sick,  and  there  were  not  enough  replace- 
ments available  to  make  up  for  such  losses.  The  High 
Command  turned  to  Germany’s  allies — or,  rather,  satel- 
lites— for  additional  troops.  During  the  winter  General 
Keitel  had  scurried  off  to  Budapest  and  Bucharest  to 
drum  up  Hungarian  and  Rumanian  soldiers — whole  di- 
visions of  them — for  the  coming  summer.  Goering  and 
finally  Hitler  himself  appealed  to  Mussolini  for  Italian 
formations. 

Goering  arrived  in  Rome  at  the  end  of  January  1942 
to  line  up  Italian  reinforcements  for  Russia,  assuring  Mus- 
solini that  the  Soviet  Union  would  be  defeated  in  1942 
and  that  Great  Britain  would  lay  down  her  arms  in  1943. 
Ciano  found  the  fat,  bemedaled  Reich  Marshal  insuffer- 
able. “As  usual  he  is  bloated  and  overbearing,”  the  Ital- 
ian Foreign  Minister  noted  in  his  diary  on  February  2. 
Two  days  later: 

Goering  leaves  Rome.  We  had  dinner  at  the  Excelsior 
Hotel,  and  during  the  dinner  Goering  talked  of  little  else 
but  the  jewels  he  owned.  In  fact,  he  had  some  beautiful 
rings  on  his  fingers  . . . On  the  way  to  the  station  he  wore 
a great  sable  coat,  something  between  what  automobile  driv- 
ers wore  in  1906  and  what  a high-grade  prostitute  wears  to 
the  opera.11 

The  corruption  and  corrosion  of  the  Number  Two  man 
in  the  Third  Reich  was  making  steady  progress. 

Mussolini  promised  Goering  to  send  two  Italian  divi- 
sions to  Russia  in  March  if  the  Germans  would  give 
them  artillery,  but  his  concern  about  his  ally’s  defeats  on 
the  Eastern  front  grew  to  such  proportions  that  Hitler 
decided  it  was  time  for  another  meeting  to  explain  how 
strong  Germany  still  was. 

This  took  place  on  April  29  and  30  at  Salzburg,  where 
the  Duce  and  Ciano  and  their  party  were  put  up  in  the 
baroque  Palace  of  Klessheim,  once  the  seat  of  the  prince- 
bishops  and  now  redecorated  with  hangings,  furniture  and 
carpets  from  France,  for  which  the  Italian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter suspected  the  Germans  “did  not  pay  too  much.”  Ciano 
found  the  Fuehrer  looking  tired.  “The  winter  months  in 
Russia  have  borne  heavily  upon  him,”  he  noted  in  his 


1190 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

hairs  ” *1  S6e  ^ 1116  fim  ^ that  he  has  many  gray 

There  followed  the  usual  German  recital  sizing  up  the 
genera1  situation,  with  Ribbentrop  and  Hitler  assuring 
their  Italian  guests  that  all  was  well— in  Russia,  in  North 
Africa,  in  the  West  and  on  the  high  seas.  The  coming 
offensive  in  the  East,  they  confided,  would  be  directed 
against  the  Caucasus  oil  fields. 

sa;rx  RwfnlaKS  SKUrCei  of  0i?  ^ exhausted  [Ribbentrop 
said]  she  will  be  brought  to  her  knees.  Then  the  British 

Empire’11  ^ l°  SaVe  What  remains  of  the  mauled 

America  is  a big  bluff  . . . 

Ciano,  listening  more  or  less  patiently  to  his  opposite 
number,  got  the  impression,  however,  that  in  regard  to 
what  the  United  States  might  eventually  do  it  was  the 
Germans  who  were  bluffing  and  that  in  reality,  when 
they  thought  of  it,  “they  feel  shivers  running  down  their 
spines. 

It  was  the  Fuehrer  who,  as  always,  did  most  of  the 
talking. 

snl^.',tl!rffalkS’KtalkS’u  ta'kS-  tCiano  wr°te  in  his  diary],  Mus- 
solim  suffers— he,  who  is  in  the  habit  of  talking  himself,  and 

dav  af^r  f ’ .prac£,cally  has  keep  quiet.  On  the  second 

day  after  lunch,  when  everything  had  been  said.  Hitler  talked 

ah^!f£r>1Pted  y f°r  an  hour  and  forty  minutes.  He  omitted 
onhv  tC  f no  argument:  war  and  peace,  religion  and  philos- 
wr^’wa,rtVhand  hls‘°ry-  Mussolint  automatically  looked  at  his 

Tverv  Hav  in'  i he  Germanus~P°°r  people— have  to  take  it 
every  day,  and  I am  certain  there  isn’t  a gesture,  a word  or  a 

pause,  which  they  don’t  know  by  heart.  General  Jodi,  after 
an  epic  struggle,  finally  went  to  sleep  on  the  divan.  Keitel 
was  reeling,  but  he  succeeded  in  keeping  his  head  up  He 
was  too  close  to  Hitler  to  let  himself  go  . . .12  P 

Despite  the  avalanche  of  talk  or  perhaps  because  of  it. 
Hitler  got  the  promise  of  more  Italian  cannon  fodder 
for  the  Russian  front.  So  successul  were  he  and  Keitel 
with  all  the  satellites  that  the  German  High  Command 

It,G<vb^ell'ha?  seen  i?!tler.  a month  before  at  headquarters  and  expressed 

grayk  m 7 ?°J.ed  U3'  he  has  already  becom?  quite 

ft,/  *,  “e  he  has  had  to  fight  off  severe  attacks  of  eiddiness 

The  Fuehrer  this  time  truly  worries  me."  He  had  (io^bbels  Tdded  ' a 
revulsion  against  frost  and  snow  . , . What  worries  and  torments 

c«6fcbS^^p^tm-t3^)COUntry  is  5tiu  covered  with  snow  ■ • •”  <~The 


1191 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

calculated  it  would  have  52  “Allied”  divisions  available 
for  the  summer’s  task — 27  Rumanian,  13  Hungarian,  9 
Italian,  2 Slovak  and  one  Spanish.  This  was  one  quarter 
of  the  combined  Axis  force  in  the  East.  Of  the  41  fresh 
divisions  which  were  to  reinforce  the  southern  part  of  the 
front,  where  the  main  German  blow  would  fall,  one  half — 
or  21  divisions — were  Hungarian  (10),  Italian  (6)  and  Ru- 
manian (5).  Haider  and  most  of  the  other  generals  did 
not  like  to  stake  so  much  on  so  many  “foreign”  divisions 
whose  fighting  qualities,  in  their  opinion,  were,  to  put  it 
mildly,  questionable.  But  because  of  their  own  shortage 
of  manpower  they  reluctantly  accepted  this  aid,  and  this 
decision  was  shortly  to  contribute  to  the  disaster  which 
ensued. 

At  first,  that  summer  of  1942,  the  fortunes  of  the  Axis 
prospered.  Even  before  the  jump-off  toward  the  Caucasus 
and  Stalingrad  a sensational  victory  was  scored  in  North 
Africa.  On  May  27,  1942,  General  Rommel  had  resumed 
his  offensive  in  the  desert.*  Striking  swiftly  with  his  famed 
Afrika  Korps  (two  armored  divisions  and  a motorized  in- 
fantry division)  and  eight  Italian  divisions,  of  which  one 
was  armored,  he  soon  had  the  British  desert  army  reeling 
back  toward  the  Egyptian  frontier.  On  June  21  he  captured 
Tobruk,  the  key  to  the  British  defenses,  which  in  1941 
had  held  out  for  nine  months  until  relieved,  and  two  days 
later  he  entered  Egypt.  By  the  end  of  June  he  was  at 
El  Alamein,  sixty-five  miles  from  Alexandria  and  the 
delta  of  the  Nile.  It  seemed  to  many  a startled  Allied 
statesman,  poring  over  a map,  that  nothing  could  now 
prevent  Rommel  from  delivering  a fatal  blow  to  the  British 
by  conquering  Egypt  and  then,  if  he  were  reinforced, 
sweeping  on  northeast  to  capture  the  great  oil  fields  of 
the  Middle  East  and  then  to  the  Caucasus  to  meet  the 
German  armies  in  Russia,  which  already  were  beginning 
their  advance  toward  that  region  from  the  north. 

It  was  one  of  the  darkest  moments  of  the  war  for  the 
Allies  and  correspondingly  one  of  the  brightest  for  the 
Axis.  But  Hitler,  as  we  have  seen,  had  never  under- 

* In  a savage  series  of  battles  with  the  British  in  November  and  December 
1941,  Rommel’s  forces  had  been  driven  back  clear  across  Cyrenaica  to  the 
El  Agheila  line  at  its  western  borders.  But  bounding  back  with  his  customapr 
resilience  in  January  1942,  Rommel  recaptured  half  of  the  ground  lost,  in 
a swift  seventeen-day  campaign  which  brought  him  back  to  El  Gazala,  from 
where  the  new  drive  of  the  end  of  May  1942  began. 


1192 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

stood  global  warfare.  He  did  not  know  how  to  exploit 
Rommel’s  surprising  African  success.  He  awarded  the  dar- 
ing leader  of  the  Afrika  Korps  a field  marshal’s  baton  but 
he  did  not  send  him  supplies  or  reinforcements.*  Under 
the  nagging  of  Admiral  Raeder  and  the  urging  of  Rommel, 
the  Fuehrer  had  only  reluctantly  agreed  to  send  the  Afrika 
Korps  and  a small  German  air  force  to  Libya  in  the  first 
place.  But  he  had  done  this  only  to  prevent  an  Italian  col- 
lapse in  North  Africa,  not  because  he  foresaw  the  im- 
portance of  conquering  Egypt. 

The  key  to  that  conquest  actually  was  the  small  island 
of  Malta,  lying  in  the  Mediterranean  between  Sicily  and 
the  Axis  bases  in  Libya.  It  was  from  this  British  bastion 
that  bombers,  submarines  and  surface  craft  wrought  havoc 
on  German  and  Italian  vessels  carrying  supplies  and  men 
to  North  Africa.  In  August  1941  some  35  per  cent  of 
Rommel’s  supplies  and  reinforcements  were  sunk;  in  Oc- 
tober, 63  per  cent.  By  November  9 Ciano  was  writing 
sadly  in  his  diary: 

Since  September  19  we  had  given  up  trying  to  get  convoys 
through  to  Libya;  every  attempt  had  been  paid  for  at  a high 
price  . . . Tonight  we  tried  it  again.  A convoy  of  seven 
ships  left,  accompanied  by  two  ten-thousand-ton  cruisers  and 
ten  destroyers  . . . All — I mean  all — our  ships  were  sunk  . . . 
The  British  returned  to  their  ports  [at  Malta]  after  having 
slaughtered  us.13 

Belatedly  the  Germans  diverted  several  U-boats  from 
the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  to  the  Mediterranean  and  Kes- 
selring  was  given  additional  squadrons  of  planes  for  the 
bases  in  Sicily.  It  was  decided  to  neutralize  Malta  and  de- 
stroy, if  possible,  the  British  fleet  in  the  eastern  Mediter- 
ranean. Success  was  immediate.  By  the  end  of  1941  the 
British  had  lost  three  battleships,  an  aircraft  carrier,  two 
cruisers  and  several  destroyers  and  submarines,  and  what 

•Hitler’s  naming  Rommel  a field  marshal  the  day  after  the  capture  of 
Tobruk  caused  Mussolini  “much  pain’’  because,  as  Ciano  noted,  it  accentu- 
ated “the  German  character  of  the  battle.’’  The  Duce  left  immediately  for 
Libya  to  grab  some  honors  for  himself,  believing  that  he  could  enter  Alex- 
andria, Ciano  says,  “in  fifteen  days.”  On  July  2 he  contacted  Hitler  by  wire 
about  “the  question  of  the  future  political  government  of  Egypt,”  proposing 
Rommel  as  the  military  commander  and  an  Italian  as  “civilian  delegate.” 
Hitler  replied  that  he  did  not  consider  the  matter  “urgent.”  (Ciano  Diaries. 
pp;  502-04.) 

“Mussolini  was  waiting  impatiently  in  Dema  [behind  the  front],”  General 
r ntz  Bayerlein,  chief  of  staff  to  Rommel,  later  recalled,  “for  the  day  when 
he  might  take  the  salute  at  a parade  of  Axis  tanks  beneath  the  shadow  of 
the  Pyramids.  ' (The  Fatal  Decisions,  ed.  Freidin  and  Richardson,  p.  103.) 


1193 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

was  left  of  their  fleet  was  driven  to  Egyptian  bases.  Malta 
had  been  battered  by  German  bombers  day  and  night  for 
weeks.  As  a result  Axis  supplies  got  through — in  January 
not  a ton  of  shipping  was  lost — and  Rommel  was  able  to 
build  up  his  forces  for  the  big  push  into  Egypt. 

In  March  Admiral  Raeder  talked  Hitler  into  approving 
plans  not  only  for  Rommel's  offensive  toward  the  Nile 
(Operation  Aida)  but  for  the  capture  of  Malta  by  para- 
chute troops  (Operation  Hercules).  The  drive  from  Libya 
was  to  begin  at  the  end  of  May  and  Malta  was  to  be  as- 
saulted in  mid-July.  But  on  June  15,  while  Rommel  was 
in  the  midst  of  his  initial  successes.  Hitler  postponed  the 
attack  on  Malta.  He  could  spare  neither  troops  nor  planes 
from  the  Russian  front,  he  explained  to  Raeder.  A few 
weeks  later  he  postponed  Hercules  again,  saying  it  could 
wait  until  after  the  summer  offensive  in  the  East  had  been 
completed  and  Rommel  had  conquered  Egypt.14  Malta 
could  be  kept  quiet  in  the  meantime,  he  advised,  by  con- 
tinued bombing. 

But  it  was  not  kept  quiet  and  for  this  failure  either  to 
neutralize  it  or  to  capture  it  the  Germans  would  shortly 
pay  a high  price.  A large  British  convoy  got  through  to  the 
besieged  island  on  June  16,  and  though  several  warships 
and  freighters  were  lost  this  put  Malta  back  in  business. 
Spitfires  were  flown  to  the  island  from  the  U.S.  aircraft 
carrier  Wasp  and  soon  drove  the  attacking  Luftwaffe 
bombers  from  the  skies.  Rommel  felt  the  effect.  Three 
quarters  of  his  supply  ships  thereafter  were  sunk. 

He  had  reached  El  Alamein  with  just  thirteen  opera- 
tional tanks.*  “Our  strength,”  he  wrote  in  his  diary  on 
July  3,  “has  faded  away.”  And  at  a moment  when  the 
Pyramids  were  almost  in  sight,  and  beyond — the  great 
prize  of  Egypt  and  Suez!  This  was  another  opportunity 
lost,  and  one  of  the  last  which  Hitler  would  be  afforded 
by  Providence  and  the  fortunes  of  war. 

THE  GERMAN  SUMMER  OFFENSIVE 
IN  RUSSIA:  1942 

By  the  end  of  the  summer  of  1942  Adolf  Hitler  seemed 
to  be  once  more  on  top  of  the  world.  German  U-boats 


* According  to  General  Bayerlein’s  postwar  testimony.  He  probably  exag- 
gerated his  losses.  Allied  intelligence  gave  Rommel  125  tanks. 


1194  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

were  sinking  700,000  tons  of  British— American  shipping 
a month  in  the  Atlantic — more  than  could  be  replaced 
in  the  booming  shipyards  of  the  United  States,  Canada  and 
Scotland.  Though  the  Fuehrer  had  denuded  his  forces  in 
the  West  of  most  of  their  troops  and  tanks  and  planes  in 
order  to  finish  with  Russia,  there  was  no  sign  that  sum- 
mer that  the  British  and  Americans  were  strong  enough 
to  make  even  a small  landing  from  across  the  Channel. 
They  had  not  even  risked  trying  to  occupy  French-held 
Northwest  Africa,  though  the  weakened  French,  of  divided 
loyalties,  had  nothing  much  with  which  to  stop  them  even 
if  they  attempted  to,  and  the  Germans  nothing  at  all  ex- 
cept a few  submarines  and  a handful  of  planes  based  in 
Italy  and  Tripoli. 

The  British  Navy  and  Air  Force  had  been  unable  to 
prevent  Germany’s  two  battle  cruisers  Scharnhorst  and 
Gneisenau  and  the  heavy  cruiser  Prinz  Eugen  from  dash- 
ing up  the  English  Channel  in  full  daylight  and  making 
their  way  safely  home  from  Brest.*  Hitler  had  feared  that 
the  British  and  Americans  would  certainly  try  to  occupy 
northern  Norway — that  was  why  he  had  insisted  on  the 
dash  from  Brest  so  that  the  three  heavy  ships  there  could 
be  used  for  the  defense  of  Norwegian  waters.  “Norway,” 
he  told  Raeder  at  the  end  of  January  1942,  “is  the  zone  of 
destiny.”  It  had  to  be  defended  at  all  costs.  As  it  turned 
out,  there  was  no  need.  The  Anglo-Americans  had  other 
plans  for  their  limited  forces  in  the  West. 

On  the  map  the  sum  of  Hitler’s  conquests  by  September 
1942  looked  staggering.  The  Mediterranean  had  become 
practically  an  Axis  lake,  with  Germany  and  Italy  holding 
most  of  the  northern  shore  from  Spain  to  Turkey  and 
the  southern  shore  from  Tunisia  to  within  sixty  miles  of 
the  Nile.  In  fact,  German  troops  now  stood  guard  from 
the  Norwegian  North  Cape  on  the  Arctic  Ocean  to  Egypt, 
from  the  Atlantic  at  Brest  to  the  southern  reaches  of  the 
Volga  River  on  the  border  of  Central  Asia. 

German  troops  of  the  Sixth  Army  had  reached  the  Volga 

* This  taken  Place  on  February  11—12,  1942,  and  had  caught  the  British 
by  surprise.  Only  weak  naval  and  aircraft  forces  were  rounded  up  in  time 
to  attack  the  German  fleet  and  they  inflicted  little  damage.  “Vice-Admiral 
Uiliax  [who  led  the  dash],  * commented  the  Times  of  London,  “has  succeeded 
where  the  Duke  of  Medina  Sidonia  failed  . . . Nothing  more  mortifying  to 
the  pride  of  sea  power  has  happened  in  Home  Waters  since  the  17th 
Century. 


1195 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

just  north  of  Stalingrad  on  August  23.  Two  days  before, 
the  swastika  had  been  hoisted  on  Mount  Elbrus,  the  highest 
peak  ( 18,481  feet)  in  the  Caucasus  Mountains.  The  Maikop 
oil  fields,  producing  annually  two  and  a half  million  tons 
of  oil,  had  been  captured  on  August  8,  though  the  Ger- 
mans found  them  almost  completely  destroyed,  and  by 
the  twenty-fifth  Kleist’s  tanks  had  arrived  at  Mozdok,  only 
fifty  miles  from  the  main  Soviet  oil  center  around 
Grozny  and  a bare  hundred  miles  from  the  Caspian  Sea. 
On  the  thirty-first  Hitler  was  urging  Field  Marshal  List, 
commander  of  the  armies  in  the  Caucasus,  to  scrape  up 
all  available  forces  for  the  final  push  to  Grozny  so  that 
he  “could  get  his  hands  on  the  oil  fields.”  On  that  last 
day  of  August,  too,  Rommel  launched  his  offensive  at 
El  Alamein  with  every  hope  of  breaking  through  to  the 
Nile. 

Although  Hitler  was  never  satisfied  with  the  perform- 
ance of  his  generals — he  had  sacked  Field  Marshal  von 
Bock,  who  commanded  the  whole  southern  offensive,  on 
July  13  and,  as  Haider’s  diary  reveals,  had  constantly 
nagged  and  cursed  most  of  the  other  commanders  as  well 
as  the  General  Staff  for  not  advancing  fast  enough — he 
now  believed  that  the  decisive  victory  was  in  his  grasp. 
He  ordered  the  Sixth  Army  and  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army 
to  swing  north  along  the  Volga,  after  Stalingrad  was 
taken,  in  a vast  encircling  movement  which  would  enable 
him  eventually  to  advance  on  central  Russia  and  Moscow 
from  the  east  as  well  as  from  the  west.  He  believed  the 
Russians  were  finished  and  Haider  tells  of  him  at  this  mo- 
ment talking  of  pushing  with  part  of  his  forces  through 
Iran  to  the  Persian  Gulf.15  Soon  he  would  link  up  with 
the  Japanese  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  He  had  no  doubt  of  the 
accuracy  of  a German  intelligence  report  on  September 
9 that  the  Russians  had  used  up  all  their  reserves  on  the 
entire  front.  In  a conference  with  Admiral  Raeder  at  the 
end  of  August  his  thoughts  were  already  turning  from 
Russia,  which  he  said  he  now  regarded  as  a “blockade- 
proof  Lebensraum,”  to  the  British  and  Americans,  who 
would  soon,  he  was  sure,  be  brought  “to  the  point  of  dis- 
cussing peace  terms.”  16 

And  yet,  as  General  Kurt  Zeitzler  later  recalled,  ap- 
pearances even  then,  rosy  as  they  were,  were  deceptive. 
Almost  all  the  generals  in  the  field,  as  well  as  those  on  the 


1196  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

General  Staff,  saw  flaws  in  the  pretty  picture.  They  could 
be  summed  up:  the  Germans  simply  didn’t  have  the  re- 
sources—the  men  or  the  guns  or  the  tanks  or  the  planes 
or  the  means  of  transportation— to  reach  the  objectives 
Hitler  had  insisted  on  setting.  When  Rommel  tried  to  tell 
this  to  the  warlord  in  respect  to  Egypt,  Hitler  ordered  him 
to  go  on  sick  leave  in  the  mountains  of  the  Semmering. 
When  Haider  and  Field  Marshal  List  attempted  to  do 
the  same  in  regard  to  the  Russian  front,  they  were 
cashiered. 

Even  the  rankest  amateur  strategist  could  see  the  grow- 
ing danger  to  the  German  armies  in  southern  Russia  as 
Soviet  resistance  stiffened  in  the  Caucasus  and  at  Stalin- 
grad and  the  season  of  the  autumn  rains  approached.  The 
long  northern  flank  of  the  Sixth  Army  was  dangerously 
exposed  along  the  line  of  the  upper  Don  for  350  miles 
from  Stalingrad  to  Voronezh.  Here  Hitler  had  stationed 
three  satellite  armies:  the  Hungarian  Seeond,  south  of 
Voronezh;  the  Italian  Eighth,  farther  southeast;  and  the 
Rumanian  Third,  on  the  right  at  the  bend  of  the  Don  just 
west  of  Stalingrad.  Because  of  the  bitter  hostility  of  Ru- 
manians and  Hungarians  to  each  other  their  armies  had 
to  be  separated  by  the  Italians.  In  the  steppes  south  of 
Stalingrad  there  was  a fourth  satellite  army,  the  Ru- 
manian Fourth.  Aside  from  their  doubtful  fighting  qual- 
ities, all  these  armies  were  inadequately  equipped,  lacking 
armored  power,  heavy  artillery  and  mobility.  Furthermore 
they  were  spread  out  very  thinly.  The  Rumanian  Third 
Army  held  a front  of  105  miles  with  only  sixty-nine  bat- 
talions. But  these  “allied”  armies  were  all  Hitler  had.  There 
were  not  enough  German  units  to  fill  the  gap.  And  since 
he  believed,  as  he  told  Haider,  that  the  Russians  were 
finished,  he  did  not  unduly  worry  about  this  exposed 
and  lengthy  Don  flank. 

Yet  it  was  the  key  to  maintaining  both  the  Sixth  Army 
and  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army  at  Stalingrad  and  Army 
Group  A in  the  Caucasus.  Should  the  Don  flank  collapse 
not  only  would  the  German  forces  at  Stalingrad  be 
threatened  with  encirclement  but  those  in  the  Caucasus 
would  be  cut  off.  Once  more  the  Nazi  warlord  had  gam- 
bled.  It  was  not  his  first  gamble  of  the  summer’s  campaign. 

On  July  23,  at  the  height  of  the  offensive,  he  had 
made  another.  The  Russians  were  in  full  retreat  between 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1197 

the  Donets  and  upper-Don  rivers,  falling  rapidly  back  to- 
ward Stalingrad  to  the  east  and  toward  the  lower  Don  to 
the  south.  A decision  had  to  be  made.  Should  the  Ger- 
man forces  concentrate  on  taking  Stalingrad  and  blocking 
the  Volga  River,  or  should  they  deliver  their  main  blow  in 
the  Caucasus  in  quest  of  Russian  oil?  Earlier  in  the  month 
Hitler  had  pondered  this  crucial  question  but  had  been 
unable  to  make  up  his  mind.  At  first,  the  smell  of  oil  had 
tempted  him  most,  and  on  July  13  he  had  detached  the 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  from  Army  Group  B,  which  had 
been  driving  down  the  Don  toward  the  river’s  bend  and 
Stalingrad  just  beyond,  and  sent  it  south  to  help  Kleist’s 
First  Panzer  Army  get  over  the  lower  Don  near  Rostov 
and  on  into  the  Caucasus  toward  the  oil  fields.  At  that 
moment  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army  probably  could  have 
raced  on  to  Stalingrad,  which  was  then  largely  unde- 
fended, and  easily  captured  it.  By  the  time  Hitler  realized 
his  mistake  it  was  too  late,  and  then  he  compounded  his 
error.  When  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army  was  shifted  back 
toward  Stalingrad  a fortnight  later,  the  Russians  had 
recovered  sufficiently  to  be  able  to  check  it;  and  its  de- 
parture from  the  Caucasus  front  left  Kleist  too  weak  to 
complete  his  drive  to  the  Grozny  oil  fields.* 

The  shifting  of  this  powerful  armored  unit  back  to  the 
drive  on  Stalingrad  was  one  result  of  the  fatal  decision 
which  Hitler  made  on  July  23.  His  fanatical  determination 
to  take  both  Stalingrad  and  the  Caucasus  at  the  same 
time,  against  the  advice  of  Haider  and  the  field  com- 
manders, who  did  not  believe  it  could  be  done,  was  em- 
bodied in  Directive  No.  45,  which  became  famous  in  the 
annals  of  the  German  Army.  It  was  one  of  the  most  fate- 
ful of  Hitler’s  moves  in  the  war,  for  in  the  end,  and  in  a 
very  short  time,  it  resulted  in  his  failing  to  achieve  either 
objective  and  led  to  the  most  humiliating  defeat  in  the 
history  of  German  arms,  making  certain  that  he  could 

•Kleist  confirmed  this  to  Liddell  Hart:  “The  Fourth  Panzer  Army 
could  have  taken  Stalingrad  without  a fight  at  the  end  of  July,  but  'was 
diverted  south  to  help  me  in  crossing  the  Don.  I did  not  need  its  aid,  and  it 
merely  congested  the  roads  I was  using.  When  it  turned  north  again  a fort- 
rught  later  the  Russians  had  gathered  just  sufficient  forces  at  Stalingrad  to 
check  it.  By  that  time  Kleist  needed  the  additional  tank  force.  “We  could 
have  reached  our  goal  l the  -Grozny  oil]  if  my  forces  had  not  been  drawn 
away  ...  to  help  the  attack  on  Stalingrad,”  he  added.  (Liddell  Hart,  The 
German  Generals  Talk,  pp.  169-71.) 


1198 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


never  win  the  war  and  that  the  days  of  the  thousand- 
year  Third  Reich  were  numbered. 

General  Haider  was  appalled,  and  there  was  a stormy 
scene  at  “Werewolf”  headquarters  in  the  Ukraine  near 
Vinnitsa  to  which  Hitler  had  moved  on  July  16  in  order 
to  be  nearer  the  front.  The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
urged  that  the  main  forces  be  concentrated  on  the  taking 
of  Stalingrad  and  tried  to  explain  that  the  German  Army 
simply  did  not  possess  the  strength  to  carry  out  two  power- 
ful offensives  in  two  different  directions.  When  Hitler  re- 
torted that  the  Russians  were  “finished,”  Haider  attempted 
to  convince  him  that,  according  to  the  Army’s  own  intelli- 
gence, this  was  far  from  the  case. 

The  contir?ual  underestimation  of  enemy  possibilities 
[Haider  noted  sadly  in  his  diary  that  evening]  takes  on 
jpotesque  forms  and  is  becoming  dangerous.  Serious  work 
has  become  impossible  here.  Pathological  reaction  to  momen- 
tary  impressions  and  a complete  lack  of  capacity  to  assess 
the  situation  and  its  possibilities  give  this  so-called  “leader- 
ship” a most  peculiar  character. 

Later  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  whose  own  days 
at  his  post  were  now  numbered,  would  come  back  to  this 
scene  and  write: 


Hitlers  decisions  had  ceased  to  have  anything  in  common 
with  the  principles  of  strategy  and  operations  as  they  have 
been  recognized  for  generations  past.  They  were  the  product 
ot  a violent  nature  following  its  momentary  impulses,  which 
recognized  no  limits  to  possibility  and  which  made  its  wish- 
dreams  the  father  of  its  acts  . . ,17 


As  to  what  he  called  the  Supreme  Commander’s  “path- 
ological overestimation  of  his  own  strength  and  criminal 
underestimation  of  the  enemy’s,”  Haider  later  told  a story: 


Once  when  a quite  objective  report  was  read  to  him  show- 
mg  that  still  m 1942  Stalin  would  be  able  to  muster  from 
one  to  one  and  a quarter  million  fresh  troops  in  the  region 
north  of  Stalingrad  and  west  of  the  Volga,  not  to  mention 
half  ,a  “union  men  in  the  Caucasus,  and  which  provided 
proof  that  Russian  output  of  front-line  tanks  amounted  to 
at  least  1,200  a month,  Hitler  flew  at  the  man  who  was  read- 
ing  with  clenched  fists  and  foam  in  the  corners  of  his 
mouth  and  forbade  him  to  read  any  more  of  such  idiotic 
twaddle.18 


“You  didn’t  have  to  have  the  gift  of  a prophet,”  says 


1199 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Haider,  “to  foresee  what  would  happen  when  Stalin  un- 
leashed those  million  and  a half  troops  against  Stalingrad 
and  the  Don  flank.*  I pointed  this  out  to  Hitler  very 
clearly.  The  result  was  the  dismissal  of  the  Chief  of  the 
Army  General  Staff.” 

This  took  place  on  September  24.  Already  on  the  ninth, 
upon  being  told  by  Keitel  that  Field  Marshal  List,  who 
had  the  over-all  command  of  the  armies  in  the  Caucasus, 
had  been  sacked,  Haider  learned  that  he  would  be  the 
next  to  go.  The  Fuehrer,  he  was  told,  had  become  con- 
vinced that  he  “was  no  longer  equal  to  the  psychic  de- 
mands of  his  position.”  Hitler  explained  this  in  greater 
detail  to  his  General  Staff  Chief  at  their  farewell  meeting 
on  the  twenty-fourth. 

“You  and  I have  been  suffering  from  nerves.  Half  of 
my  nervous  exhaustion  is  due  to  you.  It  is  not  worth  it 
to  go  on.  We  need  National  Socialist  ardor  now,  not  pro- 
fessional ability.  I cannot  expect  this  of  an  officer  of  the 
old  school  such  as  you.” 

“So  spoke,”  Haider  commented  later,  “not  a responsible 
warlord  but  a political  fanatic.”  19 

And  so  departed  Franz  Haider.  He  was  not  without 
his  faults,  which  were  similar  to  those  of  his  predecessor, 
General  Beck,  in  that  his  mind  was  often  confused  and 
his  will  to  action  paralyzed.  And  though  he  had  often 
stood  up  to  Hitler,  however  ineffectually,  he  had  also,  like 
all  of  the  other  Army  officers  who  enjoyed  high  rank 
during  World  War  II,  gone  along  with  him  and  for  a long 
time  abetted  his  outrageous  aggressions  and  his  con- 
quests. Yet  he  had  retained  some  of  the  virtues  of  more 
civilized  times.  He  was  the  last  of  the  old-school  General 
Staff  chiefs  that  the  Army  of  the  Third  Reich  would  have,  t 
He  was  replaced  by  General  Kurt  Zeitzler,  a younger  of- 

*Halder  relates  that  “quite  by  accident"  he  came  across  in  the  Ukraine 
about  that  time  a book  about  Stalin’s  defeat  of  General  Denikin  between  the 
Don  bend  and  Stalingrad  during  the  Russian  Civil  War.  He  says  the  situa- 
tion then  was  very  similar  to  that  of  1942  and  that  Stalin  exploited  “master- 
fully” Denikin’s  weak  defenses  along  the  Don.  “Hence,"  he  adds,  “came 
the  changing  of  the  name  of  the  city  from  ‘Tsaritsyn’  to  ‘Stalingrad.’  ” 
t The  sacking  of  Haider  was  a loss  not  only  to  the  Army  but  to  historians 
of  the  Third  Reich,  for  his  invaluable  diary  ends  qn  September  24,  1942.  He 
was  eventually  arrested,  placed  in  the  concentration  camp  at  Dachau  along 
with  such  illustrious  prisoners  as  Schuschnigg  and  Schacht  and  liberated  by 
U.S.  forces  at  Niederdorf,  South  Tyrol,  on  April  28,  1945.  Since  then,  up 
to  the  time  of  writing,  he  has  collaborated  with  the  U.S.  Army  in  a number 
of  military  historical  studies  of  World  War  II.  His  generosity  to  this  writer 
in  answering  queries  and  pointing  out  sources  has  already  been  noted. 


1200 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


fiew  of  a different  stripe  who  was  serving  as  chief  of  staff 
to  Rundstedt  in  the  West,  and  who  endured  in  the  post, 
which  once— especially  in  the  First  World  War— had  been 
the  highest  and  most  powerful  in  the  German  Army,  as 
little  more  than  the  Fuehrer’s  office  boy  until  the  attempt 
against  the  dictator’s  life  in  July  1944.* 

A change  in  General  Staff  chiefs  did  not  change  the 
situation  of  the  German  Army,  whose  twin  drives  on 
Stalingrad  and  the  Caucasus  had  now  been  halted  by  stif- 
fening Soviet  resistance  itself.  All  through  October  bitter 
street  fighting  continued  in  Stalingrad  itself.  The  Ger- 
mans made  some  progress,  from  budding  to  budding 
but  with  staggering  losses,  for  the  rubble  of  a great  city, 
as  everyone  who  has  experienced  modern  warfare  knows’ 
gives  many  opportunities  for  stubborn  and  prolonged  de- 
fense and  the  Russians,  disputing  desperately  every  foot 
of  the  debris,  made  the  most  of  them.  Though  Haider 
and  then  his  successor  warned  Hitler  that  the  troops  in 
Stalingrad  were  becoming  exhausted,  the  Supreme  Com- 
mander insisted  that  they  push  on.  Fresh  divisions  were 
thrown  in  and  were  soon  ground  to  pieces  in  the  inferno. 

Instead  of  a means  to  an  end — the  end  had  already 
been  achieved  when  German  formations  reached  the  west- 
ern  banks  of  the  Volga  north  and  south  of  the  city  and 
cut  off  the  river’s  traffic— Stalingrad  had  become  an  end 
in  itself.  To  Hitler  its  capture  was  now  a question  of  per- 
sonal prestige.  When  even  Zeitzler  got  up  enough  nerve 
to  suggest  to  the  Fuehrer  that  in  view  of  the  danger  to  the 
long  northern  flank  along  the  Don  the  Sixth  Army  should 
be  withdrawn  from  Stalingrad  to  the  elbow  of  the  Don, 
Hitler  flew  into  a fury.  “Where  the  German  soldier  sets 
foot,  there  he  remains!”  he  stormed. 


Despite  the  hard  going  and  the  severe  losses,  General 
Paulus,  commander  of  the  Sixth  Army,  informed  Hitler 
by  radio  on  October  25  that  he  expected  to  complete  the 
capture  of  Stalingrad  at  the  latest  by  November  10. 
Cheered  up  by  this  assurance,  Hitler  issued  orders  the 

OKW  HithfuI  and  fanatically  loyal  General  Jodi,  Chief  of  Operations  at 

also  was  in  Hitler  s doghouse  at  this  time.  He  had  opposed  the  sack- 
Sf.H  f te  d Mrhal  Hi*  ?n,d  General  Haider  and  his  defense  of  them  sent 
Hitler  into  such  a rage  that  for  months  he  refused  to  shake  hands  with  Jodi 

TnrH tlalth  aimc°T  any  0tHr  Staff  °*cer-  Hitler  was  on  the  point  of  firing 
°P  Hnuary  1943.an.d  replacing  him  with  General  Paulus,  but 
it  was  too  late.  Paulus,  as  we  shall  shortly  see,  was  no  longer  available. 


Wars  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1201 

next  day  that  the  Sixth  Army  and  the  Fourth  Panzer 
Army,  which  was  fighting  south  of  the  city,  should 
prepare  to  push  north  and  south  along  the  Volga  as  soon 
as  Stalingrad  had  fallen. 

It  was  not  that  Hitler  was  ignorant  of  the  threat  to  the 
Don  flank.  The  OKW  diaries  make  clear  that  it  caused 
him  considerable  worry.  The  point  is  that  he  did  not 
take  it  seriously  enough  and  that,  as  a consequence,  he 
did  nothing  to  avert  it.  Indeed,  so  confident  was  he  that 
the  situation  was  well  in  hand  that  on  the  last  day  of 
October  he,  the  staff  of  OKW  and  the  Army  General  Staff 
abandoned  their  headquarters  at  Vinnitsa  in  the  Ukraine 
and  returned  to  Wolfsschanze  at  Rastenburg.  The  Fuehrer 
had  practically  convinced  himself  that  if  there  were  to  be 
any  Soviet  winter  offensive  at  all  it  would  come  on  the 
central  and  northern  fronts.  He  could  handle  that  better 
from  his  quarters  in  East  Prussia. 

Hardly  had  he  returned  there  when  bad  news  reached 
him  from  another  and  more  distant  front.  Field  Marshal 
Rommel’s  Afrika  Korps  was  in  trouble. 

THE  FIRST  BLOW:  EL  ALAMEIN  AND  THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN  LANDINGS 

The  Desert  Fox,  as  he  was  called  on  both  sides  of  the 
front,  had  resumed  his  offensive  at  El  Alamein  on  August 
31  with  the  intention  of  rolling  up  the  British  Eighth 
Army  and  driving  on  to  Alexandria  and  the  Nile.  There 
was  a violent  battle  in  the  scorching  heat  on  the  40-mile 
desert  front  between  the  sea  and  the  Qattara  Depression, 
but  Rommel  could  not  quite  make  it  and  on  September  3 
he  broke  off  the  fighting  and  went  over  to  the  defensive. 
At  long  last  the  British  army  in  Egypt  had  received  strong 
reinforcements  in  men,  guns,  tanks  and  planes  (many  of 
the  last  two  from  America).  It  had  also  received  on  Au- 
gust 15  two  new  commanders:  an  eccentric  but  gifted  gen- 
eral named  Sir  Bernard  Law  Montgomery,  who  took  over 
the  Eighth  Army,  and  General  Sir  Harold  Alexander,  who 
was  to  prove  to  be  a skillful  strategist  and  a brilliant  ad- 
ministrator and  who  now  assumed  the  post  of  Commander 
in  Chief  in  the  Middle  East. 

Shortly  after  his  setback  Rommel  had  gone  on  sick 


1202 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


leave  on  the  Semmering  in  the  mountains  below  Vienna 
to  receive  a cure  for  an  infected  nose  and  a swollen 
liver,  and  it  was  there  that  on  the  afternoon  of  October 
24  he  received  a telephone  call  from  Hitler.  “Rommel, 
the  news  from  Africa  sounds  bad.  The  situation  seems 
somewhat  obscure.  Nobody  appears  to  know  what  has 
happened  to  General  Stumme.*  Do  you  feel  capable  of 
returning  to  Africa  and  taking  over  there  again?” 20 
Though  a sick  man,  Rommel  agreed  to  return  immediately. 

By  the  time  he  got  back  to  headquarters  west  of  El 
Alamein  on  the  following  evening,  the  battle,  which  Mont- 
gomery had  launched  at  9:40  p.m.  on  October  23,  was  al- 
ready lost.  The  Eighth  Army  had  too  many  guns,  tanks 
and  planes,  and  though  the  Italian-German  lines  still 
held  and  Rommel  made  desperate  efforts  to  shift  his  bat- 
tered divisions  to  stem  the  various  attacks  and  even  to 
counterattack  he  realized  that  his  situation  was  hopeless. 
He  had  no  reserves:  of  men,  or  tanks  or  oil.  The  R.A.F., 
for  once,  had  complete  command  of  the  skies  and  was 
pounding  his  troops  and  armor  and  remaining  supply 
dumps  mercilessly. 

On  November  2,  Montgomery’s  infantry  and  armor 
broke  through  on  the  southern  sector  of  the  front  and 
began  to  overrun  the  Italian  divisions  there.  That  evening 
Rommel  radioed  Hitler’s  headquarters  in  East  Prussia 
two  thousand  miles  away  that  he  could  no  longer  hold 
out  and  that  he  intended  to  withdraw,  while  there  was  still 
the  opportunity,  to  the  Fuka  position  forty  miles  to  the 
west. 

He  had  already  commenced  to  do  so  when  a long  mes- 
sage came  over  the  air  the  next  day  from  the  Supreme 
warlord: 

To  Field  Marshal  Rommel: 

I and  the  German  people  are  watching  the  heroic  defensive 
battle  waged,  in  Egypt  with  faithful  trust  in  your  powers  of 
leadership  and  in  the  bravery  of  the  German-Italian  troops 
under  your  command.  In  the  situation  in  which  you  now 
find  yourself,  there  can  be  no  other  consideration  save  that 
of  holding  fast,  of  not  retreating  one  step,  of  throwing  every 
gun  and  every  man  into  the  battle  ...  You  can  show  your 


* Stumme,  who  was  acting  commander  in  the  absence  of  Rommel,  had  died 
of  a heart  attack  the  first  night  of  the  British  offensive  while  fleeing  on  foot 
over  the  desert  from  a British  patrol  that  had  almost  captured  him. 


1203 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

troops  no  other  way  than  that  which  leads  to  victory  or  to 
death. 

Adolf  Hitler  21 

This  idiotic  order  meant,  if  obeyed,  that  the  Italo- 
German  armies  were  condemned  to  swift  annihilation  and 
for  the  first  time  in  Africa,  Bayerlein  says,  Rommel  did 
not  know  what  to  do.  After  a brief  struggle  with  his 
conscience  he  decided,  over  the  protests  of  General  Ritter 
von  Thoma,  the  actual  commander  of  the  German  Afrika 
Korps,  who  said  he  was  withdrawing  in  any  case,*  to 
obey  his  Supreme  Commander.  “I  finally  compelled  myself 
to  take  this  decision,”  Rommel  wrote  later  in  his  diary, 
“because  I myself  have  always  demanded  unconditional 
obedience  from  my  soldiers  and  I therefore  wished  to  ac- 
cept this  principle  for  myself.”  Later,  as  a subsequent  diary 
entry  declares,  he  learned  better. 

Reluctantly  Rommel  gave  the  order  to  halt  the  with- 
drawal and  at  the  same  time  sent  off  a courier  by  plane 
to  Hitler  to  try  to  explain  to  him  that  unless  he  were 
permitted  to  fall  back  immediately  all  would  be  lost.  But 
events  were  already  making  that  trip  unnecessary.  On  the 
evening  of  November  4,  at  the  risk  of  being  court- 
martialed  for  disobedience,  Rommel  decided  to  save  what 
was  left  of  his  forces  and  retreat  to  Fuka.  Only  the 
remnants  of  the  armored  and  motorized  units  could  be 
extricated.  The  foot  soldiers,  mostly  Italian,  were  left  be- 
hind to  surrender,  as  indeed  the  bulk  of  them  already  had 
done,  t On  November  5 came  a curt  message  from  the 
Fuehrer:  “I  agree  to  the  withdrawal  of  your  army  into 
the  Fuka  position.”  But  that  position  already  had  been 
overrun  by  Montgomery’s  tanks.  Within  fifteen  days  Rom- 
mel had  fallen  back  seven  hundred  miles  to  beyond 
Benghazi  with  the  remnants  of  his  African  army— some 
25,000  Italians,  10,000  Germans  and  sixty  tanks — and 
there  was  no  opportunity  to  stop  even  there. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  Adolf  Hitler,  the 
most  decisive  battle  of  the  war  yet  won  by  his  enemies, 

* The  next  day,  November  4 — after  telling  Bayerlein,  “Hitler's  order  is  a 
piece  of  unparalleled  madness.  I can’t  go  along  with  this  any  longer” — 
General  von  Thoma  donned  a clean  uniform,  with  the  insignia  of  his  rank 
and  his  decorations,  stood  by  his  burning  tank  until  a British  unit  arrived, 
surrendered  and  in  the  evening  dined  with  Montgomery  at  his  headquarters 
mess. 

t Romell’s  losses  at  El  Alamein  were  59,000  killed,  wounded  and  captured, 
of  whom  34,000  were  Germans,  out  of  a total  force  of  96,000  men. 


1204  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

though  a second  and  even  more  decisive  one  was  just 
about  to  begin  on  the  snowy  steppes  of  southern  Russia. 
But  before  it  did,  the  Fuehrer  was  to  hear  further  bad 
news  from  North  Africa  which  spelled  the  doom  of  the 
Axis  in  that  part  of  the  world. 

Already  on  November  3,  when  the  first  reports  had 
come  in  of  Rommel’s  disaster,  the  Fuehrer’s  headquarters 
had  received  word  that  an  Allied  armada  had  been  sighted 
assembling  at  Gibraltar.  No  one  at  OKW  could  make  out 
what  it  might  be  up  to.  Hitler  was  inclined  to  think  it 
was  merely  another  heavily  guarded  convoy  for  Malta. 
This  is  interesting  because  more  than  a fortnight  earlier, 
on  October  15,  the  OKW  staff  chiefs  had  discussed  sev- 
eral reports  about  an  imminent  “Anglo-Saxon  landing” 
in  West  Africa.  The  intelligence  apparently  came  from 
Rome,  for  Ciano  a week  before,  on  October  9,  noted  in 
his  diary  after  a talk  with  the  chief  of  the  military  secret 
service  that  “the  Anglo-Saxons  are  preparing  to  land  in 
force  in  North  Africa.”  The  news  depressed  Ciano;  he 
foresaw — correctly,  as  it  turned  out — that  this  would  lead 
inevitably  to  a direct  Allied  assault  on  Italy. 

Hitler,  preoccupied  as  he  was  with  the  failure  of  the 
Russians  to  cease  their  infernal  resistance,  did  not  take 
this  first  intelligence  very  seriously.  At  a meeting  of  OKW 
on  October  15,  Jodi  suggested  that  Vichy  France  be  per- 
mitted to  send  reinforcements  to  North  Africa  so  that  the 
French  could  repel  any  Anglo-American  landings.  The 
Fuehrer,  according  to  the  OKW  Diary,  turned  the  sug- 
gestion down  because  it  might  ruffle  the  Italians,  who  were 
jealous  of  any  move  to  strengthen  France.  At  the  Supreme 
Commander’s  headquarters  the  matter  appears  to  have 
been  forgotten  until  November  3.  But  on  that  day,  al- 
though German  agents  on  the  Spanish  side  of  Gibraltar 
had  reported  seeing  a great  Anglo-American  fleet  gath- 
ering there.  Hitler  was  too  busy  rallying  Rommel  at  El 
Alamein  to  bother  with  what  appeared  to  him  to  be  merely 
another  convoy  for  Malta. 

On  November  5,  OKW  was  informed  that  one  British 
naval  force  had  sailed  out  of  Gibraltar  headed  east.  But 
it  was  not  until  the  morning  of  November  7,  twelve  hours 
before  American  and  British  troops  began  landing  in 
North  Africa,  that  Hitler  gave  the  latest  intelligence  from 
Gibraltar  some  thought.  The  forenoon  reports  received  at 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1205 


his  headquarters  in  East  Prussia  were  that  British  naval 
forces  in  Gibraltar  and  a vast  fleet  of  transports  and  war- 
ships from  the  Atlantic  had  joined  up  and  were  steaming 
east  into  the  Mediterranean.  There  was  a long  discussion 
among  the  staff  officers  and  the  Fuehrer.  What  did  it  all 
mean?  What  was  the  objective  of  such  a large  naval  force? 
Hitler  was  now  inclined  to  believe,  he  said,  that  the  West- 
ern Allies  might  be  attempting  a major  landing  with  some 
four  or  five  divisions  at  Tripoli  or  Benghazi  in  order  to 
catch  Rommel  in  the  rear.  Admiral  Krancke,  the  naval 
liaison  officer  at  OKW,  declared  that  there  could  not  be 
more  than  two  enemy  divisions  at  the  most.  Even  so!  Some- 
thing had  to  be  done.  Hitler  asked  that  the  Luftwaffe  in 
the  Mediterranean  be  immediately  reinforced  but  was 
told  this  was  impossible  “for  the  moment.”  Judging  by  the 
OKW  Diary  all  that  Hitler  did  that  morning  was  to  notify 
Rundstedt,  Commander  in  Chief  in  the  West,  to  be  ready 
to  carry  out  “Anton.”  This  was  the  code  word  for  the 
occupation  of  the  rest  of  France. 

Whereupon  the  Supreme  Commander,  heedless  of  this 
ominous  news  or  of  the  plight  of  Rommel,  who  would  be 
trapped  if  the  Anglo-Americans  landed  behind  him,  or 
of  the  latest  intelligence  warning  of  an  imminent  Russian 
counteroffensive  on  the  Don  in  the  rear  of  the  Sixth  Army 
at  Stalingrad,  entrained  after  lunch  on  November  7 for 
Munich,  where  on  the  next  evening  he  was  scheduled  to 
deliver  his  annual  speech  to  his  old  party  cronies  gathered 
to  celebrate  the  anniversary  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch!  * 

The  politician  in  him,  as  Haider  noted,  had  got  the 
upper  hand  of  the  soldier  at  a critical  moment  in  the  war. 
Supreme  Headquarters  in  East  Prussia  was  left  in  charge 
of  a colonel,  one  Freiherr  Treusch  von  Buttlar-Brandenfels. 
Generals  Keitel  and  Jodi,  the  chief  officers  of  OKW,  went 
along  to  participate  in  the  beerhouse  festivities.  There  is 
something  weird  and  batty  about  such  goings  on  that 
take  the  Supreme  warlord,  who  by  now  was  insisting  on 
directing  the  war  on  far-flung  fronts  down  to  the  divi- 
sional or  regimental  or  even  battalion  level,  thousands  of 
miles  from  the  battlefields  on  an  unimportant  political  er- 


I learn  from  Hitler’s  raptured  daily  calendar  book  that  the  celebration  had 
been  moved  from  the  old  Buergerbraukeller,  where  the  putsch  had  taken 
place,  to  a more  elegant  beer  hall  in  Munich,  the  Loewenbraukeller.  The 
nuergerbraukeller,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been  wrecked  by  a time  bomb 
which  had  just  missed  killing  the  Fuehrer  on  the  night  of  November  8,  1939. 


1206 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


rand  at  a moment  when  the  house  is  beginning  to  fall  in. 
A change  in  the  man,  a corrosion,  a deterioration  has 
set  in,  as  it  already  had  with  Goering  who,  though  his 
once  all-powerful  Luftwaffe  had  been  steadily  declining, 
was  becoming  more  and  more  attached  to  his  jewels 
and  his  toy  trains,  with  little  time  to  spare  for  the  ugly 
realities  of  a prolonged  and  increasingly  bitter  war. 

Anglo-American  troops  under  General  Eisenhower  hit 
the  beaches  of  Morocco  and  Algeria  at  1:30  a.m.  on  No- 
vember 8,  1942,  and  at  5:30  Ribbentrop  was  on  the 
phone  from  Munich  to  Ciano  in  Rome  to  give  him  the 
news. 

He  was  rather  nervous  [Ciano  wrote  in  his  diary]  and 
wanted  to  know  what  we  intended  to  do.  I must  confess  that, 
having  been  caught  unawares,  I was  too  sleepy  to  give  a 
very  satisfactory  answer. 

The  Italian  Foreign  Minister  learned  from  the  German 
Embassy  that  the  officials  there  were  “literally  terrified 
by  the  blow.” 

Hitler’s  special  train  from  East  Prussia  did  not  arrive 
in  Munich  until  3:40  that  afternoon  and  the  first  reports 
he  got  about  the  Allied  landings  in  Northwest  Africa  were 
optimistic.22  Everywhere  the  French,  he  was  told,  were 
putting  up  stubborn  resistance,  and  at  Algiers  and  Oran 
they  had  repulsed  the  landing  attempts.  In  Algeria,  Ger- 
many’s friend.  Admiral  Darlan,  was  organizing  the  defense 
with  the  approval  of  the  Vichy  regime.  Hitler’s  first  re- 
actions were  confused.  He  ordered  the  garrison  at  Crete, 
which  was  quite  outside  the  new  theater  of  war,  im- 
mediately strengthened,  explaining  that  such  a step  was 
as  important  as  sending  reinforcements  to  Africa.  He 
instructed  the  Gestapo  to  bring  Generals  Weygand  and 
Giraud  * to  Vichy  and  to  keep  them  under  surveillance. 
He  asked  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt  to  set  in  action 
Anton  but  not  to  cross  the  line  of  demarcation  in  France 
until  he  had  further  orders.  And  he  requested  Ciano  f and 

* General  Giraud  at  that  moment  was  arriving  in  Algiers.  He  had  escaped 
from  a German  POW  camp  and  settled  in  the  south  of  France,  where  he  was 
taken  off  by  a British  submarine  on  November  5 and  brought  to  Gibraltar 
to  confer  with  Eisenhower  just  before  the  landings. 

t “During  the  night,”  Ciano  wrote  in  his  diary  on  November  9,  “Ribbentrop 
telephoned.  Either  the  Duce  or  I must  go  to  Munich  as  soon  as  possible. 
Laval  will  also  be  there.  I wake  up>  the  Duce.  He  is  not  very  anxious  to 
leave,  especially  since  he  is  not  feeling  very  well.  I shall  go.” 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1207 

Pierre  Laval,  who  was  now  Premier  of  Vichy  France, 
to  meet  him  in  Munich  the  next  day. 

For  about  twenty-four  hours  Hitler  toyed  with  the  idea 
of  trying  to  make  an  alliance  with  France  in  order  to 
bring  her  into  the  war  against  Britain  and  America  and, 
at  the  moment,  to  strengthen  the  resolve  of  the  Petain 
government  to  oppose  the  Allied  landings  in  North  Africa. 
He  probably  was  encouraged  in  this  by  the  action  of 
Petain  in  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
United  States  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  November  8, 
and  by  the  aged  French  Marshal’s  statement  to  the  U.S. 
charge  d’affaires  that  his  forces  would  resist  the  Anglo- 
American  invasion.  The  OKW  Diary  for  that  Sunday  em- 
phasizes that  Hitler  was  preoccupied  with  working  out 
“a  far-reaching  collaboration  with  the  French.”  That  eve- 
ning the  German  representative  in  Vichy,  Krug  von  Nid- 
da,  submitted  a proposal  to  Petain  for  a close  alliance 
between  Germany  and  France.23 

By  the  next  day,  following  his  speech  to  the  party  vete- 
rans, in  which  he  proclaimed  that  Stalingrad  was  “firmly 
in  German  hands,”  the  Fuehrer  had  changed  his  mind. 
He  told  Ciano  he  had  no  illusions  about  the  French  de- 
sire to  fight  and  that  he  had  decided  on  “the  total  occupa- 
tion of  France,  a landing  in  Corsica,  a bridgehead  in 
Tunisia.”  This  decision,  though  not  the  timing,  was  com- 
municated to  Laval  when  he  arrived  in  Munich  by  car  on 
November  10.  This  traitorous  Frenchman  promptly  prom- 
ised to  urge  Petain  to  accede  to  the  Fuehrer’s  wishes 
but  suggested  that  the  Germans  go  ahead  with  their  plans 
without  waiting  for  the  senile  old  Marshal’s  approval, 
which  Hitler  fully  intended  to  do.  Ciano  has  left  a de- 
scription of  the  Vichy  Premier,  who  was  executed  for 
treason  after  the  war. 

Laval,  with  his  white  tie  and  middle-class  French  peasant 
attire,  is  very  much  out  of  place  in  the  great  salon  among  so 
many  uniforms.  He  tries  to  speak  in  a familiar  tone  about  his 
trip  and  his  long  sleep  in  the  car,  but  his  words  go  un- 
heeded. Hitler  treats  him  with  frigid  courtesy  . . . 

The  poor  man  could  not  even  imagine  the  fait  accompli 
that  the  Germans  were  to  place  before  him.  Not  a word 
was  said  to  Laval  about  the  impending  action — but  the 
orders  to  occupy  France  were  being  given  while  he  was 
smoking  his  cigarette  and  conversing  with  various  people  in 


1208 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


die  next  room.  Von  Ribbentrop  told  me  that  Laval  would  be 
informed  only  the  next  morning  at  8 o’clock  that  on  ac- 
count of  information  received  during  the  night  Hitler  had 
been  obliged  to  proceed  to  the  total  occupation  of  the 
country.24 

The  orders  for  the  seizure  of  unoccupied  France,  in 
clear  violation  of  the  armistice  agreement,  were  given  by 
Hitler  at  8:30  p.m.  on  November  10  and  carried  out  the 
next  morning^  without  any  other  incident  than  a futile 
protest  by  Petain.  The  Italians  occupied  Corsica,  and 
German  planes  began  flying  in  troops  to  seize  French-held 
Tunisia  before  Eisenhower’s  forces  could  get  there. 

There  was  one  further— and  typical — piece  of  Hitlerian 
deceit.  On  November  13  the  Fuehrer  assured  Petain  that 
neither  the  Germans  nor  the  Italians  would  occupy  the 
naval  base  at  Toulon,  where  the  French  fleet  had  been 
tied  up  since  the  armistice.  On  November  25  the  OKW 
Diary  recorded  that  Hitler  had  decided  to  carry  out 

Lila  as  soon  as  possible.*  This  was  the  code  word  for 
the  occupation  of  Toulon  and  the  capture  of  the  French 
fleet.  On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh  German 
troops  attacked  the  naval  port,  but  French  sailors  held 
them  up  long  enough  to  allow  the  crews,  on  the  orders  of 
Admiral  de  Laborde,  to  scuttle  the  ships.  The  French  fleet 
was  thus  lost  to  the  Axis,  which  badly  needed  its  warships 
in  the  Mediterranean,  but  it  was  denied  also  to  the  Allies, 
tp  whom  it  would  have  been  a most  valuable  addition. 

_ Hitler  won  the  race  against  Eisenhower  to  seize  Tu- 
nisia, but  it  was  a doubtful  victory.  At  his  insistence 
nearly  a quarter  of  a million  German  and  Italian  troops 
were  poured  in  to  hold  this  bridgehead.  If  the  Fuehrer 
had  sent  one  fifth  as  many  troops  and  tanks  to  Rommel 
a few  months  before,  the  Desert  Fox  most  probably 
would  have  been  beyond  the  Nile  by  now,  the  Anglo- 


* It  is  only  fair  to  point  out  that  Hitler  strongly  suspected,  not  without 
reason,  that  , the  French  fleet  might  try  to  sail  for  Algeria  and  join  the 
Allies.  Despite  his  treacherous  dealings  with  the  Germans  and  his  violent 
“a^re^  . e ^ ritish,  -Admiral  Darlan,  who  happened  to  be  visiting  an  ailing 
son  at  Algiers,  had  been  pressed  into  service  by  Eisenhower  as  French  com- 
mander in  North  Africa  not  only  because  he  seemed  to  be  the  only  officer 
who  could  get  the  French  Army  and  Navy  to  cease  resisting  the  Anglo- 
American,  landings  but  also  in  the  hope  that  he  could  get  the  admiral  com- 
manding in  Tunisia  to  oppose  the  German  landings  there  and  also  induce 
the  French  fleet  in  Toulon  to  make  a dash  for  North  Africa.  The  hopes 
proved  vain,  although  Darlan  tried.  To  his  message  ordering  Admiral  de 
.Laborde  to  bring  the  fleet  over  from  Toulon  he  received  an  answer  in  one 
expressive— if  indelicate— word:  "Merde."  (See  the  Proces  du  M.  Petain.) 


1209 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

American  landing  in  Northwest  Africa  could  not  have 
taken  place  and  the  Mediterranean  would  have  been  irre- 
trievably lost  to  the  Allies,  thus  securing  the  soft  under- 
cover of  the  Axis  belly.  As  it  was,  every  soldier  and  tank 
and  gun  rushed  by  Hitler  to  Tunisia  that  winter  as  well 
as  the  remnants  of  the  Afrika  Korps  would  be  lost  by  the 
end  of  the  spring  and  more  German  troops  would  be 
marched  into  prisoner-of-war  cages  than  at  Stalingrad, 
to  which  we  must  now  return.* 

DISASTER  AT  STALINGRAD 

Hitler  and  the  principal  generals  of  OKW  were  linger- 
ing on  in  the  pleasant  Alpine  surroundings  of  Berchtes- 
gaden  when  the  first  news  of  the  Russian  counteroffensive 
on  the  Don  reached  them  a few  hours  after  it  had  been 
launched  in  a blizzard  at  dawn  on  November  19.  Though 
a Soviet  attack  in  this  region  had  been  expected  it  was 
not  believed  at  OKW  that  it  would  amount  to  enough  to 
warrant  Hitler  and  his  chief  military  advisers,  Keitel  and 
Jodi,  hurrying  back  to  headquarters  in  East  Prussia  after 
the  Fuehrer’s  ringing  beerhouse  speech  to  the  old  party 
comrades  in  Munich  on  the  evening  of  November  8.  So 
they  had  puttered  about  on  the  Obersalzberg  taking  in 
the  mountain  air. 

Their  peace  and  quiet  was  abruptly  broken  by  an  urgent 
telephone  call  from  General  Zeitzler,  the  new  Chief  of  the 
Army  General  Staff,  who  had  remained  behind  at  Rasten- 
burg.  He  had  what  the  OKW  Diary  recorded  as  “alarming 
news.”  In  the  very  first  hours  of  the  attack  an  over- 
whelming Russian  armored  force  had  broken  clean 
through  the  Rumanian  Third  Army  between  Serafimo- 
vich and  Kletskaya  on  the  Don  just  northwest  of  Stalin- 
grad. South  of  the  besieged  city  other  powerful  Soviet 
forces  were  attacking  strongly  against  the  German  Fourth 
Panzer  Army  and  the  Rumanian  Fourth  Army  and 
threatening  to  pierce  their  fronts. 

The  Russian  objective  was  obvious  to  anyone  who 
looked  at  a map  and  especially  obvious  to  Zeitzler  who, 
from  Army  intelligence,  knew  that  the  enemy  had  massed 

* Some  125,000  Germans,  according  to  General  Eisenhower,  out  of  a total  of 
240,000  Axis  troops,  the  rest  being  Italian.  This  number  includes  only  those 
who  surrendered  during  the  last  week  of  the  campaign — May  5 to  12,  1943. 
( Crusade  in  Europe,  p.  156.) 


1210 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


thirteen  armies,  with  thousands  of  tanks,  in  the  south 
to  achieve  it.  The  Russians  were  clearly  driving  in  great 
strength  from  the  north  and  the  south  to  cut  off  Stalingrad 
and  to  force  the  German  Sixth  Army  there  to  either  beat 
a hasty  retreat  to  the  west  or  see  itself  surrounded. 
Zeitzler  later  contended  that  as  soon  as  he  saw  what  was 
happening  he  urged  Hitler  to  permit  the  Sixth  Army  to 
withdraw  from  Stalingrad  to  the  Don  bend,  where  the 
broken  front  could  be  restored.  The  mere  suggestion  threw 
the  Fuehrer  into  a tantrum. 


‘j1  ^°°’t  leave  ^ Volga!  I won’t  go  back  from  the 
Volga!  he  shouted,  and  that  was  that.  This  decision, 
taken  in  such  a fit  of  frenzy,  led  promptly  to  disaster, 
the  Fuehrer  personally  ordered  the  Sixth  Army  to  stand 
fast  around  Stalingrad.25 

Hitler  and  his  staff  returned  to  headquarters  on  No- 
vember 22.  By  this  time,  the  fourth  day  of  the  attack, 
the  news  was  catastrophic.  The  two  Soviet  forces  from 
the  north  and  south  had  met  at  Kalach,  forty  miles 
west  of  Stalingrad  on  the  Don  bend.  In  the  evening  a 
wireless  message  arrived  from  General  Paulus,  command- 
er of  the  Sixth  i^my,  confirming  that  his  troops  were 
now  surrounded.  Hitler  promptly  radioed  back,  telling  Paul- 
us to  move  his  headquarters  into  the  city  and  form  a 
hedgehog  defense.  The  Sixth  Army  would  be  supplied 
by  an  until  it  could  be  relieved. 

But  this  was  futile  talk.  There  were  now  twenty  Ger- 
man and  two  Rumanian  divisions  cut  off  at  Stalingrad. 
Paulus  radioed  that  they  would  need  a minimum  of  750 
tons  of  supplies  a day  flown  in.  This  was  far  beyond  the 
capacity  of  the  Luftwaffe,  which  lacked  the  required 
number  of  transport  planes.  Even  if  they  had  been  avail- 
able, not  all  of  them  could  have  got  through  in  the 
blizzardy  weather  and  over  an  area  where  the  Russians 
had  now  established  fighter  superiority.  Nevertheless  Goe- 
rtng  assured  Hitler  that  the  Air  Force  could  do  the  job 
It  never  began  to. 

The  relief  of  the  Sixth  Army  was  a more  practical 
and  encouraging  possiblity.  On  November  25  Hitler  had 
recalled  Field  Marshal  von  Manstein,  the  most  gifted  of 
his  field  commanders,  from  the  Leningrad  front  and  put 
him  in  charge  of  a newly  created  formation.  Army  Group 


1211 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

Don.  His  assignment  was  to  push  through  from  the  south- 
west and  relieve  the  Sixth  Army  at  Stalingrad. 

But  now  the  Fuehrer  imposed  impossible  conditions  on 
his  new  commander.  Manstein  tried  to  explain  to  him  that 
the  only  chance  of  success  lay  in  the  Sixth  Army’s  break- 
ing out  of  Stalingrad  to  the  west  while  his  own  forces, 
led  by  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army,  pressed  northeast  against 
the  Russian  armies  which  lay  between  the  two  German 
forces.  But  once  again  Hitler  refused  to  draw  back  from 
the  Volga.  The  Sixth  Army  must  remain  in  Stalingrad 
and  Manstein  must  fight  his  way  to  it  there. 

This,  as  Manstein  tried  to  argue  with  the  Supreme  war- 
lord, could  not  be  done.  The  Russians  were  too  strong. 
Nevertheless,  with  a heavy  heart,  Manstein  launched  his 
attack  on  December  12.  It  was  called,  appropriately, 
“Operation  Winter  Gale,”  for  the  full  fury  of  the  Russian 
winter  had  now  hit  the  southern  steppes,  piling  up  the 
snow  in  drifts  and  dropping  the  temperature  below  zero. 
At  first  the  offensive  made  good  progress,  the  Fourth 
Panzer  Army,  under  General  Hoth,  driving  northeast  up 
both  sides  of  the  railroad  from  Kotelnikovski  toward 
Stalingrad,  some  seventy-five  miles  away.  By  December 
19  it  had  advanced  to  within  some  forty  miles  of  the 
southern  perimeter  of  the  city;  by  the  twenty-first  it  was 
within  thirty  miles,  and  across  the  snowy  steppes  the  be- 
seiged  troops  of  the  Sixth  Army  could  see  at  night  the 
signal  flares  of  their  rescuers. 

At  this  moment,  according  to  the  later  testimony  of 
the  German  generals,  a breakout  from  Stalingrad  of  the 
Sixth  Army  toward  the  advancing  lines  of  the  Fourth 
Panzer  Army  would  almost  certainly  have  succeeded.  But 
once  again  Hitler  forbade  it.  On  December  21,  Zeitzler 
had  wrung  permission  from  the  Leader  for  the  troops  of 
Paulus  to  break  out  provided  they  also  held  on  to  Stalin- 
grad. This  piece  of  foolishness,  the  General  Staff  Chief 
says,  nearly  drove  him  insane. 

“On  the  following  evening,”  Zeitzler  related  later,  “I 
begged  Hitler  to  authorize  the  breakout.  I pointed  out 
that  this  was  absolutely  our  last  chance  to  save  the  two 
hundred  thousand  men  of  Paulus’  army.” 

Hitler  would  not  give  way.  In  vain  I described  to  him 
conditions  inside  the  so-called  fortress:  the  despair  of  the 
starving  soldiers,  their  loss  of  confidence  in  the  Supreme 


1212 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Command,  the  wounded  expiring  for  lack  of  proper  atten- 
tion while  thousands  froze  to  death.  He  remained  as  im- 
pervious to  arguments  of  this  sort  as  to  those  others  which  1 
had  advanced.  v, 

In  the  face  of  increasing  Russian  resistance  in  front 
of  him  and  on  his  flanks  General  Hoth  lacked  the  strength 
to  negotiate  that  last  thirty  miles  to  Stalingrad.  He  be- 
lieved that  if  the  Sixth  Army  broke  out  he  could  still 
make  a junction  with  it  and  then  both  forces  could  with- 
draw to  Kotelnikovski.  This  at  least  would  save  a couple 
of  hundred  thousand  German  lives.*  Probably  for  a day 
or  two— between  December  21  and  23 — this  could  have 
been  done,  but  by  the  latter  date  it  had  become  impossible. 
For  unknown  to  Hoth  the  Red  Army  had  struck  farther 
north  and  was  now  endangering  the  left  flank  of  Man- 
stein’s  whole  Army  Group  Don.  On  the  night  of  De- 
cember 22,  Manstein  telephoned  Hoth  to  prepare  himself 
for  drastic  new  orders.  The  next  day  they  came.  Hoth  was 
to  abandon  his  drive  on  Stalingrad,  dispatch  one  of  his 
three  panzer  divisions  to  the  Don  front  on  the  north,  and 
defend  himself  where  he  was  and  with  what  he  had  left 
as  well  as  he  could. 

The  attempt  to  relieve  Stalingrad  had  failed. 

Manstein’s  drastic  new  orders  had  come  as  the  result 
of  alarming  news  that  reached  him  on  December  17.  On 
the  morning  of  that  day  a Soviet  army  had  broken  through 
the  Italian  Eighth  Army  farther  up  the  Don  at  Boguchar 
and  by  evening  opened  a gap  twenty-seven  miles  deep. 
Within  three  days  the  hole  was  ninety  miles  wide,  the 
Italians  were  fleeing  in  panic  and  the  Rumanian  Third 
Army  to  the  south,  which  already  had  been  badly  pum- 
meled  on  the  opening  day  of  the  Russian  offensive  on 
November  19,  was  also  disintegrating.  No  wonder  Man- 
stein had  had  to  take  part  of  Hoth’s  armored  forces  to 
help  stem  the  gap.  A chain  reaction  followed. 

Not  only  the  Don  armies  fell  back  but  also  Hoth’s 
forces,  which  had  come  so  close  to  Stalingrad.  These  re- 

* In  his  postwar  memoirs,  Field  Marshal  von  Manstein  says  that  on  Decem- 
ber 19,  in  disobedience  to  Hitler’s  orders,  he  actually  directed  the  Sixth  Army 
to_  begin  to  break  out  of  Stalingrad  to  the  southwest  and  make  a junction 
with  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army.  He  publishes  the  text  of  the  directive.  But  it 
contained  certain  reservations  and  Paulus,  who  still  was  under  orders  from 
Hitler  not  to  break  out,  must  have  been  greatly  confused  by  it.  “This,” 
declares  Manstein,  “was  our  one  and  only  chance  of  saving  the  Sixth  Army.” 
(Manstein,  Lost  Victories , pp.  336-41,  562-63.) 


1213 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

treats  in  turn  endangered  the  Germany  Army  in  the  Cau- 
casus, which  would  be  cut  off  if  the  Russians  reached 
Rostov  on  the  Sea  of  Azov.  A day  or  two  after  Christmas 
Zeitzler  pointed  out  to  Hitler,  “Unless  you  order  a with- 
drawal from  the  Caucasus  now,  we  shall  soon  have  a 
second  Stalingrad  on  our  hands.”  Reluctantly  the  Supreme 
Commander  issued  the  necessary  instructions  on  Decem- 
ber 29  to  Kleist’s  Army  Group  A,  which  comprised  the 
First  Panzer  and  Seventeenth  armies,  and  which  had 
failed  in  its  mission  to  grab  the  rich  oil  fields  of  Grozny. 
It  too  began  a long  retreat  after  having  been  within  sight 
of  its  goal. 

The  reverses  of  the  Germans  in  Russia  and  of  the  Italo— 
German  armies  in  North  Africa  stirred  Mussolini  to 
thought.  Hitler  had  invited  him  to  come  to  Salzburg  for  a 
talk  around  the  middle  of  December  and  the  ailing  Duce, 
now  on  a strict  diet  for  stomach  disorders,  had  accepted, 
though,  as  he  told  Ciano,  he  would  go  on  one  condition 
only:  that  he  take  his  meals  alone  “because  he  does  not 
want  a lot  of  ravenous  Germans  to  notice  that  he  is  com- 
pelled to  live  on  rice  and  milk.” 

The  time  had  come,  Mussolini  decided,  to  tell  Hitler 
to  cut  his  losses  in  the  East,  make  some  sort  of  deal 
with  Stalin  and  concentrate  Axis  strength  on  defending  the 
rest  of  North  Africa,  the  Balkans  and  Western  Europe. 
“Nineteen  forty-three  will  be  the  year  of  the  Anglo- 
American  effort,”  he  told  Ciano.  Hitler  was  unable  to 
leave  his  Eastern  headquarters  in  order  to  meet  Musso- 
lini, so  Ciano  made  the  long  journey  to  Rastenburg  on 
December  18  on  his  behalf,  repeating  to  the  Nazi  leader 
the  Duce’s  proposals.  Hitler  scorned  them  and  assured  the 
Italian  Foreign  Minister  that  without  at  all  weakening  the 
Russian  front  he  could  send  additional  forces  to  North 
Africa,  which  must,  he  said,  be  held.  Ciano  found  Ger- 
man spirits  at  a low  ebb  at  headquarters,  despite  Hitler’s 
confident  assurances. 

The  atmosphere  is  heavy.  To  the  bad  news  there  should 
perhaps  be  added  the  sadness  of  that  humid  forest  and  the 
boredom  of  collective  living  in  the  barracks  . . . No  one 
tries  to  conceal  from  me  the  unhappiness  over  the  news  of 
the  breakthrough  on  the  Russian  front  There  were  open  at- 
tempts to  put  the  blame  on  us. 


1214  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

At  that  very  moment  the  survivors  of  the  Italian 
Eighth  Army  on  the  Don  were  scurrying  for  their  lives, 
and  when  one  member  of  Ciano’s  party  asked  an  OKW 
officer  whether  the  Italians  had  suffered  heavy  losses  he 
was  told,  “No  losses  at  all:  they  are  running.”  26 

The  German  troops  in  the  Caucasus  and  on  the  Don, 
if  not  running,  were  getting  out  as  quickly  as  they  could 
to  avoid  being  cut  off.  Each  day,  as  the  year  1943  began, 
they  withdrew  a little  farther  from  Stalingrad.  The  time 
had  now  come  for  the  Russians  to  finish  off  the  Germans 
there.  But  first  they  gave  the  doomed  soldiers  of  the 
Sixth  Army  an  opportunity  to  save  their  lives. 

On  the  morning  of  January  8,  1943,  three  young  Red 
Army  officers,  bearing  a white  flag,  entered  the  German 
lines  on  the  northern  perimeter  of  Stalingrad  and  presented 
General  Paulus  with  an  ultimatum  from  General  Rokossov- 
ski,  commander  of  the  Soviet  forces  on  the  Don  front. 
After  reminding  him  that  his  army  was  cut  off  and  could 
not  be  relieved  or  kept  supplied  from  the  air,  the  note 
said: 

The  situation  of  your  troops  is  desperate.  They  are  suffer- 
ing from  hunger,  sickness  and  cold.  The  cruel  Russian 
winter  has  scarcely  yet  begun.  Hard  frosts,  cold  winds  and 
blizzards  still  lie  ahead.  Your  soldiers  are  unprovided  with 
winter  clothing  and  are  living  in  appalling  sanitary  condi- 
tions . . . Your  situation  is  hopeless,  and  any  further  resist- 
ance senseless. 

In  view  of  [this]  and  in  order  to  avoid  unnecessary 
bloodshed,  we  propose  that  you  accept  the  following  terms 
of  surrender  . . . 

They  were  honorable  terms.  All  prisoners  would  be 
given  “normal  rations.”  The  wounded,  sick  and  frostbit- 
ten would  receive  medical  treatment.  All  prisoners  could 
retain  their  badges  of  rank,  decorations  and  personal  be- 
longings. Paulus  was  given  twenty-four  hours  to  reply. 

He  immediately  radioed  the  text  of  the  ultimatum  to 
Hitler  and  asked  for  freedom  of  action.  His  request  was 
curtly  dismissed  by  the  Supreme  warlord.  Twenty-four 
hours  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  on  the  de- 
mand for  surrender,  on  the  morning  of  January  10,  the 
Russians  opened  the  last  phase  of  the  Battle  of  Stalin. 


1215 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

grad  with  an  artillery  bombardment  from  five  thousand 
guns. 

The  fighting  was  bitter  and  bloody.  Both  sides  fought 
with  incredible  bravery  and  recklessness  over  the  frozen 
wasteland  of  the  city’s  rubble — but  not  for  long.  Within 
six  days  the  German  pocket  had  been  reduced  by  half, 
to  an  area  fifteen  miles  long  and  nine  miles  deep  at  its 
widest.  By  January  24  it  had  been  split  in  two  and  the 
last  small  emergency  airstrip  lost.  The  planes  which  had 
brought  in  some  supplies,  especially  medicines  for  the 
sick  and  wounded,  and  which  had  flown  out  29,000  hos- 
pital cases,  could  no  longer  land. 

Once  more  the  Russians  gave  their  courageous  enemy 
a chance  to  surrender.  Soviet  emissaries  arrived  at  the 
German  lines  on  January  24  with  a new  offer.  Again 
Paulus,  tom  between  his  duty  to  obey  the  mad  Fuehrer 
and  his  obligation  to  save  his  own  surviving  troops  from 
annihilation,  appealed  to  Hitler. 

Troops  without  ammunition  [he  radioed  on  the  twenty- 
fourth]  or  food  . . . Effective  command  no  longer  possi- 
ble . . . 18,000  wounded  without  any  supplies  or  dressings 
or  drugs  . . . Further  defense  senseless.  Collapse  inevitable. 
Army  requests  immediate  permission  to  surrender  in  order 
to  save  lives  of  remaining  troops. 

Hitler’s  answer  has  been  preserved. 

Surrender  is  forbidden.  Sixth  Army  will  hold  their  posi- 
tions to  the  last  man  and  the  last  round  and  by  their  heroic 
endurance  will  make  an  unforgettable  contribution  toward 
the  establishment  of  a defensive  front  and  the  salvation  of 
the  Western  world. 

The  Western  world!  It  was  a bitter  pill  for  the  men  of 
the  Sixth  Army  who  had  fought  against  that  world  in 
France  and  Flanders  but  a short  time  ago. 

Further  resistance  was  not  only  senseless  and  futile 
but  impossible,  and  as  the  month  of  January  1943  ap- 
proached its  end  the  epic  battle  wore  itself  out,  expiring 
like  the  flame  of  an  expended  candle  which  sputters  and 
dies.  By  January  28  what  was  left  of  a once  great  army 
was  split  into  three  small  pockets,  in  the  southern  one  of 
which  General  Paulus  had  his  headquarters  in  the  cellar 
of  the  ruins  of  the  once  thriving  Univermag  department 
store.  According  to  one  eyewitness  the  commander  in 


1216  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

chief  sat  on  his  camp  bed  in  a darkened  comer  in  a 
state  of  near  collapse. 

He  was  scarcely  in  the  mood,  nor  were  his  soldiers,  to 
appreciate  the  flood  of  congratulatory  radiograms  that 
now  began  to  pour  in.  Goering,  who  had  whiled  away  a 
good  part  of  the  winter  in  sunny  Italy,  strutting  about  in 
his  great  fur  coat  and  fingering  his  jewels,  sent  a radio 
message  on  January  28. 

The  fight  put  up  by  the  Sixth  Army  will  go  down  in  his- 
tory, and  future  generations  will  speak  proudly  of  a Lange- 
marck  of  daredeviltry,  an  Alcazar  of  tenacity,  a Narvik 
of  courage  and  a Stalingrad  of  self-sacrifice. 

Nor  were  they  cheered  when  on  the  last  evening,  Janu- 
ary 30,  1943,  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Nazis’  coming 
to  power,  they  listened  to  the  fat  Reich  Marshal’s  bombas- 
tic broadcast. 

A thousand  years  hence  Germans  will  speak  of  this  battle 
[of  Stalingrad]  with  reverence  and  awe,  and  will  re- 
member that  in  spite  of  everything  Germany’s  ultimate  vic- 
tory was  decided  there  ...  In  years  to  come  it  will  be  said 
of  the  heroic  battle  on  the  Volga:  When  you  come  to  Ger- 
many, say  that  you  have  seen  us  lying  at  Stalingrad,  as  our 
honor  and  our  leaders  ordained  that  we  should,  for  the 
greater  glory  of  Germany. 

The  glory  and  the  horrible  agony  of  the  Sixth  Ajmy 
had  now  come  to  an  end.  On  January  30,  Paulus  radioed 
Hitler:  “Final  collapse  cannot  be  delayed  more  than  twenty- 
four  hours.” 

This  signal  prompted  the  Supreme  Commander  to 
shower  a series  of  promotions  on  the  doomed  officers  in 
Stalingrad,  apparently  in  the  hope  that  such  honors  would 
strengthen  their  resolve  to  die  gloriously  at  their  bloody 
posts.  “There  is  no  record  in  military  history  of  a Ger- 
man Field  Marshal  being  taken  prisoner,”  Hitler  remarked 
to  Jodi,  and  thereupon  conferred  on  Paulus,  by  radio, 
the  coveted  marshal’s  baton.  Some  117  other  officers  were 
jumped  up  a grade.  It  was  a macabre  gesture. 

The  end  itself  was  anticlimactic.  Late  on  the  last  day  of 
January  Paulus  got  off  his  final  message  to  headquarters. 

The  Sixth  Army,  true  to  their  oath  and  conscious  of  the 
lofty  importance  of  their  mission,  have  held  their  position 


1217 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point 

to  the  last  man  and  the  last  round  for  Fuehrer  and  Father- 
land  unto  the  end. 

At  7:45  p.m.  the  radio  operator  at  Sixth  Army  head- 
quarters sent  a last  message  on  his  own:  “The  Russians 
are  at  the  door  of  our  bunker.  We  are  destroying  our 
equipment.”  He  added  the  letters  “cl” — the  international 
wireless  code  signifying  “This  station  will  no  longer  trans- 
mit.” 

There  was  no  last-minute  fighting  at  headquarters. 
Paulus  and  his  staff  did  not  hold  out  to  the  last  man. 
A squad  of  Russians  led  by  a junior  officer  peered  into 
the  commander  in  chief’s  darkened  hole  in  the  cellar. 
The  Russians  demanded  surrender  and  the  Sixth  Army’s 
chief  of  staff,  General  Schmidt,  accepted.  Paulus  sat  de- 
jected on  his  camp  bed.  When  Schmidt  addressed  him — 
“May  I ask  the  Field  Marshal  if  there  is  anything  more 
to  be  said?” — Paulus  was  too  weary  to  answer. 

Farther  north  a small  German  pocket,  containing  all 
that  was  left  of  two  panzer  and  four  infantry  divisions, 
still  held  out  in  the  ruins  of  a tractor  factory.  On  the 
night  of  February  1 it  received  a message  from  Hitler’s 
headquarters. 

The  German  people  expect  you  to  do  your  duty  exactly  as 
did  the  troops  holding  the  southern  fortress.  Every  day  and 
every  hour  that  you  continue  to  fight  facilitates  the  building 
of  a new  front. 

Just  before  noon  on  February  2,  this  group  surrendered 
after  a last  message  to  the  Supreme  Commander:  . . 

Have  fought  to  the  last  man  against  vastly  superior  forces. 
Long  live  Germany!” 

Silence  at  last  settled  on  the  snow-covered,  blood- 
spattered  shambles  of  the  battlefield.  At  2:46  p.m.  on  Febru- 
ary 2 a German  reconnaissance  plane  flew  high  over  the 
city  and  radioed  back:  “No  sign  of  any  fighting  at  Stalin- 
grad.” 

By  that  time  91,000  German  soldiers,  including  twenty- 
four  generals,  half-starved,  frostbitten,  many  of  them 
wounded,  all  of  them  dazed  and  broken,  were  hobbling 
over  the  ice  and  snow,  clutching  their  blood-caked  blan- 
kets over  their  heads  against  the  24-degrees-below-zero 
cold  toward  the  dreary,  frozen  prisoner-of-war  camps 
of  Siberia.  Except  for  some  20,000  Rumanians  and  the 


1218 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 
29  °00  wounded  who  had  been  evacuated  by  air  they 

e,  a , was  of  a conquering  army  that  had 
numbered  285,000  men  two  months  before.  The  rest  had 
been  slaughtered.  And  of  those  91,000  Germans  who  be- 
ga"  c„™eary  march  i010  captivity  that  winter  day 
only  5,000  were  destined  ever  to  see  the  Fatherland 


Meanwhile  back  in  the  well-heated  headquarters  in  East 
Prussia  the  Nazi  warlord,  whose  stubbornness  and  stupid- 
Uy  were  responsible  for  this  disaster,  berated  his  generals 
at  Stalingrad  for  not  knowing  how  and  when  to  die.  The 
records  of  a conference  held  by  Hitler  at  OKW  with  his 
generals  on  February  1 survive  and  shed  enlightenment 
on  the  nature  of  the  German  dictator  at  this  trying  period 
in  his  life  and  that  of  his  Army  and  country. 

have  surrendered  there— formally  and  absolutely. 
Otherwise  they  would  have  closed  ranks,  formed  a hedge- 
hog, and  shot  themselves  with  their  last  bullet  . . . The  man 
[Paulus]  should  have  shot  himself  just  as  the  old  com- 
manders who  threw  themselves  on  their  swords  when  they 
saw  that  the  cause  was  lost  • • , Even  Varus  gave  his  slave 
the  order:  “Now  kill  me!” 

Hitler  s venom  toward  Paulus  for  deciding  to  live  be- 
came more  poisonous  as  he  ranted  on. 


. You  have  to  imagine:  he’ll  be  brought  to  Moscow— and 
imagine  that  rattrap  there.  There  he  will  sign  anything  He’ll 
make  confessions,  make  proclamations — you’ll  see.  They  will 
now  walk  down  the  slope  of  spiritual  bankruptcy  to  its  low- 
est depths  ...  You’ll  see— it  won’t  be  a week  before  Seyd- 
litz  and  Schmidt  and  even  Paulus  are  talking  over  the  radiot 
. . . They  are  going  to  be  put  into  the  Liublanka,  and  there 
the  rats  will  eat  them.  How  can  one  be  so  cowardly?  I don’t 
understand  it  . . . 


What  is  life?  Life  is  the  Nation.  The  individual  must  die 
anyway.  Beyond  the  life  of  the  individual  is  the  Nation. 
But  how  can  anyone  be  afraid  of  this  moment  of  death, 
with  which  he  can  free  himself  from  this  misery,  if  his  duty 
doesn’t  chain  him  to  this  Vale  of  Tears.  Na! 


•According  to  the  figure  given  by  the  Bonn  government  in  1958  Many  of 
the  prisoners  died  during  an  epidemic  of  typhus  in  the  following  spring 
t Hitler  was  correct  in  Els  forecast,  except  for  the  timing.  By  July  of  the 
fo  owmg  summer  Paulus  and  Seydlita,  who  became  the  leaders'  ol  the  s“ 
railed  National  Committee  of  Free  Germany,  did  take  to  the  air  over  the 
Moscow  radio  to  urge  the  Army  to  eliminate  Hitler.  ov  m 


War:  Early  Victories  and  the  Turning  Point  1219 

...  So  many  people  have  to  die,  and  then  a man  like  that 
besmirches  the  heroism  of  so  many  others  at  the  last  min- 
ute. He  could  have  freed  himself  from  all  sorrow  and  as- 
cended into  eternity  and  national  immortality,  but  he  prefers 
to  go  to  Moscow!  . . . 

What  hurts  me  most,  personally,  is  that  I still  promoted 
him  to  field  marshal.  I wanted  to  give  him  this  final  satisfac- 
tion.  That’s  the  last  field  marshal  I shall  appoint  in  this 
war.  You  musn’t  count  your  chickens  before  they’re 
hatched.27 

There  followed  a brief  exchange  between  Hitler  and 
General  Zeitzler  on  how  to  break  the  news  of  the  sur- 
render to  the  German  people.  On  February  3,  three  days 
after  the  act,  OKW  issued  a special  comminique: 

The  battle  of  Stalingrad  has  ended.  True  to  their  oath 
to  fight  to  the  last  breath,  the  Sixth  Army  under  the 
exemplary  leadership  of  Field  Marshal  Paulus  has  been  over- 
come by  the  superiority  of  the  enemy  and  by  the  un- 
favorable circumstances  confronting  our  forces. 

The  reading  of  the  communique  over  the  German  radio 
was  preceded  by  the  roll  of  muffled  drums  and  followed 
by  the  playing  of  the  second  movement  of  Beethoven’s 
Fifth  Symphony.  Hitler  proclaimed  four  days  of  national 
mourning.  All  theaters,  movies  and  variety  halls  were 
closed  until  it  was  over. 

Stalingrad,  wrote  Walter  Goerlitz,  the  German  historian, 
in  his  work  on  the  General  Staff,  “was  a second  Jena  and 
was  certainly  the  greatest  defeat  that  a German  army  had 
ever  undergone.”  28 

But  it  was  more  than  that.  Coupled  with  El  Alamein 
and  the  British-American  landings  in  North  Africa  it 
marked  the  great  turning  point  in  World  War  II.  The  high 
tide  of  Nazi  conquest  which  had  rolled  over  most  of 
Europe  to  the  frontier  of  Asia  on  the  Volga  and  in  Africa 
almost  to  the  Nile  had  now  begun  to  ebb  and  it  would 
never  flow  back  again.  The  time  of  the  great  Nazi  blitz 
offensives,  with  thousands  of  tanks  and  planes  spreading 
terror  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  armies  and  cutting  them 
to  pieces,  had  come  to  an  end.  There  would  be,  to  be 
sure,  desperate  local  thrusts — at  Kharkov  in  the  spring 
of  1943,  in  the  Ardennes  at  Christmas  time  in  1944 — 
but  they  formed  part  of  the  defensive  struggle  which 


1220  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  Germans  were  to  carry  out  with  great  tenacity  and 
valor  durrng  the  next  two— and  last— years  of  the  war 
The  initiative  had  passed  from  Hitler’s  hands,  never  to 
return.  It  was  his  enemies  who  seized  it  now,  and  held  it 

Dctx?nly™n  land  but  in  to*5  ^ Already  on  the 
night  of  May  30,  1942,  the  British  had  carried  out  their 
hrst  one-thousand-plane  bombing  of  Cologne,  and  more 
followed  on  other  cities  during  the  eventful  summer.  For 
the  hrst  tune  the  civilian  German  people,  like  the  German 
solders  at  Stalingrad  and  El  Alamein,  were  to  experience 
the  horrors  which  then  armed  forces  had  inflicted  on 
others  up  to  now. 

And  finally,  m the  snows  of  Stalingrad  and  in  the 
burning  sands  of  the  North  African  desert,  a great  and 
terrible  Nazi  dream  was  destroyed.  Not  only  was  the  Third 
Reich  doomed  by  the  disasters  to  Paulus  and  Rommel 
but  also  the  gruesome  and  grotesque  so-called  New  Order 
which  Hitler  and  his  S.S.  thugs  had  been  busy  setting 
up  in  the  conquered  lands.  Before  we  turn  to  the  final 
chapter,  the  fall  of  the  Third  Reich,  it  might  be  well  to 
pause  and  see  what  this  New  Order  was  like— in  theory 
and  in  barbarous  practice— and  what  this  ancient  and 
civilized  continent  of  Europe  barely  escaped  after  a brief 
nightmare  of  experiencing  its  first  horrors.  It  must  neces- 
sarily be  for  this  book,  as  it  was  for  the  good  Europeans 
who  lived  through  it,  or  were  massacred  before  it  ended 
the  darkest  chapter  of  all  in  the  history  of  the  Third  Reich! 


1 look  five 


* * * 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  END 


27 

THE  NEW  ORDER 


no  comprehensive  blueprint  for  the  New  Order  was 
ever  drawn  up,  but  it  is  clear  from  the  captured  docu- 
ments and  from  what  took  place  that  Hitler  knew  very 
well  what  he  wanted  it  to  be:  a Nazi-ruled  Europe  whose 
resources  would  be  exploited  for  the  profit  of  Germany, 
whose  people  would  be  made  the  slaves  of  the  German 
master  race  and  whose  “undesirable  elements” — above  all, 
the  Jews,  but  also  many  Slavs  in  the  East,  especially  the 
intelligentsia  among  them — would  be  exterminated. 

The  Jews  and  the  Slavic  peoples  were  the  Untermenschen 
— subhumans.  To  Hitler  they  had  no  right  to  live,  except 
as  some  of  them,  among  the  Slavs,  might  be  needed  to 
toil  in  the  fields  and  the  mines  as  slaves  of  their  German 
masters.  Not  only  were  the  great  cities  of  the  East,  Mos- 
cow, Leningrad  and  Warsaw,  to  be  permanently  erased* 
but  the  culture  of  the  Russians  and  Poles  and  other  Slavs 
was  to  be  stamped  out  and  formal  education  denied  them. 
Their  thriving  industries  were  to  be  dismantled  and 
shipped  to  Germany  and  the  people  themselves  confined 
to  the  pursuits  of  agriculture  so  that  they  could  grow 
food  for  Germans,  being  allowed  to  keep  for  themselves 
just  enough  to  subsist  on.  Europe  itself,  as  the  Nazi 
leaders  put  it,  must  be  made  “Jew-free.” 

“What  happens  to  a Russian,  to  a Czech,  does  not  in- 
terest me  in  the  slightest,”  declared  Heinrich  Himmler  on 
October  4,  1943,  in  a confidential  address  to  his  S.S.  of- 
ficers at  Posen.  By  this  time  Himmler,  as  chief  of  the  S.S. 
and  the  entire  police  apparatus  of  the  Third  Reich,  was 
next  to  Hitler  in  importance,  holding  the  power  of  life 

* As  early  as  September  18,  1941,  Hitler  had  specifically  ordered  that 
Leningrad  was  to  be  “wiped  off  the  face  of  the  earth.”  After  being  sur- 
rounded it  was  to  be  “razed  to  the  ground”  by  bombardment  and  bombing 
and  its  population  (three  millions)  was  to  be  destroyed  with  it.  See  above. 


1223 


1224 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


and  death  not  only  over  eighty  million  Germans  but  over 
twice  that  many  conquered  people. 

What  the  nations  [Himmler  continued]  can  offer  in  the 
way  of  good  blood  of  our  type,  we  will  take,  if  necessary 
by  kidnaping  their  children  and  raising  them  here  with  us. 
Whether  nations  live  in  prosperity  or  starve  to  death  like 
cattle  interests  me  only  in  so  far  as  we  need  them  as  slaves 
to  our  Kultur;  otherwise  it  is  of  no  interest  to  me. 

Whether  10,000  Russian  females  fall  down  from  exhaus- 
tion while  digging  an  antitank  ditch  interests  me  only  in  so 
far  as  the  antitank  ditch  for  Germany  is  finished  . . .* 

Long  before  Himmler’s  Posen  speech  in  1943  (to 
which  we  shall  return,  for  it  covers  other  aspects  of  the 
New  Order)  the  Nazi  chiefs  had  laid  down  their  thoughts 
and  plans  for  enslaving  the  people  of  the  East. 

By  October  15,  1940,  Hitler  had  decided  on  the  future 
of  the  Czechs,  the  first  Slavic  people  he  had  conquered. 
One  half  of  them  were  to  be  “assimilated,”  mostly  by 
shipping  them  as  slave  labor  to  Germany.  The  other  half, 
“particularly”  the  intellectuals,  were  simply  to  be,  in  the 
words  of  a secret  report  on  the  subject,  “eliminated.”  2 

A fortnight  before,  on  October  2,  the  Fuehrer  had 
clarified  his  thoughts  about  the  fate  of  the  Poles,  the 
second  of  the  Slavic  peoples  to  be  conquered.  His  faithful 
secretary,  Martin  Bormann,  has  left  a long  memorandum 
on  the  Nazi  plans,  which  Hitler  outlined  to  Hans  Frank, 
the  Governor  General  of  rump  Poland,  and  to  other  of- 
ficials.3 

The  Poles  [Hitler  “emphasized”]  are  especially  bom  for 
low  labor  . . . There  can  be  no  question  of  improvement 
for  them.  It  is  necessary  to  keep  the  standard  of  life  low  in 
Poland  and  it  must  not  be  permitted  to  rise  . . . The  Poles 
are  lazy  and  it  is  necessary  to  use  compulsion  to  make 
them  work  . . . The  Government  General  [of  Poland] 
should  be  used  by  us  merely  as  a source  of  unskilled  labor 
. . . Every  year  the  laborers  needed  by  the  Reich  could  be 
procured  from  there. 

As  for  the  Polish  priests, 

they  will  preach  what  we  want  them  to  preach.  If  any 
priest  acts  differently,  we  shall  make  short  work  of  him.  The 
task  of  the  priest  is  to  keep  the  Poles  quiet,  stupid  and  dull- 
witted. 


1225 


Beginning  of  the  End 

There  were  two  other  classes  of  Poles  to  be  dealt  with 
and  the  Nazi  dictator  did  not  neglect  mention  of  them. 

It  is  indispensable  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  Polish  gentry 
must  cease  to  exist;  however  cruel  this  may  sound,  they  must 
be  exterminated  wherever  they  are  . . . 

There  should  be  one  master  only  for  the  Poles,  the  Ger- 
man. Two  masters,  side  by  side,  cannot  and  must  not  exist 
Therefore,  all  representatives  of  the  Polish  intelligentsia 
are  to  be  exterminated.  This  sounds  cruel,  but  such  is  the  law 
of  life. 

This  obsession  of  the  Germans  with  the  idea  that  they 
were  the  master  race  and  that  the  Slavic  peoples  must 
be  their  slaves  was  especially  virulent  in  regard  to  Russia. 
Erich  Koch,  the  roughneck  Reich  Commissar  for  the 
Ukraine,  expressed  it  in  a speech  at  Kiev  on  March  5, 
1943. 

We  are  the  Master  Race  and  must  govern  hard  but  just 
...  I will  draw  the  very  last  out  of  this  country.  I did  not 
come  to  spread  bliss  . . . The  population  must  work, 
work,  and  work  again  . . . We  definitely  did  not  come 
here  to  give  out  manna.  We  have  come  here  to  create  the 
basis  for  victory. 

We  are  a master  race,  which  must  remember  that  the 
lowliest  German  worker  is  racially  and  biologically  a thou- 
sand times  more  valuable  than  the  population  here.4 

Nearly  a year  before,  on  July  23,  1942,  when  the  Ger- 
man armies  in  Russia  were  nearing  the  Volga  and  the  oil 
fields  of  the  Caucasus,  Martin  Bormann,  Hitler’s  party 
secretary  and,  by  now,  right-hand  man,  wrote  a long  letter 
to  Rosenberg  reiterating  the  Fuehrer’s  views  on  the  sub- 
ject. The  letter  was  summed  up  by  an  official  in  Rosen- 
berg’s ministry: 

The  Slavs  are  to  work  for  us.  In  so  far  as  we  don’t  need 
them,  they  may  die.  Therefore  compulsory  vaccination  and 
German  health  services  are  superfluous.  The  fertility  of  the 
Slavs  is  undesirable.  They  may  use  contraceptives  or  prac- 
tice abortion — the  more  the  better.  Education  is  dangerous. 
It  is  enough  if  they  can  count  up  to  100.  . . . Every  edu- 
cated person  is  a future  enemy.  Religion  we  leave,  to  them  as 
a means  of  diversion.  As  for  food  they  won’t  get  any  more 
than  is  absolutely  necessary.  We  are  the  masters.  We  come 
first.5 

When  the  German  troops  first  entered  Russia  they  were 


1226  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

in  many  places  hailed  as  liberators  by  a population  long 
ground  down  and  terrorized  by  Stalin’s  tyranny.  There 
were,  in  the  beginning,  wholesale  desertions  among  the 
Russian  soldiers.  Especially  in  the  Baltic,  which  had  been 
under  Soviet  occupation  but  a short  time,  and  in  the 
Ukraine,  where  an  incipient  independence  movement  had 
never  been  quite  stamped  out,  many  were  happy  to  be 
freed  from  the  Soviet  yoke — even  by  the  Germans. 

There  were  a few  in  Berlin  who  believed  that  if  Hitler 
played  his  cards  shrewdly,  treating  the  population  with 
consideration  and  promising  relief  from  Bolshevik  prac- 
tices (by  granting  religious  and  economic  freedom  and 
making  true  co-operatives  out  of  the  collectivized  farms) 
and  eventual  self-government,  the  Russian  people  could 
be  won  over.  They  might  then  not  only  co-operate  with 
the  Germans  in  the  occupied  regions  but  in  the  unoc- 
cupied ones  strive  for  liberation  from  Stalin’s  harsh  rule. 
If  this  were  done,  it  was  argued,  the  Bolshevik  regime  it- 
self might  collapse  and  the  Red  Army  disintegrate,  as 
the  Czarist  armies  had  done  in  1917. 

But  the  savagery  of  the  Nazi  occupation  and  the 
obvious  aims  of  the  German  conquerors,  often  publicly 
proclaimed,  to  plunder  the  Russian  lands,  enslave  their 
peoples  and  colonize  the  East  with  Germans  soon  destroyed 
any  possibility  of  such  a development. 

No  one  summed  up  this  disastrous  policy  and  all  the 
opportunities  it  destroyed  better  than  a German  himself, 
Dr.  Otto  Brautigam,  a career  diplomat  and  the  deputy 
leader  of  the  Political  Department  of  Rosenberg’s  newly 
created  Ministry  for  the  Occupied  Eastern  Territories.  In  a 
bitter  confidential  report  to  his  superiors  on  October  25, 
1942,  Brautigam  dared  to  pinpoint  the  Nazi  mistake  in 
Russia. 

In  the  Soviet  Union  we  found  on  our  arrival  a population 
weary  of  Bolshevism,  which  waited  longingly  for  new  slogans 
holding  out  the  prospect  of  a better  future  for  them.  It 
was  Germany’s  duty  to  find  such  slogans,  but  they  remained 
unuttered.  The  population  greeted  us  with  joy  as  liberators 
and  placed  themselves  at  our  disposal. 

Actually , there  was  a slogan  but  the  Russian  people 
soon  saw  through  it. 

With  the  inherent  instinct  of  the  Eastern  peoples  [Brau- 


Beginning  of  the  End  1227 

tigam  continued],  the  primitive  man  soon  found  out  that 
for  Germany  the  slogan  “Liberation  from  Bolshevism”  was 
only  a pretext  to  enslave  the  Eastern  peoples  according  to 
her  own  methods  . . . The  worker  and  peasant  soon  per- 
ceived that  Germany  did  not  regard  them  as  partners  of 
equal  rights  but  considered  them  only  as  the  objective  of 
her  political  and  economic  aims  . . . With  unequaled  pre- 
sumption, we  put  aside  all  political  knowledge  and  . . . treat 
the  peoples  of  the  occupied  Eastern  territories  as  “Second- 
Class  Whites”  to  whom  Providence  has  merely  assigned  the 
task  of  serving  as  slaves  for  Germany  . . . 

There  were  two  other  developments,  Brautigam  de- 
clared, which  had  turned  the  Russians  against  the  Ger- 
mans: the  barbaric  treatment  of  Soviet  prisoners  of  war 
and  the  shanghaiing  of  Russian  men  and  women  for  slave 
labor. 

It  is  no  longer  a secret  from  friend  or  foe  that  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Russian  prisoners  of  war  have  died  of  hun- 
ger or  cold  in  our  camps  ...  We  now  experience  the 
grotesque  picture  of  having  to  recruit  millions  of  laborers 
from  the  occupied  Eastern  territories  after  prisoners  of  war 
have  died  of  hunger  like  flies  . . . 

In  the  prevailing  limitless  abuse  of  the  Slavic  humanity, 
“recruiting”  methods  were  used  which  probably  have  their 
origin  only  in  the  blackest  periods  of  the  slave  traffic.  A reg- 
ular man  hunt  was  inaugurated.  Without  consideration  of 
health  or  age  the  people  were  shipped  to  Germany  . . .* 

German  policy  and  practice  in  Russia  had  “brought 
about  the  enormous  resistance  of  the  Eastern  peoples,” 
this  official  concluded. 

Our  policy  has  forced  both  Bolshevists  and  Russian  na- 
tionalists into  a common  front  against  us.  The  Russian 
fights  today  with  exceptional  bravery  and  self-sacrifice  for 
nothing  more  or  less  than  recognition  of  his  human  dignity. 

Closing  his  thirteen-page  memorandum  on  a positive 
note  Dr.  Brautigam  asked  for  a complete  change  of  policy. 
“The  Russian  people,”  he  argued,  “must  be  told  something 
concrete  about  their  future.”  6 

But  this  was  a voice  in  the  Nazi  wilderness.  Hitler,  as 
we  have  seen,  already  had  laid  down,  before  the  attack 

* Neither  the  extermination  of  masses  of  Soviet  prisoners  of  war  nor  the 
exploitation  of  Russian  slave  labor  was  a secret  to  the  Kremlin.  As  early  as 
November  1941,  Molotov  had  made  a formal  diplomatic  protest  against  the 
extermination  ’ of  Russian  POWs,  and  in  April  of  the  following  year  he 
made  another  protest  against  the  German  slave  labor  program. 


1228 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


began,  his  directives  on  what  would  be  done  with  Russia 
and  the  Russians*  and  he  was  not  a man  who  could  be 
persuaded  by  any  living  German  to  change  them  by  one 
iota. 

On  July  16,  1941,  less  than  a month  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  Russian  campaign  but  when  it  was  already 
evident  from  the  initial  German  successes  that  a large 
slice  of  the  Soviet  Union  would  soon  be  within  grasp, 
Hitler  convoked  Goering,  Keitel,  Rosenberg,  Bormann  and 
Lammers  (the  last,  head  of  the  Reich  Chancellery)  to  his 
headquarters  in  East  Prussia  to  remind  them  of  his  aims 
in  the  newly  conquered  land.  At  last  his  goal  so  clearly 
stated  in  Mein  Kampf  of  securing  a vast  German  Lebens- 
raum  in  Russia  was  in  sight  and  it  is  clear  from  the 
confidential  memorandum  of  the  meeting  drawn  up  by  Bor- 
mann (which  showed  up  at  Nuremberg)  7 that  he  wanted 
his  chief  lieutenants  to  understand  well  what  he  intended 
to  do  with  it.  His  intentions,  he  admonished,  must  how- 
ever not  be  “publicized.” 

There  is  no  need  for  that  [Hitler  said]  but  the  main 
thing  is  that  we  ourselves  know  what  we  want  . . . Nobody 
must  be  able  to  recognize  that  it  initiates  a final  settlement. 
This  need  not  prevent  our  taking  all  necessary  measures — 
shooting,  resettling,  etc. — and  we  shall  take  them. 

In  principle,  Hitler  continued, 

we  now  have  to  face  the  task  of  cutting  up  the  cake  ac- 
cording to  our  needs  in  order  to  be  able: 

first,  to  dominate  it; 
second,  to  administer  it; 
third,  to  exploit  it. 

He  did  not  mind,  he  said,  that  the  Russians  had  ordered 
partisan  warfare  behind  the  German  lines;  “it  enables  us 
to  eradicate  everyone  who  opposes  us.” 

In  general,  Hitler  explained,  Germany  would  dominate 
the  Russian  territory  up  to  the  Urals.  None  but  Germans 
would  be  permitted  to  carry  weapons  in  that  vast  space. 
Then  Hitler  went  over  specifically  what  would  be  done 
with  various  slices  of  the  Russian  cake. 

The  entire  Baltic  country  will  have  to  be  incorporated  into 
Germany  . . . The  Crimea  has  to  be  evacuated  by  all  for- 
eigners and  settled  by  Germans  only,  [becoming]  Reich 


See  above,  pp.  1088-94. 


1229 


Beginning  of  the  End 

territory  . . . The  Kola  Peninsula  will  be  taken  by  Germany 
because  of  the  large  nickel  mines  there.  The  annexation  of 
Finland  as  a federated  state  should  be  prepared  with  cau- 
tion . . . The  Fuehrer  will  raze  Leningrad  to  the  ground 
and  then  hand  it  over  to  the  Finns. 

The  Baku  oil  fields,  Hitler  ordered,  would  become  a 
“German  concession”  and  the  German  colonies  on  the 
Volga  would  be  annexed  outright.  When  it  came  to  a dis- 
cussion as  to  which  Nazi  leaders  would  administer  the 
new  territory  a violent  quarrel  broke  out. 

Rosenberg  states  he  intends  to  use  Captain  von  Petersdorff, 
owing  to  his  special  merits;  general  consternation;  general 
rejections.  The  Fuehrer  and  the  Reich  Marshal  [Goering] 
both  emphasize  there  was  no  doubt  that  Von  Petersdorff 
was  insane. 

There  was  also  an  argument  on  the  best  methods  of 
policing  the  conquered  Russian  people.  Hitler  suggested 
the  German  police  be  equipped  with  armored  cars.  Goering 
doubted  that  they  would  be  necessary.  His  planes  could 
“drop  bombs  in  case  of  riots,”  he  said. 

Naturally  [Goering  added]  this  giant  area  would  have 
to  be  pacified  as  quickly  as  possible.  The  best  solution  would 
be  to  shoot  anybody  who  looked  sideways.* 

Goering,  as  head  of  the  Four-Year  Plan,  was  also  put 
in  charge  of  the  economic  exploitation  of  Russia,  t 
“Plunder”  would  be  a better  word,  as  Goering  made  clear 
in  a speech  to  the  Nazi  commissioners  for  the  occupied 
territories  on  August  6,  1942.  “It  used  to  be  called  plun- 
dering,” he  said.  “But  today  things  have  become  more 
humane.  In  spite  of  that,  I intend  to  plunder  and  to  do  it 
thoroughly.” 8 On  this,  at  least,  he  was  as  good  as  his 
word,  not  only  in  Russia  but  throughout  Nazi-conquered 
Europe.  It  was  all  part  of  the  New  Order. 

THE  NAZI  PLUNDER  OF  EUROPE 

The  total  amount  of  loot  will  never  be  known;  it 
has  proved  beyond  man’s  capacity  to  accurately  compute. 

* A year  before,  it  will  be  remembered,  Goering  had  told  Ciano  that  “this 
year  between  twenty  and  thirty  million  persons  will  die  of  hunger  in  Russia” 
and  that  “perhaps  it  is  well  that  it  should  be  so.”  Already,  he  said,  Russian 

Prisoners  of  war  had  begun  “to  eat  each  other.”  See  above,  p.  1118w. 

In  a directive  of  Goering’s  Economic  Staff,  East,  on  May  23,  1941,  the 
destruction  of  the  Russian  industrial  areas  was  ordered.  The  workers  and 
their  families  in  these  regions  were  to  be  left  to  starve.  “Any  attempt  to 


1230 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


But  some  figures  are  available,  many  of  them  from  the 
Germans  themselves.  They  show  with  what  Germanic 
thoroughness  the  instructions  which  Goering  once  gave  to 
his  subordinates  were  carried  out. 

Whenever  you  come  across  anything  that  may  be  needed 
by  the  German  people,  you  must  be  after  it  like  a blood- 
hound. It  must  be  taken  out  . . . and  brought  to  Germany.9 

A great  deal  was  taken  out,  not  only  in  goods  and  serv- 
ices but  in  banknotes  and  gold.  Whenever  Hitler  occupied 
a country,  his  financial  agents  seized  the  gold  and  foreign 
holdings  of  its  national  hank.  That  was  a mere  beginning. 
Staggering  “occupation  costs”  were  immediately  assessed. 
By  the  end  of  February  1944,  Count  Schwerin  von 
Krosigk,  the  Nazi  Minister  of  Finance,  put  the  total  take 
from  such  payments  at  some  48  billion  marks  (roughly 
$12,000,000,000),  of  which  France,  which  was  milked 
heavier  than  any  other  conquered  country,  furnished  more 
than  half.  By  the  end  of  the  war,  receipts  from  occupation 
assessments  amounted  to  an  estimated  60  billion  marks 
($15,000,000,000). 

France  was  forced  to  pay  31.5  billions  of  this  total,  its 
annual  contributions  of  more  than  7 billions  coming  to 
over  four  times  the  yearly  sums  which  Germany  had  paid 
in  reparations  under  the  Dawes  and  Young  plans  after 
the  first  war — a tribute  which  had  seemed  such  a heinous 
crime  to  Hitler.  In  addition  the  Bank  of  France  was  forced 
to  grant  “credits”  to  Germany  totaling  4.5  billion  marks 
and  the  French  government  to  pay  a further  half  billion 
in  “fines.”  At  Nuremberg  it  was  estimated  that  the  Ger- 
mans extracted  in  occupation  costs  and  “credits”  two  thirds 
of  Belgium’s  national  income  and  a similar  percentage 
from  the  Netherlands.  Altogether,  according  to  a study  by 
the  U.S.  Strategic  Bombing  Survey,  Germany  extracted  in 
tribute  from  the  conquered  nations  a total  of  104  billion 
marks  ($26,000,000,000).* * 

But  the  goods  seized  and  transported  to  the  Reich 
without  even  the  formality  of  payment  can  never  possibly 

save  the  population  there,"  the  directive  stated,  "from  death  by  starvation  by 
importing  [food]  surpluses  from  the  black-soil  zone  [of  Russia]"  was 
prohibited.  See  above,  pp.  1092-93. 

* At  the  official  rate  of  exchange  (2.5  Reichsmarks  to  the  dollar)  this  would 
amount  to  40  billion  dollars.  But  I have  used  the  unofficial  rate  of  four 
Reichsmarks  to  the  dollar.  In  terms  of  purchasing  power  it  is  more  ac- 
curate. 


Beginning  of  the  End  1231 

be  estimated.  Figures  kept  pouring  in  at  Nuremberg  until 
they  overwhelmed  one;  but  no  expert,  so  far  as  I know, 
was  ever  able  to  straighten  them  out  and  compute  totals. 
In  France,  for  example,  it  was  estimated  that  the  Germans 
carted  off  (as  “levies  in  kind”)  9 million  tons  of  cereals, 
75  per  cent  of  the  total  production  of  oats,  80  per  cent 
of  oil,  74  per  cent  of  steel,  and  so  on,  for  a grand  total 
of  184.5  billion  francs. 

Russia,  devastated  by  warfare  and  German  savagery, 
proved  harder  to  milk.  Nazi  documents  are  full  of  reports 
of  Soviet  “deliveries.”  In  1943,  for  example,  9 million  tons 
of  cereals,  2 million  tons  of  fodder,  3 million  tons  of  po- 
tatoes, 662,000  tons  of  meat  were  listed  by  the  Germans 
among  the  “deliveries,”  to  which  the  Soviet  Com- 
mittee of  Investigation  added — for  the  duration  of  the 
occupation — 9 million  cattle,  12  million  pigs,  13  million 
sheep,  to  mention  a few  items.  But  Russian  “deliveries” 
proved  much  less  than  expected;  the  Germans  calculated 
them  as  worth  a net  of  only  some  4 billion  marks 
($1,000,000,000).* 

Everything  possible  was  squeezed  out  of  Poland  by  the 
greedy  Nazi  conquerors.  “I  shall  endeavor,”  said  Dr. 
Frank,  the  Governor  General,  “to  squeeze  out  of  this  prov- 
ince everything  that  is  still  possible  to  squeeze  out.”  This 
was  at  the  end  of  1942,  and  in  the  three  years  since  the 
occupation  he  had  already  squeezed  out,  as  he  continually 
boasted,  a great  deal,  especially  in  foodstuffs  for  hungry 
Germans  in  the  Reich.  He  warned,  however,  that  “if  the 
new  food  scheme  is  carried  out  in  1943  a half-million 
people  in  Warsaw  and  its  suburbs  alone  will  be  deprived 
of  food.”  10 

The  nature  of  the  New  Order  in  Poland  had  been  laid 
down  as  soon  as  the  country  was  conquered.  On  October 
3,  1939,  Frank  informed  the  Army  of  Hitler’s  orders. 

Poland  can  only  be  administered  by  utilizing  the  country 
through  means  of  ruthless  exploitation,  deportation  of  all 
supplies,  raw  materials,  machines,  factory  installations,  etc., 
which  are  important  for  the  German  war  economy,  availa- 
bility of  all  workers  for  work  within  Germany,  reduction  of 
the  entire  Polish  economy  to  absolute  minimum  necessary 

•According  to  Alexander  Dallin  in  his  exhaustive  study  of  German  rule  in 
Russm,  Germany  could  have  obtained  more  from  Russia  in  normal  trade. 
(See  Dallin,  German  Rule  in  Russia.) 


1232 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


for  bare  existence  of  the  population,  closing  of  all  educa- 
tional institutions,  especially  technical  schools  and  colleges 
in  order  to  prevent  the  growth  of  the  new  Polish  intelli- 
gentsia. Poland  shall  be  treated  as  a colony.  The  Poles 
shall  be  the  slaves  of  the  Greater  German  Reich.11 

Rudolf  Hess,  the  Nazi  deputy  Fuehrer,  added  that  Hitler 
had  decided  that  “Warsaw  shall  not  be  rebuilt,  nor  is  it 
the  intention  of  the  Fuehrer  to  rebuild  or  reconstruct  any 
industry  in  the  Government  General.”  12 

By  decree  of  Dr.  Frank,  all  property  in  Poland  belong- 
ing not  only  to  Jews  but  to  Poles  was  subject  to  confiscation 
without  compensation.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  Polish- 
owned  farms  were  simply  grabbed  and  handed  over  to 
German  settlers.  By  May  31,  1943,  in  the  four  Polish 
districts  annexed  to  Germany  (West  Prussia,  Posen, 
Zichenau,  Silesia)  some  700,000  estates  comprising  15  mil- 
lion acres  were  “seized”  and  9,500  estates  totaling  6.5 
million  acres  “confiscated.”  The  difference  between 
“seizure”  and  “confiscation”  is  not  explained  in  the 
elaborate  table  prepared  by  the  German  “Central  Estate 
Office,”  13  and  to  the  dispossessed  Poles  it  must  not  have 
mattered. 

Even  the  art  treasures  in  the  occupied  lands  were  looted, 
and,  as  the  captured  Nazi  documents  later  revealed,  on 
the  express  orders  of  Hitler  and  Goering,  who  thereby 
greatly  augmented  their  “private”  collections.  The  corpu- 
lent Reich  Marshal,  according  to  his  own  estimate,  brought 
his  own  collection  up  to  a value  of  50  million  Reichs- 
marks. Indeed,  Goering  was  the  driving  force  in  this 
particular  field  of  looting.  Immediately  upon  the  conquest 
of  Poland  he  issued  orders  for  the  seizure  of  art  treasures 
there  and  within  six  months  the  special  commissioner  ap- 
pointed to  carry  out  his  command  could  report  that  he 
had  taken  over  “almost  the  entire  art  treasury  of  the  coun- 
try.” 14 

But  it  was  in  France  where  the  bulk  of  the  great  art 
treasures  of  Europe  lay,  and  no  sooner  was  this  country 
added  to  the  Nazi  conquests  than  Hitler  and  Goering 
decreed  their  seizure.  To  carry  out  this  particular  plunder 
Hitler  appointed  Rosenberg,  who  set  up  an  organization 
called  Einsatzstab  Rosenberg,  and  who  was  assisted  not 
only  by  Goering  but  by  General  Keitel.  Indeed  one  order 
by  Keitel  to  the  Army  in  France  stated  that  Rosenberg 


1233 


Beginning  of  the  End 

“is  entitled  to  transport  to  Germany  cultural  goods  which 
appear  valuable  to  him  and  to  safeguard  them  there.  The 
Fuehrer  has  reserved  for  himself  the  decision  as  to  their 
use.”  15 

An  idea  of  Hitler’s  decision  “as  to  their  use”  is  re- 
vealed in  a secret  order  issued  by  Goering  on  November 
5,  1940,  specifying  the  distribution  of  art  objects  being 
collected  at  the  Louvre  in  Paris.  They  were  “to  be  disposed 
of  in  the  following  way”: 

1.  Those  art  objects  about  which  the  Fuehrer  has  re- 
served for  himself  the  decision  as  to  their  use. 

2.  Those  . . . which  serve  the  completion  of  the  Reich 
Marshal’s  [i.e.,  Goering’s]  collection  . . . 

4.  Those  . . . that  are  suited  to  be  sent  to  German  mu- 
seums  . . ,16 

The  French  government  protested  the  looting  of  the 
country’s  art  treasures,  declaring  that  it  was  a violation 
of  the  Hague  convention,  and  when  one  German  art  ex- 
pert on  Rosenberg’s  staff,  a Herr  Bunjes,  dared  to  call  this 
to  the  attention  of  Goering,  the  fat  one  replied: 

“My  dear  Bunjes,  let  me  worry  about  that.  I am  the 
highest  jurist  in  the  state.  It  is  my  orders  which  are  de- 
cisive and  you  will  act  accordingly.” 

And  so  according  to  a report  of  Bunjes — it  is  his  only 
appearance  in  the  history  of  the  Third  Reich,  so  far  as 
the  documents  show — 

those  art  objects  collected  at  the  Jeu  de  Paume  which  are  to 
go  into  the  Fuehrer’s  possession  and  those  which  the  Reich 
Marshal  claims  for  himself  will  be  loaded  into  two  rail- 
road cars  which  will  be  attached  to  the  Reich  Marshal’s 
special  train  ...  to  Berlin.17 

Many  more  carloads  followed.  According  to  a secret 
official  German  report  some  137  freight  cars  loaded  with 
4,174  cases  of  art  works  comprising  21,903  objects,  in- 
cluding 10,890  paintings,  made  the  journey  from  the  West 
to  Germany  up  to  July  1944.18  They  included  works  of, 
among  others,  Rembrandt,  Rubens,  Hals,  Vermeer,  Ve- 
lazquez, Murillo,  Goya,  Vecchio,  Watteau,  Fragonard, 
Reynolds  and  Gainsborough.  As  early  as  January  1941, 
Rosenberg  estimated  the  art  loot  from  France  alone  as 
worth  a billion  marks.19 

The  plunder  of  raw  materials,  manufactured  goods  and 


1234  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

food,  though  it  reduced  the  occupied  peoples  to  impover- 
ishment, hunger  and  sometimes  starvation  and  violated  the 
Hague  Convention  on  the  conduct  of  war,  might  have 
been  excused,  if  not  justified,  by  the  Germans  as  neces- 
sitated by  the  harsh  exigencies  of  total  war.  But  the  steal- 
ing of  art  treasures  did  not  help  Hitler’s  war  machine.  It 
was  a case  merely  of  avarice,  of  the  personal  greed  of 
Hitler  and  Goering. 

All  this  plunder  and  spoliation  the  conquered  popula- 
tions could  have  endured — wars  and  enemy  occupation 
had  always  brought  privation  in  their  wake.  But  this  was 
only  a part  of  the  New  Order — the  mildest  part.  It  was 
in  the  plunder  not  of  material  goods  but  of  human  lives 
that  the  mercifully  short-lived  New  Order  will  be  long- 
est remembered.  Here  Nazi  degradation  sank  to  a level 
seldom  experienced  by  man  in  all  his  time  on  earth.  Mil- 
lions of  decent,  innocent  men  and  women  were  driven 
into  forced  labor,  millions  more  tortured  and  tormented 
in  the  concentration  camps  and  millions  more  still,  of 
whom  there  were  four  and  a half  million  Jews  alone, 
were  massacred  in  cold  blood  or  deliberately  starved  to 
death  and  their  remains — in  order  to  remove  the  traces — 
burned. 

This  incredible  story  of  horror  would  be  unbelievable 
were  it  not  fully  documented  and  testified  to  by  the 
perpetrators  themselves.  What  follows  here — -a  mere  sum- 
mary, which  must  because  of  limitations  of  space  leave 
out  a thousand  shocking  details — is  based  on  that  in- 
controvertible evidence,  with  occasional  corroboration  from 
the  eyewitness  accounts  of  the  few  survivors. 

SLAVE  LABOR  IN  THE  NEW  ORDER 

By  the  end  of  September  1944,  some  seven  and  a half 
million  civilian  foreigners  were  toiling  for  the  Third  Reich. 
Nearly  all  of  them  had  been  rounded  up  by  force,  de- 
ported to  Germany  in  boxcars,  usually  without  food  or 
water  or  any  sanitary  facilities,  and  there  put  to  work  in 
the  factories,  fields  and  mines.  They  were  not  only  put  to 
work  but  degraded,  beaten  and  starved  and  often  left  to 
die  for  lack  of  food,  clothing  and  shelter. 

In  addition,  two  million  prisoners  of  war  were  added 
to  the  foreign  labor  force,  at  least  a half  a million  of 


Beginning  of  the  End  1235 

whom  were  made  to  work  in  the  armaments  and  muni- 
tions industries  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  Hague  and 
Geneva  conventions,  which  stipulated  that  no  war  prisoners 
could  be  employed  in  such  tasks.*  This  figure  did  not  in- 
clude the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  other  POWs  who 
were  impressed  into  the  building  of  fortifications  and  in 
carrying  ammunition  to  the  front  lines  and  even  in  man- 
ning antiaircraft  guns  in  further  disregard  of  the  interna- 
tional conventions  which  Germany  had  signed,  t 

In  the  massive  deportations  of  slave  labor  to  the  Reich, 
wives  were  tom  away  from  their  husbands,  and  children 
from  their  parents,  and  assigned  to  widely  separated  parts 
of  Germany.  The  young,  if  they  were  old  enough  to  work 
at  all,  were  not  spared.  Even  top  generals  of  the  Army  co- 
operated in  the  kidnaping  of  children,  who  were  carted 
off  to  the  homeland  to  perform  slave  labor.  A memo- 
randum from  Rosenberg’s  files  of  June  12,  1944,  reveals 
this  practice  in  occupied  Russia. 

Army  Group  Center  intends  to  apprehend  forty  to  fifty 
thousand  youths  from  the  age  of  10  to  14  . . . and  transport 
them  to  the  Reich.  The  measure  was  originally  proposed  by 
the  Ninth  Army  ...  It  is  intended,  to  allot  these  juveniles 
primarily  to  the  German  trades  as  apprentices.  . . . This 
action  is  being  greatly  welcomed  by  the  German  trade  since 
it  represents  a decisive  measure  for  the  alleviation  of  the 
shortage  of  apprentices. 

This  action  is  not  only  aimed  at  preventing  a direct  re- 
inforcement of  the  enemy’s  strength  but  also  as  a reduction 
of  his  biological  potentialities. 

The  kidnaping  operation  had  a code  name:  “Hay  Ac- 
tion.” It  was  also  being  carried  out,  the  memorandum 
added,  by  Field  Marshal  Model’s  Army  Group  Ukraine- 
North.22 

Increasing  terrorization  was  used  to  round  up  the  vic- 
tims. At  first,  comparatively  mild  methods  were  used.  Per- 
sons coming  out  of  church  or  the  movies  were  nabbed. 
In  the  West  especially,  S.S.  units  merely  blocked  off  a 
section  of  a town  and  seized  all  able-bodied  men  and 

•Albert  Speer,  Minister  for  Armament  and  War  Production,  admitted  at 
Nuremberg  that  40  per  cent  of  all  prisoners  of  war  were  employed  in  1944 
in  the  production  of  weapons  and  munitions  and  in  subsidiary  industries  20 
T A captured  record  shows  Field  Marshal  Milch  of  the  Air  Force  in  1943 
demanding  50,000  more  Russian  war  prisoners  to  be  added  to  the  30,000 
already  manning  antiaircraft  artillery.  “It  is  amusing.”  Milch  laughed, 
that  Russians  must  work  the  guns.”  21 


1236 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


women.  Villages  were  surrounded  and  searched  for  the 
same  purposes.  In  the  East,  when  there  was  resistance  to 
the  forced-labor  order,  villages  were  simply  burned  down 
and  their  inhabitants  carted  off.  Rosenberg’s  captured  files 
are  replete  with  German  reports  of  such  happenings.  In 
Poland,  at  least  one  German  official  thought  things 
were  going  a little  too  far. 

The  wild  and  ruthless  man  hunt  [he  wrote  to  Governor 
Frank],  as  exercised  everywhere  in  towns  and  country,  in 
streets,  squares,  stations,  even  in  churches,  at  night  in 
homes,  has  badly  shaken  the  feeling  of  security  of  the  in- 
habitants. Everybody  is  exposed  to  the  danger  of  being 
seized  anywhere  and  at  any  time  by  the  police,  suddenly 
and  unexpectedly,  and  of  being  sent  to  an  assembly  camp. 
None  of  his  relatives  knows  what  has  happened  to  him.23 

But  rounding  up  the  slave  workers  was  only  the  first 
step.*  The  condition  of  their  transport  to  Germany  left 
something  to  be  desired.  A certain  Dr.  Gutkelch  described 
one  instance  in  a report  to  Rosenberg’s  ministry  on 
September  30,  1942.  Recounting  how  a train  packed  with 
returning  worked-out  Eastern  laborers  met  a train  at  a sid- 
ing near  Brest  Litovsk  full  of  “newly  recruited”  Russian 
workers  bound  for  Germany,  he  wrote: 


Because  of  the  corpses  in  the  trainload  of  returning  lab- 
orers a catastrophe  might  have  occurred  ...  In  this  train 
women  gave  birth  to  babies  who  were  thrown  out  of  the 
windows  during  the  journey.  Persons  having  tuberculosis 
and  venereal  diseases  rode  in  the  same  car.  Dying  people 
lay  in  freight  cars  without  straw,  and  one  of  the  dead  was 
thrown  on  the  railway  embankment.  The  same  must  have  oc- 
curred in  other  returning  transports.26 

This  was  not  a very  promising  introduction  to  the  Third 
Reich  for  the  Ostarbeiter,  but  at  least  it  prepared  them 


* labor  program  was  put  in  charge  of  Fritz  Sauckel,  who 

A a ,tbe  lllle  °{  Plenipotentiary  General  for  the  Allocation  of  Labor. 

**azl»  ha<i  been  Gauleiter  and  Governor  of  Thuringia.  A 
§if rtf : “a  rnde.  a?<Lto Jg O .i1  T W3S’  33  Goebbels  mentioned  in  his 
diary,  one  of  the  dullest  of  the  dull.”  In  the  dock  at  Nuremberg  he  struck 
this  writer  as  being  a complete  nonentity,  the  sort  of  German  who  in  other 
times  nught  have  been  a butcher  in  a small  town  meat  market.  One  of  his 
nrst  directives  laid  it  down  that  the  foreign  workers  were  “to  be  treated  in 
fHcJ>  f.  WV  aS  to  e£xp  oIt  * j?m  to ,fbe  highest  possible  extent  at  the  lowest  con- 
ceivable degree  of  expenditure.”"  He  admitted  at  Nuremberg  that  of  all 
the  millions  of  foreign  workers  “not  even  200,000  came  voluntarily  ” How- 
ST“  aEtJ  u.  tnal  ,he  'ie,n'ed  3,1  responsibility  for  their  ill-treatment.  He  was 

night* ofoctober  *1*^16?  1946.  ^ hanged  “ ““  Nuremberg  jail  03  the 


1237 


r 

I Beginning  of  the  End 

somewhat  for  the  ordeal  that  lay  ahead.  Hunger  lay  ahead 
and  beatings  and  disease  and  exposure  to  the  cold,  in  un- 
heated quarters  and  in  their  thin  rags.  Long  hours  of  labor 
lay  ahead  that  were  limited  only  by  their  ability  to  stand 
on  their  feet. 

The  great  Krupp  works,  makers  of  Germany’s  guns  and 
tanks  and  ammunition,  was  a typical  place  of  employment. 
Krupp  employed  a large  number  of  slave  laborers,  in- 
cluding Russian  prisoners  of  war.  At  one  point  during  the 
war,  six  hundred  Jewish  women  from  the  Buchenwald  con- 
centration camp  were  brought  in  to  work  at  Krupp’s,  being 
“housed”  in  a bombed-out  work  camp  from  which  the 
previous  inmates,  Italian  POWs,  had  been  removed.  Dr. 
Wilhelm  Jaeger,  the  “senior  doctor”  for  Krupp’s  slaves, 
described  in  an  affidavit  at  Nuremberg  what  he  found 
there  when  he  took  over. 

Upon  my  first  visit  I found  these  females  suffering  from 
open  festering  wounds  and  other  diseases.  I was  the  first  doc- 
tor they  had  seen  for  at  least  a fortnight  . . . There  were 
no  medical  supplies  . . . They  had  no  shoes  and  went 
about  in  their  bare  feet  The  sole  clothing  of  each  consisted 
of  a sack  with  holes  for  their  arms  and  head.  Their  hair 
was  shorn.  The  camp  was  surrounded  by  barbed  wire  and 
closely  guarded  by  S.S.  guards. 

The  amount  of  food  in  the  camp  was  extremely  meager 
and  of  very  poor  quality.  One  could  not  enter  the  barracks 
without  being  attacked  by  fleas  ...  I got  large  boils  on  my 
arms  and  the  rest  of  my  body  from  them  . . . 

Dr.  Jaeger  reported  the  situation  to  the  directors  of 
Krupp  and  even  to  the  personal  physician  of  Gustav  Krupp 
von  Bohlen  and  Halbach,  the  owner — but  in  vain.  Nor 
did  his  reports  on  other  Krupp  slave  labor  camps  bring 
any  alleviation.  He  recalled  in  his  affidavit  some  of  these 
reports  of  conditions  in  eight  camps  inhabited  by  Russian 
and  Polish  workers:  overcrowding  that  bred  disease,  lack 
of  enough  food  to  keep  a man  alive,  lack  of  water, 
lack  of  toilets. 

The  clothing  of  the  Eastern  workers  was  likewise  com- 
pletely inadequate.  They  worked  and  slept  in  the  same  cloth- 
ing in  which  they  had  arrived  from  the  East.  Virtually  all  of 
them  had  no  overcoats  and  were  compelled  to  use  their 
blankets  as  coats  in  cold  and  rainy  weather.  In  view  of  the 


1238 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


shortage  of  shoes  many  workers  were  forced  to  go  to  work 
in  their  bare  feet,  even  in  winter  ... 

conditions  were  atrocious.  At  Kramerplatz  only 
ten  childrens  toilets  were  available  for  1,200  inhabitants 
Excret‘on  contaminated  the  entire  floors  of  these  lava- 
tones  . . The  Tartars  and  Kirghiz  suffered  most:  they  col- 

■ lkfC  0168  .ffro™J  bad  housing,  the  poor  quality  and 
Th^c»nt  quaDtlty  °f  food,  overwork  and  insufficient  rest. 
T i^eStK  WOrke”  weJe  ’lkewlse  afflicted  with  spotted  fever. 

*e  carrier  of  the  disease,  together  with  countless 
fleas,  bugs  and  other  vermin  tortured  the  inhabitants  of 
SrS-E  • • A*  hmes  the  water  supply  at  the  camps  was 
shut  off  for  periods  of  from  eight  to  fourteen  days  . . . 

On  the  whole,  Western  slave  workers  fared  better  than 
those  from  the  East — the  latter  being  considered  by  the 
Germans  as  mere  scum.  But  the  difference  was  only  rela- 
tive, as  Dr.  Jaeger  found  at  one  of  Krupp’s  work  camps 
occupied  by  French  prisoners  of  war  in  Nogerratstrasse 
at  .bssen. 

Its  inhabitants  were  kept  for  nearly  half  a year  in  dog 
kennels,  urinals  and  in  old  baking  houses.  The  dog  kennels 
were  three  feet  high,  nine  feet  long,  six  feet  wide.  Five  men 

kennel?  ®aC?,  them‘  Prisoners  had  to  crawl  into  these 
kennels  on  all  fours  . . . There  was  no  water  in  the  camp.*  ™ 

Some  two  and  a half  million  slave  laborers — mostly 
Slavs  and  Italians — were  assigned  to  farm  work  in  Ger- 
many  and  though  their  life  from  the  very  force  of  cir- 

factory  at  the  extermination  camp  at  Auschwitz,  where  Jews  were  worked 

to  exhaustion  and  then  gassed  to  death  J worked 

9,u,stav  KruP.P  Bohlen  und  Halbach,  the  chairman  of  the  board. 

35  a I11;iJ°,r. war  criminal  at  Nuremberg  (along  with  Goerinsr 
2rnk"2  *>gtl,*>jCrUjej0-  ',1S  Physical  and  mental  condition”  (he  had  had  a 

1950  And effort aw«  he  WaS  not  tried-  He  died  °n  January  1 6, 

£ k* jWas  -adje  tlle  Prosecution  to  try  in  his  stead  his  son 

tnWd  d*niedathisaC<1Ulr  6 0WnershiP  of  the  company  in  1943,  but  the 

tion  if  'a  l hthnroWnaeSrtten,^nCed  ‘°  tYeIve.l,!ars  imprisonment  and  confisra- 
° Pr°P.erty-  He  was  released  from  Landsberg  prison  (where 
Hitler  had  served  his  sentence  in  1924)  on  February  4 1951 
amnesty  issued  by  John  T McClov  tt  c tt*  • P'  ’ • • ’ n a general 

was  the  ronfioration  n j ivicc-ioy,  the  U.J5.  High  Commissioner.  Not  only 


1239 


Beginning  of  the  End 

cumstances  was  better  than  that  of  those  in  the  city  factories 
it  was  far  from  ideal — or  even  humane.  A captured 
directive  on  the  “Treatment  of  Foreign  Farm  Workers  of 
Polish  Nationality”  gives  an  inkling  of  their  treatment. 
And  though  applied  to  Poles — it  is  dated  March  6,  1941, 
before  Russians  became  available — it  was  later  used  as 
guidance  for  those  of  other  nationalities. 

Farm  workers  of  Polish  nationality  no  longer  have  the 
right  to  complain,  and  thus  no  complaints  will  be  accepted 
by  any  official  agency  . . . The  visit  of  churches  is  strictly  pro- 
hibited . . . Visits  to  theaters,  motion  pictures  or  other  cul- 
tural entertainment  are  strictly  prohibited  . . . 

Sexual  intercourse  with  women  and  girls  is  strictly  pro- 
hibited. 

If  it  was  with  German  females,  it  was,  according  to 
an  edict  of  Himmler  in  1942,  punishable  by  death.* 

The  use  of  “railroads,  buses  or  other  public  convey- 
ances” was  prohibited  for  slave  farm  workers.  This  ap- 
parently was  ordained  so  that  they  would  not  escape  from 
the  farms  to  which  they  were  bound. 

Arbitrary  change  of  employment  [the  directive  stated]  is 
strictly  prohibited.  The  farm  workers  have  to  labor  as  long 
as  is  demanded  by  the  employer.  There  are  no  time  limits  to 
the  working  time. 

Every  employer  has  the  right  to  give  corporal  punishment 
to  his  farm  workers  . . . They  should,  if  possible,  be  re- 
moved from  the  community  of  the  home  and  they  can  be 
quartered  in  stables,  etc.  No  remorse  whatever  should  re- 
strict such  action.28 

Even  the  Slav  women  seized  and  shipped  to  Germany 
for  domestic  service  were  treated  as  slaves.  As  early  as 
1942  Hitler  had  commanded  Sauckel  to  procure  a half 
million  of  them  “in  order  to  relieve  the  German  house- 
wife.” The  slave  labor  commissar  laid  down  the  condi- 
tions of  work  in  the  German  households. 

* Himmler’s  directive  of  February  20,  1942,  was  directed  especially  against 
Russian  slave  workers.  It  ordered  “special  treatment”  also  for  “severe 
violations  against  discipline,  including  work  refusal  or  loafing  at  work.”  In 
such  cases 

special  treatment  is  requested.  Special  treatment  is  hanging.  It  should  not 

take  place  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  camp.  A certain  number  [how- 
ever] should  attend  the  special  treatment.27 

The  term  “special  treatment”  was  a common  one  in  Himmler’s  files  and 
in  Nazi  parlance  during  the  war.  It  meant  just  what  Himmler  in  this  direc- 
tive said  it  meant. 


1240 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


There  is  no  claim  to  free  time.  Female  domestic  workers 
from  the  East  may  leave  the  household  only  to  take  care 
of  domestic  tasks  ...  It  is  prohibited  for  them  to  enter 
restaurants,  movies,  theaters  and  similar  establishments.  At- 
tending church  is  also  prohibited  . . ,29 

Women,  it  is  obvious,  were  almost  as  necessary  as  men 
in  the  Nazi  slave  labor  program.  Of  some  three  million 
Russian  civilians  pressed  into  service  by  the  Germans, 
more  than  one  half  were  women.  Most  of  them  were 
assigned  to  do  heavy  farm  work  and  to  labor  in  the  fac- 
tories. 

The  enslavement  of  millions  of  men  and  women  of  the 
conquered  lands  as  lowly  toilers  for  the  Third  Reich 
was  not  just  a wartime  measure.  From  the  statements  of 
Hitler,  Goering,  Himmler  and  the  others  already  cited — 
and  they  are  only  a tiny  sampling — it  is  clear  that  if 
Nazi  Germany  had  endured,  the  New  Order  would  have 
meant  the  rule  of  the  German  master  race  over  a vast 
slave  empire  stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Ural 
mountains.  To  be  sure,  the  Slavs  in  the  East  would  have 
fared  the  worst. 

As  Hitler  emphasized  in  July  1941,  scarcely  a month 
after  he  had  attacked  the  Soviet  Union,  his  plans  for  its 
occupation  constituted  “a  final  settlement.”  A year  later, 
at  the  high  tide  of  his  Russian  conquests,  he  admonished 
his  aides: 

As  for  the  ridiculous  hundred  million  Slavs,  we  will  mold 
the  best  of  them  to  the  shape  that  suits  us,  and  we  will 
isolate  the  rest  of  them  in  their  own  pigsties;  and  anyone 
who  talks  about  cherishing  the  local  inhabitant  and  civiliz- 
ing him,  goes  straight  off  to  a concentration  camp! 30 

THE  PRISONERS  OF  WAR 

Though  it  was  a flagrant  violation  of  the  Hague  and 
Geneva  conventions  to  use  prisoners  of  war  in  armament 
factories  or  in  any  labor  connected  with  the  fighting  at 
the  front  such  employment,  massive  as  it  was,  constituted 
the  least  of  worries  for  the  millions  of  soldiers  captured 
by  the  Third  Reich. 

Their  overwhelming  concern  was  to  survive  the  war. 
If  they  were  Russian  the  odds  were  greatly  against  them. 


Beginning  of  the  End  1241 

There  were  more  Soviet  war  prisoners  than  all  others  put 
together — some  five  and  three-quarter  million  of  them. 
Of  these  barely  one  million  were  found  alive  when  Allied 
troops  liberated  the  inmates  of  the  POW  camps  in  1945. 
About  a million  had  either  been  released  during  the  war 
or  allowed  to  serve  in  the  collaborator  units  set  up  by 
the  German  Army.  Two  million  Russian  prisoners  of  war 
died  in  German  captivity — from  starvation,  exposure  and 
disease.  The  remaining  million  have  never  been  accounted 
for  and  at  Nuremberg  a good  case  was  made  that  most 
of  them  either  had  died  from  the  above  causes  or  had 
been  exterminated  by  the  S.D.  (S.S.  Security  Service). 
According  to  the  German  records  67,000  were  executed, 
but  this  is  most  certainly  a partial  figure.31 

The  bulk  of  the  Russian  war  prisoners — some  3,800,000 
of  them — were  taken  by  the  Germans  in  the  first  phase 
of  the  Russian  campaign,  in  the  great  battles  of  encircle- 
ment which  were  fought  from  June  21  to  December  6, 
1941.  Admittedly  it  was  difficult  for  an  army  in  the  midst 
of  combat  and  rapid  advance  to  care  adequately  for  such 
a large  number  of  captives.  But  the  Germans  made  no 
effort  to.  Indeed  the  Nazi  records  show,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  the  Soviet  prisoners  were  deliberately  starved  and 
left  out  in  the  open  without  shelter  to  die  in  the  terrible 
subzero  snowbound  winter  of  1941—42. 

“The  more  of  these  prisoners  who  die,  the  better  it  is 
for  us,”  was  the  attitude  of  many  Nazi  officials  according 
to  no  less  an  authority  than  Rosenberg. 

The  clumsy  Minister  for  the  Occupied  Eastern  Territo- 
ries was  not  a humane  Nazi,  particularly  in  regard  to  the 
Russians,  with  whom,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had  grown  up. 
But  even  he  was  moved  to  protest  the  treatment  of  Rus- 
sian prisoners  in  a long  letter  to  General  Keitel,  the  Chief 
of  OKW,  dated  February  28,  1942.  This  was  the  moment 
when  the  Soviet  counteroffensive  which  had  hurled  the 
Germans  back  before  Moscow  and  Rostov  had  reached 
its  farthest  penetrations  that  winter  and  when  the  Ger- 
mans had  realized  at  last  that  their  gamble  of  destroying 
Russia  in  one  short  campaign — or  perhaps  ever— had  failed 
and  that  just  possibly,  now  that  the  U.S.A.  had  been 
added  to  Russia  and  Britain  as  their  enemies,  they  might 
not  win  the  war,  in  which  case  they  would  be  held  ac- 
countable for  their  war  crimes. 


1242 


*rhe  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  fate  of  the  Soviet  prisoners  of  war  in  Germany 
[Rosenberg  wrote  Keitel]  is  a tragedy  of  the  greatest 
extent.  Of  the  3,600,000  of  them,  only  several  hundred  thou- 
sand are  still  able  to  work  fully.  A large  part  of  them  have 
starved,  or  died  because  of  the  hazards  of  the  weather. 

This  could  have  been  avoided,  Rosenberg  continued. 
There  was  food  enough  in  Russia  to  provide  them. 

However,  in  the  majority  of  cases  the  camp  commanders 
have  forbidden  food  to  be  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  pris- 
oners; they  have  rather  let  them  starve  to  death.  Even  on 
the  march  to  the  camps,  the  civilian  population  was  not 
allowed  to  give  the  prisoners  food.  In  many  cases  when  the 
prisoners  could  no  longer  keep  up  on  the  march  because  of 
hunger  mid  exhaustion,  they  were  shot  before  the  eyes  of 
the  horrified  civilian  population  and  the  corpses  were  left.  In 
numerous  camps  no  shelter  for  the  prisoners  was  provided 
at  all.  They  lay  under  the  open  sky  during  rain  or  snow 
Finally,  the  shooting  of  the  prisoners  of  war  must  be  men- 
tioned. These  . . . ignore  all  political  understanding.  For  in- 
stance, in  various  camps  all  the  “Asiatics”  were  shot  . . .32 

Not  only  Asiatics.  Shortly  after  the  beginning  of  the 
Russian  campaign  an  agreement  was  reached  between 
OKW  and  the  S.S.  Security  Service  for  the  latter  to 
screen”  Russian  prisoners.  The  objective  was  disclosed 
in  an  affidavit  by  Otto  Ohlendorf,  one  of  the  S.D.’s  great 
killers  and  like  so  many  of  the  men  around  Himmler  a 
displaced  intellectual,  for  he  had  university  degrees  both 
in  the  law  and  in  economics  and  had  been  a professor 
at  the  Institute  for  Applied  Economic  Science. 

All  Jews  and  Communist  functionaries  [Ohlendorf  testi- 
fied] were  to  be  removed  from  the  prisoner-of-war  camps 
and  were  to  be  executed.  To  my  knowledge  this  action  was 
carried  out  throughout  the  entire  Russian  campaign.33 

But  not  without  difficulties.  Sometimes  the  Russian  cap- 
tives were  so  exhausted  that  they  could  not  even  walk  to 
them  execution.  This  brought  a protest  from  Heinrich 
Mueller,  the  chief  of  the  Gestapo,  a dapper-looking  fel- 
low but  also  a cold,  dispassionate  killer.* 

The  commanders  of  the  concentration  camps  are  com- 
plaming  that  5 to  10  per  cent  of  the  Soviet  Russians  destined 

* Mueller  was  never  apprehended  after  the  war.  He  was  last  seen  in  Hitler’s 
bunker  in  Berlin  on  April  29,  1945.  Some  of  his  sun-wfng  colleaKues  be 
great  adndrer^  “ servlce  of  the  Soviet  secret  Police,  of  which  he  was* 


1243 


Beginning  of  the  End 

for  execution  are  arriving  in  the  camps  dead  or  half  dead 
...  It  was  particularly  noted  that  when  marching,  for  ex- 
ample, from  the  railroad  station  to  the  camp,  a rather  large 
number  of  prisoners  collapsed  on  the  way  from  exhaustion, 
either  dead  or  half  dead,  and  had  to  be  picked  up  by  a 
truck  following  the  convoy.  It  cannot  be  prevented  that  the 
German  people  take  notice  of  these  occurrences. 

The  Gestapo  didn’t  care  a rap  about  the  Russian  cap- 
tives falling  dead  from  starvation  and  exhaustion,  except 
that  it  robbed  the  executioners  of  their  prey.  But  they 
didn’t  want  the  German  people  to  see  the  spectacle.  “Ges- 
tapo Mueller,”  as  he  was  known  in  Germany,  therefore 
ordered  that 

effective  from  today  [November  9,  1941]  Soviet  Russians 
obviously  marked  by  death  and  who  therefore  are  not  able 
to  withstand  the  exertions  of  even  a short  march  shall  in  the 
future  be  excluded  from  the  transport  into  the  concentration 
camps  for  execution.34 

Dead  prisoners  or  even  starved  and  exhausted  ones 
could  not  perform  work  and  in  1942,  when  it  became 
obvious  to  the  Germans  that  the  war  was  going  to  last 
considerably  longer  than  they  had  expected  and  that  the 
captive  Soviet  soldiers  constituted  a badly  needed  labor 
reservoir,  the  Nazis  abandoned  their  policy  of  extermi- 
nating them  in  favor  of  working  them.  Himmler  explained 
the  change  in  his  speech  to  the  S.S.  at  Posen  in  1943. 

At  that  time  [1941]  we  did  not  value  die  mass  of 
humanity  as  we  value  it  today,  as  raw  material,  as  labor. 
What  after  all,  thinking  in  terms  of  generations,  is  not  to  be 
regretted  but  is  now  deplorable  by  reason  of  the  loss  of 
labor,  is  that  the  prisoners  died  in  tens  and  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  exhaustion  and  hunger.35 

They  were  now  to  be  fed  enough  to  enable  them  to 
work.  By  December  1944,  three  quarters  of  a million  of 
them,  including  many  officers,  were  toiling  in  the  arma- 
ment factories,  the  mines  (where  200,000  were  assigned) 
and  on  the  farms.  Their  treatment  was  harsh,  but  at  least 
they  were  allowed  to  live.  Even  the  branding  of  the  Rus- 
sian war  captives,  which  General  Keitel  had  proposed, 
was  abandoned.* 

* On  July  20,  1942,  Keitel  had  drafted  the  order. 

1.  Soviet  prisoners  of  war  are  to  be  branded  with  a special  and  durable 

mark. 


1244  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  treatment  of  Western  prisoners  of  war,  especially 
of  the  British  and  Americans,  was  comparatively  milder 
than  that  meted  out  by  the  Germans  to  the  Russians. 
There  were  occasional  instances  of  the  murder  and  massa- 
cre of  them  but  this  was  due  usually  to  the  excessive  sad- 
ism and  cruelty  of  individual  commanders.  Such  a case 
was  the  slaughter  in  cold  blood  of  seventy-one  American 
prisoners  of  war  in  a field  near  Malmedy,  Belgium,  on 
December  17,  1944,  during  the  Battle  of  the  Bulge. 

There  were  other  occasions  when  Hitler  himself  ordered 
the  murder  of  Western  prisoners,  as  he  did  in  the  case 
of  fifty  British  flyers  who  were  caught  in  the  spring  of 
1944,  after  escaping  from  a camp  at  Sagan.  At  Nurem- 
berg Goering  said  he  “considered  it  the  most  serious  inci- 
dent of  the  whole  war”  and  General  Jodi  called  it  “sheer 
murder.” 

Actually  it  seemed  to  be  part  of  a deliberate  German 
policy,  adopted  after  Anglo-American  bombing  of  Ger- 
many became  so  extensive  from  1943  on,  to  encourage 
the  killing  of  Allied  airmen  who  had  bailed  out  over 
Germany.  Civilians  were  encouraged  to  lynch  the  flyers 
as  soon  as  they  had  parachuted  to  the  ground  and  a 
number  of  these  Germans  were  tried  after  the  war  for 
having  done  so.  In  1944  when  the  Anglo-American 
bombings  were  reaching  their  peak  Ribbentrop  urged  that 
airmen  shot  down  be  summarily  executed  but  Hitler  took 
a somewhat  milder  view.  On  May  21,  1944,  in  agreement 
with  Goering,  he  merely  ordered  that  captured  flyers  who 
had  machine-gunned  passenger  trains  or  civilians  or  Ger- 
man planes  which  had  made  emergency  landings  be  shot 
without  court-martial. 

Sometimes  captured  flyers  were  simply  turned  over  to 
the  S.D.  for  special  treatment.”  Thus  some  forty-seven 
American,  British  and  Dutch  flyers,  all  officers,  were  bra- 
tally  murdered  at  Mauthausen  concentration  camp  in 
September  1944.  An  eyewitness,  Maurice  Lampe,  a French 
inmate  at  the  camp,  described  at  Nuremberg  how  it  was 
done. 


The  forty-seven  officers  were  led  barefooted  to  the  quarry 
• ■ . At  the  bottom  of  the  steps  the  guards  loaded  stones  on 


2.  The  brand  is  to  consist  of  an  acute  angle  of  about  45  degrees  with  a 

of  S14e>  pointing  downward  on  the  left  buttock,  at 
about  a hand  s width  from  the  rectum.8*  ^ 


1245 


Beginning  of  the  End 

the  backs  of  these  poor  men  and  they  had  to  carry  them  to 
the  top.  The  first  journey  was  made  with  stones  weighing 
about  sixty  pounds  and  accompanied  by  blows  . . . The 
second  journey  the  stones  were  still  heavier,  and  whenever 
the  poor  wretches  sank  under  their  burden  they  were  kicked 
and  hit  with  a bludgeon  ...  in  the  evening  twenty-one 
bodies  were  strewn  along  the  road.  The  twenty-six  others 
died  the  following  morning.37 

This  was  a familiar  form  of  “execution”  a Mauthausen 
and  was  used  on,  among  others,  a good  many  Russian 
prisoners  of  war. 

From  1942  on — that  is,  when  the  tide  of  war  began  to 
surge  against  him — Hitler  ordered  the  extermination  of 
captured  Allied  commandos,  especially  in  the  West 
(Captured  Soviet  partisans  were  summarily  shot  as  a mat- 
ter of  course.)  The  Fuehrer’s  “Top-Secret  Commando 
Order”  of  October  18,  1942,  is  among  the  Nazi  documents. 

From  now  on  all  enemies  on  so-called  commando  mis- 
sions in  Europe  or  Africa  challenged  by  German  troops,  even 
if  they  are  in  uniform,  whether  armed  or  unarmed,  in 
batde  or  in  flight,  are  to  be  slaughtered  to  the  last  man.38 

In  a supplementary  directive  issued  the  same  day  Hit- 
ler explained  to  his  commanders  the  reason  for  his  order. 
Because  of  the  success  of  the  Allied  commandos,  he  said, 

I have  been  compelled  to  issue  strict  orders  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  enemy  sabotage  troops  and  to  declare  noncom- 
pliance with  these  orders  severely  punishable  ...  It  must 
be  made  clear  to  the  enemy  that  all  sabotage  troops  will 
be  exterminated,  without  exception,  to  the  last  man. 

This  means  that  their  chance  of  escaping  with  their  lives 
is  nil  . . . Under  no  circumstances  can  [they]  expect  to  be 
treated  according  to  the  rules  of  the  Geneva  Convention  . . . 
If  it  should  become  necessary  for  reasons  of  interrogation 
to  initially  spare  one  man  or  two,  then  they  are  to  be  shot 
immediately  after  interrogation.38 

This  particular  crime  was  to  be  kept  strictly  secret.  Gen- 
eral Jodi  appended  instructions  to  Hitler’s  directive,  under- 
lining his  words:  “This  order  is  intended  for  commanders 
only  and  must  not  under  any  circumstances  fall  into 
enemy  hands.’’  They  were  directed  to  destroy  all  copies 
of  it  after  they  had  duly  taken  note. 

It  must  have  remained  imprinted  on  their  minds,  for 


1246 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

they  proceeded  to  carry  it  out.  A couple  of  instances,  of 
many,  may  be  given. 

On  the  night  of  March  22,  1944,  two  officers  and  thir- 
teen men  of  the  267th  Special  Reconnaissance  Battalion  of 
the  U.S.  Army  landed  from  a naval  craft  far  behind  the 
German  lines  in  Italy  to  demolish  a railroad  tunnel  be- 
tween La  Spezia  and  Genoa.  They  were  all  in  uniform 
and  carried  no  civilian  clothes.  Captured  two  days  later 
they  were  executed  by  a firing  squad  on  March  26,  without 
trial,  on  the  direct  orders  of  General  Anton  Dostler,  com- 
mander of  the  LXXVth  German  Army  Corps.  Tried  by  a 
U.S.  military  tribunal  shortly  after  the  war,  General  Dost- 
ler justified  his  action  by  contending  that  he  was  merely 
obeying  Hitler’s  Commando  Order.  He  argued  that  he  him, 
self  would  have  been  court-martialed  by  the  Fuehrer  if  he 
had  not  obeyed.* 

Some  fifteen  members  of  an  Anglo-American  military 
mission — including  a war  correspondent  of  the  Associated 
Press,  and  all  in  uniform — which  had  parachuted  into 
Slovakia  in  January  1945  were  executed  at  Mauthausen  con- 
centration camp  on  the  orders  of  Dr.  Ernst  Kaltenbrun- 
ner,  the  successor  of  Heydrich  as  head  of  the  S.D.  and 
one  of  the  defendants  at  Nuremberg,  t Had  it  not  been 
for  the  testimony  of  a camp  adjutant  who  witnessed 
their  execution,  their  murder  might  have  remained  un- 
known, for  most  of  the  files  of  the  mass  executions  at 
this  camp  were  destroyed.40 


NAZI  TERROR  IN  THE  CONQUERED  LANDS 

On  October  22,  1941,  a French  newspaper  Le  Phare 
published  the  following  notice: 

Cowardiy  criminals  in  the  pay  of  England  and  Moscow 
Jr1  v Feldkommandant  of  Nantes  on  the  morning  of 
October  20.  Up  to  now  the  assassins  have  not  been  arrested. 

As  expiation  for  this  crime  I have  ordered  that  50  hos- 
tages be  shot,  to  begin  with  . . . Fifty  more  hostages  will 
be  shot  m case  the  guilty  should  not  be  arrested  between 
now  and  October  23  by  midnight. 

This  became  a familiar  notice  in  the  pages  of  the  news- 
LGmronI0°obtrr12.ai94°5ndemned  *°  d“th  by  the  U‘S'  » 

15-16.ei946nner  WM  hanged  at  Nuremberg  jail  on  the  night  of  October 


1247 


Beginning  of  the  End 

papers  or  on  red  posters  edged  with  black  in  France, 
Belgium,  Holland,  Norway,  Poland  and  Russia.  The  pro- 
portion, publicly  proclaimed  by  the  Germans,  was  invari- 
ably 100  to  1 — a hundred  hostages  shot  for  every  German 
killed. 

Though  the  taking  of  hostages  was  an  ancient  custom, 
much  indulged  in  for  instance  by  the  Romans,  it  had  not 
been  generally  practiced  in  modem  times  except  by  the 
Germans  in  the  First  World  War  and  by  the  British  in 
India  and  in  South  Africa  during  the  Boer  War.  Under 
Hitler,  however,  the  German  Army  carried  it  out  on  a 
large  scale  during  the  second  war.  Dozens  of  secret  or- 
ders signed  by  General  Keitel  and  lesser  commanders 
were  produced  at  Nuremberg  ordering  the  taking — and 
shooting — of  hostages.  “It  is  important,”  Keitel  decreed 
on  October  1,  1941,  “that  these  should  include  well-known 
leading  personalities  or  members  of  their  families”;  and 
General  von  Stuelpnagel,  the  German  commander  in 
France,  a year  later  stressed  that  “the  better  known  the 
hostages  to  be  shot  the  greater  will  be  the  deterrent  effect 
on  the  perpetrators.” 

In  all,  29,660  French  hostages  were  executed  by  the 
Germans  during  the  war  and  this  figure  did  not  include 
the  40,000  who  “died”  in  French  prisons.  The  figure  for 
Poland  was  8,000  and  for  Holland  some  2,000.  In  Denmark 
what  became  known  as  a system  of  “clearing  murders” 
was  substituted  for  the  publicly  proclaimed  shooting 
of  hostages.  On  Hitler’s  express  orders  reprisals  for 
the  killing  of  Germans  in  Denmark  were  to  be  carried 
out  in  secret  “on  the  proportion  of  five  to  one.”  41  Thus 
the  great  Danish  pastor-poet-playwright,  Kaj  Munk,  one 
of  the  most  beloved  men  in  Scandinavia,  was  brutally 
murdered  by  the  Germans,  his  body  left  on  the  road 
with  a sign  pinned  to  it:  “Swine,  you  worked  for  Ger- 
many just  the  same.” 

Of  all  the  war  crimes  which  he  claimed  he  had  to  com- 
mit on  the  orders  of  Hitler  “the  worst  of  all,”  General 
Keitel  said  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg,  stemmed  from 
the  Nacht  und  Nebel  Erlass — “Night  and  Fog  Decree.” 
This  grotesque  order,  reserved  for  the  unfortunate  inhabi- 
tants of  the  conquered  territories  in  the  West,  was  issued 
by  Hitler  himself  on  December  7,  1941.  Its  purpose,  as 


1248 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pie  weird  title  indicates,  was  to  seize  persons  “endanger- 
ing German  security”  who  were  not  to  be  immediately 
executed  and  make  them  vanish  without  a trace  into 
the  night  and  fog  of  the  unknown  in  Germany.  No  in- 
formation was  to  be  given  their  families  as  to  their  fate 
even  when,  as  invariably  occurred,  it  was  merely  a ques- 
tion of  the  place  of  burial  in  the  Reich 

On  December  12,  1941,  Keitel  issued  a directive  ex- 
plaining the  Fuehrer’s  orders.  “In  principle,”  he  said, 
the  punishment  for  offenses  committed  against  the  Ger- 
man state  is  the  death  penalty.”  But 

P“nished  with  imprisonment,  even  with 
hard  labor  for  life,  this  will  be  looked  upon  as  a sign  of 
weakness.  Efficient  intimidation  can  only  be  achieved  either 
Cap#tafu  Pun^sh?lef 4 or  by  measures  by  which  the  rela- 
fat^2°f  ^ cnmmal  and  tire  Population  do  not  know  his 

The  following  February  Keitel  enlarged  on  the  Night 
and  Fog  Decree.  In  cases  where  the  death  penalty  was 
not  meted  out  within  eight  days  of  a person’s  arrest, 

ffie  prisoners  are  to  be  transported  to  Germany  secretly  . . . 
these  measures  will  have  a deterrent  effect  because 
(a)  the  prisoners  will  vanish  without  leaving  a trace 

or  ffieirI1fate4°rmatl0n  maY  156  8iven  **  to  their  whereabouts 

The  S.D.  was  given  charge  of  this  macabre  task  and 

316  fuU  of  various  orders  pertaining  to 
NN  (for  Nacht  und  Nebel ),  especially  in  regard  to  keep- 
ing the  burial  places  of  the  victims  strictly  secret.  How 
many  Western  Europeans  disappeared  into  “Night  and 
Fog  was  never  established  at  Nuremberg  but  it  appeared 
that  few  emerged  from  it  alive. 

Some  enlightening  figures,  however,  were  obtainable 
from  the  S.D.  records  concerning  the  number  of  victims 
of  another  terror  operation  in  conquered  territory  which 
was  applied  to  Russia.  This  particular  exercise  was  carried 
out  by  what  was  known  in  Germany  as  the  Einsatzgruppen 
—Special  Action  Groups,  or  what  might  better  be  termed, 
m view  of  their  performance,  Extermination  Squads.  The 
first  round  figure  of  their  achievement  came  out,  as  if  bv 
accident,  at  Nuremberg.  3 


1249 


Beginning  of  the  End 

One  day  some  time  before  the  trial  began  a young 
American  naval  officer,  Lieutenant  Commander  Whitney 
R.  Harris,  of  the  American  prosecution  staff,  was  inter- 
rogating Otto  Ohlendorf  on  his  wartime  activities.  It 
was  known  that  this  attractive-looking  German  intellectual 
of  youthful  appearance — he  was  38 — had  been  head  of 
Amt  HI  of  Himmler’s  Central  Security  Office  (R.S.H.A.) 
but  during  the  last  years  of  the  war  had  spent  most  of  his 
time  as  a foreign  trade  expert  in  the  Ministry  of  Eco- 
nomics. He  told  his  interrogator  that  apart  from  one 
year  he  had  spent  the  war  period  on  official  duty  in 
Berlin.  Asked  what  he  had  done  during  the  year  away, 
he  replied,  “I  was  chief  of  Einsatzgruppe  D.” 

Harris,  a lawyer  by  training  and  by  this  time  something 
of  an  intelligence  authority  on  German  affairs,  knew  quite 
a bit  about  the  Einsatz  groups.  So  he  asked  promptly: 

“During  the  year  you  were  chief  of  Einsatzgruppe  D, 
how  many  men,  women  and  children  did  your  group 
kill?” 

Ohlendorf,  Harris  later  remembered,  shrugged  his 
shoulders  and  with  only  the  slightest  hesitation  answered: 

“Ninety  thousand!”  44 

The  Einsatz  groups  had  first  been  organized  by  Himm- 
ler and  Heydrich  to  follow  the  German  armies  into  Po- 
land in  1939  and  there  round  up  the  Jews  and  place  them 
in  ghettos.  It  was  not  until  the  beginning  of  the  Russian 
campaign  nearly  two  years  later  that,  in  agreement  with 
the  German  Army,  they  were  ordered  to  follow  the  com- 
bat troops  and  to  carry  out  one  phase  of  the  “final  solu- 
tion.” Four  Einsatzgruppen  were  formed  for  this  purpose, 
Groups  A,  B,  C,  D.  It  was  the  last  one  which  Ohlendorf 
commanded  between  June  1941  and  June  1942,  and  it 
was  assigned  the  southernmost  sector  in  the  Ukraine  and 
attached  to  the  Eleventh  Army.  Asked  on  the  stand  by 
Colonal  John  Harlan  Amen  what  instructions  it  received, 
Ohlendorf  answered: 

“The  instructions  were  that  the  Jews  and  the  Soviet 
political  commissars  were  to  be  liquidated.” 

“And  when  you  say  ‘liquidated,’  do  you  meah  ‘killed’?” 
Amen  asked. 

“Yes,  I mean  killed,”  Ohlendorf  answered,  explaining 
that  this  took  in  the  women  and  children  as  well  as  the 
men. 


1250 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


“For  what  reason  were  the  children  massacred?”  the 
Russian  judge.  General  I.  T.  Nikitchenko,  broke  in  to  ask. 

Ohlendom:  The  order  was  that  the  Jewish  population 
should  be  totally  exterminated. 

The  Judge:  Including  the  children? 

Ohlendorf:  Yes. 

The  Judge:  Were  all  the  Jewish  children  murdered? 
Ohlendorf:  Yes. 


In  response  to  further  questioning  by  Amen  and  in 
his  affidavit,  Ohlendorf  described  how  a typical  killing 
took  place. 

The  Einsatz  unit  would  enter  a village  or  town  and 
order  the  prominent  Jewish  citizens  to  call  together  all  Jews 
for  the  purpose  of  “resettlement.”  ♦ They  were  requested  to 
hand  over  then-  valuables  and  shortly  before  execution  to 
surrender  their  outer  clothing.  They  were  transported  to  the 
place  of  executions,  usually  an  antitank  ditch,  in  trucks— 
always  only  as  many  as  could  be  executed  immediately.  In 
this  way  it  was  attempted  to  keep  the  span  of  time  from  the 
moment  in  which  the  victims  knew  what  was  about  to  hap- 
pen to  them  until  the  time  of  their  actual  execution  as  short 
as  possible. 

Then  they  were  shot,  kneeling  or  standing,  by  firing  squads 
m a military  manner  and  the  corpses  thrown  into  the  ditch. 
I never  permitted  the  shooting  by  individuals,  but  ordered 
that  several  of  the  men  should  shoot  at  the  same  time  in 
order  to  avoid  direct  personal  responsibility.  Other  group 
leaders  demanded  that  the  victims  lie  down  flat  on  the 
ground  to  be  shot  through  the  nape  of  the  neck.  I did  not 
approve  of  these  methods. 

“Why?”  asked  Amen. 

Because,  replied  Ohlendorf,  “both  for  the  victims  and 
for  those  who  carried  out  the  executions,  it  was,  psycho- 
logically, an  immense  burden  to  bear.” 

In  the  spring  of  1942,  Ohlendorf  then  recounted  an 
order  came  from  Himmler  to  change  the  method  of  execu- 
tion of  the  women  and  children,  f Henceforth  they  were 
to  be  dispatched  in  “gas  vans”  specially  constructed  for 
the  purpose  by  two  Berlin  firms.  The  S.D.  officer  de- 
scribed to  the  tribunal  how  these  remarkable  vehicles 
worked. 


* Le.,  they  were  told  they  were  being  resettled  elsewhere. 

T J- here  was  a special  reason  for  this.  See  below,  p.  1229». 


1251 


Beginning  of  the  End 

The  actual  purpose  of  these  vans  could  not  be  seen  from 
the  outside.  They  looked  like  closed  trucks  and  were  so 
constructed  that  at  the  start  of  the  motor  the  gas  [exhaust] 
was  conducted  into  the  van  causing  death  in  ten  to  fifteen 
minutes. 

“How  were  the  victims  induced  to  enter  the  vans?” 
Colonel  Amen  wanted  to  know. 

“They  were  told  they  were  to  be  transported  to  another 
locality,”  Ohlendorf  replied.* 

The  burial  of  the  victims  of  the  gas  vans,  he  went  on 
to  complain,  was  a “great  ordeal”  for  the  members  of  the 
Einsatzgruppen.  This  was  confirmed  by  a certain  Dr. 
Becker,  whom  Ohlendorf  identified  as  the  constructor  of 
the  vans,  in  a document  produced  at  Nuremberg.  In  a let- 
ter to  headquarters  Dr.  Becker  objected  to  German  S.D. 
men  having  to  unload  the  corpses  of  the  gassed  women  and 
children,  calling  attention  to 

the  immense  psychological  injuries  and  damage  to  their 
health  which  that  work  can  have  for  these  men.  They  com- 
plained to  me  about  headaches  which  appeared  after  each 
unloading. 

Dr.  Becker  also  pointed  out  to  his  superiors  that 

the  application  of  gas  usually  is  not  undertaken  correctly. 
In  order  to  come  to  an  end  as  fast  as  possible,  the  driver 
presses  the  accelerator  to  the  fullest  extent.  The  persons  to 
be  executed  suffer  death  from  suffocation  and  not  death  by 
dozing  off,  as  was  planned. 

Dr.  Becker  was  quite  a humanitarian — in  his  own  mind 
— and  ordered  a change  in  technique. 

My  directions  now  have  proved  that  by  correct  adjust- 
ment of  the  levers  death  comes  faster  and  the  prisoners  fall 
asleep  peacefully.  Distorted  faces  and  excretions,  such  as 
could  be  seen  before,  are  no  longer  noticed.46 

But  the  gas  vans,  as  Ohlendorf  testified,  could  dispatch 
only  from  fifteen  to  twenty-five  persons  at  a time,  and 
this  was  entirely  inadequate  for  the  massacres  on  the  scale 
which  Hitler  and  Himmler  had  ordered.  Inadequate,  for 

* Ohlendorf  was  tried  at  Nuremberg  by  a U.S.  military  tribunal  along  with 
twenty-one  others  in  the  “Einsatzgruppen  Case.”  Fourteen  of  them  were 
condemned  to  death.  Only  four,  Ohlendorf  and  three  other  group  com- 
manders, were  executed — on  June  8,  1951,  at  Landsberg  prison,  some  three 
and  a half  years  after  being  sentenced.  The  death  penalties  for  the  others 
were  commuted. 


1252 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

example,  for  the  job  that  was  done  at  Kiev,  the  capital 
of  the  Ukraine,  in  just  two  days,  September  29  and  30, 
1941,  when  according  to  an  official  Einsatz  report  33,771 
persons,  mostly  Jews,  were  “executed.”  46 

An  eyewitness  report  by  a German  of  how  a com- 
paratively minor  mass  execution  was  carried  out  in  the 
Ukraine  brought  a hush  of  horror  over  the  Nuremberg 
courtroom  when  it  was  read  by  the  chief  British  prosecu- 
tor, Sir  Hartley  Shawcross.  It  was  a sworn  affidavit  by 
Herman  Graebe,  the  manager  and  engineer  of  a branch 
office  in  the  Ukraine  of  a German  construction  firm.  On 
October  5,  1942,  he  witnessed  the  Einsatz  commandos, 
supported  by  Ukrainian  militia,  in  action  at  the  execution 
pits  at  Dubno  in  the  Ukraine.  It  was  a matter,  he  re- 
ported, of  liquidating  the  town’s  5,000  Jews. 

• • ■ My  foreman  and  I went  directly  to  the  pits.  I heard 
rifle  shots  in  quick  succession  from  behind  one  of  the 
earth  mounds.  The  people  who  had  got  off  the  trucks — men, 
women  and  children  of  all  ages — had  to  undress  upon  the 
order  of  an  S.S.  man,  who  carried  a riding  or  dog  whip. 
They  had  to  put  down  their  clothes  in  fixed  places,  sorted  ac- 
cording to  shoes,  top  clothing  and  underclothing.  I saw  a 
heap  of  shoes  of  about  800  to  1,000  pairs,  great  piles  of 
under-linen  and  clothing. 

Without  screaming  or  weeping  these  people  undressed, 
stood  around  in  family  groups,  kissed  each  other,  said  fare- 
wells and  waited  for  a sign  from  another  S.S.  man,  who 
stood  near  the  pit,  also  with  a whip  in  his  hand.  During 
the  fifteen  minutes  that  I stood  near  the  pit  I heard  no  com- 
plaint or  plea  for  mercy  . . . 

An  old  woman  with  snow-white  hair  was  holding  a one- 
year-old  child  in  her  arms  and  singing  to  it  and  tickling  it 
The  child  was  cooing  with  delight.  The  parents  were  looking 
on  with  tears  in  their  eyes.  The  father  was  holding  the  hand 
of  a boy  about  10  years  old  and  speaking  to  him  softly;  the 
boy  was  fighting  his  tears.  The  father  pointed  to  the  sky, 
stroked  his  head  and  seemed  to  explain  something  to  him. 

At  that  moment  the  S.S.  man  at  the  pit  shouted  some- 
thing to  his  comrade.  The  latter  counted  off  about  twenty 
persons  and  instructed  them  to  go  behind  the  earth  mound 
...  I well  remember  a girl,  slim  and  with  black  hair,  who, 
as  she  passed  close  to  me,  pointed  to  herself  and  said; 
“twenty-three  years  old.” 

I walked  around  the  mound  and  found  myself  confronted 
by  a tremendous  grave.  People  were  closely  wedged  to- 


1253 


Beginning  of  the  End 

gether  and  lying  on  top  of  each  other  so  that  only  their 
heads  were  visible.  Nearly  all  had  blood  running  over  their 
shoulders  from  their  heads.  Some  of  the  people  were  still 
moving.  Some  were  lifting  their  arms  and  turning  their  heads 
to  show  that  they  were  still  alive.  The  pit  was  already  two- 
thirds  full.  I estimated  that  it  contained  about  a thousand 
people.  I looked  for  the  man  who  did  the  shooting.  He  was 
an  S.S.  man,  who  sat  at  the  edge  of  the  narrow  end  of  the 
pit,  his  feet  dangling  into  the  pit.  He  had  a tommy  gun 
on  his  knees  and  was  smoking  a cigarette. 

The  people,  completely  naked,  went  down  some  steps  and 
clambered  over  the  heads  of  the  people  lying  there  to  the 
place  to  which  the  S.S.  man  directed  them.  They  lay  down 
in  front  of  the  dead  or  wounded  people;  some  caressed 
those  who  were  still  alive  and  spoke  to  them  in  a low  voice. 
Then  I heard  a series  of  shots.  I looked  into  the  pit  and  saw 
that  the  bodies  were  twitching  or  the  heads  lying  already 
motionless  on  top  of  the  bodies  that  lay  beneath  them. 
Blood  was  running  from  their  necks. 

The  next  batch  was  approaching  already.  They  went  down 
into  the  pit,  lined  themselves  up  against  the  previous  victims 
and  were  shot. 

And  so  it  went,  batch  after  batch.  The  next  morning 
the  German  engineer  returned  to  the  site. 

I saw  about  thirty  naked  people  lying  near  the  pit.  Some 
of  them  were  still  alive  . . . Later  the  Jews  still  alive  were 
ordered  to  throw  the  corpses  into  the  pit.  Then  they  them- 
selves had  to  lie  down  in  this  to  be  shot  in  the  neck  . . . 
I swear  before  God  that  this  is  the  absolute  truth.47 

How  many  Jews  and  Russian  Communist  party  function- 
aries (the  former  vastly  outnumbered  the  latter)  were  mas- 
sacred by  the  Einsatzgruppen  in  Russia  before  the  Red 
Army  drove  the  Germans  out?  The  exact  total  could  never 
to  computed  at  Nuremberg  but  Himmler’s  records,  unco- 
ordinated as  they  were,  give  a rough  idea. 

Ohlendorf’s  Einsatzgruppen  D,  with  its  90,000  victims, 
did  not  do  as  well  as  some  of  the  other  groups.  Group 
A,  for  instance,  in  the  north  reported  on  January  31, 
1942,  that  it  had  “executed”  229,052  Jews  in  the  Baltic 
region  and  in  White  Russia.  Its  commander,  Franz  Stah- 
lecker,  reported  to  Himmler  that  he  was  having  difficulty 
in  the  latter  province  because  of  a late  start  “after  the 
heavy  frost  set  in,  which  made  mass  executions  much 
more  difficult.  Nevertheless,”  he  reported,  “41,000  Jews 


1254 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

[in  White  Russia]  have  been  shot  up  to  now.”  Stahlecker, 
who  was  disposed  of  later  in  the  year  by  Soviet  partisans, 
enclosed  with  his  report  a handsome  map  showing  the 
number  of  those  done  to  death — symbolized  by  coffins — 
in  each  area  under  his  command.  In  Lithuania,  alone, 
the  map  showed,  136,421  Jews  had  been  slain;  some 
34,000  had  been  spared  for  the  time  being  “as  they  were 
needed  for  labor.”  Estonia,  which  had  relatively  few  Jews, 
was  declared  in  this  report  to  be  “Jew-free.”  48 

The  Einsatzgruppen  firing  squads,  after  a letup  during 
the  severe  winter,  banged  away  all  through  the  summer 
of  1942.  Some  55,000  more  Jews  were  exterminated  in 
White  Russia  by  July  1,  and  in  October  the  remaining 
16,200  inhabitants  of  the  Minsk  ghetto  were  dispatched 
in  one  day.  By  November  Himmler  could  report  to  Hitler 
that  363,211  Jews  had  been  killed  in  Russia  from  August 
through  October,  though  the  figure  was  probably  some- 
what exaggerated  to  please  the  bloodthirsty  Fuehrer.  49  * 
All  in  all,  according  to  Karl  [Adolf]  Eichmann,  the  head 
of  the  Jewish  Office  of  the  Gestapo,  two  million  persons, 
almost  all  Jews,  were  liquidated  by  the  Einsatzgruppen  in 
the  East.  But  this  is  almost  certainly  an  exaggeration;  it 
is  strange  but  true  that  the  S.S.  bigwigs  were  so  proud  of 
their  exterminations  that  they  often  reported  swollen 
figures  to  please  Himmler  and  Hitler.  Himmler’s  own  stat- 
istician, Dr.  Richard  Korherr,  reported  to  his  chief  on 
March  23,  1943,  that  a total  of  633,300  Jews  in  Russia 
had  been  “resettled” — a euphemism  for  massacre  by  the 
Einsatzgruppen.51  Surprisingly  enough  this  figure  tallies 
fairly  well  with  exhaustive  studies  later  made  by  a num- 
ber of  experts.  Add  another  hundred  thousand  slain  in  the 
last  two  years  of  the  war  and  the  figure  is  probably  as 
accurate  as  we  will  ever  have,  t 

* August  31,  Himmler  had  ordered  an  Einsatz  detachment  to  execute  a 
hundred  inmates  of  the  Minsk  prison,  so  that  he  could  see  how  it  was  done. 
According  to  Bach-Zalewski,  a high  officer  in  the  S.S.  who  was  present, 
Himmler  almost  swooned  when  he  saw  the  effect  of  the  first  volley  from  the 
firing  squad.  A few  minutes  later,  when  the  shots  failed  to  kill  two  Jewish 
women  outright,  the  S.S.  Fuehrer  became  hysterical.  One  result  of  this 
experience  was  an  order  from  Himmler  that  henceforth  the  women  and 
children  should  not  be  shot  but  dispatched  in  the  gas  vans.60  (See  above, 
p.  1250.) 

T The  number  of  Soviet  Communist  party  functionaries  slain  by  the  Einsatz- 
gruppen has  never  even  been  estimated,  as  far  as  I know.  Most  S.D.  reports 
lumped  them  together  with  the  Jews.  In  one  report  of  Group  A,  dated 
October  15,  1941,  some  3,387  “Communists”  are  listed  among  the  121,817 
executed,  the  rest  being  Jews.  But  the  same  report  often  lists  the  two  together. 


Beginning  of  the  End 


1255 


High  as  it  is,  it  is  small  compared  to  the  number  of 
Jews  who  were  done  to  death  in  Himmler’s  extermination 
camps  when  the  “final  solution”  came  to  be  carried  out. 


THE  “FINAL  SOLUTION” 

One  fine  June  day  of  1946  at  Nuremberg  three  members 
of  the  American  prosecution  staff  were  interrogating  S.S. 
Obergruppenfuehrer  Oswald  Pohl,  who,  among  other 
things,  had  been  in  charge  of  work  projects  for  the  in- 
mates of  the  Nazi  concentration  camps.  Pohl,  a naval  of- 
ficer before  he  joined  the  S.S.,  had  gone  into  hiding  after 
the  German  collapse  and  had  not  been  apprehended  until 
a year  later — in  May  1946 — when  he  was  discovered  work- 
ing on  a farm  disguised  as  a farmhand.* 

In  answer  to  one  question  Pohl  used  a term  with  which 
the  Nuremberg  prosecution,  busy  for  months  in  poring  over 
millions  of  words  from  the  captured  documents,  had  begun 
to  become  familiar.  A certain  colleague  by  the  name  of 
Hoess  had,  Pohl  said,  been  employed  by  Himmler  “in  the 
final  solution  of  the  Jewish  question.” 

“And  what  was  that?”  Pohl  was  asked. 

“The  extermination  of  Jewry,”  he  answered. 

The  expression  crept  with  increasing  frequency  into  the 
vocabulary  and  the  files  of  the  leading  Nazis  as  the  war 
progressed,  its  seeming  innocence  apparently  sparing  these 
men  the  pain  of  reminding  one  another  what  it  meant 
and  perhaps  too,  they  may  have  thought,  furnishing  a cer- 
tain cover  for  their  guilt  should  the  incriminating  papers 
ever  come  to  light.  Indeed  at  the  Nuremberg  trials  most  of 
the  Nazi  chiefs  denied  that  they  knew  what  it  signified, 
and  Goering  contended  he  had  never  used  the  term,  but 
this  pretense  was  soon  exploded.  In  the  case  against  the 
fat  Reich  Marshal  a directive  was  produced  which  he  had 
sent  Heydrich,  the  chief  of  the  S.D.,  on  July  31,  1941, 
when  the  Einsatzgruppen  were  already  falling  with  gusto 
to  their  extermination  tasks  in  Russia. 

I herewith  commission  you  [Goering  instructed  Heydrich] 
to  carry  out  all  preparations  with  regard  to  ...  a total  solu- 
tion of  the  Jewish  question  in  those  territories  of  Europe 
which  are  under  German  influence  . . . 


* Pohl  was  condemned  to  death  in  the  so-called  “Concentration  Camp  Case” 
by  a U.S.  military  tribunal  on  November  3,  1947,  and  hanged  in  Landsbere 
prison  in  June  8,  1951,  along  with  Ohlendorf  and  others. 


1256  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

I furthermore  charge  you  to  submit  to  me  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible a draft  showing  the  . . . measures  already  taken  for 
the  execution  of  the  intended  final  solution  of  the  Jewish 
question.*  52 

Heydrich  knew  very  well  what  Goering  meant  by  the 
term  for  he  had  used  it  himself  nearly  a year  before  at 
a secret  meeting  after  the  fall  of  Poland,  in  which  he 
had  outlined  “the  first  step  in  the  final  solution,”  which 
consisted  of  concentrating  all  the  Jews  in  the  ghettos  of 
the  large  cities,  where  it  would  be  easy  to  dispatch  them 
to  their  final  fate.f 

As  it  worked  out,  the  “final  solution”  was  what  Adolf 
Hitler  had  long  had  in  mind  and  what  he  had  publicly 
proclaimed  even  before  the  war  started.  In  his  speech  to 
the  Reichstag  on  January  30,  1939,  he  had  said: 

If  the  international  Jewish  financiers  . . . should  again 
succeed  m plunging  the  nations  into  a world  war  the  result 
will  be  , , . the  annihilation  of  the  Jewish  race  throughout 
Europe. 

This  was  a prophecy,  he  said,  and  he  repeated  it  five 
times,  verbatim,  in  subsequent  public  utterances.  It  made 
no  difference  that  not  the  “international  Jewish  financiers” 
but  he  himself  plunged  the  world  into  armed  conflict.  What 
mattered  to  Hitler  was  that  there  was  now  a world  war 
and  that  it  afforded  him,  after  he  had  conquered  vast 
regions  in  the  East  where  most  of  Europe’s  Jews  lived,  the 
opportunity  to  carry  out  their  “annihilation.”  By  the  time 
the  invasion  of  Russia  began,  he  had  given  the  necessary 
orders. 

What  became  known  in  high  Nazi  circles  as  the  “Fueh- 
rer Order  on  the  Final  Solution”  apparently  was  never 
committed  to  paper — at  least  no  copy  of  it  has  yet  been 
unearthed  in  the  captured  Nazi  documents.  All  the  evi- 
dence shows  that  it  was  most  probably  given  verbally  to 
Goering,  Himmler  and  Heydrich,  who  passed  it  down  dur- 
ing the  summer  and  fall  of  1941.  A number  of  witnesses 
testified  at  Nuremberg  that  they  had  “heard”  of  it  but 

* The  emphasis  is  this  writer’s.  A faulty  translation  of  the  last  line,  render- 
tng  the  Oerman  word  Endloesung  as  “desired  solution”  instead  of  “final 
solution  in  the  English  copy  of  the  document,  led  Justice  Jackson,  who  did 
not  know  German,  to  allow  Goering  under  cross-examination  to  get  away 
with  his  contention  that  he  never  used  the  sinister  term.  (See  n.  54.)  “The 
hrst  time  I learned  of  these  terrible  exterminations,”  Goering  exclaimed  at 
one  point,  was  right  here  in  Nuremberg.” 
t See  above,  p.  874. 


1257 


Beginning  of  the  End 

none  admitted  ever  seeing  it.  Thus  Hans  Lammers,  the 
bullheaded  chief  of  the  Reich  Chancellery,  when  pressed 
on  the  witness  stand  replied: 

I knew  that  a Fuehrer  order  was  transmitted  by  Goering 
to  Heydrich  . . . This  order  was  called  “Final  Solution  of 
the  Jewish  Problem.”  53 

But  Lammers  claimed,  as  did  so  many  others  on  the 
stand,  that  he  did  not  really  know  what  it  was  all  about 
until  Allied  counsel  revealed  it  at  Nuremberg.* 

By  the  beginning  of  1942  the  time  had  come,  as  Hey- 
drich said,  “to  clear  up  the  fundamental  problems”  of 
the  “final  solution”  so  that  it  could  at  last  be  carried  out 
and  concluded.  For  this  purpose  Heydrich  convened  a 
meeting  of  representatives  of  the  various  ministries  and 
agencies  of  the  S.S.-S.D.  at  the  pleasant  Berlin  suburb  of 
Wannsee  on  January  20,  1942,  the  minutes  of  which  play 
an  important  part  in  some  of  the  later  Nuremberg  trials.54 
Despite  the  current  setback  of  the  Wehrmacht  in  Russia 
the  Nazi  officials  believed  that  the  war  was  almost  won 
and  that  Germany  would  shortly  be  ruling  all  of  Europe, 
including  England  and  Ireland.  Therefore,  Heydrich  told 
the  assembly  of  some  fifteen  high  officials,  “in  the  course 
of  this  Final  Solution  of  the  European  Jewish  problem, 
approximately  eleven  million  Jews  are  involved.”  He  then 
rattled  off  the  figures  for  each  country.  There  were  only 
131,800  Jews  left  in  the  original  Reich  territory  (out  of  a 
quarter  of  a million  in  1939),  but  in  the  U.S.S.R.,  he 
said,  there  were  five  million,  in  the  Ukraine  three  million, 
in  the  General  Government  of  Poland  two  and  a quarter 
million,  in  France  three  quarters  of  a million  and  in  Eng- 
land a third  of  a million.  The  clear  implication  was  that 
all  eleven  million  must  be  exterminated.  He  then  ex- 
plained how  this  considerable  task  was  to  be  carried  out. 

* Lammers  was  sentenced  in  April  1949  to  twenty  years’  imprisonment  by 
a U.S.  military  tribunal  at  Nuremberg,  chiefly  because  of  his  responsibility 
in  the  anti-Jewish  decrees.  But  as  in  the  case  of  most  of  the  other  convicted 
Nazis  whose  sentences  were  greatly  reduced  by  the  American  authorities, 
his  term  was  commuted  in  1951  to  ten  years  and  he  was  released  from 
Landsberg  prison  at  the  end  of  that  year,  after  serving  a total  of  six  years 
from  the  date  of  his  first  imprisonment.  It  might  be  noted  here  that  most 
Germans,  at  least  so  far  as  their  sentiment  was  represented  in  the  West 
German  parliament,  did  not  approve  of  even  the  relatively  mild  sentences 
meted  out  to  Hitler’s  accomplices.  A number  of  them  handed  over  by  the 
Allies  to  German  custody  were  not  even  prosecuted — even  when  they  were 
accused  of  mass  murder — and  some  of  them  quickly  found  employment  in 
the  Bonn  government. 


1258  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  Jews  should  now  in  the  course  of  the  Final  Solu- 
tion be  brought  to  the  East  . . . for  use  as  labor.  In  big 
labor  gangs,  with  separation  of  sexes,  the  Jews  capable  of 
work  are  brought  to  these  areas  and  employed  in  road  build- 
ing, in  which  task  undoubtedly  a great  part  will  fall  through 
natural  diminution. 

The  remnant  that  finally  is  able  to  survive  all  this 

since  this  is  undoubtedly  the  part  with  the  strongest  resist- 
ance—must  be  treated  accordingly,  since  these  people,  rep- 
resenting a natural  selection,  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  germ 
cell  of  a new  Jewish  development. 

In  other  words,  the  Jews  of  Europe  were  first  to  be 
transported  to  the  conquered  East,  then  worked  to  death, 
and  the  few  tough  ones  who  survived  simply  put  to  death. 
And  the  Jews — the  millions  of  them — who  resided  in  the 
East  and  were  already  on  hand?  State  Secretary  Dr.  Josef 
Buehler,  representing  the  Governor  General  of  Poland, 
had  a ready  suggestion  for  them.  There  were  nearly  two 
and  a half  million  Jews  in  Poland,  he  said,  who  “con- 
stituted a great  danger.”  They  were,  he  explained,  “bearers 
of  disease,  black-market  operators  and  furthermore  unfit 
for  work.”  There  was  no  transportation  problem  with  these 
two  and  a half  million  souls.  They  were  already  there. 

I have  only  one  request  [Dr.  Buehler  concluded],  that 
the  Jewish  problem  in  my  territory  be  solved  as  quickly  as 
possible. 

The  good  State  Secretary  betrayed  an  impatience  which 
was  shared  in  high  Nazi  circles  right  up  to  Hitler.  None  of 
them  understood  at  this  time — not,  in  fact,  until  toward 
the  end  of  1942,  when  it  was  too  late — how  valuable  the 
millions  of  Jews  might  be  to  the  Reich  as  slave  labor.  At 
this  point  they  only  understood  that  working  millions  of 
Jews  to  death  on  the  roads  of  Russia  might  take  some 
time.  Consequently  long  before  these  unfortunate  people 
could  be  worked  to  death — in  most  cases  the  attempt  was 
not  eyen  begun — Hitler  and  Himmler  decided  to  dispatch 
them  by  quicker  means. 

There  were  two — principally.  One  of  them,  as  we  have 
seen,  had  begun  shortly  after  the  invasion  of  Russia  in 
the  summer  of  1941.  This  was  the  method  of  mass 
slaughter  of  the  Polish  and  Russian  Jews  by  the  flying 
firing  squads  of  the  Einsatzgruppen,  which  accounted  for 
some  three  quarters  of  a million. 


1259 


Beginning  of  the  End 

It  was  this  method  of  achieving  the  “final  solution” 
that  Himmler  had  in  mind  when  he  addressed  the  S.S. 
generals  at  Posen  on  October  4,  1943. 

...  I also  want  to  talk  to  you  quite  frankly  on  a very 
grave  matter.  Among  ourselves  it  should  be  mentioned 
quite  frankly,  and  yet  we  will  never  speak  of  it  publicly  . . . 

I mean  ...  the  extermination  of  the  Jewish  race  . . . 
Most  of  you  must  know  what  it  means  when  100  corpses 
are  lying  side  by  side,  or  500,  or  1,000.  To  have  stuck  it  out 
and  at  the  same  time — apart  from  exceptions  caused  by  hu- 
man weakness — to  have  remained  decent  fellows,  that  is 
what  has  made  us  hard.  This  is  a page  of  glory  in  our  his- 
tory which  has  never  been  written  and  is  never  to  be 
written  . . ,B5 

No  doubt  the  bespectacled  S.S.  Fuehrer,  who  had  al- 
most fainted  at  the  sight  of  a hundred  Eastern  Jews, 
including  women,  being  executed  for  his  own  delectation, 
would  have  seen  in  the  efficient  working  by  S.S.  officers 
of  the  gas  chambers  in  the  extermination  camps  an  even 
more  glorious  page  in  German  history.  For  it  was  in  these 
death  camps  that  the  “final  solution”  achieved  its  most 
ghastly  success. 

THE  EXTERMINATION  CAMPS 

All  the  thirty  odd  principal  Nazi  concentration  camps 
were  death  camps  and  millions  of  tortured,  starved  in- 
mates perished  in  them.*  Though  the  authorities  kept  rec- 
ords— each  camp  had  its  official  Totenbuch  (death  book) 
— they  were  incomplete  and  in  many  cases  were  destroyed 
as  the  victorious  Allies  closed  in.  Part  of  one  Totenbuch 
that  survived  at  Mauthausen  listed  35,318  deaths  from 
January  1939  to  April  1945. t At  the  end  of  1942  when 
the  need  of  slave  labor  began  to  be  acute,  Himmler  or- 
dered that  the  death  rate  in  the  concentration  camps  “must 
be  reduced.”  Because  of  the  labor  shortage  he  had  been 
displeased  at  a report  received  in  his  office  that  of  the 
136,700  commitments  to  concentration  camps  between 
June  and  November  1942,  some  70,610  had  died  and  that 
in  addition  9,267  had  been  executed  and  27,846  “trans- 

* Kogon  estimates  the  number  at  7,125,000  out  of  a total  of  7,820,000  in- 
mates, but  the  figure  undoubtedly  is  too  high.  (Kogon,  The  Theory  and 
Practice  of  Hell,  p.  227.) 

t The  camp  commander,  Franz  Ziereis,  put  the  total  number  at  65,000.M 


1260 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ferred.”  67  To  the  gas  chamber,  that  is.  This  did  not  leave 
very  many  for  labor  duties. 

But  it  was  in  the  extermination  camps,  the  Vemicht- 
ungslager,  where  most  progress  was  made  toward  the 
“final  solution.”  The  greatest  and  most  renowned  of  these 
was  Auschwitz,  whose  four  huge  gas  chambers  and  ad- 
joining crematoria  gave  it  a capacity  for  death  and  burial 
far  beyond  that  of  die  others— Treblinka,  Belsec,  Sibibor 
and  Chelmno,  all  in  Poland.  There  were  other  minor 
extermination  camps  near  Riga,  Vilna,  Minsk,  Kaunas 
and  Lwow,  but  they  were  distinguished  from  the  main 
ones  in  that  they  killed  by  shooting  rather  than  by  gas. 

For  a time  there  was  quite  a bit  of  rivalry  among  the 
S.S.  leaders  as  to  which  was  the  most  efficient  gas  to 
speed  the  Jews  to  their  death.  Speed  was  an  important 
factor,  especially  at  Auschwitz,  where  toward  the  end  the 
camp  was  setting  new  records  by  gassing  6,000  victims  a 
day.  One  of  the  camp’s  commanders  for  a period  was 
Rudolf  Hoess,  an  ex-convict  once  found  guilty  of  murder, 
who  deposed  at  Nuremberg  on  the  superiority  of  the  gas 
he  employed.  * 

The  Final  Solution”  of  the  Jewish  question  meant  the 
complete  extermination  of  all  Jews  in  Europe.  I was  or- 
dered to  establish  extermination  facilities  at  Auschwitz  in 
June  1941.  At  that  time  there  were  already  in  the  General 
Government  of  Poland  three  other  extermination  camps: 
Belzec,  Treblinka  and  Wolzek  . . . 

I visited  Treblinka  to  find  out  how  they  carried  out  their 
extermination.  The  camp  commandant  at  Treblinka  told  me 
that  he  had  liquidated  80,000  in  the  course  of  half  a year. 
He  was  principally  concerned  with  liquidating  all  the  Jews 
from  the  Warsaw  ghetto.t 

* Bora  in  1900,  the  son  of  a small  shopkeeper  in  Baden-Baden,  Hoess  was 
pressured  by  his  pious  Catholic  father  to  become  a priest.  Instead  he  joined 
the  Nazi  Party  in  1922.  The  next  year  he  was  implicated  in  the  murder  of 
a school  teacher  who  allegedly  had  denounced  Leo  Schlageter,  a German 
saboteur  in  the  Ruhr  who  was  executed  by  the  French  and  became  a Nazi 
martyr.  Hoess  received  a life  sentence. 

He  was  released  in  a general  amnesty  in  1928,  joining  the  S.S.  two  years 
later  and  in  1934  became  a member  of  the  Death’s  Head  group  of  the  S.S. 
whose  principal  job  was  the  guarding  of  the  concentration  camps.  His  first 
job  in  this  unit  was  at  Dachau.  Thus  he  spent  almost  his  entire  adult  life 
a prisoner  and  then  as  a jailer.  He  freely — and  even  exaggeratedly — 
testified  to  his  killings  both  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  and  in  affidavits  for 
the  prosecution.  Turned  over  later  to  the  Poles,  he  was  sentenced  to  death 
and  in  March  1947  hanged  at  Auschwitz,  the  scene  of  his  greatest  crimes. 

T A task  which  because  of  the  large  numbers  involved  and  because  of  at 
the  end,  armed  resistance,  could  not  be  completed  (as  we  shall  see)  until 


1261 


Beginning  of  the  End 

He  used  monoxide  gas  and  I did  not  think  that  his  meth- 
ods were  very  efficient.  So  when  I set  up  the  extermination 
building  at  Auschwitz,  I used  Zyklon  B,  which  was  a 
crystallized  prussic  acid  which  we  dropped  into  the  death 
chamber  from  a small  opening.  It  took  from  three  to  fifteen 
minutes  to  kill  the  people  in  the  death  chamber,  depending 
upon  climatic  conditions. 

We  knew  when  the  people  were  dead  because  their 
screaming  stopped.  We  usually  waited  about  a half  hour  be- 
fore we  opened  the  doors  and  removed  the  bodies.  After  the 
bodies  were  removed  our  special  commandos  took  off  the 
rings  and  extracted  the  gold  from  the  teeth  of  the  corpses. 

Another  improvement  we  made  over  Treblinka  was  that 
we  built  our  gas  chambers  to  accommodate  2,000  people  at 
one  time,  whereas  at  Treblinka  their  ten  gas  chambers  only 
accommodated  200  people  each. 

Hoess  then  explained  how  the  victims  were  “selected” 
for  the  gas  chambers,  since  not  all  the  incoming  prisoners 
were  done  away  with — at  least  not  at  once,  because  some 
of  them  were  needed  to  labor  in  the  I.  G.  Farben  chemical 
works  and  Krupp’s  factory  until  they  became  exhausted 
and  were  ready  for  the  “final  solution.” 

We  had  two  S.S.  doctors  on  duty  at  Auschwitz  to  examine 
the  incoming  transports  of  prisoners.  These  would  be 
marched  by  one  of  the  doctors,  who  would  make  spot  de- 
cisions as  they  walked  by.  Those  who  were  fit  to  work  were 
sent  into  the  camp.  Others  were  sent  immediately  to  the  ex- 
termination plants.  Children  of  tender  years  were  invariably 
exterminated  since  by  reason  of  their  youth  they  were  un- 
able to  work. 

Always  Herr  Hoess  kept  making  improvements  in  the 
art  of  mass  killing. 

Still  another  improvement  we  made  over  Treblinka  was 
that  at  Treblinka  the  victims  almost  always  knew  that  they 
were  to  be  exterminated,  while  at  Auschwitz  we  endeavored 
to  fool  the  victims  into  thinking  that  they  were  to  go 
through  a delousing  process.  Of  course,  frequently  they  real- 
ized our  true  intentions  and  we  sometimes  had  riots  and 
difficulties.  Very  frequently  women  would  hide  their  children 
under  the  clothes  but  of  course  when  we  found  them  we 
would  send  the  children  in  to  be  exterminated. 

We  were  required  to  carry  out  these  exterminations  in 
secrecy,  but  of  course  the  foul  and  nauseating  stench  from 
the  continuous  burning  of  bodies  permeated  the  entire  area 


1262 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


and  all  of  the  people  living  in  the  surrounding  communi- 
ties knew  that  exterminations  were  going  on  at  Auschwitz. 

Sometimes,  Hoess  explained,  a few  “special  prisoners” — 
apparently  Russian  prisoners  of  war — were  simply  killed 
by  mjections  of  benzine.  “Our  doctors,”  he  added,  “had 
orders  to  write  ordinary  death  certificates  and  could  put 
down  any  reason  at  all  for  the  cause  of  death.*  68 

To  Hoess’s  blunt  description  may  be  added  a brief 
composite  picture  of  death  and  disposal  at  Auschwitz  as 
testified  to  by  surviving  inmates  and  jailers.  The  “selec- 
tion,” which  decided  which  Jews  were  to  be  worked  and 
which  ones  immediately  gassed,  took  place  at  the  railroad 
siding  as  soon  as  the  victims  had  been  unloaded  from  the 
freight  cars  in  which  they  had  been  locked  without  food 
or  water  for  as  much  as  a week — for  many  came  from 
such  distant  parts  as  France,  Holland  and  Greece.  Though 
there  were  heart-rending  scenes  as  wives  were  tom  away 
from  husbands  and  children  from  parents,  none  of  the 
captives,  as  Hoess  testified  and  survivors  agree,  realized 
just  what  was  in  store  for  them.  In  fact  some  of  them 
were  given  pretty  picture  postcards  marked  “Waldsee” 
to  be  signed  and  sent  back  home  to  their  relatives  with  a 
printed  inscription  saying: 

We  are  doing  very  well  here.  We  have  work  and  we  are 
well  treated.  We  await  your  arrival. 

The  gas  chambers  themselves  and  the  adjoining  cre- 
matoria, viewed  from  a short  distance,  were  not  sinister- 
looking  places  at  all;  it  was  impossible  to  malm  them  out 
for  what  they  were.  Over  them  were  well-kept  lawns  with 
flower  borders;  the  signs  at  the  entrances  merely  said 
baths.  The  unsuspecting  Jews  thought  they  were  simply 
being  taken  to  the  baths  for  the  delousing  which  was 
customary  at  all  camps.  And  taken  to  the  accompaniment 
of  sweet  music! 

For  there  was  light  music.  An  orchestra  of  “young  and 
pretty  girls  all  dressed  in  white  blouses  and  navy-blue 


t Usuai'y  “heart  disease”  was  written  down.  Kogon,  himself  in  Buchenwald 
for  eight  years,  gives  samples:  “.  . . Patient  died  after  prolonged  suffering 

• .7,  / Tr — 0 c'9£r,  ~?,use  death:  cardiac  weakness  complicated 

by  pneumonia'.  (Kogon,  The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Hell,  p 218  ) Such 
Wfure  dispensed  with  at  Auschwitz  when  the  massive  gassings 
began.  Often  the  day  s dead  were  not  even  counted.  K K 


Beginning  of  the  End  1263 

skirts,”  as  one  survivor  remembered,  had  been  formed 
from  among  the  inmates.  While  the  selection  was  being 
made  for  the  gas  chambers  this  unique  musical  ensemble 
played  gay  tunes  from  The  Merry  Widow  and  Tales  of 
Hoffmann.  Nothing  solemn  and  somber  from  Beethoven. 
The  death  marches  at  Auschwitz  were  sprightly  and  merry 
tunes,  straight  out  of  Viennese  and  Parisian  operetta. 

To  such  music,  recalling  as  it  did  happier  and  more 
frivolous  times,  the  men,  women  and  children  were  led 
into  the  “bath  houses,”  where  they  were  told  to  undress 
preparatory  to  taking  a “shower.”  Sometimes  they  were 
even  given  towels.  Once  they  were  inside  the  “shower- 
room” — and  perhaps  this  was  the  first  moment  that  they 
may  have  suspected  something  was  amiss,  for  as  many  as 
two  thousand  of  them  were  packed  into  the  chamber  like 
sardines,  making  it  difficult  to  take  a bath — the  massive 
door  was  slid  shut,  locked  and  hermetically  sealed.  Up 
above  where  the  well-groomed  lawn  and  flower  beds  al- 
most concealed  the  mushroom-shaped  lids  of  vents  that 
ran  up  from  the  hall  of  death,  orderlies  stood  ready  to 
drop  into  them  the  amethyst-blue  crystals  of  hydrogen 
cyanide,  or  Zyklon  B,  which  originally  had  been  com- 
mercially manufactured  as  a strong  disinfectant  and  for 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  Herr  Hoess  had  with  so  much 
pride  found  a new  use. 

Surviving  prisoners  watching  from  blocks  nearby  re- 
membered how  for  a time  the  signal  for  the  orderlies  to 
pour  the  crystals  down  the  vents  was  given  by  a Sergeant 
Moll.  “Na,  gib  ihnen  schon  zu  fressen”  (“All  right,  give 
’em  something  to  chew  on”),  he  would  laugh  and  the 
crystals  would  be  poured  through  the  openings,  which  were 
then  sealed. 

Through  heavy-glass  portholes  the  executioners  could 
watch  what  happened.  The  naked  prisoners  below  would 
be  looking  up  at  the  showers  from  which  no  water  spouted 
or  perhaps  at  the  floor  wondering  why  there  were  no 
drains.  It  took  some  moments  for  the  gas  to  have  much 
effect.  But  soon  the  inmates  became  aware  that  it  was 
issuing  from  the  perforations  in  the  vents.  It  was  then  that 
they  usually  panicked,  crowding  away  from  the  pipes  and 
finally  stampeding  toward  the  huge  metal  door  where,  as 
Reitlinger  puts  it,  “they  piled  up  in  one  blue  clammy 


1264  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


blood-spattered  pyramid,  clawing  and  mauling  each  other 
even  in  death.” 

Twenty  or  thirty  minutes  later  when  the  huge  mass  of 
naked  flesh  had  ceased  to  writhe,  pumps  drew  out  the 
poisonous  air,  the  large  door  was  opened  and  the  men  of 
tile  Sonderkommando  took  over.  These  were  Jewish  male 
inmates  who  were  promised  their  lives  and  adequate  food 
in  return  for  performing  the  most  ghastly  job  of  all.* 
Protected  with  gas  masks  and  rubber  boots  and  wielding 
hoses  they  went  to  work.  Reitlinger  has  described  it. 

Their  first  task  was  to  remove  the  blood  and  defecations 
before  dragging  the  clawing  dead  apart  with  nooses  and 
hooks,  the  prelude  to  the  ghastly  search  for  gold  and  the 
removal  of  teeth  and  hair  which  were  regarded  by  the  Ger- 
mans as  strategic  materials.  Then  the  journey  by  lift  or  rail- 
wagon  to  the  furnaces,  the  mill  that  ground  the  clinker  to 
fine  ash,  and  the  truck  that  scattered  the  ashes  in  the  stream 
of  the  Sola.f 

There  had  been,  the  records  show,  some  lively  com- 
petition among  German  businessmen  to  procure  orders 
for  building  these  death  and  disposal  contraptions  and  for 
furnishing  the  lethal  blue  crystals.  The  firm  of  I.A.  Topf 
and  Sons  of  Erfurt,  manufacturers  of  heating  equipment, 
won  out  in  its  bid  for  the  crematoria  at  Auschwitz.  The 
story  of  its  business  enterprise  was  revealed  in  a volumi- 
nous correspondence  found  in  the  records  of  the  camp. 
A letter  from  the  firm  dated  February  12,  1943,  gives  the 
tenor. 

To  the  Central  Construction  Office  of  the  S.S.  and 
Police,  Auschwitz: 

Subject.  Crematoria  2 and  3 for  the  camp. 

We  acknowledged  receipt  of  your  order  for  five  triple 
furnaces,  including  two  electric  elevators  for  raising  the 
corpses  and  one  emergency  elevator.  A practical  installa- 
tion for  stoking  coal  was  also  ordered  and  one  for  trans- 
porting ashes.60 


The  correspondence  of  two  other  firms  engaged  in  the 

!J|heyjTere  in6vi'ably  and  regularly  dispatched  in  the  gas  chambers  and 
^Pi^ivoLntoWteliataleSW  COntinUed  t0  meet  the  same  fat0-  The  S.S.  wanted 

timehsersolda:f<,twTny  n "“W Nuernberg  ‘rials  that  the  ashes  were  some- 
b fertilizer.  One  Danzig  firm,  according  to  a document  offered 

mnJir ^usslar*  prosecution,  constructed  an  electrically  heated  tank  for 
Stk  fn  homan  fat;.Its  “recipe”  called  for  ‘‘12  pounds  of  human 

iS?  'quarts  of  water,  and  8 ounces  to  a pound  of  caustic  soda  all 
boiled  for  two  or  three  hours  and  then  cooled.”  59  . . . au 


1265 


Beginning  of  the  End 

crematorium  business  popped  up  at  the  Nuremberg  trials. 
The  disposal  of  corpses  at  a number  of  Nazi  camps  had 
attracted  commercial  competition.  One  of  the  oldest  German 
companies  in  the  field  offered  its  drawings  for  crematoria  to 
be  built  at  a large  S.S.  camp  in  Belgrade.  Thus  another 
important  industrial  firm  bid  for  orders  for  a furnace  at  a 
Nazi  camp  at  Belgrade,  claiming  it  could  furnish  a very 
superior  product. 

For  putting  the  bodies  into  the  furnace,  we  suggest  simply 
a metal  fork  moving  on  cylinders. 

Each  furnace  will  have  an  oven  measuring  only  25  by  18 
inches,  as  coffins  will  not  be  used.  For  transporting  the 
corpses  from  the  storage  points  to  the  furnaces  we  suggest 
using  light  carts  on  wheels,  and  we  enclose  diagrams  of 
these  drawn  to  scale.61 

Another  firm,  C.  H.  Kori,  also  sought  the  Belgrade 
business,  emphasizing  its  great  experience  in  this  field 
since  it  had  already  constructed  four  furnaces  for  Dachau 
and  five  for  Lublin,  which,  it  said,  had  given  “full  satis- 
faction in  practice.” 

Following  our  verbal  discussion  regarding  the  delivery  of 
equipment  of  simple  construction  for  the  burning  of  bodies, 
we  are  submitting  plans  for  our  perfected  cremation  ovens 
which  operate  with  coal  and  which  have  hitherto  given  full 
satisfaction. 

We  suggest  two  crematoria  furnaces  for  the  building 
planned,  but  we  advise  you  to  make  further  inquiries  to 
make  sure  that  two  ovens  will  be  sufficient  for  your  require- 
ments. 

We  guarantee  the  effectiveness  of  the  cremation  ovens 
as  well  as  their  durability,  the  use  of  the  best  material  and 
our  faultless  workmanship. 

Awaiting  your  further  word,  we  will  be  at  your  service. 

Heil  Hitler! 

C.H.  Kori,  G.m.b.H.6* 

In  the  end  even  the  strenuous  efforts  of  German  free 
enterprise,  using  the  best  material  and  providing  faultless 
workmanship,  proved  inadequate  for  burning  the  corpses. 
The  well-constructed  crematoria  fell  far  behind  at  a num- 
ber of  camps  but  especially  at  Auschwitz  in  1944  when 
as  many  as  6,000  bodies  (Hoess  put  it  at  as  many  as 
16,000)  had  to  be  burned  daily.  For  instance,  in  forty-six 
days  during  the  summer  of  1944  between  250,000  and 
300,000  Hungarian  Jews  alone  were  done  to  death  at  this 


1266 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

camp.  Even  the  gas  chambers  fell  behind  and  resort  was 
made  to  mass  shootings  in  the  Einsatzkommando  style. 
The  bodies  were  simply  thrown  into  ditches  and  burned, 
many  of  them  only  partly,  and  then  earth  was  bulldozed 
over  them.  The  camp  commanders  complained  toward 
the  end  that  the  crematoria  had  proved  not  only  inade- 
quate but  “uneconomical.” 

The  Zyklon-B  crystals  that  killed  the  victims  in  the  first 
place  were  furnished  by  two  German  firms  which  had  ac- 
quired the  patent  from  L G.  Farben.  These  were  Tesch 
and  Stabenow  of  Hamburg,  and  Degesch  of  Dessau,  the 
former  supplying  two  tons  of  the  cyanide  crystals  a month 
and  the  latter  three  quarters  of  a ton.  The  bills  of  lading 
for  the  deliveries  showed  up  at  Nuremberg. 

The  directors  of  both  concerns  contended  that  they  had 
sold  their  product  merely  for  fumigation  purposes  and 
were  unaware  that  lethal  use  had  been  made  of  it,  but  this 
defense  did  not  hold  up.  Letters  were  found  from  Tesch 
and  Stabenow  offering  not  only  to  supply  the  gas  crystals 
but  also  the  ventilating  and  heating  equipment  for  extermi- 
nation chambers.  Besides,  the  inimitable  Hoess,  who  once 
he  started  to  confess  went  the  limit,  testified  that  the  di- 
rectors of  the  Tesch  company  could  not  have  helped  know- 
ing how  their  product  was  being  used  since  they  furnished 
enough  to  exterminate  a couple  of  million  people.  A 
British  military  court  was  convinced  of  this  at  the  trial  of 
the  two  partners,  Bruno  Tesch  and  Karl  Weinbacher,  who 
were  sentenced  to  death  in  1946  and  hanged.  The  director 
of  the  second  firm,  Dr.  Gerhard  Peters  of  Degesch  of 
Dessau,  got  off  more  lightly.  A German  court  sentenced 
him  to  five  years’  imprisonment.63 

Before  the  postwar  trials  in  Germany  it  had  been 
generally  believed  that  the  mass  killings  were  exclusively 
the  work  of  a relatively  few  fanatical  S.S.  leaders.  But 
the  records  of  the  courts  leave  no  doubt  of  the  com- 
plicity of  a number  of  German  businessmen,  not  only  the 
Krupps  and  the  directors  of  the  I.  G.  Farben  chemical 
trust  but  smaller  entrepreneurs  who  outwardly  must  have 
seemed  to  be  the  most  prosaic  and  decent  of  men,  pillars — 
like  good  businessmen  everywhere — of  their  communities. 

How  many  hapless  innocent  people — mostly  Jews  but 
including  a fairly  large  number  of  others,  especially  Rus- 


1267 


Beginning  of  the  End 

sian  prisoners  of  war — were  slaughtered  at  the  one  camp 
of  Auschwitz?  The  exact  number  will  never  be  known. 
Hoess  himself  in  his  affidavit  gave  an  estimate  of 
“2,500,000  victims  executed  and  exterminated  by  gassing 
and  burning,  and  at  least  another  half  million  who  suc- 
cumbed to  starvation  and  disease,  making  a total  of  about 
3,000,000.”  Later  at  his  own  trial  in  Warsaw  he  reduced 
the  figure  to  1,135,000.  The  Soviet  government,  which 
investigated  the  camp  after  it  was  overrun  by  the  Red 
Army  in  January  1945,  put  the  figure  at  four  million. 
Reithnger,  on  the  basis  of  his  own  exhaustive  study,  doubts 
that  the  number  gassed  at  Auschwitz  was  “even  as  high  as 
three  quarters  of  a million.”  He  estimates  that  about 
600,000  died  in  the  gas  chambers,  to  which  he  adds  “the 
unknown  proportion”  of  some  300,000  or  more  “missing,” 
who  were  shot  or  who  died  of  starvation  and  disease.  By 
any  estimate  the  figure  is  considerable.64 

The  bodies  were  burned,  but  the  gold  fillings  in  the 
teeth  remained  and  these  were  retrieved  from  the  ashes 
if  they  had  not  already  been  yanked  out  by  special  squads 
working  over  the  clammy  piles  of  corpses.*  The  gold 
was  melted  down  and  shipped  along  with  other  valuables 
snatched  from  the  condemned  Jews  to  the  Reichsbank, 
where  under  a secret  agreement  between  Himmler  and  the 
bank’s  president,  Dr.  Walther  Funk,  it  was  deposited  to 
the  credit  of  the  S.S.  in  an  account  given  the  cover  name 
of  “Max  Heiliger.”  This  prize  booty  from  the  extermina- 
tion camps  included,  besides  gold  from  dentures,  gold 
watches,  earrings,  bracelets,  rings,  necklaces  and  even  spec- 
tacle frames — for  the  Jews  had  been  encouraged  to  bring 
all  their  valuables  with  them  for  the  promised  “resettle- 
ment.” There  were  also  great  stocks  of  jewelry,  especially 
diamonds  and  much  silverware.  And  there  were  great 
wads  of  banknotes. 

The  Reichsbank,  in  fact,  was  overwhelmed  by  the  “Max 
Heiliger”  deposits.  With  its  vaults  filled  to  overflowing  as 
early  as  1942,  the  bank’s  profit-minded  directors  sought 

* Sometimes  they  were  pulled  out  before  the  victims  were  slain.  A secret 
report  of  the  German  warden  of  the  prison  at  Minsk  disclosed  that  after  he 
had  commandeered  the  services  of  a Jewish  dentist  all  the  Jews  “had  their 
gold  bridgework,  crowns  and  fillings  pulled  or  broken  out.  This  happens 
always  one  to  two  hours  before  the  special  action.”  The  warden  noted  that 
of  516  German  and  Russian  Jews  executed  at  his  prison  during  a six-week 
period  in  the  spring  of  1943,  some  336  had  the  gold  yanked  from  their  teeth.6* 


1268 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

to  turn  the  holdings  into  cold  cash  by  disposing  of  them 
through  the  municipal  pawnshops.  One  letter  from  the 
Reichsbank  to  the  Berlin  municipal  pawnshop  dated  Sep- 
tember 15  speaks  of  a “second  shipment”  and  begins,  “We 
submit  to  you  the  following  valuables  with  the  request  for 
the  best  possible  utilization.”  The  list  is  long  and  item- 
ized and  includes  154  gold  watches,  1,601  gold  earrings, 
132  diamond  rings,  784  silver  pocket  watches  and  “160  di- 
verse dentures,  partly  of  gold.”  By  the  beginning  of  1944 
the  Berlin  pawnshop  itself  was  overwhelmed  by  the  flow 
of  these  stolen  goods  and  informed  the  Reichsbank  it  could 
accept  no  more.  When  the  Allies  overran  Germany  they 
discovered  in  some  abandoned  salt  mines,  where  the  Nazis 
had  hidden  part  of  their  records  and  booty,  enough  left 
over  from  the  “Max  Heiliger”  account  to  fill  three  huge 
vaults  in  the  Frankfurt  branch  of  the  Reichsbank.66 

Did  the  bankers  know  the  sources  of  these  unique  “de- 
posits”? The  manager  of  the  Precious  Metals  Department 
of  the  Reichsbank  deposed  at  Nuremberg  that  he  and  his 
associates  began  to  notice  that  many  shipments  came  from 
Lublin  and  Auschwitz. 

We  all  knew  that  these  places  were  the  sites  of  concen- 
tration camps.  It  was  in  the  tenth  delivery  in  November, 
1943,  that  dental  gold  appeared.  The  quantity  of  dental  gold 
became  unusually  great67 

At  Nuremberg  the  notorious  Oswald  Pohl,  chief  of  the 
Economic  Office  of  the  S.S.,  who  handled  the  transactions 
for  his  organization,  emphasized  that  Dr.  Funk  and  the 
officials  and  directors  of  the  Reichsbank  knew  very  well 
the  origins  of  the  goods  they  were  trying  to  pawn.  He 
explained  in  some  detail  “the  businesss  deal  between  Funk 
and  the  S.S.  concerning  the  delivery  of  valuables  of  dead 
Jews  to  the  Reichsbank.”  He  remembered  a conversation 
with  the  bank’s  vice-president,  Dr.  Emil  Pohl. 

In  this  conversation  no  doubt  remained  that  the  objects  to 
be  delivered  [came  from]  Jews  who  had  been  killed  in 
concentration  camps.  The  objects  in  question  were  rings, 
watches,  eyeglasses,  gold  bars,  wedding  rings,  brooches,  pins, 
gold  fillings  and  other  valuables. 

Once,  Pohl  related,  after  an  inspection  tour  through  the 
vaults  of  the  Reichsbank  where  the  valuables  “from  the 
dead  Jews”  were  inspected.  Dr.  Funk  tendered  the  party 


1269 


Beginning  of  the  End 

a pleasant  dinner  in  which  the  conversation  turned  around 
the  unique  origins  of  the  booty.68* 

“THE  WARSAW  GHETTO  IS  NO  MORE” 

More  than  one  eyewitness  has  commented  on  the  spirit 
of  resignation  with  which  so  many  Jews  met  their  deaths 
in  the  Nazi  gas  chambers  or  in  the  great  execution  pits 
of  the  Einsatz  squads.  Not  all  Jews  submitted  to  extermi- 
nation so  gently.  In  the  spring  days  of  1943  some  60,000 
Jews  walled  up  in  the  Warsaw  ghetto — all  that  remained 
of  400,000  who  had  been  herded  into  this  place  like  cattle 
in  1940 — turned  on  their  Nazi  tormentors  and  fought. 

Perhaps  no  one  has  left  a more  grisly — and  authorita- 
tive— account  of  the  Warsaw  ghetto  rebellion  than  the 
proud  S.S.  officer  who  put  it  down.t  This  German  individ- 
ual was  Juergen  Stroop,  S.S.  Brigadefuehrer  and  Major 
General  of  Police.  His  eloquent  official  report,  bound  in 
leather,  profusely  illustrated  and  typed  on  seventy-five 
pages  of  elegant  heavy  bond  paper  has  survived.}  It  is  en- 
titled The  Warsaw  Ghetto  Is  No  More.6* 

By  the  late  autumn  of  1940,  a year  after  the  Nazi  con- 
quest of  Poland,  the  S.S.  had  rounded  up  some  400,000 
Jews  and  sealed  them  off  within  a high  wall  from  the  rest 
of  Warsaw  in  an  area  approximately  two  and  a half  miles 
long  and  a mile  wide  around  the  old  medieval  ghetto.  The 
district  normally  housed  160,000  persons,  so  there  was 
overcrowding,  but  this  was  the  least  of  the  hardships.  Gov- 
ernor Frank  refused  to  allot  enough  food  to  keep  even  half 
of  the  400,000  barely  alive.  Forbidden  to  leave  the  en- 
closure on  the  pain  of  being  shot  on  sight,  the  Jews  had  no 
employment  except  for  a few  armament  factories  within 
the  wall  run  by  the  Wehrmacht  or  by  rapacious  German 
businessmen  who  knew  how  to  realize  large  profits  from 
the  use  of  slave  labor.  At  least  100,000  Jews  tried  to  sur- 
vive on  a bowl  of  soup  a day,  often  boiled  from  straw, 
provided  by  the  charity  of  the  others.  It  was  a losing 
struggle  for  life. 

* Dr.  Funk  was  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment  at  Nuremberg, 
t John  Hersey’s  novel  The  W all,  based  on  the  Jewish  records,  is  an  epic 
story  of  the  uprising. 

t But  not  Stroop.  He  was  caught  after  the  war.  sentenced  to  death  by  an 
American  court  at  Dachau  on  March  22,  1947,  for  the  shooting  of  hostages 
in  Greece,  and  then  extradited  to  Poland,  where  he  was  tried  for  the  slaugh- 
ter of  the  Jews  in  the  Warsaw  ghetto.  He  was  again  sentenced  to  death 
and  hanged  at  the  scene  of  the  crime  on  September  8,  1951. 


1270  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

But  the  ghetto  population  did  not  die  fast  enough  from 
starvation  and  disease  to  suit  Himmler,  who  in  the  summer 
of  1942  ordered  the  Jews  in  the  Warsaw  ghetto  to  be 
removed  altogether  “for  security  reasons.”  On  July  22  a 
great  “resettlement”  action  was  instituted.  Between  then 
and  October  3 a total  of  310,322  Jews,  according  to  Stroop, 
were  “resettled.”  That  is,  they  were  transported  to  the 
extermination  camps,  most  of  them  to  Treblinka,  where 
they  were  gassed. 

Still  Himmler  was  not  satisfied.  When  he  paid  a surprise 
visit  to  Warsaw  in  January  1943  and  discovered  that 
60,000  Jews  were  still  alive  in  the  ghetto  he  ordered  that 
the  “resettlement”  be  completed  by  February  15.  This 
proved  to  be  a difficult  task.  The  severe  winter  and  the  de- 
mands of  the  Army,  whose  disaster  at  Stalingrad  and 
whose  consequent  retreats  in  southern  Russia  gave  it  first 
claim  to  transportation  facilities,  made  it  difficult  for  the 
S.S.  to  obtain  the  necessary  trains  to  carry  out  the  final 
“resettlement.”  Also,  Stroop  reported,  the  Jews  were  re- 
sisting their  final  liquidation  “in  every  possible  way.”  It 
was  not  until  spring  that  Himmler’s  order  could  be  carried 
out.  It  was  decided  to  clear  out  the  ghetto  in  a “special  ac- 
tion” lasting  three  days.  As  it  turned  out,  it  took  four 
weeks. 

The  deportation  of  more  than  300,000  Jews  had  enabled 
the  Germans  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  walled-in  ghetto  and 
as  S.S.  General  Stroop  turned  his  tanks,  artillery,  flame 
throwers  and  dynamite  squads  on  it  on  the  morning  of 
April  19,  1943,  it  comprised  an  area  measuring  only  1,000 
by  300  yards.  It  was  honeycombed,  though,  with  sewers, 
vaults  and  cellars  which  the  desperate  Jews  had  converted 
into  fortified  points.  Their  arms  were  few:  some  pistols 
and  rifles,  a dozen  or  two  machine  guns  that  had  been 
smuggled  in,  and  homemade  grenades.  But  they  were  now 
on  that  April  morning  determined  to  use  them — the  first 
time  and  the  last  in  the  history  of  the  Third  Reich  that 
the  Jews  resisted  their  Nazi  oppressors  with  arms. 

Stroop  had  2,090  men,  about  half  of  them  Regular  Army 
or  Waffen-S.S.  troops,  and  the  rest  S.S.  police  reinforced 
by  335  Lithuanian  militia  and  some  Polish  police  and  fire- 
men. They  ran  into  unexpected  resistance  the  first  day. 

Hardly  had  operation  begun  [Stroop  reported  in  the 


Beginning  of  the  End  1271 

first  of  his  many  teletyped  daily  reports],  than  we  ran  into 
strong  concerted  fire  by  the  Jews  and  bandits.  The  tank 
and  two  armored  cars  pelted  with  Molotov  cocktails  . . . 
Owing  to  this  enemy  counterattack  we  had  to  withdraw. 

The  German  attack  was  renewed  but  found  heavy  going. 

About  1730  hours  we  encountered  very  strong  resistance 
from  one  block  of  buildings,  including  machine-gun  fire. 
A special  raiding  party  defeated  the  enemy  but  could  not 
catch  the  resisters.  The  Jews  and  criminals  resisted  from 
base  to  base  and  escaped  at  the  last  moment  . . . Our  losses 
in  first  attack:  12  men. 

And  so  it  went  for  the  first  few  days,  the  poorly  armed 
defenders  giving  ground  before  the  attack  of  tanks,  flame 
throwers  and  artillery  but  keeping  up  their  resistance.  Gen- 
eral Stroop  could  not  understand  why  “this  trash  and  sub- 
humanity,” as  he  referred  to  the  besieged  Jews,  did  not 
give  up  and  submit  to  being  liquidated. 

Within  a few  days  [he  reported]  it  became  apparent 
that  the  Jews  no  longer  had  any  intention  to  resettle 
voluntarily,  but  were  determined  to  resist  evacuation  . . . 
Whereas  it  had  been  possible  during  the  first  days  to  catch 
considerable  numbers  of  Jews,  who  are  cowards  by  nature, 
it  became  more  and  more  difficult  during  the  second  half 
of  the  operation  to  capture  the  bandits  and  Jews.  Over  and 
over  again  new  battle  groups  consisting  of  20  to  30  Jewish 
men,  accompanied  by  a corresponding  number  of  women, 
kindled  new  resistance. 

The  women  belonged  to  the  Chalutzim,  Stroop  noted, 
and  had  the  habit,  he  said,  of  “firing  pistols  with  both 
hands”  and  also  of  unlimbering  hand  grenades  which  they 
concealed  in  their  bloomers. 

On  the  fifth  day  of  the  battle,  an  impatient  and  furious 
Himmler  ordered  Stroop  to  “comb  out”  the  ghetto  “with 
the  greatest  severity  and  relentless  tenacity.” 

I therefore  decided  [Stroop  related  in  his  final  report] 
to  destroy  the  entire  Jewish  area  by  setting  every  block  on 
fire. 

He  then  described  what  followed. 

The  Jews  stayed  in  the  burning  buildings  until  because  of 
the  fear  of  being  burned  alive  they  jumped  down  from  the 
upper  stories  . . . With  their  bones  broken,  they  still  tried  to 
crawl  across  the  street  into  buildings  which  had  not  yet  been 


1272 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

set  on  fire  . . . Despite  the  danger  of  being  burned  alive  the 
Jews  and  bandits  often  preferred  to  return  into  the  flames 
rather  than  risk  being  caught  by  us. 

It  was  simply  incomprehensible  to  a man  of  Stroop’s 
stripe  that  men  and  women  preferred  to  die  in  the  flames 
fighting  rather  than  to  die  peacefully  in  the  gas  chambers. 
For  he  was  shipping  off  the  captured  whom  he  did  not 
slaughter  to  Treblinka.  On  April  25  he  sent  a teletype  to 
S.S.  headquarters  reporting  that  27,464  Jews  had  been  cap- 
tured. 

I am  going  to  try  to  obtain  a train  for  T2  [Treblinka] 
tomorrow.  Otherwise  liquidation  will  be  carried  out  here  to- 
morrow. 

Often  it  was,  on  the  spot.  The  next  day  Stroop  informed 
his  superiors:  “1,330  Jews  pulled  out  of  dugouts  and  im- 
mediately destroyed;  362  Jews  killed  in  battle.”  Only  thirty 
prisoners  were  “evacuated.” 

Toward  the  end  of  the  rebellion  the  defenders  took  to 
the  sewers.  Stroop  tried  to  flush  them  out  by  flooding  the 
mains  but  the  Jews  managed  to  stop  the  flow  of  water. 
One  day  the  Germans  dropped  smoke  bombs  into  the  sew- 
ers through  183  manholes  but  Stroop  ruefully  reported 
that  they  failed  to  “have  the  desired  results.” 

The  final  outcome  could  never  be  in  doubt.  For  a whole 
month  the  cornered  Jews  fought  with  reckless  courage 
though  Stroop,  in  one  daily  report,  put  it  differently, 
complaining  about  the  “cunning  fighting  methods  and 
tricks  used  by  the  Jews  and  bandits.”  By  April  26  he  re- 
ported that  many  of  the  defenders  were  “going  insane 
from  the  heat,  the  smoke  and  the  explosions.” 

During  the  day  several  more  blocks  of  buildings  were 
burned  down.  This  is  the  only  and  final  method  which 
forces  this  trash  and  subhumanity  to  the  surface. 

The  last  day  was  May  16.  That  night  Stroop  got  off  his 
last  daily  battle  report. 

One  hundred  eighty  Jews,  bandits  and  subhumans  were 
destroyed.  The  former  Jewish  quarter  of  Warsaw  is  no  longer 
in  existence.  The  large-scale  action  was  terminated  at  2015 
hours  by  blowing  up  the  Warsaw  synagogue  . . . 

Total  number  of  Jews  dealt  with:  56,065,  including  both 
Jews  caught  and  Jews  whose  extermination  can  be  proved. 


1273 


Beginning  of  the  End 

A week  later  he  was  asked  to  explain  that  figure,  and 
he  replied: 

Of  the  total  of  56,065  caught,  about  7,000  were  destroyed 
in  the  former  ghetto  during  large-scale  operation.  6,929  Jews 
were  destroyed  by  transporting  them  to  Treblinka;  the  sum 
total  of  Jews  destroyed  is  therefore  13,929.  Beyond  that,  from 
five  to  six  thousand  Jews  were  destroyed  by  being  blown  up 
or  by  perishing  in  the  flames. 

General  Stroop’s  arithmetic  is  not  very  clear  since  this 
report  leaves  some  36,000  Jews  unaccounted  for.  But 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  he  was  telling  the  truth  when 
he  wrote  in  his  handsomely  bound  final  report  that  he  had 
caught  “a  total  of  56,065  Jews  whose  extermination  can 
be  proved.”  The  gas  chambers  no  doubt  accounted  for  the 
36,000. 

German  losses,  according  to  Stroop,  were  sixteen  killed 
and  ninety  wounded.  Probably  the  true  figures  were 
much  higher,  given  the  nature  of  the  savage  house-to-house 
fighting  which  the  general  himself  described  in  such  lurid 
detail,  but  were  kept  low  so  as  not  to  disturb  Himmler’s 
fine  sensibilities.  The  German  troops  and  police,  Stroop 
concluded,  “fulfilled  their  duty  indefatigably  in  faithful 
comradeship  and  stood  together  as  exemplary  models  of 
soldiers.” 

The  “final  solution”  went  on  to  the  very  end  of  the  war. 
How  many  Jews  did  it  massacre?  The  figure  has  been  de- 
bated. According  to  two  S.S.  witnesses  at  Nuremberg  the 
total  was  put  at  between  five  and  six  millions  by  one  of  the 
great  Nazi  experts  on  the  subject,  Karl  [Adolf]  Eichmann, 
chief  of  the  Jewish  Office  of  the  Gestapo,  who  carried  out 
the  “final  solution”  under  the  prodding  hand  of  its  origi- 
nator, Heydrich.*  The  figure  given  in  the  Nuremberg  in- 
dictment was  5,700,000  and  it  tallied  with  the  calculations 
of  the  World  Jewish  Congress.  Reitlinger  in  his  prodigious 
study  of  the  Final  Solution  concluded  that  the  figure  was 
somewhat  less — between  4,194,200  and  4,581,200.71 

* Eichmann,  according  to  one  of  his  henchmen,  said  just  before  the  German 
collapse  that  “he  would  leap  laughing  into  the  grave  because  the  feeling  that 
he  had  five  million  people  on  his  conscience  would  be  for  him  a source  of 
extraordinary  satisfaction.”  70  He  escaped  from  an  American  internment 
camp  in  1945.  (Note:  As  this  book  went  on  press,  the  government  of 
Israel  announced  that  it  had  apprehended  Eichmann.  He  was  tried,  found 
guilty  and  sentenced  to  death  by  an  Israeli  tribunal.  In  February  1962, 
Eichmann  was  appealing  his  sentence.) 


1274 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

There  were  some  ten  million  Jews  living  in  1939  in  the 
territories  occupied  by  Hitler’s  forces.  By  any  estimate  it 
is  certain  that  nearly  half  of  them  were  exterminated  by 
the  Germans.  This  was  the  final  consequence  and  the  shat- 
tering cost  of  the  aberration  which  came  over  the  Nazi  dic- 
tator in  his  youthful  gutter  days  in  Vienna  and  which 
he  imparted  to — or  shared  with — so  many  of  his  German 
followers. 

THE  MEDICAL  EXPERIMENTS 

There  were  some  practices  of  the  Germans  during  the 
short-lived  New  Order  that  resulted  from  sheer  sadism 
rather  than  a lust  for  mass  murder.  Perhaps  to  a psychi- 
atrist there  is  a difference  between  the  two  lusts  though 
the  end  result  of  the  first  differed  from  the  second  only 
in  the  scale  of  deaths. 

The  Nazi  medical  experiments  are  an  example  of  this 
sadism,  for  in  the  use  of  concentration  camp  inmates 
and  prisoners  of  war  as  human  guinea  pigs  very  little,  if 
any,  benefit  to  science  was  achieved.  It  is  a tale  of  horror 
of  which  the  German  medical  profession  cannot  be  proud. 
Although  the  “experiments”  were  conducted  by  fewer  than 
two  hundred  murderous  quacks — albeit  some  of  them 
held  eminent  posts  in  the  medical  world — their  criminal 
work  was  known  to  thousands  of  leading  physicians  of  the 
Reich,  not  a single  one  of  whom,  so  far  as  the  record 
shows,  ever  uttered  the  slightest  public  protest.* 

In  the  murders  in  this  field  the  Jews  were  not  the  only 
victims.  The  Nazi  doctors  also  used  Russian  prisoners  of 
war,  Polish  concentration  camp  inmates,  women  as  well 
as  men,  and  even  Germans.  The  “experiments”  were  quite 
varied.  Prisoners  were  placed  in  pressure  chambers  and 
subjected  to  high-altitude  tests  until  they  ceased  breathing. 
They  were  injected  with  lethal  doses  of  typhus  and  jaun- 
dice. They  were  subjected  to  “freezing”  experiments  in  icy 
water  or  exposed  naked  in  the  snow  outdoors  until  they 

* Not  even  Germany’s  most  famous  surgeon.  Dr.  Ferdinand  Sauerbruch, 
though  he  eventually  became  an  anti-Nazi  and  conspired  with  the  resistance, 
bauerbruch  sat  through  a lecture  at  the  Berlin  Military  Medical  Academy 
m May  of  1943  given  by  two  of  the  most  notorious  of  the  doctor-killers, 
Aarl  Uebhardt  and  Fritz  Fischer,  on  the  subject  of  gas  gangrene  experi- 
ments on  prisoners.  Sauerbruch’s  only  argument  on  this  occasion  was  that 
surgery  was  better  than  sulfanilamide  1 Professor  Gebhardt  was  sentenced 
to  death  at  the  so-called  “Doctors’  Trial”  and  hanged  on  June  2,  1948  Dr 
Fischer  was  given  life  imprisonment. 


1275 


Beginning  of  the  End 

froze  to  death.  Poison  bullets  were  tried  out  on  them  as 
was  mustard  gas.  At  the  Ravensbrueck  concentration  camp 
for  women  hundreds  of  Polish  inmates — the  “rabbit  girls” 
they  were  called — were  given  gas  gangrene  wounds  while 
others  were  subjected  to  “experiments”  in  bone  grafting. 
At  Dachau  and  Buchenwald  gypsies  were  selected  to  see 
how  long,  and  in  what  manner,  they  could  live  on  salt 
water.  Sterilization  experiments  were  carried  out  on  a large 
scale  at  several  camps  by  a variety  of  means  on  both 
men  and  women;  for,  as  an  S.S.  physician,  Dr.  Adolf 
Pokorny,  wrote  Himmler  on  one  occasion,  “the  enemy 
must  be  not  only  conquered  but  exterminated.”  If  he  could 
not  be  slaughtered — and  the  need  for  slave  labor  toward 
the  end  of  the  war  made  that  practice  questionable,  as  we 
have  seen — then  he  could  be  prevented  from  propagating. 
In  fact  Dr.  Pokorny  told  Himmler  he  thought  he  had 
found  just  the  right  means,  the  plant  Caladium  seguinum, 
which,  he  said,  induced  lasting  sterility. 

The  thought  alone  [the  good  doctor  wrote  the  S.S.  Fueh- 
rer] that  the  three  million  Bolsheviks  now  in  German  cap- 
tivity could  be  sterilized,  so  that  they  would  be  available  for 
work  but  precluded  from  propagation,  opens  up  the 
most  far-reaching  perspectives.72 

Another  German  doctor  who  had  “far-reaching  perspec- 
tives” was  Professor  August  Hirt,  head  of  the  Anatomical 
Institute  of  the  University  of  Strasbourg.  His  special  field 
was  somewhat  different  from  those  of  the  others  and  he 
explained  it  in  a letter  at  Christmas  time  of  1941  to  S.S. 
Lieutenant  General  Rudolf  Brandt,  Himmler’s  adjutant. 

We  have  large  collections  of  skulls  of  almost  all  races  and 
peoples  at  our  disposal.  Of  the  Jewish  race,  however,  only 
very  few  specimens  of  skulls  are  available  . . . The  war  in 
the  East  now  presents  us  with  the  opportunity  to  overcome 
this  deficiency.  By  procuring  the  skulls  of  the  Jewish- 
Bolshevik  commissars,  who  represent  the  prototype  of  the 
repulsive,  but  characteristic,  subhuman,  we  have  the  chance 
now  to  obtain  scientific  material. 

Professor  Hirt  did  not  want  the  skulls  of  “Jewish-Bol- 
shevik  commissars”  already  dead.  He  proposed  that  the 
heads  of  these  persons  first  be  measured  while  they  were 
alive.  Then — 

Following  the  subsequently  induced  death  of  the  Jew, 


1276 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

whose  head  should  not  be  damaged,  the  physician  will  sever 
the  head  from  the  body  and  will  forward  it  ...  in  a 
hermetically  sealed  tin  can. 

Whereupon  Dr.  Hirt  would  go  to  work,  he  promised, 
on  further  scientific  measurements.73  Himmler  was  de- 
lighted. He  directed  that  Professor  Hirt  “be  supplied  with 
everything  needed  for  his  research  work.” 

He  was  well  supplied.  The  actual  supplier  was  an  in- 
teresting Nazi  individual  by  the  name  of  Wolfram  Sievers, 
who  spent  considerable  time  on  the  witness  stand  at  the 
main  Nuremberg  trial  and  at  the  subsequent  “Doctors’ 
Trial,”  in  the  latter  of  which  he  was  a defendant.*  Sie- 
vers, a former  bookseller,  had  risen  to  be  a colonel  of  the 
S.S.  and  executive  secretary  of  the  Ahnenerbe,  the  Insti- 
tute for  Research  into  Heredity,  one  of  the  ridiculous 
“cultural”  organizations  established  by  Himmler  to  pursue 
one  of  his  many  lunacies.  It  had,  according  to  Sievers, 
fifty  “research  branches,”  of  which  one  was  called  the  “In- 
stitute for  Military  Scientific  Research,”  which  Sievers  also 
headed.  He  was  a shifty-eyed,  Mephistophelean-looking 
fellow  with  a thick,  ink-black  beard  and  at  Nuremberg  he 
was  dubbed  the  “Nazi  Bluebeard,”  after  the  famous  French 
killer.  Like  so  many  other  characters  in  this  history,  he 
kept  a meticulous  diary,  and  this  and  his  correspondence, 
both  of  which  survived,  contributed  to  his  gallows  end. 

By  June  1943  Sievers  had  collected  at  Auschwitz  the 
men  and  women  who  were  to  furnish  the  skeletons  for 
the  “scientifice  measurements”  of  Professor  Dr.  Hirt  at  the 
University  of  Strasbourg.  “A  total  of  115  persons,  includ- 
ing 79  Jews,  30  Jewesses,  4 ‘Asiatics’  and  2 Poles  were 
processed,”  Sievers  reported,  requesting  the  S.S.  main  of- 
fice in  Berlin  for  transportation  for  them  from  Auschwitz 
to  the  Natzweiler  concentration  camp  near  Strasbourg.  The 
British  cross-examiner  at  Nuremberg  inquired  as  to  the 
meaning  of  “processing.” 

“Anthropological  measurements,”  Sievers  replied. 

“Before  they  were  murdered  they  were  anthropologi- 
cally measured?  That  was  all  there  was  to  it,  was  it?” 

“And  casts  were  taken,”  Sievers  added. 

What  followed  was  narrated  by  S.S.  Captain  Josef 
Kramer,  himself  a veteran  exterminator  from  Auschwitz, 


# And  in  which  he  was  condemned  to  death,  and  hanged. 


1277 


Beginning  of  the  End 

Mauthausen,  Dachau  and  other  camps  and  who  achieved 
fleeting  fame  as  the  “Beast  of  Belsen”  and  was  con- 
demned to  death  by  a British  court  at  Lueneburg. 

Professor  Hirt  of  the  Strasbourg  Anatomical  Institute  told 
me  of  the  prisoner  convoy  en  route  from  Auschwitz.  He 
said  these  persons  were  to  be  killed  by  poison  gas  in  the  gas 
chamber  of  the  Natzweiler  camp,  their  bodies  then  to  be 
taken  to  the  Anatomical  Institute  for  his  disposal.  He  gave 
me  a bottle  containing  about  half  a pint  of  salts — I think 
they  were  cyanide  salts — and  told  me  the  approximate  dosage 
I would  have  to  use  to  poison  the  arriving  inmates  from 
Auschwitz. 

Early  in  August  1943,  I received  eighty  inmates  who  were 
to  be  killed  with  the  gas  Hirt  had  given  me.  One  night  I 
went  to  the  gas  chamber  in  a small  car  with  about  fifteen 
women  this  first  time.  I told  the  women  they  had  to  go  into 
the  chamber  to  be  disinfected.  I did  not  tell  them,  however, 
that  they  were  to  be  gassed. 

By  this  time  the  Nazis  had  perfected  the  technique. 

With  the  help  of  a few  S.S.  men  [Kramer  continued]  I 
stripped  the  women  completely  and  shoved  them  into  the 
gas  chamber  when  they  were  stark  naked. 

When  the  door  closed  they  began  to  scream.  I introduced  a 
certain  amount  of  salt  through  a tube  . . . and  observed 
through  a peephole  what  happened  inside  the  room.  The 
women  breathed  for  about  half  a minute  before  they 
fell  to  the  floor.  After  I had  turned  on  the  ventilation  I 
opened  the  door.  I found  the  women  lying  lifeless  on  the 
floor  and  they  were  covered  with  excrements. 

Captain  Kramer  testified  that  he  repeated  the  perform- 
ance until  all  eighty  inmates  had  been  killed  and  turned 
the  bodies  over  to  Professor  Hirt,  “as  requested.”  He  was 
asked  by  his  interrogator  what  his  feelings  were  at  the 
time,  and  he  gave  a memorable  answer  that  gives  insight 
into  a phenomenon  in  the  Third  Reich  that  has  seemed 
so  elusive  of  human  understanding. 

I had  no  feelings  in  carrying  out  these  things  because  I 
had  received  an  order  to  kill  the  eighty  inmates  in  the  way 
I already  told  you. 

That,  by  the  way,  was  the  way  I was  trained.1* 

Another  witness  testified  as  to  what  happened  next.  He 
was  Henry  Herypierre,  a Frenchman  who  worked  in  the 


1278 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Anatomical  Institute  at  Strasbourg  as  Professor  Hirt’s  lab- 
oratory assistant  until  the  Allies  arrived. 

The  first  shipment  we  received  was  of  the  bodies  of  thirty 
women  . . . These  thirty  female  bodies  arrived  still  warm. 
The  eyes  were  wide  open  and  shining.  They  were  red  and 
bloodshot  and  were  popping  from  their  sockets.  There  were 
also  traces  of  blood  about  the  nose  and  mouth.  No  vigor 
mortis  was  evident 

Herypierre  suspected  that  they  had  been  done  to  death 
and  secretly  copied  down  their  prison  numbers  which  were 
tattooed  on  their  left  arms.  Two  more  shipments  of  fifty- 
six  men  arrived,  he  said,  in  exactly  the  same  condition. 
They  were  pickled  in  alcohol  under  the  expert  direction 
of  Dr.  Hirt.  But  the  professor  was  a little  nervous  about 
the  whole  thing.  “Peter,”  he  said  to  Herypierre,  “if  you 
can’t  keep  your  trap  shut,  you’ll  be  one  of  them’.” 

Professor  Dr.  Hirt  went  about  his  work  nonetheless. 
According  to  the  correspondence  of  Sievers,  the  professor 
severed  the  heads  and,  as  he  wrote,  “assembled  the  skeleton 
collection  which  was  previously  nonexistent.”  But  there 
were  difficulties  and  after  hearing  them  described  by  Dr. 

Sievers  himself  had  no  expert  medical  or  anatomi- 
cal knowledge — the  chief  of  the  Ahnenerbe  reported  them 
to  Himmler  on  September  5,  1944. 


In  view  of  the  vast  amount  of  scientific  research  involved, 
me  job  of  reducing  the  corpses  has  not  yet  been  completed. 
This  requires  some  time  for  80  corpses. 

And  time  was  running  out.  Advancing  American  and 
French  troops  were  nearing  Strasbourg.  Hirt  requested  “di- 
rectives as  to  what  should  be  done  with  the  collection.” 

The  corpses  can  be  stripped  of  the  flesh  and  thereby  ren- 
dered unidentifiable  [Sievers  reported  to  headquarters  on 
behalf  of  Dr.  Hirt],  This  would  mean,  however,  that  at 
least  part  of  the  whole  work  had  been  done  for  nothing  and 
that  this  unique  collection  would  be  lost  to  science,  since  it 
would  be  impossible  to  make  plaster  casts  afterwards. 

The  skeleton  collection  as  such  is  inconspicuous.  The  flesh 
parts  could  be  declared  as  having  been  left  by  the  French 
at  the  time  we  took  over  the  Anatomical  Institute*  and 
would  be  turned  over  for  cremating.  Please  advise  me  which 
of  the  following  three  proposals  is  to  be  carried  out-  1 


r£^man l hdt,annexed.tA1TSTac.e  a£‘er  the  fal1  of  France  in  1940  and  the 
Germans  had  taken  over  the  University  of  Strasbourg. 


1279 


Beginning  of  the  End 

The  collection  as  a whole  to  be  preserved;  2.  The  collection 
to  be  dissolved  in  part;  3.  The  collection  to  be  completely 
dissolved. 

“Why  were  you  wanting  to  deflesh  the  bodies,  witness?” 
the  British  prosecutor  asked  in  the  stillness  of  the  Nurem- 
berg courtroom.  “Why  were  you  suggesting  that  the  blame 
should  be  passed  on  to  the  French?” 

“As  a layman  I could  have  no  opinion  in  this  matter,” 
the  “Nazi  Bluebeard”  replied.  “I  merely  transmitted  an 
inquiry  from  Professor  Hirt.  I had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
murdering  of  these  people.  I simply  carried  through  the 
function  of  a mailman.” 

“You  were  the  post  office,”  the  prosecutor  rejoined,  “an- 
other of  these  distinguished  Nazi  post  offices,  were  you?” 

It  was  a leaky  defense  offered  by  many  a Nazi  at  the 
trials  and  on  this  occasion,  as  on  others,  the  prosecu- 
tion nailed  it.75 

The  captured  S.S.  files  reveal  that  on  October  26,  1944, 
Sievers  reported  that  “the  collection  in  Strasbourg  has  been 
completely  dissolved  in  accordance  with  the  directive.  This 
arrangement  is  for  the  best  in  view  of  the  whole  situa- 
tion.” 76 

Herypierre  later  described  the  attempt — not  altogether 
successful — to  hide  the  traces. 

In  September,  1944,  the  Allies  made  an  advance  on  Bel- 
fort, and  Professor  Hirt  ordered  Bong  and  Herr  Maier  to 
cut  up  these  bodies  and  have  them  burned  in  the  crematory 
...  I asked  Herr  Maier  the  next  day  whether  he  had  cut 
up  all  the  bodies,  but  Herr  Bong  replied:  “We  couldn’t  cut 
up  all  the  bodies,  it  was  too  much  work.  We  left  a few 
bodies  in  the  storeroom.” 

They  were  discovered  there  by  an  Allied  team  when 
units  of  the  U.S.  Seventh  Army,  with  the  French  2nd 
Armored  Division  in  the  lead,  entered  Strasbourg  a month 
later.*  77 

Not  only  skeletons  but  human  skins  were  collected  by 
the  masters  of  the  New  Order  though  in  the  latter  case  the 
pretense  could  not  be  made  that  the  cause  of  scientific 
research  was  being  served.  The  skins  of  concentration 
camp  prisoners,  especially  executed  for  this  ghoulish  pur- 


* Professor  Dr.  Hirt  disappeared.  As  he  left  Strasbourg  he  was  heard  boast- 
ing that  no  one  would  ever  take  him  alive.  Apparently  no  one  has — alive 
or  dead. 


1280 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pose,  had  merely  decorative  value.  They  made,  it  was 
found,  excellent  lamp  shades,  several  of  which  were  ex- 
pressly fitted  up  for  Frau  Use  Koch,  the  wife  of  the  com- 
mandant of  Buchenwald  and  nicknamed  by  the  inmates  the 
“Bitch  of  Buchenwald.”  * Tattooed  skins  appear  to  have 
been  the  most  sought  after.  A German  inmate,  Andreas 
Pfaffenberger,  deposed  at  Nuremberg  on  this 

...  All  prisoners  with  tattooing  on  them  were  ordered 
to  report  to  the  dispensary  . . . After  the  prisoners  had  been 
examined  the  ones  with  the  best  and  most  artistic  specimens 
were  killed  by  injections.  The  corpses  were  then  turned  over 
to  the  pathological  department  where  the  desired  pieces  of 
tattooed  skin  were  detached  from  the  bodies  and  treated 
further.  The  finished  products  were  turned  over  to  Koch’s 
wife,  who  had  them  fashioned  into  lamp  shades,  and  other 
ornamental  household  articles.78 

One  piece  of  skin  which  apparently  struck  Frau  Koch’s 
fancy  had  the  words  “Haensel  and  Gretel”  tattooed  on  it. 

At  another  camp,  Dachau,  the  demand  for  such  skins 
often  outran  the  supply.  A Czech  physician  prisoner.  Dr. 
Frank  Blaha,  testified  at  Nuremberg  as  to  that. 

Sometimes  we  would  not  have  enough  bodies  with  good 
♦K  uaD,d  *?,r’  ^ascher  would  say,  “All  right,  you  will  get 
the  bodies.  The  next  day  we  would  receive  twenty  or 
thirty  bodies  of  young  people.  They  would  have  been  shot  in 
the  neck  or  struck  on  the  head,  so  that  the  skin  would  be 
uninjured  . • • The  skin  had  to  be  from  healthy  prisoners 
and  free  from  defects.78  v 

It  was  this  Dr.  Sigmund  Rascher  who  seems  to  have  been 
responsible  for  the  more  sadistic  of  the  medical  experi- 
ments in  the  first  place.  This  horrible  quack  had  attracted 
the  attention  of  Himmler,  among  whose  obsessions  was  the 
breeding  of  more  and  more  superior  Nordic  offspring, 
through  reports  in  S.S.  circles  that  Frau  Rascher  had  given 
birth  to  three  children  after  passing  the  age  of  forty-eight, 

over  the  inmates  of  Buchenwald 


was  complete,  and  whose  very  whim  could  ^'rin^tenriide 'punishment  tTTa 
prisoner,  was  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment  at  the  “Buchenwald  Trial  ” 
but  her  sentence  was  commuted  to  four  years,  and  shewasZnreleated 

for  H a .Gennan  court  sentenced  her  to  life  imprisonment 

for  murder.  Her  husband  was  sentenced  to  death  by  an  S.S  court  during 
the  war  for  excesses  but  was  given  the  option  of  serving  on  the  Russian 
in°thi  HUtrirtf0leah1,-COuld  do  tb's,  Prince  Waldeck,  the  leader  of  the  S.S 
Cr  t!3?  bim i executed.  Princess  Mafalda,  daughter  of  the  King 

whotod  atBuchenwakh  " °£  PnDCe  Philip  °£  Hesse>  was  am0“« 


Beginning  of  the  End  1281 

although  in  truth  the  Raschers  had  simply  kidnaped  them  at 
suitable  intervals  from  an  orphanage. 

In  the  spring  of  1941,  Dr.  Rascher,  who  was  attending  a 
special  medical  course  at  Munich  given  by  the  Luftwaffe, 
had  a brain  storm.  On  May  15,  1941,  he  wrote  Himmler 
about  it.  He  had  found  to  his  horror  that  research  on  the 
effect  of  high  altitudes  on  flyers  was  at  a standstill  because 
“no  tests  with  human  material  had  yet  been  possible  as  such 
experiments  are  very  dangerous  and  nobody  volunteers  for 
them.” 

Can  you  make  available  two  or  three  professional  criminals 
for  these  experiments  . . . The  experiments,  by  which  the 
subjects  can  of  course  die,  would  take  place  with  my  co- 
operation.80 

The  S.S.  Fuehrer  replied  within  a week  that  “prisoners 
will,  of  course,  be  made  available  gladly  for  the  high- 
flight  research.” 

They  were,  and  Dr.  Rascher  went  to  work.  The  results 
may  be  seen  from  his  own  reports  and  from  those  of 
others,  which  showed  up  at  Nuremberg  and  at  the  sub- 
sequent trial  of  the  S.S.  doctors. 

Dr.  Rascher’s  own  findings  are  a model  of  scientific 
jargon.  For  the  high-altitude  tests  he  moved  the  Air  Force’s 
decompression  chamber  at  Munich  to  the  nearby  Dachau 
concentration  camp  where  human  guinea  pigs  were  readily 
available.  Air  was  pumped  out  of  the  contraption  so  that 
the  oxygen  and  air  pressure  at  high  altitudes  could  be 
simulated.  Dr.  Rascher  then  made  his  observations,  of 
which  the  following  one  is  typical. 

The  third  test  was  without  oxygen  at  the  equivalent  of 
29,400  feet  altitude  conducted  on  a 37-year-old  Jew  in  good 
general  condition.  Respiration  continued  for  30  minutes. 
After  four  minutes  the  TP  [test  person]  began  to  perspire 
and  roll  his  head. 

After  five  minutes  spasms  appeared;  between  the  sixth 
and  tenth  minute  respiration  increased  in  frequency,  the  TP 
losing  consciousness.  From  the  eleventh  to  the  thirtieth 
minute  respiration  slowed  down  to  three  inhalations  per  min- 
ute, only  to  cease  entirely  at  the  end  of  that  period  . . , 
About  half  an  hour  after  breathing  had  ceased,  an  autopsy 
was  begun.81 

An  Austrian  inmate,  Anton  Pacholegg,  who  worked  in 


1282 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


“experiments”  less 


Dr.  Rascher’s  office,  has  described  the 
scientifically. 

th}  *!ave  Personally  seen  through  the  observation  window  of 
the  decompression  chamber  when  a prisoner  inside  would 
stand  a vacuum  until  his  lungs  ruptured  . . . They  wouTd  go 
mad  and  pull  out  then  han  in  an  effort  to  relieve  the  pres- 
sure.  They  would  tear  their  heads  and  face  with  their  fingers 

net  TV."  311  a«empt  to  maim  themselves  in  their  mad- 
ness.  They  would  beat  the  walls  with  their  hands  and  head 

d?nmfCr<TT?  “ an  eff0rt  to  relieve  pressure  on  their  ear- 
subj^ci.82  eSe  CaS6S  USUa11 y ended  “ t^e  death  of  the 

Some  two  hundred  prisoners  were  subjected  to  this  ex- 
periment before  Dr.  Rascher  was  finished  with  it  Of  these 
according  to  the  testimony  at  the  “Doctors’  Trial,”  about 
*ghty  wel!e  billed  outright  and  the  remainder  executed 
somewhat  later  so  that  no  tales  would  be  told. 
lol?18  parfic“lar  research  project  was  finished  in  May 
1942,  at  which  tune  Field  Marshal  Erhard  Milch  of  the 
Luftwaffe  conveyed  Goering’s  “thanks”  to  Himmler  for 
v fSf8^8  p!oneer  experiments.  A little  later,  on  Octo- 
ber 10,  1942  Lieutenant  General  Dr.  Hippke,  Medical  In- 
spector of  the  Air  Force,  tendered  to  Himmler  “in  the 
name  of  German  aviation  medicine  and  research”  his  “obe- 
dient gratitude”  for  “the  Dachau  experiments.”  However 
he  thought,  there  was  one  omission  in  them.  They  had  not 
taken  into  account  the  extreme  cold  which  an  aviator  faces 
at  high  altitudes.  To  rectify  this  omission  the  Luftwaffe,  he 
informed  Himmler,  was  building  a decompression  cham- 
ber equipped  with  full  refrigeration  and  with  a nominal 
altitude  of  100,000  feet.  Freezing  experiments,”  he  added, 
along  different  lines  are  still  under  way  at  Dachau.”  83 
Indeed  they  were.  And  again  Dr.  Rascher  was  in  the  van- 
guard. But  some  of  his  doctor  colleagues  were  having 
qualms.  Was  it  Christian  to  do  what  Dr.  Rascher  was 
doing?  Apparently  a few  German  Luftwaffe  medics  were 
beginning  to  have  their  doubts.  When  Himmler  heard  of  this 
he  was  infuriated  and  promptly  wrote  Field  Marshal  Milch 
protesting  about  the  difficulties  caused  by  “Christian  medi- 
cal  circles”  in  the  Air  Force.  He  begged  the  Luftwaffe 
Chief  of  Staff  to  release  Rascher  from  the  Air  Force  medical 
corps  so  that  he  could  be  transferred  to  the  S.S.  He  sug- 
gested that  they  find  a “non-Christian  physician,  who 


1283 


Beginning  of  the  End 

should  be  honorable  as  a scientist,”  to  pass  on  Dr.  Rascher’s 
valuable  works.  In  the  meantime  Himmler  emphasized  that 
he 

personally  assumed  the  responsibility  for  supplying  asocial 
individuals  and  criminals  who  deserve  only  to  die  from  con- 
centration camps  for  these  experiments. 

Dr.  Rascher’s  “freezing  experiments”  were  of  two  kinds: 
first,  to  see  how  much  cold  a human  being  could  endure 
before  he  died;  and  second,  to  find  the  best  means  of  re- 
warming a person  who  still  lived  after  being  exposed  to 
extreme  cold.  Two  methods  were  selected  to  freeze  a man: 
dumping  him  into  a tank  of  ice  water  or  leaving  him  out 
in  the  snow,  completely  naked,  overnight  during  winter. 
Rascher’s  reports  to  Himmler  on  his  “freezing”  and  “warm- 
ing” experiments  are  voluminous;  an  example  or  two  will 
give  the  tenor.  One  of  the  earliest  ones  was  made  on 
September  10,  1942. 

The  TPs  were  immersed  in  water  in  full  flying  uniform 
. . . with  hood.  A life  jacket  prevented  sinking.  The  experi- 
ments were  conducted  at  water  temperatures  between  36.5 
and  53.5  degrees  Fahrenheit.  In  the  first  test  series  the  back 
of  the  head  and  the  brain  stem  were  above  water.  In  an- 
other series  the  back  of  the  neck  and  cerebellum  were  sub- 
merged. Temperatures  as  low  as  79.5  in  the  stomach  and 
79.7  in  the  rectum  were  recorded  electrically.  Fatalities  oc- 
curred only  when  the  medulla  and  the  cerebellum  were 
chilled. 

In  autopsies  of  such  fatalities  large  quantities  of  free 
blood,  up  to  a pint,  were  always  found  inside  the  cranial 
cavity.  The  heart  regularly  showed  extreme  distention  of  the 
right  chamber.  The  TPs  in  such  tests  inevitably  died  when 
body  temperature  had  declined  to  82.5,  despite  all  rescue 
attempts.  These  autopsy  findings  plainly  prove  the  impor- 
tance of  a heated  head  and  neck  protector  for  the  foam  suit 
now  in  the  process  of  development.84 

A table  which  Dr.  Rascher  appended  covers  six  “Fatal 
Cases”  and  shows  the  water  temperatures,  body  temperature 
on  removal  from  water,  body  temperature  at  death,  the 
length  of  stay  in  the  water  and  the  time  it  took  the  patient 
to  die.  The  toughest  man  endured  in  the  ice  water  for  one 
hundred  minutes,  the  weakest  for  fifty-three  minutes. 

Walter  Neff,  a camp  inmate  who  served  as  Dr.  Rascher’s 


1284 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


medical  orderly,  furnished  the  “Doctors’  Trial”  with  a 
layman’s  description  of  one  water-freezing  test. 

It  was  the  worst  experiment  ever  made.  Two  Russian  officers 
were  brought  from  the  prison  barracks.  Rascher  had  them 
stripped  and  they  had  to  go  into  the  vat  naked.  Hour  after 
hour  went  by,  and  whereas  usually  unconsciousness  from 
the  cold  set  m after  sixty  minutes  at  the  latest,  the  two  men 
in  this  case  still  responded  fully  after  two  and  a half  hours. 
All  appeals  to  Rascher  to  put  them  to  sleep  by  injection 
were  fruitless.  About  the  third  hour  one  of  the  Russians  said 
to  the  other,  ‘Comrade,  please  tell  the  officer  to  shoot  us.’ 
The  other  replied  that  he  expected  no  mercy  from  this 
fascist  dog.  The  two  shook  hands  with  a ‘Farewell,  Comrade’ 
. . . These  words  were  translated  to  Rascher  by  a young 
Pole,  though  in  somewhat  different  form.  Rascher  went  to  his 
office.  The  young  Pole  at  once  tried  to  chloroform  the  two 
victims,  but  Rascher  came  back  at  once,  threatening  us  with 
his  gun  . . . The  test  lasted  at  least  five  hours  before 
death  supervened.85 


The  nominal  “chief’  of  the  initial  cold-water  experi- 
ments was  a certain  Dr.  Holzloehner,  Professor  of  Medi- 
cine at  the  University  of  Kiel,  assisted  by  a Dr.  Finke, 
and  after  working  with  Rascher  for  a couple  of  months 
they  believed  that  they  had  exhausted  the  experimental 
possibilities.  The  three  physicians  thereupon  drew  up  a 
thirty-two-page  top-secret  report  to  the  Air  Force  entitled 
“Freezing  Experiments  with  Human  Beings”  and  called  a 
meeting  of  German  scientists  at  Nuremberg  for  October 
26-27,  1942,  to  hear  and  discuss  their  findings.  The  subject 
of  the  meeting  was  “Medical  Questions  in  Marine  and  Win- 
ter Emergencies.”  According  to  the  testimony  at  the  “Doc- 
tors’ Trial,”  ninety-five  German  scientists,  including  some  of 
the  most  eminent  men  in  the  field,  participated,  and  though 
the  three  doctors  left  no  doubt  that  a good  many  human 
beings  had  been  done  to  death  in  the  experiments  there 
were  no  questions  put  as  to  this  and  no  protests  therefore 
made. 


Professor  Holzloehner  * and  Dr.  Finke  bowed  out  of 
the  experiments  at  this  time  but  the  persevering  Dr.  Rascher 
carried  on  alone  from  October  1942  until  May  of  the 
following  year.  He  wanted,  among  other  things,  to  pursue 


* Professor  Holzloehner 
the  British  he  committed 


may  have  had  a guilty  conscience.  Picked 
suicide  after  his  first  interrogation. 


up  by 


1285 


Beginning  of  the  End 

experiments  in  what  he  called  “dry  freezing.”  Auschwitz, 
he  wrote  to  Himmler, 

is  much  better  suited  for  such  tests  than  Dachau  because  it  is 
colder  there  and  because  the  size  of  the  grounds  causes 
less  of  a stir  in  the  camp.  (The  test  persons  yell  when 
they  freeze.) 

For  some  reason  the  change  of  locality  could  not  be  ar- 
ranged, so  Dr.  Rascher  went  ahead  with  his  studies  at 
Dachau,  praying  for  some  real  winter  weather. 

Thank  God,  we  have  had  another  intense  cold  snap  at 
Dachau  [he  wrote  Himmler  in  the  early  spring  of  1943]. 
Some  people  remained  out  in  the  open  for  14  hours  at  21 
degrees,  attaining  an  interior  temperature  of  77  degrees,  with 
peripheral  frostbite  . . ,88 

At  the  “Doctors’  Trial”  the  witness  Neff  again  provided 
a layman’s  description  of  the  “dry-freezing”  experiments  of 
his  chief. 

A prisoner  was  placed  naked  on  a stretcher  outside  the 
barracks  in  the  evening.  He  was  covered  with  a sheet,  and 
every  hour  a bucket  of  cold  water  was  poured  over  him. 
The  test  person  lay  out  in  the  open  like  this  into  the  morn- 
ing. Their  temperatures  were  taken. 

Later  Dr.  Rascher  said  it  was  a mistake  to  cover  the  subject 
with  a sheet  and  to  drench  him  with  water  ...  In  the  future 
the  test  persons  must  not  be  covered.  The  next  experiment 
was  a test  on  ten  prisoners  who  were  exposed  in  turn,  like- 
wise naked. 

As  the  prisoners  slowly  froze,  Dr.  Rascher  or  his  assistant 
would  record  temperatures,  heart  action,  respiration  and 
so  on.  The  cries  of  the  suffering  often  rent  the  night. 

Initially  [Neff  explained  to  the  court]  Rascher  forbade 
these  tests  to  be  made  in  a state  of  anesthesia.  But  the  test 
persons  made  such  a racket  that  it  was  impossible  for  Rascher 
to  continue  these  tests  without  anesthetic.87 

The  TPs  (test  persons)  were  left  to  die,  as  Himmler  said 
they  deserved  to,  in  the  ice-water  tanks  or  lying  naked 
on  the  ground  outside  the  barracks  at  Dachau  on  a winter 
evening.  If  they  survived  they  were  shortly  exterminated. 
But  the  brave  German  flyers  and  sailors,  for  whose  benefit 
the  experiments  were  ostensibly  carried  out,  and  who 
might  find  themselves  ditched  in  the  icy  waters  of  the 
Arctic  Ocean  or  marooned  in  some  frozen  waste  above  the 


1286 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Arctic  Circle  in  Norway,  Finland  or  northern  Russia,  had 
to  be  saved  if  possible.  The  inimitable  Dr.  Rascher  therefore 
took  to  performing  on  his  human  guinea  pigs  at  Dachau 
what  he  termed  “warming  experiments.”  What  was  the  best 
method,  he  wanted  to  know,  for  warming  a frozen  man 
and  thus  possibly  saving  his  life? 

Heinrich  Himmler,  never  backward  in  offering  “prac- 
tical” solutions  to  his  corps  of  busy  scientists,  suggested 
to  Rascher  that  warming  by  “animal  heat”  be  tried,  but 
at  first  the  doctor  did  not  think  much  of  the  idea.  “Warm- 
ing by  animal  heat — the  bodies  of  animals  or  women — is 
much  too  slow,”  he  wrote  the  S.S.  chief.  But  Himmler 
kept  after  him. 

I am  very  curious  [he  wrote  Rascher]  about  the  experi- 
ments with  animal  heat.  Personally  I believe  these  experi- 
ments may  bring  the  best  and  the  most  sustained  results. 

Though  skeptical,  Dr.  Rascher  was  not  the  man  to  ignore 
a suggestion  from  the  leader  of  the  S.S.  He  promptly  em- 
barked on  a series  of  the  most  grotesque  “experiments” 
of  all,  recording  them  for  posterity  in  every  morbid  de- 
tail. Four  inmates  from  the  women’s  concentration  camps 
at  Ravensbrueck  were  sent  to  him  at  Dachau.  However 
there  was  something  about  one  of  them — they  were  clas- 
sified as  prostitutes — that  disturbed  the  doctor  and  he  so 
reported  to  his  superiors. 

One  of  the  women  assigned  showed  impeccably  Nordic 
racial  characteristics  ...  I asked  the  girl  why  she  had  volun- 
teered for  brothel  service  and  she  replied,  “To  get  out  of  the 
concentration  camp.”  When  I objected  that  it  was  shameful 
to  volunteer  as  a brothel  girl,  I was  advised,  “Better  half  a 
year  in  a brothel  than  half  a year  in  the  concentration 
camp  . . .” 

My  racial  conscience  is  outraged  by  the  prospect  of  ex- 
posing to  racially  inferior  concentration  camp  elements  a 
girl  who  is  outwardly  pure  Nordic  . . . For  this  reason  I de- 
cline to  use  this  girl  for  my  experimental  purposes.88 

But  he  used  others,  whose  hair  was  less  fair  and  the 
eyes  less  blue.  His  findings  were  duly  reported  to  Himmler 
in  a report  marked  “Secret”  on  February  12,  1942.89 

The  test  persons  were  chilled  in  the  familiar  way — dressed 
or  undressed — in  cold  water  at  various  temperatures  . . . Re- 


Beginning  of  the  End  1287 

moval  from  the  water  took  place  at  a rectal  temperature 
of  86  degrees. 

In  eight  cases  the  test  persons  were  placed  between  two 
naked  women  on  a wide  bed.  The  women  were  instructed  to 
snuggle  up  to  the  chilled  person  as  closely  as  possible.  The 
three  persons  were  then  covered  with  blankets  . . . 

Once  the  test  persons  regained  consciousness,  they  never 
lost  it  again,  quickly  grasping  their  situation  and  nestling 
close  to  the  naked  bodies  of  the  women.  The  rise  of  body 
temperature  then  proceeded  at  approximately  the  same  speed 
as  with  test  persons  warmed  by  being  swathed  in  blankets 
...  An  exception  was  formed  by  four  test  persons  who  prac- 
ticed sexual  intercourse  between  86  and  89.5  degrees.  In 
these  persons,  after  coitus,  a very  swift  temperature  rise 
ensued,  comparable  to  that  achieved  by  means  of  a hot- 
water  bath. 

Dr.  Rascher  found,  somewhat  to  his  surprise,  that  one 
woman  warmed  a frozen  man  faster  than  two  women. 

I attribute  this  to  the  fact  that  in  wanning  by  means  of 
one  woman  personal  inhibitions  are  avoided  and  the  woman 
clings  more  closely  to  the  chilled  person.  Here  too,  return 
of  full  consciousness  was  notably  rapid.  In  the  case  of  only 
one  person  did  consciousness  fail  to  return  and  only  a slight 
degree  of  warming  was  recorded.  This  test  person  died  with 
symptoms  of  a brain  hemorrhage,  later  confirmed  by  au- 
topsy. 

Summing  up,  this  murderous  hack  concluded  that  warm- 
ing up  a “chilled”  man  with  women  “proceeds  very 
slowly”  and  that  hot  baths  were  more  efficacious. 

Only  test  persons  [he  concluded]  whose  physical  state 
permitted  sexual  intercourse  warmed  up  surprisingly  fast 
and  also  showed  a surprisingly  rapid  return  of  full  bodily 
well-being. 

According  to  the  testimony  at  the  “Doctors’  Trial”  some 
four  hundred  “freezing”  experiments  were  performed  on 
three  hundred  persons  of  whom  between  eighty  and  ninety 
died  directly  as  a result  thereof,  and  the  rest,  except  for  a 
few,  were  bumped  off  subsequently,  some  of  them  having 
been  driven  insane.  Dr.  Rascher  himself,  incidentally,  was 
not  around  to  testify  at  this  trial.  He  Continued  his  bloody 
labors  on  various  new  projects,  too  numerous  to  mention, 
until  May  1944,  when  he  and  his  wife  were  arrested  by  the 
S.S. — not  for  his  murderous  “experiments,”  it  seems,  but 
on  the  charge  that  he  and  his  wife  had  practiced  deceit 


1288 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

about  how  their  children  came  into  the  world.  Such  treach- 
ery Himmler,  with  his  worship  of  German  mothers,  could 
not  brook — he  had  sincerely  believed  that  Frau  Rascher 
had  begun  to  bear  her  three  children  at  the  age  of  forty- 
eight  and  he  was  outraged  when  he  learned  that  she  had 
kidnaped  them.  So  Dr.  Rascher  was  incarcerated  in  the 
political  bunker  at  his  familiar  Dachau  camp  and  his  wife 
was  carted  off  to  Ravensbrueck,  from  which  the  doctor  had 
procured  his  prostitutes  for  the  ‘Vanning”  tests.  Neither 
survived,  and  it  is  believed  that  Himmler  himself,  in  one 
of  the  last  acts  of  his  life,  ordered  their  execution.  They 
might  have  made  awkward  witnesses. 

A number  of  such  awkward  witnesses  did  survive  to 
stand  trial.  Seven  of  them  were  condemned  to  death  and 
hanged,  defending  their  lethal  experiments  to  the  last 
as  patriotic  acts  which  served  the  Fatherland.  Dr.  Herta 
Oberheuser,  the  only  woman  defendant  at  the  “Doctors’ 
Trial,”  was  given  twenty  years.  She  had  admitted  giving 
lethal  injections  to  “five  or  six”  Polish  women  among  the 
hundreds  who  suffered  the  tortures  of  the  damned  in  a 
variety  of  “experiments”  at  Ravensbrueck.  A number  of 
doctors,  such  as  the  notorious  Pokomy,  who  had  wanted 
to  sterilize  millions  of  the  enemy,  were  acquitted.  A few 
were  contrite.  At  a second  trial  of  medical  underlings  Dr. 
Edwin  Katzenellenbogen,  a former  member  of  the  faculty 
of  the  Harvard  Medical  School,  asked  the  court  for  the 
death  sentence.  “You  have  placed  the  mark  of  Cain  on  my 
forehead,”  he  exclaimed.  “Any  physician  who  committed 
the  crimes  I am  charged  with  deserves  to  be  killed.”  He  was 
given  life  imprisonment.90 

THE  DEATH  OF  HEYDRICH  AND  THE 
END  OF  LIDICE 

Midway  through  the  war  there  was  one  act  of  retribution 
against  the  gangster  masters  of  the  New  Order  for  their 
slaughtering  of  the  conquered  people.  Reinhard  Heydrich, 
chief  of  the  Security  Police  and  the  S.D.,  deputy  chief  of 
the  Gestapo,  this  long-nosed,  icy-eyed  thirty-eight-year- 
old  policeman  of  diabolical  cast,  the  genius  of  the  “final 
solution,”  Hangman  Heydrich,  as  he  became  known  in  the 
occupied  lands,  met  a violent  end. 

Restless  for  further  power  and  secretly  intriguing  to  oust 


1289 


Beginning  of  the  End 

his  chief,  Himmler,  he  had  got  himself  appointed,  in  addi- 
tion to  his  other  offices,  Acting  Protector  of  Bohemia  and 
Moravia.  Poor  old  Neurath,  the  Protector,  was  packed  off 
on  indefinite  sick  leave  by  Hitler  in  September  1941,  and 
Heydrich  replaced  him  in  the  ancient  seat  of  the  Bohemian 
kings  at  Hradschin  Castle  in  Prague.  But  not  for  long. 

On  the  morning  of  May  29,  1942,  as  he  was  driving  in 
his  open  Mercedes  sports  car  from  his  country  villa  to  the 
Castle  in  Prague  a bomb  of  British  make  was  tossed  at  him, 
blowing  the  car  to  pieces  and  shattering  his  spine.  It 
had  been  hurled  by  two  Czechs,  Jan  Kubis  and  Josef 
Gabeik,  of  the  free  Czechoslovak  army  in  England,  who 
had  been  parachuted  from  an  R.A.F.  plane.  Well  equipped 
for  their  assignment,  they  got  away  under  a smoke  screen 
and  were  given  refuge  by  the  priests  of  the  Karl  Bor- 
romaeus  Church  in  Prague. 

Heydrich  expired  of  his  wounds  on  June  4 and  a 
veritable  hecatomb  followed  as  the  Germans  took  savage 
revenge,  after  the  manner  of  the  old  Teutonic  rites,  for  the 
death  of  their  hero.  According  to  one  Gestapo  report, 
1,331  Czechs,  including  201  women,  were  immediately 
executed.91  The  actual  assassins,  along  with  120  members 
of  the  Czech  resistance  who  were  hiding  in  the  Karl 
Borromaeus  Church,  were  besieged  there  by  the  S.S.  and 
killed  to  the  last  man.*  It  was  the  Jews,  however,  who 
suffered  the  most  for  this  act  of  defiance  against  the  master 
race.  Three  thousand  of  them  were  removed  from  the 
“privileged”  ghetto  of  Theresienstadt  and  shipped  to  the 
East  for  extermination.  On  the  day  of  the  bombing 
Goebbels  had  500  of  the  few  remaining  Jews  at  large  in 
Berlin  arrested  and  on  the  day  of  Heydrich’s  death  152 
of  them  were  executed  as  a “reprisal.” 

But  of  all  the  consequences  of  Heydrich’s  death  the  fate 
of  the  little  village  of  Lidice  near  the  mining  town  of 
Kladno  not  far  from  Prague  will  perhaps  be  longest  re- 
membered by  the  civilized  world.  For  no  other  reason 
except  to  serve  as  an  example  to  a conquered  people  who 
dared  to  take  the  life  of  one  of  their  inquisitors  a terrible 
savagery  was  carried  out  in  this  peaceful  little  rural  place. 

On  the  morning  of  June  9,  1942,  ten  truckloads  of  Ger- 


* According  to  Schellenberg,  who  was  there,  the  Gestapo  never  learned 
that  the  actual  assassins  were  among  the  dead  in  the  church.  (Schellenberg, 
The  Labyrinth,  p.  292.) 


1290 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

man  Security  Police  under  the  command  of  Captain  Max 
Rostock  * arrived  at  Lidice  and  surrounded  the  village. 
No  one  was  allowed  to  leave  though  anyone  who  lived 
there  and  happened  to  be  away  could  return.  A boy  of 
twelve,  panicking,  tried  to  steal  away.  He  was  shot  down 
and  killed.  A peasant  woman  ran  toward  the  outlying  fields. 
She  was  shot  in  the  back  and  killed.  The  entire  male 
population  of  the  village  was  locked  up  in  the  bams, 
stables  and  cellar  of  a farmer  named  Horak,  who  was 
also  the  mayor. 

The  next  day,  from  dawn  until  4 p.m.,  they  were  taken 
into  the  garden  behind  the  barn,  in  batches  of  ten,  and 
shot  by  firing  squads  of  the  Security  Police.  A total  of 
172  men  and  boys,  over  sixteen,  were  executed  there.  An 
additional  nineteen  male  residents,  who  were  working  in 
the  Kladno  mines  during  the  massacre,  were  later  picked 
up  and  dispatched  in  Prague. 

Seven  women  who  were  rounded  up  at  Lidice  were 
taken  to  Prague  and  shot.  All  the  rest  of  the  women  of 
the  village,  who  numbered  195,  were  transported  to  the 
Ravensbrueck  concentration  camp  in  Germany,  where 
seven  were  gassed,  three  “disappeared”  and  forty-two  died 
of  ill  treatment.  Four  of  the  Lidice  women  who  were  about 
to  give  birth  were  first  taken  to  a maternity  hospital  in 
Prague  where  their  newly  born  infants  were  murdered  and 
they  themselves  then  shipped  to  Ravensbrueck. 

There  remained  for  the  Germans  the  disposal  of  the 
children  of  Lidice,  whose  fathers  were  now  dead,  whose 
mothers  were  imprisoned.  It  must  be  said  that  the  Germans 
did  not  shoot  them  too,  not  even  the  male  children.  They 
were  carted  off  to  a concentration  camp  at  Gneisenau. 
There  were  ninety  in  all  and  from  these  seven,  who  were 
less  than  a year  old,  were  selected  by  the  Nazis,  after  a 
suitable  examination  by  Himmler’s  “racial  experts,”  to  be 
sent  to  Germany  to  be  brought  up  as  Germans  under 
German  names.  Later,  the  others  were  similarly  disposed 
of. 

“Every  trace  of  them  has  been  lost,”  the  Czechoslovak 
government,  which  filed  an  official  report  on  Lidice  for  the 
Nuremberg  tribunal,  concluded. 

Happily,  some  of  them,  at  least,  were  later  found.  I re- 


Hanged  in  Prague  in  August  1951. 


1291 


Beginning  of  the  End 

member  in  the  autumn  of  1945  reading  the  pitiful  appeals 
in  the  then  Allied-controlled  German  newspapers  from  the 
surviving  mothers  of  Lidice  asking  the  German  people  to 
help  them  locate  their  children  and  send  them  “home.”  * 

Actually  Lidice  itself  had  been  wiped  off  the  face  of  the 
earth.  As  soon  as  the  men  had  been  massacred  and  the 
woman  and  children  carted  off,  the  Security  Police  had 
burned  down  the  village,  dynamited  the  mins  and  lev- 
eled it  off. 

Lidice,  though  it  became  the  most  widely  known  ex- 
ample of  Nazi  savagery  of  this  kind,  was  not  the  only  vil- 
lage in  the  German-occupied  lands  to  suffer  such  a barbaric 
end.  There  was  one  other  in  Czechoslovakia,  Lezhaky,  and 
several  more  in  Poland,  Russia,  Greece  and  Yugoslavia. 
Even  in  the  West,  where  the  New  Order  was  relatively  less 
murderous,  the  example  of  Lidice  was  repeated  by  the 
Germans  though  in  most  cases,  such  as  that  of  Televaag 
in  Norway,  the  men,  woman  and  children  were  merely 
deported  to  separate  concentration  camps  after  every  build- 
ing in  the  village  had  been  razed  to  the  ground. 

But  on  June  10,  1944,  two  years  to  a day  after  the  mas- 
sacre of  Lidice,  a terrible  toll  of  life  was  taken  at  the 
French  village  of  Oradour-sur-Glane,  near  Limoges.  A de- 
tachment of  the  S.S.  division  Das  Reich,  which  had  already 
earned  a reputation  for  terror — if  not  for  fighting — in 
Russia,  surrounded  the  French  town  and  ordered  the  in- 
habitants to  gather  in  the  central  square.  There  the  people 
were  told  by  the  commandant  that  explosives  were  re- 
ported to  have  been  hidden  in  the  village  and  that  a search 
and  the  checking  of  identity  cards  would  be  made.  Where- 
upon the  entire  population  of  652  persons  was  locked  up. 
TLe  men  were  herded  into  barns,  the  women  and  children 
into  the  church.  The  entire  village  was  then  set  on  fire.  The 
German  soldiers  next  set  upon  the  inhabitants.  The  men 
in  the  bams  who  were  not  burned  to  death  were  machine- 
gunned  and  killed.  The  women  and  children  in  the  church 
were  also  peppered  with  machine-gun  fire  and  those  who 
were  not  killed  were  burned  to  death  when  the  German 
soldiers  set  fire  to  the  church.  Three  days  later  the  Bishop 
of  Limoges  found  the  charred  bodies  of  fifteen  children  in 
a heap  behind  the  bumed-out  altar. 


* UNRRA  reported  on  April  2,  1947,  that  seventeen  of  them  had  been 
found  in  Bavaria  and  sent  back  to  their  mothers  in  Czechoslovakia. 


1292 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Nine  years  later,  in  1953,  a French  military  court  estab- 
lished that  642  inhabitants — 245  women,  207  children  and 
190  men — had  perished  in  the  massacre  at  Oradour.  Ten 
survived.  Though  badly  burned  they  had  simulated  death 
and  thus  escaped  it.* 

Oradour,  like  Lidice,  was  never  rebuilt.  Its  ruins  re- 
main a monument  to  Hitler’s  New  Order  in  Europe.  The 
gutted  church  stands  out  against  the  peaceful  countryside 
as  a reminder  of  the  beautiful  June  day,  just  before  the 
harvest,  when  the  village  and  its  inhabitants  suddenly 
ceased  to  exist.  Where  once  a window  stood  is  a little  sign: 
“Madame  Rouffance,  the  only  survivor  from  the  church, 
escaped  through  this  window.”  In  front  there  is  a small 
figure  of  Christ  affixed  to  a rusty  iron  cross. 

Such,  as  has  been  sketched  in  this  chapter,  were  the  be- 
ginnings of  Hitler’s  New  Order;  such  was  the  debut  of  the 
Nazi  Gangster  Empire  in  Europe.  Fortunately  for  mankind 
it  was  destroyed  in  its  infancy — not  by  any  revolt  of  the 
German  people  against  such  a reversion  to  barbarism  but 
by  the  defeat  of  German  arms  and  the  consequent  fall  of 
the  Third  Reich,  the  story  of  which  now  remains  to  be 
told. 

* Twenty  members  of  the  S.S.  detachment  were  sentenced  to  death  by  this 
court  but  only  two  were  executed,  the  remaining  eighteen  having  their 
sentences  commuted  to  prison  terms  of  from  five  to  twelve  years.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Das  Reich  Division,  S.S.  Lieutenant  General  Heinz  Lammer- 
ding  was  condemned  to  death  in  absentia.  So  far  as  I know  he  was  never 
found.  The  actual  commander  of  the  detachment  at  Oradour,  Major  Otto 
Dickmann,  was  killed  in  action  in  Normandy  a few  days  later. 


28 


THE  FALL  OF  MUSSOLINI 


for  three  successive  war  years  when  summer  came,  it 
had  been  the  Germans  who  had  launched  the  great  offen- 
sives on  the  continent  of  Europe.  Now  in  1943  the  tables 
turned. 

With  the  capture  in  early  May  of  that  year  of  the  Axis 
forces  in  Tunisia,  all  that  remained  of  a once  mighty  army 
in  North  Africa,  it  was  obvious  that  General  Eisenhower’s 
Anglo-American  armies  would  next  turn  on  Italy  itself. 
This  was  the  kind  of  nightmare  which  had  haunted  Mus- 
solini in  September  of  1939  and  which  had  made  him 
delay  Italy’s  entry  into  the  war  until  neighboring  France 
had  been  conquered  by  the  Germans  and  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  driven  across  the  Channel.  The  night- 
mare now  returned,  but  this  time  it  was  rapidly  turning 
into  reality. 

Mussolini  himself  was  ill  and  disillusioned;  and  he  was 
frightened.  Defeatism  was  rife  among  his  people  and  in 
the  armed  forces.  There  had  been  mass  strikes  in  the  indus- 
trial cities  of  Milan  and  Turin,  where  the  hungry  workers 
had  demonstrated  for  “bread,  peace  and  freedom.”  The 
discredited  and  corrupt  Fascist  regime  itself  was  fast  crum- 
bling, and  when  Count  Ciano  at  the  beginning  of  the  year 
was  relieved  as  Foreign  Minister  and  sent  to  the  Vatican 
as  ambassador  the  Germans  suspected  that  he  had  gone 
there  to  try  to  negotiate  a separate  peace  with  the  Allies, 
as  Antonescu,  the  Rumanian  dictator,  was  already  urging. 

For  several  months  Mussolini  had  been  bombarding  Hit- 
ler with  appeals  to  make  peace  with  Stalin,  so  that  his 
armies  could  be  withdrawn  to  the  West  to  make  a common 
defense  with  the  Italians  against  the  growing  threat  of  the 
Anglo-American  forces  in  the  Mediterranean  and  of 
those  which  he  believed  were  assembling  in  England  for 

1293 


1294  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

a cross-Channel  invasion.  The  time  had  come  again,  Hitler 
realized,  for  a meeting  with  Mussolini  in  order  to  buck 
up  his  sagging  partner  and  to  put  him  straight.  This  was 
arranged  for  April  7,  1943,  at  Salzburg,  and  though  the 
Duce  arrived  determined  to  have  his  way — or  at  least  his 
say — at  last,  he  once  more  succumbed  to  the  Fuehrer’s 
torrents  of  words.  Hitler  later  described  his  success  to 
Goebbels,  who  jotted  it  down  in  his  diary. 

By  putting  every  ounce  of  energy  into  the  effort,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  pushing  Mussolini  back  on  the  rails  . . . The 
Duce  underwent  a complete  change  . . . When  he  got  out 
of  the  train  on  his  arrival,  the  Fuehrer  thought,  he  looked 
like  a broken  old  man;  when  he  left  [after  four  days]  he 
was  in  high  fettle,  ready  for  any  deed.1 

But  in  point  of  fact  Mussolini  was  not  ready  for  the 
events  which  now  followed  in  quick  succession.  The  Allied 
conquest  of  Tunisia  in  May  was  followed  by  the  success- 
ful Anglo-American  landings  in  Sicily  on  July  10.  The 
Italians  had  little  stomach  for  battle  in  their  own  home- 
land. Reports  soon  reached  Hitler  that  the  Italian  Army 
was  “in  a state  of  collapse,”  as  he  put  it  to  his  advisers 
at  OKW. 

Only  barbaric  measures  [Hider  told  a war  council  on 
July  17]  like  those  applied  by  Stalin  in  1941  or  by  the 
French  in  1917  can  help  to  save  the  nation.  A sort  of 
tribunal  or  court-martial  should  be  set  up  in  Italy  to  remove 
undesirable  elements.2 

Once  again  he  summoned  Mussolini  to  discuss  the  mat- 
ter, the  meeting  taking  place  on  July  19  at  Feltre  in  north- 
ern Italy.  This,  incidentally,  was  the  thirteenth  conference 
of  the  two  dictators  and  it  followed  the  pattern  of  the 
most  recent  ones.  Hitler  did  all  the  talking,  Mussolini  all 
thq  listening — for  three  hours  before  lunch  and  for  two 
hours  after  it.  Without  much  success  the  fanatical  German 
leader  tried  to  rekindle  the  sunken  spirits  of  his  ailing 
friend  and  ally.  They  must  continue  the  fight  on  all  fronts. 
Their  tasks  could  not  be  left  “to  another  generation.”  The 
“voice  of  history”  was  still  beckoning  them.  Sicily  and 
Italy  proper  could  be  held  if  the  Italians  fought.  There 
would  be  more  German  reinforcements  to  help  them.  A 
new  U-boat  would  soon  be  in  operation  and  would  deal 
the  British  a “Stalingrad.” 


Beginning  of  the  End  1295 

Despite  Hitler’s  promises  and  boasts  the  atmosphere.  Dr. 
Schmidt  found,  was  most  depressing.  Mussolini  was  so 
overwrought  that  he  could  no  longer  follow  his  friend’s 
tirades  and  at  the  end  asked  Schmidt  to  furnish  him 
with  his  notes.  The  Duce’s  despair  worsened  when  during 
the  meeting  reports  came  in  of  the  first  heavy  daylight 
Allied  air  attack  on  Rome.3 

Benito  Mussolini,  tired  and  senile  though  he  was  only 
going  on  sixty,  he  who  had  strutted  so  arrogantly  across 
Europe’s  stage  for  two  decades,  was  at  the  end  of  his 
rope.  When  he  returned  to  Rome  he  found  much  worse 
than  the  aftermath  of  the  first  heavy  bombing.  He  faced 
revolt  from  some  of  his  closest  henchmen  in  the  Fascist 
Party  hierarchy,  even  from  his  son-in-law,  Ciano.  And  be- 
hind it  there  was  a plot  among  a wider  circle  that  reached 
to  the  King  to  overthrow  him. 

The  rebellious  Fascist  leaders,  led  by  Dino  Grandi,  Giu- 
seppe Bottai  and  Ciano,  demanded  the  convocation  of 
the  Fascist  Grand  Council,  which  had  not  met  since  De- 
cember 1939  and  which  had  always  been  a rubber-stamp 
body  completely  dominated  by  the  Duce.  It  convened  on 
the  night  of  July  24—25,  1943,  and  Mussolini  for  the 
first  time  in  his  career  as  dictator  found  himself  the  target 
of  violent  criticism  for  the  disaster  into  which  he  had  led 
the  country.  By  a vote  of  19  to  8,  a resolution  was  carried 
demanding  the  restoration  of  a constitutional  monarchy 
with  a democratic  Parliament.  It  also  called  for  the  full 
command  of  the  armed  forces  to  be  restored  to  the  King. 

The  Fascist  rebels,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Grandi, 
did  not  appear  to  have  had  any  idea  of  going  further 
than  this.  But  there  was  a second  and  wider  plot  of  cer- 
tain generals  and  the  King,  which  was  now  sprung.  Mus- 
solini himself  apparently  felt  that  he  had  weathered  the 
storm — after  all,  decisions  in  Italy  were  not  made  by  a 
majority  vote  in  the  Grand  Council  but  by  the  Duce — and 
he  was  taken  completely  by  surprise  when  on  the  evening 
of  July  25  he  was  summoned  to  the  royal  palace  by  the 
King,  summarily  dismissed  from  office  and  carted  off  under 
arrest  in  an  ambulance  to  a police  station.* 

* “I  was  completely  free  of  any  forebodings,"  Mussolini  wrote  later  in 
describing  his  state  of  mind  as  he  set  out  for  the  palace.  King  Victor  Em- 
manuel lost  no  time  in  bringing  him  down  to  earth. 

“My  dear  Duce,”  Mussolini  quotes  him  as  saying  at  the  outset,  “it’s  no 
longer  any  good.  Italy  has  gone  to  bits  . . . The  soldiers  don't  want  to  fight 


1296 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


So  fell,  ignominously,  the  modern  Roman  Caesar,  a 
bellicose-sounding  man  of  the  twentieth  century  who  had 
known  how  to  profit  from  its  confusions  and  despair,  but 
who  underneath  the  gaudy  fa§ade  was  made  largely  of 
sawdust.  As  a person  he  was  not  unintelligent.  He  had 
read  widely  in  history  and  thought  he  understood  its  les- 
sons. But  as  dictator  he  had  made  the  fatal  mistake  of 
seeking  to  make  a martial,  imperial  Great  Power  of  a 
country  which  lacked  the  industrial  resources  to  become 
one  and  whose  people,  unlike  the  Germany  were  too  civi- 
lized, too  sophisticated,  too  down  to  earth  to  be  attracted 
by  such  false  ambitions.  The  Italian  people,  at  heart,  had 
never,  like  the  Germans,  embraced  fascism.  They  had 
merely  suffered  it,  knowing  that  it  was  a passing  phase, 
and  Mussolini  toward  the  end  seems  to  have  realized  this. 
But  like  all  dictators  he  was  carried  away  by  power,  which, 
as  it  inevitably  must,  corrupted  him,  corroding  his  mind 
and  poisoning  his  judgment.  This  led  him  to  his  second 
fatal  mistake  of  tying  his  fortunes  and  those  of  Italy  to 
the  Third  Reich.  When  the  bell  began  to  toll  for  Hitler’s 
Germany  it  began  to  toll  for  Mussolini’s  Italy,  and  as 
the  summer  of  1943  came  the  Italian  leader  heard  it.  But 
there  was  nothing  he  could  do  to  escape  his  fate.  By  now  he 
was  a prisoner  of  Hitler. 

Not  a gun  was  fired — not  even  by  the  Fascist  militia — 
to  save  him.  Not  a voice  was  raised  in  his  defense.  No  one 
seemed  to  mind  the  humiliating  nature  of  his  departure — • 
being  hauled  away  from  the  King’s  presence  to  jail  in  an 
ambulance.  On  the  contrary,  there  was  general  rejoicing  at 
his  fall.  Fascism  itself  collapsed  as  easily  as  its  founder. 
Marshal  Pietro  Badoglio  formed  a nonparty  government 
of  generals  and  civil  servants,  the  Fascist  Party  was  dis- 
solved, Fascists  were  removed  from  key  posts  and  anti- 
Fascists  released  from  prison. 

The  reaction  at  Hitler’s  headquarters  to  the  news  of 
Mussolini’s  fall  may  be  imagined,  though  it  need  not  be — 
for  voluminous  secret  records  abound  to  what  it  was.1 
It  was  one  of  deep  shock.  Certain  parallels  were  immedi- 

any  more  ...  At  this  moment  you  are  the  most  hated  man  in  Italy  ..." 

“You  are  making  an  extremely  grave  decision,”  Mussolini  says  he  replied. 
But  even  by  his  own  account  he  made  little  attempt  to  induce  the  monarch 
to  change  his  mind.  He  ended  by  “wishing  luck”  to  his  successor.  (Mussolini, 
Memoirs,  1942-1943,  pp.  80-81.) 


1297 


Beginning  of  the  End 

ately  evident  even  to  the  Nazi  mind,  and  the  danger  that 
a terrible  precedent  might  have  been  set  in  Rome  greatly 
troubled  Dr.  Goebbels,  who  was  summoned  posthaste  to 
Rastenburg  headquarters  on  July  26.  The  Propaganda 
Minister’s  first  thought,  we  learn  from  his  diary,  was  how 
to  explain  the  overthrow  of  Mussolini  to  the  German  peo- 
ple. “What  are  we  to  tell  them,  anyway?”  he  asked  him- 
self, and  he  decided  that  for  the  moment  they  were  to  be 
told  only  that  the  Duce  had  resigned  “for  reasons  of 
health.” 

Knowledge  of  these  events  [he  wrote  in  his  diary]  might 
conceivably  encourage  some  subversive  elements  in  Germany 
to  think  they  could  put  over  the  same  thing  here  that 
Badoglio  and  his  henchmen  accomplished  in  Rome.  The 
Fuehrer  ordered  Himmler  to  see  to  it  that  most  severe 
police  measures  be  applied  in  case  such  a danger  seemed 
imminent  here. 

Hitler,  however,  Goebbels  added,  did  not  think  the  dan- 
ger was  very  imminent  in  Germany.  The  Propaganda 
Minister  finally  assured  himself  that  the  German  people 
would  not  “regard  the  crisis  in  Rome  as  a precedent.” 

Though  the  Fuehrer  had  observed  the  signs  of  cracking 
in  Mussolini  at  their  meeting  but  a fortnight  before,  he 
was  taken  completely  by  surprise  when  the  news  from 
Rome  began  to  trickle  in  to  headquarters  on  the  afternoon 
of  July  25.  The  first  word  was  merely  that  the  Fascist 
Grand  Council  had  met,  and  Hitler  wondered  why. 
“What’s  the  use  of  councils  like  that?”  he  asked.  “What 
do  they  do  except  jabber?” 

That  evening  his  worst  fears  were  confirmed.  “The  Duce 
has  resigned,”  he  announced  to  his  astounded  military  ad- 
visers at  a conference  that  began  at  9:30  p.m.  “Badoglio, 
our  most  bitter  enemy,  has  taken  over  the  government.” 

For  one  of  the  last  times  of  the  war  Hitler  reacted  to 
the  news  with  that  ice-cold  judgment  which  he  had  dis- 
played in  crises  in  earlier  and  more  successful  days.  When 
General  Jodi  urged  that  they  wait  for  more  complete  re- 
ports from  Rome,  Hitler  cut  him  short. 

Certainly  [he  said],  but  still  we  have  to  plan  ahead.  Un- 
doubtedly in  their  treachery  they  will  proclaim  that  they 
will  remain  loyal  to  us,  but  that  is  treachery.  Of  course 
they  won’t  remain  loyal  . . . Although  that  so-and-so 
[Badoglio]  declared  immediately  that  the  war  would  be 


1298 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

continued,  that  won’t  make  any  difference.  They  have  to  say 
that,  but  it  remains  treason.  We’ll  play  the  same  game  while 
preparing  everything  to  take  over  the  whole  crew  with  one 
stroke,  to  capture  all  that  riffraff. 

That  was  Hitler’s  first  thought:  to  seize  those  who  had 
overthrown  Mussolini  and  restore  the  Duce  to  power. 

Tomorrow  [he  went  on]  Til  send  a man  down  there 
with  orders  for  the  commander  of  the  Third  Panzergrenadier 
Division  to  the  effect  that  he  must  drive  into  Rome  with  a 
special  detail  and  arrest  the  whole  government,  the  King 
and  the  whole  bunch  right  away.  First  of  all,  to  arrest  the 
Crown  Pnna;  and  to  take  over  the  whole  gang,  especially 
Badoglio  and  that  entire  crew.  Then  watch  them  cave  in 
and  in  two  or  three  days  there’ll  be  another  coup. 

Hitler  turned  to  the  OKW  Chief  of  Operations. 

Hitler:  Jodi,  work  out  the  orders  . . . telling  them  to 
drive  into  Rome  with  their  assault  guns  . . . and  to  arrest  the 
government,  the  King,  and  the  whole  crew.  I want  the 
Crown  Prince  above  all. 

Keitel:  He  is  more  important  than  the  old  man 

Bodenschatz  [a  general  of  the  Luftwaffe]:  That  has  to 
be  organized  so  that  they  can  be  packed  into  a plane  and 
flown  away. 

Hitler:  Right  into  a plane  and  off  with  them. 

Bodenschatz:  Don’t  let  the  Bambino  get  lost  at  the  air, 
field. 

At  a later  conference  shortly  after  midnight  the  ques- 
tion was  raised  as  to  what  to  do  with  the  Vatican.  Hitler 
answered  it. 

I’ll  go  right  into  the  Vatican.  Do  you  think  the  Vatican 
embarrasses  me?  We’ll  take  that  over  right  away  . . . The 
entire  diplomatic  corps  are  in  there  . . . That  rabble  . 
We’ll  get  that  bunch  of  swine  out  of  there  . . . Later  we 
can  make  apologies  . . . 

That  night  also  Hitler  gave  orders  to  secure  the  Alpine 
passes,  both  between  Italy  and  Germany  and  between  Italy 
and  France.  Some  eight  German  divisions  from  France  and 
southern  Germany  were  hastily  assembled  for  this  purpose 
and  established  as  Army  Group  B under  the  command  of 
the  energetic  Rommel.  Had  the  Italians,  as  Goebbels 
noted  in  his  diary,  blown  the  Alpine  tunnels  and  bridges, 
the  German  forces  in  Italy,  some  of  them  already  heavily 


Beginning  of  the  End  1299 

engaged  in  Sicily  by  Eisenhower’s  armies,  would  have  been 
cut  off  from  their  source  of  supplies.  They  could  not  have 
held  out  for  long. 

But  the  Italians  could  not  suddenly  turn  on  the  Germans 
overnight.  Badoglio  had  first  to  establish  contact  with  the 
Allies  to  see  if  he  could  get  an  armistice  and  Allied  sup- 
port against  the  Wehrmacht  divisions.  Hitler  had  been 
correct  in  assuming  that  that  was  exactly  what  Badoglio 
would  do,  but  he  had  no  inkling  it  would  take  as  long  as 
it  did.  Indeed,  this  assumption  dominated  the  discussion 
at  a war  conference  at  the  Fuehrer’s  headquarters  on  July 
27  attended  by  most  of  the  bigwigs  in  the  Nazi  govern- 
ment and  armed  forces,  among  them  Goering,  Goebbels, 
Himmler,  Rommel  and  the  new  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  Navy,  Admiral  Karl  Doenitz — who  had  succeeded 
Grand  Admiral  Raeder  in  January,  when  the  latter  had 
fallen  from  favor.*  Most  of  the  generals,  led  by  Rommel, 
urged  caution,  arguing  that  any  contemplated  action  in 
Italy  be  carefully  prepared  and  well  thought  out.  Hitler 
wanted  to  move  at  once  even  though  it  meant  withdrawing 
key  panzer  divisions  from  the  Eastern  front,  where  the 
Russians  had  just  launched  (July  15)  their  first  summer 
offensive  of  the  war.  For  once  the  generals  seem  to  have 
had  their  way  and  Hitler  was  persuaded  to  withhold  ac- 
tion. In  the  meantime  as  many  German  troops  as  could 
be  rounded  up  would  be  rushed  over  the  Alps  into  Italy. 
Goebbels  took  a dim  view  of  the  hesitancy  of  the  generals. 

They  don’t  take  into  account  [he  wrote  in  his  diary  after 
the  war  powwow]  what  the  enemy  is  going  to  do.  Un- 
doubtedly the  English  won’t  wait  a week  while  we  consider 
and  prepare  for  action. 

He  and  Hitler  need  not  have  worried.  The  Allies  waited 
not  a week,  but  six  weeks.  By  then  Hitler  had  his  plans 
and  the  forces  to  carry  them  out  ready. 

* Hitler  had  become  furious  with  Raeder.  who  had  commanded  the  German 
Navy  since  1928,  for  the  Navy’s  failure  to  destroy  Allied  convoys  to  Russia 
m the  Arctic  Ocean  and  for  heavy  losses  suffered  there.  In  a hysterical  out- 
burst at  headquarters  on  January  1,  the  warlord  had  ordered  the  immediate 
decommissioning  of  the  German  High  Seas  Fleet.  The  vessels  were  to  be 
broken  up  for  scrap.  On  January  6 there  was  a stormy  showdown  between 
Hitler  and  Raeder  at  the  Wolfsschanze  headquarters.  The  Fuehrer  accused 
the  Navy  of  inaction  and  lack  of  the  will  to  fight  and  take  risks.  Raeder 
thereupon  asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  command,  and  his  resignation  was 
formally  and  publicly  accepted  on  January  30.  Doenitz,  the  new  Commander 
m Chief,  had  been  commander  of  U-boats,  knew  little  of  the  problems  of 
surface  vessels  and  henceforth  concentrated  on  submarine  warfare. 


1300  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

In  his  feverish  mind  he  had  in  fact  hastily  conceived 
the  plans  by  the  time  the  war  conference  on  July  27  con- 
vened. There  were  four  of  them:  (1)  Operation  Eiche 
(“Oak”)  provided  for  the  rescue  of  Mussolini  either  by 
the  Navy,  if  he  were  located  on  an  island,  or  by  Luftwaffe 
parachutists,  if  he  were  found  on  the  mainland;  (2)  Oper- 
ation Students  called  for  the  sudden  occupation  of  Rome 
and  the  restoration  of  Mussolini’s  government  there;  (3) 
Operation  Schwarz  (“Black”)  was  the  code  name  for  the 
military  occupation  of  all  of  Italy;  (4)  Operation  Achse 
(“Axis”)  envisaged  the  capture  or  destruction  of  the  Italian 
fleet.  Later  the  last  two  operations  were  combined  under 
the  code  name  of  “Axis.” 

Two  events  early  in  September  1943  set  the  Fuehrer’s 
plans  in  operation.  On  September  3 Allied  troops  landed 
on  the  boot  of  southern  Italy,  and  on  September  8 public 
announcement  was  made  of  the  armistice  (secretly  signed 
on  September  3)  between  Italy  and  the  Western  Powers. 

Hitler  had  flown  to  Zaporozhe  in  the  Ukraine  that  day 
to  try  to  restore  the  sagging  German  front,  but,  according 
to  Goebbels,  he  had  been  seized  “by  a queer  feeling  of  un- 
rest” and  had  returned  that  evening  to  Rastenburg  head- 
quarters in  East  Prussia,  where  the  news  awaited  him  that 
his  principal  ally  had  deserted.  Though  he  had  expected 
it  and  prepared  for  it,  the  actual  timing  took  him  by 
surprise  and  for  several  hours  there  was  great  confusion 
at  headquarters.  The  Germans  had  first  learned  of  the 
Italian  armistice  from  a BBC  broadcast  from  London,  and 
when  Jodi  put  through  a call  from  Rastenburg  to  Field 
Marshal  Kesselring  at  Frascati,  near  Rome,  to  ask  if  it 
were  true  the  commander  of  the  German  armies  in  south- 
ern Italy  confessed  that  it  was  news  to  him.  However, 
Kesselring,  whose  headquarters  that  morning  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  an  Allied  bombing  and  who  was  preoccupied 
with  rounding  up  troops  to  meet  a new  Allied  landing 
somewhere  on  the  west  coast,  was  able  to  get  out  the 
code  word  “Axis,”  which  set  in  motion  the  plans  to  disarm 
the  Italian  Army  and  occupy  the  country. 

For  a day  or  two  the  situation  of  the  German  forces 
in  central  and  south  Italy  was  extremely  critical.  Five 
Italian  divisions  faced  two  German  divisions  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Rome.  If  the  powerful  Allied  invasion  fleet  which 


Beginning  of  the  End 


1301 


had  appeared  off  Naples  .on  September  8 moved  north 
and  landed  near  the  capital  and  was  reinforced  by  para- 
chutists seizing  the  nearby  airfields,  as  Kesselring  and  his 
staff  at  first  expected,  the  course  of  the  war  in  Italy  would 
have  taken  a different  turn  than  it  did  and  final  disaster 
might  have  overtaken  the  Third  Reich  a year  earlier  than 
happened.  Kesselring  later  contended  that  on  the  evening 
of  the  eighth  Hitler  and  OKW  “wrote  off”  his  entire  force 
of  eight  divisions  as  irretrievably  lost.5  Two  days  later 
Hitler  told  Goebbels  that  southern  Italy  was  lost  and  that 
a new  line  would  have  to  be  established  north  of  Rome 
in  the  Apennines. 

But  the  Allied  Command  did  not  take  advantage  of  its 
complete  command  of  the  sea,  which  permitted  it  to  make 
landings  almost  anywhere  on  both  coasts  of  Italy,  nor  did 
it  exploit  its  overwhelming  air  superiority,  as  the  Germans 
had  feared.  Moreover,  no  effort  seems  to  have  been  made 
by  Eisenhower’s  Command  to  try  to  utilize  the  large  Ital- 
ian forces  in  conjunction  with  its  own,  especially  the  five 
Italian  divisions  in  the  vicinity  of  Rome.  Had  Eisenhower 
done  so — at  least  such  was  the  contention  of  both  Kes- 
selring and  his  chief  of  staff,  General  Siegfried  Westphal, 
later — the  predicament  of  the  Germans  would  have  be- 
come hopeless.  It  was  simply  beyond  their  powers,  they 
declared,  to  fight  off  Montgomery’s  army  advancing  up 
the  peninsula  from  the  “boot,”  throw  back  General  Mark 
Clark’s  invasion  force,  wherever  it  landed,  and  deal  with 
the  large  Italian  armed  formations  in  their  midst  and  in 
their  rear.  * 6 

Both  generals  breathed  a sigh  of  relief  when  the  Ameri- 


According  to  Captain  Harry  C.  Butcher,  Eisenhower’s  naval  aide  both  the 
American  and  British  chiefs  of  staff.  General  George  C.  Marshall  and  Field 
Marshal  Sir  John  G.  Dill,  complained  that  Eisenhower  was  not  showing 
sufficient  initiative  m pressing  forward  in  Italy.  Butcher  points  out,  in 
detense  of  his  chief,  that  insufficient  landing  craft  limited  Eisenhower’s 
plans  and  that  to  have  launched  a seaborne  invasion  as  far  north  as  the 
vicinity  of  Rome  would  have  put  the  operation  beyond  the  range  of  Allied 
tighter  planes,  which  had  to  take  off  from  Sicily.  Eisenhower  himself  points 
out  that  after  the  capture  of  Sicily  he  was  ordered  to  return  seven  divisions, 
four  American  and  three  British,  to  England  in  preparation  for  the  Channel 
invasion,  which  left  him  woefully  short  of  troops.  Butcher  also  states  that 
Eisenhower  originally  planned  to  drop  airborne  troops  on  the  Rome  airfields 
to  help  the  Italians  defend  the  capital  against  the  Germans,  but  that  at 
the  last  minute  Badoglio  begged  that  this  operation  be  “suspended  tempo- 
rarily. General  Maxwell  D.  Taylor,  who  at  great  personal  risk  had  secretly 
gone  to  Rome  to  confer  with  Badoglio,  reported  that  because  of  Italian 
defeatism  and  German  strength  the  dropping  of  an  American  airborne 
dlViSQQn  jr<T .aPPfaret} l be  suicidal.  (See  Eisenhower,  Crusade  in  Europe , 
p.  189,  and  Butcher,  My  Three  Years  with  Eisenhower , pp.  407-25.) 


1302 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

can  Fifth  Army  landed  not  near  Rome  but  south  of  Na- 
ples, at  Salerno,  and  when  the  Allied  parachutists  failed 
to  appear  over  the  Rome  airfields.  Their  relief  was  all  the 
^hen  1116  Italian  divisions  surrendered  almost 
without  firing  a shot  and  were  disarmed.  It  meant  that  the 
Germans  could  easily  hold  Rome  and,  for  the  time  being, 
even  Naples.  This  gave  them  possession  of  two  thirds  of 
Italy,  including  the  industrial  north,  whose  factories  were 
put  to  work  turning  out  arms  for  Germany.  Almost  mi- 
raculously Hitler  had  received  a new  lease  on  life  * 

Italy’s  withdrawal  from  the  war  had  embittered  him.  It 
was,  he  told  Goebbels,  who  had  again  been  summoned  to 
Rastenburg,  “a  gigantic  example  of  swinishness.”  More- 
over, the  overthrow  of  Mussolini  made  him  apprehensive 
of  his  own  position.  “The  Fuehrer,”  Goebbels  noted  in  his 
diary  on  September  11,  “invoked  final  measures  to  pre- 
clude similar  developments  with  us  once  and  for  all.” 

In  his  broadcast  to  the  nation  on  the  evening  of  Septem- 
ber 10,  which  Goebbels  had  persuaded  him  to  make  only 
after  much  pleading — “The  people  are  entitled  to  a word 
of  encouragement  and  solace  from  the  Fuehrer  in  this 
difficult  crisis,”  the  Propaganda  Minister  told  him — Hitler 
spoke  somewhat  defiantly  on  the  subject: 

,H°pe  °f  findin8  traitors  here  rests  on  complete  ignorance 
charactfr.  of  the  National  Socialist  State;  a belief 
“at  they  can  bring  about  a July  25  in  Germany  rests  on  a 
fundamental  illusion  as  to  my  personal  position,  as  well  as 
to  the  attitude  of  my  political  collaborators  and  my  field 
marshals,  admirals  and  generals. 

Actually,  as  we  shall  see,  there  were  a few  German 
generals  and  a handful  of  former  political  collaborators 
who  were  beginning  once  more,  as  the  military  setbacks 
mounted,  to  harbor  treasonable  thoughts,  which,  when  the 
next  July  rolled  around,  would  be  translated  into  an  act 
more  violent  but  less  successful  than  that  carried  out 
against  Mussolini. 

One  of  Hitler’s  measures  to  quash  any  incipient  treason 
was  to  order  all  German  princes  discharged  from  the 
Wehrmacht,  Prince  Philip  of  Hesse,  the  former  messenger 

f,-™6  o'1"8,  Badoglio i and  the  government,  much  to  Hitler’s  anger  escaned 
L>uthem°Trnly  nMost  of 'the ‘it1?  esjjabl,isl!ed  themselves  in  Allfed-’liberamd 


Beginning  of  the  End 


1303 


boy  of  the  Fuehrer  to  Mussolini,  who  had  been  hanging 
around  headquarters,  was  arrested  and  turned  over  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  the  Gestapo.  His  wife.  Princess  Mafalda, 
the  daughter  of  the  King  of  Italy,  was  also  arrested  and, 
with  her  husband,  incarcerated  in  a concentration  camp. 
The  King  of  Italy,  like  the  kings  of  Norway  and  Greece, 
had  escaped  the  clutches  of  Hitler,  who  took  what  re- 
venge he  could  by  arresting  his  daughter.* 

For  several  weeks  the  Fuehrer’s  daily  military  confer- 
ences had  devoted  a great  deal  of  time  to  a problem  that 
burned  in  Hitler’s  mind:  the  rescue  of  Mussolini.  “Opera- 
tion Oak,”  it  will  be  remembered,  was  the  code  name  for 
this  plan,  and  in  the  records  of  the  conferences  at  head- 
quarters Mussolini  was  always  referred  to  as  “the  valuable 
object.”  Most  of  the  generals  and  even  Goebbels  doubted 
whether  the  former  Duce  was  any  longer  a very  valuable 
object,  but  Hitler  still  thought  so  and  insisted  on  his  lib- 
eration. 

He  not  only  wanted  to  do  a favor  to  his  old  friend,  for 
whom  he  still  felt  a personal  affection.  He  also  had  it  in 
mind  to  set  up  Mussolini  as  head  of  a new  Fascist  gov- 
ernment in  northern  Italy,  which  would  relieve  the  Germans 
of  having  to  administer  the  territory  and  help  safeguard 
his  long  lines  of  supply  and  communication  against  an 
unfriendly  populace  from  whose  midst  troublesome  par- 
tisans were  now  beginning  to  emerge. 

By  August  1,  Admiral  Doenitz  was  reporting  to  Hitler 
that  the  Navy  believed  it  had  spotted  Mussolini  on  the 
island  of  Ventotene.  By  the  middle  of  August  Himmler’s 
sleuths  were  sure  the  Duce  was  on  another  island,  Mad- 
dalena,  near  the  northern  tip  of  Sardinia.  Elaborate  plans 
were  made  to  descend  upon  the  island  with  destroyers  and 
parachutists,  but  before  they  could  be  carried  out  Musso- 
lini had  again  been  moved.  According  to  a secret  clause 
of  the  armistice  agreement  he  was  to  be  turned  over  to 
the  Allies,  but  for  some  reason  Badoglio  delayed  in  doing 
this  and  early  in  September  the  “valuable  object”  was 
spirited  away  to  a hotel  on  top  of  the  Gran  Sasso  d’ltalia. 


Hitler  had  never  cared  for  her  personally.  “I  had  to  sit  next  to  Mafalda.” 
ne  told  his  generals  during  a military  conference  at  headquarters  in  May 
that  year.  What  do  I care  about  Mafalda?  . . . Her  intellectual  qualities 
aren  t such  that  she  would  charm  you — to  say  nothing  of  her  looks.”  (From 
the  secret  records  of  Hitler’s  daily  military  conferences,  in  Felix  Gilbert’s 
Hitler  Directs  His  War,  p.  37.) 


1304  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  highest  range  in  the  Abruzzi  Apennines,  which  could 
be  reached  only  by  a funicular  railway. 

The  Germans  soon  learned  of  his  whereabouts,  made  an 
aerial  reconnaissance  of  the  mountaintop  and  decided  that 
glider  troops  could  probably  make  a landing,  overcome 
the  carabinieri  guards  and  make  away  with  the  Duce  in 
a small  Fieseler-Storch  plane.  This  daring  plan  was  carried 
out  on  September  13  under  the  leadership  of  another  one 
of  Himmler’s  resourceful  S.S.  intellectual  roughnecks,  an 
Austrian  by  the  name  of  Otto  Skorzeny,  who  will  appear 
again  toward  the  very  end  of  this  narrative  in  another 
daredevil  exploit.*  Virtually  kidnaping  an  Italian  gene- 
ral, whom  he  packed  into  his  glider,  Skorzeny  landed  his 
airborne  force  a hundred  yards  from  the  mountaintop 
hotel,  where  he  espied  the  Duce  looking  out  hopefully 
from  a second-story  window.  Most  of  the  carabinieri,  at 
the  sight  of  German  troops,  took  to  the  hills,  and  the  few 
who  didn’t  were  dissuaded  by  Skorzeny  and  Mussolini 
from  making  use  of  their  arms,  the  S.S.  leader  yelling  at 
them  not  to  fire  on  an  Italian  general — he  pushed  his 
captive  officer  to  the  front  of  his  ranks — and  the  Duce 
shouting  from  his  window,  as  one  eyewitness  remem- 
bered, “Don’t  shoot,  anybody!  Don’t  shed  any  blood!”  And 
not  a drop  was  shed. 

Within  a few  minutes  the  overjoyed  Fascist  leader,  who 
had  sworn  he  would  kill  himself  rather  than  fall  into  Al- 
lied hands  and  be  exhibited,  as  he  later  wrote,  in  Madison 
Square  Garden  in  New  York.f  was  bundled  into  a tiny 
Fieseler-Storch  plane  and  after  a perilous  take-off  from  a 
small  rock-strewn  meadow  below  the  hotel  flown  to  Rome 
and  from  there,  the  same  evening,  to  Vienna  in  a Luftwaffe 
transport  aircraft.7 

Though  Mussolini  was  grateful  for  his  rescue  and  em- 
braced Hitler  warmly  when  they  met  a couple  of  days 
later  at  Rastenburg,  he  was  by  now  a broken  man,  the 
old  fires  within  him  turned  to  ashes,  and  much  to  Hitler’s 

* Skorzeny  had  been  summoned  to  the  Fuehrer’s  headquarters  for  the  first 
time  in  his  life  the  day  after  Mussolini’s  fall  and  personally  assigned  by 
Hitler  to  carry  out  the  rescue. 

t Just  before  Mussolini  was  liberated  Captain  Harry  Butcher  reported 
receiving  a cablegram  at  Eisenhower’s  headquarters  from  a theater  chain  in 
Cape  Town  offering  to  donate  ten  thousand  pounds  to  charity  “if  you  arrange 
for  Mussolini's  personal  appearance  on  the  stages  of  our  Cape  Town 
theatres.  Three  weeks’  engagement.’’  (Butcher.  My  Three  Years  with 
Eisenhower , p.  423). 


Beginning  of  the  End  1305 

disappointment  he  showed  little  stomach  for  reviving  the 
Fascist  regime  in  German-occupied  Italy.  The  Fuehrer  made 
no  attempt  to  hide  his  disillusionment  with  his  old  Italian 
friend  in  a long  talk  with  Goebbels  toward  the  end  of 
September. 

The  Duce  [Goebbels  confided  to  his  diary  after  the  talk] 
has  not  drawn  the  moral  conclusions  from  Italy’s  catas- 
trophe that  the  Fuehrer  had  expected  of  him  . . . The  Fueh- 
rer expected  that  the  first  thing  the  Duce  would  do  would 
be  to  wreak  full  vengeance  on  his  betrayers.  But  he  gave  no 
such  indication  and  thereby  showed  his  real  limitations.  He  is 
not  a revolutionary  like  the  Fuehrer  or  Stalin.  He' is  so 
bound  to  his  own  Italian  people  that  he  lacks  the  broad  qual- 
ities of  a world-wide  revolutionary  and  insurrectionist. 

Hitler  and  Goebbels  were  also  incensed  that  Mussolini 
had  had  a reconciliation  with  Ciano  and  seemed  to  be 
under  the  thumb  of  his  daughter,  Edda,  who  was  Ciano’s 
wife — both  of  them  had  found  refuge  in  Munich.* 
They  thought  he  should  have  had  Ciano  immediately  exe- 
cuted and  Edda,  as  Goebbels  put  it,  whipped. f They  ob- 
jected to  Mussolini’s  putting  Ciano — “that  poisoned  mush- 
room,” Goebbels  called  him — in  the  forefront  of  the  new 
Fascist  Republican  Party. 

For  Hitler  had  insisted  that  the  Duce  immediately  cre- 
ate such  a party,  and  on  September  15,  at  the  Fuehrer’s 
prodding,  Mussolini  proclaimed  the  new  Italian  Social 
Republic. 

It  never  amounted  to  anything.  Mussolini’s  heart  was 
not  in  it.  Perhaps  he  retained  enough  sense  of  reality  to 
see  that  he  was  now  merely  a puppet  of  Hitler,  that  he 
and  his  “Fascist  Republican  Government”  had  no  power 
except  what  the  Fuehrer  gave  them  in  Germany’s  inter- 
ests and  that  the  Italian  people  would  never  again  accept 
him  and  Fascism. 

He  never  returned  to  Rome.  He  set  himself  up  at  an 
isolated  spot  in  the  extreme  north — at  Rocca  delle  Cami- 
nate,  near  Gargnano,  on  the  shores  of  Lake  Garda,  where 

* Aetiially,  or  at  least  according  to  a letter  which  Ciano  later  wrote  to  King 
Victor  Emmanuel,  he  was  tricked  _ into  coming  to  Germany  in  August  by 

Germans,  who  had  informed  him  that  his  children  were  in  danger  and 
that  the  German  government  would  be  happy  to  convey  him  and  his  family 
to  Spam — via  Germany.  ( The  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  v.) 

t ‘‘Edda  Mussolini,”  Goebbels  wrote  in  his  diary,  “is  acting  like  a wildcat 
in  her  Bavarian  villa.  She  smashes  china  and  furniture  on  the  slightest 
provocation.”  ( The  Goebbels  Diaries,  p.  479.) 


1306 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

he  was  closely  guarded  by  a special  detachment  of  the  S.S. 
Leibstandarte.  To  this  beautiful  lake  resort  Sepp  Dietrich, 
the  veteran  S.S.  tough,  who  was  detached  from  his  reeling 
1st  S.S.  Armored  Corps  in  Russia  for  the  purpose — such 
were  the  goings  on  in  the  Third  Reich— escorted  Musso- 
lini’s notorious  mistress,  Clara  Petacci.  With  his  true  love 
once  more  in  his  arms,  the  fallen  dictator  seemed  to  care 
for  little  else  in  life.  Goebbels,  who  had  had  not  one  mis- 
tress but  many,  professed  to  be  shocked. 


The  personal  conduct  of  the  Duce  with  his  girl  friend 
[Goebbels  noted  in  his  diary  on  November  9],  whom  Sepp 
Dietrich  had  to  bring  to  him,  is  cause  for  much  misgiving. 

A few  days  before,  Goebbels  had  noted  that  Hitler  had 
begun  “to  write  off  the  Duce  politically.”  But  not  before, 
it  should  be  added,  the  Fuehrer  forced  him  to  “cede” 
Trieste,  Istria  and  the  South  Tyrol  to  Germany  with  the 
understanding  that  Venice  would  be  added  later  on.  Now 
no  humiliation  was  spared  this  once  proud  tyrant.  Hitler 
brought  pressure  on  him  to  arrest  his  son-in-law,  Ciano,  in 
November,  and  to  have  him  executed  in  the  jail  at  Verona 
on  January  11,  1944.* 

By  the  early  autumn  of  1943,  Adolf  Hitler  could  well 
claim  to  have  mastered  the  gravest  threats  to  the  Third 
Reich.  The  fall  of  Mussolini  and  the  unconditional  sur- 
render  of  the  Badoglio  government  in  Italy  might  easily 
have  led,  as  Hitler  and  his  generals  for  a few  crucial 
weeks  feared,  to  exposing  the  southern  borders  of  Ger- 
many to  direct  Allied  attack  and  opening  the  way — from 
northern  Italy— into  the  weakly  held  Balkans  in  the  very 
rear  of  the  German  armies  fighting  for  their  lives  in  south- 
ern Russia.  The  meek  departure  of  the  Duce  from  the 
seat  of  power  in  Rome  was  a severe  blow  to  the  Fuehrer’s 
prestige  both  at  home  and  abroad,  as  was  the  consequent 


Tali1”11?*8  -last  diar?r  ent!T  is  dated  “December  23,  1943,  Cell  27,  Verona 
tSt*  ff  }?  a moving  piece.  How  he  smuggled  this  last  note  as  well  as  a 
letter  oi  the  same  date  to  the  King  of  Italy  out  of  his  death  cell  I do  not 
know.  But  he  remarks  that  he  had  hidden  the  rest  of  the  diary  before  the 
b^Edda  r?  k‘m-  The  papers  were  smuggled  out  of  German-occupied  Italy 
y h.dda  Ciano,  who,  disguised  as  a peasant  woman  and  concealing  the 

P SllSthedoth^err  Fk.‘f ; S,U<i0ejded  over  the  border  into  Switzerland. 

r„'  , *5®,  otl!fr  Fascist  leaders  who  had  voted  against  the  Duce  in  the 

Vcasnn  hv  /'iw  wT  D““  “uld  his  hands  on  were  tried  for 
and  shot  a1nnaP®  *lJ  lr!bunal.  and,  with  one  exception,  sentenced  to  death 
and  snot  along  with  Ciano.  Among  them  was  one  of  the  Duce’s  erstwhile 

who’ha.rL/' °(1!“wer3>  Marshal  Emilio  de  Bono,  one  of  the  quadrumvirate 
o had  led  the  march  on  Rome  which  put  Mussolini  in  power. 


Beginning  of  the  End  1307 

destruction  of  the  Axis  alliance,  Yet  within  a couple  of 
months  Hitler,  by  a daring  stroke,  had  restored  Mussolini 
—at  least  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  The  Italian  areas  of 
occupation  in  the  Balkans,  in  Greece,  Yugoslavia  and  Al- 
bania, were  secured  against  Allied  attack,  which  OKW 
had  expected  any  day  that  late  summer;  the  Italian  forces 
there,  amounting  to  several  divisions,  surrendered  meekly 

Iand  were  made  prisoners  of  war.  And  instead  of  having  to 
write  off  Kesselring’s  forces,  as  he  had  first  done  and 
retreating  to  northern  Italy,  the  Fuehrer  had  the  satisfac- 
tion of  seeing  the  Field  Marshal’s  armies  digging  in  south 
of  Rome,  where  they  easily  halted  the  advance  of  the 
Anglo-American-French  troops  up  the  peninsula.  There 
was  no  disputing  that  Hitler’s  fortunes  in  the  south  had 
; been  considerably  restored  by  his  daring  and  resourceful- 
ness and  by  the  prowess  of  his  troops. 

Elsewhere,  though,  his  fortunes  continued  to  fall. 

On  July  5,  1943,  he  had  launched  what  was  to  prove 
his  last  great  offensive  of  the  war  against  the  Russians. 
The  flower  of  the  German  Army — some  500,000  men 
with  no  less  than  seventeen  panzer  divisions  outfitted  with 
the  new  heavy  Tiger  tanks — was  hurled  against  a large 
Russian  salient  west  of  Kursk.  This  was  “Operation  Cita- 
del ’ and  Hitler  believed  it  would  not  only  entrap  the  best 
of  the  Russian  armies,  one  million  strong — the  very  forces 
which  had  driven  the  Germans  from  Stalingrad  and  the 
Don  the  winter  before — but  enable  him  to  push  back  to 
the  Don  and  perhaps  even  to  the  Volga  and  swing  up 
from  the  southeast  to  capture  Moscow. 

It  led  to  a decisive  defeat.  The  Russians  were  prepared 
for  it  By  July  22,  the  panzers  having  lost  half  of  their 
tanks,  the  Germans  were  brought  to  a complete  halt  and 
started  to  fall  back.  So  confident  of  their  strength  were 
the  Russians  that  without  waiting  for  the  outcome  of  the 
offensive  they  launched  one  of  their  own  against  the  Ger- 
man salient  at  Orel,  north  of  Kursk,  in  the  middle  of 
July,  quickly  penetrating  the  front.  This  was  the  first  Rus- 
sian summer  offensive  of  the  war  and  from  this  moment 
on  the  Red  armies  never  lost  the  initiative.  Oh  August 
4 they  pushed  the  Germans  out  of  Orel,  which  had  been 
the  southern  hinge  of  the  German  drive  to  capture  Mos- 
cow in  December  1941. 

Now  the  Soviet  offensive  spread  along  the  entire  front. 


1308 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Kharkov  fell  on  August  23.  A month  later,  on  September 
25,  three  hundred  miles  to  the  northwest,  the  Germans 
were  driven  out  of  Smolensk,  from  which  city  they,  like 
the  Grande  Armee,  had  set  out  so  confidently  in  the  first 
months  of  the  Russian  campaign  on  the  high  road  to  Mos- 
cow. By  the  end  of  September  Hitler’s  hard-pressed  armies 
in  the  south  had  fallen  back  to  the  line  of  the  Dnieper 
and  a defensive  line  they  had  established  from  Zaporozhe 
at  the  bend  of  the  river  south  to  the  Sea  of  Azov.  The 
industrial  Donets  basin  had  been  lost  and  the  German 
Seventeenth  Army  in  the  Crimea  was  in  danger  of  being 
cut  off. 

Hitler  was  confident  (hat  his  armies  could  hold  on  the 
Dnieper  and  on  the  fortified  positions  south  of  Zaporozhe 
which  together  formed  the  so-called  “Winter  Line.”  But 
the  Russians  did  not  pause  even  for  regrouping.  In  the 
first  week  of  October  they  crossed  the  Dnieper  north  and 
southeast  of  Kiev,  which  fell  on  November  6.  By  the  end 
of  the  fateful  year  of  1943  the  Soviet  armies  in  the  south 
were  approaching  the  Polish  and  Rumanian  frontiers  past 
the  battlefields  where  the  soldiers  of  Hitler  had  achieved 
their  early  victories  in  the  summer  of  1941  as  they  romped 
toward  the  interior  of  the  Russian  land. 

This  was  not  all. 

There  were  two  other  setbacks  to  Hitler’s  fortunes  that 
year  which  also  marked  the  turning  of  the  tide:  the  loss  of 
the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  intensification  of  the 
devastating  air  war  day  and  night  over  Germany  itself. 

In  1942,  as  we  have  seen,  German  submarines  sank 
6,250,000  tons  of  Allied  shipping,  most  of  it  bound  for 
Britain  or  the  Mediterranean,  a tonnage  which  far  out- 
stripped the  capacity  of  the  shipyards  in  the  West  to 
make  good.  But  by  the  beginning  of  1943  the  Allies  had 
gained  the  upper  hand  over  the  U-boats,  thanks  to  an  im- 
proved technique  of  using  long-range  aircraft  and  air- 
craft carriers  and,  above  all,  of  equipping  their  surface 
vessels  with  radar  which  spotted  the  enemy  submarines 
before  the  latter  could  sight  them.  Doenitz,  the  new  com- 
mander of  the  Navy  and  the  top  U-boat  man  in  the  service, 
at  first  suspected  treason  when  so  many  of  his  under- 
water craft  were  ambushed  and  destroyed  before  they 
could  even  approach  the  Allied  convoys.  He  quickly 
learned  that  it  was  not  treason  but  radar  which  was 


1309 


Beginning  of  the  End 

causing  the  disastrous  losses.  In  the  three  months  of 
February,  March  and  April  they  had  amounted  to  ex- 
actly fifty  vessels;  in  May  alone,  thirty-seven  U-boats  were 
sunk.  This  was  a rate  of  loss  which  the  German  Navy 
could  not  long  sustain,  and  before  the  end  of  May  Doe- 
nitz,  on  his  own  authority,  withdrew  all  submarines  from 
the  North  Atlantic. 

They  returned  in  September  but  in  the  last  four  months 
of  the  year  sank  only  sixty-seven  Allied  vessels  against  the 
loss  of  sixty-four  more  submarines — a ratio  which  spelled 
the  doom  of  U-boat  warfare  and  definitely  settled  the 
Battle  of  the  Atlantic.  In  1917  in  the  First  World  War, 
when  her  armies  had  become  stalled,  Germany’s  sub- 
marines had  almost  brought  Britain  to  her  knees.  They 
were  threatening  to  accomplish  this  in  1942,  when  Hit- 
ler’s armies  in  Russia  and  North  Africa  had  also  been 
stopped,  and  when  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
were  straining  themselves  not  only  to  halt  the  drive  of 
the  Japanese  in  Southeast  Asia  but  to  assemble  men  and 
arms  and  supplies  for  the  invasion  of  Hitler’s  European 
empire  in  the  West 

Their  failure  to  seriously  disrupt  the  North  Atlantic 
shipping  lanes  during  1943  was  a bigger  disaster  than  was 
realized  at  Hitler’s  headquarters,  depressing  though  the 
actual  news  was.  * For  it  was  during  the  twelve  months 
of  that  crucial  year  that  the  vast  stocks  of  weapons  and 
supplies  were  ferried  almost  unmolested  across  the  At- 
lantic which  made  the  assault  of  Fortress  Europe  possible 
in  the  following  year. 

And  it  was  during  that  period  too  that  the  horrors  of 
modern  war  were  brought  home  to  the  German  people — 
brought  home  to  them  on  their  own  doorsteps.  The  public 
knew  little  of  how  the  U-boats  were  doing.  And  though 
the  news  from  Russia,  the  Mediterranean  and  Italy  grew 
increasingly  bad,  it  dealt  after  all  with  events  that  were 
transpiring  hundreds  or  thousands  of  miles  distant  from 

* “There  can  be  no  talk  of  a letup  in  submarine  warfare,”  Hitler  had 
stormed  at  Admiral  Doenitz  when  on  May  31  the  latter  informed  him  that 
the  U-boats  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  North  Atlantic.  “The  Atlantic,” 
he  added,  “is  my  first  line  of  defense  in  the  West.” 

. It  was  easier  said  than  done.  On  November  12  Doenitz  wrote  despairingly 
in  his  diary:.  “The  enemy  holds  every  trump  card,  covering  all  areas  with 
long-range  air  patrols  and  using  location  methods  against  which  we  still 
have  no  warning  . . . The  enemy  knows  all  our  secrets  and  we  know  none 
of  his.”8 


1310  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  homeland.  But  the  bombs  from  the  British  planes  by 
night  and  the  American  planes  by  day  were  now  begin- 
ning to  destroy  a German’s  home,  and  the  office  or  fac- 
tory where  he  worked. 

Hitler  himself  declined  ever  to  visit  a bombed-out  city; 
it  was  a duty  which  seemed  simply  too  painful  for  him  to 
endure.  Goebbels  was  much  distressed  at  this,  com- 
plaining that  he  was  being  flooded  with  letters  “asking 
why  the  Fuehrer  does  not  visit  the  distressed  air  areas 
and  why  Goering  isn’t  to  be  seen  anywhere.”  The  Propa- 
ganda Minister’s  diary  authoritatively  describes  the  grow- 
ing damage  to  German  cities  and  industries  from  the  air. 

May  16,  1943.  . . . The  day  raids  by  American  bombers  are 
creating  extraordinary  difficulties.  At  Kiel  . . . very  serious 
damage  to  military  and  technical  installations  of  the  Navy 
...  If  this  continues  we  shall  have  to  face  serious  conse- 
quences which  in  the  long  ran  will  prove  unbearable  . . . 

May  25.  The  night  raid  of  the  English  on  Dortmund  was 
extraordinarily  heavy,  probably  the  worst  ever  directed 
against  a German  city  . . . Reports  from  Dortmund  are  pretty 
horrible  . . . Industrial  and  munition  plants  have  been  hit 
very  hard  . . . Some  eighty  to  one  hundred  thousand  in- 
habitants without  shelter  ...  The  people  in  the  West  are 
gradually  beginning  to  lose  courage.  Hell  like  that  is  hard 
to  bear  ...  In  the  evening  I received  a [further]  report  on 
Dortmund.  Destruction  is  virtually  total.  Hardly  a house  is 
habitable  . . . 

hily  26.  During  the  night  a heavy  raid  on  Hamburg  . . . 
with  most  serious  consequences  both  for  the  civilian  popula- 
tion and  for  armaments  production  ...  It  is  a real  catas- 
trophe . . . 

July  29.  During  the  night  we  had  the  heaviest  raid  yet 
made  on  Hamburg  . . . with  800  to  1,000  bombers  . . . 
Kaufmann  [the  local  Gauleiter]  gave  me  a first  report  . . . 
He  spoke  of  a catastrophe  the  extent  of  which  simply  stag- 
gers the  imagination.  A city  of  a million  inhabitants  has 
been  destroyed  in  a manner  unparalleled  in  history.  We  are 
faced  with  problems  that  are  almost  impossible  of  solution. 
Food  must  be  found  for  this  population  of  a million.  Shelter 
must  be  secured.  The  people  must  be  evacuated  as  far  as 
possible.  They  must  be  given  clothing.  In  short,  we  are  fac- 
ing problems  there  of  which  we  had  no  conception  even  a 
few  weeks  ago  . . . Kaufmann  spoke  of  some  800,000  home- 
less people  who  are  wandering  up  and  down  the  streets  not 
knowing  what  to  do  . . . 


Beginning  of  the  End  1311 

Although  considerable  damage  was  done  to  specific  Ger- 
man war  plants,  especially  to  those  turning  out  fighter 
planes,  ball  bearings,  naval  ships,  steel,  and  fuel  for  the 
new  jets,  and  to  the  vital  rocket  experimental  station  at 
Peenemunde  on  which  Hitler  had  set  such  high  hopes,* 
and  though  rail  and  canal  transport  were  continually  dis- 
rupted, over-all  German  armament  production  was  not 
materially  reduced  during  the  stepped-up  Anglo-Ameri- 
can bombings  of  1943.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  in- 
creased output  of  factories  in  the  occupied  zones — above 
all,  those  in  Czechoslovakia,  France,  Belgium  and  north- 
ern Italy,  which  escaped  bombing. 

The  greatest  damage  inflicted  by  the  Anglo-American 
air  forces,  as  Goebbels  makes  clear  in  his  diary,  was  to 
the  homes  and  the  morale  of  the  German  people.  In  the 
first  war  years  they  had  been  buoyed  up,  as  this  writer 
remembers,  by  the  lurid  reports  of  what  Luftwaffe  bomb- 
ing had  done  to  the  enemy,  especially  to  the  British. 
They  were  sure  it  would  help  bring  the  war  to  an  early 
— and  victorious — end.  Now,  in  1943,  they  themselves 
began  to  bear  the  full  brunt  of  air  warfare  far  more  dev- 
astating than  any  the  Luftwaffe  had  dealt  to  others, 
even  to  the  populace  of  London  in  1940-41.  The  Ger- 
man people  endured  it  as  bravely  and  as  stoically  as  the 
British  people  had  done.  But  after  four  years  of  war  it 
was  all  the  more  a severe  strain,  and  it  is  not  surprising 
that  as  1943  approached  its  end,  with  all  its  blasted  hopes 
in  Russia,  in  North  Africa  and  in  Italy,  and  with  their 
own  cities  from  one  end  of  the  Reich  to  the  other  being 
pulverized  from  the  air,  the  German  people  began  to 
despair  and  to  realize  that  this  was  the  beginning  of  the 
end  that  could  only  spell  their  defeat. 

“Toward  the  end  of  1943  at  the  latest,”  the  now  un- 
employed General  Haider  would  later  write,  “it  had  be- 

* In  May  1943,  an  R.A.F.  reconnaissance  plane  had  photographed  the 
Peenemunde  installation  following  a tip  to  London  from  the  Polish  under- 
ground that  both  a pilotless  jet-propelled  aircraft  (later  known  as  the  V-l, 
or  buzz  bomb)  and  a rocket  (the  V-2)  were  being  developed  there.  In  August 
British  bombers  attacked  Peenemunde,  badly  damaging  the  installation  and 
setting  back  research  and  tests  by  several  months.  By  November  the  British 
and  American  air  forces  had  located  sixty-three  launching  sites  for  the  V-l 
on  the  Channel  and  between  December  and  the  following  February  bombed 
and  destroyed  seventy-three  of  the  sites,  which  by  that  time  had  increased 
to  ninety-six.  The  terms  “V-l"  and  “V-2”  came  from  the  German  word 
V ergeltungswaffen,  or  weapons  of  reprisal,  of  which  Dr.  Goebbels*  propa- 
ganda was  to  make  so  much  of  in  the  dark  year  of  1944. 


1312  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

come  unmistakably  clear  that  the  war  was  militarily 
lost.”  8 

General  Jodi,  in  a gloomy  off-the-record  lecture  to  the 
Nazi  gauleiters  in  Munich  on  November  7,  1943 — the 
eve  of  the  anniversary  of  the  Beer  Hall  Putsch — did  not 
go  quite  so  far.  But  the  picture  he  painted  of  the  sit- 
uation at  the  beginning  of  the  fifth  year  of  the  war  was 
dark  enough. 

What  weighs  most  heavily  today  on  the  home  front  and 
consequently  by  reaction  on  the  front  line  [he  said]  is  the 
enemy  terror  raids  from  the  air  on  our  homes  and  so  on  our 
wives  and  children.  In  this  respect  ...  the  war  has  as- 
sumed forms  solely  through  the  fault  of  England  such  as 
were  believed  to  be  no  longer  possible  since  the  days  of  the 
racial  and  religious  wars. 

The  effect  of  these  terror  raids,  psychological,  moral  and 
material,  is  such  that  they  must  be  relieved  if  they  cannot 
be  made  to  cease  completely. 

The  state  of  German  morale  as  the  result  of  the  defeats 
and  the  bombings  of  1943  was  vividly  described  by  this 
authoritative  source,  who  on  this  occasion  was  speaking 
for  the  Fuehrer. 

Up  and  down  the  country  the  devil  of  subversion  strides. 

All  the  cowards  are  seeking  a way  out,  or — as  they  call  it 

a political  solution.  They  saw  we  must  negotiate  while 
there  is  still  something  in  hand  . . .* 

It  wasn’t  only  the  “cowards.”  Dr.  Goebbels  himself, 
the  most  loyal  and  faithful — and  fanatical — of  Hitler’s 
followers,  was,  as  his  diary  reveals,  seeking  a way  out  be- 
fore this  year  of  1943  was  ended,  racking  his  brains  not 
over  whether  Germany  should  negotiate  for  peace  but  with 
whom — with  Russia  or  with  the  West.  He  did  not  talk  be- 
hind Hitler’s  back  about  the  necessity  of  searching  for 
peace,  as  certain  others  had  begun  to  do.  He  was  cou- 

* lecture,  entitled  “The  Strategic  Position  in  the  Beginning  of  the 

iifth  Year  of  the  War,  ’ is  perhaps  the  most  exhaustive  firsthand  account 
we  have  of  the  German  predicament  at  the  end  of  1943  as  seen  by  Hitler  and 
his  generals.  It  is  more  than  a mere  confidential  lecture  to  the  Nazi  political 
leaders.  It  is  studded  with  dozens  of  highly  secret  memoranda  and  docu- 
ments  stamped  “Fuehrer’s  GHQ”  to  which  Jodi  referred  in  his  talk  and 
which,  taken  together,  give  a revealing  history  of  the  war  as  it  appeared  to 
the  Fuehrer,  who  seems  to  have  supervised  the  preparation  of  the  lecture. 
Gloomy  though  he  was  as  to  the  present,  Jodi  was  even  more  discouraging 
about  the  future,  correctly  predicting  that  the  coming  Anglo-American 
invasion  in  the  West  “will  decide  the  war”  and  that  “the  forces  at  our 
disposal  will  not  be  adequate”  to  repel  it.10 


1313 


Beginning  of  the  End 

rageous  and  open  enough  to  pour  out  his  thoughts  directly 
to  the  Leader.  On  September  10,  1943,  while  at  the  Fueh- 
rer’s headquarters  at  Rastenburg,  whither  he  had  been 
summoned  on  the  news  of  Italy’s  capitulation,  Goebbels 
broached  the  subject  of  possible  peace  negotiations  for  the 
first  time  in  his  diary. 

The  problem  begins  to  present  itself  as  to  which  side  we 
ought  to  turn  to  first — the  Muscovite  or  the  Anglo-Ameri- 
can. Somehow  we  must  realize  clearly  that  it  will  be  very 
difficult  to  wage  war  successfully  against  both  sides. 

He  found  Hitler  “somewhat  worried”  over  the  prospect 
of  an  Allied  invasion  in  the  West  and  the  “critical”  sit- 
uation on  the  Russian  front. 

The  depressing  thing  is  that  we  haven’t  the  faintest  idea  as 
to  what  Stalin  has  left  in  the  way  of  reserves.  I doubt  very 
much  whether  under  these  conditions  we  shall  be  able  to 
transfer  divisions  from  the  East  to  the  other  European 
theaters  of  war. 

Having  put  down  some  of  his  own  ideas — which  would 
have  seemed  treasonably  defeatist  to  him  a few  months 
before — in  his  confidential  diary,  Goebbels  then  ap- 
proached Hitler. 

I asked  the  Fuehrer  whether  anything  might  be  done  with 
Stalin  sooner  or  later.  He  said  not  for  the  moment  . . . 
And  anyway,  the  Fuehrer  believes  it  would  be  easier  to 
make  a deal  with  the  English  than  with  the  Soviets.  At  a 
given  moment,  the  Fuehrer  believes,  the  English  would  come 
to  their  senses  ...  I am  rather  inclined  to  regard  Stalin  as 
more  approachable,  for  Stalin  is  more  of  a practical  poli- 
tician than  Churchill.  Churchill  is  a romantic  adventurer, 
with  whom  one  can’t  talk  sensibly. 

It  was  at  this  dark  moment  in  their  affairs  that  Hitler 
and  his  lieutenants  began  to  clutch  at  a straw  of  hope: 
that  the  Allies  would  fall  out,  that  Britain  and  America 
would  become  frightened  of  the  prospect  of  the  Red 
armies  overrunning  Europe  and  in  the  end  join  Ger- 
many to  protect  the  old  Continent  from  Bolshevism.  Hit- 
ler had  dealt  at  some  length  on  this  possibility  in  a 
conference  with  Doenitz  in  August,  and  now  in  Sep- 
tember he  and  Goebbels  discussed  it. 

The  English  [Goebbels  added  in  his  diary]  don’t  want  a 
Bolshevik  Europe  under  any  circumstances  ...  Once  they 


1314 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

realize  that  . . . they  have  a choice  only  between  Bolshevism 
or  relaxing  somewhat  toward  National  Socialism  they  will  no 
doubt  show  an  inclination  toward  a compromise  with  us 
. . . Churchill  himself  is  an  old  anti-Bolshevik  and  his 
collaboration  with  Moscow  today  is  only  a matter  of  ex- 
pediency. 

Both  Hitler  and  Goebbels  seemed  to  have  forgotten 
who  collaborated  with  Moscow  in  the  first  place  and  who 
forced  Russia  into  the  war.  Summing  up  the  discussion  of 
a possible  peace  with  Hitler,  Goebbels  concluded: 

Sooner  or  later  we  shall  have  to  face  the  question  of  in- 
clining toward  one  enemy  side  or  the  other.  Germany  has 
never  yet  had  luck  with  a two-front  war;  it  won’t  be  able 
to  stand  this  one  in  the  long  run  either. 

But  was  it  not  late  in  the  day  to  ponder  this?  Goebbels 
returned  to  headquarters  on  September  23  and  in  the 
course  of  a morning  stroll  with  the  Nazi  leader  found  him 
much  more  pessimistic  than  a fortnight  before  about  the 
possibility  of  negotiating  for  peace  with  one  side  so  that 
he  could  enjoy  a one-front  war. 

The  Fuehrer  does  not  believe  that  anything  can  be 
achieved  at  present  by  negotiation.  England  is  not  yet 
groggy  enough  ...  In  the  East,  naturally,  the  present  mo- 
ment is  quite  unfavorable  ...  At  present  Stalin  has  the 
advantage. 

That  evening  Goebbels  dined  with  Hitler  alone. 

I asked  the  Fuehrer  whether  he  would  be  ready  to  ne- 
gotiate with  Churchill  . . . He  does  not  believe  that  negotia- 
tions with  Churchill  would  lead  to  any  result  as  he  is  too 
deeply  wedded  to  his  hostile  views  and,  besides,  is  guided 
by  hatred  and  not  by  reason.  The  Fuehrer  would  prefer 
negotiations  with  Stalin,  but  he  does  not  believe  they  would 
be  successful  . . . 

Whatever  may  be  the  situation,  I told  the  Fuehrer  that  we 
must  come  to  an  arrangement  with  one  side  or  the  other. 
The  Reich  has  never  yet  won  a two-front  war.  We  must 
therefore  see  how  we  can  somehow  or  other  get  out  of  a 
two-front  war. 

This  was  a task  far  more  difficult  than  they  seem  to 
have  realized,  they  who  had  so  lightly  plunged  Germany 
into  a two-front  war.  But  on  that  September  evening  of 
1943,  at  least  for  a few  moments,  the  Nazi  warlord  finally 
shed  his  pessimism  and  ruminated  on  how  sweet  peace 


1315 


Beginning  of  the  End 

would  taste.  According  to  Goebbels,  he  even  said  he 
“yearned”  for  peace. 

He  said  he  would  be  happy  to  have  contact  with  artistic 
circles  again,  to  go  to  the  theater  in  the  evening  and  to 
visit  the  Artists’  Club.11 

Hitler  and  Goebbels  were  not  the  only  ones  in  Ger- 
many who,  as  the  war  entered  its  fifth  year,  speculated 
on  the  chances  and  means  of  procuring  peace.  The 
frustrated,  talkative  anti-Nazi  conspirators,  their  numbers 
somewhat  larger  now  but  still  pitifully  small,  were  again 
giving  the  problem  some  thought,  now  that  they  saw  the 
war  was  lost  though  Hitler’s  armies  still  fought  on  foreign 
soil.  Most  of  them,  but  by  no  means  all,  had  come 
reluctantly,  and  only  after  overcoming  the  greatest  qualms 
of  conscience,  to  the  conclusion  that  to  get  a peace  for 
Germany  which  would  leave  the  Fatherland  with  some 
prospect  for  decent  survival  they  would  have  to  remove 
Hitler  by  killing  him  and  at  the  same  time  wipe  out 
National  Socialism. 

As  1944  came,  with  the  certainty  that  the  Anglo- 
American  armies  would  launch  an  invasion  across  the 
Channel  before  the  year  was  very  far  along  and  that  the 
Red  armies  would  be  approaching  the  frontiers  of  the 
Reich  itself  and  that  the  great  and  ancient  cities  of  Ger- 
many would  soon  be  reduced  to  utter  rubble  by  the  Al- 
lied bombing,*  the  plotters  in  their  desperation  girded 
themselves  to  make  one  final  attempt  to  murder  the  Nazi 
dictator  and  overthrow  his  regime  before  it  dragged  Ger- 
many over  the  precipice  to  complete  disaster. 

They  knew  there  was  not  much  time. 

* °f  » thousand  years  is  nothing  but  rubble,”  wrote  Goerdeler 

to  .field  Marshal  von  Kluge  in  July  1943,  after  visiting  the  bombed-out 
areas  in  the  west.  In  his  letter  Goerdeler  beseeched  the  vacillating  general 
to  join  the  conspirators  in  putting  an  end  to  Hitler  and  his  “madness.” 


29 


THE  ALLIED  INVASION  OF  WESTERN 
EUROPE  AND  THE  ATTEMPT 
TO  KILL  HITLER 


the  conspirators  had  made  at  least  half  a dozen  attempts 
to  assassinate  Hitler  during  1943,  one  of  which  had  mis- 
carried only  when  a time  bomb,  planted  in  the  Fuehrer’s 
airplane  during  a flight  behind  the  Russian  front,  failed 
to  explode. 

A considerable  change  had  taken  place  that  year  in  the 
resistance  movement,  such  as  it  was.  The  plotters  had 
finally  given  up  on  the  field  marshals.  They  were  simply 
too  cowardly- — or  thickheaded — to  use  their  position  and 
military  power  to  overthrow  their  Supreme  warlord.  At 
a secret  meeting  in  November  1942  in  the  forest  of 
Smolensk,  Goerdeler,  the  political  spark  plug  of  the 
resisters,  had  pleaded  personally  with  Field  Marshal  von 
Kluge,  the  commander  of  Army  Group  Center  in  the 
East,  to  take  an  active  part  in  getting  rid  of  Hitler.  The 
unstable  General,  who  had  just  accepted  a handsome  gift 
from  the  Fuehrer,*  assented,  but  a few  days  later  got  cold 
feet  and  wrote  to  General  Beck  in  Berlin  to  count  him  out 

A few  weeks  later  the  plotters  tried  to  induce  General 
Paulus,  whose  Sixth  Army  was  surrounded  at  Stalingrad 

* On  his  sixtieth  birthday,  October  30,  1942,  Kluge  received  from  the 
Fuehrer  a check  for  250,000  marks  ($100,000  at  the  official  rate  of  ex- 
change) and  a special  permit  to  spend  half  of  it  on  the  improvement  of 
his  estate.  Notwithstanding  this  insult  to  his  honesty  and  honor  as  a German 
officer,  the  Field  Marshal  accepted  both.  (Schlabrendorff,  They  Almost 
Killed  Hitler,  p.  40.)  Later  when  Kluge  turned  against  Hitler  the  Fuehrer 
told  his  officers  at  headquarters,  “I  personally  promoted  him  twice,  gave 
him  the  highest  decorations,  gave  him  a large  estate  . . . and  a large  sup- 
plement to  his  pay  as  Field  Marshal  . . . (Gilbert,  Hitler  Directs  His 
War,  pp.  101—02,  a stenographic  account  of  Hitler’s  conference  at  head- 
quarters on  August  31,  1944.) 

1316 


1317 


Beginning  of  the  End 

and  who,  they  presumed,  was  bitterly  disillusioned  with 
the  Leader  who  had  made  this  possible,  to  issue  an  appeal 
to  the  Army  to  overthrow  the  tyrant  who  had  condemned 
a quarter  of  a million  German  soldiers  to  such  a ghastly 
end.  A personal  appeal  from  General  Beck  to  Paulus  to  do 
this  was  flown  into  the  beleaguered  city  by  an  Air  Force 
officer.  Paulus,  as  we  have  seen,  responded  by  sending  a 
flood  of  radio  messages  of  devotion  to  his  Fuehrer,  ex- 
periencing an  awakening  only  after  he  got  to  Moscow  in 
Russian  captivity. 

For  a few  days  the  conspirators,  disappointed  by  Paulus, 
pinned  their  hopes  on  Kluge  and  Manstein,  who  after  the 
disaster  of  Stalingrad  were  flying  to  Rastenburg,  it  was 
understood,  to  demand  that  the  Fuehrer  turn  over  com- 
mand of  the  Russian  front  to  them.  If  successful,  this 
demarche  was  to  be  a signal  for  a coup  d’  etat  in 
Berlin.  Once  again  the  plotters  were  victims  of  their 
wishful  thinking.  The  two  field  marshals  did  fly  to  Hit- 
ler’s headquarters,  but  only  to  reaffirm  their  loyalty  to  the 
Supreme  Commander. 

“We  are  deserted,”  Beck  complained  bitterly. 

It  was  obvious  to  him  and  his  friends  that  they  could 
expect  no  practical  aid  from  the  senior  commanders  at 
the  front.  In  desperation  they  turned  to  the  only  re- 
maining source  of  military  power,  the  Ersatzheer,  the 
Home  or  Replacement  Army,  which  was  scarcely  an  army 
at  all  but  a collection  of  recruits  in  training  and  various 
garrison  troops  of  overage  men  performing  guard  duty 
in  the  homeland.  But  at  least  its  men  were  armed,  and, 
with  the  fit  troops  and  Waffen-S.S.  units  far  away  at  the 
front,  it  might  be  sufficient  to  enable  the  conspirators  to 
occupy  Berlin  and  certain  other  key  cities  at  the  moment 
of  Hitler’s  assassination. 

But  on  the  necessity — or  even  the  desirability — of  that 
lethal  act,  the  opposition  was  still  not  entirely  agreed. 

The  Kreisau  Circle,  for  instance,  was  unalterably  op- 
posed to  any  such  act  of  violence.  This  was  a remarkable, 
heterogeneous  group  of  young  intellectual  idealists  gath- 
ered around  the  scions  of  two  of  Germany’s  most  re- 
nowned and  aristocratic  families:  Count  Helmuth  James 
von  Moltke,  a great-great-nephew  of  the  Field  Marshal 
who  had  led  the  Prussian  Army  to  victory  over  France  in 
1870,  and  Count  Peter  Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  a direct 


1318  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

descendant  of  the  famous  General  of  the  Napoleonic  era 
who,  with  Clausewitz,  had  signed  the  Convention  of 
Tauroggen  with  Czar  Alexander  I by  which  the  Prussian 
Army  changed  sides  and  helped  bring  the  downfall  of 
Bonaparte. 

Taking  its  name  from  the  Moltke  estate  at  Kreisau  in 
Silesia,  the  Kreisau  Circle  was  not  a conspiratorial  body 
but  a discussion  group  * whose  members  represented  a 
cross  section  of  Germany  society  as  it  had  been  in  the 
pre-Nazi  times  and  as  they  hoped  it  would  be  when  the 
Hitlerite  nightmare  had  passed.  It  included  two  Jesuit 
priests,  two  Lutheran  pastors,  conservatives,  liberals,  so- 
cialists, wealthy  landowners,  former  trade-union  leaders, 
professors  and  diplomats.  Despite  the  differences  in  then- 
backgrounds  and  thoughts  they  were  able  to  find  a broad 
common  ground  which  enabled  them  to  provide  the  in- 
tellectual, spiritual,  ethical,  philosophical  and,  to  some  ex- 
tent, political  ideas  of  the  resistance  to  Hitler.  Judging  by 
the  documents  which  they  have  left — almost  all  of  these 
men  were  hanged  before  the  war’s  end — which  included 
plans  for  the  future  government  and  for  the  economic, 
social  and  spiritual  foundations  of  the  new  society,  what 
they  aimed  at  was  a sort  of  Christian  socialism  in  which 
all  men  would  be  brothers  and  the  terrible  ills  of  mod- 
em times — the  perversions  of  the  human  spirit — would 
be  cured.  Their  ideals  were  noble,  high  in  the  white  clouds, 
and  to  them  was  added  a touch  of  German  mysticism. 

But  these  high-minded  young  men  were  unbelievably 
patient.  They  hated  Hitler  and  all  the  degradation  he  had 
brought  on  Germany  and  Europe.  But  they  were  not  in- 
terested in  overthrowing  him.  They  thought  Germany’s 
coming  defeat  would  accomplish  that.  They  turned  their 
attention  exclusively  to  the  thereafter.  “To  us,”  Moltke 
wrote  at  the  time,  “.  . . Europe  after  the  war  is  a question 
of  how  the  picture  of  man  can  be  re-established  in  the 
breasts  of  our  fellow  citizens.” 

Dorothy  Thompson,  the  distinguished  American  jour- 
nalist, who  had  been  stationed  for  many  years  in  Ger- 
many and  knew  it  well,  appealed  to  Moltke,  an  old  and 
close  friend  of  hers,  to  come  down  from  the  mountain- 
top.  In  a series  of  short-wave  broadcasts  from  New  York 

* “We  are  to  be  hanged,”  Moltke  wrote  to  his  wife  just  before  his  execu- 
tion, “for  thinking  together.” 


Beginning  of  the  End  1319 

during  the  summer  of  1 942  addressed  to  “Hans”  she 
begged  him  and  his  friends  to  do  something  to  get  rid  of 
the  demonic  dictator.  “We  are  not  living  in  a world  of 
saints,  but  of  human  beings,”  she  tried  to  remind  him. 

The  last  time  we  met,  Hans,  and  drank  tea  together  on  that 
beautiful  terrace  before  the  lake  ...  I said  that  one  day 
you  would  have  to  demonstrate  by  deeds,  drastic  deeds, 
where  you  stood  . . . and  I remember  that  I asked  you 
whether  you  and  your  friends  would  ever  have  the  coinage 
to  act . . .l 

It  was  a penetrating  question,  and  the  answer  seems  to 
have  turned  out  to  be  that  Moltke  and  his  friends  had 
the  courage  to  talk — for  which  they  were  executed — but 
not  to  act. 

This  flaw  in  their  minds  rather  than  in  their  hearts — for 
all  of  them  met  their  cruel  deaths  with  great  bravery — 
was  the  main  cause  of  the  differences  between  the  Kreisau 
Circle  and  the  Beck— Goerdeler— Hassell  group  of  con- 
spirators, though  they  also  were  in  dispute  about  the 
nature  and  the  make-up  of  the  government  which  was  to 
take  over  from  the  Nazi  regime. 

There  were  several  meetings  between  them  following 
a full-dress  conference  at  the  home  of  Peter  Yorck  on 
January  22,  1943,  presided  over  by  General  Beck,  who, 
as  Hassell  reported  in  his  diary,  “was  rather  weak  and  re- 
served. 2 A spirited  argument  developed  between  the 
youngsters”  and  the  “oldsters” — Hassell’s  terms — over 
future  economic  and  social  policy,  with  Moltke  clashing 
with  Goerdeler.  Hassell  thought  the  former  mayor  of 
Leipzig  was  quite  “reactionary”  and  noted  Moltke’s 
“Anglo-Saxon  and  pacifist  inclinations.”  The  Gestapo 
also  took  note  of  this  meeting  and  at  the  subsequent  trials 
of  the  participants  turned  up  a surprisingly  detailed  ac- 
count of  the  discussions. 

Himmler  was  already  closer  on  the  trail  of  the  con- 
spirators than  any  of  them  realized.  But  it  is  one  of  the 
ironies  of  this  narrative  that  at  this  point,  in  1943,  with 
the  prospect  of  victory  lost  and  of  defeat  imminent,  the 
mild-mannered,  bloodthirsty  S.S.  Fuehrer,  the  master 
policeman  of  the  Third  Reich,  began  to  take  a personal 
and  not  altogether  unfavorable  interest  in  the  resistance, 
with  which  he  had  more  than  one  friendly  contact.  And 


1320 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


it  is  indicative  of  the  mentality  of  the  plotters  that  more 
than  one  of  them,  Popitz  especially,  began  to  see  in  Himm- 
ler a possible  replacement  for  Hitler!  The  S.S.  chief,  so 
seemingly  fanatically  loyal  to  the  Fuehrer,  began  to  see 
this  himself,  but  until  almost  the  end  played  a double 
game,  in  the  course  of  which  he  snuffed  out  the  life  of 
many  a gallant  conspirator. 


The  resistance  was  now  working  in  three  fields.  The 
Kreisau  Circle  was  holding  its  endless  talks  to  work  out 
the  millennium.  The  Beck  group,  more  down  to  earth, 
was  striving  in  some  way  to  kill  Hitler  and  take  over 
power.  And  it  was  making  contact  with  the  West  in  order 
to  apprise  the  democratic  Allies  of  what  was  up  and  to 
inquire  what  kind  of  peace  they  would  negotiate  with  a 
new  anti-Nazi  government.*  These  contacts  were  made  in 
Stockholm  and  in  Switzerland. 

In  the  Swedish  capital  Goerdeler  often  saw  the  bankers 
Marcus  and  Jakob  Wallenberg,  with  whom  he  had  long 
been  friends  and  who  had  intimate  business  and  personal 
contacts  in  London.  At  one  meeting  in  April  1942  with 
Jakob  Wallenberg,  Goerdeler  urged  him  to  get  in  touch 
with  Churchill.  The  conspirators  wanted  in  advance  an 
assurance  from  the  Prime  Minister  that  the  Allies  would 
make  peace  with  Germany  if  they  arrested  Hitler  and  over- 
threw the  Nazi  regime.  Wallenberg  replied  that  from  what 
he  knew  of  the  British  government  no  such  assurance 
was  possible. 

A month  later  two  Lutheran  clergymen  made  direct 
contact  with  the  British  in  Stockholm.  These  were  Dr. 
Hans  Schoenfeld,  a member  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Bu- 
reau of  the  German  Evangelical  Church,  and  Pastor 
Dietrich  Bonhoeffer,  an  eminent  divine  and  an  active  con- 
spirator, who  on  hearing  that  Dr.  George  Bell,  the  Angli- 
can Bishop  of  Chichester,  was  visiting  in  Stockholm 
hastened  there  to  see  him — Bonhoeffer  traveling  incognito 


* It  is  said  in  some  of  the  German  memoirs  that  in  1942  and  1943  the  Nazis 
,',n  cg”t:?.ct  w,th  ‘he  Russians  about  a possible  peace  negotiation  and 
™ . j off?red  to  initiate  talks  for  a separate  peace.  Ribbentrop 

Nuremberg  made  a good  deal  of  his  own  efforts  to  get  in 
““i  With  the  Russians  and  said  he  actually  made  contact  with  Soviet 
1S1J*  Stockholm.  Peter  Klelst,  who  acted  for  Ribbentrop  in  Stockholm, 

oaner?  are°f«nrted  “ h‘S  b?°k-  i!  suspect  that  when  all  the  secret  German 
papers  are  sorted,  a revealing  chapter  on  this  episode  may  come  to  light. 


1321 


Beginning  of  the  End 

on  forged  papers  provided  him  by  Colonel  Oster  of  the 
Abwehr. 

Both  pastors  informed  the  bishop  of  the  plans  of  the 
conspirators  and,  as  had  Goerdeler,  inquired  whether  the 
Western  Allies  would  make  a decent  peace  with  a non- 
Nazi  government  once  Hitler  had  been  overthrown.  They 
asked  for  an  answer — by  either  a private  message  or  a 
public  announcement.  To  impress  the  bishop  that  the  anti- 
Hitler  conspiracy  was  a serious  business,  Bonhoeffer  fur- 
nished him  with  a list  of  the  names  of  the  leaders — an 
indiscretion  which  later  was  to  cost  him  his  life  and  to 
help  make  certain  the  execution  of  many  of  the  others. 

This  was  the  most  authoritative  and  up-to-date  infor- 
mation the  Allies  had  had  on  the  German  opposition  and 
its  plans,  and  Bishop  Bell  promptly  turned  it  over  to 
Anthony  Eden,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  when  he 
returned  to  London  in  June.  But  Eden,  who  had  resigned 
this  post  in  1938  in  protest  against  Chamberlain’s  appease- 
ment of  Hitler,  was  skeptical.  Similar  information  had 
been  conveyed  to  the  British  government  by  alleged  Ger- 
man plotters  since  the  time  of  Munich  and  nothing  had 
come  of  it.  No  response  was  made.4 

The  German  underground’s  contacts  with  the  Allies  in 
Switzerland  were  mainly  through  Allen  Dulles,  who 
headed  the  U.S.  Office  of  Strategic  Services  there  from 
November  1942  until  the  end  of  the  war.  His  chief 
visitor  was  Hans  Gisevius,  who  journeyed  to  Berne  fre- 
quently from  Berlin  and  who  also  was  an  active  mem- 
ber of  the  conspiracy,  as  we  have  seen.  Gisevius  worked 
for  the  Abwehr  and  was  actually  posted  to  the  German 
consulate  general  in  Zurich  as  vice-consul.  His  chief  func- 
tion was  to  convey  messages  to  Dulles  from  Beck  and 
Goerdeler  and  to  keep  him  informed  of  the  progress 
of  the  various  plots  against  Hitler.  Other  German  visitors 
included  Dr.  Schoenfeld  and  Trott  zu  Solz,  the  latter  a 
member  of  the  Kreisau  Circle  and  also  of  the  conspiracy, 
who  once  journeyed  to  Switzerland  to  “warn”  Dulles,  as 
had  so  many  others,  that  if  the  Western  democracies  re- 
fused to  consider  a decent  peace  with  an  anti-Nazi  Ger- 
man regime  the  conspirators  would  turn  to  Soviet  Russia. 
Dulles,  though  he  was  personally  sympathetic,  was  un- 
able to  give  any  assurances,5 

One  marvels  at  these  German  resistance  leaders  who 


1522  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

were  so  insistent  on  getting  a favorable  peace  settlement 
from  the  West  and  so  hesitant  in  getting  rid  of  Hitler 
until  they  had  got  it.  One  would  have  thought  that  if 
they  considered  Nazism  to  be  such  a monstrous  evil 
as  they  constantly  contended — no  doubt  sincerely — they 
would  have  concentrated  on  trying  to  overthrow  it  re- 
gardless of  how  the  West  might  treat  their  new  regime. 
One  gets  the  impression  that  a good  many  of  these  “good 
Germans”  fell  too  easily  into  the  trap  of  blaming  the  out- 
side world  for  their  own  failures,  as  some  of  them  had 
done  for  Germany’s  misfortunes  after  the  first  lost  war 
and  even  for  the  advent  of  Hitler  himself 

OPERATION  FLASH 

In  February  1943,  Goerdeler  told  Jakob  Wallenberg  in 
Stockholm  that  “they  had  plans  for  a coup  in  March.” 

They  had. 

The  preparations  for  Operation  Flash,  as  it  was  called, 
had  been  worked  out  during  January  and  February  by  Gen- 
eral Friedrich  Olbricht,  chief  of  the  General  Army  Office 
(Allgemeines  Heeresamt)  and  General  von  Tresckow,  chief 
of  staff  of  Kluge’s  Army  Group  Center  in  Russia.  Ol- 
bricht, a deeply  religious  man,  was  a recent  convert  to  the 
conspiracy,  but,  because  of  his  new  post,  had  rapidly  be- 
come a key  figure  in  it.  As  deputy  to  General  Friedrich 
Fromm,  commander  of  the  Replacement  Army,  he  was  in 
a position  to  rally  the  garrisons  in  Berlin  and  the  other 
large  cities  of  the  Reich  behind  the  plotters.  Fromm  him- 
self, like  Kluge,  was  by  now  disillusioned  with  his 
Fuehrer  but  was  not  regarded  as  sufficiently  trustworthy 
to  be  let  in  on  the  plot. 

“We  are  ready.  It  is  time  for  the  Flash,”  Olbricht  told 
young  Fabian  von  Schlabrendorff,  a junior  officer  on 
Tresckow’s  staff,  at  the  end  of  February.  Early  in  March  the 
plotters  met  for  a final  conference  at  Smolensk,  the  head- 
quarters of  Army  Group  Center.  Although  not  partici- 
pating in  the  action,  Admiral  Canaris,  the  chief  of  the 
Abwehr,  was  aware  of  it  and  arranged  the  meeting,  fly- 
ing Hans  von  Dohnanyi  and  General  Erwin  Lahousen  of 
his  staff  with  him  to  Smolensk  ostensibly  for  a conference 
of  Wehrmacht  intelligence  officers.  Lahousen,  a former  in- 
telligence officer  of  the  Austrian  Army  and  the  only 


Beginning  of  the  End  1323 

plotter  in  the  Abwehr  to  survive  the  war,  brought  along 
some  bombs. 

Schlabrendorff  and  Tresckow,  after  much  experiment- 
ing, had  found  that  German  bombs  were  no  good  for 
their  purpose.  They  worked,  as  the  young  officer  later  ex- 
plained,6 with  a fuse  that  made  a low  hissing  nose  which 
gave  them  away.  The  British,  they  discovered,  made  a 
better  bomb.  “Prior  to  the  explosion,"’  Schlabrendorff  says, 
“they  made  no  noise  of  any  kind.’’  The  R.A.F.  had  dropped 
a number  of  these  weapons  over  occupied  Europe  to  Al- 
lied agents  for  sabotage  purposes — one  had  been  used  to 
assassinate  Heydrich — and  the  Abwehr  had  collected  sev- 
eral of  them  and  turned  them  over  to  the  conspirators. 

The  plan  worked  out  at  the  Smolensk  meeting  was  to 
lure  Hitler  to  the  army  group  headquarters  and  there  do 
away  with  him.  This  would  be  the  signal  for  the  coup  in 
Berlin. 

Enticing  the  warlord,  who  was  now  suspicious  of  most 
of  his  generals,  into  the  trap  was  not  an  easy  matter.  But 
Tresckow  prevailed  upon  an  old  friend,  General  Schmundt 
(as  he  now  was),  adjutant  to  Hitler,  to  work  on  his  chief, 
and  after  some  hesitation  and  more  than  one  cancellation 
the  Fuehrer  agreed  definitely  to  come  to  Smolensk  on 
March  13,  1943.  Schmundt  himself  knew  nothing  of  the 
plot. 

In  the  meantime  Tresckow  had  been  renewing  his  efforts 
to  get  his  chief,  Kluge,  to  take  the  lead  in  bumping  off 
Hitler.  He  suggested  to  the  Field  Marshal  that  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Freiherr  von  Boeselager,*  who  commanded  a 
cavalry  unit  at  headquarters,  be  allowed  to  use  it  to  mow 
Hitler  and  his  bodyguard  down  when  they  arrived.  Boe- 
selager was  more  than  willing.  All  he  needed  was  an 
order  from  the  Field  Marshal.  But  the  vacillating  com- 
mander could  not  bring  himself  to  give  it.  Tresckow  and 
Schlabrendorff  therefore  decided  to  take  matters  into  their 
own  hands. 

They  would  simply  plant  one  of  their  British-made  bombs 
in  Hitler’s  plane  on  its  return  flight.  “The  semblance  of 
an  accident,”  Schlabrendorff  later  explained,  “would  avoid 
the  political  disadvantages  of  a murder.  For  in  those  days 
Hitler  still  had  many  followers  who,  after  such  an 


* Executed  by  the  Nazis. 


1324 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

event,  would  have  put  up  a strong  resistance  to  our  re- 
volt.” 

Twice  that  afternoon  and  evening  of  March  13  after 
Hitler  had  arrived  the  two  anti-Nazi  officers  were  tempted 
to  change  their  plan  and  set  the  bomb  off,  first  in  Kluge’s 
personal  quarters,  where  Hitler  conferred  with  the  top  gen- 
erals of  the  army  group,  and  later  in  the  officers’  mess 
where  the  gathering  supped.*  But  this  would  have  killed 
some  of  the  very  generals  who,  once  relieved  of  their  per- 
sonal oaths  of  allegiance  to  the  Fuehrer,  were  counted 
upon  to  help  the  conspirators  take  over  power  in  the 
Reich. 

There  still  remained  the  task  of  smuggling  the  bomb 
onto  the  Fuehrer’s  plane,  which  was  due  to  take  off  im- 
mediately after  dinner.  Schlabrendorff  had  assembled  what 
he  calls  “two  explosive  packets”  and  made  of  them  one 
parcel  which  resembled  a couple  of  brandy  bottles.  Dur- 
ing the  repast  Tresckow  had  innocently  asked  a Colonel 
Heinz  Brandt  of  the  Army  General  Staff,  who  was  in  Hit- 
ler s party,  whether  he  would  be  good  enough  to  take 
back  a present  of  two  bottles  of  brandy  to  his  old  friend 
General  Helmuth  Stieff.t  who  was  chief  of  the  Organi- 
zation Branch  of  the  Army  High  Command.  The  un- 
suspecting Brandt  said  he  would  be  glad  to. 

At  the  airfield  Schlabrendorff  nervously  reached  through 
a small  opening  in  his  parcel,  started  the  mechanism  of 
the  time  bomb  and  handed  it  to  Brandt  as  he  boarded  the 
Fuehrer’s  plane.  This  was  a cleverly  built  weapon.  It  had 
no  telltale  clockwork.  When  the  young  officer  pressed  on 
a button  it  broke  a small  bottle,  releasing  a corrosive 
chemical  which  then  ate  away  a wire  that  held  back  a 
spring.  When  the  wire  gave  out,  the  spring  pressed  for- 
ward the  striker,  which  hit  a detonator  that  exploded 
the  bomb. 

The  crash,  Schlabrendorff  says,  was  expected  shortly 
after  Hitler’s  plane  passed  over  Minsk,  about  thirty  min- 
utes’ flying  time  from  Smolensk.  Feverish  with  excite- 
ment, he  rang  up  Berlin  and  by  code  informed  the  con- 
spirators that  Flash  had  begun.  Then  he  and  Tresckow 

xi  vi*  *l*e  *!r's*  ““ting,  Schlabrendorff  says,  he  had  an  opportunity  to  examine 
•Hitler  s oversize  cap.  He  was  struck  by  its  weight.  On  examination  it 

? roved  to  be  lined  with  three  and  a half  pounds  of  steel  plating. 

Executed  by  the  Nazis. 


1325 


Beginning  of  the  End 

waited  with  pounding  hearts  for  the  great  news.  They  ex- 
pected the  first  word  would  come  by  radio  from  one  of 
the  fighter  planes  which  was  escorting  the  Fuehrer’s  plane. 
They  counted  off  the  minutes,  twenty,  thirty,  forty,  an 
hour  . . . and  still  there  was  no  word.  It  came  more  than 
two  hours  later.  A routine  message  said  that  Hitler  had 
landed  at  Rastenburg. 

We  were  stunned,  and  could  not  imagine  the  cause  of  the 
failure  [Schlabrendorff  later  recounted],  I immediately  rang 
up  Berlin  and  gave  the  code  word  indicating  that  the  at- 
tempt had  miscarried.  Then  Tresckow  and  I consulted  as  to 
what  action  to  take  next.  We  were  deeply  shaken.  It  was 
serious  enough  that  the  attempt  had  not  succeeded.  But 
even  worse  would  be  the  discovery  of  the  bomb,  which 
would  unfailingly  lead  to  our  detection  and  the  death  of  a 
wide  circle  of  close  collaborators. 

The  bomb  was  never  discovered.  That  night  Tresckow 
rang  up  Colonel  Brandt,  inquired  casually  whether  he 
had  had  time  to  deliver  his  parcel  to  General  Stieff  and 
was  told  by  Brandt  that  he  had  not  yet  got  around  to 
it.  Tresckow  told  him  to  hold  it — there  had  been  a mis- 
take in  the  bottles — and  that  Schlabrendorff  would  be  ar- 
riving the  next  day  on  some  official  business  and  would 
bring  the  really  good  brandy  that  he  had  intended  to  send. 

With  incredible  courage  Schlabrendorff  flew  to  Hitler’s 
headquarters  and  exchanged  a couple  of  bottles  of  brandy 
for  the  bomb. 

I can  still  recall  my  horror  [he  later  related]  when 
Brandt  handed  me  the  bomb  and  gave  it  a jerk  that  made 
me  fear  a belated  explosion.  Feigning  a composure  I did  not 
feel  I took  the  bomb,  immediately  got  into  a car,  and  drove 
to  the  neighboring  railway  junction  of  Korschen. 

There  he  caught  the  night  train  to  Berlin  and  in  the 
privacy  of  his  sleeping  compartment  dismantled  the  bomb. 
He  quickly  discovered  what  had  happened — or  rather,  why 
nothing  had  happened. 

The  mechanism  had  worked;  the  small  bottle  had  broken; 
the  corrosive  fluid  had  consumed  the  wire;  the  striker  had 
hit  forward;  but — the  detonator  had  not  fired. 

Bitterly  disappointed  but  not  discouraged,  the  conspir- 
ators in  Berlin  decided  to  make  a fresh  attempt  on  Hit- 


1326 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


ler’s  life.  A good  occasion  soon  presented  itself.  Hitler, 
accompanied  by  Goering,  Himmler  and  Keitel,  was  due 
to  be  present  at  the  Heroes’  Memorial  Day  ( Heldenge - 
denktag)  ceremonies  on  March  21  at  the  Zeughaus  in 
Berlin.  Here  was  an  opportunity  to  get  not  only  the  Fueh- 
rer but  his  chief  associates.  As  Colonel  Freiherr  von 
Gersdorff,  chief  of  intelligence  on  Kluge’s  staff,  later  said, 
“This  was  a chance  which  would  never  recur.”  Gersdorff 
had  been  selected  by  Tresckow  to  handle  the  bomb,  and 
this  time  it  would  have  to  be  a suicidal  mission.  The 
plan  was  for  the  colonel  to  conceal  in  his  overcoat 
pockets  two  bombs,  set  the  fuses,  stay  as  close  to  Hitler 
during  the  ceremony  as  possible  and  blow  the  Fuehrer 
and  his  entourage  as  well  as  himself  to  eternity.  With 
conspicuous  bravery  Gersdorff  readily  volunteered  to  sac- 
rifice his  life. 

On  the  evening  of  March  20  he  met  with  Schlabrendorff 
in  his  room  at  the  Eden  Hotel  in  Berlin.  Schlabrendorff 
had  brought  two  bombs  with  ten-minute  fuses.  But 
because  of  the  near-freezing  temperature  in  the  glassed- 
over  courtyard  of  the  Zeughaus  it  might  take  from  fifteen 
to  twenty  minutes  before  the  weapons  exploded.  It  was 
in  this  courtyard  that  Hitler,  after  his  speech,  was 
scheduled  to  spend  half  an  hour  examining  an  exhibition 
of  captured  Russian  war  trophies  which  Gersdorff’s  staff 
had  arranged.  It  was  the  only  place  where  the  colonel 
could  get  close  enough  to  the  Fuehrer  to  kill  him 

Gersdorff  later  recounted  what  happened.7 


The  next  day  I carried  in  each  of  my  overcoat  pockets  a 
bomb  with  a ten-minute  fuse.  I intended  to  stay  as  close  to 
Hitler  as  I could,  so  that  he  at  least  would  be  blown  to 
pieces  by  the  explosion.  When  Hitler  . . . entered  the  ex- 
hibitional hall,  Schmundt  came  across  to  me  and  said  that 
oniy  eight  or  ten  minutes  were  to  be  spent  on  inspecting 
the  exhibits.  So  the  possibility  of  carrying  out  the  assassina- 
tion no  longer  existed,  since  even  if  the  temperature  had 
been  normal  the  fuse  needed  at  least  ten  minutes.  This  last- 
minute  change  of  schedule,  which  was  typical  of  Hitler’s 
subtle  security  methods,  had  once  again  saved  him  his  life.* 


°f  pieC'ng  togethfr  deeds  of  the  plotters  is  that 
ine  memories  ot  the  few  survivors  are  far  from  perfect  so  that  th»»ir 

examplen°wh^nhad  brm?  KbutK  are  contradictory.  Schlabrendorff,  for 

Tho  had  brought  the  bombs  to  Gersdorff,  recounts  in  his  book  that 
because  they  could  not  find  a short  enough  time  fuse  the  Z^ughaul 


1327 


Beginning  of  the  End 

General  von  Tresckow,  Gerdorff  says,  was  anxiously  and 
expectantly  following  the  broadcast  of  the  ceremonies 
from  Smolensk,  “a  stop  watch  in  his  hand.”  When  the 
broadcaster  announced  that  Hitler  had  left  the  hall  only 
eight  minutes  after  he  had  entered  it,  the  General  knew 
that  still  another  attempt  had  failed. 

There  were  at  least  three  further  “overcoat”  attempts  at 
Hitler’s  life,  as  the  conspirators  called  them,  and  each, 
as  we  shall  see,  was  similarly  frustrated. 

Early  in  1943  there  was  one  spontaneous  uprising  in 
Germany  which,  though  small  in  itself,  helped  to  revive  the 
flagging  spirits  of  the  resistance,  whose  every  attempt  to 
remove  Hitler  had  been  thus  far  thwarted.  It  also  served 
as  a warning  of  how  ruthless  the  Nazi  authorities  could  be 
in  putting  down  the  least  sign  of  opposition. 

The  university  students  in  Germany,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  been  among  the  most  fanatical  of  Nazis  in  the  early 
Thirties.  But  ten  years  of  Hitler’s  rule  had  brought 
disillusionment,  and  this  was  sharpened  by  the  failure  of 
Germany  to  win  the  war  and  particularly,  as  1943  came, 
by  the  disaster  at  Stalingrad.  The  University  of  Munich, 
the  city  that  had  given  birth  to  Nazism,  became  the  hot- 
bed of  student  revolt.  It  was  led  by  a twenty-five-year-old 
medical  student,  Hans  Scholl,  and  his  twenty-one-year-old 
sister,  Sophie,  who  was  studying  biology.  Their  mentor 
was  Kurt  Huber,  a professor  of  philosophy.  By  means  of 
what  became  known  as  the  “White  Rose  Letters”  they 
carried  out  their  anti-Nazi  propaganda  in  other  univer- 
sities; they  were  also  in  touch  with  the  plotters  in  Berlin. 

One  day  in  February  1943,  the  Gauleiter  of  Bavaria, 
Paul  Giesler,  to  whom  the  Gestapo  had  brought  a file  of 
the  letters,  convoked  the  student  body,  announced  that  the 
physically  unfit  males — the  able-bodied  had  been  drafted 
into  the  Army — would  be  put  to  some  kind  of  more  useful 
war  work,  and  with  a leer  suggested  that  the  women 
students  bear  a child  each  year  for  the  good  of  the  Father- 
land. 

“If  some  of  the  girls,”  he  added,  “lack  sufficient  charm 
to  find  a mate,  I will  assign  each  of  them  one  of  my  ad- 

attempt  “had  to  be  given  up.”  He  apparently  was  unaware,  or  forgot,  that 
Gersdorff  actually  went  to  the  Zeughaus  to  try  to  carry  out  his  assignment, 
though  the  Colonel  says  that  the  night  before  he  told  him  he  was  “deter- 
mined to  do  it”  with  the  fuses  he  had. 


1328  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

jutants  . . . and  I can  promise  her  a thoroughly  enjoyable 
experience.” 

The  Bavarians  are  noted  for  their  somewhat  coarse 
humor,  but  this  vulgarity  was  too  much  for  the  students. 
They  howled  the  Gauleiter  down  and  tossed  out  of  the 
hall  the  Gestapo  and  S.S.  men  who  had  come  to  guard 
him.  That  afternoon  there  were  anti-Nazi  student  demon- 
strations in  the  streets  of  Munich,  the  first  that  had  ever 
occurred  in  the  Third  Reich.  Now  the  students,  led  by  the 
Scholls,  began  to  distribute  pamphlets  openly  calling  on 
German  youth  to  rise.  On  February  19  a building  superin- 
tendent observed  Hans  and  Sophie  Scholl  hurling  their 
leaflets  from  the  balcony  of  the  university  and  betrayed 
them  to  the  Gestapo. 

Their  end  was  quick  and  barbaric.  Haled  before  the 
dreaded  People  s Court,  which  was  presided  over  by  its 
president,  Roland  Freisler,  perhaps  the  most  sinister  and 
bloodthirsty  Nazi  in  the  Third  Reich  after  Heydrich  (he  will 
appear  again  in  this  narrative),  they  were  found  guilty  of 
treason  and  condemned  to  death.  Sophie  Scholl  was  han- 
dled so  roughly  during  her  interrogation  by  the  Gestapo 
that  she  appeared  in  court  with  a broken  leg.  But  her 
spirit  was  undimmed.  To  Freisler’s  savage  browbeating  she 
answered  calmly,  “You  know  as  well  as  we  do  that  the 
war  is  lost.  Why  are  you  so  cowardly  that  you  won’t 
admit  it?” 

She  hobbled  on  her  crutches  to  the  scaffold  and  died 
with  sublime  courage,  as  did  her  brother.  Professor 
Huber  and  several  other  students  were  executed  a few  davs 
later.8 

Tiffs  was  a reminder  to  the  conspirators  in  Berlin  of 
the  danger  that  confronted  them  at  a time  when  the  in- 
discreetness of  some  of  the  leaders  was  becoming  a source 
of  constant  worry  to  the  others.  Goerdeler  himself  was 
much  too  talkative.  The  efforts  of  Popitz  to  sound  out 
Himmler  and  other  high  S.S.  officers  on  joining  the  con- 
spiracy were  risky  in  the  extreme.  The  inimitable 
Weizsaecker,  who  after  the  war  liked  to  picture  himself 
as  such  a staunch  resister,  became  so  frightened  that  he 
broke  off  all  contact  with  his  close  friend  Hassell,  whom 
he  accused  (along  with  Frau  von  Hassell)  of  being  “un- 


1329 


Beginning  of  the  End 

believably  indiscreet”  and  whom,  he  warned,  the  Gestapo 
was  shadowing.* 

The  Gestapo  was  watching  a good  many  others,  espe- 
cially the  breezy,  confident  Goerdeler,  but  the  blow  which 
it  dealt  the  conspirators  immediately  after  the  frustrating 
month  of  March  1943  during  which  their  two  attempts  to 
kill  Hitler  had  miscarried  came,  ironically,  as  the  result 
not  so  much  of  expert  sleuthing  but  of  the  rivalry  be- 
tween the  two  intelligence  services,  the  Wehrmacht’s 
Abwehr  and  Himmler’s  R.S.H.A. — the  Central  Security 
Office — which  ran  the  S.S.  secret  service,  and  which  wanted 
to  depose  Admiral  Canaris  and  take  over  his  Abwehr. 

In  the  autumn  of  1942,  a Munich  businessman  had  been 
arrested  for  smuggling  foreign  currency  across  the  border 
into  Switzerland.  He  was  actually  an  Abwehr  agent,  but 
the  money  he  had  long  been  taking  over  the  frontier  had 
gone  to  a group  of  Jewish  refugees  in  Switzerland.  This 
was  the  height  of  crime  for  a German  in  the  Third  Reich 
to  commit  even  if  he  were  an  Abwehr  agent.  When 
Canaris  failed  to  protect  him  the  agent  began  to  tell  the 
Gestapo  what  he  knew  of  the  Abwehr.  He  implicated  Hans 
von  Dohnanyi,  who,  with  Colonel  Oster,  had  been  in  the 
inner  circle  of  the  plotters.  He  told  Himmler’s  men  of  the 
mission  of  Dr.  Josef  Mueller  to  the  Vatican  in  1940  when 
contact  was  made  with  the  British  through  the  Pope.  He 
revealed  Pastor  Bonhoeffer’s  visit  to  the  Bishop  of  Chich- 
ester at  Stockholm  in  1942  on  a false  passport  issued  by 
the  Abwehr.  He  hinted  at  Oster’s  various  schemes  to  get 
rid  of  Hitler. 

After  months  of  investigation  the  Gestapo  acted.  Doh- 
nanyi, Mueller  and  Bonhoeffer  were  arrested  on  April  5, 
1943,  and  Oster,  who  had  managed  to  destroy  most  of  the 
incriminating  papers  in  the  meantime,  was  forced  to  resign 
in  December  from  the  Abwehr  and  placed  under  house 
arrest  in  Leipzig,  t 

This  was  a staggering  blow  to  the  conspiracy.  Oster — “a 

Hassell  describes  the  painful  scene  in  his  diary.  “He  asked  me  to  spare 
him  the  embarrassment  of  my  presence,”  Hassell  writes.  "When  I started  to 
remonstrate  he  interrupted  me  harshly."  (The  Von  Hassell  Diaries,  pp. 
256-57.)  Only  when  Weizsaecker  was  safely  settled  down  in  the  Vatican 
a-s  ^erraan  ambassador  there,  did  he  urge  the  conspirators  to  action. 

I his  is  easy  to  do  from  the  Vatican,”  Hassell  commented.  Weizsaecker 
survived  to  write  his  somewhat  shabby  memoirs.  Hassell’s  diary  was  pub- 
lished after  his  execution. 

t Bonhoeffer,  Dohnanyi  and  Oster  were  all  executed  by  the  S.S.  on  April 


1330 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

man  such  as  God  meant  men  to  be,  lucid  and  serene  in 
mind,  imperturbable  in  danger,”  as  Schlabrendorff  said 
of  him — had  been  one  of  the  key  figures  since  1938  in  the 
attempt  to  get  Hitler,  and  Dohnanyi,  a jurist  by  profession, 
had  been  a resourceful  assistant.  Bonhoeffer,  the  Protes- 
tant, and  Mueller,  the  Catholic,  had  not  only  brought  a 
great  spiritual  force  to  the  resistance  but  had  given  an 
example  of  individual  courage  in  their  various  missions 
abroad — as  they  were  to  do  in  their  refusal,  even  after  the 
torture  which  followed  their  arrests,  to  betray  their  com- 
rades. 

But  most  serious  of  all,  with  the  breakup  of  the  Abwehr 
the  plotters  lost  their  “cover”  and  the  principal  means  of 
communication  with  each  other,  with  the  hesitant  gen- 
erals and  with  their  friends  in  the  West. 

Some  further  discoveries  by  Himmler’s  sleuths  put  the 
Abwehr  and  its  chief,  Canaris,  out  of  business  alto- 
gether within  a few  months. 

One  sprang  out  of  what  came  to  be  known  in  Nazi  circles 
as  “the  Frau  Solf  Tea  Party,”  which  took  place  on  Septem- 
ber 10,  1943.  Frau  Anna  Solf,  the  widow  of  a former  Colo- 
nial Minister  under  Wilhelm  II  who  had  also  served  as 
ambassador  to  Japan  under  the  Weimar  Republic,  had  long 
presided  over  an  anti-Nazi  salon  in  Berlin.  To  it  came  often 
a number  of  distinguished  guests,  who  included  Countess 
Hanna  von  Bredow,  the  granddaughter  of  Bismarck,  Count 
Albrecht  von  Bernstorff,  the  nephew  of  the  German  ambas- 
dor  to  the  United  States  during  the  First  World  War, 
Father  Erxleben,  a well-known  Jesuit  priest,  Otto  Kiep, 
a high  official  in  the  Foreign  Office,  who  once  had  been  dis- 
missed as  German  consul  general  in  New  York  for  attend- 
ing a public  luncheon  in  honor  of  Professor  Einstein  but 
who  eventually  had  got  himself  reinstated  in  the  diplo- 
matic service,  and  Elisabeth  von  Thadden,  a sparkling  and 
deeply  religious  woman  who  ran  a famous  girls’  school 
at  Weiblingen,  near  Heidelberg. 

To  the  tea  party  at  Frau  Solf’s  on  September  10  Fraulein 
von  Thadden  brought  an  attractive  young  Swiss  doctor 
named  Reckse,  who  practiced  at  the  Charite  Hospital  in 
Berlin  under  Professor  Sauerbruch.  Like  most  Swiss  Dr. 


9,  1945,  less  than  a month  before  Germany’s  capitulation.  Their  extinction 
seems  to  have  been  an  act  of  revenge  on  the  part  of  Himmler.  Mueller  alone 
survived. 


1331 


Beginning  of  the  End 


Reckse  expressed  bitter  anti-Nazi  sentiments,  in  which  he 
was  joined  by  the  others  present,  especially  by  Kiep.  Be- 
fore the  tea  party  was  over  the  good  doctor  had  volun- 
teered to  carry  any  letters  which  Frau  Solf  or  her  guests 
wished  to  send  to  their  friends  in  Switzerland — German 
anti-Nazi  emigres  and  British  and  American  diplomatic 
officials — an  offer  which  was  quickly  taken  up  by  more 
than  one  present. 

Unfortunately  for  them  Dr.  Reckse  was  an  agent  of  the 
Gestapo,  to  whom  he  turned  over  several  incriminating 
letters  as  well  as  a report  on  the  tea  party. 

Count  von  Moltke  learned  of  this  through  a friend  in 
the  Air  Ministry  who  had  tapped  a number  of  telephone 
conversations  between  the  Swiss  doctor  and  the  Gestapo, 
and  he  quickly  warned  his  friend  Kiep,  who  tipped  off  the 
rest  of  the  Solf  circle.  But  Himmler  had  his  evidence.  He 
waited  four  months  to  act  on  it,  perhaps  hoping  to  widen 
his  net.  On  January  12,  everyone  who  had  been  at  the  tea 
party  was  arrested,  tried  and  executed,  except  Frau  Solf 
and  her  daughter,  the  Countess  Ballestrem.*  The  Solfs 
were  confined  at  the  Ravensbrueck  concentration  camp  and 
miraculously  escaped  death,  t Count  von  Moltke,  impli- 
cated with  his  friend  Kiep,  was  also  arrested  at  this  time. 
But  that  was  not  the  only  consequence  of  Kiep’s  arrest. 
The  repercussions  spread  as  far  as  Turkey  and  paved  the 
way  for  the  final  liquidation  of  the  Abwehr  and  the  turning 
over  of  its  functions  to  Himmler. 

Among  Kiep’s  close  anti-Nazi  friends  were  Erich  Ver- 
mehren  and  his  stunningly  beautiful  wife,  the  former 
Countess  Elisabeth  von  Plettenberg,  who  like  other  op- 
ponents of  the  regime  had  joined  the  Abwehr  and  who 
had  been  posted  as  its  agents  in  Istanbul.  Both  were 
summoned  to  Berlin  by  the  Gestapo  to  be  interrogated  in 
the  Kiep  case.  Knowing  what  fate  was  in  store  for  them, 
they  refused,  got  in  touch  with  the  British  secret  service  at 


Apparently  Himmler  had  widened  his  net  in  the  intervening  four  months. 
According  to  Reitlinger  some  seventy-four  persons  were  arrested  as  the 
result  of  Dr.  Reckse’s  spying.  (Reitlinger,  The  S.S.,  p.  304). 
t First  the  Japanese  ambassador  intervened  to  delay  their  trial.  Then  on 
February  3,  1945,  a bomb  dropped  during  a daylight  attack  by  the  American 
Air  Force  not  only  killed  Roland  Freisler,  while  he  was  presiding  over  one 
of  his  grisly  treason  trials,  but  destroyed  the  dossier  on  the  Solfs,  which 
was  in  the  files  of  the  People’s  Court.  They  were  nevertheless  scheduled  to 
be  tried  by  this  court  on  April  27,  but  by  that  time  the  Russians  were  in 
Berlin.  Actually  the  Solfs  were  released  from  Moabit  prison  on  April  23. 
apparently  because  of  an  error.  (Wheeler-Bennett,  Nemesis,  p.  595 ».,  and 
Pechel,  Deutscher  Wilderstand , pp.  88—93.) 


1332 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  beginning  of  February  1944  and  were  flown  to  Cairo 
and  thence  to  England. 

It  was  believed  in  Berlin — though  it  turned  out  not  to  be 
true — that  the  Vermehrens  had  absconded  with  all  the 
Abwehr’s  secret  codes  and  handed  them  over  to  the  British. 
This  was  the  last  straw  for  Hitler,  coming  after  the  arrests 
of  Dohnanyi  and  others  in  the  Abwehr  and  coupled  with 
his  growing  suspicion  of  Canaris.  On  February  18,  1944, 
he  ordered  that  the  Abwehr  be  dissolved  and  its  functions 
taken  over  by  R.S.H.A.  This  was  a new  feather  in  the 
cap  of  Himmler,  whose  war  against  the  Army  officer  corps 
went  back  to  his  faking  charges  against  General  von 
Fritsch  in  1938.  It  deprived  the  armed  forces  of  any  in- 
telligence service  of  their  own.  It  enhanced  Himmler’s 
power  over  the  generals.  It  was  also  a further  blow  to 
the  conspirators,  who  were  now  left  without  any  secret 
service  whatsover  through  which  to  work.* 

They  had  not  ceased  trying  to  kill  Hitler.  Between  Sep- 
tember 1943  and  January  1944  another  half-dozen  attempts 
were  organized.  In  August  Jakob  Wallenberg  had  come  to 
Berlin  to  see  Goerdeler,  who  assured  him  that  all  prepara- 
tions were  now  ready  for  a coup  in  September  and  that 
Schlabrendorff  would  then  arrive  in  Stockholm  to  meet  a 
representative  of  Mr.  Churchill  to  discuss  peace. 

“I  was  awaiting  the  month  of  September  with  great 
suspense,”  the  Swedish  banker  later  told  Allen  Dulles.  “It 
passed  without  anything  happening.”  9 

A month  later  General  Stieff,  the  sharp-tongued  hunch- 
back to  whom  Tresckow  had  sent  the  two  bottles  of 
“brandy”  and  whom  Himmler  later  referred  to  as  “a  little 
poisoned  dwarf,”  arranged  to  plant  a time  bomb  at  Hitler’s 
noon  military  conference  at  Rastenburg,  but  at  the  last 
moment  got  cold  feet.  A few  days  later  his  store  of  English 
bombs  which  he  had  received  from  the  Abwehr  and  hidden 
under  a water  tower  in  the  headquarters  enclosure  ex- 
ploded, and  it  was  only  because  an  Abwehr  colonel,  Werner 
Schrader,  who  was  in  on  the  conspiracy,  was  entrusted 

* Canaris  was  made  chief  of  the  Office  for  Commercial  and  Economic  War- 
fare. With  the  assumption  of  this  empty  title  the  “little  Admiral”  faded 
out  of  German  history.  He  was  so  shadowy  a figure  that  no  two  writers 
agree  as  to  what  kind  of  man  he  was,  or  what  he  believed  in,  if  anything 
much.  A cynic  and  a fatalist,  he  had  hated  the  Weimar  Republic  and 
worked  secretly  against  it  and  then  turned  similarly  on  the  Third  Reich. 
His  days,  like  those  of  all  the  other  prominent  men  in  the  Abwehr  save  one 
(General  Lahousen),  were  now  numbered,  as  we  shall  see. 


1333 


Beginning  of  the  End 

by  Hitler  with  the  investigation  that  the  plotters  were  not 
discovered. 

In  November  another  “overcoat”  attempt  was  organ- 
ized. A twenty-four-year-old  infantry  captain,  Axel  von 
dem  Bussche,  was  selected  by  the  conspirators  to  “model” 
a new  Army  overcoat  and  assault  pack  which  Hitler  had 
ordered  designed  and  now  wanted  to  personally  inspect 
before  approving  for  manufacture.  Bussche,  in  order  to 
avoid  Gersdorff  s failure,  decided  to  carry  in  the  pockets  of 
his  model  overcoat  two  German  bombs  which  would  go 
off  a few  seconds  after  the  fuse  was  set.  His  plan  was  to 
grab  Hitler  as  he  was  inspecting  the  new  overcoat  and 
blow  the  two  of  them  to  pieces. 

. The  day  before  the  demonstration  an  Allied  bomb  de- 
stroyed the  models,  and  Bussche  returned  to  his  company 
on  the  Russian  front.  He  was  back  at  Hitler’s  headquarters 
in  December  for  a fresh  attempt  with  new  models,  when 
the  Fuehrer  suddenly  decided  to  leave  for  Berchtesgaden 
for  the  Christmas  holidays.  Shortly  afterward  Bussche  was 
badly  wounded  at  the  front,  so  another  young  front-line 
infantry  officer  was  pressed  into  service  to  substitute  for 
him.  This  was  Heinrich  von  Kleist,  son  of  Ewald  von 
Kleist — the  latter  one  of  the  oldest  conspirators.  The  dem- 
onstration of  the  new  overcoat  was  set  for  February  II, 
1944,  but  the  Fuehrer  for  some  reason — Dulles  says  it  was 
because  of  an  air  raid — failed  to  appear.* 

By  this  time  the  plotters  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  Hitler’s  technique  of  constantly  changing  his  sched- 
ules called  for  a drastic  overhauling  of  their  own  plans.t 

* The  Kleists,  father  and  son,  were  later  arrested.  The  father  was  executed 
on  April  16,  1945;  his  son  survived. 

t Hitler  often  discussed  this  technique  with  his  old  party  cronies.  There  is 
a stenographic  record  of  a monologue  of  his  at  headquarters  on  May  3, 
1942.  “I  quite  understand,”  he  said,  ‘‘why  ninety  per  cent  of  the  historic 
assassinations  have  been  successful.  The  only  preventive  measure  one  can 
take  is  to  live  irregularly — to  walk,  to  drive  and  to  travel  at  irregular  times 
and  unexpectedly  . . . As  far  as  possible,  whenever  I go  anywhere  by  car 
I go  off  unexpectedly  and  without  warning  the  police.”  {Hitler's  Secret 
Conversations,  p.  366.) 

Hitler  had  always  been  aware,  as  we  have  seen,  that  he  might  be  assassi- 
nated. In  his  war  conference  on  August  22,  1939,  on  the  eve  of  the  attack 
on  Poland,  he  had  emphasized  to  his  generals  that  while  he  personally  was 
indispensable  he  could  “be  eliminated  at  any  time  by  a criminal  or  an  idiot.” 

In  his  ramblings  on  the  subject  on  May  3,  1942,  he  added.  “There  can 
never  be  absolute  security  against  fanatics  and  idealists  ...  If  some 
fanatic  wishes  to  shoot  me  or  kill  me  with  a bomb,  I am  no  safer  sitting 
down  than  standing  up.”  He  thought,  though,  that  “the  number  of  fanatics 
who  seek  my  life  on  idealistic  grounds  is  getting  much  smaller  . . . The 
only  really  dangerous  elements  are  either  those  fanatics  who  have  been 


1334 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

It  was  realized  that  the  only  occasions  on  which  he  could 
definitely  be  counted  to  appear  were  his  twice-daily  mili- 
tary conferences  with  the  generals  of  OKW  and  OKH. 
He  would  have  to  be  killed  at  one  of  them.  On  December 
26,  1943,  a young  officer  by  the  name  of  Stauffenberg, 
deputizing  for  General  Olbricht,  appeared  at  the  Rasten- 
burg  headquarters  for  the  noon  conference,  at  which  he 
was  to  make  a report  on  Army  replacements.  In  his  brief- 
case was  a time  bomb.  The  meeting  was  canceled.  Hitler 
had  left  to  have  his  Christmas  on  the  Obersalzberg. 

This  was  the  first  such  attempt  by  the  handsome  young 
lieutenant  colonel,  but  not  the  last.  For  in  Klaus  Philip 
Schenk,  Count  von  Stauffenberg,  the  anti-Nazi  conspirators 
had  at  last  found  their  man.  Henceforth  he  would  not 
only  take  over  the  job  of  killing  Hitler  by  his  own  hand  in 
the  only  way  that  now  seemed  possible  but  would  breathe 
new  life  and  light  and  hope  and  zeal  into  the  conspiracy 
and  become  its  real,  though  never  nominal,  leader. 

THE  MISSION  OF  COUNT  VON  STAUFFENBERG 

This  was  a man  of  astonishing  gifts  for  a professional 
Army  officer.  Bom  in  1907,  he  came  from  an  old  and 
distinguished  South  German  family.  Through  his  mother, 
Countess  von  UxkulTGyllenbrand,  he  was  a great-grand- 
son of  Gneisenau,  one  of  the  military  heroes  of  the  war  of 
liberation  against  Napoleon  and  the  cofounder,  with  Scham- 
horst,  of  the  Prussian  General  Staff,  and  through  her  also 
a descendant  of  Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  another  celebrated 
general  of  the  Bonaparte  era.  Klaus’s  father  had  been 
Privy  Chamberlain  to  the  last  King  of  Wuerttemberg.  The 
family  was  congenial,  devoutly  Roman  Catholic  and  highly 
cultivated. 

With  this  background  and  in  this  atmosphere  Klaus  von 
Stauffenberg  grew  up.  Possessed  of  a fine  physique  and, 
according  to  all  who  knew  him,  of  a striking  handsome- 
ness, he  developed  a brilliant,  inquisitive,  splendidly  bal- 
anced mind.  He  had  a passion  for  horses  and  sports  but 
also  for  the  arts  and  literature,  in  which  he  read  widely, 
and  as  a youth  came  under  the  influence  of  Stefan  George 
and  that  poetic  genius’s  romantic  mysticism.  For  a time  the 

goaded  to  action  by  dastardly  priests  or  nationalist-minded  patriots  from 
one  of  the  countries  we  have  occupied.  My  many  years  of  experience  male? 
things  fairly  difficult  even  for  such  as  these."  {Ibid.,  p.  367.) 


1335 


Beginning  of  the  End 

young  man  thought  of  taking  up  music  as  a profession,  and 
later  architecture,  but  in  1926,  at  the  age  of  nineteen,  he 
entered  the  Army  as  an  officer  cadet  in  the  17th  Bamberg 
Cavalry  Regiment — the  famed  Bamberger  Reiter. 

In  1936  he  was  posted  to  the  War  Academy  in  Berlin, 
where  his  all-round  brilliance  attracted  the  attention  of 
both  his  teachers  and  the  High  Command.  He  emerged 
two  years  later  as  a young  officer  of  the  General  Staff. 
Though,  like  most  of  his  class,  a monarchist  at  heart,  he 
was  not  up  to  this  time  an  opponent  of  National  Socialism. 
Apparently  it  was  the  anti-Jewish  pogroms  of  1938  which 
first  cast  doubts  in  his  mind  about  Hitler,  and  these  in- 
creased when  in  the  summer  of  1939  he  saw  that  the  Fueh- 
rer was  leading  Germany  into  a war  which  might  be  long, 
frightfully  costly  in  human  lives,  and,  in  the  end,  lost. 

Nevertheless,  when  the  war  came  he  threw  himself  into 
it  with  characteristic  energy,  making  a name  for  himself 
as  a staff  officer  of  General  Hoepner’s  6th  Panzer  Division 
in  the  campaigns  in  Poland  and  France.  It  was  in  Russia 
that  Stauffenberg  seems  to  have  become  completely  dis- 
illusioned with  the  Third  Reich.  He  had  been  transferred 
to  the  Army  High  Command  (OKH)  early  in  June  1940, 
just  before  the  assault  on  Dunkirk,  and  for  the  first  eight- 
een months  of  the  Russian  campaign  spent  most  of  his 
time  in  Soviet  territory,  where,  among  other  things,  he 
helped  organize  the  Russian  “volunteer”  units  from  among 
the  prisoners  of  war.  By  this  time,  according  to  his  friends, 
Stauffenberg  believed  that  while  the  Germans  were  getting 
rid  of  Hitler’s  tyranny  these  Russian  troops  could  be  used  to 
overthrow  Stalin’s.  Perhaps  this  was  an  instance  of  the  in- 
fluence of  Stefan  George’s  wooly  ideas. 

The  brutality  of  the  S.S.  in  Russia,  not  to  mention  Hit- 
ler’s order  to  shoot  the  Bolshevik  commissars,  opened 
Stauffenberg’s  eyes  as  to  the  master  he  was  serving.  As 
chance  had  it,  he  met  in  Russia  two  of  the  chief  conspira- 
tors who  had  decided  to  make  an  end  to  that  master: 
General  von  Tresckow  and  Schlabrendorff.  The  latter 
says  it  took  only  a few  subsequent  meetings  to  convince 
them  that  Stauffenberg  was  their  man.  He  became  an  active 
conspirator. 

But  he  was  still  only  a junior  officer  and  he  soon  saw 
that  the  field  marshals  were  too  confused — if  not  too 
cowardly — to  do  anything  to  remove  Hitler  or  to  stop  the 


1336  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

grisly  slaughter  of  Jews,  Russians  and  POWs  behind  the 
lines.  Also  the  needless  disaster  at  Stalingrad  sickened 
him.  As  soon  as  it  was  over,  in  February  1943,  he  asked 
to  be  sent  to  the  front  and  was  posted  as  operations  officer 
of  the  10th  Panzer  Division  in  Tunisia,  joining  it  in  the 
last  days  of  the  battle  of  the  Kasserine  Pass  in  which  his 
unit  had  thrown  the  Americans  out  of  the  gap. 

On  April  7 his  car  drove  into  a mine  field — some  say  it 
was  also  attacked  by  low-flying  Allied  aircraft — and  Stauf- 
fenberg  was  gravely  wounded.  He  lost  his  left  eye,  his 
right  hand  and  two  fingers  of  the  other  hand  and  suffered 
injuries  to  his  left  ear  and  knee.  For  several  weeks  it  seemed 
probable  that  he  would  be  left  totally  blind,  if  he  sur- 
vived. But  under  the  expert  supervision  at  a Munich  hospi- 
tal of  Professor  Sauerbruch,  he  was  restored  to  life.  Al- 
most any  other  man,  one  would  think,  would  have  retired 
from  the  Army  and  thus  from  the  conspiracy.  But  by  mid- 
summer he  was  writing  General  Olbricht — after  much 
practice  in  wielding  a pen  with  the  three  fingers  of  his  ban- 
daged left  hand — that  he  expected  to  return  to  active 
duty  within  three  months.  During  the  long  convalescence 
he  had  had  time  to  reflect  and  he  had  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that,  physically  handicaped  though  he  was,  he  had 
a sacred  mission  to  perform. 

“I  feel  I must  do  something  now  to  save  Germany,”  he 
told  his  wife,  the  Countess  Nina,  mother  of  his  four  young 
children,  when  she  visited  his  bedside  one  day.  “We  Gen- 
eral Staff  officers  must  all  accept  our  share  of  the  responsi- 
bility.” 10 

By  the  end  of  September  1943,  he  was  back  in  Berlin 
as  a lieutenant  colonel  and  chief  of  staff  to  General  Ol- 
bricht at  the  General  Army  Office.  Soon  he  was  practicing 
with  a pair  of  tongs  how  to  set  off  one  of  the  English-made 
Abwehr  bombs  with  the  three  fingers  of  his  good  hand. 

He  was  doing  much  more.  His  dynamic  personality,  the 
clarity  of  his  mind,  the  catholicity  of  his  ideas  and  his 
marked  talents  as  an  organizer  infused  new  life  and  deter- 
mination into  the  conspirators.  And  also  some  differences, 
for  Stauffenberg  was  not  satisfied  with  the  kind  of  stodgy, 
conservative,  colorless  regime  which  the  old  rusty  leaders  of 
the  conspiracy,  Beck,  Goerdeler  and  Hassell,  envisaged  as 
soon  as  National  Socialism  was  overthrown.  More  practical 
than  his  friends  in  the  Kreisau  Circle,  he  wanted  a new 


1337 


Beginning  of  the  End 

dynamic  Social  Democracy  and  he  insisted  that  the  pro- 
posed anti-Nazi  cabinet  include  his  new  friend  Julius  Leber, 
a brilliant  Socialist,  and  Wilhelm  Leuschner,  a former 
trade-union  official,  both  deep  and  active  in  the  conspiracy. 
There  was  much  argument,  but  Stauffenberg  rapidly 
achieved  dominance  over  the  political  leaders  of  the  plot. 

He  was  equally  successful  with  most  of  the  military  men. 
He  recognized  General  Beck  as  the  nominal  leader  of  these 
and  held  the  former  General  Staff  Chief  in  great  admira- 
tion, but  on  returning  to  Berlin  he  saw  that  Beck,  recover- 
ing from  a major  cancer  operation,  was  only  a shell  of 
his  former  self,  tired  and  somewhat  dispirited,  and  that 
moreover  he  had  no  concept  of  politics,  being  in  this  field 
completely  under  the  spell  of  Goerdeler.  Beck’s  illustrious 
name  in  military  circles  would  be  useful,  even  necessary,  in 
carrying  out  the  putsch.  But  for  active  help  in  supplying 
and  commanding  the  troops  which  would  be  needed, 
younger  officers  who  were  on  active  duty  had  to  be 
mobilized.  Stauffenberg  soon  had  most  of  the  key  men  he 
needed. 

These  were,  besides  Olbricht,  his  chief:  General  Stieff, 
head  of  the  Organization  Branch  of  OKH;  General  Eduard 
Wagner,  the  First  Quartermaster  General  of  the  Army; 
General  Erich  Fellgiebel,  the  Chief  of  Signals  at  OKW; 
General  Fritz  Lindemann,  head  of  the  Ordnance  Office; 
General  Paul  von  Hase,  chief  of  the  Berlin  Komman- 
dantur  (who  could  furnish  the  troops  for  taking  over  Ber- 
lin); and  Colonel  Freiherr  von  Roenne,  head  of  the  For- 
eign Armies  Section,  with  his  chief  of  staff.  Captain  Count 
von  Matuschka. 

There  were  two  or  three  key  generals,  chief  of  whom 
was  Fritz  Fromm,  the  actual  commander  in  chief  of  the 
Replacement  Army,  who  like  Kluge,  blew  hot  and  cold 
and  could  not  be  definitely  counted  on. 

The  plotters  also  did  not  yet  have  a field  marshal  on  ac- 
tive duty.  Field  Marshal  von  Witzleben,  one  of  the  original 
conspirators,  was  slated  to  become  Commander  in  Chief  of 
the  Armed  Forces  but  he  was  on  the  inactive  list  and  had 
no  troops  at  his  command.  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt, 
who  now  commanded  all  troops  in  the  West,  was  ap- 
proached, but  declined  to  go  back  on  his  oath  to  the 
Fuehrer — or  such,  at  least,  was  his  explanation.  Likewise 
the  brilliant  but  opportunistic  Field  Marshal  von  Manstein. 


1338  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

At  this  juncture — early  in  1944 — a very  active  and  pop- 
ular Field  Marshal  made  himself,  at  first  without  the 
knowledge  of  Stauffenberg,  somewhat  available  to  the  con- 
spirators. This  was  Rommel,  and  his  entrance  into  the  plot 
against  Hitler  came  as  a great  suprise  to  the  resistance 
leaders  and  was  not  approved  by  most  of  them,  who  re- 
garded the  “Desert  Fox”  as  a Nazi  and  as  an  opportunist 
who  had  blatantly  courted  Hitler’s  favor  and  was  only  now 
deserting  him  because  he  knew  the  war  was  lost. 

In  January  1944  Rommel  had  become  commander  of 
Army  Group  B in  the  West,  the  main  force  with  which 
the  expected  Anglo-American  invasion  across  the  Chan- 
nel was  to  be  repelled.  In  France  he  began  to  see  a good 
deal  of  two  old  friends,  General  Alexander  von  Falken- 
hausen,  the  military  governor  of  Belgium  and  northern 
France,  and  General  Karl  Heinrich  von  Stuelpnagel,  mili- 
tary  governor  of  France.  Both  generals  had  already  joined 
the  anti-Hitler  conspiracy  and  gradually  initiated  Rommel 
into  it.  They  were  aided  by  an  old  civilian  friend  of  Rom- 
mel, Dr.  Karl  Stroelin,  the  Oberbuergermeister  of  Stutt- 
gart, who  like  so  many  other  characters  in  this  narrative 
had  been  an  enthusiastic  Nazi  and  now,  with  defeat 
looming  and  the  cities  of  Germany,  including  his  own,  rap- 
idly becoming  rubble  from  the  Allied  bombing,  was  having 
second  thoughts.  He,  in  turn,  had  been  helped  along  this 
path  by  Dr.  Goerdeler,  who  in  August  1943  had  per- 
suaded him  to  join  in  drawing  up  a memorandum  to  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior — now  headed  by  Himmler — in 
which  they  jointly  demanded  a cessation  of  the  persecu- 
tion of  the  Jews  and  the  Christian  churches,  the  restoration 
of  civil  rights  and  the  re-establishment  of  a system  of  jus- 
tice divorced  from  the  party  and  the  S.S.-Gestapo.  Through 
Frau  Rommel,  Stroelin  brought  the  memorandum  to  the 
attention  of  the  Field  Marshal,  on  whom  it  appears  to 
have  had  a marked  effect. 

Toward  the  end  of  February  1944,  the  two  men  met  at 
Rommel’s  home  at  Herrlingen,  near  Ulm,  and  had  a 
heart-to-heart  talk. 

I told  him  [the  mayor  later  recounted]  that  certain  sen- 
ior officers  of  the  Army  in  the  East  proposed  to  make  Hitler 
a prisoner  and  to  force  him  to  announce  over  the  radio 
that  he  had  abdicated.  Rommel  approved  of  the  idea. 

I went  on  to  say  to  him  that  he  was  our  greatest  and  most 


1339 


Beginning  of  the  End 

popular  general,  and  more  respected  abroad  than  any  other. 
“You  are  the  only  one,”  I said,  “who  can  prevent  civil  war  in 
Germany.  You  must  lend  your  name  to  the  movement.”  11 

Rommel  hesitated  and  finally  made  his  decision. 

“I  believe,”  he  said  to  Stroelin,  “it  is  my  duty  to  come  to 
the  rescue  of  Germany.” 

At  this  meeting  and  at  all  subsequent  ones  which  Rom- 
mel had  with  the  plotters,  he  opposed  assassinating  Hitler 
— not  on  moral  but  on  practical  grounds.  To  kill  the  dic- 
tator, he  argued,  would  be  to  make  a martyr  of  him.  He 
insisted  that  Hitler  be  arrested  by  the  Army  and  haled 
before  a German  court  for  crimes  against  his  own  people 
and  those  of  the  occupied  lands.12 

At  this  time  fate  brought  another  influence  on  Rommel 
in  the  person  of  General  Hans  Speidel,  who  on  April  15, 
1944,  became  the  Field  Marshal’s  chief  of  staff.  Speidel, 
like  his  fellow  conspirator  Stauffenberg — though  they  be- 
longed to  quite  separate  groups— was  an  unusual  Army 
officer.  He  was  not  only  a soldier  but  a philosopher, 
having  received  summa  cum  laude  a doctorate  in  philoso- 
phy from  the  University  of  Tuebingen  in  1925.  He  lost 
no  time  in  going  to  work  on  his  chief.  Within  a month,  on 
May  15,  he  arranged  a meeting  at  a country  house  near 
Paris  between  Rommel,  Stuelpnagel  and  their  chiefs  of 
staff.  The  purpose,  says  Speidel,  was  to  work  out  “the 
necessary  measures  for  ending  the  war  in  the  West  and 
overthrowing  the  Nazi  regime.”  13 

This  was  a large  order,  and  Speidel  realized  that  in  pre- 
paring it  closer  contacts  with  the  anti-Nazis  in  the  home- 
land, especially  with  the  Goerdeler-Beck  group,  were  ur- 
gently necessary.  For  some  weeks  the  mercurial  Goerdeler 
had  been  pressing  for  a secret  meeting  between  Rommel 
and — of  all  people — Neurath,  who,  having  done  his  own 
share  of  Hitler’s  dirty  work,  first  as  Foreign  Minister  and 
then  as  the  Reich  Protector  of  Bohemia,  was  also  experi- 
encing a rude  awakening  now  that  terrible  disaster  was 
about  to  overtake  the  Fatherland.  It  was  decided  that  it 
would  be  too  dangerous  for  Rommel  to  meet  with 
Neurath  and  Stroelin,  so  the  Field  Marshal  sent  General 
Speidel,  at  whose  home  in  Freudenstadt  the  conference 
was  held  on  May  27.  The  three  men  present,  Speidel, 
Neurath  and  Stroelin,  were,  like  Rommel  himself,  all 
Swabians  and  this  affinity  appears  not  only  to  have  made 


1340 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 
the  meeting  congenial  but  to  have  led  to  ready  agreement. 

RnmmT  that.I?ltler  must  be  quickly  overthrown  and  that 
f“me  be  Prepared  to  become  either  the  interim 

head  of  state  or  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Armed 
Forces— neither  of  which  posts,  it  must  be  said,  Rommel 
at  any  time  ever  demanded  for  himself.  A number  of  de- 

°Ut’  mcluding  plans  for  contacting  the 
Western  Allies  for  an  armistice,  and  a code  for  com- 
mumcation  between  the  conspirators  in  Germany  and  Rom- 
mel’s headquarters. 

Genera!  Speidel  is  emphatic  in  his  assertion  not  only 

thf WpTf6  k u ?f°rmed  his  immediate  superior  hi 

J®  Yk,’  ^ Marshal  von  Rundstedt,  as  to  what  was  up, 
but  that  the  latter  was  “in  complete  agreement.”  There 

was  a flaw,  however,  in  the  character  of  this  senior  officer 
or  the  Army. 

toDS  a discussion  on  the  formulation  of  joint  demands 
“Yen  Speidel  later  wrote]  Rundstedt  said  to  Rommel- 
.You  are  young.  You  know  and  love  the  people.  You  do 

After  further  conferences  that  late  spring  the  following 
plan  was  drawn  up.  Speidel,  almost  alone  among  the  Army 
conspirators  m the  West,  survived  to  describe  if 

armjStice  with  the  Western  Allies  but  not 
unconditional  surrender.  German  withdrawal  in  the  West 
to  Germany.  Immediate  suspension  of  the  Allied  bomb- 
mg  of  Germany.  Arrest  of  Hitler  for  trial  before  a German 
court.  Overthrow  of  Nazi  rule.  Temporary  assumption  of 
executive  power  in  Germany  by  the  resistance  forces  of  all 

and  thn  f leadershiP  of  General  Beck,  Goerdeler, 

fficlSrck-  d%lUU0D  representative'  Leuschner.  No  military 
dictatorship.  Preparation  of  a “constructive  peace”  within 
the  framework  of  a United  States  of  Europe  In  the  East 
continuation  of  the  war.  Holding  a shortened  line  be- 
tween  the  mouth  of  the  Danube,  the  Carpathian  Mountains 
the  River  Vistula  and  Memel 15  ’ 

tha?ffiegTririshS!2  a ^ had  D°  doubts  whatsoever 
them  in  tk  h d-  would  then  join 

ffiem  in  the  war  against  Russia  to  prevent,  as  they  said 
Europe  from  becoming  Bolshevik.  y ’ 

In  Berlin  General  Beck  agreed,  at  least  to  the  extent  of 


1341 


Beginning  of  the  End 

continuing  the  war  in  the  East.  Early  in  May  he  sent 
through  Gisevius  a memorandum  to  Dulles  in  Switzerland 
outlining  a fantastic  plan.  The  German  generals  in  the 
West  were  to  withdraw  their  forces  to  the  German  fron- 
tier after  the  Anglo-American  invasion.  While  this  was 
going  on.  Beck  urged  that  the  Western  Allies  carry  out 
three  tactical  operations;  land  three  airborne  divisions  in 
the  Berlin  area  to  help  the  conspirators  hold  the  capital, 
carry  out  large-scale  seaborne  landings  on  the  German 
coast  near  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  and  land  a sizable  force 
across  the  Channel  in  France.  Reliable  anti-Nazi  German 
troops  would  in  the  meantime  take  over  in  the  Munich 
area  and  surround  Hitler  at  his  mountain  retreat  on  the 
Obersalzberg.  The  war  against  Russia  would  go  on.  Dul- 
les says  he  lost  no  time  in  trying  to  bring  the  Berlin  con- 
spirators down  to  earth.  They  were  told  there  could  be  no 
separate  peace  with  the  West.16 

Stauffenberg,  his  friends  in  the  Kreisau  Circle  and  such 
members  of  the  conspiracy  as  Schulenburg,  the  former 
ambassador  in  Moscow,  had  come  to  realize  this.  In  fact 
most  of  them,  including  Stauffenberg,  were  “Easterners” 
— pro-Russian  though  anti-Bolshevik.  For  a time  they  be- 
lieved that  it  might  be  easier  to  get  a better  peace  with 
Russia — which  through  statements  from  Stalin  himself  had 
emphasized  in  its  radio  propaganda  that  it  was  fighting  not 
against  the  German  people  but  against  “the  Hitlerites” — 
than  with  the  Western  Allies,  who  harped  only  of  “un- 
conditional surrender.”*  But  they  abandoned  such  wishful 
thinking  in  October  1943,  when  the  Soviet  government 
at  the  Moscow  Conference  of  Allied  Foreign  Ministers 
formally  adhered  to  the  Casablanca  declaration  of  uncon- 
ditional surrender. 

And  now,  as  the  fateful  summer  of  1944  approached, 
they  realized  that  with  the  Red  armies  nearing  the  frontier 
of  the  Reich,  the  British  and  American  armies  poised  Tor 
a large-scale  invasion  across  the  Channel,  and  the  German 
resistance  to  Alexander’s  Allied  forces  in  Italy  crumbling, 
they  must  quickly  get  rid  of  Hitler  and  the  Nazi  regime 

* At  their  meeting  at  Casablanca  Churchill  and  Roosevelt  had  issued  on 
January  24,  1943,  their  declaration  of  unconditional  surrender  for  Germany. 
Goebbejs  naturally  made  a great  deal  of  this  in  trying  to  whip  the  German 
people  into  a state  of  all-out  resistance  but  in  the  opinion  of  this  author  his 
success  has  been  grossly  exaggerated  by  a surprisingly  large  number  of 
Western  writers. 


1342  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

if  any  kind  of  peace  at  all  was  to  be  had  that  would  spare 
Germany  from  being  overrun  and  annihilated. 

In  Berlin,  Stauffenberg  and  his  confederates  had  at  last 
perfected  their  plans.  They  were  lumped  under  the  code 
name  “Valkyrie” — an  appropriate  term,  since  the  Valkyrie 
were  the  maidens  in  Norse-German  mythology,  beautiful 
but  terrifying,  who  were  supposed  to  have  hovered  over 
the  ancient  battlefields  choosing  those  who  would  be  slain. 
In  this  case,  Adolf  Hitler  was  to  be  slain.  Ironically 
enough,  Admiral  Canaris,  before  his  fall,  had  sold  the 
Fuehrer  the  idea  of  Valkyrie,  dressing  it  up  as  a plan  for 
the  Home  Army  to  take  over  the  security  of  Berlin  and  the 
other  large  cities  in  case  of  a revolt  of  the  millions  0f 
foreign  laborers  toiling  in  these  centers.  Such  a revolt 
was  highly  unlikely — indeed,  impossible — since  the  for- 
eign workers  were  unarmed  and  unorganized,  but  to  the 
suspicious  Fuehrer  danger  lurked  everywhere  these  days, 
and,  with  almost  all  the  able-bodied  soldiers  absent  from 
the  homeland  either  at  the  front  or  keeping  down  the  popu- 
lace in  the  far-flung  occupied  areas,  he  readily  fell  in  with 
the  idea  that  the  Home  Army  ought  to  have  plans  for 
protecting  the  internal  security  of  the  Reich  against  the 
hordes  of  sullen  slave  laborers.  Thus  Valkyrie  became  a 
perfect  cover  for  the  military  conspirators,  enabling  them 
to  draw  up  quite  openly  plans  for  the  Home  Army  to 
take  over  the  capital  and  such  cities  as  Vienna  Munich 
and  Cologne  as  soon  as  Hitler  had  been  assassinated. 

In  Berlin  their  main  difficulty  was  that  they  had  very 
few  troops  at  their  disposal  and  that  these  were  outnum- 
bered by  the  S.S.  formations.  Also  there  were  considerable 
numbers  of  Luftwaffe  units  in  and  around  the  city  man- 
ning the  antiaircraft  defenses,  and  these  troops,  unless  the 
Army  moved  swiftly,  would  remain  loyal  to  Goering  and 
certainly  make  a fight  of  it  to  retain  the  Nazi  regime  under 
their  chief  even  if  Hitler  were  dead.  Their  flak  guns  could 
be  used  as  artillery  against  the  Army  detachments.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  police  force  in  Berlin  had  been  won 
over  through  its  chief,  Count  von  HeUdorf,  who  had 
joined  the  conspiracy. 

In  view  of  the  strength  of  the  S.S.  and  Air  Force 
troops,  Stauffenberg  laid  great  stress  on  the  timing  of  the 
operation  to  gain  control  of  the  capital.  The  first  two 


Beginning  of  the  End  1343 

hours  would  be  the  most  critical.  In  that  short  space  of 
time  the  Army  troops  must  occupy  and  secure  the  national 
broadcasting  headquarters  and  the  city’s  two  radio  sta- 
tions, the  telegraph  and  telephone  centrals,  the  Reich 
Chancellery,  the  ministries  and  the  Headquarters  of  the 
S.S.-Gestapo.  Goebbels,  the  only  prominent  Nazi  who 
rarely  left  Berlin,  must  be  arrested  along  with  the  S.S. 
officers.  In  the  meantime,  the  moment  Hitler  was  killed 
his  headquarters  at  Rastenburg  must  be  isolated  from 
Germany  so  that  neither  Goering  nor  Himmler,  nor  any  of 
the  Nazi  generals  such  as  Keitel  and  Jodi,  could  take  over 
and  attempt  to  rally  the  police  or  the  troops  behind  a 
continued  Nazi  regime.  General  Fellgiebel,  Chief  of  Sig- 
nals, who  was  staioned  at  the  Fuehrer’s  headquarters,  had 
undertaken  to  see  to  this. 

Only  then,  after  all  these  things  had  been  accomplished 
within  the  first  couple  of  hours  of  the  coup,  could  the 
messages,  which  had  been  drawn  up  and  filed,  be  sent 
out  by  radio,  telephone  and  telegraph  to  the  commanders 
of  the  Home  Army  in  other  cities  and  to  the  top  generals 
commanding  the  troops  at  the  front  and  in  the  occupied 
zones,  announcing  that  Hitler  was  dead  and  that  a new 
anti-Nazi  government  had  been  formed  in  Berlin.  The  re- 
volt would  have  to  be  over — and  achieved — within  twenty- 
four  hours  and  the  new  government  firmly  installed.  Other- 
wise the  vacillating  generals  might  have  second  thoughts. 
Goering  and  Himmler  might  be  able  to  rally  them,  and  a 
civil  war  would  ensue.  In  that  case  the  fronts  would  cave 
in  and  the  very  chaos  and  collapse  which  the  plotters 
wished  to  prevent  would  become  inevitable. 

All  depended  for  success,  after  Hitler  had  been  assas- 
sinated— and  Stauffenberg  personally  would  see  to  this — 
on  the  ability  of  the  plotters  to  utilize  for  their  purposes, 
and  with  the  utmost  speed  and  energy,  the  available  Army 
troops  in  and  around  Berlin.  This  posed  a knotty  problem. 

Only  General  Fritz  Fromm,  the  commander  in  chief  of 
the  Home  or  Replacement  Army,  could  normally  give  the 
order  to  carry  out  Valkyrie.  And  to  the  very  last  he  re- 
mained a question  mark.  All  through  1943  the  conspirators 
had  worked  on  him.  They  finally  concluded  that  this  wary 
officer  could  be  definitely  counted  upon  only  after  he 
saw  that  the  revolt  had  succeeded.  But  since  they  were 
sure  of  its  success,  they  proceeded  to  draft  a series  of 


1344 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

orders  under  Fromm’s  name,  though  without  his  knowledge 
In  case  he  wavered  at  the  crucial  moment,  Fromm  was  to 
be  replaced  by  General  Hoepner,  the  brilliant  tank  com- 
mander  who  had  been  cashiered  by  Hitler  after  the  battle 
for  Moscow  in  1941  and  forbidden  to  wear  his  uniform. 

The  problem  of  another  key  general  in  Berlin  also 
plagued  the  plotters.  This  was  General  von  Kortzfleisch 
an  out-and-out  Nazi,  who  commanded  Wehrkreis  III’ 
which  included  Berlin  and  Brandenburg.  It  was  decided 
to  have  him  arrested  and  replaced  by  General  Freiherr 

V?nr>TrUengen'  ,General  Paul  von  Hase,  the  commandant 
ot  Berlin,  was  in  on  the  plot  and  could  be  counted  upon 
to  lead  the  local  garrison  troops  in  the  first,  all-important 
step  of  taking  over  the  city. 

Besides  drawing  up  detailed  plans  for  seizing  control  of 
Berlin,  Stauffenberg  and  Tresckow,  in  collaboration  with 
Goerdeler,  Beck,  Witzleben  and  others,  drafted  papers 
giving  instructions  to  the  district  military  commanders  on 
how  they  were  to  take  over  executive  power  in  their  areas 
put  down  the  S.S.,  arrest  the  leading  Nazis  and  occupy 
the  concentration  camps.  Furthermore,  several  ringing  dec- 
larations were  composed  which  at  the  appropriate  moment 
were  to  be  issued  to  the  armed  forces,  the  German  people, 
the  press  and  the  radio.  Some  were  signed  by  Beck,  as 
the  new  head  of  state,  others  by  Field  Marshal  von  Witz- 
leben, as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Wehrmacht,  and  by 
Goerdeler,  as  the  new  Chancellor.  Copies  of  the  orders 
and  appeals  were  typed  in  great  secrecy  late  at  night  in 
the  Bendlerstrasse  by  two  brave  women  in  the  plot,  Frau 
Erika  von  Tresckow,  the  wife  of  the  general  who  had  done 
so  much  to  further  the  conspiracy,  and  Margarete  von 
Oven,  the  daughter  of  a retired  general  and  for  years  the 
faithful  secretary  of  two  former  commanders  in  chief  of 
the  Army,  Generals  von  Hammerstein  and  von  Fritsch 
The  papers  were  then  hidden  in  General  Olbricht’s  safe. 

The  plans,  then,  were  ready.  In  fact,  they  had  been  per- 
fected by  the  end  of  1943,  but  for  months  little  had  been 
done  to  carry  them  out.  Events,  however,  could  not  wait 
on  the  conspirators.  As  June  1944  came  they  realized  that 
time  was  running  out  on  them.  For  one  thing,  the  Gestapo 
was  closing  in.  The  arrests  of  those  who  were  in  on  the 
plot,  among  them  Count  von  Moltke  and  the  members  of 
the  Kreisau  Circle,  were  mounting  with  each  week  that 


1345 


Beginning  of  the  End 

passed,  and  there  were  many  executions.  Beck,  Goerdeler, 
Hassell,  Witzleben  and  others  in  the  inner  circle  were  being 
so  closely  shadowed  by  Himmler’s  secret  police  that  they 
found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  meet  together.  Himmler 
himself  had  warned  the  fallen  Canaris  in  the  spring  that 
he  knew  very  well  that  a rebellion  was  being  hatched  by 
the  generals  and  their  civilian  friends.  He  mentioned  that 
he  was  keeping  a watch  on  Beck  and  Goerdeler.  Canaris 
passed  the  warning  on  to  Olbricht.17 

Just  as  ominous  for  the  conspirators  was  the  military 
situation.  The  Russians,  it  was  believed,  were  about  to 
launch  an  all-out  offensive  in  the  East.  Rome  was  being 
abandoned  to  the  Allied  forces.  (It  fell  on  June  4.)  In  the 
West  the  Anglo-American  invasion  was  imminent.  Very 
soon  Germany  might  go  down  to  military  defeat — before 
Nazism  could  be  overthrown.  Indeed,  there  was  a growing 
number  of  conspirators,  perhaps  influenced  by  the  think- 
ing of  the  Kreisau  Circle,  who  began  to  feel  that  it  might 
be  better  to  call  off  their  plans  and  let  Hitler  and  the 
Nazis  take  the  responsibility  for  the  catastrophe.  To 
overthrow  them  now  might  merely  perpetrate  another 
“stab-in-the-back”  legend,  such  as  that  which  had  fooled' 
so  many  Germans  after  the  First  World  War. 

THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  INVASION, 

JUNE  6,  1944 

Stauffenberg  himself  did  not  believe  that  the  Western 
Allies  would  attempt  to  land  in  France  that  summer.  He 
persisted  in  this  belief  even  after  Colonel  Georg  Hansen, 
a carryover  from  the  Abwehr  in  Himmler’s  military-intel- 
ligence bureau,  had  warned  him  early  in  May  that  the  in- 
vasion might  begin  on  any  day  in  June. 

The  German  Army  itself  was  beset  by  doubts,  at  least 
as  to  the  date  and  place  of  the  assault.  In  May  there 
had  been  eighteen  days  when  the  weather,  the  sea  and  the 
tides  were  just  right  for  a landing,  and  the  Germans 
noted  that  General  Eisenhower  had  not  taken  advantage  of 
them.  On  May  30  Rundstedt,  the  Commander  in  Chief  in 
the  West,  had  reported  to  Hitler  that  there  was  no  indi- 
cation that  the  invasion  was  “immediately  imminent.”  On 
June  4,  the  Air  Force  meteorologist  in  Paris  advised  that 
because  of  the  inclement  weather  no  Allied  action  could 
be  expected  for  at  least  a fortnight. 


1346 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

On  the  strength  of  this  and  of  what  little  information 
he  had — the  Luftwaffe  had  been  prevented  from  making 
aerial  reconnaissance  of  the  harbors  on  England’s  south 
coast  where  Eisenhower’s  troops  at  that  moment  were 
swarming  aboard  their  ships,  and  the  Navy  had  withdrawn 
its  reconnaissance  craft  from  the  Channel  because  of  the 
heavy  seas — Rommel  drew  up  a situation  report  on  the 
morning  of  June  5 reporting  to  Rundstedt  that  the  in- 
vasion was  not  imminent,  and  immediately  set  off  by  car 
for  his  home  at  Herrlingen  to  spend  the  night  with  his 
family  and  then  to  proceed  to  Berchtesgaden  the  next  day 
to  confer  with  Hitler. 

June  5,  General  Speidel,  Rommel’s  chief  of  staff,  later 
recalled,  “was  a quiet  day.”  There  seemed  no  reason  why 
Rommel  should  not  make  his  somewhat  leisurely  journey 
back  to  Germany.  There  were  the  usual  reports  from  Ger- 
man agents  about  the  possibility  of  an  Allied  landing — this 
time  between  June  6 and  June  16 — but  there  had  been  hun- 
dreds of  these  since  April  and  they  were  not  taken  seri- 
ously. Indeed,  on  the  sixth  General  Friedrich  Dollmann, 
who  commanded  the  Seventh  Army  in  Normandy,  on 
whose  beaches  the  Allied  forces  were  about  to  land,  ordered 
a temporary  relaxation  of  the  standing  alert  and  convoked 
his  senior  officers  for  a map  exercise  at  Rennes,  some  125 
miles  south  of  those  beaches. 

If  the  Germans  were  in  the  dark  about  the  date  of  the 
invasion,  they  were  also  ignorant  of  where  it  would  take 
place.  Rundstedt  and  Rommel  were  certain  it  would  be  in 
the  Pas-de-Calais  area,  where  the  Channel  was  at  its  nar- 
rowest. There  they  had  concentrated  their  strongest  force, 
the  Fifteenth  Army,  whose  strength  during  the  spring  was 
increased  from  ten  to  fifteen  infantry  divisions.  But  by  the 
end  of  March  Adolf  Hitler’s  uncanny  intuition  was  telling 
him  that  the  Schwerpunkt  of  the  invasion  probably  would 
be  in  Normandy,  and  during  the  next  few  weeks  he  or- 
dered considerable  reinforcements  to  the  region  between 
the  Seine  and  the  Loire.  “Watch  Normandy!”  he  kept 
warning  his  generals. 

Still,  the  overwhelming  part  of  German  strength,  in  both 
infantry  and  panzer  divisions,  was  retained  north  of  the 
Seine,  between  Le  Havre  and  Dunkirk.  Rundstedt  and  his 
generals  were  watching  the  Pas-de-Calais  rather  than  Nor- 
mandy and  they  were  encouraged  in  this  by  a number  of 


Beginning  of  the  End  1347 

deceptive  maneuvers  carried  out  during  April  and  May  by 
the  British-American  High  Command  which  indicated  to 
them  that  their  calculations  were  correct. 

The  day  of  June  5,  then,  passed  in  relative  quiet,  so 
far  as  the  Germans  were  concerned.  Severe  Anglo- 
American  air  attacks  continued  to  disrupt  German  depots, 
radar  stations,  V-l  sites,  communications  and  transport, 
but  these  had  been  going  on  night  and  day  for  weeks  and 
seemed  no  more  intense  on  this  day  than  on  others. 

Shortly  after  dark  Rundstedt’s  headquarters  was  in- 
formed that  the  BBC  in  London  was  broadcasting  an  un- 
usually large  number  of  coded  messages  to  the  French 
resistance  and  that  the  German  radar  stations  between 
Cherbourg  and  Le  Havre  were  being  jammed.  At  10  p.m. 
the  Fifteenth  Army  intercepted  a code  message  from  the 
BBC  to  the  French  resistance  which  it  believed  meant  that 
the  invasion  was  about  to  begin.  This  army  was  alerted, 
but  Runstedt  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  alert  the  Seventh 
Army,  on  whose  sector  of  the  coast  farther  west,  between 
Caen  and  Cherbourg,  the  Allied  forces  were  now — toward 
midnight — approaching  on  a thousand  ships. 

It  was  not  until  eleven  minutes  past  1 a.m.,  June  6, 
that  the  Seventh  Army,  its  commander  not  yet  returned 
from  his  map  exercise  at  Rennes,  realized  what  was  hap- 
pening. Two  American  and  one  British  airborne  divisions 
had  begun  landing  in  its  midst.  The  general  alarm  was 
sounded  at  1:30  a.m. 

Forty-five  minutes  later  Major  General  Max  Pemsel, 
chief  of  staff  of  the  Seventh  Army,  got  General  Speidel 
on  the  telephone  at  Rommel’s  headquarters  and  told  him 
that  it  looked  like  “a  large-scale  operation.”  Speidel  did  not 
believe  it  but  passed  on  the  report  to  Rundstedt,  who  was 
equally  skeptical.  Both  generals  believed  the  dropping  of 
parachutists  was  merely  an  Allied  feint  to  cover  their  main 
landings  around  Calais.  At  2:40  a.m.  Pemsel  was  advised 
that  Rundstedt  “does  not  consider  this  to  be  a major  op- 
eration.” 18  Not  even  when  the  news  began  to  reach  him 
shortly  after  dawn  on  June  6 that  on  the  Normandy  coast 
between  the  rivers  Vire  and  Orne  a huge  Allied  fleet  was 
disembarking  large  bodies  of  troops,  under  cover  of  a 
murderous  fire  from  the  big  guns  of  an  armada  of  war- 
ships, did  the  Commander  in  Chief  West  believe  that  this 
was  to  be  the  main  Allied  assault.  It  did  not  become  ap- 


1348 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


parent,  Speidel  says,  until  the  afternoon  of  June  6.  By 
that  time  the  Americans  had  a toehold  on  two  beaches 
and  the  British  on  a third  and  had  penetrated  inland  for  a 
distance  of  from  two  to  six  miles. 

Speidel  had  telephoned  Rommel  at  6 a.m.  at  his  home 
and  the  Field  Marshal  had  rushed  back  by  car  without 
going  on  to  see  Hitler,  but  he  did  not  arrive  at  Army 
Group  B headquarters  until  late  that  afternoon.*  In  the 
the  meantime  Speidel,  Rundstedt  and  the  latter’s  chief  of 
staff,  General  Blumentritt,  had  been  on  the  telephone  to 
OKW,  which  was  then  at  Berchtesgaden.  Due  to  an  idiotic 
order  of  Hitler’s  not  even  the  Commander  in  Chief  in  the 
West  could  employ  his  panzer  divisions  without  the  spe- 
cific permission  of  the  Fuehrer.  When  the  three  generals 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  sixth  begged  for  permission  to 
rush  two  tank  divisions  to  Normandy,  Jodi  replied  that 
Hitler  wanted  first  to  see  what  developed.  Whereupon 
the  Fuehrer  went  to  bed  and  could  not  be  disturbed  by  the 
frantic  calls  of  the  generals  in  the  West  until  3 p.m. 

When  he  woke  up,  the  bad  news  which  had  in  the  mean- 
time arrived  finally  stirred  the  Nazi  warlord  to  action. 
He  gave — too  late,  as  it  turned  out — permission  to  engage 
the  Panzer  Lehr  and  12th  S.S.  Panzer  divisions  in  Nor- 
mandy. He  also  issued  a famous  order  which  has  been 
preserved  for  posterity  in  the  log  of  the  Seventh  Army: 

. 16:55  hours.  June  6,  1944 

Chief  of  Staff  Western  Command  emphasizes  the  desire  of 
the  Supreme  Command  to  have  the  enemy  in  the  bridgehead 
annihilated  by  the  evening  of  June  6 since  there  exists  the 
danger  of  additional  sea-  and  airborne  landings  for  support 
. . . The  beachhead  must  be  cleaned  up  by  not  later  than  to- 
night. 


In  the  eerie  mountain  air  of  the  Obersalzberg,  from 
which  Hitler  was  now  trying  to  direct  the  most  crucial 
battle  of  the  war  up  to  this  moment — he  had  been  saying 
for  months  that  Germany’s  destiny  would  be  decided  in 
the  West  this  fantastic  order  seems  to  have  been  issued 
in  all  seriousness,  concurred  in  by  Jodi  and  Keitel.  Even 
Rommel,  who  passed  it  on  by  telephone  shortly  before 
5 o clock  that  afternoon,  an  hour  after  his  return  from 
Germany,  seems  to  have  taken  it  seriously,  for  he  ordered 


* Because  of  Allied 

senior  commanders  to 


air  superiority  in  the  West,  Hitler  had  forbidden  his 
travel  by  plane. 


1349 


Beginning  of  the  End 

Seventh  Army  headquarters  to  launch  an  attack  by  the 
21st  Panzer  Division,  the  only  German  armored  unit  in 
the  area,  “immediately  regardless  of  whether  reinforce- 
ments arrive  or  not.” 

This  the  division  had  already  done,  without  waiting 
for  Rommel’s  command.  General  Pemsel,  who  was  on  the 
other  end  of  the  line  when  Rommel  called  Seventh  Army 
headquarters,  gave  a blunt  reply  to  Hitler’s  demand  that 
the  Allied  beachhead — there  were  actually  now  three — 
“be  cleaned  up  by  not  later  than  tonight.” 

“That,”  he  replied,  “would  be  impossible.” 

Hitler’s  much-propagandized  Atlantic  Wall  had  been 
breached  within  a few  hours.  The  once  vaunted  Luftwaffe 
had  been  driven  completely  from  the  air  and  the  German 
Navy  from  the  sea,  and  the  Army  taken  by  surprise.  The 
battle  was  far  from  over,  but  its  outcome  was  not  long 
in  doubt.  “From  June  9 on,”  says  Speidel,  “the  initiative 
lay  with  the  Allies.” 

Rundstedt  and  Rommel  decided  that  it  was  time  to  say 
so  to  Hitler,  face  to  face,  and  to  demand  that  he  accept 
the  consequences.  They  enticed  him  to  a meeting  on 
June  17  at  Margival,  north  of  Soissons,  in  the  elaborate 
bombproof  bunker  which  had  been  built  to  serve  as  the 
Fuehrer’s  headquarters  for  the  invasion  of  Britain  in  the 
summer  of  1940,  but  never  used.  Now,  four  summers  later, 
the  Nazi  warlord  appeared  there  for  the  first  time. 

He  looked  pale  and  sleepless  [Speidel  later  wrote],  play- 
ing nervously  with  his  glasses  and  an  array  of  colored 
pencils  which  he  held  between  his  fingers.  He  sat  hunched 
upon  a stool,  while  the  field  marshals  stood.  His  hypnotic 
powers  seemed  to  have  waned.  There  was  a curt  and  frosty 
greeting  from  him.  Then  in  a loud  voice  he  spoke  bitterly  of 
his  displeasure  at  the  success  of  the  Allied  landings,  for 
which  he  tried  to  hold  the  field  commanders  responsible.10 

But  the  prospect  of  another  stunning  defeat  was  embold- 
ening the  generals,  or  at  least  Rommel,  whom  Rundstedt 
left  to  do  most  of  the  talking  when  Hitler’s  diatribe 
against  them  had  come  to  a momentary  pause.  “With  mer- 
ciless frankness,”  says  Speidel,  who  was  present,  “Rommel 
pointed  out  . . . that  the  struggle  was  hopeless  against 
the  [Allied]  superiority  in  the  air,  at  sea  and  on  the 
land.”*20  Well,  not  quite  hopeless,  if  Hitler  abandoned 


* “If,  in  spite  of  the  enemy’s  air  superiority,  we  succeed  in  getting  a large 


1350 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


his  absurd  determination  to  hold  every  foot  of  ground 
and  then  to  drive  the  Allied  forces  into  the  sea.  Rommel 
proposed,  with  Rundstedt’s  assent,  that  the  Germans  with- 
draw out  of  range  of  the  enemy’s  murderous  naval  guns, 
take  their  panzer  units  out  of  the  line  and  re-form  them 
for  a later  thrust  which  might  defeat  the  Allies  in  a battle 
fought  “outside  the  range  of  the  enemy’s  naval  artillery.” 

But  the  Supreme  warlord  would  not  listen  to  any  pro- 
posal for  withdrawal.  German  soldiers  must  stand  and 
fight.  The  subject  obviously  was  unpleasant  to  him  and 
he  quickly  changed  to  others.  In  a display  which  Speidel 
calls  “a  strange  mixture  of  cynicism  and  false  intuition,” 
Hitler  assured  the  generals  that  the  new  V-l  weapon,  the 
buzz  bomb,  which  had  been  launched  for  the  first  time 
the  day  before  against  London,  “would  be  decisive  against 
Great  Britain  . . . and  make  the  British  willing  to  make 
peace.”  When  the  two  field  marshals  drew  Hitler’s  atten- 
tion to  the  utter  failure  of  the  Luftwaffe  in.  the  West,  the 
Fuehrer  retorted  that  “masses  of  jet  fighters” — the  Allies 
had  no  jets,  but  the  Germans  had  just  put  them  into  pro- 
duction— would  soon  drive  the  British  and  American  fly- 
ers from  the  skies.  Then,  he  said,  Britain  would  collapse. 
At  this  juncture  the  approach  of  Allied  planes  forced 
them  to  adjourn  to  the  Fuehrer’s  air-raid  shelter. 

Safe  in  the  underground  concrete  bunker,  they  resumed 
the  conversation,*  and  at  this  point  Rommel  insisted  on 
steering  it  into  politics. 

He  predicted  [says  Speidel]  that  the  German  front  in 
Normandy  would  collapse  and  that  a breakthrough  into  Ger- 
many by  the  Allies  could  not  be  checked  ...  He  doubted 
whether  the  Russian  front  could  be  held.  He  pointed  to  Ger- 
many’s complete  political  isolation  ...  He  concluded 
with  an  urgent  request  that  the  war  be  brought  to  an  end.’ 

Hitler,  who  had  interrupted  Rommel  several  times,  fi- 
nally  cut  him  short:  “Don’t  you  worry  about  the  future 


S’th^tW  Tforce  into  action  in  the  threatened  coast  defense  sectors 

in  the  first  hours,  I am  convinced  that  the  enemy  attack  on  the  coast  will 

Anri?S21C0£PJeIh  y T “s  first1.  di;y't”  Romniel  had  written  General  Jodi  on 
H?rt  \ LW0  months  before.  {The  Rommel  Papers,  ed.  Liddell 

5"‘r*’  P-  46?->  Hitler’s  strict  orders  had  made  it  impossible  to  throw  in  the 
armored  divisions  in  the  first  hours”  or  even  first  days  When  they  finally 
arrived  they  were  thrown  in  piecemeal  and  failed.  y y 

dli  ^ i o |Ste  j ^rom  9 A M to  4 P M-  with  a break  for  lunch— "a  one- 
^Pf!del  recounts  at  which  Hitler  bolted  a heaped  plate  of 
f'cc  and  vegetables,  after  it  had  been  previously  tasted  for  him.  Pills  and 
hqueur  glasses  containing  various  medicines  were  ranged  around  his  place 
and  he  took  them  in  turn.  Two  S.S.  men  stood  guard  hehind  h.s  chlu  ” ’ 


Beginning  of  the  End  1351 

course  of  the  war,  but  rather  about  your  own  invasion 
front.” 

The  two  field  marshals  were  getting  nowhere,  either  with 
their  military  or  political  arguments.  “Hitler  paid  no  atten- 
tion whatsoever  to  their  warnings,”  General  Jodi  later  re- 
called at  Nuremberg.  Finally  the  generals  urged  the  Su- 
preme Commander  at  least  to  visit  Rommel’s  Army  Group 
B headquarters  to  confer  with  some  of  the  field  com- 
manders on  what  they  were  up  against  in  Normandy.  Hit- 
ler reluctantly  agreed  to  the  visit  for  June  19 — two  days 
hence. 

He  never  showed  up.  Shortly  after  the  field  marshals 
had  departed  from  Margival  on  the  afternoon  of  June  17 
an  errant  V-l  on  its  way  to  London  turned  around  and 
landed  on  the  top  of  the  Fuehrer’s  bunker.  No  one  was 
killed  or  even  hurt,  but  Hitler  was  so  upset  that  he  set  off 
immediately  for  safer  parts,  not  stopping  until  he  got  to 
the  mountains  of  Berchtesgaden. 

There  more  bad  news  shortly  arrived.  On  June  20  the 
long-awaited  Russian  offensive  on  the  central  front  began, 
developing  with  such  overwhelming  power  that  within  a 
few  days  the  German  Army  Group  Center,  in  which  Hit- 
ler had  concentrated  his  strongest  forces,  was  completely 
smashed,  the  front  tom  wide  open  and  the  road  to  Poland 
opened.  On  July  4 the  Russians  crossed  the  1939  Polish 
eastern  border  and  converged  on  East  Prussia.  All  avail- 
able reserves  of  the  High  Command  were  quickly  rounded 
up  to  be  rushed — for  the  first  time  in  World  War  II — to 
the  defense  of  the  Fatherland  itself.  This  helped  to  doom 
the  German  armies  in  the  West.  From  now  on  they  could 
not  count  on  receiving  any  sizable  reinforcements. 

Once  more,  on  June  29,  Rundstedt  and  Rommel  ap- 
pealed to  Hitler  to  face  realities  both  in  the  East  and  in 
the  West  and  to  try  to  end  the  war  while  considerable 
parts  of  the  German  Army  were  still  in  being.  This  meet- 
ing took  place  on  the  Obersalzberg,  where  the  Supreme 
warlord  treated  the  two  field  marshals  frostily,  dismissing 
their  appeals  curtly  and  then  lapsing  into  a long  mono- 
logue on  how  he  would  win  the  war  with  new  “miracle 
weapons.”  His  discourse,  says  Speidel,  “became  lost  in  fan- 
tastic digressions.” 

Two  days  later  Rundstedt  was  replaced  as  Commander 


1352 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

in  Chief  West  by  Field  Marshal  von  Kluge.*  On  July  15 
Rommel  wrote  a long  letter  to  Hitler  and  dispatched  it 
by  Army  teletype.  “The  troops,”  he  wrote,  “are  fighting 
heroically  everywhere,  but  the  unequal  struggle  is  nearing 
its  end.”  He  added  a postscript  in  his  own  handwriting: 

I must  beg  you  to  draw  the  proper  conclusions  without 
delay.  I feel  it  my  duty  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army 
Group  to  state  this  clearly.21 

“I  have  given  him  his  last  chance,”  Rommel  told  Speidel. 
“If  he  does  not  take  it,  we  will  act.”22 

Two  days  later,  on  the  afternoon  of  July  17,  while 
driving  back  to  headquarters  from  the  Normandy  front, 
Rommel’s  staff  car  was  shot  up  by  low-flying  Allied  fighter 
planes  and  he  was  so  critically  wounded  that  it  was  first 
thought  he  would  not  survive  the  day.  This  was  a disaster 
to  the  conspirators,  for  Rommel  had  now — Speidel  swears 
to  it  23 — made  up  his  mind  irrevocably  to  do  his  part  in 
ridding  Germany  of  Hitler’s  rule  (though  still  opposing 
his  assassination)  within  the  next  few  days.  As  it  turned 
out,  his  dash  and  daring  were  sorely  missing  among  the 
Army  officers  who,  at  long  last,  as  the  German  armies 
crumbled  in  the  East  and  West  that  July  of  1944,  made 
their  final  bid  to  bring  Hitler  and  National  Socialism  down. 

The  conspirators,  says  Speidel,  “felt  themselves  painfully 
deprived  of  their  pillar  of  strength.”  t 24 

THE  CONSPIRACY  AT  THE  ELEVENTH  HOUR 

The  successful  Allied  landing  in  Normandy  threw  the 
conspirators  in  Berlin  into  great  confusion.  Stauffenberg, 

* Rundstedt’s  dismissal  may  have  come  partly  as  the  result  of  his  blunt 
words  to  Keitel  the  night  before.  The  latter  had  rung  him  up  to  inquire 
about  the  situation.  An  all-out  German  attack  on  the  British  lines  by  four 
S.S.  panzer  divisions  had  just  floundered  and  Rundstedt  was  in  a gloomy 
mood. 

“What  shall  we  do?”  cried  Keitel. 

“Make  peace,  you  fools,”  Rundstedt  retorted.  “What  else  can  you  do?” 

It  seems  that  Keitel,  the  “telltale  toady,”  as  most  Army  field  commanders 
called  him,  went  straight  to  Hitler  with  the  remarks.  The  Fuehrer  was  at 
that  moment  conferring  with  Kluge,  who  had  been  on  sick  leave  for  the 
last  few  months  as  the  result  of  injuries  sustained  in  a motor  accident. 
Kluge  was  immediately  named  to  replace  Rundstedt.  In  such  ways  were 
top  commands  changed  by  the  Nazi  warlord.  General  Blumentritt  told  of 
the  telephone  conversation  to  both  Wilmot  ( The  Struggle  for  Europe,  p. 
347)  and  Liddell  Hart  ( The  German  Generals  Talk,  p.  205). 
t Speidel  quotes  the  writer  Ernst  Juenger,  whose  books  had  once  been  pop- 
ular in  Nazi  Germany  but  who  eventually  had  turned  and  had  joined  the 
Pans  end  of  the  plot:  “The  blow  that  felled  Rommel  on  the  Livarot  Road 
on  July  17  deprived  our  plan  of  the  only  man  strong  enough  to  bear  the 
terrible  weight  of  war  and  civil  war  simultaneously/’  (Speidel,  Invasion 
1944,  p.  119.) 


1353 


Beginning  of  the  End 

as  we  have  seen,  had  not  believed  it  would  be  attempted 
in  1944,  and  that,  if  it  were,  there  was  a fifty-fifty  chance 
that  it  would  faiL  He  seems  to  have  wished  that  it 
would,  since  then  the  American  and  British  governments, 
after  such  a bloody  and  costly  setback,  would  be  more 
willing  to  negotiate  a peace  in  the  West  with  his  new 
anti-Nazi  government,  which  in  this  case  could  get  bet- 
ter terms. 

When  it  became  evident  that  the  invasion  had  succeeded, 
that  Germany  had  suffered  another  crucial  defeat,  and 
that  a new  one  was  threatening  in  the  East,  Stauffenberg, 
Beck  and  Goerdeler  wondered  whether  there  was  any 
point  in  going  ahead  with  their  plans.  If  they  succeeded 
they  would  only  be  blamed  for  bringing  on  the  final  ca- 
tastrophe. Though  they  knew  it  was  now  inevitable,  this 
was  not  generally  realized  by  the  mass  of  the  German  peo- 
ple. Beck  finally  concluded  that  though  a successful  anti- 
Nazi  revolt  could  not  now  spare  Germany  from  enemy 
occupation,  it  could  bring  the  war  to  an  end  and  save 
further  loss  of  blood  and  destruction  of  the  Fatherland. 
A peace  now  would  also  prevent  the  Russians  from  over- 
running Germany  and  Bolshevizing  it.  It  would  show  the 
world  that  there  was  “another  Germany”  besides  the  Nazi 
one.  And — who  knew? — perhaps  at  least  the  Western  Al- 
lies, despites  their  terms  of  unconditional  surrender,  might 
not  be  too  hard  on  a conquered  Germany.  Goerdeler 
agreed  and  pinned  even  greater  hopes  on  the  Western  de- 
mocracies. He  knew,  he  said,  how  much  Churchill  feared 
the  danger  of  “a  total  Russian  victory.” 

The  younger  men,  led  by  Stauffenberg,  were  not  en- 
tirely convinced.  They  sought  advice  from  Tresckow,  who 
was  now  chief  of  staff  of  the  Second  Army  on  the  crum- 
bling Russian  front.  His  reply  brought  the  stumbling  plot- 
ters back  on  the  track. 

The  assassination  must  be  attempted  at  any  cost.  Even 
should  it  fail,  the  attempt  to  seize  power  in  the  capital  must 
be  undertaken.  We  must  prove  to  the  world  and  to  future 
generations  that  the  men  of  the  German  Resistance  Move- 
ment dared  to  take  the  decisive  step  and  to  hazard  their 
lives  upon  it.  Compared  with  this  object,  nothing  else 
matters.25 

This  inspired  answer  settled  the  matter  and  revived  the 


1354 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


spirits  and  dissolved  the  doubts  of  Stauffenberg  and  his 
young  friends.  The  threatened  collapse  of  the  fronts  in 
Russia,  France  and  Italy  impelled  the  plotters  to  act  at 
once.  Another  event  helped  to  speed  them  on  their  way. 

From  the  beginning  the  Beck-Goerdeler-Hassel  circle 
had  declined  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  Communist 
underground,  and  vice  versa.  To  the  Communists  the 
plotters  were  as  reactionary  as  the  Nazis  and  their  very 
success  might  prevent  a Communist  Germany  from  suc- 
ceeding a National  Socialist  one.  Beck  and  his  friends  were 
well  aware  of  this  Communist  line,  and  they  knew  also 
that  the  Communist  underground  was  directed  from  Mos- 
cow and  served  chiefly  as  an  espionage  source  for  the  Rus- 
sians.* Furthermore,  they  knew  that  it  had  become  in- 
filtrated with  Gestapo  agents — “V  men,”  as  Heinrich  Muel- 
ler, the  Gestapo  chief  and  himself  a student  and  ad- 
mirer of  the  Soviet  N.K.V.D.,  called  them. 

In  June  the  plotters,  against  the  advice  of  Goerdeler  and 
the  older  members,  decided  to  contact  the  Communists. 

* This  came  out  in  the  “Rote  Kapelle”  affair  in  1942,  when  the  Abwehr 
discovered  a large  number  of  strategically  placed  Germans,  many  of  them 
from  old,  prominent  families,  running  an  extensive  espionage  network  for 
the  Russians.  At  one  time  they  were  transmitting  intelligence  to  Moscow 
over  some  100  clandestine  radio  transmitters  in  Germany  and  in  the  oc- 
cupied countries  of  the  West.  The  leader  of  the  “Rote  Kapelle”  (Red 
Orchestra)  was  Harold  Schulze-Boysen,  a grandson  of  Grand  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  a picturesque  leader  of  the  “lost  generation”  after  the  First  World 
War  and  a familiar  Bohemian  figure  in  those  days  in  Berlin,  where  his 
black  sweater,  his  thick  mane  of  blond  hair  and  his  passion  for  revolutionary 
poetry  and  politics  attracted  attention.  At  that  time  he  rejected  both  Nazism 
and  Communism,  though  he  considered  himself  a man  of  the  Left.  Through 
his  mother  he  got  into  the  Luftwaffe  as  a lieutenant  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  and  wormed  himself  into  Goering’s  “research”  office,  the  Forschung- 
samt,  which,  as  we  have  seen  in  connection  with  the  Anschluss,  specialized 
in  tapping  telephones.  Soon  he  was  organizing  a vast  espionage  service  for 
Moscow,  with  trusted  associates  in  every  ministry  and  military  office  in 
Berlin.  Among  these  were  Arvid  Harnack,  nephew  of  a famous  theologian, 
a brilliant  young  economist  in  the  Ministry  of  Economics,  who  was  married 
to  an  American  woman,  Mildred  Fish,  whom  he  had  met  at  the  University 
of  Wisconsin;  Franz  Scheliha  in  the  Foreign  Office;  Horst  Heilmann  in  the 
Propaganda  Ministry;  and  Countess  Erika  von  Brockdorff  in  the  Ministry 
of  Labor. 

Two  Soviet  agents  who  parachuted  into  Germany  and  were  later  appre- 
hended gave  the  “Rote  Kapelle”  away,  and  a large  number  of  arrests 
followed. 

Of  the  seventy-five  leaders  charged  with  treason,  fifty  were  condemned 
to  death,  including  Schulze-Boysen  and  Harnack.  Mildred  Harnack  and 
Countess  von  Brockdorff  got  off  with  prison  sentences  but  Hitler  insisted 
that  they  be  executed  too,  and  they  were.  To  impress  would-be  traitors  the 
Fuehrer  ordered  that  the  condemned  be  hanged.  But  there  were  no  gallows 
in  Berlin,  where  the  traditional  form  of  execution  was  the  ax,  and  so  the 
victims  were  simply  strangled  by  a rope  around  their  necks  which  was  at- 
tached to  a meathook  (borrowed  from  an  abattoir)  and  slowly  hoisted.  From 
then  on  this  method  of  hanging  was  to  be  employed,  as  a special  form  of 
cruelty,  on  those  who  dared  to  defy  the  Fuehrer. 


1355 


Beginning  of  the  End 

This  was  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Socialist  wing  and 
especially  of  Adolf  Reichwein,  the  Socialist  philosopher 
and  celebrated  Wandervogel,  who  was  now  director  of  the 
Folklore  Museum  in  Berlin.  Reichwein  had  maintained 
vague  contacts  with  the  Communists.  Though  Stauffenberg 
himself  was  suspicious  of  them,  his  Socialist  friends 
Reichwein  and  Leber  convinced  him  that  some  contact  with 
them  had  become  necessary  in  order  to  see  what  they 
were  up  to  and  what  they  would  do  in  case  the  putsch 
succeeded,  and,  if  possible,  to  use  them  at  the  last  mo- 
ment to  widen  the  basis  of  the  anti-Nazi  resistance.  Re- 
luctantly he  agreed  to  Leber  and  Reichwein  meeting  with 
the  underground  Communist  leaders  on  June  22.  But  he 
warned  them  that  the  Communists  should  be  told  as  little 
as  possible. 

The  meeting  took  place  in  East  Berlin  between  Leber  and 
Reichwein,  representing  the  Socialists,  and  two  individuals 
named  Franz  Jacob  and  Anton  Saefkow  who  claimed  to  be 
— and  perhaps  were — the  leaders  of  the  Communist  un- 
derground. They  were  accompanied  by  a third  comrade 
whom  they  introduced  as  “Rambow.”  The  Communists 
turned  out  to  know  quite  a bit  about  the  plot  against 
Hitler  and  wanted  to  know  more.  They  asked  for  a 
meeting  with  its  military  leaders  on  July  4.  Stauffenberg 
refused,  but  Reichwein  was  authorized  to  represent  him 
at  a further  meeting  on  that  date.  When  he  arrived  at  it, 
he,  along  with  Jacob  and  Saefkow,  were  promptly  arrested. 
“Rambow,”  it  turned  out,  was  a Gestapo  stool  pigeon. 
The  next  day  Leber,  on  whom  Stauffenberg  was  counting 
to  become  the  dominant  political  force  in  the  new  govern- 
ment, was  also  arrested.* 

Stauffenberg  was  not  only  deeply  upset  by  the  arrest  of 
Leber,  with  whom  he  had  become  a close  personal  friend 
and  whom  he  regarded  as  indispensable  to  the  proposed 
new  government,  but  he  saw  at  once  that  the  whole  con- 
spiracy was  in  dire  peril  of  being  snuffed  out  now  that 
Himmler’s  men  were  so  close  on  its  trail.  Leber  and  Reich- 
wein were  courageous  men  and  could  be  counted  on,  he 
thought,  not  to  reveal  any  secrets  even  under  torture.  Or 
could  they  be?  Some  of  the  plotters  were  not  so  sure. 


All  four,  Leber,  Reichwein,  Jacob  and  Saefkow,  were  executed. 


1356 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

There  might  be  limits  beyond  which  even  the  bravest  man 
could  not  keep  silent  when  his  body  was  being  racked  by 
insufferable  pain. 

The  arrest  of  Leber  and  Reichwein  was  a further  spur  to 
immediate  action. 

THE  COUP  OF  JULY  20,  1944 

Toward  the  end  of  June  the  plotters  received  one  good 
stroke  of  fortune.  Stauffenberg  was  promoted  to  full  colo- 
nel and  appointed  chief  of  staff  to  General  Fromm,  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  Home  Army.  This  post  not  only 
enabled  him  to  issue  orders  to  the  Home  Army  under 
Fromm’s  name  but  gave  him  direct  and  frequent  access  to 
Hitler.  Indeed,  the  Fuehrer  began  to  summon  the  chief  of 
the  Replacement  Army,  or  his  deputy,  to  headquarters  two 
or  three  times  a week  to  demand  fresh  replacements  for  his 
decimated  divisions  in  Russia.  At  one  of  these  meetings 
Stauffenberg  intended  to  plant  his  bomb. 

Stauffenberg  had  now  become  the  key  man  in  the  con- 
spiracy. On  his  shoulders  alone  rested  its  only  chance  for 
success.  As  the  one  member  of  the  plot  who  could  penetrate 
the  heavily  guarded  Fuehrer  headquarters  it  was  up  to 
him  to  kill  Hitler.  As  chief  of  staff  of  the  Replacement 
Army  it  would  have  to  be  left  to  him — since  Fromm  had 
not  been  won  over  completely  and  could  not  be  definitely 
counted  on — to  direct  the  troops  that  were  to  seize 
Berlin  after  Hitler  was  out  of  the  way.  And  he  had  to 
carry  out  both  objectives  on  the  same  day  and  at  two 
spots  separated  by  two  or  three  hundred  miles — the  Fueh- 
rer’s headquarters,  whether  on  the  Obersalzberg  or  at 
Rastenburg,  and  Berlin.  Between  the  first  and  the  second 
acts  there  must  be  an  interval  of  two  or  three  hours  while 
his  plane  was  droning  back  to  the  capital  during  which  he 
could  do  nothing  but  hope  that  his  plans  were  being 
energetically  initiated  by  his  confederates  in  Berlin.  That 
was  one  trouble,  as  we  shall  shortly  see. 

There  were  others.  One  seems  to  have  been  an  almost 
unnecessary  complication  that  sprang  up  in  the  minds  of 
the  now  desperate  conspirators.  They  came  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  it  would  not  suffice  to  kill  Adolf  Hitler.  They  must 
at  the  same  time  kill  Goering  and  Himmler,  thus  ensuring 
that  the  military  forces  under  the  command  of  these  two 


1357 


Beginning  of  the  End 

men  could  not  be  used  against  them.  They  thought  too  that 
the  top  generals  at  the  front  who  had  not  yet  been  won 
over  would  join  them  more  quickly  if  Hitler’s  two  chief 
lieutenants  were  also  done  away  with.  Since  Goering  and 
Himmler  usually  attended  the  daily  military  conferences 
at  the  Fuehrer  headquarters,  it  was  believed  that  it  would 
not  be  too  difficult  to  kill  all  three  men  with  one  bomb. 
This  foolish  resolve  led  Stauffenberg  to  miss  two  golden 
opportunities. 

He  was  summoned  to  the  Obersalzberg  on  July  11 
to  report  to  the  Fuehrer  on  the  supply  of  badly  needed 
replacements.  He  carried  with  him  on  the  plane  down  to 
Berchtesgaden  one  of  the  Abwehr’s  English-made  bombs. 
It  had  been  decided  at  a meeting  of  the  plotters  in 
Berlin  the  night  before  that  this  was  the  moment  to  kill 
Hitler— and  Goering  and  Himmler  as  well.  But  Himmler 
was  not  present  at  the  conference  that  day  and  when 
Stauffenberg,  leaving  the  meeting  for  a moment,  rang  up 
General  Olbricht  In  Berlin  to  tell  him  so,  stressing  that 
he  could  still  get  Hitler  and  Goering,  the  General  urged 
him  to  wait  for  another  day  when  he  could  get  all  three. 
That  night,  on  his  return  to  Berlin,  Stauffenberg  met  with 
Beck  and  Olbricht  and  insisted  that  the  next  time  he  must 
attempt  to  kill  Hitler,  regardless  of  whether  Goering  and 
Himmler  were  present  or  not.  The  others  agreed. 

The  next  time  was  soon  at  hand.  On  July  14  Stauffen- 
berg was  ordered  to  report  the  next  day  to  the  Fuehrer  on 
the  replacement  situation — every  available  recruit  was 
needed  to  help  fill  the  gaps  in  Russia,  where  Army  Group 
Center,  having  lost  twenty-seven  divisions,  had  ceased  to 
exist  as  a fighting  force.  That  day — the  fourteenth — Hitler 
had  moved  his  headquarters  back  to  Wolfsschanze  at  Ras- 
tenburg  to  take  personal  charge  of  trying  to  restore  the 
central  front,  where  Red  Army  troops  had  now  reached 
a point  but  sixty  miles  from  East  Prussia. 

Again,  on  the  morning  of  July  15,  Colonel  Stauffenberg 
set  out  by  plane  for  the  Fuehrer’s  headquarters  * with  a 

* There  is  disagreement  among  the  historians  whether  Stauffenberg  set  out 
for  Rastenburg  or  the  Obersalzberg.  The  two  most  authoritative  German 
writers  on  the  subject,  Eberhard  Zeller  and  Professor  Gerhard  Ritter,  give 
contradictory  accounts.  Zeller  thinks  Hitler  was  still  at  Berchtesgaden,  but 
Ritter  is  sure  this  is  a mistake  and  that  the  Fuehrer  had  returned  to 
Rastenburg.  I’nfortunately  Hitler’s  daily  calendar  book,  which  has  proved 
an  unfailing  guide  to  this  writer  up  to  this  point,  was  not  captured  intact 


1358 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


bomb  in  his  briefcase.  This  time  the  conspirators  were  so 
certain  of  success  that  it  was  agreed  that  the  first  Valkyrie 
signal — for  the  troops  to  start  marching  in  Berlin  and  for 
the  tanks  from  the  panzer  school  at  Krampnitz  to  begin 
rolling  toward  the  capital — should  be  given  two  hours  before 
Hitler’s  conference,  scheduled  for  1 p.m.,  began.  There 
must  be  no  delay  in  taking  over. 

At  11  a.m.  on  Saturday,  July  15,  General  Olbricht  is- 
sued Valkyrie  I for  Berlin  and  before  noon  troops  were 
moving  toward  the  center  of  the  capital  with  orders  to 
occupy  the  Wilhelmstrasse  quarter.  At  1 p.m.  Stauffenberg, 
briefcase  in  hand,  arrived  at  the  Fuehrer’s  conference 
room,  made  his  report  on  replacements,  and  then  absented 
himself  long  enough  to  telephone  Olbricht  in  Berlin  to  say 
— by  prearranged  code — that  Hitler  was  present  and  that 
he  intended  to  return  to  the  meeting  and  set  off  his 
bomb.  Olbricht  informed  him  that  the  troops  in  Berlin  were 
already  on  the  march.  At  last  success  in  the  great  enter- 
prise seemed  at  hand.  But  when  Stauffenberg  returned  to 
the  conference  room  Hitler  had  left  it  and  did  not  return. 
Disconsolate,  Stauffenberg  hurriedly  rang  up  Olbricht  with 
the  news.  The  General  frantically  canceled  the  Valkyrie 
alarm  and  the  troops  were  marched  back  to  their  barracks 
as  quickly  and  as  inconspicuously  as  possible. 

The  news  of  still  another  failure  was  a heavy  blow  to 
the  conspirators,  who  gathered  in  Berlin  on  Stauffenberg’s 
return  to  consider  what  next  to  do.  Goerdeler  was  for  re- 
sorting to  the  so-called  “Western  solution.”  He  proposed 
to  Beck  that  both  of  them  fly  to  Paris  to  confer  with  Field 
Marshal  von  Kluge  on  getting  an  armistice  in  the  West 
whereby  the  Western  Allies  would  agree  not  to  push  farther 
than  the  Franco-German  border,  thus  releasing  the  Ger- 
man armies  in  the  West  to  be  shunted  to  the  Eastern  front 
to  save  the  Reich  from  the  Russians  and  their  Bolshevism. 
Beck  had  a clearer  head.  The  idea  that  they  could  now  get 
a separate  peace  with  the  West,  he  knew,  was  a pipe  dream. 
Nevertheless  the  plot  to  kill  Hitler  and  overthrow  Nazism 


!?ad„ff^!ln0t.C0Ver  this  perlod-  But  ,he  best  evidence,  including  a report  on 

Stauffenberg  s movements  drawn  up  at  Fuehrer  headquarters  on  July  22, 

^ S on  15  Hitler  was  at  Rastenburg  and 

“P*  11  ,was  ‘here  that  Stauffenberg  planned  to  kill  him.  Though  the  two 
places  from  which  Hitler  tried  to  conduct  the  war — he  was  rarely  in  Berlin 
Zh':C,h,  WS?  unmercifully  bombed-were  about  equidistant  from  the 

'tt,?eAChteSgade”,  h®1”8  im,“re  fentrally  located  and  near  Munich, 
where  the  Army  garrison  was  believed  to  be  loyal  to  Beck  had  certain  ad- 
vantages  over  Rastenburg  for  the  conspirators.  ’ d 


1359 


Beginning  of  the  End 

must  be  carried  out  at  all  costs,  Beck  argued,  if  only  to 
save  Germany’s  honor.  Stauffenberg  agreed.  He  swore  he 
would  not  fail  the  next  time.  General  Olbricht,  who  had 
received  a dressing  down  from  Keitel  for  moving  his  troops 
in  Berlin,  declared  that  he  could  not  risk  doing  it  again, 
since  that  would  unmask  the  whole  conspiracy.  He  had 
barely  got  by,  he  said,  with  an  explantion  to  Keitel  and 
Fromm  that  this  was  a practice  exercise.  This  fear  of  again 
setting  the  troops  in  motion  until  it  was  known  definitely 
that  Hitler  was  dead  was  to  have  disastrous  consequences 
on  the  crucial  following  Thursday. 

On  Sunday  evening,  July  16,  Stauffenberg  invited  to  his 
home  at  Wannsee  a small  circle  of  his  close  friends  and 
relatives:  his  brother,  Berthold,  a quiet,  introspective, 
scholarly  young  man  who  was  an  adviser  on  international 
law  at  naval  headquarters;  Lieutenant  Colonel  Caesar  von 
Hofacker,  a cousin  of  the  Stauffenbergs  and  their  liaison 
man  with  the  generals  in  the  West;  Count  Fritz  von  der 
Schulenburg,  a former  Nazi  who  was  still  deputy  police 
president  of  Berlin;  and  Trott  zu  Solz.  Hofacker  had  just 
returned  from  the  West,  where  he  had  conferred  with  a 
number  of  generals — Falkenhausen,  Stuelpnagel,  Speidel, 
Rommel  and  Kluge.  He  reported  an  imminent  German 
breakdown  on  the  Western  front  but,  more  important,  that 
Rommel  would  back  the  conspiracy  regardless  of  which 
way  Kluge  jumped,  though  he  still  opposed  killing  Hitler. 
After  a long  discussion  the  young  conspirators  agreed, 
however,  that  ending  Hitler’s  life  was  now  the  only  way  out. 
They  had  no  illusions  by  this  time  that  their  desperate 
act  would  Save  Germany  from  having  to  surrender  un- 
conditionally. They  even  agreed  that  this  would  have  to  be 
done  to  the  Russians  as  well  as  to  the  Western  democracies. 
The  important  thing,  they  said,  was  for  Germans — and 
not  their  foreign  conquerors — to  free  Germany  from 
Hitler’s  tyranny.26 

They  were  terribly  late.  The  Nazi  despotism  had  endured 
for  eleven  years  and  only  the  certainty  of  utter  defeat  in  a 
war  which  Germany  had  launched,  and  which  they  had 
done  little  to  oppose — or,  in  many  cases,  not  opposed  at 
all — had  roused  them  to  action.  But  better  late  than  never. 
There  remained,  however,  little  time.  The  generals  at  the 
front  were  advising  them  that  collapse  in  both  the  East 
and  the  West  was  probably  only  a matter  of  weeks. 


1360 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


For  the  plotters  there  seemed  to  be  only  a few  more  days 
left  to  them  to  act.  The  premature  march  of  the  troops  in 
Berlin  on  July  15  had  aroused  the  suspicions  of  OKW.  On 
that  day  came  news  that  General  von  Falkenhausen,  one  of 
the  leaders  of  the  plot  in  the  West,  had  been  suddenly  dis- 
missed from  his  post  as  military  governor  of  Belgium  and 
northern  France.  Someone,  it  was  feared,  must  be  giving 
them  away.  On  July  17  they  learned  that  Rommel  had  been 
so  seriously  wounded  that  he  would  have  to  be  left  out  of 
their  plans  indefinitely.  The  next  day  Goerdeler  was  tipped 
off  by  his  friends  at  police  headquarters  that  Himmler  had 
issued  an  order  for  his  arrest.  At  Stauffenberg’s  insistence 
Goerdeler  went,  protesting,  into  hiding.  That  same  day  a 
personal  friend  in  the  Navy,  Captain  Alfred  Kranzf elder, 
one  of  the  very  few  naval  officers  in  on  the  conspiracy, 
informed  Stauffenberg  that  rumors  were  spreading  in  Berlin 
that  the  Fuehrer’s  headquarters  were  to  be  blown  up  in  the 
next  few  days.  Again  it  seemed  that  someone  in  the  con- 
spiracy must  have  been  indiscreet.  Everything  pointed  to 
the  Gestapo’s  closing  in  on  the  inner  ring  of  the  conspiracy. 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  19  Stauffenberg  was  again 
summoned  to  Rastenburg,  to  report  to  Hitler  on  the  progress 
being  made  with  the  new  Volksgrenadier  divisions  which 
the  Replacement  Army  was  hurriedly  training  to  be  thrown 
in  on  the  dissolving  Eastern  front.  He  was  to  make  his 
report  at  the  first  daily  conference  at  Fuehrer  headquarters 
the  next  day,  July  20,  at  1 p.m.*  Field  Marshal  von  Witzle- 
ben  and  General  Hoepner,  who  lived  some  distance  out- 
side Berlin,  were  notified  by  Stauffenberg  to  appear  in  the 
city  in  good  time.  General  Beck  made  his  last-minute 
preparations  for  directing  the  coup  until  Stauffenberg  could 
return  by  air  from  his  murderous  deed.  The  key  officers 
in  the  garrisons  in  and  around  Berlin  were  apprised  that 
July  20  would  be  Der  Tag. 

Stauffenberg  worked  at  the  Bendlerstrasse  on  his  report 
for  Hitler  until  dusk,  leaving  his  office  shortly  after  8 
o’clock  for  his  home  at  Wannsee.  On  his  way  he  stopped  off 

* General  Adolf  Heusinger,  Chief  of  Operations  of  the  Army  High  Com- 
mand, recounts  that  on  July  19  the  news  from  the  Ukrainian  front  was  so 
bad  that  he  inquired  at  OKW  whether  the  Replacement  Army  had  any 
troops  in  training  in  Poland  which  might  be  thrown  into  the  Eastern  front. 
Keitel  suggested  that  Stauffenberg  be  summoned  the  next  day  to  advise 
them.  (Heusinger,  Befehl  im  Widerstreit,  p.  350.) 


Beginning  of  the  End 


1361 


at  a Catholic  church  in  Dahlem  to  pray.*  He  spent  the 
evening  at  home  quietly  with  is  brother,  Berthold,  and  re- 
tired early.  Everyone  who  saw  him  that  afternoon  and 
evening  remembered  that  he  was  amiable  and  calm,  as  if 
nothing  unusual  was  in  the  offing. 

JULY  20,  1944 


Shortly  after  6 o’clock  on  the  warm,  sunny  summer 
morning  of  July  20,  1944,  Colonel  Stauffenberg,  accom- 
panied by  his  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Werner  von  Haeften, 
drove  out  past  the  bombed-out  buildings  of  Berlin  to  the 
airport  at  Rangsdorf.  In  his  bulging  briefcase  were  papers 
concerning  the  new  Volksgrenadier  divisions  bn  which  at 
1 p.m.  he  was  to  report  to  Hitler  at  the  “Wolf’s  Lair”  at 
Rastenburg  in  East  Prussia.  In  between  the  papers,  wrapped 
in  a shirt,  was  a time  bomb. 

It  was  identical  to  the  one  which  Tresckow  and  Schla- 
brendorff  had  planted  in  the  Fuehrer’s  airplane  the  year  be- 
fore and  which  had  failed  to  explode.  Of  English  make,  as 
we  have  seen,  it  was  set  off  by  breaking  a glass  capsule, 
whose  acid  then  ate  away  a small  wire,  which  released  the 
firing  pin  against  the  percussion  cap.  The  thickness  of  the 
wire  governed  the  time  required  to  set  off  the  explosion.  On 
this  morning  the  bomb  was  fitted  with  the  thinnest  possible 
wire.  It  would  dissolve  in  a bare  ten  minutes. 

At  the  airport  Stauffenberg  met  General  Stieff,  who  had 
produced  the  bomb  the  night  before.  There  they  found  a 
plane  waiting,  the  personal  craft  of  General  Eduard  Wag- 
ner, the  First  Quartermaster  General  of  the  Army  and  a 
ringleader  in  the  plot,  who  had  arranged  to  put  it  at 
their  disposal  for  this  all-important  flight.  By  7 o’clock  the 
plane  was  off,  landing  at  Rastenburg  shortly  after  10  a.m. 
Haeften  instructed  the  pilot  to  be  ready  to  take  off  for  the 
return  trip  at  any  time  after  twelve  noon. 

From  the  airfield  a staff  car  drove  the  party  to  the 
Wolfsschanze  headquarters,  set  in  a gloomy,  damp,  heav- 
ily wooded  area  of  East  Prussia.  It  was  not  an  easy  place 
to  get  into  or,  as  Stauffenberg  undoubtedly  noted,  out  of. 
It  was  built  in  three  rings,  each  protected  by  mine  fields, 


FitzGibbon  (20  July,  p.  150)  “it  is  believed  that  he  had  previously 
confessed,  but  of  course  could  not  be  granted  absolution.”  The  author  re- 
counts that  Stauffenberg  had  told  the  Bishop  of  Berlin,  Cardinal  Count 
rreysing,  of  what  he  intended  to  do,  and  that  the  bishop  had  replied  that 
he  honored  the  young  man’s  motives  and  did  not  feel  justified  in  attempting 
to  restrain  him  on  theological  grounds.  ( Ibid.,  p.  152.)  1 K 


1362 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pillboxes  and  an  electrified  barbed-wire  fence,  and  was 
patrolled  day  and  night  by  fanatical  S.S.  troops.  To  get 
into  the  heavily  guarded  inner  compound,  where  Hitler 
lived  and  worked,  even  the  highest  general  had  to  have  a 
special  pass,  good  for  one  visit,  and  pass  the  personal 
inspection  of  S.S.  Oberfuehrer  Rattenhuber,  Himmler’s 
chief  of  security  and  commander  of  the  S.S.  guard,  or  of 
one  of  his  deputies.  However,  since  Hitler  himself  had 
ordered  Stauffenberg  to  report,  he  and  Haeften,  though  they 
were  stopped  and  their  passes  examined,  had  little  trouble 
in  getting  through  the  three  check  points.  After  break- 
fast with  Captain  von  Moellendorff,  adjutant  to  the  camp 
commander,  Stauffenberg  sought  out  General  Fritz  Fellgie- 
bel,  Chief  of  Signals  at  OKW. 

Fellgiebel  was  one  of  the  key  men  in  the  plot.  Stauffen- 
berg made  sure  that  the  General  was  ready  to  flash  the 
news  of  the  bombing  to  the  conspirators  in  Berlin  so  that 
action  there  could  begin  immediately.  Fellgiebel  was  then 
to  isolate  the  Fuehrer  headquarters  by  shutting  off  all 
telephone,  telegraph  and  radio  communications.  No  one 
was  in  such  a perfect  position  to  do  this  as  the  head  of  the 
OKW  communications  network,  and  the  plotters  counted 
themselves  lucky  to  have  won  him  over.  He  was  indis- 
pensable to  the  success  of  the  entire  conspiracy. 

After  calling  on  General  Buhle,  the  Army’s  representa- 
tive at  OKW,  to  discuss  the  affairs  of  the  Replacement 
Army,  Stauffenberg  walked  over  to  Keitel’s  quarters,  hung 
up  his  cap  and  belt  in  the  anteroom  and  entered  the  office  of 
the  Chief  of  OKW.  There  he  learned  that  he  would  have  to 
act  with  more  dispatch  than  he  had  planned.  It  was  now  a 
little  after  12  noon,  and  Keitel  informed  him  that  because 
Mussolini  would  be  arriving  by  train  at  2:30  p.m.  the 
Fuehrer’s  first  daily  conference  had  been  put  forward 
from  1 p.m.  to  12:30.  The  colonel,  Keitel  advised,  must 
make  his  report  brief.  Hitler  wanted  the  meeting  over  early. 

Before  the  bomb  could  go  off?  Stauffenberg  must  have 
wondered  if  once  again,  and  on  what  was  perhaps  his  last 
try,  fate  was  robbing  him  of  success.  Apparently  he  had 
hoped  too  that  this  time  the  conference  with  Hitler  would 
be  held  in  the  Fuehrer’s  underground  bunker,  where  the 
blast  from  the  bomb  would  be  several  times  more  effective 
than  in  one  of  the  surface  buildings.  But  Keitel  told  him  the 
meeting  would  be  in  the  Lagebaracke — the  conference 


1363 


Beginning  of  the  End 

barracks.*  This  was  far  from  being  the  flimsy  wooden 
hut  so  often  described.  During  the  previous  winter  Hitler 
had  had  the  original  wooden  structure  reinforced  with 
concrete  walls  eighteen  inches  thick  to  give  protection 
against  incendiary  and  splinter  aerial  bombs  that  might  fall 
nearby.  These  heavy  walls  would  add  force  to  Stauffen- 
berg’s  bomb. 

He  must  soon  set  it  to  working.  He  had  briefed  Keitel  on 
what  he  proposed  to  report  to  Hitler  and  toward  the  end 
had  noticed  the  OKW  Chief  glancing  impatiently  at  his 
watch.  A few  minutes  before  12:30  Keitel  said  they  must 
leave  for  the  conference  immediately  or  they  would  be 
late.  They  emerged  from  his  quarters,  but  before  they  had 
taken  more  than  a few  steps  Stauffenberg  remarked  that  he 
had  left  his  cap  and  belt  in  the  anteroom  and  quickly 
turned  to  go  back  for  them  before  Keitel  could  suggest  that 
his  adjutant,  a Lieutenant  von  John,  who  was  walking 
alongside,  should  retrieve  them  for  him. 

In  the  anteroom  Stauffenberg  swiftly  opened  his  brief- 
case, seized  the  tongs  with  the  only  three  fingers  he  had, 
and  broke  the  capsule.  In  just  ten  minutes,  unless  there 
was  another  mechanical  failure,  the  bomb  would  explode. 

Keitel,  as  much  a bully  with  his  subordinates  as  he 
was  a toady  with  his  superiors,  was  aggravated  at  the 
delay  and  turned  back  to  the  building  to  shout  to  Stauffen- 
berg to  get  a move  on.  They  were  late,  he  yelled.  Stauffen- 
berg apologized  for  the  delay.  Keitel  no  doubt  realized  that 
it  took  a man  as  maimed  as  the  colonel  a little  extra 
time  to  put  on  his  belt.  As  they  walked  over  to  Hitler’s  hut 
Stauffenberg  seemed  to  be  in  a genial  mood  and  Keitel’s 
petty  annoyance — he  had  no  trace  of  suspicion  as  yet — 
was  dissipated. 

Nevertheless,  as  Keitel  had  feared,  they  were  late.  The 
conference  had  already  begun.  As  Keitel  and  Stauffenberg 
entered  the  building  the  latter  paused  for  a moment  in 

* Anumber  °*  writers  have  declared  that  Hitler’s  daily  military  conferences 
at  Rastenburg  usually  took  place  in  his  underground  bunker  and  that  be- 
cause of  repairs  being  made  to  it  and  because  of  the  hot,  humid  day,  the 
meeting  on  July  20  was  shifted  to  the  building  aboveground.  “This  acci- 
dental change  of  place  saved  Hitler’s  life.”  Bullock  writes  ( Hitler , p.  681). 
It  is  to  be  doubted  if  there  was  any  accidental  change  of  place.  The  Lage- 
baracke,  as  its  name  implies,  was,  so  far  as  I can  make  out,  the  place 
where  the  daily  conferences  were  usually  held.  Only  in  case  of  threatened 
air  raids  were  the  meetings  adjourned  to  the  underground  bunker  which, 
at  that,  would  have  been  cooler  on  this  sweltering  day.  (See  Zeller.  Geist 
aer  Fretheit,  p.  360,  n.4.) 


■ 


1364  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  entrance  hall  to  tell  the  sergeant  major  in  charge  of 
the  telephone  board  that  he  expected  an  urgent  call 
from  his  office  in  Berlin,  that  it  would  contain  information 
he  needed  to  bring  his  report  up  to  the  minute  (this  was 
for  Keitel’s  ear),  and  that  he  was  to  be  summoned  im- 
mediately when  the  call  came.  This  too,  though  it  must 
have  seemed  most  unusual — even  a field  marshal  would 
scarcely  dare  to  leave  the  Nazi  warlord’s  presence  until  he 
had  been  dismissed  or  until  the  conference  was  over  and 
the  Supreme  Commander  had  left  first — did  not  arouse 
Keitel’s  suspicions. 

The  two  men  entered  the  conference  room.  About  four 
minutes  had  ticked  by  since  Stauffenberg  reached  into  his 
briefcase  with  his  tongs  and  broke  the  capsule.  Six  minutes 
to  go.  The  room  was  relatively  small,  some  thirty  by  fifteen 
feet,  and  it  had  ten  windows,  all  of  which  were  wide 
open  to  catch  the  breezes  on  this  hot,  sultry  day.  So 
many  open  windows  would  certainly  reduce  the  effect  of 
any  bomb  blast.  In  the  middle  of  the  room  was  an  oblong 
table,  eighteen  by  five  feet,  made  of  thick  oak  planks.  It 
was  a peculiarly  constructed  table  in  that  it  stood  not  on 
legs  but  on  two  large  heavy  supports,  or  socles,  placed 
near  the  ends  and  extending  to  nearly  the  width  of  the 
table.  This  interesting  construction  was  not  without  its  effect 
on  subsequent  history. 

When  Stauffenberg  entered  the  room,  Hitler  was  seated 
at  the  center  of  the  long  side  of  the  table,  his  back  to  the 
door.  On  his  immediate  right  were  General  Heusinger, 
Chief  of  Operations  and  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army, 
General  Korten,  Air  Force  Chief  of  Staff,  and  Colonel 
Heinz  Brandt,  Heusinger’s  chief  of  staff.  Keitel  took  his 
place  immediately  to  the  left  of  the  Fuehrer  and  next  to 
him  was  General  Jodi.  There  were  eighteen  other  officers 
of  the  three  services  and  the  S.S.  standing  around  the 
table,  but  Goering  and  Himmler  were  not  among  them.  Only 
Hitler,  playing  with  his  magnifying  glass — which  he  now 
needed  to  read  the  fine  print  on  the  maps  spread  before 
him — and  two  stenographers  were  seated. 

Heusinger  was  in  the  midst  of  a lugubrious  report  on 
the  latest  break-through  on  the  central  Russian  front  and  on 
the  perilous  position,  as  a consequence,  of  the  German  ar- 
mies not  only  there  but  on  the  northern  and  southern  fronts 
as  well.  Keitel  broke  in  to  announce  the  presence  of  Colonel 


1365 


Beginning  of  the  End 

von  Stauffenberg  and  its  purpose.  Hitler  glanced  up  at  the 
one-armed  colonel  with  a patch  over  one  eye,  greeted  him 
curtly,  and  announced  that  before  hearing  his  report  he 
wanted  to  have  done  with  Heusinger’s. 

Stauffenberg  thereupon  took  his  place  at  the  table  be- 
tween Korten  and  Brandt,  a few  feet  to  the  right  of  Hitler. 
He  put  his  briefcase  on  the  floor,  shoving  it  under  the  table 
so  that  it  leaned  against  the  inside  of  the  stout  oaken 
support.  It  was  about  six  feet  distant  from  the  Fuehrer’s 
legs.  The  time  was  now  12:37.  Five  minutes  to  go.  Heu- 
singer  continued  to  talk,  pointing  constantly  to  the  situa- 
tion map  spread  on  the  table.  Hitler  and  the  officers  kept 
bending  over  to  study  it. 

No  one  seems  to  have  noticed  Stauffenberg  stealing 
away.  Except  perhaps  Colonel  Brandt.  This  officer  became 
so  absorbed  in  what  his  General  was  saying  that  he  leaned 
over  the  table  the  better  to  see  the  map,  discovered  that 
Stauffenberg’s  bulging  briefcase  was  in  his  way,  tried  to 
shove  it  aside  with  his  foot  and  finally  reached  down  with 
one  hand  and  lifted  it  to  the  far  side  of  the  heavy  table 
support,  which  now  stood  between  the  bomb  and  Hitler.* 
This  seemingly  insignificant  gesture  probably  saved  the 
Fuehrer’s  life;  it  cost  Brandt  his.  There  was  an  inexplicable 
fate  involved  here.  Colonel  Brandt,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  the  innocent  officer  whom  Tresckow  had  induced  to 
carry  a couple  of  “bottles  of  brandy”  back  on  Hitler’s 
plane  from  Smolensk  to  Rastenburg  on  the  evening  of  March 
13,  1943,  and  he  had  done  so  without  the  faintest  sus- 
picion that  they  were  in  reality  a bomb — the  very  make  of 
bomb  which  he  had  now  unostentatiously  moved  farther 
away  under  the  table  from  the  warlord.  Its  chemical  had 
by  this  time  almost  completed  the  eating  away  of  the 
wire  that  held  back  the  firing  pin. 

Keitel,  who  was  responsible  for  the  summoning  of 
Stauffenberg,  glanced  down  the  table  to  where  the  colonel 
was  supposed  to  be  standing.  Heusinger  was  coming  to 
the  end  of  his  gloomy  report  and  the  OKW  Chief  wanted 
to  indicate  to  Stauffenberg  that  he  should  make  ready  to 
report  next.  Perhaps  he  would  need  some  aid  in  getting 
his  papers  out  of  his  briefcase.  But  the  young  colonel,  he 

* According  to  the  account  given  Allied  interrogators  by  Admiral  Kurt 
Assmann,  who  was  present,  Stauffenberg  had  whispered  to  Brandt,  “I  must 
go  and  telephone.  Keep  an  eye  on  my  briefcase.  It  has  secret  papers  in  it.” 


1366 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


saw  to  his  extreme  annoyance,  was  not  there.  Recalling 
what  Stauffenberg  had  told  the  telephone  operator  on 
coming,  in,  Keitel  slipped  out  of  the  room  to  retrieve  this 
curiously  behaving  young  officer. 

Stauffenberg  was  not  at  the  telephone.  The  sergeant  at 
the  board  said  he  had  hurriedly  left  the  building.  Non- 
plused,  Keitel  turned  back  to  the  conference  room. 
Heusinger  was  concluding,  at  last,  his  report  on  the 
day  s catastrophic  situation.  “The  Russian,"  he  was  say- 
ing, “is  driving  with  strong  forces  west  of  the  Duna  to- 
ward the  north.  His  spearheads  are  already  southwest  of 
Dunaburg.  If  our  army  group  around  Lake  Peipus  is  not 
immediately  withdrawn,  a catastrophe  . . 27 

It  was  a sentence  that  was  never  finished. 

At  that  precise  moment,  12:42  p.m.,  the  bomb  went  off. 

Stauffenberg  saw  what  followed.  He  was  standing 
with  General  Fellgiebel  before  the  latter’s  office  in  Bunker 
88  a couple  of  hundred  yards  away,  glancing  anxiously 
first  at  his  wrist  watch  as  the  seconds  ticked  off  and  then 
at  the  conference  barracks.  He  saw  it  go  up  with  a roar  in 
smoke  and  flame,  as  if,  he  said  later,  it  had  been  hit  di- 
rectly by  a 155-mm.  shell.  Bodies  came  hurtling  out  of 
the  windows,  debris  flew  into  the  air.  There  was  not  the 
slightest  doubt  in  Stauffenberg’s  excited  mind  that  every 
single  person  in  the  conference  room  was  dead  or  dying. 
He  bade  a hasty  farewell  to  Fellgiebel,  who  was  now  to 
telephone  the  conspirators  in  Berlin  that  the  attempt  had 
succeeded  and  then  cut  off  communications  until  the  plot- 
ters in  the  capital  had  taken  over  the  city  and  proclaimed 
the  new  government.* 


Stauffenberg’s  next  task  was  to  get  out  of  the  Rasten- 
burg  headquarters  camp  alive  and  quickly.  The  guards  at 
the  check  points  had  seen  or  heard  the  explosion  at  the 
Fuehrer’s  conference  hall  and  immediately  closed  all 
exits.  At  the  first  barrier,  a few  yards  from  Fellgiebel’s 


if  Wrlt,erS  have  contended  that  at  this  moment  General  Fell- 
giebel  was  to  have  blown  up  the  communications  center  and  that  his  failure 
to  do  so  was  disastrous  to  the  conspiracy.  Thus  Wheeler- Bennett  ( Nemesis , 
of  his  fast 3 Shfc,  £eneral.  Fellgiebel  failed  lamentably  in  the  execution 
Since  tlle  various  communications  centers  were  housed  in 
several  different  underground  bunkers,  heavily  guarded  by  S.S  it  is  most 
mprobable  that  Stauffenberg’s  plans  ever  called  for  blowing  th’em  up-an 
impossible  task  for  the  General.  What  Fellgiebel  agreed  to  do  was  t^lhut 
off  communication  with  the  outside  world  for  two  or  three  hours  after  he 

hfpse  OT  two!rhe  d°idferlm  °£  thC  eXplosion'  This>  ««P‘  £or  an  unavoidable 


1367 


Beginning  of  the  End 

bunker,  Stauffenberg’s  car  was  halted.  He  leaped  out  and 
demanded  to  speak  with  the  duty  officer  in  the  guard- 
room.  In  the  latter’s  presence  he  telephoned  someone — 
whom  is  not  known — spoke  briefly,  hung  up  and  turned  to 
the  officer,  saying,  “Herr  Leutnant,  I am  allowed  to  pass.” 

This  was  pure  bluff,  but  it  worked,  and  apparently, 
after  the  lieutenant  had  dutifully  noted  in  his  log:  “12:44. 
Col.  Stauffenberg  passed  through,”  word  was  sent  along  to 
the  next  check  point  to  let  the  car  through.  At  the  third 
and  final  barrier,  it  was  more  difficult.  Here  an  alarm  had 
already  been  received,  the  rail  had  been  lowered  and  the 
guard  doubled,  and  no  one  was  to  be  permitted  to  enter  or 
leave.  Stauffenberg  and  his  aide,  Lieutenant  Haeften, 
found  their  car  blocked  by  a very  stubborn  sergeant 
major  named  Kolbe.  Again  Stauffenberg  demanded  the  use 
of  the  telephone  and  rang  up  Captain  von  Moellendorff, 
adjutant  to  the  camp  commander.  He  complained  that 
“because  of  the  explosion,”  the  guard  would  not  let  him 
through.  “I’m  in  a hurry.  General  Fromm  is  waiting  for 
me  at  the  airfield.”  This  also  was  bluff.  Fromm  was  in 
Berlin,  as  Stauffenberg  well  knew. 

Hanging  up,  the  colonel  turned  to  the  sergeant.  “You 
heard,  Sergeant,  I’m  allowed  through.”  But  the  sergeant 
was  not  to  be  bluffed.  He  himself  rang  through  to 
Moellendorff  for  confirmation.  The  captain  gave  it.28 

The  car  then  raced  to  the  airport  while  Lieutenant 
Haeften  hurriedly  dismantled  a second  bomb  that  he  had 
brought  along  in  his  briefcase,  tossing  out  the  parts  on 
the  side  of  the  road,  where  they  were  later  found  by  the 
Gestapo.  The  airfield  commandant  had  not  yet  received 
any  alarm.  The  pilot  had  his  engines  warming  up  when 
the  two  men  drove  onto  the  field.  Within  a minute  or  two 
the  plane  took  off. 

It  was  now  shortly  after  1 p.m.  The  next  three  hours 
must  have  seemed  the  longest  in  Stauffenberg’s  life.  There 
was  nothing  he  could  do  as  the  slow  Heinkel  plane  headed 
west  over  the  sandy,  flat  German  plain  but  to  hope  that 
Fellgiebel  had  been  able  to  get  through  to  Berlin  with  the 
all-important  signal,  that  his  fellow  plotters  in  the  capital 
had  swung  immediately  into  action  in  taking  over  the 
city  and  sending  out  the  prepared  messages  to  the  military 
commanders  in  Germany  and  in  the  West,  and  that  his 
plane  would  not  be  forced  down  by  alerted  Luftwaffe 


1368 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

fighters  or  by  prowling  Russian  craft,  which  - were  in- 
creasingly active  over  East  Prussia.  His  own  plane  had 
no  long-distance  radio  which  might  have  enabled  him  to 
tune  in  on  Berlin  and  hear  the  first  thrilling  broadcasts 
which  he  expected  the  conspirators  would  be  making  be- 
fore he  landed.  Nor,  for  this  lack,  could  he  himself 
communicate  with  his  confederates  in  the  capital  and 
give  the  signal  that  General  Fellgiebel  might  not  have  been 
able  to  flash. 

His  plane  droned  on  through  the  early  summer  after- 
noon. It  landed  at  Rangsdorf  at  3:45  p.m.  and  Stauffen- 
berg,  in  high  spirits,  raced  to  the  nearest  telephone  at 
the  airfield  to  put  through  a call  to  General  Olbricht  to 
learn  exactly  what  had  been  accomplished  in  the  fateful 
three  hours  on  which  all  depended.  To  his  utter  con- 
sternation he  found  that  nothing  had  been  accomplished. 
Word  about  the  explosion  had  come  through  by  tele- 
phone from  Fellgiebel  shortly  after  1 o’clock  but  the 
connection  was  bad  and  it  was  not  quite  clear  to  the  con- 
spirators whether  Hitler  had  been  killed  or  not.  There- 
fore nothing  had  been  done.  The  Valkyrie  orders  had  been 
taken  from  Olbricht’s  safe  but  not  sent  out.  Everyone  in 
the  Bendlerstrasse  had  been  standing  idly  by  waiting  for 
Stauffenberg’s  return.  General  Beck  and  Field  Marshal  von 
Witzleben,  who  as  the  new  head  of  state  and  Commander 
in  Chief  of  the  Wehrmacht,  respectively,  were  supposed 
to  have  started  issuing  immediately  the  already-prepared 
proclamations  and  commands  and  to  have  gone  on  the 
air  at  once  to  broadcast  the  dawn  of  a new  day  in  Ger- 
many, had  not  yet  showed  up. 

Hitler,  contrary  to  Stauffenberg’s  firm  belief,  which  he 
imparted  to  Olbricht  on  the  telephone  from  Rangsdorf,  had 
not  been  killed.  Colonel  Brandt’s  almost  unconscious  act 
of  shoving  the  briefcase  to  the  far  side  of  the  stout 
oaken  table  support  had  saved  his  life.  He  had  been  badly 
shaken  but  not  severely  injured.  His  hair  had  been  singed, 
his  legs  burned,  his  right  arm  bruised  and  temporarily 
paralyzed,  his  eardrums  punctured  and  his  back  lacerated 
by  a falling  beam.  He  was,  as  one  eyewitness  later  re- 
called, hardly  recognizable  as  he  emerged  from  the  wrecked 
and  burning  building  on  the  arm  of  Keitel,  his  face 
blackened,  his  hair  smoking  and  his  trousers  in  shreds. 


1369 


Beginning  of  the  End 

Keitel,  miraculously,  was  uninjured.  But  most  of  those 
who  had  been  at  the  end  of  the  table  where  the  bomb 
had  exploded  were  either  dead,  dying  or  badly  wounded.* 

In  the  first  excitement  there  were  several  guesses  as  to 
the  origin  of  the  explosion.  Hitler  thought  at  first  it  might 
have  been  caused  by  a sneak  attack  of  an  enemy  fighter- 
bomber.  Jodi,  nursing  a blood-spattered  head — the  chan- 
delier, among  other  objects,  had  fallen  on  him — was  con- 
vinced that  some  of  the  building  laborers  had  planted  a 
time  bomb  under  the  floor  of  the  building.  The  deep  hole 
which  Stauffenberg’s  bomb  had  blown  in  the  floor  seemed 
to  confirm  this.  It  was  some  time  before  the  colonel  be- 
came suspected.  Himmler,  who  came  running  to  the  scene 
on  hearing  the  explosion,  was  completely  puzzled  and  his 
first  act  was  to  telephone — a minute  or  two  before  Fellgie- 
bel  shut  down  communications — Artur  Nebe,  the  head  of 
the  criminal  police  in  Berlin,  to  dispatch  by  plane  a squad 
of  detectives  to  carry  out  the  investigation. 

In  the  confusion  and  shock  no  one-  at  first  remembered 
that  Stauffenberg  had  slipped  out  of  the  conference  room 
shortly  before  the  explosion.  It  was  at  first  believed  that 
he  must  have  been  in  the  building  and  was  one  of  those 
severely  hurt  who  had  been  rushed  to  the  hospital.  Hitler, 
not  yet  suspicious  of  him,  asked  that  the  hospital  be 
checked. 

Some  two  hours  after  the  bomb  went  off  the  clues  began 
to  come  in.  The  sergeant  who  operated  the  telephone 
board  at  the  Lagebaracke  reported  that  “the  one-eyed  colo- 
nel,” who  had  informed  him  he  was  expecting  a long- 
distance call  from  Berlin,  had  come  out  of  the  conference 
room  and,  without  waiting  for  it,  had  left  the  building  in 
a great  hurry.  Some  of  the  participants  at  the  conference 
recalled  that  Stauffenberg  had  left  his  briefcase  under  the 
table.  The  guardhouses  at  the  check  points  revealed  that 
Stauffenberg  and  his  aide  had  passed  through  immedi- 
ately after  the  explosion. 

Hitler’s  suspicions  were  now  kindled.  A call  to  the  air- 
field at  Rastenburg  supplied  the  interesting  information 
that  Stauffenberg  had  taken  off  from  there  in  great  haste 
shortly  after  1 p.m.,  giving  as  his  destination  the  air- 

* The  official  stenographer,  Berger,  was  killed,  and  Colonel  Brandt,  General 
Schmundt,  Hitler’s  adjutant,  and  General  Korten  died  of  their  wounds.  All 
the  others,  including  Generals  Jodi,  Bodenschatz  (Goering’s  chief  of  stall) 
and  Heusinger,  were  more  or  less  severely  injured. 


1370 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

port  at  Rangsdorf.  Himmler  immediately  ordered  that  he 
be  arrested  on  landing  there,  but  his  order  never  got  through 
to  Berlin  because  of  Fellgiebel’s  courageous  action  in 
closing  down  communications.  Up  to  this  minute  no  one 
at  headquarters  seems  to  have  suspected  that  anything  un- 
toward might  be  happening  in  Berlin.  All  now  believed 
that  Stauffenberg  had  acted  alone.  It  would  not  be  dif- 
ficult to  apprehend  him  unless,  as  some  suspected,  he  had 
landed  behind  the  Russian  lines.  Hitler,  who,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, seems  to  have  behaved  calmly  enough,  had 
something  else  on  his  mind.  He  had  to  greet  Mussolini, 
who  was  due  to  arrive  at  4 p.m.,  his  train  having  been 
delayed. 

There  is  something  weird  and  grotesque  about  this  last 
meeting  of  the  two  fascist  dictators  on  the  afternoon  of 
July  20,  1944,  as  they  surveyed  the  ruins  of  the  con- 
ference hall  and  tried  to  fool  themselves  into  thinking  that 
the  Axis  which  they  had  forged,  and  which  was  to  have 
dominated  the  continent  of  Europe,  was  not  also  in 
shambles.  The  once  proud  and  strutting  Duce  was  now  no 
more  than  a Gauleiter  of  Lombardy,  rescued  from  im- 
prisonment by  Nazi  thugs,  and  propped  up  by  Hitler  and 
the  S.S.  Yet  the  Fuehrer’s  friendship  and  esteem  for  the 
fallen  Italian  tyrant  had  never  faltered  and  he  greeted  him 
with  as  much  warmth  as  his  physical  condition  per- 
mitted, showed  him  through  the  still  smoking  debris  of 
the  Lagebaracke  where  his  life  had  almost  been  snuffed  out 
a few  hours  before,  and  predicted  that  their  joint  cause 
would  soon,  despite  all  the  setbacks,  triumph. 

Dr.  Schmidt,  who  was  present  as  interpreter,  has  re- 
called the  scene.29 

Mussolini  was  absolutely  horrified.  He  could  not  under- 
stand how  such  a thing  could  happen  at  Headquarters.  . . . 

“I  was  standing  here  by  this  table  [Hitler  recounted];  the 
bomb  went  off  just  in  front  of  my  feet  ...  It  is  obvious 
that  nothing  is  going  to  happen  to  me;  undoubtedly  it  is  my 
fate  to  continue  on  my  way  and  bring  my  task  to  completion 
. . . What  happened  here  today  is  the  climax!  Having  now 
escaped  death  ...  I am  more  than  ever  convinced  that  the 
great  cause  which  I serve  will  be  brought  through  its  present 
perils  and  that  everything  can  be  brought  to  a good  end.” 

Mussolini,  carried  away  as  so  often  before  by  Hitler’s 
words,  says  Schmidt,  agreed. 


1371 


Beginning  of  the  End 

“Our  position  is  bad  [he  said],  one  might  almost  say 
desperate,  but  what  has  happened  here  today  gives  me  new 
courage.  After  [this]  miracle  it  is  inconceivable  that  our 
cause  should  meet  with  misfortune.” 

The  two  dictators,  with  their  entourages,  then  went  to 
tea,  and  there  now  ensued — it  was  about  5 p.m. — a ludi- 
crous scene  that  gives  a revealing,  if  not  surprising,  picture 
of  the  shabby,  tattered  Nazi  chiefs  -at  the  moment  of  one 
of  the  supreme  crises  in  the  Third  Reich.  By  this  time 
the  communications  system  of  Rastenburg  had  been  re- 
stored by  the  direct  order  of  Hitler  and  the  first  reports 
from  Berlin  had  begun  to  come  in  indicating  that  a 
military  revolt  had  broken  out  there  and  perhaps  one  on 
the  Western  front.  Mutual  recriminations,  long  suppressed, 
broke  out  between  the  Fuehrer’s  captains,  their  shouting 
echoing  through  the  rafters  though  at  first  Hitler  himself 
sat  silent  and  brooding  while  Mussolini  blushed  with 
embarrassment. 

Admiral  Doenitz,  who  had  rushed  by  air  to  Rastenburg 
at  the  news  of  the  attentat  and  arrived  after  the  tea  party 
had  begun,  lashed  out  at  the  treachery  of  the  Army. 
Goering,  on  behalf  of  the  Air  Force,  supported  him.  Then 
Doenitz  lit  on  Goering  for  the  disastrous  failures  of  the 
Luftwaffe,  and  the  fat  Reich  Marshal,  after  defending 
himself,  attacked  his  pet  hate,  Ribbentrop,  for  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  Germany’s  foreign  policy,  at  one  point  threaten- 
ing to  smack  the  arrogant  Foreign  Minister  with  his 
marshal’s  baton.  “You  dirty  little  champagne  salesman! 
Shut  your  damned  mouth!”  Goering  cried,  but  this  was 
impossible  for  Ribbentrop,  who  demanded  a little  respect, 
even  from  the  Reich  Marshal.  “I  am  still  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister,” he  shouted,  “and  my  name  is  von  Ribbentrop!”  * 

Then  someone  brought  up  the  subject  of  an  earlier  “re- 
volt” against  the  Nazi  regime,  the  Roehm  “plot”  of  June 
30,  1934.  Mention  of  this  aroused  Hitler — who  had  been 
sitting  morosely  sucking  brightly  colored  medicinal  pills 
supplied  by  his  quack  physician.  Dr.  Theodor  Morell — to 
a fine  fury.  Eyewitnesses  say  he  leaped  from  his  chair, 
foam  on  his  lips,  and  screamed  and  raged.  What  he  had 

* Ribbentrop  had  been  a champagne  salesman  and  then  had  married  the 
daughter  of  Germany’s  leading  producer  of  the  wine.  His  “von”  had  come 
through  adoption  by  an  aunt — Fraulein  Gertrud  von  Ribbentrop — in  1925, 
when  he  was  thirty -two  years  old. 


1572  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

done  with  Roehm  and  his  treasonable  followers  was 
nothing,  he  shouted,  to  what  he  would  do  to  the  traitors  of 
this  day.  He  would  uproot  them  all  and  destroy  them. 
“I’ll  Put  their  wives  and  children  into  concentration  camps,” 
he  raved,  “and  show  them  no  mercy!”  In  this  case,  as 
in  so  many  similar  ones,  he  was  as  good  as  his  word. 

Partly  because  of  exhaustion  but  also  because  the  tele- 
phone from  Berlin  began  to  bring  further  details  of  a 
military  uprising,  Hitler  broke  off  his  mad  monologue, 
but  his  temper  did  not  subside.  He  saw  Mussolini  off  to 
his  train — it  was  their  final  parting — and  returned  to  his 
quarters.  When  told  at  about  6 o’clock  that  the  putsch 
had  not  yet  been  squelched,  he  grabbed  the  telephone  and 
shrieked  orders  to  the  S.S.  in  Berlin  to  shoot  everyone  who 
was  the  least  suspect.  “Where’s  Himmler?  Why  is  he  not 
there!”  he  yelled,  forgetful  that  only  an  hour  before,  as  his 
party  sat  down  to  tea,  he  had  ordered  the  S.  S.  chief  to  fly 
to  Berlin  and  ruthlessly  put  down  the  rebellion,  and  that 
his  master  policeman  could  not  possibly  have  arrived  as 
yet.30 

The  long  and  carefully  prepared  rebellion  in  Berlin  had, 
as  Stauffenberg  learned  to  his  dismay  when  he  landed  at 
Rangsdorf  at  3:45  p.m.,  got  off  to  a slow  start.  Three 
precious,  vital  hours,  during  which  the  Fuehrer  head- 
quarters had  been  shut  off  from  the  outside  world,  had 
been  lost. 

Stauffenberg,  for  the  life  of  him,  could  not  understand 
why,  nor  can  a historian  trying  to  reconstitute  the  events 
of  this  fateful  day.  The  weather  was  hot  and  sultry,  and 
perhaps  this  had  a certain  effect.  Though  the  chief 
conspirators  had  known  that  Stauffenberg  had  left  for 
Rastenburg  that  morning  “heavily  laden,”  as  General 
Hoepner  was  informed,  to  attend  the  1 p.m.  Fuehrer  con- 
ference, only  a few  of  them,  and  these  mostly  junior  of- 
ficers, began  to  drift  leisurely  into  the  headquarters  of  the 
Replacement  Army — and  of  the  plot — in  the  Bendlerstrasse 
toward  noon.  On  Stauffenberg’s  last  previous  attempt  to 
get  Hitler,  on  July  15,  it  will  be  recalled,  General  Ol- 
bricht  had  ordered  the  troops  of  the  Berlin  garrison  to 
start  marching  two  hours  before  the  bomb  was  timed  to 
go  off.  But  on  July  20,  perhaps  mindful  of  the  risk  he 
had  run,  he  did  not  issue  similar  orders.  Unit  commanders 


1373 


Beginning  of  the  End 

in  Berlin  and  in  the  training  centers  in  nearby  Doeberitz, 
Jueterbog,  Krampnitz  and  Wuensdorf  had  been  tipped  the 
night  before  that  they  would  most  prohably  be  receiving 
the  Valkyrie  orders  on  the  twentieth.  But  Olbricht  decided 
to  wait  until  definite  word  had  come  from  Fellgiebel  at 
Rastenburg  before  again  setting  his  troops  in  motion. 
General  Hoepner,  with  the  uniform  which  Hitler  had  for- 
bade him  to  wear  in  his  suitcase,  arrived  at  the  Bendler- 
strasse  at  thirty  minutes  past  noon — at  the  very  moment 
Stauffenberg  was  breaking  the  capsule  of  his  bomb — and 
he  and  Olbricht  went  out  for  lunch,  where  they  toasted  the 
success  of  their  enterprise  with  a half  bottle  of  wine. 

They  had  not  been  back  in  Olbricht’s  office  very  long 
when  General  Fritz  Thiele,  chief  signals  officer  of  OKH, 
burst  in.  He  had  just  been  on  the  telephone  to  Fellgiebel,  he 
said  excitedly,  and  though  the  line  was  bad  and  Fellgiebel 
was  very  guarded  in  what  he  said,  it  seemed  that  the  ex- 
plosion had  taken  place  but  that  Hitler  had  not  been 
killed.  In  that  case  Thiele  concluded  that  the  Valkyrie 
orders  should  not  be  issued.  Olbricht  and  Hoepner  agreed. 

So  between  approximately  1:15  p.m.  and  3:45,  when 
Stauffenberg  set  down  at  Rangsdorf  and  hurried  to  the 
telephone,  nothing  was  done.  No  troops  were  assembled, 
no  orders  were  sent  out  to  the  military  commands  in 
other  cities  and,  perhaps  the  strangest,  of  all,  no  one 
thought  of  seizing  the  radio  broadcasting  headquarters 
or  the  telephone  and  telegraph  exchanges.  The  two  chief 
military  leaders,  Beck  and  Witzleben,  had  not  yet  ap- 
peared. 

The  arrival  of  Stauffenberg  finally  moved  the  con- 
spirators to  action.  On  the  telephone  from  Rangsdorf  he 
urged  General  Olbricht  not  to  wait  until  he  had  reached 
the  Bendlerstrasse — the  trip  in  from  the  airfield  would 
take  forty-five  minutes — but  to  start  Valkyrie  going  at 
once.  The  plotters  finally  had  someone  to  give  orders — 
without  such,  a German  officer  seemed  lost,  even  a rebel- 
lious one,  even  on  this  crucial  day — and  they  began  to 
act.  Colonel  Mertz  von  Quirnheim,  Olbricht’s  chief  of 
staff  and  a close  friend  of  Stauffenberg,  fetched  the  Val- 
kyrie orders  and  began  to  dispatch  them  by  teleprinter  and 
telephone.  The  first  one  alerted  the  troops  in  and  around 
Berlin,  and  a second  one,  signed  by  Witzleben  as 


1374  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Wehrmacht”  and  counter- 
signed by  Count  von  Stauffenberg' — they  had  been  drawn 
up  months  before — announced  that  the  Fuehrer  was  dead 
and  that  Witzleben  was  “transferring  executive  power” 
to  the  Army  district  commanders  at  home  and  to  the 
commanders  in  chief  of  the  fighting  armies  at  the  front. 
Field  Marshal  von  Witzleben  had  not  yet  arrived  at  the 
Bendlerstrasse.  He  had  got  as  far  as  Zossen,  twenty  miles 
southeast  of  Berlin,  where  he  was  conferring  with  the 
First  Quartermaster  General,  Wagner.  He  was  sent  for,  as 
was  General  Beck.  The  two  senior  generals  in  the  plot  were 
acting  in  the  most  leisurely  manner  on  this  fateful  day. 

With  the  orders  going  out,  some  of  them  signed  by  Gen- 
eral Fromm,  though  without  his  knowledge,  Olbricht  went 
to  the  office  of  the  commander  of  the  Replacement  Army, 
told  him  that  Fellgiebel  had  reported  that  Hitler  had  been 
assassinated  and  urged  him  to  take  charge  of  Valkyrie 
and  assure  the  internal  security  of  the  State.  Fromm’s 
orders,  the  conspirators  realized,  would  be  obeyed  auto- 
matically. He  was  very  important  to  them  at  this  moment. 
But  Fromm,  like  Kluge,  was  a genius  at  straddling;  he 
was  not  the  man  to  jump  until  he  saw  where  he  was  land- 
ing. He  wanted  definite  proof  that  Hitler  was  dead  before 
deciding  what  to  do. 

At  this  point  Olbricht  made  another  one  of  the  disastrous 
mistakes  committed  by  the  plotters  that  day.  He  was  sure 
from  what  Stauffenberg  had  told  him  on  the  telephone 
from  Rangsdorf  that  the  Fuehrer  was  dead.  He  also 
knew  that  Fellgiebel  had  succeeded  in  blocking  the  tele- 
phone lines  to  Rastenburg  all  afternoon.  Boldly  he 
picked  up  the  telephone  and  asked  for  a “blitz”  telephone 
connection  with  Keitel.  To  his  utter  surprise — communi- 
cations, as  we  have  seen,  had  now  been  reopened,  but  Ol- 
bricht did  not  know  this — Keitel  was  almost  instantly  on 
the  line. 

Fromm:  What  has  happened  at  General  Headquarters? 
Wild  rumors  are  afloat  in  Berlin. 

Keitel:  What  should  be  the  matter?  Everything  is  as 
usual  here. 

Fromm:  I have  just  received  a report  that  the  Fuehrer 
has  been  assassinated. 

Keitel:  That’s  all  nonsense.  It  is  true  there  has  been  an 
attempt,  but  fortunately  it  has  failed.  The  Fuehrer  is  alive 


1375 


Beginning  of  the  End 

and  only  slightly  injured.  Where,  by  the  way,  is  your  Chief 
of  Staff,  Colonel  Count  Stauffenberg? 

Fromm:  Stauffenberg  has  not  yet  returned  to  us.31 

From  that  moment  on  Fromm  was  lost  to  the  con- 
spiracy, with  consequences  which  would  soon  prove  cat- 
astrophic. Olbricht,  momentarily  stunned,  slipped  out  of 
the  office  without  a word.  At  this  moment  General  Beck 
arrived,  attired  in  a dark  civilian  suit — perhaps  this  was  a 
gesture  toward  playing  down  the  military  nature  of  the 
revolt — to  take  charge.  But  the  man  really  in  charge,  as 
everyone  soon  realized,  was  Colonel  von  Stauffenberg, 
who,  hatless  and  out  of  breath,  bounded  up  the  stairs  of 
the  old  War  Ministry  at  4:30  p.m.  He  reported  briefly  on 
the  explosion,  which  he  emphasized  he  had  seen  himself 
from  a couple  of  hundred  yards  away.  When  Olbricht  inter- 
jected that  Keitel  himself  had  just  been  on  the  phone 
and  swore  that  Hitler  was  only  slightly  wounded,  Stauffen- 
berg answered  that  Keitel  was  playing  for  time  by  lying. 
At  the  very  least,  he  contended,  Hitler  must  have  been 
severely  wounded.  In  any  case,  he  added,  there  was  only 
one  thing  they  could  now  do:  use  every  minute  to  over- 
throw the  Nazi  regime.  Beck  agreed.  It  did  not  make  too 
much  difference  to  him,  he  said,  whether  the  despot  was 
alive  or  dead.  They  must  go  ahead  and  destroy  his  evil 
rule. 

The  trouble  was  that  after  the  fateful  delay  and  in  the 
present  confusion  they  did  not,  for  all  their  planning,  know 
how  to  go  ahead.  Not  even  when  General  Thiele  brought 
word  that  the  news  of  Hitler’s  survival  was  shortly  to  be 
broadcast  over  the  German  national  radio  network  does 
it  seem  to  have  occurred  to  the  conspirators  that  the  first 
thing  they  had  to  do,  and  at  once,  was  to  seize  the 
broadcasting  central,  block  the  Nazis  from  getting  their 
word  out,  and  begin  flooding  the  air  with  their  own 
proclamations  of  a new  government.  If  troops  were  not 
yet  at  hand  to  accomplish  this,  the  Berlin  police  could 
have  done  it.  Count  von  Helldorf,  the  chief  of  police 
and  deep  in  the  conspiracy,  had  been  waiting  impatiently 
since  midday  to  swing  into  action  with  his  sizable  and 
already  alerted  forces.  But  no  call  had  come  and  finally 
at  4 o’clock  he  had  driven  over  to  the  Bendlerstrasse  to 
see  what  had  happened.  He  was  told  by  Olbricht  that  his 
police  would  be  under  the  orders  of  the  Army.  But  as  yet 


1376 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

there  was  no  rebel  army — only  bewildered  officers  milling 
about  at  headquarters  without  any  soldiers  to  command. 

Instead  of  seeing  to  this  at  once  Stauffenberg  put  in  an 
urgent  telephone  call  to  his  cousin,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Caesar  von  Hofacker,  at  General  von  Stuelpnagel’s  head- 
quarters in  Paris,  urging  the  conspirators  to  get  busy  there. 
This  was  of  the  utmost  importance,  to  be  sure,  since  the 
plot  had  been  better  organized  in  France  and  was  sup- 
ported by  more  important  Army  officers  than  in  any  other 
place  save  Berlin.  Actually  Stuelpnagel  was  to  show  more 
energy  than  his  fellow  generals  at  the  center  of  the  re- 
volt. Before  dark  he  had  arrested  and  locked  up  all  1,200 
S.S.  and  S.D.  officers  and  men  in  Paris,  including 
their  redoubtable  commander,  S.S.  Major  General  Karl 
Oberg.  Had  similar  energy  and  similar  direction  of  energy 
been  shown  in  Berlin  that  afternoon,  history  might  have 
taken  a different  turn. 

Having  alerted  Paris,  Stauffenberg  next  turned  his  at- 
tention to  the  stubborn  Fromm,  whose  chief  of  staff  he 
was,  and  whose  refusal  to  go  along  with  the  rebels  after 
he  had  learned  from  Keitel  that  Hitler  was  alive  was 
seriously  jeopardizing  the  success  of  the  plot.  Beck  had 
no  stomach  to  quarrel  with  Fromm  so  early  in  the  game 
and  excused  himself  from  joining  Stauffenberg  and  01- 
bricht,  who  went  to  see  him.  Olbricht  told  Fromm  that 
Stauffenberg  could  confirm  Hitler’s  death. 

“That  is  impossible,”  Fromm  snapped.  “Keitel  has  as- 
sured me  to  the  contrary.” 

“Keitel  is  lying,  as  usual,”  Stauffenberg  put  in.  “I  myself 
saw  Hitler’s  body  being  carried  out.” 

This  word  from  his  chief  of  staff  and  an  eyewitness 
gave  Fromm  food  for  thought  and  for  a moment  he 
said  nothing.  But  when  Olbricht,  trying  to  take  advantage 
of  his  indecision,  remarked  that,  at  any  rate,  the  code 
word  for  Valkyrie  had  already  been  sent  out,  Fromm 
sprang  to  his  feet  and  shouted,  “This  is  rank  insub- 
ordination! Who  issued  the  order?”  When  told  that  Colo- 
nel Mertz  yon  Quirnheim  had,  he  summoned  this  officer 
and  told  him  he  was  under  arrest. 

Stauffenberg  made  one  last  effort  to  win  his  chief  over. 
General,  he  said,  “I  myself  set  off  the  bomb  at  Hit- 
ler’s conference.  The  explosion  was  as  if  a fifteen-mil- 


Beginning  of  the  End 


1377 


limeter  shell  had  hit.  No  one  in  that  room  can  still 
be  alive.” 

But  Fromm  was  too  ingenious  a trimmer  to  be  bluffed. 
“Count  Stauffenberg,”  he  answered,  “the  attempt  has 
failed.  You  must  shoot  yourself  at  once.”  Stauffenberg 
coolly  declined.  In  a moment  Fromm,  a beefy,  red-faced 
man,  was  proclaiming  the  arrest  of  all  three  of  his 
visitors,  Stauffenberg,  Olbricht  and  Mertz. 

“You  deceive  yourself,”  Olbricht  answered.  “It  is  we  who 
are  now  going  to  arrest  you.” 

An  untimely  scuffle  among  the  brother  officers  ensued 
in  which  Fromm,  according  to  one  version,  struck  the  one- 
armed  Stauffenberg  in  the  face.  The  General  was  quickly 
subdued  and  put  under  arrest  in  the  room  of  his  adjutant, 
where  Major  Ludwig  von  Leonrod  was  assigned  to  guard 
him.* *  The  rebels  took  the  precaution  of  cutting  the  tele- 
phone wires  in  the  room. 

Stauffenberg  returned  to  his  office  to  find  that  Ober- 
fuehrer  Piffraeder,  an  S.S.  ruffian  who  had  distinguished 
himself  recently  by  superintending  the  exhuming  and 
destroying  of  221,000  bodies  of  Jews  murdered  by  the 
Einsatzgruppen  in  the  Baltic  regions  before  the  advancing 
Russians  got  to  them,  had  come  to  arrest  him.  Piffraeder 
and  his  two  S.D.  plain-clothes  men  were  locked  up  in  an 
adjacent  empty  office.  Then  General  von  Kortzfleisch, 
who  had  over-all  command  of  the  troops  in  the  Berlin- 
Brandenburg  district  (Wehrkreis  III),  arrived  to  demand 
what  was  up.  This  strictly  Nazi  General  insisted  on  seeing 
Fromm  but  was  taken  to  Olbricht,  with  whom  he  re- 
fused to  speak.  Beck  then  received  him,  and  when 
Kortzfleisch  proved  adamant  he  too  was  locked  up.  Gen- 
eral von  Thuengen,  as  planned,  was  appointed  to  re- 
place him. 

Piffraeder’s  appearance  reminded  Stauffenberg  that  the 
conspirators  had  forgotten  to  place  a guard  around 
the  building.  So  a detachment  from  the  Guard  Battalion 
Grossdeutschland,  which  was  supposed  to  be  on  guard 
duty  but  wasn’t,  was  posted  at  the  entrance.  By  a little 
after  5 p.m.,  then,  the  rebels  were  at  least  in  control  of 


i'iKfc'Vveeks  be,ftrf"  Leonrod  had  asked  an  Army  chaplain  friend  of  his, 

* ?r  j ermann  Wehrle,  whether  the  Catholic  Church  condoned  tyrannicide 
fS di  w beeii.  gl^en  ,a,  negative  answer.  When  this  came  out  in  Leonrod’s 
People  s Court,  Father  Wehrle  was  arrested  for  not  haying 
told  the  authorities  and,  like  Leonrod,  was  executed. 


1378 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


their  own  headquarters,  but  that  was  all  of  Berlin  they 
were  in  control  of.  What  had  happened  to  the  Army  troops 
that  were  supposed  to  occupy  the  capital  and  secure  it 
for  the  new  anti-Nazi  government? 

A little  after  4 p.m.,  when  the  conspirators  had  finally 
come  to  life  following  Staulfenberg’s  return,  General  von 
Hase,  the  Berlin  commandant,  telephoned  the  commander 
of  the  crack  Guard  Battalion  Grossdeutschland  at 
Doeberitz  and  instructed  him  to  alert  his  unit  and  him- 
self to  report  at  once  to  the  Kommandantur  on  the  Unter 
den  Linden.  The  battalion  commander,  recently  ap- 
pointed, was  Major  Otto  Remer,  who  was  to  play  a key 
role  this  day,  though  not  the  one  the  plotters  had  counted 
on.  They  had  investigated  him,  since  his  battalion  had 
been  alloted  an  all-important  task,  and  satisfied  themselves 
that  he  was  a nonpolitical  officer  who  would  obey  the 
orders  of  his  immediate  superiors.  Of  his  bravery  there 
could  be  no  doubt.  He  had  been  wounded  eight  times  and 
had  recently  received  from  the  hand  of  Hitler  himself  the 
Knight’s  Cross  with  Oak  Leaves — a rare  distinction. 

Remer  alerted  his  battalion,  as  instructed,  and  sped  into 
the  city  to  receive  his  specific  orders  from  Hase.  The 
General  told  him  of  Hitler’s  assassination  and  of  an  at- 
tempted S.S.  putsch  and  instructed  him  to  seal  off  the 
ministries  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the  S.S.  Security  Main 
Office  in  the  nearby  Anhalt  Station  quarter.  By  5:30 
p.m.  Remer,  acting  with  dispatch,  had  done  so  and  re- 
ported back  to  Unter  den  Linden  for  further  orders. 

And  now  another  minor  character  nudged  himself 
into  the  drama  and  helped  Remer  to  become  the  nemesis 
of  the  conspiracy.  A Lieutenant  Dr.  Hans  Hagen,  a highly 
excitable  and  self-important  young  man,  had  been  posted 
as  National  Socialist  guidance  officer  to  Remer’s  guard 
battalion.  He  also  worked  for  Dr.  Goebbels  at  the  Propa- 
ganda Ministry  and  at  the  moment  was  actually  stationed 
at  Bayreuth  where  he  had  been  sent  by  the  Minister  to 
work  on  a book  which  Martin  Bormann,  Hitler’s  secre- 
tary, wanted  written — a “History  of  National  Socialist 
Culture.”  His  presence  in  Berlin  was  quite  fortuitous. 
He  had  come  to  deliver  a memorial  address  in  tribute  to 
an  obscure  writer  who  had  fallen  at  the  front  and  he 
sought  to  take  advantage  of  his  visit  by  also  delivering  a 


1379 


Beginning  of  the  End 

lecture  that  afternoon  to  his  battalion — though  it  was  a hot 
and  sultry  day — on  “National  Socialist  Guidance  Ques- 
tions.” He  had  a passion  for  public  speaking. 

On  his  way  to  Doeberitz  the  excitable  lieutenant  was 
sure  he  saw  Field  Marshal  von  Brauchitsch  in  a passing 
Army  car  attired  in  full  uniform,  and  it  immediately  oc- 
curred to  him  that  the  old  generals  must  be  up  to  some- 
thing treasonable.  Brauchitsch,  who  had  been  booted  out 
of  his  command  long  before  by  Hitler,  was  not  in  Berlin 
that  day,  in  uniform  or  out,  but  Hagen  swore  he  had 
seen  him.  He  spoke  of  his  suspicions  to  Remer,  with 
whom  he  happened  to  be  talking  when  the  major  received 
his  orders  to  occupy  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  The  orders  kin- 
dled his  suspicions  and  he  persuaded  Remer  to  give  him 
a motorcycle  and  sidecar,  in  which  he  promptly  raced 
to  the  Propaganda  Ministry  to  alert  Goebbels. 

The  Minister  had  just  received  his  first  telephone  call 
from  Hitler,  who  told  him  of  the  attempt  on  his  life  and 
instructed  him  to  get  on  the  air  as  soon  as  possible  and 
announce  that  it  had  failed.  This  seems  to  have  been  the 
first  news  the  usually  alert  Propaganda  Minister  had  of 
what  had  occurred  at  Rastenburg.  Hagen  soon  brought  him 
up  to  date  on  what  was  about  to  happen  in  Berlin.  Goeb- 
bels was  at  first  skeptical — he  regarded  Hagen  as  some- 
what of  a nuisance — and,  according  to  one  version,  was 
on  the  point  of  throwing  his  visitor  out  when  the  lieu- 
tenant suggested  he  go  to  the  window  and  see  for  himself. 
What  he  saw  was  more  convincing  than  Hagen’s  hysterical 
words.  Army  troops  were  taking  up  posts  around  the 
ministry.  Goebbels,  who  though  a stupid  man  was  ex- 
tremely quick-witted,  told  Hagen  to  send  Remer  to  him 
at  once.  This  Hagen  did,  and  thereupon  passed  out  of 
history. 

Thus  while  the  conspirators  in  the  Bendlerstrasse  were 
getting  in  touch  with  generals  all  over  Europe  and  giving 
no  thought  to  such  a junior  officer  as  Remer,  indispensa- 
ble as  his  job  was,  Goebbels  was  getting  in  touch  with  the 
man  who,  however  low  in  rank,  mattered  most  at  this 
particular  moment. 

The  contact  was  inevitable,  for  in  the  meantime  Remer 
had  been  ordered  to  arrest  the  Propaganda  Minister.  Thus 
the  major  had  an  order  to  nab  Goebbels  and  also  a mes- 
sage from  Goebbels  inviting  him  to  see  him.  Remer  en- 


1380  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

tered  the  Propaganda  Ministry  with  twenty  men,  whom 
he  instructed  to  fetch  him  if  he  did  not  return  from  the 
Minister’s  office  within  a few  minutes.  With  drawn  pis- 
tols he  and  his  adjutant  then  went  into  the  office  to  arrest 
the  most  important  Nazi  official  in  Berlin  on  that  day. 

Among  the  talents  which  had  enabled  Joseph  Goebbels 
to  rise  to  his  eminence  in  the  Third  Reich  was  a genius 
for  fast  talking  in  tight  situations — and  this  was  the  tight- 
est and  most  precarious  of  his  stormy  life.  He  reminded 
the  young  major  of  his  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief.  Remer  retorted  crisply  that  Hitler  was 
dead.  Goebbels  said  that  the  Fuehrer  was  very  much  alive 
— he  had  just  talked  with  him  on  the  telephone.  He  would 
prove  it.  Whereupon  he  picked  up  the  phone  and  put  in 
an  urgent  call  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  at  Rastenburg. 
Once  more  the  failure  of  the  conspirators  to  seize  the  Ber- 
lin telephone  exchange  or  at  least  cut  its  wires  com- 
pounded disaster.*  Within  the  matter  of  a minute  or  two 
Hitler  was  on  the  line.  Goebbels  quickly  handed  his  tele- 
phone to  Remer.  Did  the  major  recognize  his  voice?  asked 
the  warlord.  Who  in  Germany  could  fail  to  recognize  that 
husky  voice,  since  it  had  been  heard  on  the  radio  hun- 
dreds of  times?  Moreover,  Remer  had  heard  it  directly  a 
few  weeks  before  when  he  received  his  decoration  from 
the  Fuehrer.  The  major,  it  is  said,  snapped  to  attention. 
Hitler  commanded  him  to  crush  the  uprising  and  obey  only 
the  commands  of  Goebbels,  Himmler,  who  he  said  had 
just  been  named  the  commander  of  the  Replacement 
Army  and  who  was  en  route  by  plane  to  Berlin,  and  Gen- 
eral Reinecke,  who  happened  to  be  in  the  capital  and  had 
been  ordered  to  take  over  the  command  of  all  troops  in 
the  city.  The  Fuehrer  also  promoted  the  major  forthwith 
to  colonel. 

This  was  enough  for  Remer.  He  had  received  orders 
from  on  high  and  he  proceeded  with  an  energy  which  was 
lacking  in  the  Bendlerstrasse  to  carry  them  out.  He  with- 
drew his  battalion  from  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  occupied  the 
Kommandantur  in  the  Unter  den  Linden,  sent  out  patrols 
to  halt  any  other  troops  that  might  be  marching  on  the 

* “To  think  that  these  revolutionaries  weren’t  even  smart  enough  to  cut  the 
telephone  wires!”  Goebbels  is  said  to  have  exclaimed  afterward.  “My  little 
daughter  would  have  thought  of  that.”  (Curt  Riess,  Joseph  Goebbels:  The 
Devil’s  Advocate,  p.  280.) 


1381 


Beginning  of  the  End 

city  and  himself  set  out  to  find  where  the  headquarters  of 
the  conspiracy  was  so  that  he  could  arrest  the  ringleaders. 

Why  the  rebelling  generals  and  colonels  entrusted  such 
a key  role  to  Remer  in  the  first  place,  why  they  did  not 
replace  him  at  the  last  moment  with  an  officer  who  was 
heart  and  soul  behind  the  conspiracy,  why  at  least  they  did 
not  send  a dependable  officer  along  with  the  guard  bat- 
talion to  see  that  Remer  obeyed  orders — these  are  among 
the  many  riddles  of  July  20.  But  then,  why  was  not  Goeb- 
bels,  the  most  important  and  the  most  dangerous  Nazi  of- 
ficial present  in  Berlin,  arrested  at  once?  A couple  of 
Count  von  Helldorf’s  policemen  could  have  done  this  in 
two  minutes,  for  the  Propaganda  Ministry  was  completely 
unguarded.  But  why  then  did  the  plotters  not  seize  the 
Gestapo  headquarters  in  the  Prinz  Albrechtstrasse  and  not 
only  suppress  the  secret  police  but  liberate  a number  of 
their  fellow  conspirators,  including  Leber,  who  were  in- 
carcerated there?  The  Gestapo  headquarters  were  virtually 
un-guarded,  as  was  the  central  office  of  the  R.S.H.A.,  the 
nerve  center  of  the  S.D.  and  S.S.,  which,  one  would  have 
thought,  would  be  among  the  first  places  to  be  occupied. 
It  is  impossible  to  answer  these  questions. 

Remer’s  quick  turnabout  did  not  become  known  in  the 
Bendlerstrasse  headquarters  for  some  time.  Apparently 
very  little  of  what  was  happening  in  Berlin  became 
known  there  until  too  late.  And  it  is  difficult  even  today 
to  find  out,  for  the  eyewitness  reports  are  filled  with  be- 
wildering contradictions.  Where  were  the  tanks,  where 
were  the  troops  from  the  outlying  stations? 

A brief  announcement  broadcast  shortly  after  6:30  p.m. 
over  the  Deutschlandsender,  a radio  station  with  such  a 
powerful  transmitter  that  it  could  be  heard  all  over  Eu- 
rope, announcing  that  there  had  been  an  attempt  to  kill 
Hitler  but  that  it  had  failed,  came  as  a severe  blow  to  the 
harried  men  in  the  Bendlerstrasse,  but  it  was  a warning 
that  the  detachment  of  troops  which  was  supposed  to  have 
occupied  the  Rundfunkhaus  had  failed  to  do  so.  Goebbels 
had  been  able  to  telephone  the  text  of  the  announcement 
to  broadcasting  headquarters  while  he  was  waiting  for 
Remer.  At  a quarter  to  seven  Stauffenberg  sent  out  a sig- 
nal by  teleprinter  to  the  Army  commanders,  saying  that 
the  radio  announcement  was  false  and  that  Hitler  was 
dead.  But  the  damage  to  the  putschists  was  almost  ir- 


1382 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

reparable.  The  commanding  generals  in  Prague  and  Vi- 
enna, who  had  already  proceeded  to  arrest  the  S.S.  and 
Nazi  Party  leaders,  began  to  backtrack.  Then  at  8:20  p.m. 
Keitel  managed  to  get  out  by  Army  teleprinter  to  all 
Army  commands  a message  from  Fuehrer  headquarters 
announcing  that  Himmler  had  been  appointed  chief  of  the 
Replacement  Army  and  that  “only  orders  from  him  and 
myself  are  to  be  obeyed.”  Keitel  added,  “Any  orders  issued 
by  Fromm,  Witzleben  or  Hoepner  are  invalid.”  The 
Deutschlandsender’s  announcement  that  Hitler  was  alive 
and  Keitel’s  crisp  order  that  only  his  commands  and  not 
those  of  the  conspirators  were  to  be  obeyed  had,  as  we 
shall  see,  a decisive  effect  upon  Field  Marshal  von  Kluge, 
who  off  in  France  was  on  the  point  of  throwing  in  his 
lot  with  the  conspirators.* 

Even  the  tanks,  on  which  the  rebel  officers  had  counted 
so  much,  failed  to  arrive.  It  might  have  been  thought 
that  Hoepner,  an  outstanding  panzer  general,  would  have 
seen  to  the  tanks,  but  he  did  not  get  around  to  it.  The 
commandant  of  the  panzer  school  at  Krampnitz,  which 
was  to  supply  the  tanks,  Colonel  Wolfgang  Glaesemer,  had 
been  ordered  by  the  conspirators  to  start  his  vehicles  rol- 
ling into  the  city  and  himself  to  report  to  the  Bendler- 
strasse  for  further  instructions.  But  the  tank  colonel 
wanted  no  part  in  any  military  putsch  against  the  Nazis, 
and  Olbricht,  after  pleading  with  him  in  vain,  had  to 
lock  him  up  too  in  the  building.  Glaesemer,  however,  was 
able  to  whisper  to  his  adjutant,  who  was  not  arrested, 
instructions  to  inform  the  headquarters  of  the  Inspectorate 

* There  are  conflicting  stories  as  to  why  the  Berlin  radio  was  not  seized. 
According  to  one  account,  a unit  from  the  infantry  school  at  Doeberitz  had 
been  assigned  this  task,  which  was  to  be  carried  out  by  the  commandant, 
General  Hitzfeld.  who  was  in  on  the  plot.  But  the  conspirators  failed  to 
warn  Hitzfeld  that  July  20  was  the  day,  and  he  was  away  in  Baden  attending 
the  funeral  of  a relative.  His  second-in-command,  a Colonel  Mueller,  was 
also  away  on  a military  assignment.  When  Mueller  finally  returned  about 
8 p.m.  he  found  that  his  best  battallion  had  left  for  a night  exercise.  By  the 
time  he  rounded  up  his  troops  at  midnight,  it  was  too  late.  According  to  a 
different  story,  a Major  Jacob  succeeded  in  surrounding  the  Rundfunkhaus 
with  troops  from  the  infantry  school  but  could  get  no  clear  orders  from 
Olbricht  as  to  what  to  do.  When  Goebbels  phoned  the  text  of  the  first  an- 
nouncement Jacob  did  not  interfere  with  its  being  broadcast.  Later  the 
major  contended  that  if  Olbricht  had  given  him  the  necessary  orders  the 
German  radio  network  could  easily  have  been  denied  the  Nazis  and  put  at 
the  service  of  the  conspirators.  The  first  version  is  given  by  Zeller  (Geist 
t r i**’  PP'  267—68),  the  most  authoritative  German  historian  on  the 

July  20  plot;  the  second  is  given  by  Wheeler-Bennett  ( Nemesis , pp.  654- 
55n.)  and  Rudolf  Sammler  ( Goebbels : The  Man  Next  to  Hitler,  p 138), 
both  of  whom  say  Major  Jacob  gave  the  above  testimony. 


1383 


Beginning  of  the  End 

of  Panzer  Troops  in  Berlin,  which  had  jurisdiction  over 
the  tank  formations,  of  what  had  happened  and  to  see  to 
it  that  only  the  inspectorate’s  commands  were  obeyed. 

Thus  it  happened  that  the  badly  needed  tanks,  though 
some  of  them  reached  the  heart  of  the  city  at  the  Victory 
Column  in  the  Tiergarten,  were  denied  the  rebels.  Colonel 
Glaesemer  escaped  from  his  confinement  by  a ruse,  telling 
his  guards  that  he  had  decided  to  accept  Olbricht’s  orders 
and  would  himself  take  command  of  the  tanks,  whereupon 
he  slipped  out  of  the  building.  The  tanks  were  soon  with- 
drawn from  the  city. 

The  panzer  colonel  was  not  the  only  officer  to  slip 
away  from  the  haphazard  and  gentlemanly  confinement 
imposed  on  those  who  would  not  join  the  conspiracy — a 
circumstance  which  contrubuted  to  the  swift  end  of  the 
revolt. 

Field  Marshal  von  Witzleben,  when  he  finally  arrived  in 
full  uniform  and  waving  his  baton  shortly  before  8 p.m. 
to  take  over  his  duites  as  the  new  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Wehrmacht,  seems  to  have  realized  at  once  that 
the  putsch  had  failed.  He  stormed  at  Beck  and  Stauffen- 
berg  for  having  bungled  the  whole  affair.  At  his  trial  he 
told  the  court  that  it  was  obvious  to  him  that  the  at- 
tempt had  misfired  when  he  learned  that  not  even  the 
broadcasting  headquarters  had  been  occupied.  But  he  him- 
self had  done  nothing  to  help  at  a time  when  his  authority 
as  a field  marshal  might  have  rallied  more  of  the  troop 
commanders  in  Berlin  and  abroad.  Forty-five  minutes 
after  he  had  entered  the  Bendlerstrasse  building  he 
stamped  out  of  it — and  out  of  the  conspiracy,  now  that 
it  seemed  certain  to  fail — drove  his  Mercedes  back  to 
Zossen,  where  he  had  whiled  away  the  seven  hours  that 
were  decisive  that  day,  told  Quartermaster  General  Wag- 
ner that  the  revolt  had  failed,  and  drove  on  to  his  country 
estate  thirty  miles  beyond,  where  he  was  arrested  the  next 
day  by  a fellow  General  named  Linnertz. 

The  curtain  now  went  up  on  the  last  act. 

Shortly  after  9 p.m.  the  frustrated  conspirators  were 
struck  dumb  at  hearing  the  Deutschlandsender  announce 
that  the  Fuehrer  would  broadcast  to  the  German  people 
later  in  the  evening.  A few  minutes  afterward  it  was 
learned  that  General  von  Hase,  the  Berlin  commandant. 


1384 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

who  had  started  Major — now  Colonel — Remer  on  his  fate- 
ful errand,  had  been  arrested  and  that  the  Nazi  General, 
Reinecke,  backed  by  the  S.S.,  had  taken  over  command  of 
all  troops  in  Berlin  and  was  preparing  to  storm  the  Ben- 
dlerstrasse. 

The  S.S.  had  at  last  rallied,  thanks  mostly  to  Otto 
Skorzeny,  the  tough  S.S.  leader  who  had  shown  his  prow- 
ess in  rescuing  Mussolini  from  captivity.  Unaware  that 
anything  was  up  that  day  Skorzeny  had  boarded  the  night 
express  for  Vienna  at  6 P.M.,  but  had  been  hauled  off  the 
train  when  it  stopped  at  the  suburb  of  Lichterfelde,  at 
the  urging  of  S.S.  General  Schellenberg,  the  Number  Two 
man  in  the  S.D.  Skorzeny  found  the  unguarded  S.D.  head- 
quarters in  a most  hysterical  state,  but  being  the  cold- 
blooded man  he  was,  and  a good  organizer  to  boot,  he 
quickly  rounded  up  his  armed  bands  and  went  to  work. 
It  was  he  who  first  persuaded  the  tank  school  formations 
to  remain  loyal  to  Hitler. 

The  energetic  counteraction  at  Rastenburg,  the  quick 
thinking  of  Goebbels  in  winning  over  Remer  and  in  uti- 
lizing the  radio,  the  revival  of  the  S.S.  in  Berlin  and  the 
unbelievable  confusion  and  inaction  of  the  rebels  in  the 
Bendlerstrasse  caused  a good  many  Army  officers  who  had 
been  on  the  point  of  throwing  in  their  lot  with  the  con- 
spirators, or  had  even  done  so,  to  think  better  of  it.  One 
of  these  was  General  Otto  Herfurth,  chief  of  staff  to  the 
arrested  Kortzfleisch,  who  at  first  had  co-operated  with 
the  Bendlerstrasse  in  trying  to  round  up  the  troops, 
and  then,  when  he  saw  how  things  were  going,  changed 
sides,  ringing  up  Hitler’s  headquarters  around  9:30  p.m. 
to  say  that  he  was  putting  down  the  military  putsch.* 

General  Fromm,  whose  refusal  to  join  the  revolt  had 
put  it  in  jeopardy  from  the  beginning  and  who,  as  a re- 
sult, had  been  arrested,  now  bestirred  himself.  About  8 
p.m.,  after  four  hours  of  confinement  in  his  adjutant’s  of- 
fice, he  had  had  asked  to  be  allowed  to  retire  to  his  pri- 
vate quarters  on  the  floor  below.  He  had  given  his  word  of 
honor  as  an  officer  that  he  would  make  no  attempt  to 
escape  or  to  establish  contact  with  the  outside.  General 
Hoepner  had  consented  and  moreover,  since  Fromm  had 
complained  that  he  was  not  only  hungry  but  thirsty,  had 

* His  treachery  did  not  prevent  his  being  arrested  for  complicity  in  the  plot 
and  hanged  for  it. 


1385 


Beginning  of  the  End 

sent  him  sandwiches  and  a bottle  of  wine.  A little  earlier 
three  generals  of  Fromm’s  staff  had  arrived,  had  refused 
to  join  the  rebellion,  and  had  demanded  to  be  taken  to 
their  chief.  Inexplicably,  they  were  taken  to  him  in  his 
private  quarters,  though  put  under  arrest.  They  had  no 
sooner  arrived  than  Fromm  told  them  of  a little-used  rear 
exit  through  which  they  could  escape.  Breaking  his  word 
to  Hoepner,  he  ordered  the  generals  to  organize  help,  storm 
the  building,  liberate  him  and  put  down  the  revolt.  The 
generals  slipped  out  unnoticed. 

But  already  a group  of  junior  officers  on  Olbricht’s 
staff,  who  at  first  had  either  gone  along  with  the  rebels 
or  stuck  around  in  the  Bendlerstrasse  to  see  how  the  re- 
volt would  go,  had  begun  to  sense  that  it  was  failing.  They 
had  begun  to  realize  too,  as  one  of  them  later  said,  that 
they  would  all  be  hanged  as  traitors  if  the  revolt  failed 
and  they  had  not  turned  against  it  in  time.  One  of  them. 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Franz  Herber,  a former  police  officer 
and  a convinced  Nazi,  had  fetched  some  Tommy  guns  and 
ammunition  from  the  arsenal  of  Spandau,  and  these  were 
secreted  on  the  second  floor.  About  10:30,  these  officers 
called  upon  Olbricht  and  demanded  to  know  exactly  what 
he  and  his  friends  were  trying  to  accomplish.  The  Gen- 
eral told  them,  and  without  arguing  they  withdrew. 

Twenty  minutes  later  they  returned — six  or  eight  of 
them,  led  by  Herber  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bodo  von  der 
Heyde — brandishing  their  weapons  and  demanded  further 
explanations  from  Olbricht.  Stauffenberg  looked  in  to  see 
what  all  the  noise  was  about  and  was  seized.  When  he 
tried  to  escape,  bolting  out  the  door  and  down  the  cor- 
ridor, he  was  shot  in  the  arm — the  only  one  he  had.  The 
counterrebels  began  shooting  wildly,  though  apparently 
not  hitting  anyone  except  Stauffenberg.  They  then  roved 
through  the  wing  which  had  been  the  headquarters  of  the 
plot,  rounding  up  the  conspirators.  Beck,  Hoepner,  Ol- 
bricht, Stauffenberg,  Haeften  and  Mertz  were  herded  into 
Fromm’s  vacated  office,  where  Fromm  himself  shortly  ap- 
peared, brandishing  a revolver. 

“Well,  gentlemen,”  he  said,  “I  am  now  going  to  treat 
you  as  you  treated  me.”  But  he  didn’t. 

“Lay  down  your  weapons,”  he  commanded,  and  in- 
formed his  former  captors  that  they  were  under  arrest. 

“You  wouldn’t  make  that  demand  of  me,  your  old  com- 


1386 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

manding  officer,”  Beck  said  quietly,  reaching  for  his  re- 
volver. “I  will  draw  the  consequences  from  this  unhappy 
situation  myself.” 

“Well,  keep  it  pointed  at  yourself,”  Fromm  warned. 

The  curious  lack  of  will  to  act  of  this  brilliant,  civilized 
former  General  Staff  Chief  had  finally  brought  his  down- 
fall at  the  supreme  test  of  his  life.  It  remained  with  him 
to  the  very  end. 

“At  this  moment  it  is  the  old  days  that  I recall  . . 
he  began  to  say,  but  Fromm  cut  him  short. 

“We  don’t  want  to  hear  that  stuff  now.  I ask  you  to  stop 
talking  and  do  something.” 

Beck  did.  He  pulled  the  trigger,  but  the  bullet  merely 
scratched  his  head.  He  slumped  into  his  chair,  bleeding  a 
little. 

“Help  the  old  gentleman,”  Fromm  commanded  two 
young  officers,  but  when  they  tried  to  take  the  weapon 
Beck  objected,  asking  for  another  chance.  Fromm  nodded 
his  consent. 

Then  he  turned  to  the  rest  of  the  plotters.  “And  you 
gentlemen,  if  you  have  any  letters  to  write  I’ll  give  you 
a few  more  minutes.”  Olbricht  and  Hoepner  asked  for 
stationery  and  sat  down  to  pen  brief  notes  of  farewell  to 
their  wives.  Stauffenberg,  Mertz,  Haeften  and  the  others 
stood  there  silently.  Fromm  marched  out  of  the  room. 

He  had  quickly  made  up  his  mind  to  eliminate  these 
men  and  not  only  to  cover  up  the  traces — for  though  he 
had  refused  to  engage  actively  in  the  plot,  he  had  known 
of  it  for  months,  sheltering  the  assassins  and  not  reporting 
their  plans — but  to  curry  favor  with  Hitler  as  the  man 
who  put  down  the  revolt.  In  the  world  of  the  Nazi  gang- 
sters it  was  much  too  late  for  this,  but  Fromm  did  not 
realize  it. 

He  returned  in  five  minutes  to  announce  that  “in  the 
name  of  the  Fuehrer”  he  had  called  a session  of  a “court- 
martial”  (there  is  no  evidence  that  he  had)  and  that  it  had 
pronounced  death  sentences  on  four  officers:  “Colonel  of 
the  General  Staff  Mertz,  General  Olbricht,  this  colonel 
whose  name  I no  longer  know  [Stauffenberg]  and  this 
lieutenant  [Ha»ften].” 

The  two  generals,  Olbricht  and  Hoepner,  were  still 
scratching  their  letters  to  their  wives.  General  Beck  lay 
sprawled  in  his  chair,  his  face  smeared  with  blood  from 


1387 


Beginning  of  the  End 

the  bullet  scratch.  The  four  officers  “condemned”  to  death 
stood  like  ramrods,  silent. 

“Well,  gentlemen,”  Fromm  said  to  Olbricht  and  Hoep- 
ner,  “are  you  ready?  I must  ask  you  to  hurry  so  as  not  to 
make  it  too  difficult  for  the  others.” 

Hoepner  finished  his  letter  and  laid  it  on  the  table.  Ol- 
bricht asked  for  an  envelope,  put  his  letter  in  it  and  sealed 
it.  Beck,  now  beginning  to  come  to,  asked  for  another 
pistol.  Stauffenberg,  the  sleeve  of  his  wounded  good  arm 
soaked  in  blood,  and  his  three  “condemned”  companions 
were  led  out.  Fromm  told  Hoepner  to  follow  him. 

In  the  courtyard  below  in  the  dim  rays  of  the  blackout- 
hooded  headlights  of  an  Army  car  the  four  officers  were 
quickly  dispatched  by  a firing  squad.  Eyewitnesses  say 
there  was  much  tumult  and  shouting,  mostly  by  the  guards, 
who  were  in  a hurry  because  of  the  danger  of  a bombing 
attack — British  planes  had  been  over  Berlin  almost  every 
night  that  summer.  Stauffenberg  died  crying,  “Long  live 
our  sacred  Germany!”32 

In  the  meantime  Fromm  had  given  General  Hoepner  a 
certain  choice.  Three  weeks  later,  in  the  shadow  of  the 
gallows,  Hoepner  told  of  it  to  the  People’s  Court. 

“Well,  Hoepner  [Fromm  said],  this  business  really  hurts 
me.  We  used  to  be  good  friends  and  comrades,  you  know. 
You’ve  got  yourself  mixed  up  in  this  thing  and  must  take 
the  consequences.  Do  you  want  to  go  the  same  way  as  Beck? 
Otherwise  I shall  have  to  arrest  you  now.” 

Hoepner  answered  that  he  did  “not  feel  so  guilty”  and 
that  he  thought  he  could  “justify”  himself. 

“I  understand  that,”  Fromm  answered,  shaking  his  hand. 
Hoepner  was  carted  off  to  the  military  prison  at  Moabit. 

As  he  was  being  taken  away  he  heard  Beck’s  tired  voice 
through  the  door  in  the  next  room:  “If  it  doesn’t  work 
this  time,  then  please  help  me.”  There  was  the  sound  of 
a pistol  shot.  Beck’s  second  attempt  to  kill  himself  failed. 
Fromm  poked  his  head  irt  the  door  and  once  more  told 
an  officer,  “Help  the  old  gentleman.”  This  unknown  officer 
declined  to  give  the  coup  de  grace,  leaving  that  to  a 
sergeant,  who  dragged  Beck,  unconscious  from  the  sec- 
ond wound,  outside  the  room  and  finished  him  off  with  a 
shot  in  the  neck.33 

It  was  now  sometime  after  midnight.  The  revolt,  the 
only  serious  one  ever  made  against  Hitler  in  the  eleven 


1388 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


and  a half  years  of  the  Third  Reich,  had  been  snuffed 
out  in  eleven  and  a half  hours.  Skorzeny  arrived  at  the 
Bendlerstrasse  with  a band  of  armed  S.S.  men,  forbade 
any  more  executions — as  a policeman  he  knew  enough 
not  to  kill  those  who  could  be  tortured  into  giving  much 
valuable  evidence  of  the  extent  of  the  plot — handcuffed 
the  rest  of  the  plotters,  sent  them  off  to  the  Gestapo  prison 
on  the  Prinz  Albrechtstrasse  and  put  detectives  to  work 
collecting  incriminating  papers  which  the  conspirators  had 
not  had  time  to  destroy.  Himmler,  who  had  reached  Ber- 
lin a little  earlier  and  set  up  temporary  headquarters  in 
Goebbel’s  ministry,  now  protected  by  part  of  Remer’s 
guard  battalion,  telephoned  Hitler  and  reported  that  the 
revolt  had  been  crushed.  In  East  Prussia  a radio  van 
was  racing  from  Koenigsberg  to  Rastenburg  so  that  the 
Fuehrer  could  make  his  long-heralded  broadcast  which  the 
Deutschlandsender  had  been  promising  every  few  minutes 
since  9 p.m. 

Just  before  1 a.m.  Adolph  Hitler’s  hoarse  voice  burst 
upon  the  summer  night’s  air. 

My  German  comrades! 

If  I speak  to  you  today  it  is  first  in  order  that  you  should 
hear  my  voice  and  should  know  that  I am  unhurt  and  well, 
and  secondly,  that  you  should  know  of  a crime  unparalleled 
in  German  history. 

A very  small  clique  of  ambitious,  irresponsible  and,  at  the 
same  time,  senseless  and  stupid  officers  have  concocted  a 
plot  to  eliminate  me  and,  with  me,  the  staff  of  the  High 
Command  of  the  Wehrmacht. 

The  bomb  planted  by  Colonel  Count  Stauffenberg  ex- 
ploded two  meters  to  the  right  of  me.  It  seriously  wounded 
a number  of  my  true  and  loyal  collaborators,  one  of  whom 
has  died.  I myself  am  entirely  unhurt,  aside  from  some  very 
minor  scratches,  bruises  and  burns.  I regard  this  as  a con- 
firmation of  the  task  imposed  upon  me  by  Providence  . . . 

The  circle  of  these  usurpers  is  very  small  and  has  nothing 
in  common  with  the  spirit  of  the  German  Wehrmacht  and, 
above  all,  none  with  the  German  people.  It  is  a gang  of 
criminal  elements  which  will  be  destroyed  without  mercy. 

I therefore  give  orders  now  that  no  military  authority  . . . 
is  to  obey  orders  from  this  crew  of  usurpers.  I also  order 
that  it  is  everyone’s  duty  to  arrest,  or,  if  they  resist,  to 
shoot  at  sight,  anyone  issuing  or  handling  such  orders  . . . 

This  time  we  shall  settle  accounts  with  them  in  the  man- 
ner to  which  we  National  Socialists  are  accustomed. 


Beginning  of  the  End 


1389 


BLOODY  VENGEANCE 

This  time,  too,  Hitler  kept  his  word. 

The  barbarism  of  the  Nazis  toward  their  own  fellow 
Germans  reached  its  zenith.  There  was  a wild  wave  of  ar- 
rests followed  by  gruesome  torture,  drumhead  trials, 
and  death  sentences  carried  out,  in  many  cases,  by  slow 
strangling  while  the  victims  were  suspended  by  piano  wire 
from  meathooks  borrowed  from  butchershops  and  slaught- 
erhouses. Relatives  and  friends  of  the  suspects  were  rounded 
up  by  the  thousands  and  sent  to  concentration  camps,  where 
many  of  them  died.  The  brave  few  who  gave  shelter  to 
those  who  were  in  hiding  were  summarily  dealt  with. 

Hitler,  seized  by  a titantic  fury  and  an  unquenchable 
thirst  for  revenge,  whipped  Himmler  and  Kaltenbrunner 
to  ever  greater  efforts  to  lay  their  hands  on  every  last 
person  who  had  dared  to  plqt  against  him.  He  himself 
laid  down  the  procedure  for  dispatching  them. 

“This  time,”  he  stormed  at  one  of  his  first  conferences 
after  the  explosion  at  Rastenburg,  “the  criminals  will  be 
given  short  shrift.  No  military  tribunals.  We’ll  hale  them 
before  the  People’s  Court.  No  long  speeches  from  them. 
The  court  will  act  with  lightning  speed.  And  two  hours 
after  the  sentence  it  will  be  carried  out.  By  hanging — 
without  mercy.”  34 

These  instructions  from  on  high  were  carried  out  literal- 
ly by  Ronald  Freisler,  the  president  of  the  People’s 
Court  (Volksgerichtshof),  a vile,  vituperative  maniac, 
who  as  a prisoner  of  war  in  Russia  during  the  first  war 
had  become  a fanatical  Bolshevik  and  who,  even  after  he 
became,  in  1924,  an  equally  fanatical  Nazi,  remained  a 
warm  admirer  of  Soviet  terror  and  a keen  student  of  its 
methods.  He  had  made  a special  study  of  Andrei 
Vishinsky’s  technique  as  chief  prosecutor  in  the  Mos- 
cow trials  of  the  Thirties  in  which  the  “Old  Bolsheviks” 
and  most  of  the  leading  generals  had  been  found  guilty  of 
“treason”  and  liquidated.  “Freisler  is  our  Vishinsky,” 
Hitler  had  exclaimed  in  the  conference  mentioned  above. 

The  first  trial  of  the  July  20  conspirators  before  the 
People’s  Court  took  place  in  Berlin  on  August  7 and  8, 
with  Field  Marshal  von  Witzleben,  Generals  Hoepner, 
Stieff  and  von  Hase,  and  the  junior  officers,  Hagen, 


1390 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Klausing,  Bernardis  and  Count  Peter  Yorck  von  Warten- 
burg,  who  had  worked  closely  with  their  idol  Stauffenberg, 
in  the  dock.  They  were  already  pretty  well  broken  by 
their  treatment  in  the  Gestapo  cellars  and,  since  Goeb- 
bels  had  ordered  every  minute  of  the  trial  to  be  filmed  so 
that  the  movie  could  be  shown  to  the  troops  and  to  the 
civilian  public  as  an  example — and  a warning — every- 
thing had  been  done  to  make  the  accused  look  as  shabby 
as  possible.  They  were  outfitted  in  nondescript  clothes, 
old  coats  and  sweaters,  and  they  entered  the  courtroom 
unshaven,  collarless,  without  neckties  and  deprived  of 
suspenders  and  belts  to  keep  their  trousers  hitched  up. 
The  once  proud  Field  Marshal,  especially,  looked  like  a 
terribly  broken,  toothless  old  man.  His  false  teeth  had  been 
taken  from  him  and  as  he  stood  in  the  dock,  badgered 
unmercifully  by  the  venomous  chief  judge,  he  kept  grasp- 
ing at  his  trousers  to  keep  them  from  falling  down. 

“You  dirty  old  man,”  Freisler  shouted  at  him,  “why  do 
you  keep  fiddling  with  your  trousers?” 

Yet  though  the  accused  knew  that  their  fate  was  al- 
ready settled  they  behaved  with  dignity  and  courage 
despite  Freisler’s  ceaseless  efforts  to  degrade  and  de- 
mean them.  Young  Peter  Yorck,  a cousin  of  Stauffenberg, 
was  perhaps  the  bravest,  answering  the  most  insulting 
questions  quietly  and  never  attempting  to  hide  his  con- 
tempt for  National  Socialism. 

“Why  didn’t  you  join  the  party?”  Freisler  asked. 

“Because  I am  not  and  never  could  be  a Nazi,”  the 
count  replied. 

When  Freisler  had  recovered  from  this  answer  and 
pressed  the  point,  Yorck  tried  to  explain.  “Mr.  President, 
I have  already  stated  in  my  interrogation  that  the  Nazi 
ideology  was  such  that  I — ” 

The  judge  interrupted  him.  “ — could  not  agree  . . . 
You  didn’t  agree  with  the  National  Socialist  conception 
of  justice,  say,  in  regard  to  rooting  out  the  Jews?” 

“What  is  important,  what  brings  together  all  these 
questions,”  Yorck  replied,  “is  the  totalitarian  claim  of 
the  State  on  the  individual  which  forces  him  to  renounce 
his  moral  and  religious  obligations  to  God.” 

“Nonsense!”  Cried  Freisler,  and  he  cut  off  the  young 
man.  Such  talk  might  poison  Dr.  Goebbels’  film  and  en- 


1391 


Beginning  of  the  End 

rage  the  Fuehrer,  who  had  decreed,  “No  long  speeches 
from  them.” 

The  court-appointed  defense  lawyers  were  more  than 
ludicrous.  Their  cowardice,  as  one  reads  the  transcript 
of  the  trial,  is  almost  unbelievable.  Witzleben’s  attorney, 
for  example,  a certain  Dr.  Weissmann,  outdid  the  state 
prosecutor  and  almost  equaled  Freisler,  in  denouncing  his 
client  as  a “murderer,”  as  completely  guilty  and  as  de- 
serving the  worst  punishment. 

That  punishment  was  meted  out  as  soon  as  the  trial  had 
ended  on  August  8.  “They  must  all  be  hanged  like  cattle,” 
Hitler  had  ordered,  and  they  were.  Out  at  Ploetzensee 
prison  the  eight  condemned  were  herded  into  a small 
room  in  which  eight  meathooks  hung  from  the  ceiling. 
One  by  one,  after  being  stripped  to  the  waist,  they  were 
strung  up,  a noose  of  piano  wire  being  placed  around 
their  necks  and  attached  to  the  meathooks.  A movie 
camera  whirled  as  the  men  dangled  and  strangled,  their 
beltless  trousers  finally  dropping  off  as  they  struggled, 
leaving  them  naked  in  their  death  agony.35  The  developed 
film,  as  ordered,  was  rushed  to  Hitler  so  that  he  could 
view  it,  as  well  as  the  pictures  of  the  trial,  the  same  eve- 
ning. Goebbels  is  said  to  have  kept  himself  from  fainting 
by  holding  both  hands  over  his  eyes.*  36 

All  that  summer,  fall  and  winter  and  into  the  new  year 
of  1945  the  grisly  People’s  Court  sat  in  session,  racing 
through  its  macabre  trials  and  grinding  out  death  sen- 
tences, until  finally  an  American  bomb  fell  directly  on  the 
courthouse  on  the  morning  of  February  3,  1945,  just  as 
Schlabrendorff  was  being  led  into  the  courtroom,  killing 
Judge  Freisler  and  destroying  the  records  of  most  of  the 
accused  who  still  survived.  Schlabrendorff  thus  miracu- 
lously escaped  with  his  life — one  of  the  very  few  conspi- 
rators on  whom  fortune  smiled — being  eventually  liber- 
ated from  the  Gestapo’s  clutches  by  American  troops  in 
the  Tyrol. 

* Though  the  film  of  this  trial  was  found  by  the  Allies  (and  shown  at 
Nuremberg,  where  the  author  first  saw  it)  that  of  the  executions  was  never 
discovered  and  presumably  was  destroyed  on  the  orders  of  Hitler  lest  it  fall 
into  enemy  hands.  According  to  Allen  Dulles  the  two  films — originally  thirty 
miles  long  and  cut  to  eight  miles — were  put  together  by  Goebbels  and  shown 
to  certain  Army  audiences  as  a lesson  and  a warning.  But  the  soldiers  re- 
fused to  look  at  it — at  the  Cadet  School  at  Lichterfelde  they  walked  out  as 
it  began  to  run — and  it  was  soon  withdrawn  from  circulation.  (Dulles, 
Germany  s Underground,  p.  83.) 


1392 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  fate  of  the  others  must  now  be  recorded. 

Goerdeler,  who  was  to  be  the  Chancellor  of  the  new 
regime,  had  gone  into  hiding  three  days  before  July 
20,  after  having  been  warned  that  the  Gestapo  had  is- 
sued an  order  for  his  arrest.  He  wandered  for  three  weeks 
between  Berlin,  Potsdam  and  East  Prussia,  rarely  spending 
two  nights  in  the  same  place  but  always  being  taken  in 
by  friends  or  relatives,  who  risked  death  by  giving  him 
shelter,  for  Hitler  had  now  put  a price  of  one  million 
marks  on  his  head.  On  the  morning  of  August  12,  ex- 
hausted and  hungry  after  several  days  and  nights  wan- 
dering afoot  in  East  Prussia,  he  stumped  into  a small  inn 
in  the  village  of  Konradswalde  near  Marienwerder.  While 
waiting  to  be  served  breakfast  he  noticed  a woman  in  the 
uniform  of  a Luftwaffe  Wac  eying  him  closely,  and  with- 
out waiting  for  his  food  he  slipped  out  and  made  for  the 
nearby  woods.  It  was  too  late.  The  woman  was  an  old 
acquaintance  of  the  Goerdeler  family,  a Helene  Schwaerzel, 
who  had  easily  recognized  him  and  who  promptly  con- 
fided in  a couple  of  Air  Force  men  who  were  sitting  with 
her.  Goerdeler  was  quickly  apprehended  in  the  woods. 

He  was  sentenced  to  death  by  the  People’s  Court  on 
September  8,  1944,  but  not  executed  until  February  2 of 
the  following  year,  along  with  Popitz.*  Apparently 
Himmler  delayed  the  hangings  because  he  thought  the 
contacts  of  the  two  men,  especially  those  of  Goerdeler, 
with  the  Western  Allies  through  Sweden  and  Switzerland 
might  prove  helpful  to  him  if  he  took  over  the  sinking 
ship  of  state — a prospect  which  began  to  grow  in  his 
mind  at  this  time.37 

Count  Friedrich  Werner  von  Schulenburg,  the  former 
ambassador  in  Moscow,  and  Hassell,  the  former  ambassa- 
dor in  Rome,  both  of  whom  were  to  have  taken  over  the 
direction  of  foreign  policy  in  the  new  anti-Nazi  regime, 
were  executed  on  November  10  and  September  8,  re- 
spectively. Count  Fritz  von  der  Schulenburg  died  on  the 
gallows  August  10.  General  Fellgiebel,  chief  of  signals 
at  OKW,  whose  role  at  Rastenburg  on  July  20  we  have 
recounted,  was  executed  on  the  same  day. 

Father  Alfred  Delp,  Jesuit  member  of  the  Kreisau  Circle,  was  executed 
with  them.  Ooerdeler’s  brother,  Fritz,  was  hanged  a few  days  later  Count 
Cltke',  ,  *  1,eader  of  tde  Kreisau  Circle,  was  executed  on  January  23, 

1 j-  th,9ufh  ,he  had  “?d  no  part  in  the  assassination  plot.  Trott  zu  Solz,  a 
lea™8  light  in  the  Circle  and  in  the  conspiracy,  was  hanged  on  August 


1393 


Beginning  of  the  End 

The  death  roll  is  a long  one.  According  to  one  source  it 
numbered  some  4,980  names.38  The  Gestapo  records  list 
7,000  arrests.  Among  those  resistance  leaders  mentioned 
in  these  pages  who  were  executed  were  General  Fritz 
Lindemann,  Colonel  von  Boeselager,  Pastor  Dietrich  Bon- 
hoeffer,  Colonel  Georg  Hansen  of  the  Abwehr,  Count 
von  Helldorf,  Colonel  von  Hofacker,  Dr.  Jens  Peter  lessen, 
Otto  Kiep,  Dr.  Carl  Langbehn,  Julius  Leber,  Major  von 
Leonrod,  Wilhelm  Leuschner,  Artur  Nebe  (the  chief  of 
the  criminal  police),  Professor  Adolf  Reichwein,  Count 
Berthold  von  Stauffenberg,  brother  of  Klaus,  General 
Thiele,  Chief  of  Signals,  OKH,  and  General  von 
Thuengen,  who  was  appointed  by  Beck  to  succeed  Gen- 
eral von  Kortzfleisch  on  the  day  of  the  putsch. 

One  group  of  twenty  condemned,  whose  lives  Himmler 
had  prolonged  apparently  in  the  belief  that  they  might 
prove  useful  to  him  if  he  took  over  power  and  had  to 
make  peace,  were  shot  out  of  hand  on  the  night  of  April 
22-23  as  the  Russians  began  fighting  to  the  center  of  the 
capital.  The  prisoners  were  being  marched  from  the 
Lehrterstrasse  prison  to  the  Prinz  Albrechtstrasse  Gestapo 
dungeon — a good  many  prisoners  escaped  in  the  black- 
out on  occasions  such  as  these  in  the  final  days  of  the 
Third  Reich — when  they  met  an  S.S.  detachment,  which 
lined  them  up  against  a wall  and  mowed  them  down,  only 
two  escaping  to  tell  the  tale.  Among  those  who  perished 
were  Count  Albrecht  von  Bernstorff,  Klaus  Bonhoeffer, 
brother  of  the  pastor,  and  Albrecht  Haushofer,  a close 
friend  of  Hess  and  son  of  the  famous  geopolitician.  The 
father  committed  suicide  shortly  afterward. 

General  Fromm  did  not  escape  execution  despite  his 
behavior  on  the  fateful  evening  of  July  20.  Arrested  the 
next  day  on  orders  of  Himmler,  who  had  succeeded  him 
as  head  of  the  Replacement  Army,  he  was  haled  before 
the  People’s  Court  in  February  1945  on  charges  of 
“Cowardice”  and  sentenced  to  death.*  Perhaps  as  a small 
recognition  for  his  vital  service  in  helping  to  save  the 
Nazi  regime,  he  was  not  strangled  from  a meathook,  as 
were  those  whom  he  had  arrested  on  the  night  of  July 


* “The  sentence  affected  him  deeply,”  Schlabrendorff,  who  saw  a good  deal 
of  Fromm  at  the  Prinz  Albrechtstrasse  Gestapo  prison,  later  recounted.  “He 
had  not  expected  it.”  (Schlabrendorff,  They  Almost  Killed  Hitler,  p.  121.) 


1394  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

1945Ut  merely  disPatched  by  a firing  squad  on  March  19, 

The  mystery  which  surrounded  the  life  of  Admiral 
Canaris,  the  deposed  head  of  the  Abwehr  who  had  done 
so  much  to  aid  the  conspirators  but  was  not  directly  in- 
volved in  the  events  of  July  20,  enveloped  for  many  years 
the  circumstances  of  his  death.  It  was  known  that  he  was 
arrested  after  the  attempt  on  Hitler’s  life.  But  Keitel,  in 
one  of  the  few  decent  gestures  of  his  life  at  OKW,  man- 
aged to  prevent  him  from  being  handed  over  to  the  Peo- 
ple’s Court.  The  Fuehrer,  outraged  at  the  delay,  then 
ordered  Canaris  to  be  tried  by  a summary  S.S.  court 
This  process  was  also  delayed,  but  Canaris,  along  with 
Colonel  Oster,  his  former  assistant,  and  four  others  were 
finally  tried  at  Flossenburg  concentration  camp  on  April  9, 
1945,  less  than  a month  before  the  war  ended,  and  sen- 
tenced to  death.  But  it  was  not  known  for  sure  whether 
Canaris  had  been  executed.  It  took  ten  years  to  solve  the 
mystery.  In  1955  the  Gestapo  prosecutor  in  the  case 
was  brought  to  trial  and  a large  number  of  witnesses  testi- 
fied that  they  had  seen  Canaris  hanged  on  April  9,  1945. 
One  eyewitness,  the  Danish  Colonel  Lunding,  told  of  see- 
Canaris  dragged  naked  from  his  cell  to  the  gallows. 
Oster  was  dispatched  at  the  same  time. 

Some  who  were  arrested  escaped  trial  and  were  even- 
tually liberated  from  the  Gestapo  by  the  advancing  Al- 
lied troops.  Among  those  were  General  Haider  and  Dr. 
Schacht,  who  had  had  no  part  in  the  July  20  revolt 
though  on  the  stand  at  Nuremberg  Schacht  claimed  to 
have  been  “initiated”  into  it.  Haider  was  placed  in  solitary 
confinement  in  a pitch-dark  cell  for  several  months.  Hie 
two  men,  along  with  a distinguished  group  of  prisoners, 
German  and  foreign,  including  Schuschnigg,  L6on  Blum, 
Schlabrendorff  and  General  von  Falkenhausen,  were  freed 
by  American  troops  on  May  4,  1945,  at  Niederdorf  in  the 
South  Tyrol  just  as  their  Gestapo  guard  was  on  the  point 
of  executing  the  whole  lot.  Falkenhausen  was  later  tried 
by  the  Belgians  as  a war  criminal  and  sentenced  on 
March  9,  1951,  after  four  years  in  prison  awaiting  trial, 
to  twelve  years’  penal  servitude.  He  was  released,  how- 
ever, a fortnight  later  and  returned  to  Germany. 

A good  many  Army  officers  implicated  in  the  plot  chose 
suicide  rather  than  let  themselves  be  turned  over  to  the 


1395 


Beginning  of  the  End 

tender  mercies  of  the  Volksgericht.  On  the  morning  of 
July  21,  General  Henning  von  Tresckow,  who  had  been 
the  heart  and  soul  of  the  conspiracy  among  the  officers  on 
the  Eastern  front,  took  leave  of  his  friend  and  aide, 
Schlabrendorff,  who  has  recalled  his  last  words: 

“Everybody  will  now  turn  upon  us  and  cover  us  with 
abuse.  But  my  conviction  remains  unshaken — we  have  done 
the  right  thing.  Hitler  is  not  only  the  archenemy  of  Ger- 
many: he  is  the  archenemy  of  the  world.  In  a few  hours  I 
shall  stand  before  God,  answering  for  my  actions  and  for 
my  omissions.  I think  I shall  be  able  to  uphold  with  a clear 
conscience  all  that  I have  done  in  the  fight  against  Hitler  . . . 

“Whoever  joined  the  resistance  movement  put  on  the 
shirt  of  Nessus.  The  worth  of  a man  is  certain  only  if  he  is 
prepared  to  sacrifice  his  life  for  his  convictions.” 38 

That  morning  Tresckow  drove  off  to  the  28th  Rifle 
Division,  crept  out  to  no  man’s  land  and  pulled  the  pin 
on  a hand  grenade.  It  blew  his  head  off. 

Five  days  later  the  First  Quartermaster  General  of  the 
Army,  Wagner,  took  his  own  life. 

Among  the  high  Army  officers  in  the  West,  two  field 
marshals  and  one  general  committed  suicide.  In  Paris,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  uprising  had  got  off  to  a good  start 
when  General  Heinrich  von  Stuelpnagel,  the  military 
governor  of  France,  arrested  the  entire  force  of  the  S.S. 
and  S.D. -Gestapo.  Now  all  depended  on  the  behavior  of 
Field  Marshal  von  Kluge,  the  new  Commander  in  Chief 
West,  on  whom  Tresckow  had  worked  for  two  years  on 
the  Russian  front  in  an  effort  to  make  him  an  active  con- 
spirator. Though  Kluge  had  blown  hot  and  cold,  he  had 
finally  agreed — or  so  the  conspirators  understood — that 
he  would  support  the  revolt  once  Hitler  was  dead. 

There  was  a fateful  dinner  meeting  that  evening  of  July 
20  at  La  Roche-Guyon,  the  headquarters  of  Army  Group 
B,  which  Kluge  had  also  taken  over  after  Rommel’s  acci- 
dent. Kluge  wanted  to  discuss  the  conflicting  reports  as  to 
whether  Hitler  was  dead  or  alive  with  his  chief  advisers, 
General  Guenther  Blumentritt,  his  chief  of  staff,  General 
Speidel,  chief  of  staff  of  Army  Group  B,  General  Stuelp- 
nagel and  Colonel  von  Hofacker,  to  whom  Stauffenberg 
had  telephoned  earlier  in  the  afternoon  informing  him  of 
the  bombing  and  the  coup  in  Berlin.  When  the  officers 
assembled  for  dinner  it  seemed  to  some  of  them  at  least 


1396 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

that  the  cautious  Field  Marshal  had  about  made  up  his 
mind  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  the  revolt.  Beck  had  reached 
him  by  telephone  shortly  before  dinner  and  had  pleaded 
for  his  support — whether  Hitler  was  dead  or  alive.  Then 
the  first  general  order  signed  by  Field  Marshal  von  Witz- 
leben  had  arrived.  Kluge  was  impressed. 

Still,  he  wanted  more  information  on  the  situation  and, 
unfortunately  for  the  rebels,  this  now  came  from  General 
Stieff,  who  had  journeyed  to  Rastenburg  with  Stauffen- 
berg  that  morning,  wished  him  well,  seen  the  explosion, 
ascertained  that  it  had  not  killed  Hitler  and  was  now,  by 
evening,  trying  to  cover  up  the  traces.  Blumentritt  got 
him  on  the  line  and  Stieff  told  him  the  truth  of  what  had 
happened,  or  rather,  not  happened. 

“It  has  failed,  then,”  Kluge  said  to  Blumentritt.  He 
seemed  to  be  genuinely  disappointed,  for  he  added  that 
had  it  succeeded  he  would  have  lost  no  time  in  getting  in 
touch  with  Eisenhower  to  request  an  armistice. 

At  the  dinner — a ghostly  affair,  Speidel  later  recalled, 
“as  if  they  sat  in  a house  visited  by  death” — Kluge 
listened  to  the  impassioned  arguments  of  Stuelpnagel  and 
Hofacker  that  they  must  go  ahead  with  the  revolt  even 
though  Hitler  might  have  survived.  Blumentritt  has  de- 
scribed what  followed. 

When  they  had  finished,  Kluge,  with  obvious  disappoint- 
ment, remarked:  “Well  gentlemen,  the  attempt  has  failed. 
Everything  is  over.”  Stuelpnagel  then  exclaimed:  “Field 
Marshal,  I thought  you  were  acquainted  with  the  plans. 
Something  must  be  done.”  40 

Kluge  denied  that  he  knew  of  any  plans.  After  order- 
ing Stuelpnagel  to  release  the  arrested  S.S.-S.D.  men  in 
Paris,  he  advised  him,  “Look  here,  the  best  thing  you  can 
do  is  to  change  into  civilian  clothes  and  go  into  hiding.” 

But  this  was  not  the  way  out  which  a proud  general  of 
Stuelpnagel’s  stripe  chose.  After  a weird  all-night  cham- 
pagne party  at  the  Hotel  Raphael  in  Paris  in  which  the 
released  S.S.  and  S.D.  officers,  led  by  General  Oberg, 
fraternized  with  the  Army  leaders  who  had  arrested  them 
— and  who  most  certainly  would  have  had  them  shot  had 
the  revolt  succeeded — Stuelpnagel,  who  had  been  ordered 
to  report  to  Berlin,  left  by  car  for  Germany.  At  Verdun, 
where  he  had  commanded  a battalion  in  the  First  World 
War,  he  stopped  to  have  a look  at  the  famous  battlefield. 


1397 


Beginning  of  the  End 

But  also  to  carry  out  a personal  decision.  His  driver  and  a 
guard  heard  a revolver  shot.  They  found  him  floundering 
in  the  waters  of  a canal.  A bullet  had  shot  out  one  eye 
and  so  badly  damaged  the  other  that  it  was  removed  in 
the  military  hospital  at  Verdun,  to  which  he  was  taken. 

This  did  not  save  Stuelpnagel  from  a horrible  end. 
Blinded  and  helpless,  he  was  brought  to  Berlin  on  Hitler’s 
express  orders,  haled  before  the  People’s  Court,  where  he 
lay  on  a cot  while  Freisler  abused  him,  and  strangled  to 
death  in  Ploetzensee  prison  on  August  30. 

Field  Marshal  von  Kluge’s  decisive  act  in  refusing  to 
join  the  revolt  did  not  save  him  any  more  than  Fromm, 
by  similar  behavior  in  Berlin,  saved  himself.  “Fate,”  as 
Speidel  observed  apropos  of  this  vacillating  general,  “does 
not  spare  the  man  whose  convictions  are  not  matched  by 
his  readiness  to  give  them  effect.”  There  is  evidence 
that  Colonel  von  Hofacker,  under  terrible  torture — he 
was  not  executed  until  December  20 — mentioned  the 
complicity  of  Kluge,  Rommel  and  Speidel  in  the  plot. 
Blumentritt  says  that  Oberg  informed  him  that  Hofacker 
had  “mentioned”  Kluge  in  his  first  interrogations,  and 
that,  after  being  informed  of  this  by  Oberg  himself,  the 
Field  Marshal  “began  to  look  more  and  more  worried.”  41 

Reports  from  the  front  were  not  such  as  to  restore  his 
spirits. 

On  July  26,  General  Bradley’s  American  forces  broke 
through  the  German  front  at  St.-Lo.  Four  days  later 
General  Patton’s  newly  formed  Third  Army,  racing 
through  the  gap,  reached  Avranches,  opening  the  way  to 
Brittany  and  to  the  Loire  to  the  south.  This  was  the  turn- 
ing point  in  the  Allied  invasion,  and  on  July  30  Kluge 
notified  Hitler’s  headquarters,  “The  Whole  Western 
front  has  been  ripped  open  . . . The  left  flank  has  col- 
lapsed.” By  the  middle  of  August  all  that  was  left  of  the 
German  armies  in  Normandy  was  locked  in  a narrow 
pocket  around  Falaise,  where  Hitler  had  forbidden  any 
further  retreat.  The  Fuehrer  had  now  had  enough  of 
Kluge,  whom  he  blamed  for  the  reverses  in  the  West  and 
whom  he  suspected  of  considering  the  surrender  of  his 
forces  to  Eisenhower. 

On  August  17  Field  Marshal  Walther  Model  arrived 
to  replace  Kluge — his  sudden  appearance  was  the  first 
notice  the  latter  had  of  his  dismissal.  Kluge  was  told  by 


1398 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hitler  to  leave  word  as  to  his  whereabouts  in  Germany — 
a warning  that  he  had  become  suspect  in  connection  with 
the  July  20  revolt.  The  next  day  he  wrote  a long  letter 
to  Hitler  and  then  set  off  by  car  for  home.  Near  Metz  he 
swallowed  poison. 

His  farewell  letter  to  the  Fuehrer  was  found  in  the  cap- 
tured German  military  archives. 

When  you  receive  these  lines  I shall  be  no  more  . . . Life 
has  no  more  meaning  for  me  . . . Both  Rommel  and  I 
. . . foresaw  the  present  development.  We  were  not  listened 
to  . . . 

I do  not  know  whether  Field  Marshal  Model  who  has  been 
proved  in  every  sphere,  will  master  the  situation  . . . Should 
it  not  be  so,  however,  and  your  cherished  new  weapons  not 
succeed,  then,  my  Fuehrer,  make  up  your  mind  to  end  the 
war.  The  German  people  have  borne  such  untold  suffering 
that  it  is  time  to  put  an  end  to  this  frightfulness  . . . 

I have  always  admired  your  greatness  ...  If  fate  is 
stronger  than  your  will  and  your  genius,  so  is  Providence 
. . . Show  yourself  now  also  great  enough  to  put  an  end  to  a 
hopeless  struggle  when  necessary  . . . 

Hitler  read  the  letter,  according  to  the  testimony  of  Jodi 
at  Nuremberg,  in  silence  and  handed  it  to  him  without 
comment.  A few  days  later,  at  his  military  conference  on 
August  31,  the  Supreme  warlord  observed,  “There  are 
strong  reasons  to  suspect  that  had  Kluge  not  committed  sui- 
cide he  would  have  been  arrested  anyway.” 42 

The  turn  of  Field  Marshal  Rommel,  the  idol  of  the 
German  masses,  came  next. 

As  General  von  Stuelpnagel  lay  blinded  and  uncon- 
scious on  the  operating  table  in  the  hospital  at  Verdun 
after  his  not  quite  successful  attempt  to  kill  himself,  he 
had  blurted  out  the  name  of  Rommel.  Later  under  hid- 
eous torture  in  the  Gestapo  dungeon  in  the  Prinz  Albrecht- 
strasse  in  Berlin  Colonel  von  Hofacker  brpke  down  and 
told  of  Rommel’s  part  in  the  conspiracy.  “Tell  the  people 
in  Berlin  they  can  count  on  me.”  Hofacker  quoted  the 
Field  Marshal  as  assuring  him.  It  was  a phrase  that  stuck 
in  Hitler’s  mind  when  he  heard  of  it  and  which  led  him  to 
decide  that  his  favorite  general,  whom  he  knew  to  be 
the  most  popular  one  in  Germany,  must  die. 

Rommel,  who  had  suffered  bad  fractures  of  his  skull, 
temples  and  cheekbones  and  a severe  injury  to  his  left 
eye,  and  whose  head  was  pitted  with  shell  fragments, 


1399 


Beginning  of  the  End 

was  first  removed  from  a field  hospital  at  Bernay  to  St.- 
Germain  to  escape  capture  by  the  advancing  Allied  troops 
and  thence,  on  August  8,  to  his  home  at  Herrlingen  near 
Ulm.  He  received  the  first  warning  of  what  might  be  in 
store  for  him  when  General  Speidel,  his  former  chief  of 
staff,  was  arrested  on  September  7,  the  day  after  he  had 
visited  him  at  Herrlingen. 

“That  pathological  liar,”  Rommel  had  exclaimed  to 
Speidel  when  the  talk  turned  to  Hitler,  “has  how  gone 
completely  mad.  He  is  venting  his  sadism  on  the  con- 
spirators of  July  20,  and  this  won’t  be  the  end  of  it!”  43 

Rommel  now  noticed  that  his  house  was  being  shad- 
owed by  the  S.D.  When  he  went  out  walking  in  the  nearby 
woods  with  his  fifteen-year-old  son,  who  had  been  given 
temporary  leave  from  his  antiaircraft  battery  to  tend  his 
father,  both  carried  revolvers.  At  headquarters  in  Rasten- 
burg  Hitler  had  now  received  a copy  of  Hofacker’s  testi- 
mony incriminating  Rommel.  He  thereupon  decreed  his 
death — but  in  a special  way.  The  Fuehrer  realized,  as 
Keitel  later  explained  to  an  interrogator  at  Nuremberg, 
“that  it  would  be  a terrible  scandal  in  Germany  if  this 
well-known  Field  Marshal,  the  most  popular  general  we 
had,  were  to  be  arrested  and  haled  before  the  People’s 
Court.”  So  Hitler  arranged  with  Keitel  that  Rommel  would 
be  told  of  the  evidence  against  him  and  given  the  choice 
of  killing  himself  or  standing  trial  for  treason  before 
the  People’s  Court.  If  he  chose  the  first  he  would  be  given 
a state  funeral  with  full  military  honors  and  his  family 
would  not  be  molested. 

Thus  it  was  that  at  noon  on  October  14,  1944,  two 
generals  from  Hitler’s  headquarters  drove  up  to  the  Rom- 
mel home,  which  was ' now  surrounded  by  S.S.  troops 
reinforced  by  five  armored  cars.  The  generals  were  Wil- 
helm Burgdorf,  an  alcoholic,  florid-faced  man  who  rivaled 
Keitel  in  his  slavishness  to  Hitler,  and  his  assistant  in  the 
Army  Personnel  Office,  Ernst  Maisel,  of  like  character. 
They  had  sent  word  ahead  to  Rommel  that  they  were 
coming  from  Hitler  to  discuss  his  “next  employment.” 

“At  the  instigation  of  the  Fuehrer,”  Keitel  later  testi- 
fied, “I  sent  Burgdorf  there  with  a copy  of  the  testimony 
against  Rommel.  If  it  were  true,  he  was  to  take  the  conse- 
quences. If  it  were  not  true,  he  would  be  exonerated  by  the 
court.” 


1400  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“And  you  instructed  Burgdorf  to  take  some  poison  with 
him,  didn’t  you?”  Keitel  was  asked. 

Yes.  I told  Burgdorf  to  take  some  poison  along  so  that 
he  could  put  it  at  Rommel’s  disposal,  if  conditions  war- 
ranted it.” 

After  Burgdorf  ahd  Maisel  arrived  it  soon  began  evi- 
dent that  they  had  not  come  to  discuss  Rommel’s  next  as- 
signment. They  asked  to  talk  with  the  Field  Marshal 
alone  and  the  three  men  retired  to  his  study. 

“A  few  minutes  later,”  Manfred  Rommel  later  related, 

I heard  my  father  come  upstairs  and  go  into  my  mother’s 
room.”  Then: 

We  went  into  my  room.  “I  have  just  had  to  tell  your 
mother,  he  began  slowly,  “that  I shall  be  dead  in  a quarter 
of  an  hour  . . . Hitler  is  charging  me  with  high  treason.  In 
view  of  my  services  in  Africa  I am  to  have  the  chance  of 
dying  by  poison.  The  two  generals  have  brought  it  with 
them.  It’s  fatal  in  three  seconds.  If  I accept,  none  of  the 
usual  steps  will  be  taken  against  my  family  . . . I’m  to  be 
given  a state  funeral.  It’s  all  been  prepared  to  the  last  de- 
^ Quarter  of  an  hour  you  will  receive  a call  from 
the  hospital  in  Ulm  to  say  that  I’ve  had  a brain  seizure 
on  the  way  to  a conference.” 

And  that  is  what  happened. 

Rommel,  wearing  his  old  Afrika  Korps  leather  jacket 
and  grasping  his  field  marshal’s  baton,  got  into  the  car 
with  the  two  generals,  was  driven  a mile  or  two  up  the 
road  by  the  side  of  a forest,  where  General  Maisel  and 
the  S.S.  driver  got  out,  leaving  Rommel  and  General 
Burgdorf  in  the  back  seat.  When  the  two  men  returned 
to  the  car  a minute  later,  Rommel  was  slumped  over  the 
seat,  dead.  Burgdorf  paced  up  and  down  impatiently,  as 
though  he  feared  he  would  be  late  for  lunch  and  his  mid- 
day drinks.  Fifteen  minutes  after  she  had  bidden  her 
husband  farewell,  Frau  Rommel  received  the  expected 
telephone  call  from  the  hospital.  The  chief  doctor  re- 
ported that  two  generals  had  brought  in  the  body  of  the 
Field  Marshal,  who  had  died  of  a cerebral  embolism  ap- 
parently as  the  result  of  his  previous  skull  fractures. 
Actually  Burgdorf  had  gruffly  forbidden  an  autopsy.  “Do 
not  touch  the  corpse,”  he  stormed.  “Everything  has  al- 
ready been  arranged  in  Berlin.” 

It  had  been. 


1401 


Beginning  of  the  End 

Field  Marshal  Model  issued  a ringing  order  of  the  day 
announcing  that  Rommel  had  died  Of  “wounds  sustained 
on  July  17”  and  mourning  the  loss  “of  one  of  the  greatest 
commanders  of  our  nation.” 

Hitler  wired  Frau  Rommel:  “Accept  my  sincerest  sym- 
pathy for  the  heavy  loss  you  have  suffered  with  the  death 
of  your  husband.  The  name  of  Field  Marshal  Rommel 
will  be  forever  linked  with  the  heroic  battles  in  North 
Africa.”  Goering  telegraphed  “in  silent  compassion”. 

The  fact  that  your  husband  has  died  a hero’s  death  as  the 
result  of  his  wounds,  after  we  all  hoped  that  he  would  re- 
main to  the  German  people,  has  deeply  touched  me. 

Hitler  ordered  a state  funeral,  at  which  the  senior  officer 
of  the  German  Army,  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt,  de- 
livered the  funeral  oration.  “His  heart,”  said  Rundstedt 
as  he  stood  over  Rommel’s  swastika-bedecked  body,  “be- 
longed to  the  Fuehrer.”  * 

“The  old  soldier  [Rundstedt],”  Speidel  says,  “appeared 
to  those  present  to  be  broken  and  bewildered  . . . Here 
destiny  gave  him  the  unique  chance  to  play  the  role  of 
Mark  Antony.  He  remained  in  his  moral  apathy.”t  45 

The  humiliation  of  the  vaunted  officer  corps  of  the 
German  Army  was  great.  It  had  seen  three  of  its  illus- 
trious field  marshals,  Witzleben,  Kluge  and  Rommel,  im- 

* It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  Rundstedt  probably  did  not  know  of  the  circum- 
stances of  Rommel’s  death,  apparently  learning  them  only  from  Keitel’s 
testimony  at  Nuremberg.  “I  did  not  hear  these  rumors,”  Rundstedt  testified 
on  the  stand,  “otherwise  I would  have  refused  to  act  as  representative  of 
the  Fuehrer  at  the  state  funeral;  that  would  have  been  an  infamy  beyond 
words.”  44  Nevertheless  the  Rommel  family  noticed  that  this  gentleman  of 
the  old  school  declined  to  attend  the  cremation  after  the  funeral  and  to  come 
to  the  Rommel  home,  as  did  most  of  the  other  generals,  to  extend  condol- 
ences of  the  widow. 

t General  Speidel  himself,  though  incarcerated  in  the  cellars  of  the  Gestapo 
prison  in  the  Prinz  Albrechtstrasse  in  Berlin  and  subjected  to  incessant 
questioning,  became  neither  broken  nor  bewildered.  Being  a philosopher  as 
well  as  a soldier  perhaps  helped.  He  outwitted  his  S.D.  tormentors,  admit- 
ting nothing  and  betraying  no  one.  He  had  one  bad  moment  when  he  was 
confronted  with  Colonel  von  Hofacker,  who,  he  believes,  had  been  not 
only  tortured  but  drugged  into  talking,  but  on  this  occasion  Hofacker  did 
not  betray  him  and  repudiated  what  he  had  previously  said. 

Though  never  brought  to  trial,  Speidel  was  kept  in  Gestapo  custody  for 
seven  months.  As  American  troops  neared  his  place  of  confinement  near 
Lake  Constance  in  southern  Germany,  he  escaped  with  twenty  others  by  a 
ruse  and  took  refuge  with  a Catholic  priest,  who  hid  the  group  until  the 
Americans  arrived.  Speidel  omits  this  chapter  of  his  life  in  his  book,  which 
is  severely  objective  and  written  in  the  third  person,  but  he  told  the  story 
to  Desmond  Young  who  gives  it  in  his  Rommel — -The  Desert  Fox  (pp.  251- 
52  of  the  paperback  edition). 

Capping  an  unusual  career,  Speidel  held  an  important  command  at  NATO 
in  the  late  1950s. 


1402  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

plicated  in  a plot  to  overthrow  the  Supreme  warlord,  for 
which  one  of  them  was  strangled  and  two  forced  to’  sui- 
cide. It  had  to  stand  idly  by  while  scores  of  its  highest- 
ranking  generals  were  hauled  off  to  the  prisons  of  the 
Gestapo  and  judicially  murdered  after  farcical  trials  be- 
fore the  People’s  Court.  In  this  unprecedented  situation, 
despite  all  its  proud  traditions,  the  corps  did  not  close 
ranks.  Instead  it  sought  to  preserve  its  “honor”  by  what 
a foreign  observer,  at  least,  can  only  term  dishonoring  and 
degrading  itself.  Before  the  wrath  of  the  former  Austrian 
corporal,  its  frightened  leaders  fawned  and  groveled. 

No  wonder  that  Field  Marshal  von  Rundstedt  looked 
broken  and  bewildered  as  he  intoned  the  funeral  oration 
over  the  body  of  Rommel.  He  had  fallen  to  a low  state, 
as  had  his  brother  officers,  whom  Hitler  now  forced  to 
drink  the  bitter  cup  to  its  dregs.  Rundstedt  himself  ac- 
cepted the  post  of  presiding  officer  over  the  so-called  mili- 
tary Court  of  Honor  which  Hitler  created  to  expel  from 
the  Army  all  officers  suspected  of  complicity  in  the 
plot  against  him  so  that  they  could  be  denied  a court- 
martial  and  handed  over  in  disgrace  as  civilians  to  the 
drumhead  People’s  Court.  The  Court  of  Honor  was  not 
permitted  to  hear  an  accused  officer  in  his  own  defense;  it 
acted  merely  on  the  “evidence”  furnished  it  by  the  Ges- 
tapo. Rundstedt  did  not  protest  against  this  restriction, 
nor  did  another  member  of  the  court,  General  Guderian 
— who  the  day  after  the  bombing  had  been  appointed  as 
the  new  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff — though  the  lat- 
ter, in  his  memoirs,  confesses  that  it  was  an  “unpleasant 
task,”  that  the  court  sessions  were  “melancholy”  and  raised 
“the  most  difficult  problems  of  conscience.”  No  doubt 
they  did,  for  Rundstedt,  Guderian  and  their  fellow  judges 
— all  generals — turned  over  hundreds  of  their  comrades 
to  certain  execution  after  degrading  them  by  throwing 
them  out  of  the  Army. 

Guderian  did  more.  In  his  capacity  of  General  Staff 
Chief  he  issued  two  ringing  orders  of  the  day  to  assure 
the  Nazi  warlord  of  the  undying  loyalty  of  the  officer 
corps.  The  first,  promulgated  on  July  23,  accused  the  con- 
spirators of  being  “a  few  officers,  some  of  them  on  the 
retired  list,  who  had  lost  all  courage  and,  out  of  coward- 
ice and  weakness,  preferred  the  road  of  disgrace  to  the 
only  road  open  to  an  honest  soldier — the  road  of  duty 


1403 


Beginning  of  the  End 

and  honor.”  Whereupon  he  solemnly  pledged  to  the  Fueh- 
rer “the  unity  of  the  generals,  of  the  officer  corps  and  of 
the  men  of  the  Army.” 

In  the  meantime  the  discarded  Field  Marshal  von 
Brauchitsch  rushed  into  print  with  a burning  statement 
condemning  the  putsch,  pledging  renewed  allegiance  to 
the  Fuehrer  and  welcoming  the  appointment  of  Himmler 
— who  despised  the  generals,  including  Brauchitsch — as 
chief  of  the  Replacement  Army.  Another  discard,  Grand 
Admiral  Raeder,  fearful  that  he  might  be  suspected  of  at 
least  sympathy  with  the  plotters,  rushed  out  of  retire- 
ment to  Rastenburg  to  personally  assured  Hitler  of  his 
loyalty.  On  July  24  the  Nazi  salute  was  made  compulsory 
in  place  of  the  old  military  salute  “as  a sign  of  the  Army’s 
unshakable  allegiance  to  the  Fuehrer  and  of  the  closest 
unity  between  Army  and  Party.” 

On  July  29  Guderian  warned  all  General  Staff  officers 
that  henceforth  they  must  take  the  lead  in  being  good 
Nazis,  loyal  and  true  to  the  Leader. 

Every  General  Staff  officer  must  be  a National  Socialist 
officer-leader  not  only  ...  by  his  model  attitude  toward 
political  questions  but  by  actively  co-operating  in  the  po- 
litical indoctrination  of  younger  commanders  in  accordance 
with  the  tenets  of  the  Fuehrer  . . . 

In  judging  and  selecting  General  Staff  officers,  superiors 
should  place  traits  of  character  and  spirit  above  the  mind. 
A rascal  may  be  ever  so  cunning  but  in  the  hour  of  need 
he  will  nevertheless  fail  because  he  is  a rascal. 

I expect  every  General  Staff  officer  immediately  to  de- 
clare himself  a convert  or  adherent  to  my  views  and  to  make 
an  announcement  to  that  effect  in  public.  Anyone  unable 
to  do  so  should  apply  for  his  removal  from  the  General  Staff.* 

So  far  as  is  known  no  one  applied. 

With  this,  comments  a German  military  historian,  “the 
story  of  the  General  Staff  as  an  autonomous  entity  may  be 
said  to  have  come  to  an  end.”  46  This  elite  group,  founded 
by  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau  and  built  up  by  Moltke 
to  be  the  pillar  of  the  nation,  which  had  ruled  Germany 
during  the  First  World  War,  dominated  the  Weimar 
Republic  and  forced  even  Hitler  to  destroy  the  S.A.  and 
murder  its  leader  when  they  stood  in  its  way,  had  been 


* In  his  memoirs,  Guderian,  who  constantly  emphasizes  how  he  stood  up  %o 
Hitler  and  criticizes  him  bitterly,  makes  no  mention  of  these  orders  of  the  day. 


1404  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

reduced  in  the  summer  of  1944  to  a pathetic  body  of 
fawning,  frightened  men.  There  was  to  be  no  more  op- 
position to  Hitler,  not  even  any  criticism  of  him.  The 
once  mighty  Army,  like  every  other  institution  in  the 
Third  Reich,  would  go  down  with  him,  its  leaders  too  be- 
numbed now,  too  lacking  in  the  courage  which  the  handful 
of  conspirators  alone  had  shown,  to  raise  their  voices — 
let  alone  do  anything— to  stay  the  hand  of  the  one  man 
who  they  by  now  fully  realized  was  leading  them  and 
the  German  people  rapidly  to  the  most  awful  catastrophe 
in  the  history  of  their  beloved  Fatherland. 

This  paralysis  of  the  mind  and  will  of  grown-up  men, 
raised  as  Christians,  supposedly  disciplined  in  the  old 
virtues,  boasting  of  their  code  of  honor,  courageous  in  the 
face  of  death  on  the  battlefield,  is  astonishing,  though 
perhaps  it  can  be  grasped  if  one  remembers  the  course 
of  German  history,  outlined  in  an  earlier  chapter,  which 
made  blind  obedience  to  temporal  rulers  the  highest  vir- 
tue of  Germanic  man  and  put  a premium  on  servility. 
By  now  the  generals  knew  the  evil  of  the  man  before 
whom  they  groveled.  Guderian  later  recalled  Hitler  as  he 
was  after  July  20. 

In  his  case,  what  had  been  hardness  became  cruelty, 
while  a tendency  to  bluff  became  plain  dishonesty.  He  often 
lied  without  hesitation  and  assumed  that  others  lied  to  him 
He  believed  no  one  any  more.  It  had  already  been  difficult 
enough  dealing  with  him:  it  now  became  a torture  that  grew 
steadily  worse  from  month  to  month.  He  frequently  lost  all 
self-control  and  his  language  grew  increasingly  violent  In 
his  intimate  circle  he  now  found  no  restraining  influence.47 

Nevertheless,  it  was  this  man  alone,  half  mad,  rapidly 
deteriorating  in  body  and  mind,  who  now,  as  he  had  done 
in  the  snowy  winter  of  1941  before  Moscow,  rallied  the 
beaten,  retreating  armies  and  put  new  heart  into  the 
battered  nation.  By  an  incredible  exercise  of  will  power 
which  all  the  others  in  Germany — in  the  Army,  in  the 
government  and  among  the  people— lacked,  he  was  able 
almost  smglehandedly  to  prolong  the  agony  of  war  for 
well  nigh  a year. 

The  revolt  of  July  20,  1944,  had  failed  not  only  be- 
cause of  the  inexplicable  ineptness  of  some  of  the 
ablest  men  in  the  Army  and  in  civilian  life,  because  of  the 


1405 


Beginning  of  the  End 

fatal  weakness  of  character  of  Fromm  and  Kluge  and  be- 
cause misfortune  plagued  the  plotters  at  every  turn.  It  had 
flickered  out  because  almost  all  the  men  who  kept  this 
great  country  running,  generals  and  civilians,  and  the 
mass  of  the  German  people,  in  uniform  and  out,  were  not 
ready  for  a revolution — in  fact,  despite  their  misery  and 
the  bleak  prospect  of  defeat  and  foreign  occupation,  did 
not  want  it.  National  Socialism,  notwithstanding  the  de- 
gradation it  had  brought  to  Germany  and  Europe,  they  still 
accepted  and  indeed  supported,  and  in  Adolf  Hitler  they 
still  saw  the  country’s  savior. 

At  that  time  [Guderian  later  wrote] — the  fact  seems  be- 
yond dispute — the  great  proportion  of  the  German  people 
still  believed  in  Adolf  Hitler  and  would  have  been  con- 
vinced that  with  his  death  the  assassin  had  removed  the 
only  man  who  might  still  have  been  able  to  bring  the  war  to 
a favorable  conclusion.48 

Even  after  the  end  of  the  war  General  Blumentritt,  who 
was  not  in  on  the  conspiracy  but  would  have  supported 
it  had  his  chief,  Kluge,  been  of  sterner  stuff,  found  that 
at  least  “one  half  of  the  civil  population  was  shocked 
that  the  German  generals  had  taken  part  in  the  attempt 
to  overthrow  Hitler,  and  felt  bitterly  toward  them  in  con- 
sequence— and  the  same  feeling  was  manifested  in  the 
Army  itself.”  49 

By  a hypnotism  that  defies  explanation — at  least  by  a 
non-German — Hitler  held  the  allegiance  and  trust  of  this 
remarkable  people  to  the  last.  It  was  inevitable  that  they 
would  follow  him  blindly,  like  dumb  cattle  but  also  with 
a touching  faith  and  even  an  enthusiasm  that  raised  them 
above  the  animal  herd,  over  the  precipice  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  nation. 


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Book  Six 


* * * 


TIIE  FALL 
OF 

THE  THIRD  REICH 


' 


30 

TOE  CONQUEST  OF  GERMANY 


the  war  came  home  to  Germany. 

Scarcely  had  Hitler  recovered  from  the  shock  of  the 
July  20  bombing  when  he  was  faced  with  the  loss  of  France 
and  Belgium  and  of  the  great  conquests  in  the  East.  Enemy 
troops  in  overwhelming  numbers  were  converging  on  the 
Reich. 

By  the  middle  of  August  1944,  the  Russian  summer 
offensives,  beginning  June  10  and  unrolling  one  after 
another,  had  brought  the  Red  Army  to  the  border  of 
East  Prussia,  bottled  up  fifty  German  divisions  in  the 
Baltic  region,  penetrated  to  Vyborg  in  Finland,  destroyed 
Army  Group  Center  and  brought  an  advance  on  this 
front  of  four  hundred  miles  in  six  weeks  to  the  Vistula 
opposite  Warsaw,  while  in  the  south  a new  attack  which 
began  on  August  20  resulted  in  the  conquest  of  Rumania 
by  the  end  of  the  month  and  with  it  the  Ploesti  oil  fields, 
the  only  major  source  of  natural  oil  for  the  German 
armies.  On  August  26  Bulgaria  formally  withdrew  from 
the  war  and  the  Germans  began  to  hastily  clear  out  of  that 
country.  In  September  Finland  gave  up  and  turned  on  the 
German  troops  which  refused  to  evacuate  its  territory. 

In  the  West,  France  was  liberated  quickly.  In  General 
Patton,  the  commander  of  the  newly  formed  U.S.  Third 
Army,  the  Americans  had  found  a tank  general  with  the 
dash  and  flair  of  Rommel  in  Africa.  After  the  capture 
of  Avranches  on  July  30,  he  had  left  Brittany  to  wither 
on  the  vine  and  begun  a great  sweep  around  the  German 
armies  in  Normandy,  moving  southeast  to  Orleans  on  the 
Loire  and  then  due  east  toward  the  Seine  south  of  Paris. 
By  August  23  the  Seine  was  reached  southeast  and  north- 
west of  the  capital,  and  two  days  later  the  great  city,  the 
glory  of  France,  was  liberated  after  four  years  of  German 

1409 


1410 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

occupation  when  General  Jacques  Leclerc’s  French  2nd 
Armored  Division  and  the  U.S.  4th  Infantry  Division 
broke  into  it  and  found  that  French  resistance  units  were 
largely  in  control.  They  also  found  the  Seine  bridges, 
many  of  them  works  of  art,  intact.* 

The  remnants  of  the  German  armies  in  France  were  now 
in  full  retreat.  Montgomery,  the  victor  over  Rommel  in 
North  Africa,  who  on  September  1 was  made  a field  mar- 
shal, drove  his  Canadian  First  Army  and  British  Second 
Army  two  hundred  miles  in  four  days — from  the  lower 
Seine  past  the  storied  battle  sites  of  1914-18  and  1940 
into  Belgium.  Brussels  fell  to  him  on  September  3 and 
Antwerp  the  next  day.  So  swift  was  the  advance  that  the 
Germans  did  not  have  time  to  destroy  the  harbor  facilities 
at  Antwerp.  This  was  a great  stroke  of  fortune  for  the 
Allies,  for  this  port,  as  soon  as  its  approaches  were 
cleared,  was  destined  to  become  the  principal  supply  base 
of  the  Anglo-American  armies. 

Farther  south  of  the  British-Canadian  forces,  the  U.S. 
First  Army,  under  General  Courtney  H.  Hodges,  ad- 
vanced with  equal  speed  into  southeastern  Belgium,  reach- 
ing the  Meuse  River,  from  which  the  devastating  German 
breakthrough  had  begun  in  May  1940,  and  capturing  the 
fortresses  of  Namur  and  Liege,  where  the  Germans  had 
no  time  to  organize  a defense.  Farther  south  still,  Patton’s 
Third  Army  had  taken  Verdun,  surrounded  Metz,  reached 
the  Moselle  River  and  linked  up  at  the  Belfort  Gap  with 
the  Franco-American  Seventh  Army,  which  under  the 
command  of  General  Alexander  Patch  had  landed  on  the 
Riviera  in  southern  France  on  August  15  and  pushed 
rapidly  up  the  Rhone  Valley. 

By  the  end  of  August  the  German  armies  in  the  West  had 
lost  500,000  men,  half  of  them  as  prisoners,  and  almost 
all  of  their  tanks,  artillery  and  trucks.  There  was  very  little 
left  to  defend  the  Fatherland.  The  much-publicized  Sieg- 
fried Line  was  virtually  unmanned  and  without  guns. 

* On  August  23,  according  to  Speidel,  Hitler  had  ordered  all  the  Paris 
bridges  and  other  important  installations  destroyed  “even  if  artistic  monu- 
ments  are  destroyed  thereby.”  Speidel  refused  to  carry  out  the  order,  as  did 
General  von  Choltitz,  the  new  commandant  of  Greater  Paris,  who  surren- 
dered after  a few  shots  had  satisfied  his  honor.  For  this  Choltitz  was  tried 
in  absentia  for  treason  in  April  1945,  but  officer  friends  of  his  managed  to 
delay  the  proceedings  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Speidel  also  reveals  that  as 
soon  as  Paris  was  lost  Hitler  ordered  its  destruction  by  heavy  artillery  and 
V-l  flying  bombs,  but  this  order  too  he  refused  to  obey.  (Speidel,  Invasion 
1944,  pp.  143-45.) 


1411 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Most  of  the  German  generals  in  the  West  believed  that  the 
end  had  come.  “There  were  no  longer  any  ground  forces 
in  existence,  to  say  nothing  of  air  forces,”  says  Speidel.1 
“As  far  as  1 was  concerned,”  Rundstedt,  who  was  rein- 
stated on  September  4 as  Commander  in  Chief  in  the 
West,  told  Allied  interrogators  after  the  war,  “the  war 
was  ended  in  September.”  2 

But  not  for  Adolf  Hitler.  On  the  last  day  of  August  he 
lectured  some  of  his  generals  at  headquarters,  attempting 
to  inject  new  iron  into  their  veins  and  at  the  same  time  hold 
out  hope. 

If  necessary  we’ll  fight  on  the  Rhine.  It  doesn’t  make  any 
difference.  Under  all  circumstances  we  will  continue  this 
battle  until,  as  Frederick  the  Great  said,  one  of  our  damned 
enemies  gets  too  tired  to  fight  any  more.  We’ll  fight  until 
we  get  a peace  which  secures  the  life  of  the  German  nation 
for  the  next  fifty  or  a hundred  years  and  which,  above  all, 
does  not  besmirch  our  honor  a second  time,  as  happened  in 
1918  ...  I live  only  for  the  purpose  of  leading  this  fight 
because  I know  that  if  there  is  not  an  iron  will  behind  it, 
this  battle  cannot  be  won. 

After  excoriating  the  General  Staff  for  its  lack  of  iron 
will,  Hitler  revealed  to  his  generals  some  of  the  reasons 
for  his  stubborn  hopes. 

The  time  will  come  when  the  tension  between  the  Allies 
will  become  so  great  that  the  break  will  occur.  All  the  coali- 
tions in  history  have  disintegrated  sooner  or  later.  The  only 
thing  is  to  wait  for  the  right  moment,  no  matter  how  hard 
it  is.3 

Goebbels  was  assigned  the  task  of  organizing  “total 
mobilization,”  and  Himmler,  the  new  chief  of  the  Replace- 
ment Army,  went  to  work  to  raise  twenty-five  Volks- 
grenadier  divisions  for  the  defense  of  the  West.  Despite 
all  the  plans  and  all  the  talk  in  Nazi  Germany  concerning 
“total  war”  the  resources  of  the  country  had  been  far 
from  “totally”  organized.  At  Hitler’s  insistence  the 
production  of  civilian  goods  had  been  maintained  at  a sur- 
prisingly large  figure  throughout  the  war — ostensibly  to 
keep  up  morale.  And  he  had  balked  at  carrying  out  the 
prewar  plans  to  mobilize  women  for  work  in  the  factories. 
“The  sacrifice  of  our  most  cherished  ideals  is  too  great  a 
price,”  he  said  in  March  1943  when  Speer  wanted  to  draft 


1412 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


women  for  industry.4  Nazi  ideology  had  taught  that  the 
place  of  the  German  woman  was  in  the  home  and  not  in 
the  factory — and  in  the  home  she  stayed.  In  the  first 
four  years  of  the  war,  when  in  Great  Britain  two  and  a 
quarter  million  women  had  been  placed  in  war  production, 
only  182,000  women  were  similarly  employed  in  Germany. 
The  number  of  peacetime  domestic  servants  in  Germany 
remained  unchanged  at  a million  and  a half  during  the 
war.5 

Now  with  the  enemy  at  the  gates,  the  Nazi  leaders  be- 
stirred themselves.  Boys  between  fifteen  and  eighteen  and 
men  between  fifty  and  sixty  were  called  to  the  colors. 
Universities  and  high  schools,  offices  and  factories,  were 
combed  for  recruits.  In  September  and  October  1944  a 
half-million  men  were  found  for  the  Army.  But  no  pro- 
vision was  made  to  replace  them  in  the  factories  and 
offices  by  women,  and  Albert  Speer,  the  Minister  for 
Armament  and  War  Production,  protested  to  Hitler  that  the 
drafting  of  skilled  workers  was  seriously  affecting  the 
output  of  arms. 

Not  since  Napoleonic  times  had  German  soldiers  been 
forced  to  defend  the  sacred  soil  of  the  Fatherland.  All  the 
subsequent  wars,  Prussia’s  and  Germany’s,  had  been  fought 
on — and  had  devastated — the  soil  of  other  peoples.  A 
shower  of  exhortations  fell  upon  the  hard-pressed  troops. 

SOLDIERS  OF  THE  WESTERN  FRONT! 

...  I expect  you  to  defend  Germany’s  sacred  soil  ...  to 
the  very  last!  . . . 

Heil  the  Fuehrer! 

von  Rundstedt, 
Field  Marshal 

SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  GROUP! 

. . . None  of  us  gives  up  a square  foot  of  German  soil 
while  still  alive  . . . Whoever  retreats  without  giving  battle  is 
a traitor  to  his  people  . . . 

Soldiers!  Our  homeland,  the  lives  of  our  wives  and  chil- 
dren are  at  stake! 

Our  Fuehrer  and  our  loved  ones  have  confidence  in  their 
soldiers!  . . . 

Long  live  our  Germany  and  our  beloved  Fuehrer! 

Model, 
Field  Marshal 

Nevertheless,  with  the  roof  caving  in,  there  were  an 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1413 

increasing  number  of  desertions  and  Himmler  took  drastic 
action  to  discourage  them.  On  September  10  he  posted  an 
order: 

Certain  unreliable  elements  seem  to  believe  that  the  war 
will  be  over  for  them  as  soon  as  they  surrender  to  the 
enemy.  . . . 

Every  deserter  . . . will  find  his  just  punishment.  Further- 
more, his  ignominious  behavior  will  entail  the  most  severe 
consequences  for  his  family  . . . They  will  be  summarily 
shot 

A Colonel  Hoffmann-Schonfom  of  the  18  th  Grenadier 
Division  proclaimed  to  his  unit: 

Traitors  from  our  ranks  have  deserted  to  the  enemy  . . . 
These  bastards  have  given  away  important  military  secrets 
. . . Deceitful  Jewish  mudslingers  taunt  you  with  their  pam- 
phlets and  try  to  entice  you  into  becoming  bastards  also. 
Let  them  spew  their  poison!  ...  As  for  the  contemptible 
traitors  who  have  forgotten  their  honor — their  families 
will  have  to  atone  for  their  treason.8 

In  September  what  the  skeptical  German  generals  called 
a “miracle”  occurred.  To  Speidel  it  was  “a  German  vari- 
ation of  the  ‘miracle  of  the  Marne’  for  the  French  in 
1914.  The  furious  advance  of  the  Allies  suddenly  subsided.” 

Why  it  subsided  has  been  a subject  of  dispute  to  this 
day  among  the  Allied  commanders  from  General  Eisen- 
hower on  down;  to  the  German  generals  it  was  incom- 
prehensible. By  the  second  week  in  September  American 
units  had  reached  the  German  border  before  Aachen  and 
on  the  Moselle.  Germany  lay  open  to  the  Allied  armies. 
Early  in  September  Montgomery  had  urged  Eisenhower 
to  allot  all  of  his  supplies  and  reserves  to  the  British  and 
Canadian  armies  and  the  U.S.  Ninth  and  First  armies  for 
a bold  offensive  in  the  north  under  his  command  that 
would  penetrate  quickly  into  the  Ruhr,  deprive  the  Ger- 
mans of  their  main  arsenal,  open  the  road  to  Berlin  and 
end  the  war.  Eisenhower  rejected  the  proposal.*  He  wanted 
to  advance  toward  the  Rhine  on  a “broad  front.” 

But  his  armies  had  outrun  their  supplies.  Every  ton 
of  gasoline  and  ammunition  had  to  be  brought  in  over 

* aJ?,cert^!n»”  Eisenhower  wrote  in  his  memoirs  ( Crusade  in  Europe,  p. 
305),  that  Field  Marshal  Montgomery,  in  the  light  of  later  events,  would 
agree  that  this  view  was  a mistaken  one.”  But  this  is  far  from  being  the 
case,  as  those  who  have  read  Montgomery’s  memoirs  know. 


1414  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

the  beaches  in  Normandy  or  through  the  single  port  of 
Cherbourg  and  transported  by  truck  three  to  four  hundred 
miles  to  the  advancing  front.  By  the  second  week  of  Sep- 
tember, Eisenhower’s  armies  were  bogging  down  for  lack 
of  supplies.  They  were  also  running  into  unexpected  Ger- 
man resistance.  By  concentrating  his  available  forces  at 
two  critical  points  Rundstedt  was  able,  by  the  middle  of 
September,  to  halt  at  least  temporarily  Patton’s  Third 
Army  on  the  Moselle  and  Hodges’  First  Army  in  front 
of  Aachen. 

Eisenhower,  prodded  by  Montgomery,  had  then  agreed 
to  a bold  plan  to  seize  a bridgehead  over  the  Lower 
Rhine  at  Arnhem  and  thus  obtain  a position  from  which 
the  Siegfried  Line  could  be  outflanked  on  the  north.  The 
objective  fell  far  short  of  Montgomery’s  dream  of  racing 
into  the  Ruhr  and  thence  to  Berlin,  but  it  promised  a 
strategic  base  for  a later  try.  The  attack,  led  by  a massive 
drop  of  two  American  and  one  British  airborne  divi- 
sions, flying  in  from  bases  in  Britain,  began  on  September 
17,  but  due  to  bad  weather,  to  the  circumstance  that  the 
airborne  troops  landed  right  in  the  midst  of  two  S.S. 
panzer  divisions  they  did  not  know  were  there,  and  to  the 
lack  of  adequate  land  forces  pushing  up  from  the  south, 
it  failed,  and  after  ten  days  of  savage  fighting  the  Allies 
withdrew  from  Arnhem.  The  British  1st  Airborne  Divi- 
sion, which  had  been  dropped  near  the  city,  lost  all  but 
2,163  of  some  9,000  men.  To  Eisenhower  this  setback 
“was  ample  evidence  that  much  bitter  campaigning  was 
to  come.”  7 

Yet  he  hardly  expected  the  Germans  to  recover  suffi- 
ciently to  launch  the  stunning  surprise  that  burst  on  the 
Western  Front  as  Christmas  approached  that  winter. 

HITLER’S  LAST  DESPERATE  GAMBLE 

On  the  evening  of  December  12,  1944,  a host  of  German 
generals,  the  senior  field  commanders  on  the  Western  front, 
were  called  to  Rundstedt’s  headquarters,  stripped  of  their 
side  arms  and  briefcases,  packed  into  a bus,  driven 
about  the  dark,  snowy  countryside  for  half  an  hour  to 
make  them  lose  their  bearings,  and  finally  deposited  at 
the  entrance  to  a deep  underground  bunker  which  turned 
out  to  be  Hitler’s  headquarters  at  Ziegenberg  near  Frank-- 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1415 


furt.  There  they  learned  for  the  first  time  what  only  a 
handful  of  the  top  staff  officers  and  army  commanders 
had  known  for  more  than  a month:  the  Fuehrer  was  to 
launch  in  four  days  a mighty  offensive  in  the  West. 

The  idea  had  been  simmering  in  his  mind  since  mid- 
September,  when  Eisenhower’s  armies  had  been  brought 
to  a halt  on  the  German  frontier  west  of  the  Rhine. 
Although  the  U.S.  Ninth,  First  and  Third  armies  tried 
to  resume  the  offensive  in  October  with  the  objective  of 
“slugging”  their  way  to  the  Rhine,  as  Eisenhower  put  it, 
the  going  had  been  hard  and  slow.  Aachen,  the  old  im- 
perial capital,  the  seat  of  Charlemagne,  surrendered  to 
First  Army  on  October  24  after  a bitter  battle — the  first 
German  city  to  fall  into  Allied  hands — but  the  Americans 
had  been  unable  to  achieve  a breakthrough  to  the  Rhine. 
Still,  all  along  the  front  they — and  the  British  and  Cana- 
dians to  the  north — were  wearing  down  the  weakening 
defenders  in  battles  of  attrition.  Hitler  realized  that  by 
remaining  on  the  defensive  he  was  merely  postponing 
the  hour  of  reckoning.  In  his  feverish  mind  there  emerged 
a bold  and  imaginative  plan  to  recapture  the  initiative, 
strike  a blow  that  would  split  the  U.S.  Third  and  First 
armies,  penetrate  to  Antwerp  and  deprive  Eisenhower  of 
his  main  port  of  supply,  and  roll  up  the  British  and 
Canadian  armies  along  the  Belgian— Dutch  border.  Such  an 
offensive,  he  thought,  would  not  only  administer  a crush- 
ing defeat  on  the  Anglo-American  armies  and  thus  free 
the  threat  to  Germany’s  western  border,  but  would  then 
enable  him  to  turn  against  the  Russians,  who,  though  still 
advancing  in  the  Balkans,  had  been  halted  on  the  Vistula 
in  Poland  and  in  East  Prussia  since  October.  The  offen- 
sive would  strike  swiftly  through  the  Ardennes,  where  the 
great  breakthrough  in  1940  had  begun,  and  which  Ger- 
man intelligence  knew  to  be  defended  only  by  four  weak 
American  infantry  divisions. 

It  was  a daring  plan.  It  would,  Hitler  believed,  almost 
certainly  catch  the  Allies  by  surprise  and  overcome  them 
before  they  had  a chance  to  recover.*  But  there  was  one 

* There  was  an  interesting  adornment  to  the  plan  called  “Operation  Greif,” 
which  seems  to  have  been  Hitler’s  brain  child.  Its  leadership  was  entrusted 
by  the  Fuehrer  to  Otto  Skorzeny,  who,  following  his  rescue  of  Mussolini 
and  his  resolute  action  in  Berlin  on  the  night  of  July  20,  1944,  had  further 
distinguished  himself  in  his  special  field  by  kidnaping  the  Hungarian  Regent, 


1416 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

drawback.  The  German  Army  was  not  only  weaker  than  it 
had  been  in  1940,  especially  in  the  air,  but  it  was  up 
against  a much  more  resourceful  and  far  better  armed 
enemy.  The  German  generals  lost  no  time  in  bringing 
this  to  the  Fuehrer’s  attention. 

“When  I received  this  plan  early  in  November,”  Rund- 
stedt  later  declared,  “I  was  staggered.  Hitler  had  not 
troubled  to  consult  me  ...  It  was  obvious  to  me  that  the 
available  forces  were  far  too  small  for  such  an  extremely 
ambitious  plan.”  Realizing,  however,  that  it  was  useless  to 
argue  with  Hitler,  Rundstedt  and  Model  decided  to  propose 
an  alternative  plan  which  might  satisfy  the  warlord's  in- 
sistence on  an  offensive  but  which  would  be  limited  to 
pinching  off  the  American  salient  around  Aachen.8  The 
German  Commander  in  Chief  in  the  West,  however,  had 
so  little  hope  of  changing  the  Fuehrer’s  mind  that  he 
declined  to  attend  a military  conference  in  Berlin  on  De- 
cember 2,  sending  his  chief  of  staff,  Blumentritt,  instead. 
But  Blumentritt,  Field  Marshal  Model,  General  Hasso  von 
Manteuffel  and  S.S.  General  Sepp  Dietrich  (the  last  two 
were  to  command  two  great  panzer  armies  for  the  break- 
through), who  attended  the  meeting,  were  unable  to 
shake  Hitler’s  resolve.  All  through  the  late  autumn  he  had 
been  scraping  the  barrel  in  Germany  for  this  last  desperate 
gamble.  In  November  he  had  managed  to  collect  nearly 
1,500  new  or  rebuilt  tanks  and  assault  guns,  and  in  De- 
cember another  1,000.  He  had  assembled  some  twenty- 
eight  divisions,  including  nine  panzer  divisions,  for  the 
Ardennes  breakthrough,  with  another  six  divisions  allotted 
for  an  attack  in  Alsace  to  follow  the  main  offensive.  Goer- 
ing  promised  3,000  fighter  planes. 

This  was  a considerable  force,  though  far  weaker  than 
Rundstedt’s  army  group  on  the  same  front  in  1940.  But 
raising  it  had  meant  denying  the  German  forces  in  the  - 
East  the  reinforcements  their  commanders  thought  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  repel  the  expected  Russian  winter 
attack  in  January.  When  Guderian,  the  Chief  of  the 

Admiral  Horthy,  in  Budapest  in  October  1944,  when  the  latter  tried  to  sur- 
render Hungary  to  the  advancing  Russians.  Skorzeny’s  new  assignment  was 
to  organize  a special  brigade  of  two  thousand  English-speaking  German 
soldiers,  put  them  in  American  uniforms,  and  infiltrate  them  in  captured 
American  tanks  and  jeeps  behind  the  American  lines  to  cut  communication 
wires,  kill  dispatch  riders,  misdirect  traffic  and  generally  sow  confusion. 
Small  units  were  also  to  penetrate  to  the  Meuse  bridges  and  try  to  hold 
them  intact  until  the  main  German  panzer  troops  arrived. 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1417 


General  Staff,  who  was  responsible  for  the  Eastern  front, 
protested  Hitler  gave  him  a stern  lecture. 

“There’s  no  need  for  you  to  try  to  teach  me.  I’ve  been 
commanding  the  German  Army  in  the  field  for  five  years 
and  during  that  time  I’ve  had  more  practical  experience 
than  any  gentleman  of  the  General  Staff  could  ever  hope 
to  have.  I’ve  studied  Clausewitz  and  Moltke  and  read  all 
the  Schlieffen  papers.  I’m  more  in  the  picture  than  you  are!” 

When  Guderian  protested  that  the  Russians  were  about  to 
attack  in  overwhelming  strength  and  cited  figures  of  the 
Soviet  build-up,  Hitler  shouted,  “It’s  the  greatest  bluff 
since  Gengis  Khan!  Who’s  responsible  for  producing  all 
this  rubbish?”  9 

The  generals  who  assembled  at  the  Fuehrer’s  head- 
quarters at  Ziegenberg  on  the  evening  of  December  12, 
minus  their  briefcases  and  revolvers,  found  the  Nazi  war- 
lord, as  Manteuffel  later  recalled,  “a  stooped  figure  with 
a pale  and  puffy  face,  hunched  in  his  chair,  his  hands 
trembling,  his  left  arm  subject  to  a violent  twitching 
which  he  did  his  best  to  conceal.  A sick  man  . . . When 
he  walked  he  dragged  one  leg  behind  him.”  10 

Hitler’s  spirits,  however,  were  as  fiery  as  ever.  The 
generals  had  expected  to  be  briefed  on  the  over-all  mili- 
tary picture  of  the  offensive,  but  the  warlord  treated  them 
instead  to  a political  and  historical  harangue. 

Never  in  history  was  there  a coalition  like  that  of  our 
enemies,  composed  of  such  heterogeneous  elements  with 
such  divergent  aims  . . . Ultracapitalist  states  on  the  one 
hand;  ultra-Marxist  states  on  the  other.  On  the  one  hand  a 
dying  Empire,  Britain;  on  the  other,  a colony  bent  upon  in- 
heritance, the  United  States  . . . 

Each  of  the  partners  went  into  this  coalition  with  the  hope 
of  realizing  his  political  ambitions  . . . America  tries  to 
become  England’s  heir;  Russia  tries  to  gain  the  Balkans  . . . 
England  tries  to  hold  her  possessions  ...  in  the  Medi- 
terranean . . . Even  now  these  states  are  at  loggerheads, 
and  he  who,  like  a spider  sitting  in  the  middle  of  his  web, 
can  watch  developments  observes  how  these  antagonisms 
grow  stronger  and  stronger  from  hour  to  hour. 

If  now  we  can  deliver  a few  more  blows,  then  at  any 
moment  this  artificially  bolstered  common  front  may  sud- 
denly collapse  with  a gigantic  clap  of  thunder  . . . pro- 
vided always  that  there  is  no  weakening  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many. 


1418 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

It  is  essential  to  deprive  the  enemy  of  his  belief  that  vic- 
tory is  certain  ...  Wars  are  finally  decided  by  one  side  or 
the  other  recognizing  that  they  cannot  be  won.  We  must 
allow  no  moment  to  pass  without  showing  the  enemy  that, 
whatever  he  does,  he  can  never  reckon  on  [our]  capitula- 
tion. Never!  Never! 11 

With  this  pep  talk  resounding  in  their  ears  the  generals 
dispersed,  none  of  them — or  at  least  so  they  said  after- 
ward— believing  that  the  Ardennes  blow  would  succeed  but 
determined  to  carry  out  their  orders  to  the  best  of  their 
ability. 

This  they  did.  The  night  of  December  15  was  dark  and 
frosty  and  a thick  mist  hung  over  the  rugged  snow-laden 
hills  of  the  Ardennes  Forest  as  the  Germans  moved  up  to 
their  assault  positions  on  a seventy-mile  front  between 
Monschau,  south  of  Aachen,  and  Echternach,  northwest 
of  Trier.  Their  meteorologist  had  predicted  several  days 
of  such  weather,  during  which  it  was  calculated  that  the 
Allied  air  forces  would  be  grounded  and  the  German 
supply  columns  spared  the  inferno  of  Normandy.  For  five 
days  Hitler’s  luck  with  the  weather  held  and  the  Germans, 
catching  the  Allied  High  Command  completely  by  sur- 
prise, scored  several  breakthroughs  after  their  initial  pene- 
trations on  the  morning  of  December  16. 

When  a German  armored  group  reached  Stavelot  on 
the  night  of  December  17,  it  was  only  eight  miles  from  the 
U.S.  First  Army  headquarters  at  Spa,  which  was  being 
hurriedly  evacuated.  More  important,  it  was  only  a mile 
from  a huge  American  supply  dump  containing  three 
million  gallons  of  gasoline.  Had  this  dump  been  captured 
the  German  armored  divisions,  which  were  continually 
being  slowed  down  because  of  the  delay  in  bringing  up 
gasoline,  of  which  the  Germans  were  woefully  short, 
might  have  gone  farther  and  faster  than  they  did.  Skor- 
zeny’s  so-called  Panzer  Brigade  150,  its  men  outfitted  in 
American  uniforms  and  driving  captured  American  tanks, 
trucks  and  jeeps,  got  farthest.  Some  forty  jeeploads  slipped 
through  the  crumbling  front,  a few  of  them  getting  as  far 
as  the  River  Meuse.* 

* On  the  sixteenth  a German  officer  carrying  several  copies  of  Operation 
Gretf  was  taken  prisoner  and  the  Americans  thus  learned  what  was  up.  But 
this  does  not  seem  to  have  curbed  the  initial  confusion  spread  by  Skorzeny’s 
men,  some  of  whom,  posing  as  M.P.s,  took  up  posts  at  crossroads  and  mis- 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1419 

Yet  stubborn  makeshift  resistance  by  scattered  units 
of  the  U.S.  First  Army  after  the  four  weak  divisions  in 
the  Ardennes  had  been  overrun  slowed  up  the  German 
drive  and  the  firm  stand  on  the  northern  and  southern 
shoulders  of  the  breakthrough  at  Monschau  and  Bastogne, 
respectively,  channeled  Hitler’s  forces  through  a narrow 
salient.  The  American  defense  of  Bastogne  sealed  their 
fate. 

This  road  junction  was  the  key  to  the  defense  of  the 
Ardennes  and  of  the  River  Meuse  behind.  If  strongly  held 
it  not  only  would  block  the  main  roads  along  which  Man- 
teuffel’s  Fifth  Panzer  Army  was  driving  for  the  Meuse 
River  at  Dinant  but  would  tie  up  considerable  German 
forces  earmarked  for  the  push  beyond.  By  the  morning 
of  December  18,  Manteuffel’s  armored  spearheads  were 
only  fifteen  miles  from  the  town  and  the  only  Americans 
in  it  belonged  to  a corps  headquarters  staff  which  was 
preparing  to  evacuate.  However,  on  the  evening  of  the 
seventeenth  the  101st  Airborne  Division,  which  had  been 
refitting  at  Reims,  was  ordered  to  proceed  with  all  speed 
to  Bastogne  a hundred  miles  away.  By  driving  its  trucks 
with  headlights  on  through  the  night  it  reached  the  town 
in  twenty-four  hours,  just  ahead  of  the  Germans.  It 
was  a decisive  race  and  the  Germans  had  lost  it.  Although 
they  encircled  Bastogne,  they  had  difficulty  in  getting  their 
divisions  around  it  to  renew  the  drive  toward  the  Meuse. 
And  they  had  to  leave  strong  forces  behind  to  contain 
the  road  junction  and  to  try  to  take  it. 

On  December  22,  General  Heinrich  von  Luettwitz, 
commander  of  the  German  XLVIIth  Armored  Corps, 
sent  a written  note  to  General  A.  C.  McAuliffe,  command- 
ing the  101st  Airborne,  demanding  surrender  of  Bastogne. 
He  received  a one- word  answer  which  became  famous: 
“nuts!” 

directed  American  military  traffic.  Nor  did  it  prevent  First  Army’s  intel- 
Ugence  office  from  believing  the  tall  tales  of  some  of  the  captured  Germans  in 
American  uniform  that  more  than  a few  of  Skorzeny’s  desperadoes  were  on 
their  way  to  Paris  to  assassinate  Eisenhower.  For  several  days  thousands  of 
American  soldiers  as  far  back  as  Paris  were  stopped  by  M.P.s  and  had  to 
prove  their  nationality  by  telling  who  won  the  World  Series  and  what  the 
capital  of  their  native  state  was — though  some  could  not  remember  or  did 
not  know.  A good  many  of  the  Germans  caught  in  American  uniforms  were 
summarily  shot  and  others  court-martialed  and  executed.  Skorzeny  himself 
was  tried  by  an  American  tribunal  at  Dachau  in  1947  but  acquitted.  There- 
after he  moved  to  Spain  and  South  America,  where  he  soon  established  a 
prosperous  cement  business  and  composed  his  memoirs. 


1420  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

The  definite  turning  point  in  Hitler’s  Ardennes  gamble 
came  on  the  day  before  Christmas.  A reconnaissance  bat- 
talion of  the  German  2nd  Panzer  Division  had  reached  the 
heights  three  miles  east  of  the  Meuse  at  Dinant  the  day 
before  and  had  waited  for  gasoline  for  its  tanks  and  some 
reinforcements  before  plunging  down  the  slopes  to  the 
river.  Neither  the  gasoline  nor  the  reinforcements  ever 
arrived.  The  U.S.  2nd  Armored  Division  suddenly  struck 
from  the  north.  Already  several  divisions  of  Patton’s 
Third  Army  were  moving  up  from  the  south,  their  main 
objective  being  to  relieve  Bastogne.  “On  the  evening  of  the 
twenty-fourth,”  Manteuffel  later  wrote,  “it  was  clear  that 
the  high-water  mark  of  our  operation  had  been  reached. 
We  now  knew  that  we  would  never  reach  our  objective.” 
The  pressure  on  the  northern  and  southern  flanks  of  the 
deep  and  narrow  German  salient  had  become  too  great. 
And  two  days  before  Christmas  the  weather  had  finally 
cleared  and  the  Anglo-American  air  forces  had  begun 
to  have  a field  day  with  massive  attacks  on  German  supply 
lines  and  on  the  troops  and  tanks  moving  up  the  narrow, 
tortuous  mountain  roads.  The  Germans  made  another 
desperate  attempt  to  capture  Bastogne.  All  day  Christmas, 
beginning  at  3 a.m.,  they  launched  a series  of  attacks,  but 
McAuliffe’s  defenders  held.  The  next  day  an  armored 
force  of  Patton’s  Third  Army  broke  through  from  the 
south  and  relieved  the  town.  For  the  Germans  it  now  be- 
came a question  of  extricating  their  forces  from  the  nar- 
row corridor  before  they  were  cut  off  and  annihilated 

But  Hitler  would  not  listen  to  any  withdrawal  being 
made.  On  the  evening  of  December  28  he  held  a full-dress 
military  conference.  Instead  of  heeding  the  advice  of 
Rundstedt  and  Manteuffel  to  pull  out  the  German  forces 
in  the  Bulge  in  time,  he  ordered  the  offensive  to  be  resumed, 
Bastogne  to  be  stormed  and  the  push  to  the  Meuse  re- 
newed. Moreover,  he  insisted  on  a new  offensive  being 
started  immediately  to  the  south  in  Alsace,  where  the 
American  line  had  been  thinned  out  by  the  sending  of 
several  of  Patton’s  divisions  north  to  the  Ardennes.  To 
the  protests  of  the  generals  that  they  lacked  sufficient 
forces  either  to  continue  the  offensive  in  the  Ardennes 
or  to  attack  in  Alsace  he  remained  deaf. 

Gentlemen,  I have  been  in  this  business  for  eleven  years, 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1421 


and  ...  I have  never  heard  anybody  report  that  everything 
was  completely  ready  ...  You  are  never  entirely  ready. 
That  is  plain. 

He  talked  on  and  on.*  It  must  have  been  obvious  to  the 
generals  long  before  he  finished  that  their  Commander  in 
Chief  had  become  blinded  to  reality  and  had  lost  himself 
in  the  clouds. 

The  question  is  . . . whether  Germany  has  the  will  to  re- 
main in  existence  or  whether  it  will  be  destroyed  . . . The 
loss  of  this  war  will  destroy  the  German  people. 

There  followed  a long  dissertation  on  the  history  of 
Rome  and  of  Prussia  in  the  Seven  Years’  War.  Finally 
he  returned  to  the  immediate  problems  at  hand.  Although 
he  admitted  that  the  Ardennes  offensive  had  not  “re- 
sulted in  the  decisive  success  which  might  have  been  ex- 
pected,” he  claimed  that  it  had  brought  about  “a  trans- 
formation of  the  entire  situation  such  as  nobody  would 
have  believed  possible  a fortnight  ago.” 

The  enemy  has  had  to  abandon  all  his  plans  for  attack 
...  He  has  had  to  throw  in  units  that  were  fatigued.  His 
operational  plans  have  been  completely  upset  He  is  enor- 
mously criticized  at  home.  It  is  a bad  psychological  moment 
for  him.  Already  he  has  had  to  admit  that  there  is  no 
chance  of  the  war  being  decided  before  August  perhaps  not 
before  the  end  of  next  year  . . . 

Was  this  last  phrase  an  admission  of  ultimate  defeat? 
Hitler  quickly  tried  to  correct  any  such  impression. 

I hasten  to  add,  gentlemen,  that  . . . you  are  not  to  con- 
clude that  even  remotely  I envisage  the  loss  of  this  war  . . . 
I have  never  learned  to  know  the  word  “capitulation”  . . . 
For  me  the  situation  today  is  nothing  new.  I have  been  in 
very  much  worse  situations.  I mention  this  only  because  I 
want  you  to  understand  why  I pursue  my  aim  with  such 
fanaticism  and  why  nothing  can  wear  me  down.  As  much 
as  I may  be  tormented  by  worries  and  even  physically 
shaken  by  them,  nothing  will  make  the  slightest  change  in 
my  decision  to  fight  on  till  at  last  the  scales  tip  to  our  side. 

Whereupon  he  appealed  to  the  generals  to  support  the 
new  attacks  “with  all  your  fire.” 

* For  several  hours,  judging  by  the  length  of  the  stenographic  record  of 
this  conference,  which  has  survived  almost  intact.  It  is  Fragment  27  of  the 
Fuehrer  conferences.  Gilbert  gives  the  entire  text  in  Hitler  Directs  His 
War,  pp.  158-74. 


1422 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

We  shall  then  . . . smash  the  Americans  completely  . . . 
Then  we  shall  see  what  happens.  1 do  not  believe  that  in  the 
long  run  the  enemy  will  be  able  to  resist  forty-five  German 
divisions  . . . We  shall  yet  master  fate! 

It  was  too  late.  Germany  lacked  the  military  force  to 
make  good  his  words. 

On  New  Year’s  Day  Hitler  threw  eight  German  divi- 
sions into  an  attack  in  the  Saar  and  followed  it  with  a 
thrust  from  the  bridgehead  on  the  Upper  Rhine  by  an 
army  under  the  command  of — to  the  German  generals  this 
was  a bad  joke — Heinrich  Himmler.  Neither  drive  got 
very  far.  Nor  did  an  all-out  assault  on  Bastogne  beginning 
on  January  3 by  no  less  than  two  corps  of  nine  divisions 
which  led  to  the  most  severe  fighting  of  the  Ardennes 
campaign.  By  January  5 the  Germans  abandoned  hope  of 
taking  this  key  town.  They  were  now  faced  with  being 
cut  off  by  a British-American  counteroffensive  from  the 
north  which  had  begun  on  January  3.  On  January  8 
Model,  whose  armies  were  in  danger  of  being  entrapped  at 
Houffalize,  northeast  of  Bastogne,  finally  received  permis- 
sion to  withdraw.  By  January  16,  just  a month  after  the 
beginning  of  the  offensive  on  which  Hitler  had  staked  his 
last  reserves  in  men  and  guns  and  ammunition,  the  Ger- 
man forces  were  back  to  the  line  from  which  they  had 
set  out. 

They  had  lost  some  120,000  men,  killed,  wounded  and 
missing,  600  tanks  and  assault  guns,  1,600  planes  and 
6,000  vehicles.  American  losses  were  also  severe — 8,000 
killed,  48,000  wounded,  21,000  captured  or  missing,  and 
733  tanks  and  tank  destroyers.*  But  the  Americans  could 

•Among  the  American  dead  were  several  prisoners  shot  in  cold  blood  by 
Colonel  Jochen  Peiper’s  combat  group  of  the  1st  S.S.  Panzer  Division  near 
Malmedy  on  December  17.  According  to  the  evidence  presented  at  Nurem- 
berg 129  American  prisoners  were  massacred;  at  the  subsequent  trial  of  the 
S.S.  officers  involved,  the  figure  was  reduced  to  71.  The  trial  before  an  Amer- 
ican military  tribunal  at  Dachau  in  the  spring  of  1946  had  a curious  denoue- 
ment. Forty-three  S.S.  officers,  including  Peiper,  were  condemned  to  death, 
twenty-three  to  life  imprisonment  and  eight  to  shorter  sentences.  Sepp 
Dietrich,  commander  of  the  Sixth  S.S.  Panzer  Army,  which  fought  in  the 
northern  side  of  the  Bulge^  received  twenty-five  years;  Kraemer,  commander 
of  the  1st  S.S.  Armored  Corps,  ten  years,  and  Hermann  Priess,  commander 
of  the  1st  S.S.  Panzer  Division,  eighteen  years. 

Then  a hue  and  cry  arose  in  the  U.S.  Senate,  especially  from  the  late 
Senator  McCarthy,  that  the  S.S.  officers  had  been  treated  brutally  in  order 
to  extort  confessions.  In  March  1948  thirty-one  of  the  death  sentences  were 
commuted;  in  April  General  Lucius  D.  Clay  reduced  the  death  sentences 
from  twelve  to  six;  and  in  January  1951,  under  a general  amnesty,  John  J. 
McLloy,  the  American  High  Commissioner,  commuted  the  remaining  death 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1423 

make  good  their  losses;  the  Germans  could  not.  They  had 
shot  their  last  bolt.  This  was  the  last  major  offensive  of 
the  German  Army  in  World  War  II.  Its  failure  not  only 
made  defeat  inevitable  in  the  West,  it  doomed  the  German 
armies  in  the  East,  where  the  effect  of  Hitler’s  throwing 
his  last  reserves  into  the  Ardennes  became  immediately 

In  his  long  lecture  to  the  generals  in  the  West  three  days 
after  Christmas  Hitler  had  been  quite  optimistic  about 
the  Russian  front,  where,  though  the  Balkans  was  being 
lost,  the  German  armies  had  held  firmly  on  the  Vistula 
in  Poland  and  in  East  Prussia  since  October. 

Unfortunately  [Hitler  said]  because  of  the  treachery  of 
our  dear  allies  we  are  forced  to  retire  gradually  . . . Yet 
despite  all  this  it  has  been  possible  on  the  whole  to  hold  the 
Eastern  front 

But  for  how  long?  On  Christmas  Eve,  after  the  Rus- 
sians had  surrounded  Budapest,  and  again  on  New  Year’s 
morning  Guderian  had  pleaded  in  vain  with  Hitler  for 
reinforcements  to  meet  the  Russian  threat  in  Hungary  and 
to  counter  the  Soviet  offensive  in  Poland  which  he  ex- 
pected to  begin  the  middle  of  January. 

I pointed  out  [Guderian  says]  that  the  Ruhr  had  already 
been  paralyzed  by  the  Western  Allies’  bombing  attacks.  . . . 
on  the  other  hand,  I said,  the  industrial  area  of  Upper  Silesia 
could  still  work  at  full  pressure,  the  center  of  the  German 
armament  industry  was  already  in  the  East,  and  the  loss  of 
Upper  Silesia  must  lead  to  our  defeat  in  a very  few  weeks. 
All  this  was  of  no  avail.  I was  rebuffed  and  I spent  a grim 
and  tragic  Christmas  Eve  in  those  most  unchristian  sur- 
roundings. 

Nonetheless  Guderian  returned  to  Hitler’s  headquarters 
for  a third  time  on  January  9.  He  took  with  him  his  Chief 
of  Intelligence  in  the  East,  General  Gehlen,  who  with 
maps  and  diagrams  tried  to  explain  to  the  Fuehrer  the 
precarious  German  position  on  the  eve  of  the  expected 
renewal  of  the  Russian  offensive  in  the  north. 

Hitler  [Guderian  says]  completely  lost  his  temper  . . . 

sentences  to  life  imprisonment.  At  the  time  of  writing  all  have  been  released. 
Almost  forgotten  in  the  hubbub  over  the  alleged  ill-treatment  of  the  S S 
officers  was  the  indisputable  evidence  that  at  least  seventy-one  unarmed 
U.S.  war  prisoners  were  slain  in  cold  blood  on  a snowy  field  near  Malmedy 
on  December  17,  1944,  on  the  orders — or  incitement — of  several  S.S.  officers. 


1424 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

declaring  the  maps  and  diagrams  to  be  “completely  idiotic” 
and  ordering  that  I have  the  man  who  had  made  them  shut 
up  a lunatic  asylum.  I then  lost  my  temper  and  said 
• ■ • H you  want  General  Gehlen  sent  to  a lunatic  asylum 
then  you  had  better  have  me  certified  as  well.” 

When  Hitler  argued  that  the  Eastern  front  had  “never 
before  possessed  such  a strong  reserve  as  now,”  Guderian 
retorted,  “The  Eastern  front  is  like  a house  of  cards.  If 
the  front  is  broken  through  at  one  point  all  the  rest  will 
collapse.”  12 

And  that  is  what  happened.  On  January  12,  1945, 
Konev’s  Russian  army  group  broke  out  of  its  bridgehead 
at  Baranov  on  the  upper  Vistula  south  of  Warsaw  and 
headed  for  Silesia.  Farther  north  Zhukov’s  armies  crossed 
the  Vistula  north  and  south  of  Warsaw,  which  fell  on 
January  17.  Farther  north  still,  two  Russian  armies  overran 
half  of  East  Prussia  and  drove  to  the  Gulf  of  Danzig. 

This  was  the  greatest  Russian  offensive  of  the  war.  Stalin 
was  throwing  in  180  divisions,  a surprisingly  large  part  of 
them  armored,  in  Poland  and  East  Prussia  alone.  There 
was  no  stopping  them. 

By  January  27  [only  fifteen  days  after  the  Soviet 
drive  began]  the  Russian  tidal  wave,”  says  Guderian, 
was  rapidly  assuming  for  us  the  proportions  of  a com- 
plete disaster.”13  By  that  date  East  and  West  Prussia 
were  cut  off  from  the  Reich.  Zhukov  that  very  day  crossed 
the  Oder  near  Lueben  after  an  advance  of  220  miles  in  a 
fortnight,  reaching  German  soil  only  100  miles  from  Ber- 
lin. Most  catastrophic  of  all,  the  Russians  had  overrun  the 
Silesian  industrial  basin. 

Albert  Speer,  in  charge  of  armament  production,  drew 
up  a memorandum  to  Hitler  on  January  30— the  twelfth 
anniversary  of  Hitler’s  coming  to  power — pointing  out  the 
significance  of  the  loss  of  Silesia.  “The  war  is  lost,”  his 
report  began,  and  he  went  on  in  his  cool  and  objective 
manner  to  explain  why.  The  Silesian  mines,  ever  since  the 
intensive  bombing  of  the  Ruhr,  had  supplied  60  per  cent  of 
Germany’s  coal.  There  was  only  two  weeks’  supply  of  coal 
for  the  German  railways,  power  plants  and  factories. 
Henceforth,  now  that  Silesia  was  lost,  Speer  could  supply, 
he  said,  only  one  quarter  of  the  coal  and  one  sixth  of  the 
steel  which  Germany  had  been  producing  in  1944. 14  This 
augured  disaster  for  1945. 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1425 

The  Fuehrer,  Guderian  later  related,  glanced  at  Speer’s 
report,  read  the  first  sentence  and  then  ordered  it  filed 
away  in  his  safe.  He  refused  to  see  Speer  alone,  saying  to 
Guderian: 

"...  I refuse  to  see  anyone  alone  any  more  . . . [He]  al- 
ways has  something  unpleasant  to  say  to  me.  I can’t  bear 
that.” 

On  the  afternoon  of  January  27,  the  day  Zhukov’s  troops 
crossed  the  Oder  a hundred  miles  from  Berlin,  there  was 
an  interesting  reaction  at  Hitler’s  headquarters,  which  had 
now  been  transferred  to  the  Chancellery  in  Berlin,  where 
it  was  to  remain  until  the  end.  On  the  twenty-fifth  the 
desperate  Guderian  had  called  on  Ribbentrop  and  urged 
him  to  try  to  get  an  immediate  armistice  in  the  West  so 
that  what  was  left  of  the  German  armies  could  be  con- 
centrated in  the  East  against  the  Russians.  The  Foreign 
Minister  had  quickly  tattled  to  the  Fuehrer,  who  that 
evening  upbraided  his  General  Staff  Chief  and  accused 
him  of  committing  “high  treason.” 

But  two  nights  later,  under  the  impact  of  the  disaster  in 
the  East,  Hitler,  Goering  and  Jodi  were  in  such  a state 
that  they  thought  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  ask  the 
West  for  an  armistice.  They  were  sure  the  Western  Allies 
would  come  running  to  them  in  their  fear  of  the  conse- 
quences of  the  Bolshevik  victories.  A fragment  of  the 
Fuehrer  conference  of  January  27  has  preserved  part  of  the 
scene. 

Hitler:  Do  you  think  the  English  are  enthusiastic  about 
all  the  Russian  developments? 

Goering:  They  certainly  didn’t  plan  that  we  hold  them  off 
while  the  Russians  conquer  all  of  Germany  . . . They  had 
not  counted  on  our  . . . holding  them  off  like  madmen  while 
the  Russians  drive  deeper  and  deeper  into  Germany,  and 
practically  have  all  of  Germany  now  . . . 

Jodl:  They  have  always  regarded  the  Russians  with  sus- 
picion. 

Goering:  If  this  goes  on  we  will  get  a telegram  [from 
the  English]  in  a few  days.1® 

On  such  a slender  thread  the  leaders  of  the  Third 
Reich  began  to  pin  their  last  hopes.  In  the  end  these  Ger- 
man architects  of  the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  against  the  West 
would  reach  a point  where  they  could  not  understand  why 


1426 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  British  and  Americans  did  not  join  them  in  repelling 
the  Russian  invaders. 

THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  ARMIES 

The  end  came  quickly  for  the  Third  Reich  in  the  spring 
of  1945. 

The  death  throes  began  in  March.  By  February,  with 
the  Ruhr  largely  in  ruins  and  Upper  Silesia  lost,  coal  pro- 
duction was  down  to  one  fifth  of  what  it  had  been  the 
year  before  and  very  little  of  this  could  be  moved  be- 
cause of  the  dislocation  of  rail  and  water  transport  by 
Anglo-American  bombing.  The  Fuehrer  conferences  be- 
came dominated  by  talk  of  the  coal  shortage,  Doenitz 
complaining  that  many  of  his  ships  had  to  lie  idle  because 
of  lack  of  fuel  and  Speer  explaining  patiently  that  the 
power  plants  and  armament  factories  were  in  a sim- 
ilar situation  for  the  same  reason.  The  loss  of  the  Ruma- 
nian and  Hungarian  oil  fields  and  the  bombing  of  the 
synthetic-oil  plants  in  Germany  caused  such  an  acute 
shortage  of  gasoline  that  a good  part  of  the  desperately 
needed  fighter  planes  had  to  be  grounded  and  were 
destroyed  on  the  fields  by  Allied  air  attacks.  Many  panzer 
divisions  could  not  move  for  lack  of  fuel  for  their  tanks. 

The  hopes  in  the  promised  “miracle  weapons,”  which 
had  for  a time  sustained  not  only  the  masses  of  the  people 
and  the  soldiers  but  even  such  hardheaded  generals  as 
Guderian,  were  finally  abandoned.  The  launching  sites 
for  the  V-l  flying  bombs  and  the  V-2  rockets  directed 
against  Britain  were  almost  entirely  lost  when  Eisen- 
hower’s forces  reconquered  the  French  and  Belgian  coasts, 
though  a few  remained  in  Holland.  Nearly  eight  thousand 
of  the  two  V bombs  were  hurled  against  Antwerp  and 
other  military  targets  after  the  British-American  armies 
reached  the  German  frontier,  but  the  damage  they  did  was 
negligible. 

Hitler  and  Goering  had  counted  on  the  new  jet  fighters 
driving  the  Allied  air  forces  from  the  skies,  and  well  they 
might  have — for  the  Germans  succeeded  in  producing  more 
than  a thousand  of  them — had  the  Anglo-American  fly- 
ers, who  lacked  this  plane,  not  taken  successful  counter- 
action. The  conventional  Allied  fighter  was  no  match  for 
the  German  jet  in  the  air,  but  few  ever  got  off  the  ground. 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1427 


The  refineries  producing  the  special  fuel  for  them  were 
bombed  and  destroyed  and  the  extended  runways  which 
had  to  be  constructed  for  them  were  easily  detected  by 
Allied  pilots,  who  destroyed  the  jets  on  the  ground. 

Grand  Admiral  Doenitz  had  promised  the  Fuehrer  that 
the  new  electro-U-boats  would  provide  a miracle  at  sea, 
once  more  wreaking  havoc  on  the  British-American  life- 
lines in  the  North  Atlantic.  But  by  the  middle  of  February 
1945  only  two  of  the  126  new  craft  commissioned  had  put 
to  sea. 

As  for  the  German  atom  bomb  project,  which  had  given 
London  and  Washington  much  worry,  it  had  made  little 
progress  due  to  Hitler’s  lack  of  interest  in  it  and  Himmler’s 
practice  of  arresting  the  atom  scientists  for  suspected  dis- 
loyalty or  pulling  them  off  to  work  on  some  of  his  pet 
nonsensical  “scientific”  experiments  which  he  deemed 
more  important.  Before  the  end  of  1944  the  American 
and  British  governments  had  learned,  to  their  great  re- 
lief, that  the  Germans  would  not  have  an  atom  bomb  in 
this  war.  * 


On  February  8 Eisenhower’s  armies,  now  eighty-five 
divisions  strong,  began  to  close  in  on  the  Rhine  They 
had  expected  that  the  Germans  would  fight  only  a de- 
laying action  and,  conserving  their  strength,  retire  behind 
the  formidable  water  barrier  of  the  wide  and  swift-flow- 
ing river.  Rundstedt  counseled  this.  But  here,  as  elsewhere 
throughout  the  years  of  his  defeats.  Hitler  would  not  listen 
to  a withdrawal.  It  would  merely  mean,  he  told  Rundstedt, 
“moving  the  catastrophe  from  one  place  to  another.”  So 
the  German  armies,  at  Hitler’s  insistence,  stood  and 
fought— but  not  for  long.  By  the  end  of  the  month  the 
British  and  Americans  had  reached  the  Rhine  at  several 
places  north  of  Duesseldorf,  and  a fortnight  later  they  had 
firm  possession  of  the  left  bank  from  the  Moselle  River 
northward.  The  Germans  had  lost  another  350,000  men 
killed,  wounded  or  captured  (the  prisoners  numbered 
293,000)  and  most  of  their  arms  and  equipment. 

Hitler  was  in  a fine  fury.  He  sacked  Rundstedt  for  the 


* How  they  learned  is  a fascinating  story  in  itself  but  too  long  to  be  set 
down  here.  Professor  Samuel  Goudsmit  has  told  it  well  in  his  book  Alsos. 
Aisos  was  the  code  name  of  the  American  scientific  mission  which  he 
headed  and  which  followed  Eisenhower’s  armies  into  Western  Europe. 


1428 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


last  time  on  March  10,  replacing  him  with  Field  Mar- 
shal Kesselring,  who  had  held  out  so  stubbornly  and  long 
in  Italy.  Already  in  February  the  Fuehrer,  in  a fit  of  rage, 
had  considered  denouncing  the  Geneva  Convention  in 
order,  he  said  at  a conference  on  the  nineteenth,  “to  make 
the  enemy  realize  that  we  are  determined  to  fight  for 
our  existence  with  all  the  means  at  our  disposal.”  He  had 
been  urged  to  take  this  step  by  Dr.  Goebbels,  the  blood- 
thirsty noncombatant,  who  suggested  that  all  captured  air- 
men be  shot  summarily  in  reprisal  for  their  terrible  bomb- 
ing of  the  German  cities.  When  some  of  the  officers  pres- 
ent raised  legal  objections  Hitler  retorted  angrily: 

To  hell  with  that!  ...  If  I make  it  clear  that  I show  no 
consideration  for  prisoners  but  that  I treat  enemy  prisoners 
without  any  consideration  for  their  rights,  regardless  of  re- 
prisals, then  quite  a few  [Germans]  will  think  twice  be- 
fore they  desert.17 

This  was  one  of  the  first  indications  to  his  followers 
that  Hitler,  his  mission  as  world  conqueror  having  failed, 
was  determined  to  go  down,  like  Wotan  at  Valhalla,  in  a 
holocaust  of  blood — not  only  the  enemy’s  but  that  of  his 
own  people.  At  the  close  of  the  discussion  he  asked  Ad- 
miral Doenitz  “to  consider  the  pros  and  cons  of  this  step 
and  to  report  as  soon  as  possible.” 

Doenitz  came  back  with  his  answer  on  the  following  day 
and  it  was  typical  of  the  man. 

The  disadvantages  would  outweigh  the  advantages  ...  It 
would  be  better  in  any  case  to  keep  up  outside  appearances 
and  carry  out  the  measures  believed  necessary  without  an- 
nouncing them  beforehand.18 

Hitler  reluctantly  agreed  and  while,  as  we  have  seen,* 
there  was  no  general  massacre  of  captured  flyers  or  of 
other  prisoners  of  war  (except  the  Russians)  several  were 
done  to  death  and  the  civil  population  was  incited  to 
lynch  Allied  air  crews  who  parachuted  to  the  ground.  One 
captive  French  general,  Mesny,  was  deliberately  murdered 
on  the  orders  of  Hitler,  and  a good  many  Allied  POWs 
perished  when  they  were  forced  to  make  long  marches 
without  food  or  water  on  roads  strafed  by  British,  Ameri- 
can and  Russian  flyers  as  the  Germans  herded  them  to- 

* In  Chapter  27,  “The  New  Order." 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1429 


ward  the  interior  of  the  country  to  prevent  them  from 
being  liberated  by  the  advancing  Allied  armies. 

Hitler’s  concern  to  make  German  soldiers  “think  twice 
before  they  desert”  was  not  ungrounded.  In  the  West  the 
number  of  deserters,  or  at  least  of  those  who  gave  them- 
selves up  as  quickly  as  possible  in  the  wake  of  the  British 
-American  advances,  became  staggering.  On  February  12 
Keitel  issued  an  order  “in  the  name  of  the  Fuehrer” 
stating  that  any  soldier  “who  deceitfully  obtains  leave 
papers,  or  who  travels  with  false  papers,  will  ...  be 
punished  by  death.”  And  on  March  5 General  Blaskowitz, 
commanding  Army  Group  H in  the  West,  issued  this  order: 

All  soldiers  . . . encountered  away  from  their  units  . . . 
and  who  announce  they  are  stragglers  looking  for  their  units 
will  be  summarily  tried  and  shot. 

On  April  12  Himmler  added  his  bit  by  decreeing  that 
any  commander  who  failed  to  hold  a town  or  an  important 
communications  center  “is  punishable  by  death.”  The 
order  was  already  being  carried  out  in  the  case  of  the 
unfortunate  commanders  at  one  of  the  Rhine  bridges. 

On  the  early  afternoon  of  March  7,  a spearhead  of  the 
U.S.  9th  Armored  Division  reached  the  heights  above  the 
town  of  Remagen,  twenty-five  miles  down  the  Rhine  from 
Koblenz.  To  the  amazement  of  the  American  tank  crews 
they  saw  that  the  Ludendorff  railroad  bridge  across  the 
river  was  still  intact.  They  raced  down  the  slopes  to  the 
water  front.  Engineers  frantically  cut  every  demolition 
wire  they  could  find.  A platoon  of  infantry  raced  across 
the  bridge.  As  they  were  approaching  the  east  bank  a 
charge  went  ofi  and  then  another.  The  bridge  shook  but 
held.  Feeble  German  forces  on  the  far  shore  were  quickly 
driven  back.  Tanks  sped  over  the  span.  By  dusk  the 
Americans  had  a strong  bridgehead  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  Rhine.  The  last  great  natural  barrier  in  Western  Ger- 
many had  been  crossed.* 

A few  days  later,  on  the  night  of  March  22,  Patton’s  Third 
Army,  after  overrunning  the  Saar-Palatinate  triangle  in 
a brilliant  operation  carried  out  in  conjunction  with  the 


pfi11"  hSd/‘Kht  German  officers  who  commanded  the  weak  forces  at  the 
Kemagen  bridge  executed.  They  were  tried  by  a “Flying  Special  Tribunal, 
West,  set  up  by  the  Fuehrer  and  presided  oyer  by  a fanatical  Nazi  generaf 
vy  me  name  01  xluebner. 


1430 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


U.S.  Seventh  and  French  First  armies,  made  another  cross- 
ing of  the  Rhine  at  Oppenheim,  south  of  Mainz.  By  March 
25  the  Anglo-American  armies  were  in  possession  of  the 
entire  west  bank  of  the  river  and  across  it  in  two  places 
with  strong  bridgeheads.  In  six  weeks  Hitler  had  lost  more 
than  one  third  of  his  forces  in  the  West  and  most  of 
the  arms  for  half  a million  men. 

At  2:30  a.m.  on  March  24,  he  called  a war  conference 
at  his  headquarters  in  Berlin  to  consider  what  to  do. 

Hitler:  I consider  the  second  bridgehead  at  Oppenheim  as 
the  greatest  danger. 

Hewel  [Foreign  Office  representative]:  The  Rhine  isn’t 
so  very  wide  there. 

Hitler:  A good  two  hundred  fifty  meters.  On  a river 
barrier  only  one  man  has  to  be  asleep  and  a terrible  mis- 
fortune can  happen. 

The  Supreme  Commander  wanted  to  know  if  there  was 
“no  brigade  or  something  like  that  which  could  be  sent 
there.”  An  adjutant  answered: 

At  the  present  time  no  unit  is  available  to  be  sent  to 
Oppenheim.  There  are  only  five  tank  destroyers  in  the 
camp  at  Senne,  which  will  be  ready  today  or  tomorrow. 
They  could  be  put  into  the  battle  in  the  next  few  days  . . ,19 

In  the  next  few  days!  At  that  very  moment  Patton 
had  a bridgehead  at  Oppenheim  seven  miles  wide  and  six 
miles  deep  and  his  tanks  were  heading  eastward  toward 
Frankfurt.  It  is  a measure  of  the  plight  of  the  once  mighty 
German  Army  whose  vaunted  panzer  corps  had  raced 
through  Europe  in  the  earlier  years  that  at  this  moment 
of  crisis  the  Supreme  Commander  should  be  concerned 
with  scraping  up  five  broken-down  tank  destroyers  which 
could  only  be  “put  into  battle  in  the  next  few  days”  to 
stem  the  advance  of  a powerful  enemy  armored  army.* 

With  the  Americans  across  the  Rhine  by  the  third  week 

* The  transcript  of  this  March  23  Fuehrer  conference  is  the  last  one  which 
was  saved,  fairly  intact,  from  the  flames.  It  gives  a good  picture  of  the 
frantic  mind  of  the  Fuehrer  and  his  obsession  with  trivial  details  at  the 
moment  when  the  walls  are  caving  in.  For  the  best  part  of  an  hour  he  dis- 
cusses Goebbels’  proposal  to  use  the  broad  avenue  tli rough  the  Tiergarten  in 
Berlin  as  an  airstrip.  He  lectures  on  the  weakness  of  German  concrete  in 
the  face  of  bombing.  Much  of  the  conference  is  given  over  to  scraping  up 
troops.  One  general  raises  the  question  of  the  Indian  Legion. 

Hitler:  The  Indian  Legion  is  a joke.  There  are  Indians  who  can’t  kill 

a louse,  who’d  rather  let  themselves  be  eaten  up.  They  won’t  kill  an  Eng- 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1431 


of  March  and  a mighty  Allied  army  of  British,  Canadians 
and  Americans  under  Montgomery  poised  to  cross  the 
Lower  Rhine  and  head  both  into  the  North  German  plain 
and  into  the  Ruhr — which  they  did,  beginning  on  the 
night  of  March  23 — Hitler’s  vengeance  turned  from  the  ad- 
vancing enemy  to  his  own  people.  They  had  sustained 
him  through  the  greatest  victories  in  German  history.  Now 
in  the  winter  of  defeat  he  thought  them  no  longer  worthy 
of  his  greatness. 

“If  the  German  people  were  to  be  defeated  in  the  strug- 
gle,” Hitler  had  told  the  gauleiters  in  a speech  in  August 
1944,  “it  must  have  been  too  weak:  it  had  failed  to  prove 
its  mettle  before  history  and  was  destined  only  to  destruc- 
tion.” 20 

He  was  fast  becoming  a physical  wreck  and  this  helped 
to  poison  his  view.  The  strain  of  conducting  the  war,  the 
shock  of  defeats,  the  unhealthy  life  without  fresh  air  and 
exercise  in  the  underground  headquarters  bunkers  which  he 
rarely  left,  his  giving  way  to  ever  more  frequent  temper 
tantrums  and,  not  the  least,  the  poisonous  drugs  he  took 
daily  on  the  advice  of  his  quack  physician,  Dr.  Morell, 
had  undermined  his  health  even  before  the  July  20, 
1944,  bombing.  The  explosion  on  that  day  had  broken  the 
tympanic  membranes  of  both  ears,  which  contributed  to 
his  spells  of  dizziness.  After  the  bombing  his  doctors 
advised  an  extended  vacation,  but  he  refused.  “If  I leave 
East  Prussia,”  he  told  Keitel,  “it  will  fall.  As  long  as  I 
am  here,  it  will  hold.” 

In  September  1944  he  suffered  a breakdown  and  had  to 
take  to  bed,  but  he  recovered  in  November  when  he  re- 
turned to  Berlin.  But  he  never  recovered  control  of  his 
terrible  temper.  More  and  more,  as  the  news  from  the 
fronts  in  1945  grew  worse,  he  gave  way  to  hysterical 
rage.  It  was  invariably  accompanied  by  a trembling  of  his 
hands  and  feet  which  he  could  not  control.  General 
Guderian  has  given  several  descriptions  of  him  at  these 
moments.  At  the  end  of  January,  when  the  Russians  had 
reached  the  Oder  only  a hundred  miles  from  Berlin  and 


lishman  either  I consider  it  nonsense  to  put  them  opposite  the  English 
. . . it  we  used  Indians  to  turn  prayer  mills,  or  something  like  that,  they 
would  be  the  most  indefatigable  soldiers  in  the  world  . . . 


And  so  on  far  into  the  night.  The  meeting  broke  up  at  3:43  a.m. 


1432 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  General  Staff  Chief  started  to  demand  the  evacuation 
by  sea  of  several  German  divisions  cut  o2  in  the  Baltic 
area,  Hitler  turned  on  him. 

He  stood  in  front  of  me  shaking  his  fists,  so  that  my  good 
Chief  of  Staff,  Thomale,  felt  constrained  to  seize  me  by  the 
skirt  of  my  jacket  and  pull  me  backward  lest  I be  the  victim 
of  a physical  assault. 

A few  days  later,  on  February  13,  1945,  the  two  men 
got  into  another  row  over  the  Russian  situation  that  lasted, 
Guderian  says,  for  two  hours. 

His  fists  raised,  his  cheeks  flushed  with  rage,  his  whole 
body  trembling,  the  man  stood  there  in  front  of  me,  beside 
himself  with  fury  and  having  lost  all  self-control.  After  each 
outburst  Hitler  would  stride  up  and  down  the  carpet  edge, 
then  suddenly  stop  immediately  before  me  and  hurl  his  next 
accusation  in  my  face.  He  was  almost  screaming,  his  eyes 
seemed  to  pop  out  of  his  head  and  the  veins  stood  out  in 
his  temples.21 

It  was  in  this  state  of  mind  and  health  that  the  German 
Fuehrer  made  one  of  the  last  momentous  decisions  of  his 
life.  On  March  19  he  issued  a general  order  that  all  mili- 
tary, industrial,  transportation  and  communication  instal- 
lations as  well  as  all  stores  in  Germany  must  be  destroyed 
in  order  to  prevent  them  from  falling  intact  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  The  measures  were  to  be  carried  out  by  the 
military  with  the  help  of  the  Nazi  gauleiters  and  “com- 
missars for  defense.”  “All  directives  opposing  this,”  the 
order  concluded,  “are  invalid.”  22 

Germany  was  to  be  made  one  vast  wasteland.  Nothing 
was  to  be  left  with  which  the  German  people  might  some- 
how survive  their  defeat. 

Albert  Speer,  the  outspoken  Minister  for  Armament  and 
War  Production,  had  anticipated  the  barbarous  directive 
from  previous  meetings  with  Hitler  and  on  March  15  had 
drawn  up  a memorandum  in  which  he  strenuously  op- 
posed such  a criminal  step  and  reiterated  his  contention 
that  the  war  was  already  lost.  He  presented  it  to  the 
Fuehrer  personally  on  the  evening  of  March  18. 

In  four  to  eight  weeks  [Speer  wrote]  the  final  collapse  of 
the  German  economy  must  be  expected  with  certainty  . . . 
After  that  collapse  the  war  cannot  be  continued  even  mili- 
tarily . . . We  must  do  everything  to  maintain,  even  if  only 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1433 


in  a most  primitive  manner,  a basis  for  the  existence  of  the 
nation  to  the  last  . . . We  have  no  right  at  this  stage  of  the 
war  to  carry  out  demolitions  which  might  affect  the  life  of 
the  people.  If  our  enemies  wish  to  destroy  this  nation, 
which  has  fought  with  unique  bravery,  then  this  historical 
shame  shall  rest  exclusively  upon  them.  We  have  the  duty 
of  leaving  to  the  nation  every  possibility  of  insuring  its  re- 
construction in  the  distant  future  . . .23 

But  Hitler,  his  own  personal  fate  sealed,  was  not  in- 
terested in  the  continued  existence  of  the  German  people, 
for  whom  he  had  always  professed  such  boundless  love. 
He  told  Speer: 

If  the  war  is  lost,  the  nation  will  also  perish.  This  fate 
is  inevitable.  There  is  no  necessity  to  take  into  consideration 
the  basis  which  the  people  will  need  to  continue  a most 
primitive  existence.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  be  better  to 
destroy  these  things  ourselves  because  this  nation  will  have 
proved  to  be  the  weaker  one  and  the  future  will  belong 
solely  to  the  stronger  eastern  nation  [Russia],  Besides, 
those  who  will  remain  after  the  battle  are  only  die  inferior 
ones,  for  the  good  ones  have  been  killed. 

Whereupon  the  Supreme  Warlord  promulgated  his  in- 
famous “scorched . earth”  directive  the  next  day.  It  was 
followed  on  March  23  by  an  equally  monstrous  order  by 
Martin  Bormann,  the  Fuehrer’s  secretary,  a molelike  man 
who  had  now  gained  a position  at  court  second  to  none 
among  the  Nazi  satraps.  Speer  described  it  on  the  stand  at 
Nuremberg. 

The  Bormann  decree  aimed  at  bringing  the  population  to 
the  center  of  the  Reich  from  both  East  and  West,  and  the 
foreign  workers  and  prisoners  of  war  were  to  be  included. 
These  millions  of  people  were  to  be  sent  upon  their  trek  on 
foot.  No  provisions  for  their  existence  had  been  made,  nor 
could  it  be  carried  out  in  view  of  the  situation.  It  would 
have  resulted  in  an  unimaginable  hunger  catastrophe. 

And  had  all  the  other  orders  of  Hitler  and  Bormann — 
there  were  a number  of  supplementary  directives — been 
carried  out,  millions  of  Germans  who  had  escaped  with 
their  lives  up  to  then  might  well  have  died.  Speer  tried 
to  summarize  for  the  Nuremberg  court  the  various 
“scorched  earth”  orders.  To  be  destroyed,  he  said,  were 

all  industrial  plants,  all  important  electrical  facilities,  water 
works,  gas  works,  food  stores  and  clothing  stores;  all  bridges, 


1434 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

all  railway  and  communication  installations,  all  waterways, 
all  ships,  all  freight  cars  and  all  locomotives. 

That  the  German  people  were  spared  this  final  catastro- 
phe was  due  to — aside  from  the  rapid  advances  of  the 
Allied  troops,  which  made  the  carrying  out  of  such  a 
gigantic  demolition  impossible — the  superhuman  efforts  of 
Speer  and  a number  of  Army  officers  who,  in  direct 
disobedience  (finally!)  of  Hitler’s  orders,  raced  about  the 
country  to  make  sure  that  vital  communications,  plants 
and  stores  were  not  blown  up  by  zealously  obedient 
Army  officers  and  party  hacks. 

The  end  now  approached  for  the  German  Army. 

While  Field  Marshal  Montgomery’s  British-Canadian 
armies,  after  their  crossing  of  the  Lower  Rhine  the  last 
week  of  March,  pushed  northeast  for  Bremen,  Hamburg  and 
the  Baltic  at  Luebeck,  General  Simpson’s  U.S.  Ninth  Army 
and  General  Hodges’  U.S.  First  Army  advanced  rapidly 
past  the  Ruhr,  the  Ninth  Army  on  its  northern  perimeter, 
the  First  Army  to  the  south.  On  April  1 they  linked  up  at 
Lippstadt.  Field  Marshal  Model’s  Army  Group  B,  consisting 
of  the  Fifteenth  and  the  Fifth'  Panzer  armies — some 
twenty-one  divisions — was  trapped  in  the  ruins  of  Ger- 
many’s greatest  industrial  area.  It  held  out  for  eighteen 
days,  surrendering  on  April  18.  Another  325,000  Ger- 
mans, including  thirty  generals,  were  captured,  but  Model 
was  not  among  them.  Rather  than  become  a prisoner  he 
shot  himself. 

The  encirclement  of  Model’s  armies  in  the  Ruhr  had  tom 
the  German  front  in  the  West  wide  open,  leaving  a gap 
two  hundred  miles  wide  through  which  the  divisions  of  the 
U.S.  Ninth  and  First  armies  not  needed  to  contain  the 
Ruhr  now  burst  toward  the  Elbe  River  in  the  heart  of 
Germany.  The  road  to  Berlin  lay  open,  for  between  these 
two  American  armies  and  the  German  capital  there  were 
only  a few  scattered,  disorganized  German  divisions.  On 
the  evening  of  April  11,  after  advancing  some  sixty  miles 
since  daybreak,  a spearhead  of  the  U.S.  Ninth  Army 
reached  the  Elbe  River  near  Magdeburg,  and  on  the  next 
day  threw  a bridgehead  over  it.  The  Americans  were  only 
sixty  miles  from  Berlin. 

Eisenhower’s  purpose  now  was  to  split  Germany  in  two 
by  joining  up  with  the  Russians  on  the  Elbe  between  Mag- 


1435 


The  Fall  of  ihe  Third  Reich 


deburg  and  Dresden.  Though  bitterly  criticized  by  Church- 
ill and  the  British  military  chiefs  for  not  beating  the  Rus- 
sians to  Berlin,  as  he  easily  could  have  done,  Eisenhower 
and  his  staff  at  SHAEF  were  obsessed  at  this  moment 
with  the  urgency  of  heading  southeast  after  the  junction 
with  the  Russians  in  order  to  capture  the  so-called  Na- 
tional Redoubt,  where  it  was  believed  Hitler  was  gather- 
ing his  remaining  forces  to  make  a last  stand  in  the 
almost  impenetrable  Alpine  mountains  of  southern  Bavaria 
and  western  Austria. 

The  “National  Redoubt”  was  a phantom.  It  never  existed 
except  in  the  propaganda  blasts  of  Dr.  Goebbels  and  in  the 
cautious  minds  at  Eisenhower’s  headquarters  which  had 
fallen  for  them.  As  early  as  March  11,  SHAEF  intelligence 
had  warned  Eisenhower  that  the  Nazis  were  planning  to 
make  an  impregnable  fortress  in  the  mountains  and  that 
Hitler  himself  would  command  its  defenses  from  his  re- 
treat at  Berchtesgaden.  The  icy  mountain  crags  were  “prac- 
tically impenetrable,”  it  said. 

Here  [it  continued],  defended  by  nature  and  by  the  most 
efficient  secret  weapons  yet  invented,  the  powers  that  have 
hitherto  guided  Germany  will  survive  to  reorganize  her 
resurrection;  here  armaments  will  be  manufactured  in 
bombproof  factories,  food  and  equipment  will  be  stored  in 
vast  underground  caverns  and  a specially  selected  corps  of 
young  men  will  be  trained  in  guerrilla  warfare,  so  that  a 
whole  underground  army  can  be  fitted  and  directed  to 
liberate  Germany  from  the  occupying  forces.24 


It  would  almost  seem  as  though  the  Allied  Supreme 
Commander’s  intelligence  staff  had  been  infiltrated  by 
British  and  American  mystery  writers.  At  any  rate,  this 
fantastic  appreciation  was  taken  seriously  at  SHAEF, 
where  Eisenhower’s  chief  of  staff,  General  Bedell  Smith, 
mulled  over  the  dread  possibility  “of  a prolonged  cam- 
paign in  the  Alpine  area”  which  would  take  a heavy  toll 
of  American  lives  and  prolong  the  war  indefinitely.* 


* “Not  until  after  the  campaign  ended,”  General  Omar  Bradley  later  wrote, 
“were  we  to  learn  that  this  Redoubt  existed  largely  in  the  imaginations  of  a 
few  fanatic  Nazis.  It  grew  into  so  exaggerated  a scheme  that  I am  astonished 
we  could  have  believed  it  as  innocently  as  we  did.  But  while  it  persisted, 
this  legend  of  the  Redoubt  was  too  ominous  a threat  to  ignore  and  in  con; 
sequence  it  shaped  our  tactical  thinking  during  the  closing  weeks  of  the  war. 
(Bradley,  A Soldier’s  Story,  p.  536.)  . . 

"A  great  deal  has  been  written  about  the  Alpine  Fortress.  Field  Marshal 
Kesselring  commented  wryly  after  the  war,  “mostly  nonsense.’  (Kesselnng, 
A Soldiers  Record,  p.  276.) 


1436 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

This  was  the  last  time  that  the  resourceful  Dr.  Goebbels 
succeeded  in  influencing  the  strategic  course  of  the  war 
by  propaganda  bluff.  For  though  Adolf  Hitler  at  first 
considered  retiring  to  the  Austro-Bavarian  mountains 
near  which  he  was  bom  and  in  which  he  had  spent  most 
of  the  private  hours  of  his  life,  and  which  he  loved  and 
where  he  had  the  only  home  he  could  call  his  own — on 
the  Obersalzberg  above  Berchtesgaden — and  there  make 
a last  stand,  he  had  hesitated  until  it  was  too  late. 

On  April  16,  the  day  American  troops  reached  Nurem- 
berg, the  city  of  the  great  Nazi  Party  rallies,  Zhukov’s 
Russian  armies  broke  loose  from  their  bridgeheads  over 
the  Oder,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  April  21  they  reached 
the  outskirts  of  Berlin.  Vienna  had  already  fallen  on  April 
13.  At  4:40  on  the  afternoon  of  April  25,  patrols  of  the 
U.S.  69th  Infantry  Division  met  forward  elements  of  the 
Russian  58th  Guards  Division  at  Torgau  on  the  Elbe, 
some  seventy-five  miles  south  of  Berlin.  North  and  South 
Germany  were  severed.  Adolf  Hitler  was  cut  off  in  Berlin 
The  last  days  of  the  Third  Reich  had  come. 


31 

GOETTERRAEMMERUNG:  THE  LAST 
DAYS  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 


hitler  had  planned  to  leave  Berlin  on  April  20,  his  fifty- 
sixth  birthday,  for  Obersalzberg  and  there  direct  the  last 
stand  of  the  Third  Reich  in  the  legendary  mountain  fast- 
ness of  Barbarossa.  Most  of  the  ministerial  offices  had 
already  moved  south  with  their  trucks  full  of  state  papers 
and  of  frantic  officials  desperate  to  get  out  of  doomed 
Berlin.  The  Fuehrer  himself  had  sent  most  of  the  members 
of  his  household  staff  to  Berchtesgaden  ten  days  before 
to  prepare  his  mountain  villa,  the  Berghof,  for  his  com- 
ing. 

He  was  destined,  however,  never  to  see  his  beloved 
Alpine  retreat  again.  The  end  was  approaching  faster  than 
he  had  thought  possible.  The  Americans  and  Russians  were 
driving  swiftly  to  a junction  on  the  Elbe.  The  British 
were  at  the  gates  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen  and  threatening 
to  cut  off  Germany  from  occupied  Denmark.  In  Italy 
Bologna  had  fallen  and  Alexander’s  Allied  forces  were 
plunging  into  the  valley  of  the  Po.  The  Russians,  having 
captured  Vienna  on  April  13,  were  heading  up  the  Danube, 
and  the  U.S.  Third  Army  was  sweeping  down  that  river 
to  meet  them  in  Hitler’s  home  town  of  Linz  in  Austria. 
Nuremberg,  where  work  had  been  going  on  throughout 
the  war  on  the  great  auditorium  and  stadiums  which  were 
to  mark  the  ancient  town  as  the  capital  of  the  Nazi  Party, 
was  besieged  and  part  of  the  U.S.  Seventh  Army  was 
sweeping  past  it  toward  Munich,  the  birthplace  of  the 
Nazi  movement.  In  Berlin  the  thunder  of  Russian  heavy 
artillery  could  be  heard. 

“All  through  the  week,”  Count  Schwerin  von  Krosigk, 
the  puerile  Minister  of  Finance  and  former  Rhodes 
scholar,  who  had  scooted  out  of  Berlin  for  the  north  at 

1437 


1438 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  first  word  of  the  approaching  Bolsheviki,  noted  in  his 
diary  on  April  23,  “there  was  nothing  but  a succession 
of  Job’s  messengers.  Our  people  seem  to  be  faced  with  the 
darkest  fate.”  1 

Hitler  had  left  his  headquarters  in  Rastenburg  in  East 
Prussia  for  the  last  time  on  the  previous  November  20,  as 
the  Russians  approached,  and  had  remained  in  Berlin, 
which  he  had  scarcely  seen  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war  in  the  East,  until  December  10,  when  he  had  gone 
to  his  Western  headquarters  at  Ziegenberg  near  Bad  Nau- 
heim to  direct  the  great  gamble  in  the  Ardennes.  After 
its  failure  he  had  returned  on  January  16  to  Berlin, 
where  he  was  to  remain  until  the  end,  directing  his  crum- 
bling armies  from  the  underground  bunker  fifty  feet  below 
the  Chancellery,  whose  great  marble  halls  were  now  in 
ruins  from  Allied  bombing. 

Physically  he  was  fast  deteriorating.  A young  Army 
captain  who  saw  him  for  the  first  time  in  February  later 
recalled  his  appearance. 

His  head  was  slightly  wobbling.  His  left  arm  hung  slackly 
and  his  hand  trembled  a good  deal.  There  was  an  indescrib- 
able flickering  glow  in  his  eyes,  creating  a fearsome  and 
wholly  unnatural  effect.  His  face  and  the  parts  around  his 
eyes  gave  the  impression  of  total  exhaustion.  All  his  move- 
ments were  those  of  a senile  man.2 

Since  the  July  20  attempt  on  his  life  he  had  grown 
distrustful  of  everyone,  even  of  his  old  party  stalwarts. 
‘ I am  lied  to  on  all  sides,”  he  fumed  to  one  of  his  women 
secretaries  in  March. 

I can  rely  on  no  one.  They  all  betray  me.  The  whole  busi- 
ness makes  me  sick  ...  If  anything  happens  to  me,  Germany 
will  be  left  without  a leader.  I have  no  successor.  Hess  is 
mad,  Goering  has  lost  the  sympathy  of  the  people,  and 
Himmler  would  be  rejected  by  the  Party— besides,  he 
[Himmler]  is  so  completely  inartistic  . . . Rack  your 
brains  and  tell  me  who  my  successor  is  to  be  . . ,3 

One  would  have  thought  that  at  this  stage  of  history  the 
question  of  succession  was  academic,  but  it  was  not — not 
in  this  Nazi  cuckoo  land.  Not  only  the  Fuehrer  was  obsessed 
by  it  but  the  leading  candidates  to  succeed  him,  as  we 
shall  shortly  see. 

Physical  wreck  though  Hitler  now  was,  with  a disastrous 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1439 

end  staring  him  in  the  face  as  the  Russians  approached 
Berlin  and  the  Western  Allies  overran  the  Reich,  he  and 
a few  of  his  most  fanatical  followers,  Goebbels  above 
all,  clung  stubbornly  to  their  hopes  of  being  saved  at  the 
last  minute  by  a miracle. 

One  fine  evening  early  in  April  Goebbels  had  sat  up 
reading  to  Hitler  from  one  of  the  Fuehrer’s  favorite  books, 
Carlyle’s  History  of  Frederick  the  Great.  The  chapter 
he  was  reading  told  of  the  darkest  days  of  the  Seven 
Years’  War,  when  the  great  King  felt  himself  at  the 
end  of  his  rope  and  told  his  ministers  that  if  by  Feb- 
ruary 15  no  change  for  the  better  in  his  fortunes  oc- 
curred he  would  give  up  and  take  poison.  This  portion  of 
history  certainly  had  its  appropriateness  and  no  doubt 
Goebbels  read  it  in  his  most  dramatic  fashion. 

“Brave  King!  [Goebbels  read  on]  Wait  yet  a little  while, 
and  the  days  of  your  suffering  will  be  over.  Already  the 
sun  of  your  good  fortune  stands  behind  the  clouds  and  soon 
will  rise  upon  you.”  On  February  12  the  Czarina  died,  the 
Miracle  of  the  House  of  Brandenburg  had  come  to  pass. 

The  Fuehrer  s eyes,  Goebbels  told  Krosigk,  to  whose 
diary  we  owe  this  touching  scene,  “were  filled  with  tears.”  4 

With  such  encouragement— and  from  a British  source 

they  sent  for  two  horoscopes,  which  were  kept  in  the 
files  of  one  of  Himmler’s  multitudinous  “research”  offices. 
One  was  the  horoscope  of  the  Fuehrer  drawn  up  on 
January  30,  1933,  the  day  he  took  office;  the  other  was  the 
horoscope  of  the  Weimar  Republic,  composed  by  some  un- 
known astrologer  on  November  9,  1918,  the  day  of  the 
Republic’s  birth.  Goebbels  communicated  the  results  of 
the  re-examination  of  these  two  remarkable  documents 
to  Krosigk. 

An  amazing  fact  has  become  evident,  both  horoscopes 
predicting  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1939,  the  victories 
until  1941,  and  the  subsequent  series  of  reversals,  with  the 
hardest  blows  during  the  first  months  of  1945,  particularly 
during  the  first  half  of  April.  In  the  second  half  of  April 
we  were  to  experience  a temporary  success.  Then  there 
would  be  stagnation  until  August  and  peace  that  same 
month.  For  the  following  three  years  Germany  would  have 
a hard  time,  but  starting  in  1948  she  would  rise  again.® 


1440  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Fortified  by  Carlyle  and  the  “amazing”  predictions  of 
the  stars,  Goebbels  on  April  6 issued  a ringing  appeal 
to  the  retreating  troops: 

The  Fuehrer  has  declared  that  even  in  this  very  year  a 
change  of  fortune  shall  come  . . . The  true  quality  of  genius 
is  its  consciousness  and  its  sure  knowledge  of  coming 
change.  The  Fuehrer  knows  the  exact  hour  of  its  arrival. 
Destiny  has  sent  us  this  man  so  that  we,  in  this  time  of 
great  external  and  internal  stress,  shall  testify  to  the 
miracle  . . .8 

Scarcely  a week  later,  on  the  night  of  April  12,  Goebbels 
convinced  himself  that  “the  exact  hour”  of  the  miracle 
had  come.  It  had  been  a day  of  further  bad  news.  The 
Americans  had  appeared  on  the  Dessau— Berlin  autobahn 
and  the  High  Command  had  hastily  ordered  the  destruction 
of  its  last  two  remaining  powder  factories,  which  were 
in  the  vicinity.  Henceforth  the  German  soldiers  would 
have  to  get  along  with  the  ammunition  at  hand.  Goebbels 
had  spent  the  day  at  the  headquarters  of  General  Busse 
on  the  Oder  front  at  Kuestrin.  The  General  had  assured  him 
that  a Russian  breakthrough  was  impossible,  that  (as 
Goebbels  the  next  day  told  Krosigk)  he  was  “holding 
out  until  the  British  kick  us  in  the  ass.” 

In  the  evening  [Goebbels  recounted]  they  had  sat  to- 
gether at  headquarters  and  he  had  developed  his  thesis  that 
according  to  historical  logic  and  justice  things  were 
bound  to  change,  just  as  in  the  Seven  Years’  War  there  had 
been  the  miracle  of  the  House  of  Brandenburg. 

“What  Czarina  will  die  this  time?”  an  officer  asked. 

Goebbels  did  not  know.  But  fate,  he  replied,  “holds 
all  sorts  of  possibilities.” 

When  the  Propaganda  Minister  got  back  to  Berlin  late 
that  night  the  center  of  the  capital  was  in  flames  from 
another  R.A.F.  bombing.  The  remains  of  the  Chancellery 
and  the  Adlon  Hotel  up  the  Wilhelmstrasse  were  burning. 
At  the  steps  of  the  Propaganda  Ministry,  a secretary 
greeted  Goebbels  with  a piece  of  urgent  news.  “Roosevelt  ” 
he  said,  “is  dead!” 

The  Minister’s  face  lit  up,  visible  to  all  in  the  light  of  the 
flames  from  the  Chancellery  across  the  Wilhelmsplatz. 


1441 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

“Bring  out  our  best  champagne!”  Goebbels  cried.  “And 
get  me  die  Fuehrer  on  the  telephone!” 

Hitler  was  in  his  deep  bunker  across  the  way  sitting  out 
the  bombing.  He  picked  up  the  telephone. 

“My  Fuehrer,”  Goebbels  said.  “I  congratulate  you! 
Roosevelt  is  dead!  It  is  written  in  the  stars  that  the  second 
half  of  April  will  be  the  turning  point  for  us.  This  is 
Friday,  April  the  thirteenth.  [It  was  already  after  mid- 
night.] It  is  the  turning  point!” 

Hitler’s  reaction  to  the  news  was  not  recorded,  though  it 
may  be  imagined  in  view  of  the  encouragement  he  had 
been  receiving  front  Carlyle  and  the  stars.  But  that  of 
Goebbels  was.  “He  was,”  says  his  secretary,  “in  ecstasy.”  7 

The  fatuous  Count  Schwerin  von  Krosigk  too.  When 
Goebbels’  State  Secretary  phoned  him  that  Roosevelt  was 
dead  he  exclaimed — at  least  in  his  faithful  diary: 

This  was  the  Angel  of  History!  We  felt  its  wings  flutter 
through  the  room.  Was  that  not  the  turn  of  fortune  we 
awaited  so  anxiously? 

The  next  morning  Krosigk  telephoned  Goebbels  with 
his  “congratulations” — he  affirms  it  proudly  in  his  diary — 
and,  as  if  this  were  not  enough,  followed  it  with  a letter 
in  which  he  hailed  Roosevelt’s  death,  he  says,  as  “a 
divine  judgment ...  a gift  from  God.” 

In  this  atmosphere  of  a lunatic  asylum,  with  cabinet 
ministers  long  in  power  and  educated  in  Europe’s  ancient 
universities,  as  Krosigk  and  Goebbels  were,  grasping  at 
the  readings  of  the  stars  and  rejoicing  amidst  the  flames 
of  the  burning  capital  in  the  death  of  the  American  Presi- 
dent as  a sure  sign  that  the  Almighty  would  now  rescue 
the  Third  Reich  at  the  eleventh  hour  from  impending  catas- 
trophe, the  last  act  in  Berlin  was  played  out  to  its  final 
curtain. 

Eva  Braun  had  arrived  in  Berlin  to  join  Hitler  on  April 
15.  Very  few  Germans  knew  of  her  existence  and  even 
fewer  of  her  relationship  to  Adolf  Hitler.  For  more  than 
twelve  years  she  had  been  his  mistress.  Now  in  April  she 
had  come,  as  Trevor-Roper  says,  for  her  wedding  and  her 
ceremonial  death. 

She  is  interesting  for  her  role  in  the  last  chapter  of  this 
narrative  but  not  interesting  in  herself;  she  was  not  a 


1442 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Pompadour  or  a Lola  Montez.*  Hitler,  although  he  was 
undoubtedly  extremely  fond  of  her  and  found  relaxation 
in  her  unobtrusive  company,  had  always  kept  her  out  of 
sight,  refusing  to  allow  her  to  come  to  his  various  head- 
quarters, where  he  spent  almost  all  of  his  time  during  the 
war  years,  and  rarely  permitting  her  even  to  come  to  Ber- 
lin. She  remained  immured  at  the  Berghof  on  the  Ober- 
salzberg,  passing  her  time  in  swimming  and  skiing,  in 
reading  cheap  novels  and  seeing  trashy  films,  in  dancing 
(which  Hitler  disapproved  of)  and  endlessly  groom- 
ing herself,  pining  away  for  her  absent  loved  one. 

^ She  was,”  says  Erich  Kempka,  the  Fuehrer’s  chauffeur, 
“the  unhappiest  woman  in  Germany.  She  spent  most  of 
her  life  waiting  for  Hitler.”  8 

Field  Marshal  Keitel  described  her  appearance  during  an 
interrogation  at  Nuremberg. 


She  was  very  slender,  elegant  appearance,  quite  nice  legs 
—one  could  see  that — reticent  and  retiring  and  a very,  very 
nice  person,  dark  blond.  She  stood  very  much  in  the  back- 
ground and  one  saw  her  very  rarely.9 

The  daughter  of  lower-middle-class  Bavarian  parents, 
who  at  first  strenuously  opposed  her  illicit  relation  with 
Hitler,  even  though  he  was  the  dictator,  she  had  been 
employed  in  the  Munich  photograph  shop  of  Heinrich 
Hoffmann,  who  introduced  her  to  the  Fuehrer.  This  was 
a year  or  two  after  the  suicide  of  Geli  Raubal,  the  niece 
of  Hitler,  for  whom,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had  the  one 
great  passionate  love  of  his  life.  Eva  Braun  too,  it  seems, 
was  often  driven  to  despair  by  her  lover,  though  not  for 
the  same  reasons  as  Geli  Raubal.  Eva,  though  installed  in 
a suite  in  Hitler’s  Alpine  villa,  couldn’t  endure  the  long 
separations  when  he  was  away  and  twice  tried  to  kill  her- 
self in  the  early  years  of  their  friendship.  But  gradually 
she  accepted  her  frustrating  and  ambiguous  role — acknowl- 
edged neither  as  wife  nor  as  mistress — content  to  be  sole 
woman  companion  of  the  great  man  and  making  the  most 
of  their  rare  moments  together. 

She  was  now  determined  to  share  his  end.  Like  Dr. 
and  Frau  Goebbels,  she  had  no  desire  to  live  in  a Ger- 
many without  Adolf  Hitler.  “It  would  not  be  fit  to  live 


For  all  writers  of  history,”  Speer  told  Trevor-Roper,  “Eva  Braun  is 

going  to  be  a disappointment,”  to  which  the  historian  adds:  “—and  for 
readers  of  history  too.”  (Trevor-Roper,  The  Last  Days  of  Hitler  p 92  ) 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1443 


in  for  a true  German,”  she  told  Hanna  Reitsch,  the 
famed  German  woman  test  pilot,  in  the  shelter  just  before 
the  end.10  Though  Eva  Braun  had  a birdlike  mind  and 
made  no  intellectual  impression  on  Hitler  at  all — perhaps 
this  is  one  reason  he  preferred  her  company  to  that  of  in- 
telligent women — it  is  obvious  that  his  influence  on  her, 
as  on  so  many  others,  was  total. 

HITLER’S  LAST  GREAT  DECISION 

Hitler’s  birthday  on  April  20  passed  quietly  enough, 
although,  as  General  Karl  Roller,  the  Air  Force  Chief  of 
Staff,  who  was  present  at  the  celebration  in  the  bunker, 
noted  in  his  diary,  it  was  a day  of  further  catastrophes 
on  the  rapidly  disintegrating  fronts.  All  the  Old  Guard 
Nazis,  Goering,  Goebbels,  Himmler,  Ribbentrop  and  Bor- 
mann,  were  there,  as  well  as  the  surviving  military  leaders, 
Doenitz,  Keitel,  Jodi  and  Krebs — the  last-named  the  new, 
and  last,  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff.  They  offered 
the  Fuehrer  birthday  congratulations. 

The  warlord  was  not  unusually  cast  down,  despite  the 
situation.  He  was  still  confident,  as  he  had  told  his  gen- 
erals three  days  before,  that  “the  Russians  were  going 
to  suffer  their  bloodiest  defeat  of  all  before  Berlin.”  The 
generals  knew  better,  and  at  the  regular  military  confer- 
ence after  the  birthday  party  they  urged  Hitler  to  leave 
Berlin  for  the  south.  In  a day  or  two,  they  explained,  the 
Russians  would  cut  off  the  last  escape  corridor  in  that 
direction.  Hitler  hesitated;  he  would  not  say  yes  or  no. 
Apparently  he  could  not  quite  face  the  appalling  fact 
that  the  capital  of  the  Third  Reich  was  now  about  to  be 
captured  by  the  Russians,  whose  armies,  he  had  an- 
nounced years  before,  were  as  good  as  destroyed.  As  a 
concession  to  the  generals  he  consented  to  setting  up  two 
separate  commands  in  case  the  Americans  and  Russians 
made  their  junction  on  the  Elbe.  Admiral  Doenitz  would 
head  that  in  the  north  and  perhaps  Kesselring  the  one  in 
the  south — he  was  not  quite  sure  about  the  latter  appoint- 
ment. 

That  night  there  was  a general  getaway  from  Berlin. 
Two  of  the  Fuehrer’s  most  trusted  and  veteran  aides  got 
out:  Himmler  and  Goering,  the  latter  in  a motor  caravan 
whose  trucks  were  filled  with  booty  from  his  fabulous 


1444  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

estate,  Karinhall.  Each  of  these  Old  Guard  Nazis  left  con- 
vinced that  his  beloved  Leader  would  soon  be  dead  and 
that  he  would  succeed  him. 

They  never  saw  him  again.  Nor  did  Ribbentrop,  who 
also  scurried  for  safer  parts  late  that  night. 

But  Hitler  had  not  yet  given  up.  On  the  day  after  his 
birthday  he  ordered  an  all-out  counterattack  on  the  Rus- 
sians in  the  southern  suburbs  of  Berlin  by  S.S.  General 
Felix  Steiner.  Every  available  soldier  in  the  Berlin  area 
was  to  be  thrown  into  the  attack,  including  the  Luftwaffe 
ground  troops. 

“Any  commander  who  holds  back  his  forces,”  Hitler 
shouted  to  General  Roller,  who  had  remained  behind  to 
represent  the  Air  Force,  “will  forfeit  his  life  in  five  hours. 
You  yourself  will  guarantee  with  your  head  that  the  last 
man  is  thrown  in.”  11 

All  through  the  day  and  far  into  the  next  Hitler  waited 
impatiently  for  the  news  of  Steiner’s  counterattack.  It  was 
a further  example  of  his  loss  of  contact  with  reality.  There 
was  no  Steiner  attack.  It  was  never  attempted.  It  existed 
only  in  the  feverish  mind  of  the  desperate  dictator.  When 
he  was  finally  forced  to  recognize  this  the  storm  broke. 

April  22  brought  the  last  turning  point  in  Hitler’s  road 
to  ruin.  From  early  morning  until  3 p.m.  he  had  been  on 
the  telephone,  as  he  had  been  the  day  before,  trying  to 
find  out  from  the  various  command  posts  how  the  Steiner 
counterattack  was  going.  No  one  knew.  General  Koller’s 
planes  could  not  locate  it,  nor  could  the  ground  command- 
ers, though  it  was  supposed  to  be  rolling  only  two  or 
three  miles  south  of  the  capital.  Not  even  Steiner,  though 
he  existed,  could  be  found,  let  alone  his  army. 

The  blowup  came  at  the  daily  military  conference  in  the 
bunker  at  3 p.m.  Hitler  angrily  demanded  news  of  Steiner. 
Neither  Keitel  nor  Jodi  nor  anyone  else  had  any.  But  the 
generals  had  other  news.  The  withdrawal  of  troops  from 
the  north  of  Berlin  to  support  Steiner  had  so  weakened 
the  front  there  that  the  Russians  had  broken  through 
and  their  tanks  were  now  within  the  city  limits. 

This  was  too  much  for  the  Supreme  Warlord.  All  the  sur- 
viving witnesses  testify  that  he  completely  lost  control  of 
himself.  He  flew  into  the  greatest  rage  of  his  life.  This 
was  the  end,  he  shrieked.  Everyone  had  deserted  him. 
There  was  nothing  but  treason,  lies,  corruption  and  cow- 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1445 


ardice.  All  was  over.  Very  well,  he  would  stay  on  in  Berlin. 
He  would  personally  take  over  the  defense  of  the  capital 
of  the  Third  Reich.  The  others  could  leave,  if  they  wished. 
In  this  place  he  would  meet  his  end. 

The  others  protested.  There  was  still  hope,  they  said,  if 
the  Fuehrer  retired  to  the  south,  where  Field  Marshal  Ferdi- 
nand Schoemer’s  army  group  in  Czechoslovakia  and  con- 
siderable forces  of  Kesselring  were  still  intact.  Doenitz, 
who  had  left  for  the  northwest  to  take  over  command 
of  the  troops  there,  and  Himmler,  who,  as  we  shall 
see,  was  up  to  his  own  game,  telephoned  to  urge  the  Leader 
not  to  remain  in  Berlin.  Even  Ribbentrop  called  up  to 
say  he  was  about  to  spring  a “diplomatic  coup”  which 
would  save  everything.  But  Hitler  had  no  more  faith  in 
them,  not  even  in  his  “second  Bismarck,”  as  he  once,  in  a 
moment  of  folly,  had  called  his  Foreign  Minister.  He  had 
made  his  decision,  he  said  to  all.  And  to  show  them 
that  it  was  irrevocable,  he  called  for  a secretary  and  in 
their  presence  dictated  an  announcement  that  was  to  be 
read  immediately  over  the  radio.  The  Fuehrer,  it  said, 
would  stay  in  Berlin  and  defend  it  to  the  end. 

Hitler  then  sent  for  Goebbels  and  invited  him,  his  wife 
and  their  six  young  children  to  move  into  the  Fuehrer- 
bunker  from  their  badly  bombed  house  in  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  garden.  He  knew  that  at  least  this  fanatical  and 
faithful  follower,  and  his  family,  would  stick  by  him  to 
the  end.  Next  Hitler  turned  to  his  papers,  sorted  out 
those  he  wished  to  be  destroyed,  and  turned  them  over 
to  one  of  his  adjutants,  Julius  Schaub,  who  took  them  up 
to  the  garden  and  burned  them. 

Finally  that  evening  he  called  in  Keitel  and  Jodi  and 
ordered  them  to  proceed  south  to  take  over  direct  com- 
mand of  the  remaining  armed  forces.  Both  generals,  who 
had  been  at  Hitler’s  side  throughout  the  war,  have  left 
vivid  accounts  of  their  final  parting  with  the  Supreme 
Warlord.12 

When  Keitel  protested  that  he  would  not  leave  without 
the  Fuehrer,  Hitler  answered,  “You  will  follow  my 
orders.”  Keitel,  who  had  never  disobeyed  an  order 
from  the  Leader  in  his  life,  not  even  those  commanding 
him  to  commit  the  vilest  war  crimes,  said  nothing 
further,  but  Jodi,  less  a lackey,  did.  To  this  soldier,  who, 
despite  his  fanatical  devotion  to  the  Fuehrer  whom  he 


1446 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

had  served  so  well,  still  retained  some  sense  of  military 
tradition,  the  Supreme  Warlord  was  deserting  the  com- 
mand of  his  troops  and  shirking  his  responsibility  for 
them  at  a moment  of  disaster. 

“You  can’t  direct  anything  from  here,”  Jodi  said.  “If 
you  don’t  have  your  Leadership  Staff  with  you  how  can 
you  lead  anything?” 

Well,  then,”  Hitler  retorted,  “Goering  can  take  over  the 
leadership  down  there.” 

When  one  of  them  pointed  out  that  no  soldier  would 
fight  for  the  Reich  Marshal,  Hitler  cut  in.  “What  do  you 
mean,,  fight?  There’s  precious  little  more  fighting  to  be 
done!”  Even  for  the  mad  conqueror  the  scales  at  last 
were  falling  from  the  eyes.  Or,  at  least,  the  gods  were 
giving  him  moments  of  lucidity  in  these  last  nightmarish 
days  of  his  life. 

There  were  several  repercussions  to  Hitler’s  outbursts 
on  April  22  and  to  his  final  decision  to  remain  in  Berlin. 
When  Himmler,  who  was  at  Hohenlychen,  northwest  of 
Berlin,  received  a firsthand  account  on  the  telephone  from 
Hermann  Fegelein,  his  S.S.  liaison  officer  at  headquar- 
ters, he  exclaimed  to  his  entourage,  “Everyone  is  mad  in 
Berlin!  What  am  I to  do?” 

Y°u  go  straight  to  Berlin,”  replied  one  of  Himmler’s 
principal  aides,  Obergruppenfuehrer  Gottlob  Berger,  the 
chief  of  the  S.S.  head  office.  Berger  was  one  of  those  simple 
Germans  who  sincerely  believed  in  National  Socialism.  He 
had  no  idea  that  his  revered  chief,  Himmler,  under  the 
prodding  of  S.S.  General  Walter  ScheUenberg,  was  already  in 
touch  with  Count  Folke  Bernadotte  of  Sweden  about  sur- 
rendering the  German  armies  in  the  West.  “I  am  going  to 
Berlin,  Berger  said  to  Himmler,  “and  it  is  your  dutv  to 
go  too.” 

Berger,  but  not  Himmler,  went  to  Berlin  that  night  and 
his  visit  is  of  interest  because  of  his  firsthand  description 
of  Hitler  on  the  night  of  his  great  decision.  Russian  shells 
were  already  bursting  near  the  Chancellery  when  Berger 
arrived.  To  his  shock  he  found  the  Fuehrer  “a  broken 
man — finished.”  When  he  ventured  to  express  his  apprecia- 
tion of  Hitler’s  resolve  to  remain  in  Berlin — “one  couldn’t 
desert  the  people  after  they  had  held  out  so  loyally  and 
long,”  he  says  he  declared — the  very  words  touched  off  the 
Leader  again. 


1447 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

All  this  time  [Berger  later  recounted]  the  Fuehrer  had 
never  uttered  a word;  then  suddenly  he  shrieked:  “Everyone 
has  deceived  me!  No  one  has  told  me  the  truth!  The  Armed 
Forces  have  lied  to  me!”  ...  He  went  on  and  on  in  a loud 
voice.  Then  his  face  went  bluish  purple.  I thought  he  was 
going  to  have  a stroke  any  minute  ... 

Berger  was  also  the  head  of  Himmler’s  Prisoner-of- 
War  Administration,  and  after  the  Fuehrer  had  calmed 
down  they  discussed  the  fate  of  a group  of  prominent 
British,  French  and  American  prisoners  as  well  as  of  such 
Germans  as  Haider  and  Schacht  and  the  former  Austrian 
Chancellor,  Schuschnigg,  who  were  being  moved  southeast 
to  keep  them  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Americans  advancing 
through  Germany.  Berger  was  flying  to  Bavaria  that 
night  to  take  charge  of  them.  The  two  men  also  talked  of 
reports  that  there  had  been  outbreaks  of  separatism  in 
Austria  and  Bavaria.  The  idea  that  revolt  could  break 
out  in  his  native  Austria  and  in  his  adopted  Bavaria  once 
more  convulsed  Hitler. 

His  hand  was  shaking,  his  leg  was  shaking  and  his  head 
was  shaking;  and  all  that  he  kept  saying  [Berger  reported] 
was:  “Shoot  them  all!  Shoot  them  all!” 13 

Whether  this  was  an  order  to  shoot  all  the  separatists 
or  all  the  distinguished  prisoners,  or  both,  was  not  clear 
to  Berger,  but  apparently  to  this  simple  man  it  meant  the 
whole  lot. 

GOERING  AND  HIMMLER  TRY 
TO  TAKE  OVER 

General  Roller  had  stayed  away  from  the  Fuehrer’s 
military  conference  on  April  22.  He  had  the  Luftwaffe 
to  look  after,  and  “besides,”  he  says  in  his  diary,  “I 
should  never  have  been  able  to  tolerate  being  insulted  all 
day  long.” 

General  Eckard  Christian,  his  liaison  officer  at  the 
bunker,  had  rung  him  up  at  6:15  p.m.  and  in  a breath- 
less voice  had  said,  “Historical  events,  the  most  decisive 
of  the  war,  are  taking  place  here!”  A couple  of  hours  later 
Christian  arrived  at  Air  Force  headquarters  at  Wildpark- 
Werder  on  the  outskirts  of  Berlin  to  report  to  Roller  in 
person.  “The  Fuehrer  has  broken  down!”  Christian,  an 
ardent  Nazi  who  had  married  one  of  Hitler’s  secretaries, 


1448 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

gasped,  but  beyond  saying  that  the  Leader  had  decided  to 
meet  his  end  in  Berlin  and  was  burning  his  papers,  he  was 
so  incoherent  that  the  Luftwaffe  Chief  of  Staff  set  out, 
despite  a heavy  British  bombing  that  had  just  begun,  to 
find  General  Jodi  and  ascertain  just  what  had  happened 
that  day  in  the  bunker. 

At  Krampnitz,  between  Berlin  and  Potsdam,  where  the 
now  Fuehrerless  OKW  had  set  up  temporary  headquarters, 
he  found  him,  and  Jodi  told  his  Air  Force  friend  the 
whole  sad  story.  Fie  also  revealed  something  which  no  one 
else  had  yet  mentioned  to  Koller  and  which  was  to  lead 
to  a certain  denouement  during  the  next  few  frantic  days. 

“When  it  comes  to  negotiating  [for  peace],”  Hitler 
had  told  Keitel  and  Jodi,  “Goering  can  do  better  than  I. 
Goering  is  much  better  at  those  things.  He  can  deal  much 
better  with  the  other  side.”  Jodi  now  repeated  this  to 
Koller.14 

The  Air  Force  General  felt  that  it  was  his  duty  to  im- 
mediately fly  to  Goering.  It  would  be  difficult  and  also 
dangerous,  in  view  of  the  enemy’s  monitoring,  to  try  to 
explain  this  new  development  in  a radio  message.  If  Goer- 
ing, who  had  been  officially  named  by  Hitler  years  before 
as  his  successor-designate,  were  to  take  over  peace  negotia- 
tions, as  the  Fuehrer  had  suggested,  there  was  no  time  to 
lose.  Jodi  agreed.  At  3:30  on  the  morning  of  April  23 
Koller  took  off  in  a fighter  plane  and  sped  toward  Munich. 

At  noon  he  arrived  on  the  Obersalzberg  and  delivered 
his  news  to  the  Reich  Marshal.  Goering,  who  had  been 
looking  forward,  to  put  it  mildly,  to  the  day  when  he  might 
succeed  Hitler,  was  more  circumspect  than  might  have 
been  expected.  He  did  not  want  to  lay  himself  open,  he 
said,  to  the  machinations  of  his  “deadly  enemy,”  Bormann, 
a precaution  which,  as  it  turned  out,  was  well  founded.  He 
perspired  under  his  dilemma.  “If  I act  now,”  he  told  his 
advisers,  “I  may  be  stamped  as  a traitor;  if  I don’t  act, 
I’ll  be  accused  of  having  failed  to  do  something  in  the 
hour  of  disaster.” 

Goering  sent  for  Hans  Lammers,  the  State  Secretary  of 
the  Reich  Chancellery,  who  was  in  Berchtesgaden,  for  legal 
advice  and  also  fetched  from  his  safe  a copy  of  the  Fueh- 
rer’s decree  of  June  29,  1941.  The  decree  was  quite  clear. 
It  stipulated  that  if  Hitler  died  Goering  was  to  be  his  suc- 
cessor and  that  if  the  Fuehrer  were  incapacitated  Goering 


i 


1449 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

was  to  act  as  his  deputy.  All  agreed  that  by  remaining  in 
Berlin  to  die,  cut  off  in  his  last  hours  from  both  the  military 
commands  and  the  government  offices,  Hitler  was  incapaci- 
tated from  governing  and  that  it  was  Goering’s  clear  duty 
under  the  decree  to  take  over. 

Nevertheless  the  Reich  Marshal  drafted  his  telegram  to 
Hitler  with  great  care.  He  wanted  to  make  sure  of  the 
delegation  of  authority. 

My  Fuehrer! 

In  view  of  your  decision  to  remain  in  the  fortress  of  Ber- 
lin,  do  you  agree  that  I take  over  at  once  the  total  leadership 
of  the  Reich,  with  full  freedom  of  action  at  home  and 
abroad  as  your  deputy,  in  accordance  with  your  decree  of 
June  29,  1941?  If  no  reply  is  received  by  10  o’clock  to- 
night, I shall  take  it  for  granted  that  you  have  lost  your 
freedom  of  action,  and  shall  consider  the  conditions  of  your 
decree  as  fulfilled,  and  shall  act  for  the  best  interest  of  our 
country  and  our  people.  You  know  what  I feel  for  you  in 
this  gravest  hour  of  my  life.  Words  fail  me  to  express  my- 
self. May  God  protect  you,  and  speed  you  quickly  here  in 
spite  of  all. 

Your  loyal 
Hermann  Goering 

That  very  evening  several  hundred  miles  away  Hein- 
rich Himmler  was  meeting  with  Count  Bemadotte  in 
the  Swedish  consulate  at  Luebeck  on  the  Baltic.  Der 
treue  Heinrich — the  loyal  Heinrich,  as  Hitler  had  often 
fondly  referred  to  him — was  not  asking  for  the  powers 
of  succession;  he  was  already  assuming  them. 

“The  Fuehrer’s  great  life,”  he  told  the  Swedish  count, 
“is  drawing  to  a close.”  In  a day  or  two,  he  said,  Hitler 
would  be  dead.  Whereupon  Himmler  urged  Bernadotte 
to  communicate  to  General  Eisenhower  immediately 
Germany’s  willingness  to  surrender  to  the  West.  In  the 
East,  Himmler  added,  the  war  would  be  continued  until 
the  Western  Powers  themselves  had  taken  over  the  front 
against  the  Russians — such  was  the  naivete,  or  stupid- 
ity, or  both,  of  this  S.S.  chieftain  who  now  claimed  for 
himself  the  dictatorship  of  the  Third  Reich.  When  Bema- 
dotte asked  that  Himmler  put  in  writing  his  offer  to  sur- 
render, a letter  was  hastily  drafted  by  candlelight — for  an 
R.A.F.  bombing  that  night  had  shut  off  the  electricity  in 


1450  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Luebeck  and  driven  the  conferees  to  the  cellar.  Himmler 
signed  it.15 

Both  Goering  and  Himmler  had  acted  prematurely,  as 
they  quickly  found  out.  Although  Hitler  was  cut  off  from 
all  but  a scanty  radio  communication  with  his  armies  and 
his  ministries — for  the  Russians  had  nearly  completed 
their  encirclement  of  the  capital  by  the  evening  of  the 
twenty-third — he  was  now  to  demonstrate  that  he  could 
rule  Germany  by  the  power  of  his  personality  and  prestige 
alone  and  quell  “treason,”  even  by  the  most  eminent  of 
his  followers,  by  a mere  word  over  his  creaky  wireless 
transmitter  suspended  from  a balloon  above  the  bunker. 

Albert  Speer  and  a remarkable  lady  witness  whose  dra- 
matic appearance  in  the  last  act  of  the  drama  in  Berlin  will 
shortly  be  noted  have  described  Hitler’s  reaction  to  Goer- 
ing’s  telegram.  Speer  had  flown  into  the  besieged  capital 
on  the  night  of  April  23,  landing  in  a cub  plane  on  the 
eastern  end  of  the  East— West  Axis — the  broad  avenue  which 
led  through  the  Tiergarten — at  the  Brandenburg  Gate,  a 
block  from  the  Chancellery.  Having  learned  that  Hitler  had 
decided  to  remain  in  Berlin  to  the  end,  which  could  not  be 
far  off,  Speer  had  come  to  say  his  farewell  to  the  Leader 
and  to  confess  to  him  that  his  “conflict  between  personal 
loyalty  and  public  duty,”  as  he  puts  it,  had  forced  him  to 
sabotage  the  Fuehrer’s  scorched-earth  policy.  He  fully  ex- 
pected to  be  arrested  for  “treason”  and  probably  shot,  and 
no  doubt  he  would  have  been  had  the  dictator  known  of 
Speer’s  effort  two  months  before  to  kill  him  and  all  the 
others  who  had  escaped  Stauffenberg’s  bomb. 

The  brilliant  architect  and  Armament  Minister,  though 
he  had  always  prided  himself  on  being  apolitical,  had  had, 
like  some  other  Germans,  a late — a too  late — awakening. 
When  he  had  finally  realized  that  his  beloved  Fuehrer  was 
determined  through  his  scorched-earth  decrees  to  destroy 
the  German  people  he  had  decided  to  murder  him.  His 
plan  was  to  introduce  poison  gas  into  the  ventilation  sys- 
tem in  the  bunker  in  Berlin  during  a full-dress  military 
conference.  Since  not  only  the  generals  but  invariably 
Goering,  Himmler  and  Goebbels  now  attended  these, 
Speer  hoped  to  wipe  out  the  entire  Nazi  leadership  of  the 
Third  Reich  as  well  as  the  High  Command.  He  procured 
his  gas,  inspected  the  air-conditioning  system  and  then 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1451 


discovered,  he  says,  that  the  air-intake  pipe  in  the  garden 
was  protected  by  a twelve-foot-high  chimney,  recently  in- 
stalled on  Hitler’s  personal  orders  to  discourage  sabotage, 
and  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  inject  his  gas  into  it 
without  being  interrupted  by  the  S.S.  guards  in  the  garden. 
So  he  abandoned  his  project  and  Hitler  once  again  escaped 
assassination. 

Now  on  the  evening  of  April  23  Speer  made  a full  con- 
fession of  his  insubordination  in  refusing  to  carry  out  the 
wanton  destruction  of  Germany’s  remaining  installations. 
To  his  surprise  Hitler  showed  no  resentment  or  anger. 
Perhaps  the  Fuehrer  was  touched  by  the  candor  and 
courage  of  his  young  friend — Speer  had  just  turned  forty 
— for  whom  he  had  long  had  a deep  affection  and  whom 
he  regarded  as  a “fellow  artist.”  Hitler,  as  Keitel  also 
noted,  seemed  strangely  serene  that  evening,  as  though 
having  made  up  his  mind  to  die  in  this  place  within  a few 
days  had  brought  a peace  of  mind  and  spirit.  But  it  was 
the  calm  not  only  after  the  storm — of  the  previous  day — 
but  before  the  storm. 

For  Goering’s  telegram  had  meanwhile  arrived  in  the 
Chancellery  and  after  being  held  up  by  Bormann,  who 
saw  his  opportunity  at  last,  was  presented  to  the  Fuehrer 
by  this  master  of  intrigue  as  an  “ultimatum”  and  as  a 
treasonous  attempt  to  “usurp”  the  Leader’s  power. 

“Hitler  was  highly  enraged,”  says  Speer,  “and  expressed 
himself  very  strongly  about  Goering.  He  said  he  had 
known  for  some  time  that  Goering  had  failed,  that  he  was 
corrupt  and  a drug  addict” — a statement  which  “extremely 
shook”  the  young  architect,  since  he  wondered  why  Hitler 
had  employed  such  a man  in  so  high  a post  so  long.  Speer 
was  also  puzzled  when  Hitler  calmed  down  and  added, 
“Well,  let  Goering  negotiate  the  capitulation  all  the  same. 
It  doesn’t  matter  anyway  who  does  it.”  16  But  this  mood 
lasted  only  a few  moments. 

Before  the  discussion  was  finished.  Hitler,  prompted  by 
Bormann,  dictated  a telegram  informing  Goering  that  he 
had  committed  “high  treason,”  for  which  the  penalty  was 
death,  but  that  because  of  his  long  service  to  the  Nazi 
Party  and  State  his  life  would  be  spared  if  he  immediately 
resigned  all  his  offices.  He  was  ordered  to  answer  with  one 
word:  Yes  or  No.  This  did  not  satisfy  the  wormlike  Bor- 
mann. On  his  own  hook  he  got  off  a radiogram  to  the 


1452 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

S.S.  headquarters  in  Berchtesgaden  ordering  the  immediate 
arrest  of  Goering,  his  staff  and  Lammers  for  “high 
treason.”  Before  dawn  the  next  day  the  Number  Two  man 
of  the  Third  Reich,  the  most  arrogant — and  opulent — of 
the  Nazi  princes,  the  only  Reich  Marshal  in  German  his- 
tory and  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Air  Force,  found 
himself  a prisoner  of  the  S.S. 

Three  days  later,  on  the  evening  of  April  26,  Hitler  ex- 
pressed himself  even  more  strongly  on  the  subject  of 
Goering  than  he  had  in  the  presence  of  Speer. 

THE  LAST  TWO  VISITORS  TO  THE  BUNKER 

Two  more  interesting  visitors  had  meanwhile  arrived  in 
the  madhouse  of  the  Fuehrer’s  bunker:  Hanna  Reitsch,  the 
crack  woman  test  pilot  who,  among  other  qualities,  had  a 
capacity  for  monumental  hatred,  especially  of  Goering, 
and  General  Ritter  von  Greim,  who  on  April  24  had  been 
summoned  from  Munich  to  appear  personally  before  the 
Supreme  Warlord  and  had  done  so,  though  the  plane  in 
which  he  and  Reitsch  flew  the  last  lap  on  the  evening  of 
the  twenty-sixth  had  been  torn  over  the  Tiergarten  by 
Russian  antiaircraft  shells  and  Greim’s  foot  had  been  shat- 
tered. 

Hitler  came  into  the  surgery,  where  a physician  was 
dressing  the  general’s  wound. 

Hitler:  Do  you  know  why  I have  called  you? 

Greim:  No,  my  Fuehrer. 

Hitler:  Because  Hermann  Goering  has  betrayed  and  de- 
serted both  me  and  his  Fatherland.  Behind  my  back  he  has 
established  contact  with  the  enemy.  His  action  was  a mark 
of  cowardice.  Against  my  orders  he  has  gone  to  save  himself 
at  Berchtesgaden.  From  there  he  sent  me  a disrespectful  tele- 
gram. It  was  . . . 

At  this  point,  says  Hanna  Reitsch,  who  was  present,  the 
Fuehrer’s  face  began  to  twitch  and  his  breath  came  in  ex- 
plosive puffs. 

Hitler:  ...  an  ultimatum!  A crass  ultimatum!  Now 
nothing  remains.  Nothing  is  spared  me.  No  allegiances  are 
kept,  no  honor  lived  up  to,  no  disappointments  that  I have 
not  had,  no  betrayals  that  I have  not  experienced,  and  now 
this  above  all  else!  Nothing  remains.  Every  wrong  has  al- 
ready been  done  me. 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1453  / 

I immediately  had  Goering  arrested  as  a traitor  to  the 
Reich,  took  from  him  all  his  offices,  and  removed  him  from 
all  organizations.  That  is  why  I have  called  you.17 

Then  and  there  he  named  the  startled  General  lying 
wounded  on  his  cot  the  new  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Luftwaffe — a promotion  he  could  have  made  by  radio, 
which  would  have  spared  Greim  a crippled  foot  and  left 
him  at  headquarters,  the  only  place  from  which  what  was 
left  of  the  Air  Force  could  be  directed.  Three  days  later 
Hitler  ordered  Greim,  who  by  now,  like  Fraulein  Reitsch, 
expected  and  indeed  desired  to  die  in  the  bunker  at  the 
side  of  the  Leader,  to  depart  in  order  to  deal  with  a new 
case  of  “treachery.”  For  “treason,”  as  we  have  seen,  was 
not  confined  among  the  leaders  of  the  Third  Reich  to  Her- 
mann Goering. 

During  those  three  days  Hanna  Reitsch  had  ample  op- 
portunity to  observe  the  lunatic  life  in  the  underground 
madhouse — indeed,  she  participated  in  it.  Since  she  was 
as  emotionally  unstable  as  her  distinguished  host,  the  ac- 
count she  has  left  of  it  is  lurid  and  melodramatic,  and 
yet  it  is  probably  largely  true  and  even  fairly  accurate,  for 
it  has  been  checked  against  other  eyewitness  reports,  and 
is  thus  of  importance  for  the  closing  chapter  of  this  history. 

Late  on  the  night  of  her  arrival  with  General  von  Greim 
— it  was  April  26 — Russian  shells  began  falling  on  the 
Chancellery  and  the  thud  of  the  explosions  and  the  sound 
of  crashing  walls  above  increased  the  tension  in  the 
bunker.  Hitler  took  the  aviatrix  aside. 

“My  Fuehrer,  why  do  you  stay?”  she  said.  “Why  do  you 
deprive  Germany  of  your  life?  . . . The  Fuehrer  must  live 
so  that  Germany  can  live.  The  people  demand  it.” 

“No,  Hanna,”  she  says  the  Fuehrer  replied.  “If  I die  it 
is  for  the  honor  of  our  country,  it  is  because  as  a soldier 
I must  obey  my  own  command  that  I would  defend  Berlin 
to  the  last.” 

My  dear  girl  [he  continued],  I did  not  intend  it  so.  I 
believed  firmly  that  Berlin  would  be  saved  on  the  banks  of 
the  Oder  . . . When  our  best  efforts  failed  I was  the  most 
horrorstruck  of  all.  Then  when  the  encirclement  of  the 
city  began  ...  I believed  that  by  staying  all  the  troops  of 
the  land  would  take  example  from  my  act  and  come  to  the 
rescue  of  the  city  . . . But,  my  Hanna,  I still  have  hope. 
The  army  of  General  Wenck  is  moving  up  from  the  south. 


1454  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

He  must  and  will  drive  the  Russians  back  long  enough  to 
save  our  people.  Then  we  will  fall  back  to  hold  again.18 

That  was  one  mood  of  Hitler  that  evening;  he  still  had 
hope  in  General  Wenck’s  relieving  Berlin.  But  a few  mo- 
ments later,  as  the  Russian  bombardment  of  the  Chan- 
cellery reached  great  intensity,  he  was  in  despair  again. 
He  handed  Reitsch  a vial  of  poison  for  herself  and  one 
for  Greim. 

“Hanna,”  he  said,  “you  belong  to  those  who  will  die 
with  me  ...  I do  not  wish  that  one  of  us  falls  to  the 
Russians  alive,  nor  do  I wish  our  bodies  to  be  found  by 
them  . . . Eva  and  I will  have  our  bodies  burned.  You 
will  devise  your  own  method.” 

Hanna  took  the  vial  of  poison  to  Greim  and  they  de- 
cided that  “should  the  end  really  come”  they  would  swal- 
low the  poison  and  then,  to  make  sure,  pull  a pin  from  a 
heavy  grenade  and  hold  it  tightly  to  their  bodies. 

A day  and  a half  later,  on  the  twenty-eighth,  Hitler’s 
hopes  seem  to  have  risen  again — or  at  least  his  delusions. 
He  radioed  Keitel: 

“I  expect  the  relief  of  Berlin.  What  is  Heinrici’s  army 
doing?  Where  is  Wenck?  What  is  happening  to  the  Ninth 
Army?  When  will  Wenck  and  Ninth  Army  join?”  19 

Reitsch  describes  the  Supreme  Warlord  that  day,  strid- 
ing 

about  the  shelter,  waving  a road  map  that  was  fast  dis- 
integrating from  the  sweat  of  his  hands  and  planning 
Wenck’s  campaign  with  anyone  who  happened  to  be  listen- 
ing. 

But  Wenck’s  “campaign,”  like  the  Steiner  “attack”  of  a 
week  before,  existed  only  in  the  Fuehrer’s  imagination. 
Wenck’s  army  had  already  been  liquidated,  as  had  the 
Ninth  Army.  Heinrici’s  army,  to  the  north  of  Berlin,  was 
beating  a hasty  retreat  westward  so  that  it  might  be  cap- 
tured by  the  Western  Allies  instead  of  by  the  Russians. 

All  through  April  28  the  desperate  men  in  the  bunker 
waited  for  news  of  the  counterattacks  of  these  three 
armies,  especially  that  of  Wenck.  Russian  spearheads  were 
now  but  a few  blocks  from  the  Chancellery  and  advancing 
slowly  toward  it  up  several  streets  from  the  east  and  north 
and  through  the  nearby  Tiergarten  from  the  west.  When 
no  news  of  the  relieving  forces  came.  Hitler,  prompted  by 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1455 

Bormann,  began  to  expect  new  treacheries.  At  8 p.m. 
Bormann  got  out  a radiogram  to  Doenitz. 

Instead  of  urging  the  troops  forward  to  our  rescue,  the 
men  in  authority  are  silent.  Treachery  seems  to  have  re- 
placed loyal tyl  We  remain  here.  The  Chancellery  is  already 
in  ruins. 

Later  that  night  Bormann  sent  another  message  to 
Doenitz. 

Schoerner,  Wenck  and  others  must  prove  their  loyalty 
to  the  Fuehrer  by  coming  to  the  Fuehrer’s  aid  as  soon  as 
possible.20 

Bormann  was  now  speaking  for  himself.  Hitler  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  die  in  a day  or  two,  but  Bormann 
wanted  to  live.  He  might  not  succeed  the  Fuehrer  but  he 
wanted  to  continue  to  pull  the  strings  behind  the  scenes 
for  whoever  did. 

Finally,  that  night  Admiral  Voss  got  out  a message  to 
Doenitz  saying  that  all  radio  connection  with  the  Army 
had  broken  down  and  urgently  requesting  the  Navy  to 
send  over  the  naval  wave  length  some  news  of  what  was 
happening  in  the  outside  world.  Very  shortly  some 
news  came,  not  from  the  Navy  but  from  the  listening 
post  in  the  Propaganda  Ministry,  and  it  was  shattering 
for  Adolf  Hitler. 

Besides  Bormann  there  was  another  Nazi  official  in  the 
bunker  who  wanted  to  live.  This  was  Hermann  Fegelein, 
Himmler’s  representative  at  court  and  typical  of  the  type 
of  German  who  rose  to  prominence  under  Hitler’s  rule.  A 
former  groom  and  then  a jockey  and  quite  illiterate,  he 
was  a protege  of  the  notorious  Christian  Weber,  one  of 
Hitler’s  oldest  party  cronies  and  himself  a horse  fancier, 
who  by  fraudulence  had  amassed  a fortune  and  a great 
racing  stable  after  1933.  Fegelein,  with  Weber’s  help,  had 
climbed  quite  high  in  the  Third  Reich.  He  was  a general 
in  the  Waffen  S.S.  and  in  1944,  shortly  after  being  ap- 
pointed Himmler’s  liaison  officer  at  Fuehrer  headquarters, 
he  had  further  advanced  his  position  at  court  by  marrying 
Eva  Braun’s  sister,  Gretl.  All  the  surviving  S.S.  chiefs 
agree  that,  in  alliance  with  Bormann,  Fegelein  lost  no  time 
in  betraying  his  own  S.S.  chief,  Himmler,  to  Hitler.  But 
disreputable,  illiterate  and  ignorant  though  he  was, 
Fegelein  seems  to  have  been  possessed  of  a simon-pure 


1456 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

instinct  for  survival.  He  knew  a sinking  ship  when  he  saw 
one. 

On  April  26  he  quietly  left  the  bunker.  By  the  next  aft- 
ernoon Hitler  had  noticed  his  disappearance.  The  Fueh- 
rer’s easily  aroused  suspicions  were  kindled  and  he  sent 
out  an  armed  S.S.  search  party  to  try  to  find  the  man. 
He  was  found,  in  civilian  clothes,  resting  in  his  home  in 
the  Charlottenburg  district,  which  the  Russians  were  about 
to  overrun.  Brought  back  to  the  Chancellery,  he  was 
stripped  of  his  S.S.  rank  of  Obergruppenfuehrer  and  placed 
under  arrest.  Fegelein’s  attempt  at  desertion  made  Hitler 
immediately  suspicious  of  Himmler.  What  was  the  S.S. 
chief  up  to,  now  that  he  had  deliberately  absented  himself 
from  Berlin?  There  had  been  no  news  since  his  liaison 
officer,  Fegelein,  had  quit  his  post.  It  now  came. 

April  28,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  a trying  day  in 
the  bunker.  The  Russians  were  getting  close.  The  expected 
news  of  Wenck’s  counterattack,  or  of  any  counterattack, 
had  not  come  through.  Desperately  the  besieged  had 
asked,  through  the  Navy’s  radio,  for  news  of  develop- 
ments outside  the  encircled  city. 

The  radio  listening  post  of  the  Propaganda  Ministry  had 
picked  up  from  a broadcast  of  the  BBC  in  London  one 
piece  of  news  of  what  was  happening  outside  Berlin.  It 
was  a Reuter  dispatch  from  Stockholm  and  it  was  so 
sensational,  so  incredible,  that  one  of  Goebbels’  assistants, 
Heinz  Lorenz,  had  scampered  across  the  shell-torn  square 
late  on  the  evening  of  April  28  to  the  bunker  with  copies 
of  it  for  his  Minister  and  for  the  Fuehrer. 

"Hie  dispatch,  says  Reitsch,  struck  “a  deathblow  to  the 
entire  assembly.  Men  and  women  alike  screamed  with 
rage,  fear  and  desperation,  all  mixed  into  one  emotional 
spasm.”  Hitler’s  spasm  was  the  worst.  “He  raged,”  says 
the  aviatrix,  “like  a madman.” 

Heinrich  Himmler — der  treue  Heinrich — had  also  de- 
serted the  sinking  ship  of  state.  The  Reuter  dispatch  told 
of  his  secret  negotiations  with  Count  Bernadotte  and  his 
offer  to  surrender  the  German  armies  in  the  West  to  Eisen- 
hower. 

To  Hitler,  who  had  never  doubted  Himmler’s  absolute 
loyalty,  this  was  the  heaviest  blow  of  all.  “His  color,”  says 
Reitsch,  “rose  to  a heated  red  and  his  face  was  virtually 


k 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1457 


unrecognizable  . . . After  the  lengthy  outburst  Hitler  sank 
into  a stupor  and  for  a time  the  entire  bunker  was  silent.” 
Goering  at  least  had  asked  the  Leader’s  permission  to  take 
over.  But  the  “ treue ” S.S.  chief  and  Reichsfuehrer  had  not 
bothered  to  ask;  he  had  treasonably  contacted  the  enemy 
without  saying  a word.  This,  Hitler  told  his  followers  when 
he  had  somewhat  recovered,  was  the  worst  act  of  treachery 
he  had  ever  known. 

This  blow — coupled  with  the  news  received  a few  min- 
utes later  that  the  Russians  were  nearing  the  Potsdamer- 
platz,  but  a block  away,  and  would  probably  storm  the 
Chancellery  on  the  morning  of  April  30,  thirty  hours  hence 
— was  the  signal  for  the  end.  It  forced  Hitler  to  make 
immediately  the  last  decisions  of  his  life.  By  dawn  he  had 
married  Eva  Braun,  drawn  up  his  last  will  and  testa- 
ment, dispatched  Greim  and  Hanna  Reitsch  to  rally  the 
Luftwaffe  for  an  all-out  bombing  of  the  Russian  forces 
approaching  the  Chancellery,  and  ordered  them  also  to 
arrest  Himmler  as  a traitor. 

“A  traitor  must  never  succeed  me  as  Fuehrer!”  Hanna 
says  he  told  them.  “You  must  get  out  to  insure  that  he 
will  not.” 

Hitler  could  not  wait  to  begin  his  revenge  against 
Himmler.  He  had  the  S.S.  chief’s  liaison  man,  Fegelein,  in 
his  hands.  The  former  jockey  and  present  S.S.  General 
was  now  brought  out  of  the  guardhouse,  closely  questioned 
as  to  Himmler’s  “betrayal,”  accused  of  having  been  an 
accomplice  in  it,  and  on  the  Fuehrer’s  orders  taken  up  to 
the  Chancellery  garden  and  shot.  The  fact  that  Fegelein 
was  married  to  Eva  Braun’s  sister  did  not  help  him.  Eva 
made  no  effort  to  save  her  brother-in-law’s  life. 

“Poor,  poor  Adolf,”  she  whimpered  to  Hanna  Reitsch, 
“deserted  by  everyone,  betrayed  by  all.  Better  that  ten 
thousand  others  die  that  that  he  be  lost  to  Germany.” 

He  was  lost  to  Germany  but  in  those  final  hours  he  was 
won  by  Eva  Braun.  Sometime  between  1 a.m.  and  3 a.m. 
on  April  29,  as  a crowning  award  for  her  loyalty  to  the 
end,  he  accorded  his  mistress’s  wish  and  formally  mar- 
ried her.  He  had  always  said  that  marriage  would  inter- 
fere with  his  complete  dedication  to  leading  first  his  party 
to  power  and  then  his  nation  to  the  heights.  Now  that 
there  was  no  more  leading  to  do  and  his  life  was  at  an 


1458 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

end,  he  could  safely  enter  into  a marriage  which  could 
last  only  a few  hours. 

Goebbels  rounded  up  a municipal  councilor,  one  Walter 
Wagner,  who  was  fighting  in  a unit  of  the  Volkssturm 
not  many  blocks  away,  and  this  surprised  official  performed 
the  ceremony  in  the  small  conference  room  of  the  bunker. 
The  marriage  document  survives  and  gives  part  of  the 
picture  of  what  one  of  the  Fuehrer’s  secretaries  described 
as  the  death  marriage.”  Hitler  asked  that  “in  view  of  war 
developments  the  publication  of  the  banns  be  done  orally 
and  all  other  delays  be  avoided.”  The  bride-  and  groom-to- 
be  swore  they  were  “of  complete  Aryan  descent”  and  had 

no  hereditary  disease  to  exclude  their  marriage.”  On  the 
eve  of  death  the  dictator  insisted  on  sticking  to  form.  Only 
in  the  spaces  given  to  the  name  of  his  father  (bom 
Schicklgruber ) and  his  mother  and  the  date  of  their  mar- 
riage did  Hitler  leave  a blank.  His  bride  started  to  sign 
her  name  Eva  Braun,”  but  stopped,  crossed  out  the  “B” 
and  wrote  “Eva  Hitler,  bom  Braun.”  Goebbels  and  Bor- 
mann  signed  as  witnesses. 

After  the  brief  ceremony  there  was  a macabre  wedding 
breakfast  in  the  Fuehrer’s  private  apartment.  Champagne 
was  brought  out  and  even  Friiulein  Manzialy,  Hitler’s 
vegetarian  cook,  was  invited,  along  with  his  secretaries, 
the  remaining  generals,  Krebs  and  Burgdorf,  Bormann 
and  Dr.  and  Frau  Goebbels,  to  share  in  the  wedding  cele- 
bration. For  a time  the  talk  gravitated  to  the  good  old 
times  and  the  party  comrades  of  better  days.  Hitler  spoke 
fondly  of  the  occasion  on  which  he  had  been  best  man 
at  the  Goebbels  wedding.  As  was  his  custom,  even  to  the 
very  last,  the  bridegroom  talked  on  and  on,  reviewing  the 
high  points  in  his  dramatic  life.  Now  it  was  ended,  he 
said,  and  so  was  National  Socialism.  It  would  be  a release 
for  him  to  die,  since  he  had  been  betrayed  by  his  oldest 
friends  and  supporters.  The  wedding  party  was  plunged 
into  gloom  and  some  of  the  guests  stole  away  in  tears. 
Hitler  finally  slipped  away  himself.  In  an  adjoining  room 
he  summoned  one  of  his  secretaries,  Frau  Gertrude 
Junge,  and  began  to  dictate  his  last  will  and  testament. 

HITLER’S  LAST  WILL  AND  TESTAMENT 

These  two  documents  survive,  as  Hitler  meant  them  to, 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1459 


and  like  others  of  his  papers  they  are  significant  to  this 
narrative.  They  confirm  that  the  man  who  had  ruled  over 
Germany  with  an  iron  hand  for  more  than  twelve  years, 
and  over  most  of  Europe  for  four,  had  learned  nothing 
from  his  experience;  not  even  his  reverses  and  shattering 
final  failure  had  taught  him  anything.  Indeed,  in  the  last 
hours  of  his  life  he  reverted  to  the  young  man  he  had 
been  in  the  gutter  days  in  Vienna  and  in  the  early  rowdy 
beer  hall  period  in  Munich,  cursing  the  Jews  for  all  the 
ills  of  the  world,  spinning  his  half-baked  theories  about  the 
universe,  and  whining  that  fate  once  more  had  cheated 
Germany  of  victory  and  conquest.  In  this  valedictory  to 
the  German  nation  and  to  the  world  which  was  also  meant 
to  be  a last,  conclusive  appeal  to  history,  Adolf  Hitler 
dredged  up  all  the  empty  claptrap  of  Mein  Kampf  and 
added  his  final  falsehoods.  It  was  a fitting  epitaph  of  a 
power-drunk  tyrant  whom  absolute  power  had  corrupted 
absolutely  and  destroyed. 

The  “Political  Testament,”  as  he  called  it,  was  divided 
into  two  parts,  the  first  consisting  of  his  appeal  to  posterity, 
the  second  of  his  specific  directions  for  the  future. 

More  than  thirty  years  have  passed  since  I made  my 
modest  contribution  as  a volunteer  in  the  First  World  War, 
which  was  forced  upon  the  Reich. 

In  these  three  decades,  love  and  loyalty  to  my  people 
alone  have  guided  me  in  all  my  thoughts,  actions  and  life. 
They  gave  me  power  to  make  the  most  difficult  decisions 
which  have  ever  confronted  mortal  man  . . . 

It  is  untrue  that  I or  anybody  else  in  Germany  wanted 
war  in  1939.  It  was  wanted  and  provoked  exclusively  by 
those  international  statesmen  who  either  were  of  Jewish 
origin  or  worked  for  Jewish  interests. 

I have  made  too  many  offers  for  the  limitation  and  con- 
trol of  armaments,  which  posterity  will  not  for  all  time  be 
able  to  disregard,  for  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of  this 
war  to  be  placed  on  me.  Further,  I have  never  wished  that 
after  the  appalling  First  World  War  there  should  be  a second 
one  against  either  England  or  America.  Centuries  will  go 
by,  but  from  the  ruins  of  our  towns  and  monuments  the 
hatred  of  those  ultimately  responsible  will  always  grow 
anew.  They  are  the  people  whom  we  have  to  thank  for  all 
this:  international  Jewry  and  its  helpers. 

Hitler  then  repeated  the  lie  that  three  days  before  the 
attack  on  Poland  he  had  proposed  to  the  British  govern- 


1460  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ment  a reasonable  solution  of  the  Polish-German  problem. 

It  was  rejected  only  because  the  ruling  clique  in  England 
wanted  war,  partly  for  commercial  reasons,  partly  because  it 
was  influenced  by  propaganda  put  out  by  the  international 
Jewry. 

Next  he  placed  “sole  responsibility”  not  only  for  the 
millions  of  deaths  suffered  on  the  battlefields  and  in  the 
bombed  cities  but  for  his  own  massacre  of  the  Jews — on 
the  Jews.  Then  he  turned  to  the  reasons  for  his  decision  to 
remain  in  Berlin  to  the  last. 

After  six  years  of  war,  which  in  spite  of  all  setbacks  will 
one  day  go  down  in  history  as  the  most  glorious  and  heroic 
manifestation  of  the  struggle  for  existence  of  a nation,  I 
cannot  forsake  the  city  that  is  the  capital  of  this  state 
. . . I wish  to  share  my  fate  with  that  which  millions  of 
others  have  also  taken  upon  themselves  by  staying  in  this 
town.  Further,  I shall  not  fall  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
who  requires  a new  spectacle,  presented  by  the  Jews,  to 
divert  their  hysterical  masses. 

I have  therefore  decided  to  remain  in  Berlin  and  there 
to  choose  death  voluntarily  at  that  moment  when  I believe 
that  the  position  of  the  Fuehrer  and  the  Chancellery  itself 
can  no  longer  be  maintained.  I die  with  a joyful  heart  in  my 
knowledge  of  the  immeasurable  deeds  and  achievements  of 
our  peasants  and  workers  and  of  a contribution  unique  in 
history  of  our  youth  which  bears  my  name. 

There  followed  an  exhortation  to  all  Germans  “not  to 
give  up  the  struggle.”  He  had  finally  forced  himself  to  rec- 
ognize, though,  that  National  Socialism  was  finished  for 
the  moment,  but  he  assured  his  fellow  Germans  that  from 
the  sacrifices  of  the  soldiers  and  of  himself 

the  seed  has  been  sown  that  will  grow  one  day  ...  to  the 
glorious  rebirth  of  the  National  Socialist  movement  of  a 
truly  united  nation. 

Hitler  could  not  die  without  first  hurling  one  last  insult 
at  the  Army  and  especially  at  its  officer  corps,  whom  he 
held  chiefly  responsible  for  the  disaster.  Though  he  con- 
fessed that  Nazism  was  dead,  at  least  for  the  moment,  he 
nevertheless  adjured  the  commanders  of  the  three  armed 
services 

to  strengthen  with  every  possible  means  the  spirit  of  resist- 
ance of  our  soldiers  in  the  National  Socialist  belief,  with 
special  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  I myself,  as  the  founder 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1461 

and  creator  of  this  movement,  prefer  death  to  cowardly 
resignation  or  even  to  capitulation. 

Then  the  jibe  at  the  Army  officer  caste: 

May  it  be  in  the  future  a point  of  honor  with  the  German 
Army  officers,  as  it  already  is  in  our  Navy,  that  the  sur- 
render of  a district  or  town  is  out  of  the  question  and  that, 
above  everything  else,  the  commanders  must  set  a shining 
example  of  faithful  devotion  to  duty  unto  death. 

It  was  Hitler’s  insistence  that  “a  district  or  town”  must 
be  held  “unto  death,”  as  at  Stalingrad,  which  had  helped 
bring  about  military  disaster.  But  in  this,  as  in  other 
things,  he  had  learned  nothing 

The  second  part  of  the  Political  Testament  dealt  with 
the  question  of  succession.  Though  the  Third  Reich  was 
going  up  in  flames  and  explosions,  Hitler  could  not  bear 
to  die  without  naming  his  successor  and  dictating  the 
exact  composition  of  the  government  which  that  successor 
must  appoint.  First  he  had  to  eliminate  his  would-be  suc- 
cessors. 

Before  my  death,  I expel  former  Reich  Marshal  Hermann 
Goering  from  the  party  and  withdraw  from  him  all  the 
rights  that  were  conferred  on  him  by  the  decree  of  June  20, 
1941  ...  In  his  place  I appoint  Admiral  Doenitz  as  President 
of  the  Reich  and  Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces. 

Before  my  death,  I expel  the  former  Reichsfuehrer  of  the 
S.S.  and  the  Minister  of  Interior  Heinrich  Himmler  from 
the  party  and  from  all  his  state  offices. 

The  leaders  of  the  Army,  the  Air  Force  and  the  S.S., 
he  believed,  had  betrayed  him,  had  cheated  him  of  victory. 
So  his  only  possible  choice  of  successor  had  to  be  the 
leader  of  the  Navy,  which  had  been  too  small  to  play  a 
major  role  in  Hitler’s  war  of  conquest.  This  was  a final 
jibe  at  the  Army,  which  had  done  most  of  the  fighting 
and  lost  most  of  the  men  killed  in  the  war.  There  was 
also  a last  parting  denunciation  of  the  two  men  who  had 
been,  with  Goebbels,  his  most  intimate  collaborators  since 
the  early  days  of  the  party. 

Apart  altogether  from  their  disloyalty  to  me,  Goering 
and  Himmler  have  brought  irreparable  shame  on  the  whole 
nation  by  secretly  negotiating  with  the  enemy  without  my 
knowledge  and  against  my  will,  and  also  by  illegally  at- 
tempting to  seize  control  of  the  State. 


1462 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Having  expelled  the  traitors  and  named  his  successor, 
Hitler  then  proceeded  to  tell  Doenitz  whom  he  must  have 
in  his  new  government.  They  were  all  “honorable  men,” 
he  said,  “who  will  fulfill  the  task  of  continuing  the  war 
with  all  means.”  Goebbels  was  to  be  the  Chancellor  and 
Bormann  the  “Party  Minister” — a new  post.  Seyss-Inquart, 
the  Austrian  quisling  and,  most  recently,  the  butcher  gov- 
ernor of  Holland,  was  to  be  Foreign  Minister.  Speer,  like 
Ribbentrop,  was  dropped.  But  Count  Schwerin  von  Krosigk, 
who  had  been  Minister  of  Finance  continuously  since  his 
appointment  by  Papen  in  1932,  was  to  retain  that  post 
This  man  was  a fool,  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  he  had 
a genius  for  survival. 

Hitler  not  only  named  his  successor’s  government.  He 
imparted  one  last  typical  directive  to  it. 

Above  all,  I enjoin  the  government  and  the  people  to  up- 
hold the  racial  laws  to  the  limit  and  to  resist  mercilessly 
the  poisoner  of  all  nations,  international  Jewry.21 

With  that  the  Supreme  German  Warload  was  finished. 
The  time  was  now  4 a.m.  on  Sunday,  April  29.  Hitler  called 
in  Goebbels,  Bormann  and  Generals  Krebs  and  Burgdorf 
to  witness  his  signing  of  the  document,  and  to  affix  their 
own  signatures.  He  then  quickly  dictated  his  personal  will. 
In  this  the  Man  of  Destiny  reverted  to  his  lower-middle- 
class  origins  in  Austria,  explaining  why  he  had  married 
and  why  he  and  his  bride  were  killing  themselves,  and 
disposing  of  his  property,  which  he  hoped  would  be  enough 
to  support  his  surviving  relatives  in  a modest  way.  At  least 
Hitler  had  not  used  his  power  to  amass  a vast  private 
fortune,  as  had  Goering. 

Although  during  the  years  of  struggle  I believed  that  I 
could  not  undertake  the  responsibility  of  marriage,  now,  be- 
fore the  end  of  my  life,  I have  decided  to  take  as  my  wife  the 
woman  who,  after  many  years  of  true  friendship,  came  to 
this  city,  already  almost  besieged,  of  her  own  free  will  in  order 
to  share  my  fate. 

She  will  go  to  her  death  with  me  at  her  own  wish  as  my 
wife.  This  will  compensate  us  both  for  what  we  lost  through 
my  work  in  the  service  of  my  people. 

My  possessions,  insofar  as  they  are  worth  anything,  belong 
to  the  party,  or,  if  this  no  longer  exists,  to  the  State.  If  the 
State  too  is  destroyed,  there  is  no  need  for  any  further  insruc- 
tions  on  my  part.  The  paintings  in  the  collections  bought 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1463 


by  me  during  the  years  were  never  assembled  for  private 
purposes  but  solely  for  the  establishment  of  a picture  gallery 
in  my  home  town  of  Linz  on  the  Danube. 

Bormann,  as  executor,  was  asked 

to  hand  over  to  my  relatives  everything  that  is  of  value  as  a 
personal  memento  or  is  necessary  for  maintaining  a petty- 
bourgeois  [ kleinen  buergerlichen ] standard  of  living  . . .* 

My  wife  and  I choose  to  die  in  order  to  escape  the  shame 
of  overthrow  or  capitulation.  It  is  our  wish  that  our  bodies 
be  burned  immediately  in  the  place  where  I have  performed 
the  greater  part  of  my  daily  work  during  the  twelve  years  of 
service  to  my  people. 

Exhausted  by  the  dictation  of  his  farewell  messages. 
Hitler  went  to  bed  as  dawn  was  breaking  over  Berlin  on 
this  last  Sabbath  of  his  life.  A pall  of  smoke  hung  over 
the  city.  Buildings  crashed  in  flames  as  the  Russians  fired 
their  artillery  at  point-blank  range.  They  were  now  not  far 
from  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the  Chancellery. 

While  Hitler  slept,  Goebbels  and  Bormann  made  haste. 
In  his  Political  Testament,  which  they  had  signed  as  wit- 
nesses, the  Fuehrer  had  specifically  ordered  them  to  leave 
the  capital  and  join  the  new  government.  Bormann  was 
more  than  willing  to  obey.  For  all  his  devotion  to  the 
Leader,  he  did  not  intend  to  share  his  death,  if  he  could 
avoid  it.  The  only  thing  in  life  he  wanted  was  power  be- 
hind the  scenes,  and  Doenitz  might  still  offer  him  this. 
That  is,  if  Goering,  on  learning  of  the  Fuehrer’s  death, 
did  not  try  to  usurp  the  throne.  To  make  sure  that  he 
did  not,  Bormann  now  got  out  a radio  message  to  the  S.S. 
headquarters  at  Berchtesgaden. 

...  If  Berlin  and  we  should  fall,  the  traitors  of  April  23 
must  be  exterminated.  Men,  do  your  duty!  Your  life  and 
honor  depend  on  it!  22 

This  was  an  order  to  murder  Goering  and  his  Air  Force 
staff,  whom  Bormann  had  already  placed  under  S.S.  arrest. 

Dr.  Goebbels,  like  Eva  Braun  but  unlike  Bormann, 
had  no  desire  to  live  in  a Germany  from  which  his  revered 
Fuehrer  had  departed.  He  had  hitched  his  star  to  Hitler, 
to  whom  alone  he  owed  his  sensational  rise  in  life.  He 
had  been  the  chief  prophet  and  propagandist  of  the  Nazi 


* Who  these  relatives  were  Hitler  did  not  say,  but  from  what  he  told  his 
secretaries  he  had  in  mind  his  sister,  Paula,  and  his  mother-in-law. 


1464 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

movement.  It  was  he  who,  next  to  Hitler,  had  created  its 
myths.  To  perpetuate  those  myths  not  only  the  Leader  but 
his  most  loyal  follower,  the  only  one  of  the  Old  Guard 
who  had  not  betrayed  him,  must  die  a sacrificial  death. 
He  too  must  give  an  example  that  would  be  remembered 
down  the  ages  and  help  one  day  to  rekindle  the  fires  of 
National  Socialism. 

Such  seem  to  have  been  his  thoughts  when,  after  Hitler 
retired,  Goebbels  repaired  to  his  little  room  in  the  bunker 
to  write  his  own  valedictory  to  present  and  future  genera- 
tions. He  entitled  it  “Appendix  to  the  Fuehrer’s  Political 
Testament.” 

The  Fuehrer  has  ordered  me  to  leave  Berlin  . . . and  take 
part  as  a leading  member  in  the  government  appointed  by  him. 

For  the  first  time  in  my  life  I must  categorically  refuse  to 
obey  an  order  of  the  Fuehrer.  My  wife  and  children  join  me 
m this  refusal.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  feelings  of  humanity 
and  personal  loyalty  forbid  us  to  abandon  the  Fuehrer 
in  his  hour  of  greatest  need,  I would  otherwise  appear  for  the 
rest  of  my  life  as  a dishonorable  traitor  and  a common 
scoundrel  and  would  lose  my  self-respect  as  well  as  the  respect 
of  my  fellow  citizens  . . . 

In  the  nightmare  of  treason  which  surrounds  the  Fuehrer 
in  these  most  critical  days  of  the  war,  there  must  be  someone 
at  least  who  will  stay  with  him  unconditionally  until  death  . . . 

I believe  I am  thereby  doing  the  best  service  to  the  future  of 
the  German  people.  In  the  hard  times  to  come,  examples  will 
be  more  important  than  men  . . . 

For  this  reason,  together  with  my  wife,  and  on  behalf  of 
my  children,  who  are  too  young  to  be  able  to  speak  for 
themselves  and  who,  if  they  were  old  enough,  would  unreserv- 
edly agree  with  this  decision,  I express  my  unalterable  resolu- 
tion not  to  leave  the  Reich  capital,  even  if  it  falls,  but  rather, 
at  the  side  of  the  Fuehrer,  to  end  a life  that  for  me  personally 
will  have  no  further  value  if  I cannot  spend  it  at  the  service 
of  the  Fuehrer  and  at  his  side.23 

Dr.  Goebbels  finished  writing  his  piece  at  half  past  five 
on  the  morning  of  April  29.  Daylight  was  breaking  over 
Berlin,  but  the  sun  was  obscured  by  the  smoke  of  battle. 
In  the  electric  light  of  the  bunker  much  remained  to  be 
done.  The  first  consideration  was  how  to  get  the  Fuehrer’s 
last  will  and  testament  out  through  the  nearby  Russian 
lines  so  that  it  could  be  delivered  to  Doenitz  and  others 
and  preserved  for  posterity. 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1465 


Three  messengers  were  chosen  to  take  copies  of  the 
precious  documents  out:  Major  Willi  Johannmeier,  Hitler’s 
military  adjutant;  Wilhelm  Zander,  an  S.S.  officer  and  ad- 
viser to  Bormann;  and  Heinz  Lorenz,  the  Propaganda  Min- 
istry official  who  had  brought  the  shattering  news  of 
Himmler’s  treachery  the  night  before.  Johannmeier,  a much 
decorated  officer,  was  to  lead  the  party  through  the  Red 
Army’s  lines.  He  himself  was  then  to  deliver  his  copy  of  the 
papers  to  Field  Marshal  Ferdinand  Schoerner,  whose  army 
group  still  held  out  intact  in  the  Bohemian  mountains  and 
whom  Hitler  had  named  as  the  new  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Army.  General  Burgdorf  enclosed  a covering  letter 
informing  Schoerner  that  Hitler  had  written  his  Testament 
“today  under  the  shattering  news  of  Himmler’s  treachery. 
It  is  his  unalterable  decision.”  Zander  and  Lorenz  were  to 
take  their  copies  to  Doenitz.  Zander  was  given  a covering 
note  from  Bormann. 

Dear  Grand  Admiral: 

Since  all  divisions  have  failed  to  arrive  and  our  position 
seems  hopeless,  the  Fuehrer  dictated  last  night  the  attached 
political  Testament.  Heil  Hitler. 

The  three  messengers  set  out  on  their  dangerous  mission 
at  noon,  edging  their  way  westward  through  the  Tier- 
garten  and  Charlottenburg  to  Pichelsdorf  at  the  head  of 
the  Havel  lake,  where  a Hitler  Youth  battalion  held  the 
bridge  in  anticipation  of  the  arrival  of  Wenck’s  ghost 
army.  To  get  that  far  they  had  successfully  slipped  through 
three  Russian  rings;  at  the  Victory  Column  in  the  middle 
of  the  Tiergarten,  at  the  Zoo  Station  just  beyond  the  park, 
and  on  the  approaches  to  Pichelsdorf.  They  still  had  many 
other  lines  to  penetrate,  and  much  adventure  lay  ahead 
of  them,*  and  though  they  eventually  got  through  it  was 
much  too  late  for  their  messages  to  be  of  any  use  to 
Doenitz  and  Schoerner,  who  never  saw  them. 

The  three  messengers  were  not  the  only  persons  to  de- 

* Trevor-Roper,  in  The  Last  Days  of  Hitler,  has  given  a graphic  account  of 
their  adventures.  But  for  an  indiscretion  of  Heinz  Lorenz,  the  farewell 
messages  of  Hitler  and  (Joebbels  might  never  have  become  known.  Major 
Johannmeier  eventually  buried  his  copy  of  the  documents  in  the  garden  of 
his  home  at  Iserlohn  in  Westphalia.  Zander  hid  his  copy  in  a trunk  which 
he  left  in  the  Bavarian  village  of  Tegernsee.  Changing  his  name  and  as- 
suming a disguise,  he  attempted  to  begin  a new  life  under  the  name  of 
Wilhelm  Paustin.  But  Lorenz,  a journalist  by  profession,  was  too  garrulous 
to  keep  his  secret  very  well  and  a chance  indiscretion  led  to  the  discovery  of 
his  copy  and  to  the  exposure  of  the  other  two  messengers. 


1466 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

part  from  the  bunker  that  day.  At  noon  on  April  29, 
Hitler,  who  had  now  been  restored  to  a period  of  calm, 
held  his  customary  war  conference  to  discuss  the  military 
situation,  just  as  he  had  daily  at  this  hour  for  nearly  six 
years — and  just  as  if  the  end  of  the  road  had  not  been 
reached.  General  Krebs  reported  that  the  Russians  had  ad- 
vanced farther  toward  the  Chancellery  during  the  night 
and  early  morning.  The  supply  of  ammunition  of  the  city’s 
defenders,  such  as  they  were,  was  getting  low.  There  was 
still  no  news  from  Wenck’s  rescue  army.  Three  military 
adjutants,  who  now  found  little  to  do  and  who  did  not 
want  to  join  the  Leader  in  self-inflicted  death,  asked  if 
they  could  leave  the  bunker  in  order  to  try  to  find  out 
what  had  happened  to  Wenck.  Hitler  granted  them  per- 
mission and  instructed  them  to  urge  General  Wenck  to 
get  a move  on.  During  the  afternoon  the  three  officers 
left. 

They  were  soon  joined  by  a fourth,  Colonel  Nicolaus 
von  Below,  Hitler’s  Luftwaffe  adjutant,  who  had  been  a 
junior  member  of  the  inner  circle  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  Below  too  did  not  believe  in  suicide  and  felt  that 
there  was  no  longer  any  useful  employment  in  the  Chan- 
cellery shelter.  He  asked  the  permission  of  the  Fuehrer  to 
leave  and  it  was  granted.  Hitler  was  being  most  reason- 
able this  day.  It  also  occurred  to  him  that  he  could  utilize 
the  Air  Force  colonel  to  carry  out  one  last  message. 
This  was  to  be  to  General  Keitel,  whom  Bormann  already 
suspected  of  treason,  and  it  would  contain  the  warlord’s 
final  blast  at  the  Army,  which,  he  felt,  had  let  him  down. 

No  doubt  the  news  at  the  evening  situation  conference 
at  10  p.m.  increased  the  Fuehrer’s  already  monumental 
bitterness  at  the  Army.  General  Weidling,  who  commanded 
the  courageous  but  ragged  overage  Volkssturm  and  under- 
age Hitler  Youth  troops  being  sacrificed  in  encircled  Ber- 
lin to  prolong  Hitler’s  life  a few  days,  reported  that  the 
Russians  had  pushed  ahead  along  the  Saarlandstrasse  and 
the  Wilhelmstrasse  almost  to  the  Air  Ministry,  which  was 
only  a stone’s  throw  from  the  Chancellery.  The  enemy 
would  reach  the  Chancellery,  he  said,  by  May  1 at  the 
latest — in  a day  or  two,  that  is. 

This  was  the  end.  Even  Hitler,  who  up  until  now  had 
been  directing  nonexistent  armies  supposed  to  be  coming 
to  the  relief  of  the  capital,  saw  that — at  last.  He  dictated 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1467 


his  final  message  and  asked  Below  to  deliver  it  to  Keitel. 
He  informed  his  Chief  of  OKW  that  the  defense  of  Berlin 
was  now  at  an  end,  that  he  was  killing  himself  rather 
than  surrender,  that  Goering  and  Himmler  had  betrayed 
him,  and  that  he  had  named  Admiral  Doenitz  as  his  suc- 
cessor. 

He  had  one  last  word  to  say  about  the  armed  forces 
which,  despite  his  leadership,  had  brought  Germany  to  de- 
feat. The  Navy,  he  said,  had  performed  superbly.  The 
Luftwaffe  had  fought  bravely  and  only  Goering  was  re- 
sponsible for  its  losing  its  initial  supremacy  in  the  war. 
As  for  the  Army,  the  common  soldiers  had  fought  well 
and  courageously,  but  the  generals  had  failed  them — and 
him. 

The  people  and  the  armed  forces  [he  continued]  have  given 
their  all  in  this  long  hard  struggle.  The  sacrifice  has  been 
enormous.  But  my  trust  has  been  misused  by  many  people. 
Disloyalty  and  betrayal  have  undermined  resistance  through- 
out the  war. 

It  was  therefore  not  granted  to  me  to  lead  the  people  to 
victory.  The  Army  General  Staff  cannot  be  compared  with  the 
General  Staff  in  the  First  World  War.  Its  achievements  were 
far  behind  those  of  the  fighting  front 

At  least  the  Supreme  Nazi  Warlord  was  remaining  true 
to  character  to  the  very  end.  The  great  victories  had  been 
due  to  him.  The  defeats  and  final  failure  had  been  due  to 
others — to  their  “disloyalty  and  betrayal.” 

And  then  the  parting  valediction — the  last  recorded 
written  words  of  this  mad  genius’s  life. 

The  efforts  and  sacrifices  of  the  German  people  in  this 
war  have  been  so  great  that  I cannot  believe  that  they  have 
been  in  vain.  The  aim  must  still  be  to  win  territory  in  the 
East  for  the  German  people.* 

The  last  sentence  was  straight  out  of  Mein  Kampf. 
Hitler  had  begun  his  political  life  with  the  obsession  that 
“territory  in  the  East”  must  be  won  for  the  favored  Ger- 
man people,  and  he  was  ending  his  life  with  it.  All  the 
millions  of  German  dead,  all  the  millions  of  German 
homes  crushed  under  the  bombs,  even  the  destruction  of 
the  German  nation  had  not  convinced  him  that  the  rob- 


* Colonel  Below  destroyed  the  message  when  he  learned  of  Hitler’s  death 
while  he  was  still  making  his  wa y toward  the  Allied  Western  armies.  He  has 
reconstructed  it  from  memory.  See  Trevor-Roper,  op.  cit.,  pp.  194-95. 


1468  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

bing  of  the  lands  of  the  Slavic  peoples  to  the  East  was — 
morals  aside — a futile  Teutonic  dream. 

THE  DEATH  OF  HITLER  AND  HIS  BRIDE 

During  the  afternoon  of  April  29  one  of  the  last  pieces 
of  news  to  reach  the  bunker  from  the  outside  world  came 
in.  Mussolini,  Hitler’s  fellow  fascist  dictator  and  partner 
in  aggression,  had  met  his  end  and  it  had  been  shared 
by  his  mistress,  Clara  Petacci. 

They  had  been  caught  by  Italian  partisans  on  April  27 
while  trying  to  escape  from  Como  into  Switzerland,  and 
executed  two  days  later.  On  the  Saturday  night  of  April 
28  the  bodies  were  brought  to  Milan  in  a truck  and  dumped 
on  the  piazza.  The  next  day  they  were  strung  up  by  the 
heels  from  lampposts  and  later  cut  down  so  that  through- 
out the  rest  of  the  Sabbath  day  they  lay  in  the  gutter, 
where  vengeful  Italians  reviled  them.  On  May  Day  Benito 
Mussolini  was  buried  beside  his  mistress  in  the  paupers’ 
plot  in  the  Cimitero  Maggiore  in  Milan.  In  such  a 
macabre  climax  of  degradation  II  Duce  and  Fascism  passed 
into  history. 

It  is  not  known  how  many  of  the  details  of  the  Duce’s 
shabby  end  were  communicated  to  the  Fuehrer.  One  can 
only  speculate  that  if  he  heard  many  of  them  he  was 
only  strengthened  in  his  resolve  not  to  allow  himself  or 
his  bride  to  be  made  a “spectacle,  presented  by  the  Jews, 
to  divert  their  hysterical  masses,” — as  he  had  just  written 
in  his  Testament — not  their  live  selves  or  their  bodies. 

Shortly  after  receiving  the  news  of  Mussolini’s  death 
Hitler  began  to  make  the  final  preparations  for  his.  He  had 
his  favorite  Alsatian  dog,  Blondi,  poisoned  and  two  other 
dogs  in  the  household  shot.  Then  he  called  in  his  two  re- 
maining women  secretaries  and  handed  them  capsules  of 
poison  to  use  if  they  wished  to  when  the  barbarian  Russians 
broke  in.  He  was  sorry,  he  said,  not  to  be  able  to  give 
them  a better  farewell  gift,  and  he  expressed  his  ap- 
preciation for  their  long  and  loyal  service. 

Evening  had  now  come,  the  last  of  Adolf  Hitler’s  life. 
He  instructed  Frau  Junge,  one  of  his  secretaries,  to  de- 
stroy the  remaining  papers  in  his  files  and  he  sent  out 
word  that  no  one  in  the  bunker  was  to  go  to  bed  until 
further  orders.  This  was  interpreted  by  all  as  meaning  that 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1469 

he  judged  the  time  had  come  to  make  his  farewells.  But  it 
was  not  until  long  after  midnight,  at  about  2:30  a.m.  of 
April  30,  as  several  witnesses  recall,  that  the  Fuehrer 
emerged  from  his  private  quarters  and  appeared  in  the 
general  dining  passage,  where  some  twenty  persons,  mostly 
the  women  members  of  his  entourage,  were  assembled.  He 
walked  down  the  line  shaking  hands  with  each  and  mum- 
bling a few  words  that  were  inaudible.  There  was  a heavy 
film  of  moisture  on  his  eyes,  as  Frau  Junge  remembered, 
“they  seemed  to  be  looking  far  away,  beyond  the  walls  of 
the  bunker.” 

After  he  retired,  a curious  thing  happened.  The  tension 
which  had  been  building  up  to  an  almost  unendurable 
point  in  the  bunker  broke,  and  several  persons  went  to 
the  canteen — to  dance.  The  weird  party  soon  became  so 
noisy  that  word  was  sent  from  the  Fuehrer’s  quarters  re- 
questing more  quiet.  The  Russians  might  come  in  a few 
hours  and  kill  them  all — though  most  of  them  were  al- 
ready thinking  of  how  they  could  escape — but  in  the  mean- 
time for  a brief  spell,  now  that  the  Fuehrer’s  strict  control 
of  their  lives  was  over,  they  would  seek  pleasure  where 
and  how  they  could  find  it.  The  sense  of  relief  among 
these  people  seems  to  have  been  enormous  and  they  danced 
on  through  the  night. 

Not  Bormann.  This  murky  man  still  had  work  to  do. 
His  own  prospects  for  survival  seemed  to  be  diminishing. 
There  might  not  be  a long  enough  interval  between  the 
Fuehrer’s  death  and  the  arrival  of  the  Russians  in  which 
he  could  escape  to  Doenitz.  If  not,  while  the  Fuehrer  still 
lived  and  thus  clothed  his  orders  with  authority,  Bormann 
could  at  least  exact  further  revenge  on  the  “traitors.”  He 
dispatched  during  this  last  night  a further  message  to 
Doenitz. 

Doenitz! 

Our  impression  grows  daily  stronger  that  the  divisions  in 
the  Berlin  theater  have  been  standing  idle  for  several  days.  All 
the  reports  we  receive  are  controlled,  suppressed,  or  distorted 
by  Keitel  . . . The  Fuehrer  orders  you  to  proceed  at  once,  and 
mercilessly,  against  all  traitors. 

And  then,  though  he  knew  that  Hitler’s  death  was  only 
hours  away,  he  added  a postscript,  “The  Fuehrer  is  alive, 
and  is  conducting  the  defense  of  Berlin.” 


1470 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


But  Berlin  was  no  longer  defensible.  The  Russians  al- 
ready had  occupied  almost  all  of  the  city.  It  was  now 
merely  a question  of  the  defense  of  the  Chancellery.  It 
too  was  doomed,  as  Hitler  and  Bormann  learned  at  the 
situation  conference  at  noon  on  April  30,  the  last  that 
was  ever  to  take  place.  The  Russians  had  reached  the 
eastern  end  of  the  Tiergarten  and  broken  into  the  Pots- 
damerplatz.  They  were  just  a block  away.  The  hour  for 
Adolf  Hitler  to  carry  out  his  resolve  had  come. 

His  bride  apparently  had  no  appetite  for  lunch  that  day 
and  Hitler  took  his  repast  with  his  two  secretaries  and 
with  his  vegetarian  cook,  who  perhaps  did  not  realize  that 
she  had  prepared  his  last  meal.  While  they  were  finishing 
their  lunch  at  about  2:30  p.m.,  Erich  Kempka,  the  Fueh- 
rer’s chauffeur,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Chancellery 
garage,  received  an  order  to  deliver  immediately  200  liters 
of  gasoline  in  jerricans  to  the  Chancellery  garden.  Kempka 
had  some  difficulty  in  rounding  up  so  much  fuel  but  he 
managed  to  collect  some  180  liters  and  with  the  help  of 
three  men  carried  it  to  the  emergency  exit  of  the  bunker.24 

While  the  oil  to  provide  the  fire  for  the  Viking  funeral 
was  being  collected,  Hitler,  having  done  with  his  last 
meal,  fetched  Eva  Braun  for  another  and  final  farewell 
to  his  most  intimate  collaborators:  Dr.  Goebbels,  Generals 
Krebs  and  Burgdorf,  the  secretaries  and  Fraulein  Man- 
zialy,  the  cook.  Frau  Goebbels  did  not  appear.  This  for- 
midable and  beautiful  blond  woman  had,  like  Eva  Braun, 
found  it  easy  to  make  the  decision  to  die  with  her  hus- 
band, but  the  prospect  of  killing  her  six  young  children, 
who  had  been  playing  merrily  in  the  underground  shelter 
these  last  days  without  an  inkling  of  what  was  in  store  for 
them,  unnerved  her. 

“My  dear  Hanna,”  she  had  said  to  Fraulein  Reitsch 
two  or  three  evenings  before,  “when  the  end  comes  you 
must  help  me  if  I become  weak  about  the  children  . . . 
They  belong  to  the  Third  Reich  and  to  the  Fuehrer,  and 
if  these  two  cease  to  exist  there  can  be  no  further  place 
for  them.  My  greatest  fear  is  that  at  the  last  moment  I 
will  be  too  weak.”  Alone  in  her  little  room  she  was  now 
striving  to  overcome  her  greatest  fear.* 

* The  children  and  their  ages  were:  Hela,  12;  Hilda,  11;  Helmut,  9;  Holde, 
7;  Hedda,  5;  Heide,  3. 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1471 


Hitler  and  Eva  Braun  had  no  such  problem.  They  had 
only  their  own  lives  to  take.  They  finished  their  farewells 
and  retired  to  their  rooms.  Outside  in  the  passageway. 
Dr.  Goebbels,  Bormann  and  a few  others  waited.  In  a 
few  moments  a revolver  shot  was  heard.  They  waited  for  a 
second  one,  but  there  was  only  silence.  After  a decent  in- 
terval they  quietly  entered  the  Fuehrer’s  quarters.  They 
found  the  body  of  Adolf  Hitler  sprawled  on  the  sofa  drip- 
ping blood.  He  had  shot  himself  in  the  mouth.  At  his  side 
lay  Eva  Braun.  Two  revolvers  had  tumbed  to  the  floor, 
but  the  bride  had  not  used  hers.  She  had  swallowed  poison. 

It  was  3:30  p.m.  on  Monday,  April  30,  1945,  ten  days 
after  Adolf  Hitler’s  fifty-sixth  birthday,  and  twelve  years 
and  three  months  to  a day  since  he  had  become  Chancellor 
of  Germany  and  had  instituted  the  Third  Reich.  It  would 
survive  him  but  a week. 

The  Viking  funeral  followed.  There  were  no  words 
spoken;  the  only  sound  was  the  roar  of  Russian  shells  ex- 
ploding in  the  garden  of  the  Chancellery  and  on  the  shat- 
tered walls  around  it.  Hitler’s  valet,  S.S.  Sturmbannfuehrer 
Heinz  Linge,  and  an  orderly  carried  out  the  Fuehrer’s 
body,  wrapped  in  an  Army  field-gray  blanket,  which  con- 
cealed the  shattered  face.  Kempka  identified  it  in  his  own 
mind  by  the  black  trousers  and  shoes  which  protruded 
from  the  blanket  and  which  the  warlord  always  wore  with 
his  field-gray  jacket.  Eva  Braun’s  death  had  been  cleaner, 
there  was  no  blood,  and  Bormann  carried  out  her  body 
just  as  it  was  to  the  passage,  where  he  turned  it  over  to 
Kempka. 

Frau  Hitler  [the  chafleur  later  recounted]  wore  a dark  dress 
...  I could  not  recognize  any  injuries  to  the  body. 

The  corpses  were  carried  up  to  the  garden  and  during 
a lull  in  the  bombardment  placed  in  a shell  hole  and 
ignited  with  gasoline.  The  mourners,  headed  by  Goebbels 
and  Bormann,  withdrew  to  the  shelter  of  the  emergency 
exit  and  as  the  flames  mounted  stood  at  attention  and 
raised  their  right  hands  in  a farewell  Nazi  salute.  It  was 
a brief  ceremony,  for  Red  Army  shells  began  to  spatter 
the  garden  again  and  the  survivors  retired  to  the  safety  of 
the  bunker,  leaving  the  gasoline-fed  flames  to  complete  the 
work  of  eradicating  the  last  earthly  remains  of  Adolf  Hitler 


1472 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

and  his  wife.*  For  Bormann  and  Goebbels,  there  were  still 
tasks  to  perform  in  the  Third  Reich,  now  bereft  of  its 
founder  and  dictator,  though  they  were  not  the  same  tasks. 

There  had  not  yet  been  time  for  the  messengers  to  reach 
Doenitz  with  the  Fuehrer’s  testament  appointing  him  as 
his  successor.  The  admiral  would  now  have  to  be  informed 
by  radio.  But  even  at  this  point,  with  power  slipped  from 
his  hands,  Bormann  hesitated.  It  was  difficult  to  one  who 
had  savored  it  to  give  it  up  so  abruptly.  Finally  he  got  off 
a message. 

Grand  Admiral  Doenitz: 

In  place  of  the  former  Reich  Marshal  Goering  the  Fuehrer 
appoints  you  as  his  successor.  Written  authority  is  on  its  way. 
You  will  immediately  take  all  such  measures  as  the  situation 
requires. 

There  was  not  a word  that  Hitler  was  dead. 

The  Admiral,  who  was  in  command  of  all  German 
forces  in  the  north  and  had  moved  his  headquarters  to 
Ploen  in  Schleswig,  was  flabbergasted  at  the  news.  Unlike 
the  party  leaders,  he  had  no  desire  to  succeed  Hitler;  the 
thought  had  never  entered  his  sailor’s  head.  Two  days  be- 
fore, believing  that  Himmler  would  inherit  the  succession, 
he  had  gone  to  the  S.S.  chief  and  offered  him  his  support. 
But  since  it  would  never  have  occurred  to  him  to  disobey 
an  order  of  the  Fuehrer,  he  sent  the  following  reply,  in 
the  belief  that  Adolf  Hitler  was  still  alive. 

My  Fuehrer! 

My  loyalty  to  you  will  be  unconditional.  I shall  do  every- 
thing possible  to  relieve  you  in  Berlin.  If  fate  nevertheless 
compels  me  to  rule  the  Reich  as  your  appointed  successor,  I 
shall  continue  this  war  to  an  end  worthy  of  the  unique,  heroic 
struggle  of  the  German  people. 

Grand  Admiral  Doenitz 

That  night  Bormann  and  Goebbels  had  a fresh  idea. 
They  decided  to  try  to  negotiate  with  the  Russians.  Gen- 
eral Krebs,  the  Chief  of  the  Army  General  Staff,  who 
had  remained  in  the  bunker,  had  once  been  the  assistant 
military  attach6  in  Moscow,  spoke  Russian,  and  on  one 

•The  bones  were  never  found,  and  this  gave  rise  to  rumors  after  the  war 
that  Hitler  had  survived.  But  the  separate  interrogation  of  several  eyewit- 
nesses by  British  and  American  intelligence  officers  leaves  no  doubt  about 
the  matter.  Kempka  has  given  a plausible  explanation  as  to  why  the  charred 
bones  were  never  found.  “The  traces  were  wiped  out,”  he  told  his  interro- 
gators, by  the  uninterrupted  Russian  artillery  fire.” 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1473 


famous  occasion  had  even  been  embraced  by  Stalin  at  the 
Moscow  railway  station.  Perhaps  he  could  get  something 
out  of  the  Bolsheviks;  specifically,  what  Goebbels  and  Bor- 
mann  wanted  was  a safe-conduct  for  themselves  so  that 
they  could  take  their  appointed  places  in  the  new  Doenitz 
government.  In  return  for  this  they  were  prepared  to  sur- 
render Berlin. 

General  Krebs  set  out  shortly  after  midnight  of  April 
30-May  1 to  see  General  Chuikov,*  the  Soviet  com- 
mander of  the  troops  fighting  in  Berlin.  One  of  the  Ger- 
man officers  accompanying  him  has  recorded  the  opening 
of  their  conversation. 

Krebs:  Today  is  the  First  of  May,  a great  holiday  for  our 
two  nations.! 

Chuikov:  We  have  a great  holiday  today.  How  things  are 
with  you  over  there  it  is  hard  to  say.25 

The  Russian  General  demanded  the  unconditional  sur- 
render of  everyone  in  the  Fuehrer’s  bunker  as  well  as  of 
the  remaining  German  troops  in  Berlin. 

It  took  Krebs  some  time  to  carry  out  his  mission,  and 
when  he  had  not  returned  by  11  a.m.  on  May  1 the  im- 
patient Bormann  dispatched  another  radio  message  to 
Doenitz. 

The  Testament  is  in  force.  I will  join  you  as  soon  as  possible. 
Till  then,  I recommend  that  publication  be  held  up. 

This  was  still  ambiguous.  Bormann  simply  could  not  be 
straightforward  enough  to  say  that  the  Fuehrer  was  dead. 
He  wanted  to  get  out  to  be  the  first  to  inform  Doepitz 
of  the  momentous  news  and  thereby  help  to  insure  his 
favor  with  the  new  Commander  in  Chief.  But  Goebbels, 
who  with  his  wife  and  children  was  about  to  die,  had  no 
such  reason  for  not  telling  the  Admiral  the  simple  truth. 
At  3:15  p.m.  he  got  off  his  own  message  to  Doenitz — the 
last  radio  communication  ever  to  leave  the  beleaguered 
bunker  in  Berlin. 

Grand  Admiral  Doenitz 

MOST  SECRET 

The  Fuehrer  died  yesterday  at  1530  hours  [3:30  p.m.]. 
Testament  of  April  29  appoints  you  as  Reich  President  . . . 


* Not  Marshal  Zhukov,  as  most  accounts  have  had  it. 
t May  1 was  the  traditional  Labor  Day  in  Europe. 


1474 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

[There  follow  the  names  of  the  principal  cabinet  appointments.] 

By  order  of  the  Fuehrer  the  Testament  has  been  sent  out  of 
Berlin  to  you  . . . Bormann  intends  to  go  to  you  today  and 
to  inform  you  of  the  situation.  Time  and  form  of  announce- 
ment to  the  press  and  to  the  troops  is  left  to  you.  Confirm 
receipt. 

Goebbels 

Goebbels  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  inform  the  new 
Leader  of  his  own  intentions.  Early  in  the  evening  of  May 
1 , he  carried  them  out.  The  first  act  was  to  poison  the  six 
children.  Their  playing  was  halted  and  they  were  given 
lethal  injections,  apparently  by  the  same  physician  who 
the  day  before  had  poisoned  the  Fuehrer’s  dogs.  Then 
Goebbels  called  his  adjutant,  S.S.  Hauptsturmfuehrer 
Guenther  Schwaegermann,  and  instructed  him  to  fetch 
some  gasoline. 

“Schwaegermann,”  he  told  him,  “this  is  the  worst 
treachery  of  all.  The  generals  have  betrayed  the  Fuehrer. 
Everything  is  lost.  I shall  die,  together  with  my  wife  and 
family.”  He  did  not  mention,  even  to  his  adjutant,  that 
he  had  just  had  his  children  murdered.  “You  will  burn  our 
bodies.  Can  you  do  that?” 

Schwaegermann  assured  him  he  could  and  sent  two 
orderlies  to  procure  the  gasoline.  A few  minutes  later,  at 
about  8:30  p.m.,  just  as  it  was  getting  dark  outside,  Dr. 
and  Frau  Goebbels  walked  through  the  bunker,  bade  good- 
bye to  those  who  happened  to  be  in  the  corridor,  and 
mounted  the  stairs  to  the  garden.  There,  at  their  request, 
an  S.S.  orderly  dispatched  them  with  two  shots  in  the 
back  of  the  head.  Four  cans  of  gasoline  were  poured  over 
their  bodies  and  set  on  fire,  but  the  cremation  was  not  well 
done.26  The  survivors  in  the  bunker  were  anxious  to  join 
the  mass  escape  which  was  just  getting  under  way  and 
there  was  no  time  to  waste  on  burning  those  already  dead. 
The  Russians  found  the  charred  bodies  of  the  Propaganda 
Minister  and  his  wife  the  next  day  and  immediately 
identified  them. 

By  9 o’clock  on  the  evening  of  May  1,  the  Fuehrer- 
bunker  had  been  set  on  fire  and  some  five  or  six  hundred 
survivors  of  the  Fuehrer’s  entourage,  mostly  S.S.  men, 
were  milling  about  in  the  shelter  of  the  New  Chancellery 
— like  chickens  with  their  heads  off,  as  one  of  them,  the 
Fuehrer’s  tailor,  later  recalled — preparatory  to  the  great 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1475 

breakout.  The  plan  was  to  go  by  foot  along  the  subway 
tracks  from  the  station  below  the  Wilhelmsplatz,  opposite 
the  Chancellery,  to  the  Friedrichstrasse  Bahnhof  and 
there  cross  the  River  Spree  and  sift  through  the  Russian 
lines  immediately  to  the  north  of  it.  A good  many  got 
through;  some  did  not,  among  them  Martin  Bormann. 

When  General  Krebs  had  finally  returned  to  the  bunker 
that  afternoon  with  General  Chuikov’s  demand  for  uncon- 
ditional surrender  Hitler’s  party  secretary  had  decided  that 
his  only  chance  for  survival  lay  in  joining  the  mass  exodus. 
His  group  attempted  to  follow  a German  tank,  but  ac- 
cording to  Kempka,  who  was  with  him,  it  received  a direct 
hit  from  a Russian  shell  and  Bormann  was  almost  cer- 
tainly killed.  Artur  Axmann,  the  Hitler  Youth  leader,  who 
had  deserted  his  battalion  of  boys  at  the  Pichelsdorf 
Bridge  to  save  his  neck,  was  also  present  and  later  deposed 
that  he  had  seen  Bormann’s  body  lying  under  the  bridge 
where  the  Invalidenstrasse  crosses  the  railroad  tracks. 
There  was  moonlight  on  his  face  and  Axmann  could  see 
no  sign  of  wounds.  His  presumption  was  that  Bormann 
had  swallowed  his  capsule  of  poison  when  he  saw  that 
his  chances  of  getting  through  the  Russian  lines  were  nil. 

Generals  Krebs  and  Burgdorf  did  not  join  in  the  mass 
attempt  to  escape.  It  is  believed  that  they  shot  themselves 
in  the  cellar  of  the  New  Chancellery. 

THE  END  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH 

The  Third  Reich  survived  the  death  of  its  founder  by 
seven  days. 

A little  after  10  o’clock  on  the  evening  of  the  first  of 
May,  while  the  bodies  of  Dr.  and  Frau  Goebbels  were 
burning  in  the  Chancellery  garden  and  the  inhabitants  of 
the  bunker  were  herding  together  for  their  escape  through 
a subway  tunnel  in  Berlin,  the  Hamburg  radio  interrupted 
the  playing  of  a recording  of  Bruckner’s  solemn  Seventh 
Symphony.  There  was  a roll  of  military  drums  and  then 
an  announcer  spoke. 

Our  Fuehrer,  Adolf  Hitler,  fighting  to  the  last  breath  against 
Bolshevism,  fell  for  Germany  this  afternoon  in  his  operational 
headquarters  in  the  Reich  Chancellery.  On  April  30  the 
Fuehrer  appointed  Grand  Admiral  Doenitz  his  successor.  The 


1476  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Grand  Admiral  and  successor  of  the  Fuehrer  now  speaks  to 
the  German  people. 

The  Third  Reich  was  expiring,  as  it  had  begun,  with  a 
shabby  lie.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  Hitler  had  not  died 
that  afternoon  but  the  previous  one,  which  was  not  im- 
portant, he  had  not  fallen  fighting  “to  the  last  breath,” 
but  the  broadcasting  of  this  falsehood  was  necessary  if 
the  inheritors  of  his  mantle  were  to  perpetuate  a legend 
and  also  if  they  were  to  hold  control  of  the  troops  who 
were  still  offering  resistance  and  who  would  surely  have 
felt  betrayed  if  they  had  known  the  truth. 

Doenitz  himself  repeated  the  lie  when  he  went  on  the 
air  at  10:20  p.m.  and  spoke  of  the  “hero’s  death”  of  the 
Fuehrer.  Actually  at  that  moment  he  did  not  know  how 
Hitler  had  met  his  end.  Goebbels  had  radioed  only  that 
he  had  “died”  on  the  previous  afternoon.  But  this  did  not 
inhibit  the  Admiral  either  on  this  point  or  on  others,  for 
he  did  his  best  to  muddy  the  confused  minds  of  the  Ger- 
man people  in  the  hour  of  their  disaster. 

It  is  my  first  task  [he  said]  to  save  Germany  from  destruc- 
tion by  the  advancing  Bolshevik  enemy.  For  this  aim  alone 
the  military  struggle  continues.  As  far  and  as  long  as  the 
achievement  of  this  aim  is  impeded  by  the  British  and  Amer- 
icans, we  shall  be  forced  to  carry  on  our  defensive  fight  against 
them  as  well.  Under  such  conditions,  however,  the  Anglo- 
Americans  will  continue  the  war  not  for  their  own  people 
but  solely  for  the  spreading  of  Bolshevism  in  Europe. 

After  this  silly  distortion,  the  Admiral,  who  is  not  re- 
corded as  having  protested  Hitler’s  decision  to  make  the 
Bolshevik  nation  Germany’s  ally  in  1939  so  that  a war 
could  be  fought  against  England  and  later  America,  as- 
sured the  German  people  in  concluding  his  broadcast  that 
“God  will  not  forsake  us  after  so  much  suffering  and 
sacrifice.” 

These  were  empty  words.  Doenitz  knew  that  German 
resistance  was  at  an  end.  On  April  29,  the  day  before 
Hitler  took  his  life,  the  German  armies  in  Italy  had  sur- 
rendered unconditionally,  an  event  whose  news,  because  of 
the  breakdown  in  communications,  was  spared  the  Fueh- 
rer, which  must  have  made  his  last  hours  more  bearable 
than  they  otherwise  would  have  been.  On  May  4 the  Ger- 
man High  Command  surrendered  to  Montgomery  all  Ger- 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  1477 

man  forces  in  northwest  Germany,  Denmark  and  Holland. 
The  next  day  Kesselring’s  Army  Group  G,  comprising  the 
German  First  and  Nineteenth  armies  north  of  the  Alps, 
capitulated. 

On  that  day,  May  5,  Admiral  Hans  von  Friedeburg,  the 
new  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  German  Navy,  arrived 
at  General  Eisenhower’s  headquarters  at  Reims  to  negotiate 
a surrender.  The  German  aim,  as  the  last  papers  of  OKW 
make  clear,27  was  to  stall  for  a few  days  in  order  to 
have  time  to  move  as  many  German  troops  and  refugees 
as  possible  from  the  path  of  the  Russians  so  that  they 
could  surrender  to  the  Western  Allies.  General  Jodi  ar- 
rived at  Reims  the  next  day  to  help  his  Navy  colleague 
draw  out  the  proceedings.  But  it  was  in  vain.  Eisenhower 
saw  through  the  garfie. 

I told  General  Smith  [he  later  recounted]  to  inform  Jodi 
that  unless  they  instantly  ceased  all  pretense  and  delay  I would 
close  the  entire  Allied  front  and  would,  by  force,  prevent  any 
more  German  refugees  from  entering  our  lines.  I would  brook 
no  further  delay.28 

At  1:30  a.m.  on  May  7 Doenitz,  after  being  informed 
by  Jodi  of  Eisenhower’s  demands,  radioed  the  German 
General  from  his  new  headquarters  at  Flensburg  on  the 
Danish  frontier  full  powers  to  sign  the  document  of  un- 
conditional surrender.  The  game  was  up. 

In  a little  red  schoolhouse  at  Reims,  where  Eisenhower 
had  made  his  headquarters,  Germany  surrendered  uncon- 
ditionally at  2:41  on  the  morning  of  May  7,  1945.  The 
capitulation  was  signed  for  the  Allies  by  General  Walter 
Bedell  Smith,  with  General  Ivan  Susloparov  affixing  his 
signature  as  witness  for  Russia  and  General  Francois 
Sevez  for  France.  Admiral  Friedeburg  and  General  Jodi 
signed  for  Germany. 

Jodi  asked  permission  to  say  a word  and  it  was  granted. 

With  this  signature  the  German  people  and  the  German 
Armed  Forces  are,  for  better  or  worse,  delivered  into  the  hands 
of  the  victors  ...  In  this  hour  I can  only  express  the  hope 
that  the  victor  will  treat  them  with  generosity. 

There  was  no  response  from  the  Allied  side.  But  per- 
haps Jodi  recalled  another  occasion  when  the  roles  were 
reversed  just  five  years  before.  Then  a French  general,  in 


1478  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

signing  France’s  unconditional  surrender  at  Compiegne, 
had  made  a similar  plea — in  vain,  as  it  turned  out. 

The  guns  in  Europe  ceased  firing  and  the  bombs  ceased 
dropping  at  midnight  on  May  8—9,  1945,  and  a strange 
but  welcome  silence  settled  over  the  Continent  for  the  first 
time  since  September  1,  1939.  In  the  intervening  five  years, 
eight  months  and  seven  days  millions  of  men  and  women 
had  been  slaughtered  on  a hundred  battlefields  and  in  a 
thousand  bombed  towns,  and  millions  more  done  to  death 
in  the  Nazi  gas  chambers  or  on  the  edge  of  the  S.S. 
Einsatzgruppen  pits  in  Russia  and  Poland — -as  the  result 
of  Adolf  Hitler’s  lust  for  German  conquest.  A greater  part 
of  most  of  Europe’s  ancient  cities  lay  in  ruins,  and  from 
their  rubble,  as  the  weather  warmed,  there  was  the  stench 
of  the  countless  unburied  dead. 

No  more  would  the  streets  of  Germany  echo  to  the  jack 
boot  of  the  goose-stepping  storm  troopers  or  the  lusty  yells 
of  the  brown-shirted  masses  or  the  shouts  of  the  Fuehrer 
blaring  from  the  loudspeakers. 

After  twelve  years,  four  months  and  eight  days,  an  Age 
of  Darkness  to  all  but  a multitude  of  Germans  and  now 
ending  in  a bleak  night  for  them  too,  the  Thousand-Year 
Reich  had  come  to  an  end.  It  had  raised,  as  we  have  seen, 
this  great  nation  and  this  resourceful  but  so  easily  misled 
people  to  heights  of  power  and  conquest  they  had  never 
before  experienced  and  now  it  had  dissolved  with  a sud- 
denness and  a completeness  that  had  few,  if  any,  parallels 
in  history. 

In  1918,  after  the  last  defeat,  the  Kaiser  had  fled,  the 
monarchy  had  tumbled,  but  the  other  traditional  institu- 
tions supporting  the  State  had  remained,  a government 
chosen  by  the  people  had  continued  to  function,  as  did  the 
nucleus  of  a German  Army  and  a General  Staff.  But  in  the 
spring  of  1945  the  Third  Reich  simply  ceased  to  exist 
There  was  no  longer  any  German  authority  on  any  level. 
The  millions  of  soldiers,  airmen  and  sailors  were  prisoners 
of  war  in  their  own  land.  The  millions  of  civilians  were 
governed,  down  to  the  villages,  by  the  conquering  enemy 
troops,  on  whom  they  depended  not  only  for  law  and  order 
but  throughout  that  summer  and  bitter  winter  of  1945  for 
food  and  fuel  to  keep  them  alive.  Such  was  the  state  to 
which  the  follies  of  Adolf  Hitler — and  their  own  folly 
in  following  him  so  blindly  and  with  so  much  enthusiasm 


1479 


The  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

— had  brought  them,  though  I found  little  bitterness  to- 
ward him  when  I returned  to  Germany  that  fall. 

The  people  were  there,  and  the  land— the  first  dazed 
and  bleeding  and  hungry,  and,  when  winter  came,  shiver- 
ing in  their  rags  in  the  hovels  which  the  bombings  had 
made  of  their  homes;  the  second  a vast  wasteland  of 
rubble.  The  German  people  had  not  been  destroyed,  as 
Hitler,  who  had  tried  to  destroy  so  many  other  peoples 
and,  in  the  end,  when  the  war  was  lost,  themselves,  had 
wished. 

But  the  Third  Reich  had  passed  into  history. 


A BRIEF  EPILOGUE 


i went  back  that  autumn  to  the  once  proud  land,  where  I 
had  spent  most  of  the  brief  years  of  the  Third  Reich.  It 
was  difficult  to  recognize.  I have  described  that  return  in 
another  place.29  It  remains  here  merely  to  record  the  fate 
of  the  remaining  characters  who  have  figured  prominently 
in  these  pages. 

Doenitz’s  rump  government,  which  had  been  set  up  at 
Flensburg  on  the  Danish  border,  was  dissolved  by  the 
Allies  on  May  23,  1945,  and  all  its  members  were  ar- 
rested. Heinrich  Himmler  had  been  dismissed  from  the 
government  on  May  6,  on  the  eve  of  the  surrender  at 
Reims,  in  a move  which  the  Admiral  calculated  might  win 
him  favor  with  the  Allies.  The  former  S.S.  chief,  who 
had  held  so  long  the  power  of  life  and  death  over  Europe’s 
millions,  and  who  had  often  exercised  it,  wandered  about 
in  the  vicinity  of  Flensburg  until  May  21,  when  he  set 
out  with  eleven  S.S.  officers  to  try  to  pass  through  the 
British  and  American  lines  to  his  native  Bavaria.  Himmler 
— it  must  have  galled  him — had  shaved  off  his  mustache, 
tied  a black  patch  over  his  left  eye  and  donned  an  Army 
private’s  uniform.  The  party  was  stopped  the  first  day  at 
a British  control  point  between  Hamburg  and  Bremer- 
haven.  After  questioning,  Himmler  confessed  his  identity 
to  a British  Army  captain,  who  hauled  him  away  to  Second 
Army  headquarters  at  Lueneburg.  There  he  was  stripped 
and  searched  and  made  to  change  into  a British  Army 
uniform  to  avert  any  possibility  that  he  might  be  con- 
cealing poison  in  his  clothes.  But  the  search  was  not  thor- 
ough. Himmler  kept  his  vial  of  potassium  cyanide  con- 
cealed in  a cavity  of  his  gums.  When  a second  British 
intelligence  officer  arrived  from  Montgomery’s  headquar- 
ters on  May  23  and  instructed  a medical  officer  to  ex- 
amine the  prisoner’s  mouth,  Himmler  bit  on  his  vial  and 
1480 


1481 


A Brief  Epilogue 

was  dead  in  twelve  minutes,  despite  frantic  efforts  to  keep 
him  alive  by  pumping  his  stomach  and  administering 
emetics. 

The  remaining  intimate  collaborators  of  Hitler  lived  a 
bit  longer.  I went  down  to  Nuremberg  to  see  them.  I had 
often  watched  them  in  their  hour  of  glory  and  power  at 
the  annual  party  rallies  in  this  town.  In  the  dock  before 
the  International  Military  Tribunal  they  looked  different. 
There  had  been  quite  a metamorphosis.  Attired  in  rather 
shabby  clothes,  slumped  in  their  seats  fidgeting  nerv- 
ously, they  no  longer  resembled  the  arrogant  leaders  of 
old.  They  seemed  to  be  a drab  assortment  of  mediocrities. 
It  seemed  difficult  to  grasp  that  such  men,  when  last  you 
had  seen  them,  had  wielded  such  monstrous  power,  that 
such  as  they  could  conquer  a great  nation  and  most  of 
Europe. 

There  were  twenty-one  of  them*  in  the  dock:  Goering, 
eighty  pounds  lighter  than  when  last  I had  seen  him,  in 
a faded  Luftwaffe  uniform  without  insignia  and  obviously 
pleased  that  he  had  been  given  the  Number  One  place  in 
the  dock — a sort  of  belated  recognition  of  his  place  in  the 
Nazi  hierarchy  now  that  Hitler  was  dead;  Rudolf  Hess, 
who  had  been  the  Number  Three  man  before  his  flight  to 
England,  his  face  now  emaciated,  his  deep-set  eyes  staring 
vacantly  into  space,  feigning  amnesia  but  leaving  no  doubt 
that  he  was  a broken  man;  Ribbentrop,  at  last  shorn  of  his 
arrogance  and  his  pompousness,  looking  pale,  bent  and 
beaten;  Keitel,  who  had  lost  his  jauntiness;  Rosenberg, 
the  muddled  party  “philosopher,”  whom  the  events  which 
had  brought  him  to  this  place  appeared  to  have  awakened 
to  reality  at  last. 

Julius  Streicher,  the  Jew-baiter  of  Nuremberg,  was  there. 
This  sadist  and  pornographer,  whom  I had  once  seen  strid- 
ing through  the  streets  of  the  old  town  brandishing  a whip, 
seemed  to  have  wilted.  A bald,  decrepit-looking  old  man, 
he  sat  perspiring  profusely,  glaring  at  the  judges  and  con- 
vincing himself — so  a guard  later  told  me — that  they  were 
all  Jews.  There  was  Fritz  Sauckel,  the  boss  of  slave  labor 
in  the  Third  Reich,  his  narrow  little  slit  eyes  giving  him  a 
porcine  appearance.  He  seemed  nervous,  swaying  to  and 


* Dr.  Robert  Ley,  head  of  the  Arbeitsfront,  who  was  to  have  been  a de- 
fendant, had  hanged  himself  in  his  cell  before  the  trial  began.  He  had  made 
a noose  from  rags  torn  from  a towel,  which  he  had  tied  to  a toilet  pipe. 


1482 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

fro.  Next  to  him  was  Baldur  von  Schirach,  the  first  Hitler 
Youth  Leader  and  later  Gauleiter  of  Vienna,  more  Ameri- 
can by  blood  than  German  and  looking  like  a contrite  col- 
lege boy  who  had  been  kicked  out  of  school  for  some 
folly.  There  was  Walther  Funk,  the  shifty-eyed  nonentity 
who  had  succeeded  Schacht.  And  there  was  Dr.  Schacht 
himself,  who  had  spent  the  last  months  of  the  Third  Reich 
as  a prisoner  of  his  once  revered  Fuehrer  in  a concentra- 
tion camp,  fearing  execution  any  day,  and  who  now 
bristled  with  indignation  that  the  Allies  should  try  him 
as  a war  criminal.  Franz  von  Papen,  more  responsible 
than  any  other  individual  in  Germany  for  Hitler’s  coming 
to  power,  had  been  rounded  up  and  made  a defendant 
He  seemed  much  aged,  but  the  look  of  the  old  fox,  who 
had  escaped  from  so  many  tight  fixes,  was  till  imprinted 
on  his  wizened  face. 

Neurath,  Hitler’s  first  Foreign  Minister,  a German  of 
the  old  school,  with  few  convictions  and  little  integrity, 
seemed  utterly  broken.  Not  Speer,  who  made  the  most 
straightforward  impression  of  all  and  who  during  the  long 
trial  spoke  honestly  and  with  no  attempt  to  shirk  his 
responsibility  and  his  guilt.  Seyss-Inquart,  the  Austrian 
quisling,  was  in  the  dock,  as  were  Jodi  and  the  two  Grand 
Admirals,  Raeder  and  Doenitz — the  latter,  the  successor 
to  the  Fuehrer,  looking  in  his  store  suit  for  all  the  world 
like  a shoe  clerk.  There  was  Kaltenbrunner,  the  bloody 
successor  of  “Hangman  Heydrich,”  who  on  the  stand 
would  deny  all  his  crimes;  and  Hans  Frank,  the  Nazi  In- 
quisitor in  Poland,  who  would  admit  some  of  his,  having 
become  in  the  end  contrite  and,  as  he  said,  having  redis- 
covered God,  whose  forgiveness  he  begged;  and  Frick, 
as  colorless  on  the  brink  of  death  as  he  had  been  in  life! 
And  finally  Hans  Fritzsche,  who  had  made  a career  as  a 
radio  commentator  because  his  voice  resembled  that  of 
Goebbels,  who  had  made  him  an  official  in  the  Propa- 
ganda Ministry.  No  one  in  the  courtroom,  including 
Fritzsche,  seemed  to  know  why  he  was  there — he  was  too 
small  a fry— unless  it  were  as  a ghost  for  Goebbels,  and 
he  was  acquitted. 

So  were  Schacht  and  Papen.  All  three  later  drew  stiff 
prison  sentences  from  German  denazification  courts 
though,  in  the  end,  they  served  very  little  time. 


1483 


A Brief  Epilogue 

Seven  defendants  at  Nuremberg  drew  prison  sentences: 
Hess,  Raeder  and  Funk  for  life,  Speer  and  Schirach  for 
twenty  years,  Neurath  for  fifteen,  Doenitz  for  ten  The 
others  were  sentenced  to  death. 

At  eleven  minutes  past  1 a.m.  on  October  16,  1946 
Ribbentrop  mounted  the  gallows  in  the  execution  chamber 
of  the  Nuremberg  prison,  and  he  was  followed  at  short 
intervals  by  Keitel,  Kaltenbrunner,  Rosenberg,  Frank, 
Frick,  Streicher,  Seyss-Inquart,  Sauckel  and  Jodi 

But  not  by  Hermann  Goering.  He  cheated  the  hangman. 
Two  hours  before  his  turn  would  have  come  he  swallowed 
T\v'a!_. °f  Poison  that  had  been  smuggled  into  his  cell. 
Like  his  Fuehrer,  Adolf  Hitler,  and  his  rival  for  the  suc- 
cession, Heinrich  Himmler,  he  had  succeeded  at  the  last 
hour  in  choosing  the  way  in  which  he  would  depart  this 
earth,  on  which  he,  like  the  other  two,  had  made  such 
a murderous  impact. 


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NOTES 


NOTES 


Abbreviations  used  in  these  notes: 

DBrFP — Documents  on  British 
Foreign  Policy.  Files  of  the 
British  Foreign  Office. 

1)1)  l — / Documenti  diplomatica 
italiani.  Files  of  the  Italian 
government. 

DGFP — Documents  on  German 
Foreign  Policy.  Files  of  the 
German  Foreign  Office. 

FCNA — Fuehrer  Conferences  on 
Naval  Affairs.  Summary  rec- 
ords of  Hitler’s  conferences 
with  the  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  German  Navy. 

NCA — Nazi  Conspiracy  and  Ag- 
gression. Part  of  the  Nurem- 
berg documents. 

N.D. — Nuremberg  document. 

NSR — Nazi  - Soviet  Relations. 
From  the  files  of  the  German 
Foreign  Office. 

TMWC — Trial  of  the  Major  War 
Criminals.  Nuremberg  docu- 
ments and  testimony. 

TWC — Trials  of  War  Criminals 
before  the  Nuremberg  Military 
Tribunals. 

CHAPTER  1 

1.  The  Hammerstein  memoran- 
dum, cited  by  Wheeler-Bennett 
in  his  The  Nemesis  of  Power, 
p.  285.  The  memorandum 
was  written  for  Wheeler-Ben- 
nett by  Dr.  Kunrath  von 
Hammerstein,  son  of  the  Gen- 
eral, and  was  based  on  his 
father’s  notes  and  diaries.  It 
is  entitled  “Schleicher,  Ham- 
merstein and  the  Seizure  of 
Power.” 

2.  Joseph  Goebbels,  Vom  Kais - 


erhof  zur  Reichskanzlei,  p. 
251. 

3.  Hammerstein  memorandum, 
cited  by  Wheeler-Bennett,  op. 
cit.,  p.  280. 

4.  Goebbels,  op.  cit.,  p.  250. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  252. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  252. 

7.  Andre  Franfois-Poncet,  The 
Fateful  Years,  p.  48.  He  was 
French  ambassador  in  Berlin 
1930-38. 

8.  Goebbels,  Kaiserhof,  pp.  251- 
54. 

9.  Proclamation  of  September  5, 
1934,  at  Nuremberg. 

10.  Friedrich  Meinecke,  The  Ger- 
man Catastrophe,  p.  96. 

11.  Adolf  Hitler,  Mein  Kampf, 
American  edition  (Boston, 
1943),  p.  3.  In  a good  num- 
ber of  quotations  from  this 
book  I have  altered  the  Eng- 
lish translation  somewhat  to 
bring  it  closer  to  the  original 
text  in  German. 

12.  Konrad  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer, 
p.  36.  All  who  write  on  the 
Third  Reich  are  indebted  to 
Heiden  for  material  on  the 
early  life  of  Hitler. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  41. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  43. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  43. 

16.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  6. 

17.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

18.  Ibid.,  pp.  8-10. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  10. 

20.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
1941-44,  p.  287. 

21.  Ibid.,  p.  346. 

22.  Ibid.,  p.  547. 

23.  Ibid.,  pp.  566-67. 

24.  August  Kubizek,  The  Young 
Hitler  1 Knew,  p.  50. 

1487 


1488 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


25.  Ibid.,  p.  49. 

26.  Mein  Kampf,  pp.  14-15. 

27.  Kubizek,  op.  cit.,  p.  52,  and 
Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
p.  567. 

28.  Kubizek,  op.  cit.,  p.  44. 

29.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  18. 

30.  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

31.  Kubizek,  op.  cit.,  p.  59. 

32.  Ibid.,  p.  76. 

33.  Ibid.,  pp.  54-55. 

34.  Konrad  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer, 
p.  52. 

35.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  20. 

36.  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

37.  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

38.  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

39.  Ibid.,  pp.  21-22. 

40.  Ibid.,  p.  34. 

41.  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer,  p.  54. 

42.  Ibid.,  p.  68. 

43.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  34. 

44.  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

45.  Ibid.,  pp.  35-37. 

46.  Ibid.,  pp.  22,  125. 

47.  Ibid.,  pp.  38-39. 

48.  Ibid.,  p.  41. 

49.  Ibid.,  pp.  43-44. 

50.  Ibid.,  pp.  116-17. 

51.  Ibid.,  p.  118. 

52.  Ibid.,  pp.  55,  69,  122. 

53.  Stefan  Zweig,  The  World  of 
Yesterday,  p.  63. 

54.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  100. 

55.  Ibid.,  p.  107. 

56.  Ibid.,  p.  52. 

57.  Kubizek,  op.  cit.,  p.  79. 

58.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  52. 

59.  Ibid.,  p.  56. 

60.  Ibid.,  pp.  56-57. 

61.  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

62.  Ibid.,  pp.  63-64. 

63.  Ibid.,  pp.  123-24. 

64.  Ibid.,  pp.  161,  163. 

CHAPTER  2 

1.  Mein  Kampf,  pp.  204-5. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.  202. 

3.  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer,  p.  84. 

4.  Rudolf  Olden,  Hitler,  the 
Pawn,  p.  70. 

5.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  193. 

6.  Ibid.,  pp.  205-6. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  207. 

8.  Ibid.,  pp.  215-16. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.  210,  213. 

10.  Ibid.,  pp.  218-19. 


11.  Ibid.,  p.  220. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  221-22. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  224. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  687n. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  687. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  354. 

17.  Ibid.,  p.  355. 

18.  Ibid.,  pp.  369-70. 

19.  Konrad  Heiden,  A History  of 
National  Socialism,  p.  36. 

20.  Mein  Kampf,  pp.  496-97.  The 
italics  are  Hitler’s. 

21.  Heiden,  A History  of  Na- 
tional Socialism,  pp.  51-52. 

22.  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer,  pp.  98- 
99. 

23.  Heiden,  A History  of  Na- 
tional Socialism,  p.  52. 

24.  Heiden,  Hitler,  pp.  90—91. 

CHAPTER  3 

1.  Wheeler-Bennett,  Wooden  Ti- 
tan: Hindenburg,  pp.  207-8. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.  131. 

3.  Wheeler-Bennett’s  Nemesis,  p. 
58. 

4.  Franz  L.  Neumann,  Behe- 
moth, p.  23. 

5.  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer,  pp. 
131-33. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  164. 

7.  Lt.  Gen.  Friedrich  von  Rabe- 
nau,  Seeckt,  aus  seinem  Le- 
ben,  II,  p.  342. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  371. 

9.  Karl  Alexander  von  Mueller, 
quoted  by  Heiden  in  Der 
Fuehrer,  p.  190. 

10.  The  record  of  the  court  pro- 
ceedings is  contained  in  Der 
Hitler  Prozess. 

CHAPTER  4 

1.  The  figures  are  from  a study 
of  Eher  Verlag’s  royalty  state- 
ments made  by  Prof.  Oron 
James  Hale  and  published  in 
The  American  Historical  Re- 
view, July  1955,  under  the 
title  “Adolf  Hitler:  Tax- 
payer.” 

2.  The  quotations  are  from  Mein 
Kampf,  pp.  619,  672,  674. 

3.  Ibid.,  pp.  138-39. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  140. 

5.  Ibid.,  pp.  643,  646,  652. 


Notes 


1489 


6.  Ibid.,  p.  649. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  675. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  654. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.  150-53. 

10.  Adolf  Hillers  Reden,  p.  32. 
Quoted  by  Bullock,  op.,  cit., 

p.  68. 

11.  Mein  Kampf,  pp.  247-53. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  134-35,  285,  289. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  290. 

14.  Ibid.,  pp.  295-96. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  296,  for  this  and  the 
two  quotations  above  it. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  646. 

17.  Ibid.,  pp.  383-84. 

18.  Ibid.,  p.  394. 

19.  Ibid.,  pp.  402-4. 

20.  Ibid.,  p.  396. 

21.  Ibid.,  pp.  449-50. 

22.  A.  J.  P.  Taylor,  The  Course 
of  German  History,  p.  24. 

23.  Wilhelm  Roepke,  The  Solu- 
tion of  the  German  Problem, 
p.  153. 

24.  Mein  Kampf,  pp.  154,  225— 
26. 

25.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
p.  198. 

26.  See  his  study  of  Chamberlain 
in  The  Third  Reich,  ed.  by 
Baumont,  Fried  and  Vermeil. 

27.  The  foregoing,  from  Cham- 
berlain back  to  Fichte  and 
Hegel,  is  based  on  the  works 
of  the  authors  and  on  quota- 
tions and  interpretations  in 
such  books  as  German  Phi- 
losophy and  Politics,  by  John 
Dewey;  The  German  Catas- 
trophe, by  Friedrich  Mei- 
necke;  The  Solution  of  the 
German  Problem,  by  Wil- 
helm Roepke;  A History  of 
Western  Philosophy,  by  Ber- 
trand Russell;  Thus  Speaks 
Germany,  ed.  by.  W.  W. 
Coole  and  M.  F.  Potter;  The 
Third  Reich,  ed.  by  Baumont, 
Fried  and  Vermeil;  German 
Nationalism : The  Tragedy  of 
a People,  by  Louis  L.  Snyder; 
German  History:  Some  New 
German  Views,  ed.  by  Hans 
Kohn;  The  Rise  and  Fall  of 
Nazi  Germany,  by  T.  L.  Jar- 
man; Der  Fuehrer,  by  Konrad 
Heiden;  The  Course  of  Ger- 
man History,  by  A.  J.  P.  Tay- 


lor; L’Allemagne  Contempo- 
raine,  by  Edmond  Vermeil; 
History  of  Germany,  by  Her- 
mann Pinnow. 

E.  Eyck’s  Bismarck  and  the 
German  Empire  is  an  inval- 
uable study. 

The  limitations  of  space  in 
a work  of  this  kind  prohibited 
discussion  of  the  considerable 
influence  on  the  Third  Reich 
of  a number  of  other  Ger- 
man intellectuals  whose  writ- 
ings were  popular  and  signifi- 
cant in  Germany:  Schlegel,  J. 
Goerres,  Novalis,  Arndt,  Jahn, 
Lagarde,  List,  Droysen,  Ran- 
ke, Mommsen,  Constantin 
Frantz,  Stoecker,  Bernhardi, 
Klaus  Wagner,  Langbehn, 
Lange,  Spengler. 

28.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  381. 

29.  Ibid.,  p.  293. 

30.  Ibid.,  pp.  212-13. 

31.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Phi- 
losophy of  History,  pp.  31— 

32.  Quoted  by  Bullock,  op. 
cit.,  p.  351. 

32.  Quoted  in  The  Third  Reich, 

ed.  by  Baumont  et  al.,  pp. 
204-5,  from  two  works  of 
Nietzsche:  Y.ur  Genealogie 

der  Moral  and  Der  Wille  zur 
Macht. 

CHAPTER  5 

1.  Kurt  Ludecke,  I Knew  Hit- 
ler, pp.  217-18. 

2.  Baynes  (ed.),  The  Speeches 
of  Adolf  Hitler,  I,  pp.  155-56. 

3.  Curt  Riess,  Joseph  Goebbels, 
p.  8. 

4.  This  and  the  other  quoted 
Hitler  reminiscences  of  Janu- 
ary 16-17,  1942,  about  Ober- 
salzberg  are  from  Hitler’s  Se- 
cret Conversations. 

5.  Such  authorities  as  Heiden 
and  Bullock  tell  of  the  Rau- 
bals  coming  to  Haus  Wachen- 
feld  in  1925,  when  Geli  Rau- 
bal  was  seventeen.  But  Hitler 
makes  it  clear  that  he  did  not 
acquire  the  villa  until  1928, 
at  which  time  he  says,  “I  im- 
mediately rang  up  my  sister 
in  Vienna  with  the  news,  and 


1490 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


begged  her  to  be  so  good  as 
to  take  over  the  part  of  mis- 
tress of  the  house.”  See  Hit- 
ler’s Secret  Conversations,  p. 
177. 

6.  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer,  pp. 
384-86. 

7.  See  the  fascinating  analysis  of 
Hitler’s  income  tax  returns 
made  by  Prof.  Oron  James 
Hale  in  The  American  His- 
torical Review,  July  1955. 

8.  Ibid. 

9.  Ibid. 

10.  Heiden,  Der  Fuehrer,  p.  419. 

11.  The  speech  does  not  appear 
in  Baynes  or  in  Roussy  de 
Sales’s  collection  of  Hitler’s 
speeches  (Hitler,  My  New 
Order).  It  was  published  ver- 
batim in  the  Voelkischer  Boe- 
bachter  (special  Reichswehr 
edition)  on  March  26,  1929, 
and  is  quoted  at  length  in 
“Blueprint  of  the  Nazi  Under- 
ground ” Research  Studies  of 
the  State  College  of  Wash- 
ington, June  1945. 

12.  The  quotations  are  from  the 
Frankfurter  Zeitung,  Septem- 
ber 26,  1930. 

13.  Nazi  Conspiracy  and  Aggres- 
sion [hereafter  referred  to  as 
NCA],  Supplement  A,  p. 
1194  (Nuremberg  Document 
[hereafter,  N.D.]  EC-440). 

14.  Otto  Dietrich,  Mit  Hitler  in 
die  Macht. 

15.  Funk’s  testimony,  NCA,  Sup- 
pi.  A,  pp.  1194-1204  (N.D. 
EC-440),  and  NCA,  V.,  pp. 
478-95  (N.D.  2328-PS).  Thys- 
sen’s  declarations  are  from 
his  book  I Paid  Hitler,  pp. 
79-108. 

16.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  512-13  (N.D. 
EC-456). 

CHAPTER  6 

1.  According  to  Heiden,  Der 
Fuehrer,  p.  433. 

2.  Heiden,  History  of  National 
Socialism,  p.  166. 

3.  Goebbels,  Kaiserhof,  pp.  19— 

20. 

4.  Ibid.,  pp.  80-81. 


5.  Wheeler-Bennett,  Nemesis,  p. 
243. 

6.  The  above  quotes  are  from 
Goebbels,  Kaiserhof,  pp.  81— 
104. 

7.  Frangois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  p. 
23. 

8.  Franz  von  Papen,  Memoirs, 
p.  162. 

9.  NCA,  Suppl.  A,  p.  508,  (N.D. 
3309-PS). 

10.  Hermann  Rauschning,  The 
Voice  of  Destruction. 

11.  Goebbels  was  not  caught  nap- 
ping this  time,  as  he  had  been 
on  August  13.  He  immediately 
gave  the  press  the  exchange 
of  correspondence  and  it  was 
published  in  the  morning  pa- 
pers of  Nov.  25.  It  is  avail- 
able in  the  Jahrbuch  des 
Oeffenlichen  Rechts,  Vol.  21, 
1933-40. 

12.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  216-17. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  220. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  222. 

15.  Frangois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  p. 
43.  He  says  erroneously,  “sev- 
enty days." 

16.  NCA,  II,  pp.  922-24. 

17.  Kurt  von  Schuschnigg,  Fare- 
well, Austria,  pp.  165-66. 

18.  Meissner  affidavit,  NCA,  Sup- 
pl. A,  p.  511. 

19.  The  Hammerstein  memoran- 
dum, Wheeler-Bennett’s  Nem- 
esis, p.  280. 

20.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
p.  404. 

21.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  243-44. 

CHAPTER  7 

1.  NCA,  III,  pp.  272-75  (N.D. 
351-PS). 

2.  Goebbels.  Kaiserhof,  p.  256. 

3.  See  affidavit  of  Georg  von 
Schnitzler,  NCA,  VII,  p.  501 
(N.D.  EC-439);  speeches  of 
Goering  and  Hitler,  NCA, 
VI,  p.  1080  (N.D.  D-203); 
Schacht’s  interrogation,  NCA, 
VI,  p.  465  (N.D.  3725— PS ) ; 
Funk’s  interrogation,  NCA, 
V,  p.  495  (N.D.  2828-PS). 

4.  Goebbels,  Kaiserhof,  pp.  269— 
70. 

5.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  p.  268. 


Notes 


1491 


6.  Rudolf  Diels,  Lucifer  ante 
Portas,  p.  194. 

7.  For  sources  on  the  responsi- 

bility for  the  Reichstag  fire 
see:  Haider’s  affidavit,  NCA, 
VI,  p.  635  (N.D.  3740-PS); 
transcript  of  Gisevius’  cross- 
examination  on  April  25, 
1946,  Trial  of  the  Major  War 
Criminals  [hereafter  cited  as 
TMWC],  XII,  pp.  252-53; 
Diehl’s  affidavit,  Goering’s  de- 
nial, TMWC,  IX,  pp.  432-36, 
and  NCA,  VI,  pp.  298-99 
(N.D.  3593 -PS);  Willy 

Frischauer,  The  Rise  and  Fall 
of  Hermann  Goering,  pp.  88- 
95;  Douglas  Reed,  The  Burn- 
ing of  the  Reichstag;  John 
Gunther,  Inside  Europe 
(Gunther  attended  the  trial  at 
Leipzig).  There  are  many  al- 
leged testaments  and  confes- 
sions by  those  claiming  to 
have  participated  in  the  Nazi 
firing  of  the  Reichstag  or 
to  have  positive  knowledge 
of  it,  but  none,  so  far  as  I 
know,  has  ever  been  substan- 
tiated. Of  these,  memoran- 
da by  Ernst  Oberfohren, 
a Nationalist  deputy,  and 
Karl  Ernst,  the  Berlin  S.A. 
leader,  have  been  given  some 
credence.  Both  men  were 
slain  by  the  Nazis  within  a 
few  months  of  the  fire. 

8.  NCA,  III,  pp.  968-70  (N.D. 
1390-PS). 

9.  NCA,  XV,  p.  496  (N.D. 

1856-PS). 

10.  NCA,  V,  p.  669  (N.D.  2962- 
PS). 

11.  Dokumente  der  deutschen 
Politik,  I,  1935,  pp.  20-24. 

12.  Franfois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  p. 
61. 

13.  Text  of  law,  NCA,  IV,  pp. 
638-39  (N.D.  2001-PS). 

14.  Laws  of  March  31  and  April 

7,  1933,  and  January  30, 

1934,  all  in  NCA,  IV,  pp. 
640—43. 

15.  NCA,  III,  p.  962  (N.D.  1388- 
PS). 

16.  Goebbels,  Kaiserhof,  p.  307. 

17.  NCA,  III,  pp.  380-85  (N.D. 
392-PS). 


18.  Law  of  May  19,  1933,  NCA, 
III,  p.  387  (N.D.  405-PS). 

19.  Goebbels,  op.  cit.,  p.  300. 

20.  N.  S.  Monatschefte,  No.  39 
(June  1933). 

21.  The  July  1 and  6 quotations 
in  Baynes,  I,  p.  287  and  pp. 
865-66. 

22.  From  a study  entitled  My 
Relations  with  Adolf  Hitler 
and  the  Party,  which  Admiral 
Raeder  wrote  in  Moscow 
after  his  capture  by  the  Rus- 
sians and  which  was  made 
available  at  Nuremberg.  NCA, 
VIII,  p.  707. 

23.  Baynes,  I,  p.  289. 

24.  Spengler,  Jahre  der  Entschei- 
dung,  p.  viii. 

25.  Blomberg’s  directive,  TWMC, 

XXXIV,  pp.  487-91  (N.D. 

C-140). 

26.  Quoted  by  Telford  Taylor  in 
Sword  and  Swastika,  p.  41. 
The  Seeckt  papers  are  now 
at  the  National  Archives  in 
Washington. 

27.  The  source  for  the  “Pact  of 
the  Deutschland"  is  Weiss- 
buch  ueber  die  Erschiessung 
des  30  Juni,  1934  (Paris, 
1935),  pp.  52-53.  Herbert 
Rosinski  in  his  The  German 
Army,  pp.  222—23,  confirms 
the  terms  of  the  pact.  Bullock 
and  Wheeler-Bennett  accept 
it  in  their  books  on  this  pe- 
riod. The  source  for  the  May 
16  meeting  of  the  generals  is 
Jacques  Benoist-Mechin’s  His- 
toire  de  I’Armte  Allemande 
depuis  l’ Armistice,  II,  pp. 
553-54. 

28.  Rede  des  Vizekanzlers  von 
Papen  vor  dem  Universitaets- 
bund,  Marburg,  am  17  Juni, 
1934  (Berlin:  Germania-Ver- 
lag). 

29.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  p.  310. 

30.  NCA,  V,  pp.  654-55  (N.D. 
2950-PS). 

31.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  330-33. 

CHAPTER  8 

1.  Leo  Stein,  1 Was  in  Hell  with 
Niemoeller,  p.  80. 

2.  Neumann,  Behemoth,  p.  109. 


1492 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


He  states  that  the  quotations 
are  from  the  research  project 
“Antisemitism”  of  the  Insti- 
tute of  Social  Research,  pub- 
lished in  Studies  in  Philoso- 
phy and  Social  Science,  1940. 

3.  Rauschning,  The  Voice  of 
Destruction,  p.  54. 

4.  Stewart  W.  Herman,  Jr.,  It's 
Your  Souls  We  Want,  pp. 
157-58.  Herman  was  pastor 
of  the  American  Church  in 
Berlin  from  1936  to  1941. 

5.  The  text  is  given  in  Herman, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  297-300;  also  in 
the  New  York  Times  of  Jan. 
3,  1942. 

6.  Affidavit  of  Nov.  19,  1945, 
NCA,  V,  pp.  735-36  (N.D. 
3016-PS). 

7.  Most  foreign  correspondents 
in  Berlin  kept  a collection  of 
such  gems.  My  own  has  been 
lost.  The  quotations  are  from 
Philipp  Lenard,  Deutsche 
Physik,  preface;  Wallace 
Deuel,  People  under  Hitler; 
William  Ebenstein,  The  Nazi 
State. 

8.  Wilhelm  Roepke,  The  Solu- 
tion of  the  German  Problem, 
p.  61. 

9.  Quoted  in  Frederic  Lilge’s 
The  Abuse  of  Learning:  The 
Failure  of  the  German  Uni- 
versity, p.  170. 

10.  Schirach’s  American  ancestry 
is  given  by  Douglas  M.  Kel- 
ley, the  American  psychiatrist 
at  the  Nuremberg  jail  during 
the  trial  of  the  major  war 
criminals,  in  his  book,  22 
Cells  in  Nuremberg,  pp.  86— 
87. 

11.  Reichsgesetzblatt,  1936,  Part 
1,  p.  933.  Quoted  in  NCA, 
III,  pp.  972-73  (N.D.  1392- 
PS). 

12.  From  his  book,  Basic  Facts 
for  a History  of  German  War 
and  Armament  Economy. 
Quoted  in  NCA,  I,  p.  350 
(N.D.  2353-PS). 

13.  The  ministry’s  report  of  Sep- 
tember 30,  1934,  NCA,  VII, 
pp.  306-9  (N.D.  EC-128); 
Schacht’s  report  of  May  3, 
1935,  NCA,  III,  pp.  827-30 


(N.D.  1168-PS);  text  of  the 
secret  Reich  Defense  Law, 
NCA,  IV,  pp.  934-36  (N.D. 
2261-PS). 

14.  NCA,  VII,  p.  474  (N.D.  EC- 
419). 

15.  Thyssen,  I Paid  Hitler,  pp. 
xv,  157. 

16.  Quoted  by  Neumann  in  Be- 
hemoth, p.  432. 

17.  Ebenstein,  op.  cit.,  p.  84. 

18.  NCA,  III,  pp.  568-72  (N.D. 
787,  788-PS). 

19.  The  Third  Reich,  ed.  by  Bau- 
mont  et  al.,  p.  630. 

20.  Eugen  Kogon’s  phrase.  See 
his  Der  SS  Staat — das  System 
der  deutschen  Konzentrations- 
lager.  A somewhat  abridged 
version  appeared  in  English, 
The  Theory  and  Practice  of 
Hell.  It  is  the  best  study  of 
Nazi  concentration  camps  yet 
written.  Kogon  spent  seven 
years  in  them. 

21.  Quoted  in  NCA,  II,  p.  258 
(N.D.  1852-PS). 

22.  NCA,  VIII,  pp.  243-44  (N.D. 
R-142). 

23.  Voelkischer  Beobachter,  May 
20,  1936. 

CHAPTER  9 

1.  Friedelind  Wagner,  Heritage 
of  Fire,  p.  109. 

2.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  p.  338. 

3.  Daily  Mail,  Aug.  6,  1934. 

4.  Le  Matin,  Nov.  18,  1934. 

5.  Wolfgang  Foerster,  Ein  Gen- 
eral kaempft  gegen  den  Krieg, 

g.  22.  This  book  is  based  on 
eck’s  papers. 

6.  NCA,  VII,  p.  333  (N.D.  EC- 
177). 

7.  NCA,  I,  p.  431  (N.D.  C- 
189). 

8.  NCA,  VI,  p.  1018  (N.D.  C- 
190). 

9.  Ibid. 

10.  TMWC,  XX,  p.  603. 

11.  My  New  Order,  ed.  by  Roussy 
de  Sales,  pp.  309-33.  The 
text  of  the  speech  is  also  in 
Baynes,  II,  pp.  1218-47. 

12.  My  New  Order,  pp.  333-34. 

13.  Pertinax,  The  Grave  Diggers 
of  France,  p.  381. 


Notes 


1493 


14.  The  author’s  Berlin  Diary,  p. 
43. 

15.  Franfois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
188-89. 

16.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  951-52  (N.D. 
C— 139),  the  text  of  the  or- 
der. See  also  TMWC,  XV, 
pp.  445-48. 

17.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  454-55  (N.D. 

EC-405),  minutes  of  the 
meeting.  _ 

18.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  974-76  (N.D. 
C-159). 

19.  TMWC,  XV,  p.  252,  for 
Jodi’s  evidence;  Hitler’s  Se- 
cret Conversations,  pp.  211— 
12,  for  Hitler’s  figure. 

20.  Frangois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  p. 

193.  „ 

21.  Berlin  Diary,  pp.  51-54. 

22.  Francois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  p. 
190. 

23.  Ibid.,  pp.  194-95. 

24.  TMWC,  XV,  p.  253. 

25.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
pp.  211-12.  Remarks  of  Jan- 
uary 27,  1942. 

26.  Paul  Schmidt,  Hitler’s  Inter- 
preter, p.  41. 

27.  TMWC,  XV,  p.  352. 

28.  TMWC,  XXI,  p.  22. 

29.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 

p.  211. 

30.  Quoted  by  Franfois-Poncet, 
op.  cit.,  p.  196. 

31.  NCA,  VII,  p.  890  (N.D.  L- 

iso). 

32.  Kurt  von  Schuschmgg,  Aus- 
trian Requiem,  p.  5. 

33.  NCA,  I,  p.  466  (N.D.  2248- 
PS). 

34.  Documents  on  German  For- 
eign Policy  [hereafter  re- 
ferred to  as  DGFP ] , Series 
D,  I,  pp.  278-81  (No.  152). 

35.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  p.  370. 

36.  DGFP,  III,  pp.  1-2. 

37.  Ibid.,  pp.  892-94. 

38.  DGFP,  I,  p.  37. 

39.  Ibid.,  Ill,  p.  172. 

40.  Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers, 
ed.  by  Malcolm  Muggeridge, 
pp.  43—48. 

41.  Milton  Shulman,  Defeat  in 
West,  p.  76.  His  source  is 
given  as  a British  War  Office 
Intelligence  Review,  Decem- 
ber 1945.  It  would  seem  to  be 


from  an  interrogation  of 
Goering. 

42.  Text  of  the  secret  protocol, 
DGFP,  I,  p.  734. 

43.  TWC,  XII,  pp.  460-65  (N.D. 
NI-051). 

44.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  281. 

45.  DGFP,  I,  p.  40. 

46.  Ibid.,  pp.  55-67. 

47.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  1001-11  (N.D. 

C-175).  j J 

48.  The  Hossbach  minutes,  dated 
Nov.  10,  1937.  The  German 
text  is  given  in  TMWC,  XXV, 
pp.  402-13,  and  the  best  Eng- 
lish translation  is  in  DGFP, 
I,  pp.  29-39.  A hasty  Eng- 
lish version  was  done  at 
Nuremberg  and  printed  in 
NCA,  III,  pp.  295-305  (N.D. 
386-PS).  Hossbach  also  gives 
an  account  of  the  meeting  in 
his  book  Zwischen  Wehr- 
macht  und  Hitler,  pp.  186- 
94.  The  brief  testimony  of 
Goering,  Raeder  and  Neurath 
on  the  conference  is  printed 
in  TMWC. 

CHAPTER  10 

1.  Affidavit  of  Baroness  von  Rit- 
ter, a relative  of  Neurath, 
TMWC,  XVI,  p.  640. 

2.  TMWC,  XVI,  p.  640. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  641. 

4.  Schacht,  Account  Settled,  p. 
90. 

5.  Jodi’s  dairy,  TMWC,  XXVIII, 
p.  357. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  356. 

7 ..Ibid.,  pp.  360-62. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  357. 

9.  Telford  Taylor,  Sword  and 
Swastika,  pp.  149-50.  The 
manuscript  of  Blomberg’s  un- 
published memoirs  is  in  the 
Library  of  Congress. 

10.  Bullock,  op.  cit.,  p.  381,  and 
Wheeler-Bennett,  Nemesis,  p. 
369. 

11.  Wolfgang  Foerster,  Ein  Gen- 
eral kaempft  gegen  den  Krieg, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  70-73. 

12.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  290. 

13.  The  Von  Hassell  Diaries, 
1938-1944,  p.  23. 


1494 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


CHAPTER  11 

1.  Dispatch  to  Hitler,  Dec.  21, 
1937,  DGFP,  I,  p.  486. 

2.  Papen,  op.  cit.,  p.  404. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  406. 

4.  Schuschnigg,  Austrian  Re- 
quiem, pp.  12-19;  NCA,  V, 
pp.  709-12  (N.D.  2995-PS). 

5.  Draft  of  protocol  submitted 
to  Schuschnigg,  DGFP,  1,  pp. 
513-15. 

6.  NCA,  V,  p.  711  (N.D.  2995- 
PS). 

7.  Schuschnigg,  Austrian  Re- 
quiem, p.  23. 

8.  N.D.  2995-PS,  op.  cit. 

9.  Schuschnigg  gave  slightly  dif- 
ferent versions  of  Hitler’s 
threats  in  his  book,  p.  24,  and 
in  his  Nuremberg  affidavit, 
2995-PS  (NCA,  V,  p.  712). 
I have  used  both  in  abbrevi- 
ated form. 

10.  Austrian  Requiem,  p.  24. 

11.  Ibid. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  24,  and  Schusch- 
nigg’s  affidavit,  N.D.  2995-PS, 
op.  cit. 

13.  Austrian  Requiem,  p.  25. 

14.  NCA,  IV,  p.  357  (N.D.  1775- 
PS). 

15.  NCA,  IV,  p.  361  (N.D.  1780- 
PS). 

16.  From  my  own  notes  taken 
during  the  broadcast. 

17.  Dispatch  to  the  German  For- 
eign Office  on  Feb.  25,  1938, 
marked  “Very  Secret,” 
DGFP,  I,  p.  546. 

18.  For  Miklas’  testimony,  see 
NCA,  Suppl.  A,  p.  523.  Pa- 
pen’s  suggestion  is  in  his 
Memoirs,  p.  425. 

19.  Austrian  Requiem,  pp.  35-36. 

20.  NCA,  IV,  p.  362  (N.D.  1780- 
PS). 

21.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  911-12  (N.D. 
C-102). 

22.  Ibid.,  VI,  p.  913  (N.D.  C- 
103). 

23.  DGFP,  I,  pp.  573-76. 

24.  NCA,  V,  pp.  629-54  (N.D. 
2949-PS). 

25.  Austrian  Requiem,  p.  47. 

26.  Testimony  of  Wilhelm  Miklas 
on  January  30,  1946,  during 


anti-Nazi  court  proceedings 
against  Dr.  Rudolf  Neumayer. 
Though  the  former  President 
is  a bit  hazy  about  exact 
times  and  the  exact  sequence 
of  events  on  the  fateful  day, 
his  testimony  is  of  great  value 
and  interest.  NCA,  Suppl.  A, 
pp.  518-34  (N.D.  3697— PS). 

27.  Austrian  Requiem,  p.  51. 

28.  See  NCA,  Suppl.  A,  pp.  525- 

34  (N.D.  3697-PS).  Also, 

NCA,  V,  p.  209  (N.D.  2465- 
PS.  2466-PS). 

29.  NCA,  VI,  p.  1017  (N.D.  C- 
182). 

30.  DGFP,  I,  pp.  584-86. 

31.  Ibid.,  pp.  553-55. 

32.  TMWC,  XVI,  p.  153. 

33.  DGFP,  I,  p.  263. 

34.  Ibid.,  pp.  273-75. 

35.  Ibid.,  p.  578. 

36.  NCA,  I,  pp.  501-2  (N.D. 
3287-PS). 

37.  Text  of  circular  cipher  tele- 
gram, DGFP,  I,  pp.  586-87. 

38.  TMWC,  XX,  p.  605. 

39.  TMWC,  XV,  p.  632. 

40.  Memorandum  of  Seyss-In- 
quart  at  Nuremberg,  Sept.  9, 
1945,  NCA,  V,  pp.  961-92 
(N.D.  3254-PS). 

41.  TMWC,  XIV,  p.  429. 

42.  Text  of  Schacht’s  address, 
NCA,  VII,  pp.  394-402  (N.D. 
EC— 297— A). 

43.  NCA,  IV,  p.  585  (N.D.  1947- 
PS). 

CHAPTER  12 

1.  The  file  for  Case  Green  was 
kept  at  Hitler’s  headquarters 
and  was  captured  intact  by 
American  troops  in  a cellar 
at  Obersalzberg.  The  sum- 
mary of  the  Apr.  21  Hitler- 
Keitel  discussion  is  the  second 
paper  in  the  collection.  The 
entire  file  was  introduced  in 
evidence  at  Nuremberg  as 
N.D.  388-PS.  An  English 
translation  is  in  NCA,  III,  pp. 
306-709;  a better  English  ver- 
sion of  the  Apr.  21  talks  is  in 
DGFP,  II,  pp.  239-40. 

2.  Secret  memorandum  of  the 
German  Foreign  Office,  Aug. 


Notes 


1495 


19.  1938,  NCA,  VI,  p.  855 
(N.D.  3059-PS). 

3.  DGFP,  II,  pp.  197-98. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  255. 

5.  Weizsaecker  memorandum, 
May  12,  1938,  DGFP,  II,  pp. 
273-74. 

6.  Text  of  four  telegrams  ex- 
changed, NCA,  III,  pp.  308-9 
(N.D.  388-PS). 

7.  Ibid.,  pp.  309-10. 

8.  Text  of  Keitel’s  letter  and  of 
the  directive,  DGFP,  II,  pp. 
299-303. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.  307-8. 

10.  Dispatch  of  the  German  min- 
ister and  military  attache  in 
Prague,  May  21,  1938,  ibid., 
pp.  309-10. 

11.  Dispatch  of  Ambassador  von 
Dirksen,  May  22,  1938,  ibid., 
pp.  322-23. 

12.  Speech  to  the  Reichstag,  Jan. 
30,  1939,  in  My  New  Order, 
ed.  by  Roussy  de  Sales,  p.  563. 

13.  According  to  Fritz  Wieder- 

mann,  one  of  the  Fuehrer’s 
adjutants,  who  was  present 

and  who  later  swore  that  he 
“was  considerably  shaken  by 
this  statement.”  NCA,  V,  pp. 
743-44  (N.D.  3037-PS). 

14.  Undated  Johl  dairy  entry, 
TMWC,  XXVIII,  p.  372 
(N.D.  1780-PS). 

15.  Item  11  of  Case  Green, 

NCA,  III,  pp.  315-20  (N.D. 

388-PS);  also  DGFP,  II,  pp. 
357-62. 

16.  TMWC,  XXVIII,  p.  373.  The 
TMWC  volume  gives  the  Ger- 
man text.  An  English  trans- 
lation of  excerpts  of  Jodi’s 
dairy  is  in  NCA,  IV,  pp.  360- 
70. 

17.  The  texts  of  the  memoranda 
are  given  by  Wolfgang  Foer- 
ster  in  Ein  General  kaempft 
gegen  den  Krieg,  pp.  81-119. 

18.  Jodi’s  dairy,  TMWC,  XXVIII, 
p.  374.  English  translation, 
NCA,  IV,  p.  364  (N.D.  1780- 
PS). 

19.  Ibid. 

20.  TMWC,  XX,  p.  606. 

21.  The  Von  Hassell  Diaries,  p. 

6. 

22.  Ibid.,  p.  347. 


23.  Foerster,  op.  cit.,  p.  122. 

24.  Dispatches  of  June  8 and  9, 
1938,  DGFP,  II,  pp.  395, 
399-401. 

25.  Dispatch  of  June  22,  ibid.,  p. 
426. 

26.  Ibid.,  pp.  529-31. 

27.  Ibid.,  p.  611. 

28.  Item  17  of  the  “Green”  file, 
NCA,  III,  pp.  332-33  (N.D. 
388-PS). 

29.  TMWC,  XXVIII,  p.  375. 

30.  Minutes  of  the  Sept.  3,  1938, 
meeting,  NCA,  III,  pp.  334- 
35  (N.D.  388-PS). 

31.  Schmundt’s  minutes  of  the 
Sept.  9 meeting,  ibid.,  pp. 
335-38.  It  is  Item  19  in  the 
“Green”  file. 

32.  Jodi’s  dairy  note  for  Sept.  13, 
TMWC,  XXVIII,  pp.  378-79 
(N.D.  1780-PS). 

33.  DGFP,  II,  p.  536. 

34.  Reports  of  Kleist’s  visit  are 
in  Documents  on  British  For- 
eign Policy  [hereafter  re- 
ferred to  as  DBrFP ],  Third 
Series,  II. 

35.  Most  of  the  text  of  Church- 
ill’s letter  is  in  DGFP,  II, 
p.  706. 

36.  DBrFP,  Third  Series,  II,  pp. 
686-87. 

37.  Nevile  Henderson,  Failure  of 
a Mission,  pp.  147,  150. 

38.  DBrFP,  Third  Series,  I. 

39.  Erich  Kordt  gives  his  broth- 
er’s account  of  this  meeting 
in  his  book  Nicht  aus  den 
Akten,  pp.  279-81. 

40.  DGFP,  II,  p.  754. 

41.  Ibid.,  p.  754. 

42.  L.  B.  Namier,  Diplomatic 
Prelude,  p.  35. 

43.  T h e r e is  a considerable 
amount  of  material  about  the 
conference.  The  text  of  the 
official  report  drawn  up  by 
Paul  Schmidt,  who  acted  as 
interpreter  and  was  the  only 
other  person  present,  is  in 
DGFP,  II,  pp.  786-98. 
Schmidt  has  given  an  eyewit- 
ness account  of  the  meeting 
in  his  book  Hitler’s  Inter- 
preter, pp.  90-95.  Chamber- 
lain’s notes  are  in  DBrFP, 
Third  Series,  pp.  338-41;  his 


1496 


letter  to  his  sister  on  the 
meeting  is  in  Keith  Feiling’s 
Life  of  Neville  Chamberlain, 
pp.  366-68.  See  also  Nevile 
Henderson’s  Failure  of  a Mis- 
sion, pp.  152-54. 

44.  DGFP,  II,  p.  801. 

45.  Ibid.,  p.  810. 

46.  Feiling,  op.  cit.,  p.  367. 

47.  NCA,  VI,  p.  799  (N.D.  C-2). 

48.  DGFP,  II,  pp.  863-64. 

49.  British  White  Paper,  Cmd. 
5847,  No.  2.  Text  also  in 
DGFP,  II,  pp.  831-32. 

50.  See  Berlin  Dairy,  p.  137. 

51.  The  chief  sources  for  the 

Godesberg  conference  are: 
Schmidt’s  notes  on  the  two 
Godesberg  meetings,  DGFP, 
II,  pp.  870-79,  898-908; 

Schmidt’s  description  of  the 
talks,  Hitler’s  Interpreter,  pp. 
95-102;  texts  of  correspond- 
ence exchanged  between  Hit- 
ler and  Chamberlain  on  Sep- 
tember 23.  DGFP,  II,  pp. 
887-92;  notes  by  Kirkpatrick 
on  the  meeting,  DBrFP,  Third 
Series,  II,  pp.  463-73,  499- 
508;  Henderson’s  description 
in  Failure  of  a Mission,  pp. 
156-62. 

52.  NCA,  IV,  p.  367  (N.D.  1780- 
PS). 

53.  Jodi’s  dairy,  Sept.  26,  1938, 
ibid. 

54.  Text  of  the  Godesberg  memo- 
randum. DGFP,  U,  pp.  908- 
10. 

55.  The  Times,  London,  Sept.  24. 
1938. 

56.  Text  of  the  Czech  reply,  Brit- 
ish White  Paper,  Cmd.  5847, 
No.  7. 

57.  Text  of  Chamberlain’s  letter 
to  Hitler  of  Sept.  26,  1938, 
DGFP,  II,  pp.  994-95. 

58.  Though  Dr.  Schmidt’s  notes 
on  this  meeting  are  missing 
from  the  German  Foreign  Of- 
fice papers,  his  own  account 
of  it  appears  in  his  book,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  102-3.  Kirkpatrick’s 
notes  are  in  DBrFP,  Third 
Series,  II.  No.  1,  p.  118. 
Henderson’s  version  in  his 
book,  op.  cit.,  p.  163. 

59.  Items  31—33  of  “Green”  file, 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

NCA,  III,  pp.  350-52  (N.D. 
388— PS). 

60.  Dispatch  from  Paris,  DGFP, 
II,  p.  977. 

61.  The  text  of  Roosevelt’s  two 
appeals  and  Hitler’s  answer 
to  the  first  one  are  in  DGFP, 

n. 

62.  Dispatch  from  Prague,  DGFP, 
II,  p.  976. 

63.  Text  of  Hitler’s  letter  of  Sept. 
27,  1938,  DGFP,  II,  pp.  966- 
68. 

64.  Chamberlain’s  plan,  DGFP, 
II,  pp.  987-88.  The  Prime 
Minister’s  messages  are  quoted 
by  Wheeler-Bennett  in  Mu- 
nich, pp.  151-52,  155,  from 
the  Czech  Archives. 

65.  Ibid.,  p.  158. 

66.  Text  in  British  White  Paper, 
Cmd.  5848,  No.  1.  The  letter 
was  handed  to  Hitler  by  Hen- 
derson at  noon  the  next  day. 

67.  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  144, 
DBrFP,  Third  Series,  II,  p. 
614. 

68.  Jodi’s  dairy.  Sept.  28,  1938, 
NCA,  IV,  p.  368  (N.D.  1780- 
PS). 

69.  Sources:  Haider’s  interroga- 
tion at  Nuremberg  by  Capt. 
Sam  Harris,  a New  York  at- 
torney, NCA,  Suppl.  B,  pp. 
1547-71;  also  Haider’s  memo- 
randum, which  was  given  to 
the  press  at  Nuremberg  but 
is  not  included  in  either  the 
NCA  or  TMWC  volumes. 
Gisevius,  To  the  Bitter  End, 
pp.  283-328;  his  testimony  at 
Nuremberg,  TMWC,  XII,  pp. 
210-19.  Schacht,  Account  Set- 
tled, pp.  114-25. 

70.  Gisevius,  To  the  Bitter  End, 
p.  325.  Also  his  testimony  on 
the  stand  at  Nuremberg, 
TMWC,  XII,  p.  219. 

71.  Erich  Kordt’s  memorandum, 
made  available  to  the  writer. 
Allen  Dulles,  Germany’s  Un- 
derground, p.  46,  also  gives 
an  account  of  the  call. 

72.  Accounts  of  the  meetings  in 
the  Chancellery  on  the  fore- 
noon of  Sept.  28  are  given 
by  some  of  the  participants: 
Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  105-8; 


Notes 


1497 


Frangois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
265-68;  Henderson,  op.  cit., 
pp.  166-71. 

73.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  107. 

74.  Ibid.,  p.  107. 

75.  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1 68— 
69.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  108. 

76.  Masaryk  later  described  this 
scene  to  the  writer,  as  he  did 
to  many  other  friends.  But 
my  notes  on  it  were  lost,  and 
I have  used  Wheeler-Bennett’s 
moving  account  in  Munich, 
pp.  170-71. 

77.  From  Haider’s  interrogation, 
Feb.  25,  1946,  NCA,  Suppl. 
B,  pp.  1553-58. 

78.  Schacht,  op.  cit.,  p.  125. 

79.  Gisevius,  op.  cit.,  p.  326. 

80.  Ciano’s  Hidden  Dairy,  1937- 
1938,  p.  166.  In  a telegram 
dated  June  26,  1940,  Musso- 
lini reminded  Hitler  that  at 
Munich  he  had  promised  to 
take  part  in  the  attack  on 
Britain.  The  text  of  the  tele- 
gram is  in  DGFP,  X,  p.  27. 

81.  Text  of  the  Chamberlain  and 
BeneS  notes,  DBrFP,  Third 
Series,  II,  pp.  509,  604. 

82.  The  minutes  of  the  two  Mu- 
nich meetings,  DGFP,  II,  pp. 
1003-8,  1011-14. 

83.  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  171. 
Frangois-Poncet,  op.  cit.,  p. 
271. 

84.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  110. 

85.  Text  of  the  Munich  Agree- 
ment, DGFP,  II,  op.  1014-16. 

86.  From  the  official  report  of 
Dr.  Masarik  to  the  Czech 
Foreign  Office.  The  sources 
for  this  section  on  the  Mu- 
nich Conference  are:  DGFP, 
II,  as  cited  above  in  note  83; 
text  of  the  Munich  Agree- 
ment, ibid.,  pp.  1014-16; 
DBrFP,  Third  Series,  II,  No. 
1,  p.  227;  and  Ciano,  Schmidt, 
Henderson,  Frangois  - Poncet 
and  Weizsaecker,  op.  cit. 

87.  Berlin  Dairy,  p.  145. 

88.  The  sources  for  this  Cham- 
berlain-Hitler meeting  are: 
DGFP,  II,  p.  1017,  for  text 
of  declaration;  DGFP,  IV, 
pp.  287-93,  for  Schmidt’s  of- 
ficial memorandum  on  the 


meeting;  Schmidt’s  book,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  112-13.  DBrFP,  Third 
Series,  II,  No.  1228,  gives  a 
slightly  different  version  of 
the  conversation. 

89.  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  4-5. 

90.  Jodi’s  diary,  NCA,  IV,  p. 
368  (N.D.  1780-PS). 

91.  Keitel’s  testimony,  April  4, 
1946,  TMWC,  X,  p.  509. 

92.  Manstein’s  testimony,  Aug.  9, 
1946,  TMWC,  XX,  p.  606. 

93.  Jodi’s  testimony,  June  4,  1946, 
TMWC,  XV,  p.  361. 

94.  Gamelin,  Servir,  pp.  344-46. 
A disappointing  book!  Per- 
tinax.  The  Grave  Diggers  of 
France,  p.  3,  confirms  the 
General  here.  These  are  also 
the  sources  of  Gamelin’s  ad- 
vice on  Sept.  26  and  28. 

95.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  p.  339. 

96.  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  602-4. 

97.  Schacht  on  the  stand  at  Nu- 
remberg, TMWC,  XII,  p.  531. 

98.  Speech  to  the  commanders  in 
chief,  Nov.  23,  1939,  NCA, 
HI  p.  573  (N.D.  789-PS). 

CHAPTER  13 

1.  “Green”  file,  Item  48,  NCA, 
III,  pp.  372-74  (N.D.  388- 
PS). 

2.  Ibid. 

3.  Hitler’s  directive,  Oct.  21, 
1938,  NCA,  VI,  pp.  947-48 
(N.D.  C-136). 

4.  DGFP,  IV,  p.  46. 

5.  Heydrich’s  orders  to  the  police 
for  organizing  the  pogrom, 
NCA,  V,  pp.  797-801  (N.D. 
3051-PS);  Heydrich’s  report 
to  Goering  on  the  damage  and 
the  number  of  killed  and 
wounded,  NCA,  V,  p.  854 
(N.D.  3058-PS).  Report  of 
Walter  Buch,  chief  party  judge, 
on  the  pogrom,  NCA,  V,  pp. 
868-76  (N.D.  3063-PS);  Ma- 
jor Buch  gives  lurid  details 
of  numerous  murders  of  Jews 
and  blames  Goebbels  for  the 
excesses.  Stenographic  report 
of  the  meeting  of  Goering  with 
cabinet  members  and  gover- 
ment  officials  and  a representa- 


1498 


The  Rise 

tive  of  the  insurance  companies 
on  Nov.  12,  NCA,  IV,  pp.  425- 
57  (N.D.  1816— PS).  Though 
the  complete  report  is  missing, 
the  part  which  was  found  runs 
to  10,000  words, 

6.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  538. 

7.  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  639-49. 

8.  DBrFP,  Third  Series,  IV,  No. 

9.  Ciano’s  Hidden  Diary , entry 
for  Oct.  28,  1938,  p.  185; 
Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers,  pp. 
242-46. 

10.  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  515-20. 

11.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  118;  his 
notes  on  the  meeting,  DGFP, 
IV,  pp.  471-77. 

12.  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  69-72. 

13.  Ibid.,  pp.  82-83. 

14.  Ibid.,  pp.  185-86;  also  in  NCA, 
VI,  pp.  950-51  (N.D.  C-138). 

15.  Dispatch  of  the  charge,  DGFP, 
IV,  pp.  188-89. 

16.  DGFP,  IV,  p.  215. 

17.  Memoranda  of  Chvalkovsky’s 
two  talks,  with  Hitler  and  Rib- 
bentrop,  on  Jan.  21,  1939, 
DGFP,  IV,  pp.  190-202.  Ch- 
valkovsky’s own  report  to  the 
Czechoslovak  cabinet  on  Jan. 
23,  Czech  Archives,  quoted  by 
Wheeler-Bennett  in  Munich, 
pp.  316-17.  Also  see  French 
Yellow  Book,  pp.  55-56. 

18.  Text,  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  207-8. 

19.  Text,  ibid,  pp.  218-20. 

20.  Memorandum  of  meeting, 
ibid.,  pp.  209-13, 

21.  Text,  ibid.,  pp.  234-35. 

22.  Based  on  an  account  later 
given  by  the  British  minister  in 
Prague,  NCA,  VII,  pp.  88-90 
(N.D.  D-571). 

23.  Secret  minutes  of  Tiso-Hitler 
talk,  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  243-45. 

24.  See  DGFP,  IV,  p.  250. 

25.  Ibid.,  pp.  249,  255,  260.  For 
Ambassador  Coulondre’s  dis- 
patch, see  French  Yellow 
Book,  p.  96  (No.  77). 

26.  Dispatch  from  Prague,  March 
13,  1939,  DGFP,  IV,  p.  246. 

27.  TMWC,  IX,  pp.  303-4. 

28.  The  sources  for  the  foregoing 
section,  “The  Ordeal  of  Dr. 
Hacha,”  are:  Secret  minutes 
of  the  meeting  of  Hitler  and 


and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Hacha,  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  263- 
69;  it  is  also  in  the  Nuremberg 
documents,  NCA,  V,  pp.  433- 
40  (N.D.  2798-PS).  Text  of 
the  declaration  of  the  German 
and  Czechoslovak  govern- 
ments, March  15,  1939,  DGFP, 
IV,  pp.  270-71;  the  first  part 
was  issued  as  a communique; 
it  was  actually  drafted  in  the 
Foreign  Office  on  March  14. 
Proclamation  of  the  Fuehrer 
to  the  German  People,  March 
15,  NCA,  VIII,  pp.  402-  (N.D. 
TC-50).  Coulondre’s  dispatch, 
French  Yellow  Book,  p.  96 
(No.  77).  Schmidt’s  descrip- 
tion of  meeting,  his  book,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  123-26.  Henderson  on, 
his  book,  op.  cit.,  Ch.  9.  Scene 
with  secretaries,  A.  Zoller,  ed.. 
Hitler  Privat,  p.  84. 

29.  TMWC,  XVI,  pp.  654-55. 

30.  Text,  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  42^15. 

31.  Text,  DGFP.  IV,  p.  241. 

32.  Berlin  Diary,  p.  156. 

33.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  1939-1943, 
pp.  9-12. 

34.  Text,  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  274-75. 

35.  Ibid.,  pp.  273-74. 

36.  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  20-21. 

37.  Ibid.,  pp.  16-17,  40. 

38.  Reports  of  Dirksen,  March  18, 
1939,  ibid.,  pp.  24-25,  36-39. 

39.  Ibid.,  p.  39. 

CHAPTER  14 

1.  German  memo  of  meeting, 
DGFP,  VI.  pp.  104-7.  Lipski’s 
report  to  Beck,  Polish  White 
Book,  No.  44;  given  in  NCA, 

V II,  p.  483  (N.D.  TC-73,  No. 
44). 

2.  Hitler’s  assurance  to  Lipski, 
Nov.  15,  1937,  DGFP,  VI,  pp. 
26-27;  assurance  to  Beck,  Jam 
14,  1938,  ibid.,  p.  39. 

3.  Beck's  instructions  to  Lipski, 
Oct.  31,  1938,  Polish  W.  ite 
Book,  No.  45;  NCA,  VII,  pp. 
484-86.  Ribbentrop’s  memo 
on  meeting  with  Lipski,  Nov. 
19,  DGFP,  V,  pp.  127-29. 

4.  German  memo  of  meeting  by 
Dr.  Schmidt,  DGFP,  V,  pp. 
152-58.  Polish  minutes  on, 
Polish  White  Book,  No.  48; 


Notes 


1499 


NCA,  VIII,  pp.  486-88  (N.D. 
TC-73). 

5.  Ribbentrop’s  memo  of  the 
meeting,  DGFP,  V,  pp.  1 59— 
61.  Polish  minutes  on,  Polish 
White  Book,  No.  49;  NCA, 
VIII,  p.  488  (N.D.  TC-73). 

6.  Ribbentrop’s  memo  of  his 
meeting  with  Beck  in  Warsaw, 
Jan.  26,  1939,  DGFP,  V,  pp. 
167-68;  Beck’s  version  is  given 
in  the  Polish  White  Book,  No. 
52. 

7.  Dispatch  of  Moltke,  Feb.  26, 
1939,  DGFP,  VI,  p.  172. 

8.  Lipski’s  dispatch  to  Warsaw 
on  the  meeting,  Polish  White 
Book,  No.  61;  also  in  NCA, 
VIII,  pp.  489-92  (N.D.  TC- 
73,  No.  61).  Ribbentrop’s 
memo  of  the  meeting,  DGFP, 
VI,  pp.  70-72. 

9.  Foreign  Office  memo  of  the 
meeting,  DGFP,  V,  pp.,  524- 

26. 

10.  Ibid.,  pp.  502-4. 

11.  Source  for  this  paragraph; 
DGFP,  V,  pp.  528-30. 

12.  DGFP,  VI,  p.  97. 

13.  Ibid.,  pp.  110-11. 

14.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  83-86  (N.D. 
R-100). 

15.  Text  in  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  122- 

24.  Ribbentrop’s  report  on 
March  26  meeting  with  Lipski, 
ibid.,  pp.  121-22;  Polish  ver- 
sion, White  Book,  No.  63. 

16.  Dr.  Schmidt’s  memo  of  the 
meeting,  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  135- 
36. 

17.  Moltke’s  dispatch,  ibid.,  pp. 
147-48;  Polish  version,  White 
Book,  No.  64. 

18.  DBtFP,  IV,  No.  538. 

19.  See  DBrFP,  IV,  Nos.  485,  518, 
538  (tfext  of  Anglo-French 
proposal),  561,  563,  566,  571, 
573. 

20.  Ibid.,  No.  498. 

21.  DBrFP,  V,  No.  12. 

22.  Quoted  by  Gisevius,  op.  cit., 
p.  363. 

23.  The  text  of  Case  White,  NCA, 
VI,  pp.  916-28;  a partial  trans- 
lation is  in  DGFP,  VI,  pp. 
186-87,  223-28  (N.D.  C-120). 
The  text  of  the  original  Ger- 


man is  in  TMWC,  XXXIV, 
pp.  380-422. 

24.  Confidential  German  memos 
on  the  Goering-Mussolini 
talks  are  in  DGFP,  VI,  pp. 
248-53,  258-63.  See  also  The 
Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  66-67. 

25.  The  circular  telegram  of  April 
17,  1939,  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  264- 
65;  Foreign  Office  memo  of 
the  answers,  ibid.,  pp.  309-10; 
Weizsaecker’s  call  to  German 
minister  in  Riga,  April  18, 
ibid.,  pp.  283-84. 

26.  Ibid.,  pp.  355,  399. 

27.  DGFP,  IV,  pp.  602-7. 

28.  Ibid,  pp.  607-8  (dispatch  of 
Oct.  26,  1938). 

29.  Ibid.,  pp.  608-9. 

30.  Ibid.,  p.  631. 

31.  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  1-3. 

32.  Davies,  Mission  to  Moscow, 
pp.  437-39.  Ambassador  Sied’s 
dispatch,  DBrFP,  IV,  No.  419. 

33.  Boothby,  I Fight  to  Live,  p. 
189.  Halifax  statement  to 
Maisky,  DBrFP,  IV,  No.  433. 

34.  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  88-89. 

35.  Ibid.,  p.  139. 

36.  German  memo  of  Goering- 
Mussolini  talk,  April  16,  1939, 
ibid.,  pp.  259-60. 

37.  Ibid.,  pp.  266-67. 

38.  Ibid.,  pp.  419-20. 

39.  Ibid.,  p.  429. 

40.  Ibid.,  pp.  535-36. 

41.  Nazi-Soviet  Relations,  1939- 
'.1  [hereafter  referred  to  as 
NSR],  pp.  5-7,  8-9. 

42.  French  Yellow  Book,  Dis- 
patches Nos.  123,  125.  I have 
used  the  French-language  edi- 
tion (Le  Livre  Jaune  Frangais), 
but  I believe  the  English  edi- 
tion carries  the  same  numbers 
for  dispatches. 

43.  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  1,  111.  Appen- 
ds; I of  this  volume  contains 
a number  of  memoranda  on 
the  staff  talks  taken  from  the 
German  naval  archives. 

44.  The  Ciano  Diaries;  pp.  67-68. 

45.  German  memo  on  the  Milan 
meeting,  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  450- 
52.  Ciano’s  minutes,  Ciano’s 
Diplomatic  Papers,  pp.  282-87. 

46.  Text  of  the  treaty  of  alliance, 
DGFP,  VI,  pp.  561-64.  A se- 


1500 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


cret  protocol  contained  noth- 
ing of  significance. 

47.  Schmundt’s  minutes,  May  23, 
1939,  NCA,  VII,  pp.  847-54 
(N.D.  L-79).  There  is  also  an 
English  translation  in  DGFP, 
VI,  pp.  574—80.  The  German 
text  is  in  TMWC,  XXXVII, 
pp.  546-56. 

48.  For  details  of  the  plan,  see 
N.D.  NOKW-2584.  This  is  in 
the  TWC  volumes  [ Trials  of 
War  Criminals  before  the  Nu- 
remberg Military  Tribunals], 

49.  NCA,  VI.  pp.  926-27  (N.D. 
C-120). 

50.  TMWC,  XXXIV,  pp.  428-42 
(N.D.  C-126).  The  English 
translation  of  this  document  in 
NCA,  VI,  pp.  937-38,  is  so 
abbreviated  that  it  has  little 
value. 

51.  NCA,  VI,  p.  827  (N.D.  C- 
23). 

52.  Text  of  the  Anglo-French 
draft,  DBrFP,  V,  No.  624;  the 
British  ambassador’s  account 
of  Molotov’s  reaction  is  in  the 
same  volume,  Nos.  648  and 
657. 

53.  “Urgent”  dispatch  of  May  31, 
DGFP,  VI,  pp.  616-17. 

54.  Dispatch  of  June  1,  ibid.,  pp. 
624-26. 

55.  Ibid.,  p.  547. 

56.  Ibid.,  pp.  589-93. 

57.  Ibid.,  p.  593. 

58.  Letter,  Weizsaecker  to  Schu- 
lenburg,  May  27,  with  post- 
script of  May  30,  ibid.,  pp. 
597-98. 

59.  Ibid.,  pp.  608-9. 

60.  Ibid.,  pp.  618-20. 

61.  Ibid.,  pp.  790-91. 

62.  Ibid.,  pp.  805-7. 

63.  Ibid.,  p.  810. 

64.  Ibid.,  p.  813. 

65.  DBrFP,  V,  Nos.  5 and  38. 

66.  Pravda,  June  29,  1939. 

67.  Dispatch  of  June  29,  DGFP, 
VI,  pp.  808-9. 

68.  TMWC,  XXXIV,  pp.  493-500 
(N.D.  C-142).  It  is  given  much 
more  briefly  in  English  trans- 
lation in  NCA,  VI,  p.  956. 

69.  NCA,  IV,  pp.  1035-36  (N.D. 
2327-PS). 


70.  NCA,  VI,  p.  934  (N.D.  C- 
126). 

71.  The  secret  minutes  of  the 
meeting  of  the  Reich  Defense 
Council,  June  23,  1939,  NCA, 
VI,  pp.  718-31  (N.D.  3787- 
PS). 

72.  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  750,  920-21. 

73.  Ibid.,  pp.  864-65. 

74.  Text  of  notes,  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
4-5,  9-10. 

75.  Report  of  Burckhardt  to  the 
League  of  Nations,  March  19, 
1940.  Text  in  Documents  On 
International  Affairs,  1939- 
1946,  I,  pp.  346-47. 

76.  DGFP,  VI,  pp.  936-38. 

77.  Ibid.,  pp.  955-56. 

78.  Schnurre’s  memo,  ibid.,  pp. 
1106-9. 

79.  Ibid.,  pp.  1015-16. 

80.  Ibid.,  pp.  1022-23. 

81.  Ibid.,  pp.  1010-11. 

82.  Ibid.,  p.  1021. 

83.  DBrFP,  IV,  No.  183. 

84.  See  DBrFP,  VI,  Nos.  329,  338, 
346,  357,  358,  376,  399. 

85.  Ibid.,  Nos.  376  and  473. 

86.  Two  dispatches  of  Aug.  1, 
DGFP,  VI,  pp.  1033-34. 

87.  DBrFP,  Appendix  V,  p.  763. 

88.  Burnett’s  letter  in  DBrFP,  VII, 
Appendix  II,  p.  600;  Seeds’s 
telegram,  ibid.,  VI,  No.  416. 

89.  DGFP,  VI,  p.  1047. 

90.  Ibid.,  pp.  1048-49. 

91.  Ibid.,  pp.  1049-50. 

92.  Ibid.,  pp.  1051-52. 

93.  Ibid.,  pp.  1059-62. 

94.  French  Yellow  Book,  Fr.  ed., 
pp.  250-51. 

95.  Text  of  two  letters,  DGFP,  VI, 
pp.  973-74. 

96.  Attolico’s  dispatch  on  his  July 
6 meeting  with  Ribbentrop  is 
printed  in  I Documenti  diplo- 
matica  italiani  [hereafter  cited 
as  DDI],  Seventh  Series,  XII, 
No.  503.  I have  used  the  quo- 
tation and  paraphrasing  from 
The  Ev-  of  the  War,  ed.  by 
Arnold  and  Veronica  M.  Toyn- 
bee. 

97.  Memo  of  Weizsaecker,  DGFP, 
VI,  pp.  971-72. 

98.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  113-14. 

99.  Ibid.,  pp.  116-18. 


Notes 


1501 


100.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  118- 
19,  582-83.  Ciano's  minutes 
of  the  meeting  with  Ribben- 
trop  are  in  Ciano’s  Diplo- 
matic Papers,  pp.  297-98;  also 
in  DDl,  Eighth  Series,  XIII, 
No.  1.  No  German  record  of 
this  meeting  has  been  found. 

101.  The  captured  German  min- 
utes of  the  meetings  on  Aug. 
12  and  13  were  presented  at 
Nuremberg  as  documents 
1871-PS  and  TC-77.  The 
latter  is  the  more  complete 
and  is  published  in  English 
translation  in  NCA,  VIII,  pp. 
516-29.  I have  used  the  ver- 
sion signed  by  Dr.  Schmidt, 
in  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  39-49,  53- 
56.  Ciano’s  record  of  his  two 
talks  with  Hitler  are  in 
Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers, 
pp.  303-4,  and  in  DDl,  XIII, 
Nos.  4 and  21.  Also  the  en- 
tries for  Aug.  12  and  13,  1939, 
and  Dec.  23,  1943,  in  his 
Diaries,  pp.  119-20,  582-83. 

102.  This  extract  from  Haider’s 
diary  is  published  in  DGFP, 
VII,  p.  556. 

103.  See  DDl,  Seventh  Series, 
XIII,  No.  28,  and  DBrFP,  VI, 
No.  662. 

CHAPTER  15 

1.  Schnurre’s  memo  of  the  meet- 
ing taken  from  his  dispatch  to 
the  embassy  in  Moscow,  Aug. 
14,  1939,  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  58- 
59. 

2.  Text  of  Schulenburg’s  letter, 
ibid.,  pp.  67-68. 

3.  Text  of  Ribbentrop’s  telegram, 
ibid.,  pp.  62-64. 

4.  The  memo  of  the  British  busi- 
nessmen was  found  in  a file  of 
Goering’s  office  and  is  pub- 
lished in  DGFP,  VI,  pp. 
1088-93.  There  are  numerous 
jottings  on  the  document  in 
Goering’s  handwriting.  “Oho!” 
he  scribbled  several  times  op- 
posite statements  that  obvious- 
ly he  could  not  believe.  The 
whole  fantastic  and  somewhat 
ludicrous  story  of  Dahlerus’ 
peace  mission  which  brought 


him  briefly  to  the  center  of  the 
stage  at  a momentous  moment 
is  told  in  his  own  book,  The 
Last  Attempt.  Also  in  his  testi- 
mony at  Nuremberg,  TMWC, 
IX,  pp.  457-91,  and  in  Sir 
Lewis  Namier’s  Diplomatic 
Prelude,  pp.  417-33;  the  chap- 
ter is  entitled  “An  Interloper 
in  Diplomacy.” 

5.  Interrogation  of  Haider,  Feb. 
26,  1946,  NCA,  Suppl.  B,  p. 
1562. 

6.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  53,  63-64. 

7.  Thomas,  “Gedanken  und  Er- 
eignisse,”  Schweizerische 
Monatshefte,  December  1945. 

8.  Memo  of  Canaris  on  conversa- 
tion with  Keitel,  Aug.  17,  1939, 
NCA,  III,  p.  580  (N.D.  795- 
PS). 

9.  Naujocks  affidavit,  NCA,  VI, 
pp.  390-92  (N.D.  2751-PS). 

10.  Dispatch  of  Schulenburg,  2:48 
a.m.,  Aug.  16,  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
76-77.  The  ambassador  gave  a 
fuller  account  in  a memo  dis- 
patched by  courier,  and  he 
added  details  in  a letter  to 
Weizsaecker,  ibid,  pp.  87-90, 
99-100. 

11.  DBrFP,  Third  Series,  VII,  pp. 
41-42.  For  Ambassador  Stein- 
hardt’s  reports  see  U.S.  Diplo- 
matic Papers,  1939,  I,  pp.  296- 
99,  334. 

12.  Dispatch  of  Ribbentrop  to 
Schulenburg,  Aug.  16,  DGFP, 
VII,  pp.  84-85. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  100. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  102. 

15.  Dispatch  by  Schulenburg,  5:58 
a.m.,  Aug.  18,  ibid.,  pp.  114— 

16. 

16.  Dispatch  of  Ribbentrop,  10:48 
p.m.,  Aug.  18,  ibid.,  pp.  121— 
23. 

17.  Memo  of  Schnurre,  Aug.  19, 
ibid.,  pp.  132-33. 

18.  Dispatch  of  Schulenburg,  6:22 
p.m.,  Aug.  19,  ibid.,  p.  134. 

19.  Dispatch  of  Schulenburg, 
12:08  a.m.,  Aug.  20,  ibid.,  pp. 
149-50. 

20.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  p.  392.  He  does  not 
give  his  source. 

21.  Ibid.,  p.  391. 


1502 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


22.  Hitler’s  telegram  to  Stalin, 
Aug.  20,  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  156— 
57. 

23.  Dispatch  of  Schulenburg,  1:19 
a.m.,  Aug.  21,  ibid.,  pp.  161-62. 

24.  Dispatch  of  Ribbentrop,  Aug. 
21,  ibid.,  p.  162. 

25.  Dispatch  of  Schulenburg,  1:43 
P.M.,  Aug.  21,  ibid,  p.  164. 

26.  Stalin’s  letter  to  Hitler,  Aug. 
21,  ibid.,  p.  168. 

27.  NCA,  Suppl.  B,  pp.  1103-5. 

28.  DBrFP,  VI,  No.  376. 

29.  See  DBrFP,  Third  Series,  VII, 
Appendix  II,  pp.  558-614.  The 
appendix  contains  a detailed 
day-to-day  record  of  the  mili- 
tary conversations  in  Moscow 
and  constitutes  the  most  com- 
prehensive source  I have  seen 
of  the  Allied  version  of  the 
talks.  It  includes  reports  to 
London,  during  the  negotia- 
tions, by  Air  Marshal  Burnett 
and  Gen.  Heywood,  and  the 
final  report  of  the  British  mis- 
sion by  Adm.  Drax.  Also,  a 
verbatim  account  of  the  dra- 
matic meeting  of  Gen.  Dou- 
menc  with  Marshal  Voroshilov 
on  the  evening  of  Aug.  22, 
when  the  chief  of  the  French 
military  mission  tried  desper- 
ately to  save  the  situation  de- 
spite the  public  announcement 
that  Ribbentrop  was  arriving 
in  Moscow  the  next  day.  Also, 
the  record  of  the  final,  painful 
meeting  of  the  Allied  missions 
with  Voroshilov  on  Aug.  26. 
Volume  VII  also  includes 
many  dispatches  between  the 
British  Foreign  Office  and  the 
embassy  in  Moscow  which 
throw  fresh  light  on  this  epi- 
sode. 

This  section  of  the  chapter 
is  based  largely  on  these  con- 
fidential British  papers.  Un- 
fortunately the  Russians,  so 
far  as  I know,  have  never  pub- 
lished their  documents  on  the 
meeting,  though  a Soviet  ac- 
count is  given  in  Nikonov’s 
Origins  of  World  War  II,  in 
which  much  use  of  the  British 
Foreign  Office  documents  is 
made.  The  Soviet  version  is 


also  given  in  Histoire  de  la 
Diplomatic,  ed.  by  V.  Potem- 
kin. 

30.  Paul  Reynaud,  In  the  Thick  o) 
the  Fight,  p.  212.  Reynaud, 
pp.  210-33,  gives  the  French 
version  of  the  Allied  negotia- 
tions in  Moscow  in  August 
1939.  He  gives  his  sources  on 
p.  211.  Bonnet  gives  his  ver- 
sion in  his  book  Fin  d’une 
Europe. 

31.  The  documents  are  in  DBrFP, 
VII  (see  note  29  above).  It  is 
interesting  that  not  a line  on 
the  Anglo-French  diplomatic 
efforts  in  Warsaw  to  get  the 
Poles  to  accept  Russian  help 
nor  on  the  course  of  the  mili- 
tary talks  in  Moscow  was  pub- 
lished in  either  the  British  Blue 
Book  or  the  French  Yellow 
Book. 

32.  Dispatch  of  Ribbentrop,  9:05 
P.M.,  Aug.  23,  from  Moscow, 
DGFP,  VII,  p.  220. 

33.  Secret  German  memoranda, 
Aug.  24,  ibid.,  pp.  225-29. 

34.  Text  of  the  Soviet  draft, 
DGFP,  VII,  pp.  150-51. 

35.  Gaus  affidavit  at  Nuremberg, 
TMWC,  X,  p.  312. 

36.  Text  of  the  German-Soviet 
non-aggression  pact  and  of  se- 
cret additional  protocol,  signed 
in  Moscow  Aug.  23,  1939, 
DGFP,  VII,  pp.  245-47. 

37.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  p.  394. 

CHAPTER  16 

1.  British  Blue  Book,  pp.  96-98. 

2.  Henderson’s  dispatch,  Aug.  23, 
1939,  ibid.,  pp.  98-100.  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  memo  of 
meeting,  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  210- 
15.  Henderson  reported  on  the 
second  meeting  on  Aug.  24 
(British  Blue  Book,  pp.  100- 
2). 

3.  Text  of  Hitler’s  letter  of  Aug. 
23  to  Chamberlain,  ibid.,  pp. 
102-4.  It  is  also  printed  in 
DGFP,  VII,  pp.  216-19. 

4.  Text  of  Hitler’s  letter  to  Mus- 
solini, Aug.  25,  DGFP,  VH, 
pp.  281-83. 


Notes 


1503 


5.  Text  of  verbal  declaration  of 
Hitler  to  Henderson,  Aug.  25, 
drawn  up  by  Ribbentrop  and 
Dr.  Schmidt,  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
279-84;  also  in  British  Blue 
Book,  pp.  120-22.  Henderson’s 
dispatch  of  Aug.  25  describing 
interview,  British  Blue  Book, 
p>.  122-23.  See  also  Hender- 
son’s Failure  of  a Mission,  p. 
270. 

6.  Coulondre’s  dispatch,  Aug.  25, 
French  Yellow  Book,  Fr.  ed., 
pp.  312-14. 

7.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  977-98.  From  a 
file  on  Russo-German  relations 
found  in  the  files  of  the  Navy 
High  Command. 

8.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  144. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.  143-44. 

10.  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  120-29. 

11.  Weizsaecker  memorandum, 
Aug.  20,  DGFP,  VII,  p.  160. 

12.  Mackensen  letter  to  Weiz- 
saecker, Aug.  23,  ibid.,  pp. 
240—43. 

13.  Dispatch  of  Mackensen,  Aug. 
25,  ibid.,  pp.  291-93. 

14.  See  DGFP,  VII,  note  on  p. 
285. 

15.  Mussolini’s  letter  to  Hitler, 
Aug.  25,  ibid.,  pp.  285-86. 

16.  NCA,  VI,  pp.,  977-78  (N.D. 
C-170). 

17.  Ribbentrop’s  interrogation, 
Aug.  29.  1945,  NCA,  VII,  pp. 
535-36;  Goering’s  interroga- 
tion, Aug.  29,  1945,  ibid.,  pp. 
534-35;  Keitel’s  testimony  on 
the  stand  at  Nuremberg  under 
direct  examination,  Apr.  4, 
1946,  TMWC,  X,  pp.  514-15. 

18.  NCA,  Suppl.  B,  pp.  1561-63. 

19.  Gisevius,  op.  cit.,  pp.  358-59. 

20.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  p.  59. 

21.  Thomas,  “Gedanken  und  Er- 
eignisse,”  loc.  cit. 

22.  Testimony  of  Dr.  Schacht, 
May  2,  1946,  at  Nuremberg, 
TMWC,  XII,  pp.  545-46. 

23.  Testimony  of  Gisevius,  Apr. 
25,  1946,  at  Nuremberg,  ibid., 
pp.  224-25. 

24.  The  texts  of  all  these  appeals 
are  in  the  British  Blue  Book, 
pp.  122-42. 

25.  Hitler  to  Mussolini,  Aug.  25, 
7:40  p.m.,  DGFP,  VII,  p.  289. 


26.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  129. 

27.  Mussolini  to  Hitler,  Aug.  26, 
12:10  P.M.,  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
309-10. 

28.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  129.  Macken- 
sen’s  report,  DGFP,  VII,  p. 
325. 

29.  Hitler  to  Mussolini,  Aug.  26, 
3:08  p.m.,  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
313-14. 

30.  Mussoliri  to  Hitler,  6:42  p.m., 
Aug.  26,  ibid.,  p.  323. 

31.  Hitler  to  Mussolini,  12:10 
a.m.,  Aug.  27,  ibid.,  pp.  346- 
47. 

32.  Mussolini  to  Hitler,  4:30  P.M., 
Aug.  27,  ibid.,  pp.  353-54. 

33.  Dispatch  of  Mackensen,  Aug. 

27,  ibid.,  pp.  351-53. 

34.  Daladier  to  Hitler,  Aug.  26, 
ibid.,  pp.  330-31.  Also  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book,  Fr.  ed., 
pp.  321-22. 

35.  Haider’s  diary,  entry  of  Aug. 

28,  recapitulating  “sequence 
of  events”  of  previous  five 
days.  This  portion  is  in  DGFP, 

VII,  pp.  564-66. 

36.  Goering’s  interrogation,  Aug. 

29,  1945,  at  Nuremberg,  NCA, 

VIII,  p.  534  (N.D.  TC-90). 

37.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  498. 

38.  The  accoun.  of  the  doings  of 
Dahlerus  is  based  on  his  book, 
op.  cit.,  and  on  his  testimony 
at  Nuremberg,  where  he 
learned  how  naive  he  had  been 
about  his  German  friends.  See 
above,  note  4 for  Chapter  15. 
It  is  substantiated  by  a great 
deal  of  material  from  the  Brit- 
ish Foreign  Office  published  in 
DBrFP.  Third  Series,  Vol.  VII. 

39.  DBrFP,  VII,  p.  287. 

40.  Testimony  of  Dahlerus  at  Nu- 
remberg, TMWC,  IX,  p.  465. 

41.  DBrFP,  VII,  p.  319n. 

42.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  466. 

43.  DBrFP,  VII,  pp.  321-22. 

44.  British  Blue  Book,  p.  125,  and 
DBrFP,  VII,  p.  318, 

45.  Text  of  British  note  to  Ger- 
many, Aug.  28,  British  Blue 
Book,  pp.  126-28. 

46.  Dispatch  of  Henderson  to 
Halifax,  2:35  a.m.,  Aug.  29, 
ibid.,  pp.  128-31. 

47.  Dispatch  of  Henderson  to 


1504 


The  Rise 

Halifax,  Aug.  29,  ibid.,  p.  131. 

48.  Dispatch  of  Henderson,  Aug. 
29,  DBrFP,  VII,  p.  360. 

49.  Ibid.,  p.  361. 

50.  Text  of  German  reply,  Aug. 
29,  British  Blue  Book,  pp.  135— 
37. 

51.  DBrFP,  Third  Series,  VII,  p. 
393. 

52.  Henderson,  Failure  of  a Mis- 
sion, p.  281. 

53.  British  Blue  Book,  p.  139. 

54.  Text  of  Chamberlain’s  note  to 
Hitler,  Aug.  30,  DGFP,  VII, 
p.  441. 

55.  British  Blue  Book,  pp.  139-40. 

56.  Ibid.,  p.  140. 

57.  Ibid.,  p.  142. 

58.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  150-55. 
Also  Schmidt’s  testimony  at 
Nuremberg,  TMWC,  X,  pp. 
196-222. 

59.  TMWC,  X,  p.  275. 

60.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 

61.  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  447-50. 

62.  Henderson’s  Final  Report, 
Cmd.  6115,  p.  17.  Also  his 
book,  op.  cit.,  p.  287. 

63.  DBrFP,  VII,  No.  575,  p.  433. 

64.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  493. 

65.  Henderson’s  wire  to  Halifax, 
12:30  p.m.,  Aug.  31,  DBrFP, 
VII,  p.  440;  letter  to  Halifax, 
ibid.,  pp.  465-67;  wire,  12:30 
A.M.,  Sept.  1,  ibid.,  pp.  468-69. 
Kennard’s  wire  to  Halifax, 
Aug.  31,  ibid.,  No.  618. 

66.  DBrFP,  VII,  pp.  441-43. 

67.  British  Blue  Book,  p.  144. 

68.  Ibid.,  p.  147. 

69.  Ibid.,  p.  147. 

70.  Text  of  Polish  written  reply  to 
Britain,  Aug.  31,  ibid.,  pp.  MS- 
49;  Kennard’s  dispatch,  Aug. 
31  (it  was  not  received  in  Lon- 
don until  7:15  p.m.),  ibid.,  p. 
148. 

71.  For  Lipski’s  Final  Report,  see 
Polish  White  Book.  Extracts 
are  published  in  NCA,  VIII, 
pp.  499-512. 

72.  DGFP,  VII,  p.  462. 

73.  Lipski’s  version  in  his  Final 
Report,  loc.  cit.  Dr.  Schmidt’s 
German  account  of  the  inter- 
view is  in  DGFP,  VII,  p.  463. 

74.  The  German  text  of  Hitler’s  di- 
rective is  in  TMWC,  XXXIV, 


and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

pp.  456-59  (N.D.  C-126). 

English  translations  are  given 
in  NCA,  VI,  pp.  935-39,  and 
DGFP,  VII,  pp.  477-79. 

75.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  68-73. 

76.  Dahlerus’  testimony  at  Nurem- 
berg, TMWC,  IX,  pp.  470-71; 
Forbes’s  answer  to  question- 
naire submitted  by  Goering’s 
lawyer  at  Nuremberg  is  quoted 
in  Namier,  Diplomatic  Prel- 
ude, pp.  376-77.  Henderson’s 
account  is  in  his  Final  Report, 
p.  19. 

77.  DBrFP,  VII,  p.  483.  Hender- 
son’s later  account  of  the  dis- 
patch is  given  in  his  Final  Re- 
port, p.  20,  and  in  his  book,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  291-92. 

78.  TMWC,  II,  p.  451. 

79.  Naujocks  affidavit,  loc.  cit. 

80.  DGFP,  VII,  p.  472. 

81.  Gisevius,  op  cit.,  pp.  374-75. 

CHAPTER  17 

1.  DGFP,  VII,  p.  491. 

2.  From  Dahlerus’  book,  op.  cit., 
t>p.  1 19-20;  and  from  his  testi- 
mony on  the  stand  at  Nurem- 
berg, TMWC,  IX,  p.  471. 

3.  DBrFP,  VII,  pp.  466-67. 

4.  Ibid. 

5.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  436.  Dahlerus’ 
testimony,  as  printed  here,  con- 
tains a typographical  error 
which  makes  him  say  the  Poles 
“had  been  attacked,”  and  is 
therefore  totally  misleading. 

6.  DBrFP,  VII,  pp.  474-75. 

7.  Ibid.,  Nos.  651,  652,  pp.  479- 
80. 

8.  The  text  is  in  DGFP,  VII,  p. 
492,  and  in  the  British  Blue 
Book,  p.  168.  Dr.  Schmidt’s 
notes  on  Ribbentrop’s  com- 
ments to  Henderson  and  Cou- 
londre  are  in  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
493  and  495,  respectively. 

9.  Schmidt’s  version  of  the  argu- 
ment in  DGFP,  VII,  p.  493; 
Henderson  gave  his  account 
briefly  in  his  dispatch  on  the 
evening  of  Sept.  1,  1939  (Brit- 
ish Blue  Book,  p.  169). 

10.  DBrFP,  VII,  No.  621,  p.  459. 

11.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  135. 


Notes 


1505 


12.  DGFP,  VII,  p.  483. 

13.  Ibid.,.pp.  485-86. 

14.  Bonnet  to  Frangois-Poncet, 
11:45  a.m.,  Sept.  1,  French 
Yellow  Book,  Fr.  ed.,  pp.  377- 
78.  Mussolini’s  proposal  for  a 
conference  on  September  5 
was  outlined  in  a dispatch 
from  Frangois-Poncet  to  Bon- 
net Aug.  31,  ibid.,  pp.  360-61. 

15.  DBrFP,  VII,  pp.  530-31. 

16.  Henderson’s  Final  Report,  p. 

22. 

17.  Text  in  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  509- 

10. 

18.  From  Schmidt’s  memo,  on 
which  this  scene  is  based, 
ibid.,  pp.  512-13. 

19.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  156. 

20.  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  136-37. 

21.  DGFP,  VII,  pp.  524-25. 

22.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  137.  De 
Monzie,  a defeatist  French 
senator,  confirms  the  story  in 
his  book  Ci-Devant,  pp.  146- 
47. 

23.  Corbin’s  dispatch,  French  Yel- 
low Book,  Fr.  ed.,  p.  395. 

24.  This  section  is  based  on 
DBrFP,  VII,  covering  Sept. 
2—3.  There  is  an  excellent 
summary,  based  on  the  confi- 
dential British  Foreign  Office 
papers  and  on  the  scant  French 
sources  available,  in  The  Eve 
of  the  War,  1939,  ed.  by  Ar- 
nold and  Veronica  M.  Toyn- 
bee. Namier,  Diplomatic  Prel- 
ude, also  is  useful.  I have  pur- 
posely omitted  the  references 
to  scores  of  documents  in 
DBrFP  in  order  to  avoid 
cluttering  the  pages  with 
numerals. 

25.  Halifax  wires  to  Henderson: 
11:50  p.m.,  Sept.  2,  DBrFP, 
VII,  No.  746,  p.  528;  12:25 
A.M.,  Sept.  3,  ibid.,  p.  533. 

26.  The  text  is  in  the  British  Blue 
Book,  p.  175,  and  in  DGFP, 
VII,  p.  529. 

27.  DBrFP,  VII,  No.  758,  p.  535. 

28.  Schmidt’s  account  is  in  his 
book,  op.  cit..  p.  157;  see  also 
his  testimony  on  the  stand  at 
Nuremberg,  TMWC,  X,  p.  200. 

29.  Schmidt  op.  cit.,  pp.  157-58; 


also  his  testimony  at  Nurem- 
berg TMWC,  X,  pp.  200-1. 

30.  Ibid. 

31.  DBrFP,  VII,  No.  762,  p.  537, 
n.  1. 

32.  Ibid. 

33.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  473. 

34.  Bonnet  recounts  this  himself, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  365-68. 

35.  Weizsaecker’s  memo  of  the 
meeting,  DGFP,  VII,  p.  532. 

36.  The  text  is  in  DGFP,  VII,  pp. 
548-49. 

37.  The  text  is  given  in  DGFP, 

VII,  pp.  538-39. 

38.  This  is  revealed  in  the  German 
Foreign  Office  papers,  ibid.,  p. 
480. 

39.  Text  of  telegram,  ibid.,  pp. 
540-41. 

40.  Fuehrer  Conferences  on  Na- 
val Affairs  [hereafter  referred 
to  as  FCNA],  1939,  pp.  13-14. 

CHAPTER  18 

1.  Text  of  Russian  reply,  DGFP, 

VIII,  p.  4.  A number  of  these 
Nazi  - Soviet  exchanges  are 
printed  in  NSR,  but  DGFP 
gives  a fuller  account. 

2.  Ibid.,  pp.  33-34. 

3.  Molotov’s  congratulations, 
ibid.,  p.  34.  His  promise  of 
military  action,  p.  35. 

4.  Schulenburg  dispatch.  Sept.  10, 
ibid.,  pp.  44-45. 

5.  Ibid.,  pp.  60-61. 

6.  Ibid.,  pp.  68-70. 

7.  Ibid.,  pp.  76-77. 

8.  Ibid.,  pp.  79-80. 

9.  Schulenburg  dispatch,  ibid.,  p. 
92. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  103. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  105. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  123-24. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  130. 

14.  The  two  telegrams,  ibid.,  pp. 
147-48. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  162. 

16.  Ibid.,  Appendix  11 

17.  Text  of  the  treaty,  including 
the  secret  protocols,  a public 
declaration,  and  exchanges  of 
two  letters  between  Molotov 
and  Ribbentrop,  ibid.,  pp. 
164-68. 


1506 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


CHAPTER  19 

1.  Maj.-Gen.  J.  F.  C.  Fuller,  The 
Second  World  War,  p,  55. 
Quoted  from  The  First  Quar- 
ter, p.  343. 

2.  Text  of  Directive  No.  3 
DGFP,  VIII,  p.  41. 

3.  Namier,  op.  cit.,  pp.  459-60. 
He  quotes  the  French  text  of 
the  convention. 

4.  Testimony  of  Haider  for  de- 
fendants in  the  “Ministries 
Case”  trial,  on  Sept.  8-9, 
1948,  at  Nuremberg.  TWC 
XII,  p.  1086. 

5.  Testimony  of  Jodi  in  his  own 

defense  on  June  4,  1946  at 
Nuremberg,  TMWC,  XV’  d 
350.  ’ 

6.  Testimony  of  Keitel  in  his  own 
defense  on  April  4,  1946  at 
Nuremberg,  ibid.,  X,  p.  519. 

7.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  p.  478. 

8.  FCNA,  1939,  pp.  16-17. 

9.  Weizsaecker’s  memorandum  of 
his  talk  with  Kirk,  DGFP, 
VIII,  pp.  3-4.  His  testimony  at 
Nuremberg  on  his  talk  with 
Raeder,  TMWC,  XIV,  p.  278. 

10.  Ibid.,  XXXV,  pp.  527-29 
(N.D.  804— D).  The  document 
gives  both  Raeder’s  memoran- 
dum of  his  conversation  and 
the  text  of  the  American  naval 
attache’s  cable  to  Washington. 

11.  Sworn  statement  of  Doenitz  at 
Nuremberg,  NCA,  VII,  pp. 
114-15  (N.D.  638-D). 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  156—58. 

13.  Nuremberg  testimony  of 
Raeder,  TMWC,  XIV,  p.  78; 
of  Weizsaecker,  ibid.,  pp.  277, 
279,  293;  of  Hans  Fritzsche,  a 
high  official  in  the  Propaganda 
Ministry  and  an  acquitted  de- 
fendant in  the  trial,  ibid., 
XVII,  pp.  191,  234-35.  The 
Voelkischer  Beobachter  article 
is  in  NCA,  V,  p.  1008  (N.D. 
3260  — PS).  For  Goebbels’ 
broadcast,  see  Berlin  Diary,  p. 
238. 

14.  Schmidt  memorandum  of  the 
ialk,  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  140-45. 

15.  Brauchitsch’s  testimony  at 


Nuremberg,  TMWC,  XX,  p. 
573.  A note  in  the  OKW  War 
Diary  confirms  the  quotation. 

16.  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  154 — 55. 
Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers,  pd. 
309-16. 

17.  DGFP,  VIII,  p.  24. 

18.  Ibid.,  pp.  197-98. 

19.  DGFP,  VII,  p.  414. 

20.  Hitler’s  memorandum,  NCA, 
VII,  pp.  800-14  (N.D.  L-52); 
Directive  No.  6,  NCA,  VI  pp 
880-81  (N.D.  C-62). 

21.  The  text  is  in  TWC,  X,  pp. 
864-72  (N.D.  NOKW-3433). 

22.  Both  Schlabrendorff,  op.  cit., 
p.  25,  and  Gisevius,  op.  cit., 
p.  431,  tell  of  this  plot. 

23.  Wheeler-Bennett  in  Nemesis, 
p.  49 In.,  gives  the  German 
sources.  See  also  Hassell,  op. 
cit.,  and  Thomas,  “Gedanken 
und  Ereignisse,"  loc.  cit. 

24.  Haider’s  interrogation  at  Nu- 
remberg. Feb.  26,  1946,  NCA, 
Suppl.  B,  pp.  1564-75. 

25.  Rothfels,  The  German  Oppo- 
sition to  Hitler. 

26.  They  are  given  in  NCA,  VI. 
pp.  893-905  (N.D.  C-72). 

27.  Buelow-Schwante  testified  in 
the  “Ministries  Case”  before 
the  Nuremberg  Military  Tribu- 
nal about  Goerdeler’s  message 
and  his  own  private  audience 
with  King  Leopold.  See  tran- 
script, English  edition,  pp. 
9807-11.  It  is  also  mentioned 
in  DGFP,  VIII,  p.  384n.  His 
telegram  of  warning  to  Berlin 
is  printed  in  DGFP,  VIII  p 
386. 

28.  For  the  varied  accounts  of  the 
Venlo  kidnaping,  see  S.  Payne 
Best,  The  Venlo  Incident ; 
Schellenberg,  The  Labyrinth; 
Wheeler-Bennett,  Nemesis. 

An  official  Dutch  account  is 
given  in  the  protest  of  the 
Netherlands  government  to 
Germany,  DGFP,  VIII,  pp. 
395-96.  Additional  material 
was  given  at  the  “Ministries 
Case”  trial  at  Nuremberg.  See 
TWC,  XII. 

29.  TWC,  XII,  pp.  1206-8,  and 
DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  395-96. 

30.  For  various  accounts  of  the 


Notes 


1507 


bomb  attempt,  see  Best,  op. 
cit.;  Schellenberg,  op.  cit.; 
Wheeler  - Bennett,  Nemesis; 
Reitlinger,  The  S.S.;  Berlin 
Diary;  Gisevius,  op.  cit.  There 
was  also  some  material  at 
Nuremberg  from  which  I 
made  notes  and  which  I have 
used  here,  though  I cannot 
find  it  in  the  NCA  and 
TMWC  volumes. 

31.  The  textual  notes  are  given  in 
NCA,  III,  pp.  572-80,  and 
also  in  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  439- 
46  (N.D.  789-PS). 

32.  Haider’s  dairy  for  Nov.  23 
and  his  footnote  added  later. 
Brauchitsch’s  testimony  at 
Nuremberg,  TMWC,  XX,  p. 
575. 

33.  Haider’s  interrogation  at  Nu- 
remberg, NCA,  Suppl.  B,  pp. 
1569-70.  Also  see  Thomas, 
“Gedanken  und  Ereignisse, 
loc.  cit. 

34.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  93-94, 
172. 

35.  Ibid.,  pp.  79,  94. 

36.  From  the  dairy  of  Admiral 
Canaris,  NCA,  V,  p.  769 
(N.D.  3047-PS). 

37.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  97-101  (N.D. 
3363-PS). 

38.  TMWC,  I,  p.  297. 

39.  Ibid.,  VII,  pp.  468-69. 

40.  Ibid.,  XXIX,  pp.  447-48. 

41.  NCA,  IV,  p.  891  (N.D.  2233- 
C-PS). 

42.  Ibid.,  pp.  891-92. 

43.  Ibid.,  pp.  553-54. 

44.  DGFP,  VIII,  p.  683n. 

45.  The  text,  ibid.,  604-9. 

46.  Ibid.,  p.  394. 

47.  Ibid.,  p.  213. 

48.  Ibid.,  p.  490. 

49.  NCA,  IV,  p.  1082. 

50.  Ibid.,  p.  1082  (N.D.  2353- 
PS). 

51.  DGFP,  VIII,  p.  537. 

52.  Ibid.,  pp.  591,  753,  respec- 
tively. 

53.  Text  of  trade  treaty  of  Feb. 
11,  1940,  and  figures  on  de- 
liveries, ibid.,  pp.  762-64. 

54.  NCA,  IV,  pp.  1081-82  (N.D. 
2353-PS). 

55.  DGFP.  VIH,  pp.  814-17 


(Schnurre  memorandum,  Feb. 
26,  1940). 

56.  NCA,  III,  p.  620  (N.D.  864- 
PS). 

57.  Langsdorff’s  moving  letter  is 
given  in  FCNA,  1939,  p.  62. 
Other  German  material  on  the 
battle  and  its  aftermath,  pp. 
59-62. 

58.  I have  used  some  of  the  orig- 

inal German  sources  for  this 
account  of  the  forced  land- 
ing: reports  of  the  German 
ambassador  and  the  air  at- 
tache in  Brussels  to  Berlin, 
DGFP,  VIII,  and  Jodi’s  dairy. 
The  text  of  the  German  plan 
of  attack  in  the  West,  as  sal- 
vaged by  the  Belgians,  is 
given  in  NCA,  VIII,  pp.  423- 
28  (N.D.  TC-58-A).  Karl 

Bartz  has  given  an  account  of 
the  incident  in  Als  der  Him- 
mel  brannte.  Churchill’s  com- 
ments are  in  The  Gathering 
Storm,  pp.  556-57.  He  gives  a 
wrong  date  for  the  forced 
landing. 

CHAPTER  20 

1.  NCA,  IV,  p.  104  (N.D.  1546- 
PS);  VI,  pp.  891-92  (N.D. 
C-66). 

2.  Ibid.,  VI,  pp.  928  (N.D.  C- 
122),  p.  978  (N.D.  C-170). 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  892  (N.D.  C-166); 
FCNA,  1939,  p.  27. 

4.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  pp.  531—37. 

5.  FCNA,  1939,  p.  51. 

6.  Rosenberg’s  memorandum, 
NCA,  VI,  pp.  885-87  (N.D. 
C-64).  It  is  also  given  in 
FCNA,  1939,  pp.  53-55. 

7.  FCNA,  1939,  pp.  55-57. 

8.  Ibid.,  pp.  57-58. 

9.  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  515,  546-47. 

10.  Jodi's  diary,  Dec.  12,  13 — 
obviously  misdated.  Haider 
diary  for  Dec.  14. 

11.  Rosenberg  memorandum, 
NCA,  III,  pp.  22-25  (N.D. 
004-PS ) . 

12.  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  663-66. 

13.  Text  of  the  directive,  NCA, 
VI,  p.  883  (N.D.  C-63 ) . 

14.  Interrogation  of  Falkenhorst 


1508 


The  Rise 

at  Nuremberg,  NCA,  SuppL 
B,  pp.  1543—47. 

15.  Text  of  the  directive,  NCA, 
VI,  pp.  1003-5;  also  in  DGFP, 
VIII,  pp.  831-33. 

16.  Jodi’s  diary,  March  10-14, 
1940. 

17.  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  910-13. 

18.  Ibid.,  pp.  179-81,  470-71. 

19.  Ibid.,  pp.  89-91. 

20.  Text  of  Hitler’s  directive,  ibid., 
pp.  817-19. 

21.  Dr.  Schmidt’s  minutes  of  the 
meetings  of  Sumner  Welles 
with  Hitler,  Goering  and  Rib- 
bentrop  are  in  DGFP,  VIII; 
also  Weizsaecker’s  two  memo- 
randa on  his  talk  with  Welles. 
The  American  envoy  also  saw 
Dr.  Schacht  after  the  banker, 
now  fallen  from  grace,  had 
been  summoned  by  Hitler  and 
told  what  line  to  take.  See 
Hassell,  op.  cit.,  p.  121.  Welles 
has  given  his  own  account  of 
his  talks  in  Berlin  in  The  Time 
for  Decision. 

22.  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  865-66. 

23.  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  652-56,  683- 
84. 

24.  Text  of  Hitler’s  letter  to  Mus- 
solini, March  8,  1940,  ibid., 
pp.  871-80. 

25.  Schmidt’s  minutes  of  the  meet- 
ings, ibid.,  pp.  882-93,  898- 
909;  Ciano’s  version  is  in 
Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers,  pp. 
339-59.  Also  see  Schmidt,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  170-71,  and  The  Ciano 
Diaries,  for  their  personal 
comments  on  the  meetings. 
Ribbentrop’s  two  telegrams  to 
Hitler  reporting  on  his  inter- 
views are  in  DGFP,  VIII. 

26.  Welles,  op.  cit.,  p.  138. 

27.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  220. 

28.  Dr.  Schmidt’s  transcribed 
shorthand  notes  of  the  meet- 
ing, DGFP,  IX,  pp.  1—16. 

29.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  116-18, 
on  which  this  account  is  largely 
based. 

30.  Allen  Dulles,  Germany*s  Un- 
derground, p.  59. 

31.  Shirer,  The  Challenge  of  Scan- 
dinavia, pp.  223-25. 

32.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  p.  579.  The  British 


and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

plans  for  R-4  are  given  in 
Derry,  The  Campaign  in  Nor- 
way, the  official  British  ac- 
count of  the  Norwegian  cam- 
paign. 

33.  Text  of  the  directive,  DGFP, 
IX,  pp.  66-68. 

34.  Text,  ibid.,  pp.  68-73. 

35.  Text  of,  NCA,  VI,  pp.  914-15 
(N.D.  C-115). 

36.  TMWC,  XIV,  pp.  99,  194. 

37.  Text  of,  NCA,  VIII,  pp.  410- 
14  (N.D.  TC-55).  Also  in 
DGFP,  IX,  pp.  88-93. 

38.  Renthe-Fink’s  dispatch  from 
Copenhagen,  DGFP,  IX,  pp. 
102-3;  Brauer’s  dispatch  from 
Oslo,  ibid.,  p.  102. 

39.  The  Danish  version  of  the 
German  occupation  is  based 
on  the  author’s  The  Challenge 
of  Scandinavia,  and  on  Den- 
mark during  the  Occupation, 
ed.  by  B0rge  Outze.  Lt.  Col. 
Th.  Thaulow’s  contribution  is 
especially  valuable.  A Guards 
officer,  he  was  with  the  King 
at  the  time. 

40.  From  the  secret  German  Army 
Archives,  Quoted  in  NCA, 
VI,  pp.  299-308  (N.D.  3596- 
PS). 

41.  From  the  Norwegian  State  Ar- 
chives; quoted  in  the  author’s 
The  Challenge  of  Scandinavia, 
p.  38. 

42.  DGFP,  IX,  p.  124. 

43.  Ibid.,  p.  129. 

44.  Ibid.,  p.  186. 

45.  Churchill,  The  Gathering 
Storm,  p.  601. 

CHAPTER  21 

1.  Belgium — The  Official  Ac- 
count of  What  Happened, 
1939-1940,  pp.  27-29. 

2.  NCA,  IV,  p.  1037  (N.D.  2329- 
PS). 

3.  Ibid.,  VI,  p.  880  (N.D.  C-62). 

4.  Allen  Dulles,  op.  cit.,  pp.  58— 
61.  Dulles  says  Col.  Sas  per- 
sonally confirmed  this  account 
to  him  after  the  war. 

5.  There  is  a vast  amount  of  ma- 
terial on  the  development  of 
the  German  plans  for  the  at- 
tack in  the  West.  I have  drawn 


Notes 


1509 


on  the  following:  the  diaries 
of  Haider  and  Jodi;  Haider’s 
booklet,  Hiller  als  Feldherr, 
Munich,  1949  (an  English 
translation,  Hitler  as  War 
Lord,  was  published  in  London 
in  1950);  extracts  from  the 
OKW  War  Diary  published  in 
the  NCA  and  TMWC  volumes 
of  the  Nuremberg  documents; 
the  various  directives  of  Hitler 
and  OKW,  published  in  the 
Nuremberg  volumes  and  in 
DGFP,  VIII  and  IX;  Man- 
stein,  Verlorene  Siege;  Goer- 
litz,  History  of  the  German 
General  Staff  and  Der  Z weite 
Weltkrieg;  Jacobsen,  Doku- 
mente  zur  Vorgeschichte  des 
Westfeldzuges,  1939—40;  Gu- 
derian.  Panzer  Leader;  Blu- 
mentritt,  Von  Rundstedt;  Lid- 
dell Hart,  The  German  Gen- 
erals Talk;  considerable  Ger- 
man material  in  the  Nurem- 
berg documents  of  the  NOKW 
series  which  were  produced  at 
the  secondary  trials.  For  the 
British  plans,  see  Churchill’s 
first  two  volumes  of  his  mem- 
oirs; Ellis,  The  War  in  France 
and  Flanders,  which  is  the  offi- 
cial British  account;  J.  F.  C. 
Fuller,  The  Second  World 
War;  Draper,  The  Six  Weeks’ 
War.  The  best  over-all  ac- 
count, based  on  all  the  Ger- 
man material  available,  is  in 
Telford  Taylor’s  The  March 
of  Conquest. 

6.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
pp.  42-43. 

7.  DGFP,  IX,  pp.  343—44. 

8.  Both  Goering  and  Kesselring 
were  questioned  on  the  stand 
at  Nuremberg  in  regard  to  the 
bombing  of  Rotterdam.  See 
TMWC,  IX,  pp.  175-77,  213- 
18,  338-40. 

9.  TMWC,  XXXVI,  p.  656. 

10.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
p.  40. 

11.  For  more  detailed  accounts, 
see  Walther  Melzer,  Albert 
Kanal  und  Eben-Emael;  Ru- 
dolf Witzig,  “Die  Einnahme 
von  Eben-Emael,”  Wehrkunde, 
May  1954  (Lt.  Witzig  com- 


manded the  operation,  but  be- 
cause of  a mishap  to  his  glider 
did  not  arrive  until  his  men, 
under  Sgt.  Wenzel,  had  nearly 
accomplished  their  mission); 
Gen.  van  Overstraeten,  Albert 
1-Leopold  III;  Belgium — The 
Official  Account  of  What 
Happened.  Telford  Taylor, 
The  March  of  Conquest,  pp. 
210-14,  gives  an  excellent 
summary. 

12.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
pp.  46-47. 

13.  Hitler  to  Mussolini,  May  18, 
1940,  DGFP,  IX,  pp.  374-75. 

14.  From  the  King’s  own  account 
of  the  meeting  and  that  of 
Premier  Pierlot.  Published  in 
the  official  Belgian  Rapport, 
Annexes,  pp.  69-75,  and 
quoted  by  Paul  Reynaud,  who 
was  French  Premier  at  the 
time,  in  his  In  the  Thick  of  the 
Fight,  pp.  420-26. 

15.  Lord  Gort’s  dispatches,  Sup- 
plement to  the  London  Ga- 
zette, London,  1941. 

16.  Weygand,  Rappele  au  service, 
pp.  125-26. 

17.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
p.  76. 

18.  Liddell  Hart,  The  German 
Generals  Talk,  pp.  114—15 
(soft-cover  edition). 

19.  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  265-66. 

20.  Telford  Taylor,  The  March  of 
Conquest,  p.  297. 

21.  Text,  Wilhelm  II’s  telegram 
and  draft  of  Hitler’s  reply, 
DGFP,  IX,  p.  598. 

22.  Texts  of  the  exchange  of  let- 
ters between  Hitler  and  Mus- 
solini in  May-June  1940  are 
in  DGFP,  IX. 

23.  Ciano  Dairies,  p.  267. 

24.  DGFP,  IX,  pp.  608-11. 

25.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  266. 

26.  Ibid.,  p.  266. 

27.  Though  copies  of  the  minutes 
found  in  the  German  Archives 
are  unsigned,  Dr.  Schmidt  has 
testified  that  he  himself  drew 
them  up.  Since  he  acted  as  in- 
terpreter, he  was  in  the  best 
position  of  anyone  to  do  this. 
They  are  printed  in  DGFP, 
IX  as  follows:  negotiations  of 


1510 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


June  21,  pp.  643-52;  record  of  43. 
the  telephone  conversations  be- 
tween Gen.  Huntziger  and 
Gen.  Weygand  (at  Bordeaux) 
on  the  evening  of  June  21,  as  44. 
drawn  up  by  Schmidt,  who 
had  been  directed  to  listen  in,  45. 
pp.  652-54;  record  of  the  tele- 
phone conversation  between  46. 
Gen.  Huntziger  and  Col.  Bour-  47. 
get,  Gen.  Weygand’s  adjutant 
(at  Bordeaux),  at  10  a.m.  on 
June  22,  pp.  664-71;  text  of 
the  Franco-German  Armistice  1. 
Agreement,  pp.  671-76;  memo- 
randum of  questions  raised  by 
the  French  and  answered  by 
the  Germans  during  the  ne- 
gotiations at  Compiegne,  pp. 
676-79.  Hitler  gave  instruc- 
tions that  this  document, 
though  not  a part  of  the  agree- 
ment, was  “binding  on  the 
German  side." 

The  Germans  had  placed 
hidden  microphones  in  the 
wagon-lit  and  recorded  every 
word  spoken.  I myself  listened 
to  part  of  the  proceedings  as 
they  were  being  recorded  in 
the  German  communications 
van.  So  far  as  I know,  they 


were  never  published  and  per-  2. 
haps  neither  the  recording  nor 
the  transcript  was  ever  found. 

My  own  notes  are  very  frag-  3. 

mentary,  except  for  the  closing 
dramatic  session.  4. 

28.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour,  5. 

p.  177. 

29.  DGFP,  X,  pp.  49-50. 

30.  Ibid.,  IX,  pp.  550-51.  6. 

31.  Ibid.,  IX,  pp.  558-59,  585. 

32.  Ibid.,  X,  pp.  125-26. 

33.  Ibid.,  pp.  39-40. 

34.  Ibid.,  p.  298. 

35.  Ibid.,  pp.  424,  435.  7. 

36.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
pp.  259-60. 

37.  Ibid.,  pp.  261-62. 

38.  DGFP,  X,  p.  82.  8. 

39.  OKW  directive,  signed  by  Kei- 
tel, FCNA,  1940,  pp.  61-62.  9. 

40.  Ciano  Dairies,  p.  274. 

41.  FCNA,  1940,  pp.  62-66. 

42.  Letter  of  Hitler  to  Mussolini, 

July  13,  1940,  DGFP,  X,  pp. 
209-11.  10. 


Text  of  Directive  No.  16, 
NCA,  III,  pp.  399-403  (N.D. 
442-PS).  It  is  also  published 
in  DGFP,  X,  pp.  226-29. 

The  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  277— 
78  (for  July  19,  22). 

Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 

p.  261. 

DGFP,  X,  pp.  79-80. 

Ibid.,  p.  148. 

CHAPTER  22 

Naval  Staff  War  Diary,  June 
18,  1940.  Quoted  in  Ronald 
Wheatley,  Operation  Sea  Lion, 
p.  16.  The  author,  a member 
of  the  British  team  compiling 
an  official  history  of  the  war, 
had  unrestricted  access  to  the 
captured  German  military,  na- 
val, air  and  diplomatic  ar- 
chives, a privilege  not  accorded 
up  to  the  time  of  writing  to 
any  unofficial  American  au- 
thors by  either  the  British  or 
the  American  authorities,  who 
hold  joint  custody  of  the  docu- 
ments. Wheatley,  as  a guide 
to  restricted  German  sources 
on  Sea  Lion,  is  therefore  very 
helpful. 

OKM  (Navy  High  Com- 
mand) records.  Wheatley,  p. 
26. 

Naval  Staff  War  Diary,  Nov. 
15,  1939.  Wheatley,  pp.  4-7. 
Wheatley,  pp.  7—1 3. 

FCNA,  p.  51  (May  21,  1940); 
Naval  Staff  War  Diary,  same 
date,  Wheatley,  p.  15. 

Text,  TMWC,  XXVIII,  pp. 
301-3  (N.D.  1776-PS).  A not 
very  good  English  translation 
is  published  in  NCA,  Suppl. 
A,  pp.  404-6. 

British  War  Office  Intelligence 
Review,  November  1945.  Cited 
by  Shulman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  49- 
50. 

Liddell  Hart,  The  German 
Generals  Talk,  p.  129. 

From  OKH  papers,  cited  by 
Wheatley,  pp.  40,  152-55,  158. 
The  plan  was  continually  be- 
ing altered  throughout  the 
next  six  weeks. 

Naval  Staff  War  Diary, 


Notes 


1511 


Raeder-Brauchitsch  discus- 
sion,  July  17.  Wheatley,  p.  40n. 

11.  Haider  dairy,  July  22;  FCNA, 
pp.  71-73  (July  21). 

12.  Naval  Staff  War  Diary,  July 
30,  and  memorandum,  July  29. 
Wheatley,  pp.  45-46. 

13.  FCNA,  Aug.  1,  1940.  This  is 
Raeder’s  confidential  report  on 
the  meeting.  Haider  gave  his 
in  a long  dairy  entry  of  July  31. 

14.  DGFP,  X,  pp.  390-91.  It  is 
also  given  in  N.D.  443-PS, 
which  was  not  published  in 
the  NCA  or  TMWC  volumes. 

15.  FCNA,  pp.  81-82  (Aug.  1, 
1940). 

16.  Ibid.,  pp.  73-75. 

17.  From  the  Jodi  and  OKW  pa- 
pers. Wheatley,  p.  68. 

18.  FCNA,  pp.  82-83  (Aug.  13). 

19.  The  two  directives,  ibid.,  pp. 
81-82  (Aug.  16). 

20.  Ibid.,  pp.  85-86.  Wheatley,  pp. 
161-62,  gives  details  of  Au- 
tumn Journey  from  the  Ger- 
man military  records. 

21.  Text  of  Brauchitsch’s  instruc- 
tions, from  the  OKH  files. 
Wheatley,  pp.  174-82. 

22.  FCNA,  1940,  p.  88. 

23.  Ibid.,  pp.  91-97. 

24.  Haider’s  diary  of  the  same 
date;  A s s m a n n , Deutsche 
Schicksalsjahre,  pp.  189-90; 
OKW  War  Diary,  cited  by 
Wheatley,  p.  82. 

25.  Raeder’s  report,  FCNA,  1940, 
pp.  98-101.  Haider’s  dairy. 
Sept.  14. 

26.  FCNA,  1940,  pp.  100-1. 

27.  Naval  Staff  War  Diary,  Sept. 
17.  Wheatley,  p.  88. 

28.  Ibid.,  Sept.  18.  Cited  by  Wheat- 
ley. 

29.  FCNA,  1940,  p.  101. 

30.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  298. 

31.  FCNA,  1940,  p.  103. 

32.  Vorstudien  zur  Luftkriegsge- 
schichte,  Heft  11,  Der  Luft- 
krieg  gegen  England,  1940-1, 
by  Lt.  Col.  von  Hesler,  cited 
by  Wheatley,  p.  59.  The  two  to 
four  weeks’  estimate  was  given 
Haider,  who  noted  it  in  his 
dairy  on  July  11. 

33.  Adolf  Galland,  The  First  and 
the  Last,  p.  26.  Also  from  Gal- 


land’s  interrogation,  quoted  by 
Wilmot  in  The  Struggle  for 
Europe,  p.  44. 

34.  Luftwaffe  General  Staff  record 
of  directives  given  by  Goering 
at  this  conference.  Wheatley, 
p.  73. 

35.  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  290. 

36.  See  T.  H.  O’Brien,  Civil  De- 
fence. This  is  a volume  in  the 
official  British  history  of  the 
Second  World  War,  edited  by 
Prof.  J.  R.  M.  Butler  and  pub- 
lished by  H.  M.  Stationery 
Office. 

37.  Notes  on  Goering’s  conference 
with  air  chiefs,  Sept.  16.  Cited 
by  Wheatley,  p.  87. 

38.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
p.  279. 

39.  Peter  Fleming,  Operation  Sea 
Lion,  p.  293.  An  excellent 
book,  but  Fleming  was  denied 
access  to  restricted  documents, 
though  he  says  he  was  per- 
mitted to  glance  through — for 
an  hour  or  two — Wheatley’s 
study  shortly  before  it  was 
published. 

40.  DGFP,  X. 

41.  Schellenberg,  The  Labyrinth, 
Ch.  2. 

42.  New  York  Times,  Aug.  1, 
1957. 

CHAPTER  23 

1.  DGFP,  IX,  p.  108. 

2.  Ibid.,  pp.  294,  316. 

3.  Ibid.,  pp.  599-600. 

4.  Ibid.,  X,  pp.  3-4. 

5.  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour, 
pp.  135-36  (the  text  of  his  let- 
ter to  Stalin). 

6.  DGFP,  X,  pp.  207-8. 

7.  Mein  Kampf,  p.  654. 

8.  Speech  of  Jodi,  Nov.  7,  1943, 
NCA,  I,  p.  795  (N.D.  L-172). 

9.  Sworn  testimony  of  Warli- 
mont,  Nov.  21,  1945,  NCA,  V, 
p.  741;  interrogation  of  Warli- 
mont,  Oct.  12,  1945,  ibid., 
Suppl.  B,  pp.  1635-37. 

10.  Haider’s  diary,  July  22,  1940. 
He  records  what  Brauchitsch 
told  him  of  the  conference 
with  Hitler  in  Berlin  on  the 
previous  day. 


1512 


The  Rise 

11.  Haider’s  diary,  July  3,  1940. 

12.  NCA,  IV,  p.  1083  (N.b.  2353- 
PS). 

13.  War  Diary,  OKW  Operations 
Staff,  Aug.  26,  1940.  Quoted 
in  DGFP,  X,  pp.  549-50. 

14.  See  Warlimont’s  two  affidavits, 
NCA,  V,  pp.  740-41  (N.D. 
3031,  2-PS),  and  his  interro- 
gation, ibid.,  Suppl.  B,  p.  1536. 
Jodi’s  directive  of  Sept.  6, 
1940,  is  given  in  NCA,  III,  pp. 
849-50  (N.D.  1229-PS). 

15.  The  directive  of  Nov.  12,  1940, 
NCA,  III,  pp.  403-7.  The  por- 
tion dealing  with  Russia  is  on 
p.  406. 

16.  OKW  War  Diary,  Aug.  28. 
Quoted  in  DGFP,  X,  pp.  566- 
67  n. 

17.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  289. 

18.  NCA,  VI,  p.  873  (N.D.  C-53). 

19.  NSR,  pp.  178-81. 

20.  The  German  memorandum, 
ibid.,  pp.  181-83;  the  Soviet 
memorandum  of  Sept.  21  in 
reply,  ibid.,  pp.  190-94. 

21.  Ibid.,  pp.  188—89. 

22.  Ibid.,  pp.  195-96. 

23.  Ibid.,  pp.  197-99. 

24.  Ibid.,  pp.  201-3. 

25.  Ibid.,  pp.  206-7. 

26.  Ribbentrop’s  letter  to  Stalin, 
Oct.  13,  1940,  ibid.,  pp.  207- 

27.  Text  of  Ribbentrop’s  indignant 
telegram,  ibid.,  p.  214. 

28.  Text  of  Stalin’s  reply,  ibid.,  p. 
216. 

29.  Ibid.,  p.  217. 

30.  Memoranda  of  the  meetings  of 
Molotov  with  Ribbentrop  and 
Hitler  on  Nov.  12-13,  1940, 
ibid.,  pp.  217-54. 

31.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  212. 

32.  Ibid.,  p.  214. 

33.  Dispatch  of  Schulenburg,  Nov. 
26,  1940,  NSR,  pp.  258-59. 

34.  FCNA,  1941,  p.  13;  Haider’s 
diary,  Jan.  16,  1941. 

35.  Haider  diary,  Dec.  5,  1940; 
NCA,  IV,  pp.  374-75  (N.D. 
1799-PS).  The  latter  is  a 
translation  of  part  of  the  War 
Diary  of  the  OKW  Operations 
Staff,  headed  by  Jodi. 

36.  Complete  German  text, 
TMWC,  XXVI,  pp.  47-52; 


and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

short  English  version,  NCA, 
III,  pp.  407-9  (N.D.  446-PS). 

37.  Haider,  Hitler  als  Feldherr,  p. 

22. 

38.  FCNA,  1940,  pp.  135-36  (con- 
ference of  Dec.  27,  1940). 

39.  Ibid.,  pp.  91-97,  104-8  (con- 
ferences of  Sept.  6 and  26, 
1940).  Raeder  signed  both  re- 
ports. 

40.  DGFP,  IX,  pp.  620-21. 

41.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  196.  The 
interpreter  gives  a fairly  com- 
plete account  of  the  conversa- 
tions. The  German  minutes  in 
the  U.S.  State  Department’s 
The  Spanish  Government  and 
the  Axis  are  fragmentary. 
Erich  Kordt,  who  was  also 
present,  gives  a more  detailed 
account  in  his  unpublished 
memorandum,  previously  re- 
ferred to. 

42.  Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers,  p. 
402. 

43.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  197. 

44.  The  text  of  the  Montoire 
Agreement  is  among  the  cap- 
tured German  Foreign  Office 
papers  but  was  not  released  by 
the  State  Department  at  the 
time  of  writing.  However,  Wil- 
liam L.  Langer,  Our  Vichy 
Gamble  (pp.  94-95),  cites  it 
from  the  German  papers  made 
available  to  him  by  the  De- 
partment. 

45.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  300. 

46.  Ribbentrop  on  the  stand  at 
Nuremberg,  and  Schmidt  in 
his  book,  p.  220,  recalled  the 
words. 

47.  Sc  midt,  op.  cit.,  p.  200. 

48.  Haider’s  diary,  Nov.  4,  1940; 
report  of  Jodi  to  Adm.  Schnie- 
wind,  Nov.  4,  FCNA,  1940, 
pp.  112-17;  Directive  No.  18, 
Nov.  12,  1940,  NCA,  III,  pp. 
403-7  (N.D.  444-PS). 

49.  FCNA.  1940,  p.  125. 

50.  Ibid.,  p.  124. 

51.  The  Spanish  Government  and 
the  Axis,  pp.  28-33. 

52.  Raeder’s  report  is  in  FCNA, 
1941,  pp.  8-13;  Haider  did  not 
record  the  two-day  conference 
in  his  dairy  until  Jan.  16,  1941. 

53.  Text  of  Directive  No.  20, 


Note9 


1513 


NCA,  IV.  pp.  101-3  (N.D. 
1541-PS). 

54.  Text  of  Directive  No.  22  and 
supplementary  order  giving 
code  names,  NCA,  III,  pp. 
413-15  (N.D.  448-PS). 

55.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  939—46  (N.D. 
C-134). 

56.  Haider,  Hitler  als  Feldherr, 
pp.  22-24. 

57.  NCA,  III,  pp.  626-33  (N.D. 
872-PS). 

58.  German  figures  given  by  For- 
eign Office,  as  of  Feb.  21, 
1941,  NSR,  p.  275. 

59.  German  minutes  of  confer- 
ence, NCA,  IV,  pp.  272-75 
(N.D.  1746-PS). 

60.  NCA,  I,  p.  783  (N.D.  1450- 
PS). 

61.  A partial  text  of  Directive  No. 
25,  NCA,  VI,  pp.  938-39 
(N.D.  C-127). 

62.  OKW  minutes  of  the  meeting, 
NCA,  IV,  pp.  275-78  (N.D. 
1746-PS,  Part  II). 

63.  Jodi’s  testimony,  TMWC,  XV, 
p.  387.  His  “tentative”  plan  of 
operations,  NCA,  IV,  pp.  278- 
79  (N.D.  1746-PS,  Part  V). 

64.  Text,  letter  of  Hitler  to  Mus- 
solini, March  28,  1941,  NCA, 
IV,  pp.  475-77  (N.D.  1835- 
PS). 

65.  For  details  see  text  of  direc- 
tive, NCA,  III,  pp.  838-39 
(N.D.  1195-PS). 

66.  Churchill,  The  Grand.  Alliance, 
pp.  235-36. 

67.  From  the  Russian  file  of  the 
High  Command  of  the  Ger- 
man Navy;  entries  for  May  30 
and  June  6,  NCA,  VI,  pp. 
998-1000  (N.D.  C-170). 

68.  FCNA,  1941,  pp.  50-52. 

69.  TMWC,  VII,  pp.  255-56. 

70.  NCA,  VI,  p.  996  (N.D.  C- 
170). 

71.  Cited  by  Shulman,  op.  cit.,  p. 
65. 

72.  Top-secret  directive,  April  30, 
1941,  NCA,  III,  pp.  633-34 
(N.D.  873-PS). 

73.  Haider  affidavit,  Nov.  22,  1945, 
at  Nuremberg,  NCA,  VIII,  pp. 
645-46. 

74.  TMWC,  XX,  p.  609. 

75.  Testimony  of  Brauchitsch  at 


Nuremberg,  TMWC,  XX,  pp. 
581—82  593 

76.  Text  of  Keitel’s  order,  July  23, 
1941,  NCA,  VI,  p.  876  (N.D. 
C-52);  July  27  order,  ibid., 
pp.  875-76  (N.D.  C-51). 

77.  Text  of  the  court-martial  di- 
rective, NCA,  III,  pp.  637-39 
(N.D.  886-PS).  A slightly  dif- 
ferent version  found  in  the 
records  of  Army  Group  South 
and  dated  a day  later,  May  14, 
is  given  in  NCA,  VI,  pp.  872- 
75  (N.D.  C-50). 

78.  Text  of  directive,  also  dated 
May  13,  1941,  NCA,  III,  pp. 
409-13  (N.D.  447-PS). 

79.  Text  of  Rosenberg’s  instruc- 
tions, NCA,  III,  pp.  690-93 
(N.D.  1029,  1030-PS). 

80.  Text,  NCA,  III,  pp.  716-17 
(N.D.  1058-PS). 

81.  Text  of  directive,  NCA,  VII, 
p.  300  (N.D.  EC-126). 

82.  Memorandum  of  meeting, 
NCA,  V,  p.  378  (N.D.  2718- 
PS). 

83.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  233. 

84.  Keitel  interrogation,  NCA, 
Suppl.  B,  pp.  1271-73. 

85.  The  Duke  of  Hamilton’s  per- 
sonal report,  NCA,  VIII,  pp. 
38-40  (N.D.  M-116). 

86.  Kirkpatrick’s  reports  on  his 
interviews  with  Hess  on  May 
13,  14,  15,  ibid.,  pp.  40-46 
(N.D.s  M-117,  118,  119). 

87.  Churchill,  The  Grand  Alli- 
ance, p.  54. 

88.  TMWC,  X,  p.  7. 

89.  Ibid.,  p.  74. 

90.  Douglas  M.  Kelley,  22  Cells 
in  Nuremberg,  pp.  23—24. 

91.  NSR,  p.  324. 

92.  Ibid.,  p.  326. 

93.  Ibid.,  p.  325. 

94.  Ibid.,  p.  318. 

95.  Ibid.,  pp.  340-41. 

96.  Ibid.,  pp.  316-18. 

97.  Ibid.,  p.  328. 

98.  Ibid.,  p.  338. 

99.  Schulenburg’s  dispatches,  May 
7,  12,  ibid.,  pp.  335-39. 

100.  Ibid.,  p.  334. 

101.  Ibid.,  pp.  334-35. 

102.  Sumner  Welles,  The  Time  for 
Decision,  pp.  170—71. 


1514  The  Rise 

103.  Churchill,  The  Grand  Alli- 
ance, pp.  356-61. 

104.  NSR,  p.  330. 

105.  NCA,  VI,  p.  997  (N.D.  C~ 

170).  . 

106.  NSR,  p.  344. 

107.  Ibid.,  pp.  345-46. 

108.  Ibid.,  p.  346. 

109.  Text  of,  NCA,  VI,  pp.  852- 
67  (N.D.  C-39). 

110.  The  minutes  of  this  meeting 
never  turned  up,  so  far  as  I 
know,  but  Haider’s  dairy  for 
June  14,  1941,  describes  it, 
and  Keitel  told  about  it  on 
the  stand  at  Nuremberg 
(TMWC,  X,  pp.  531-32). 
The  Naval  War  Diary  also 
mentions  it  briefly. 

111.  NSR,  pp.  355-56. 

112.  Ibid.,  pp.  347—49. 

113.  Schmidt’s  formal  memoran- 
dum of  the  meeting,  ibid.,  pp. 
356-57.  Also  his  book,  pp. 
234-35. 

114.  Hitler  to  Mussolini,  June  21, 
1941,  NSR,  pp.  349-53. 

115.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  369. 
372. 

116.  Ibid.,  p.  372. 

CHAPTER  24 

1.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  905-6  (N.D.  C- 
74).  The  complete  text  in 
German,  TMWC,  XXXI V,  pp. 
298-302. 

2.  Haider  Report  T mimeo- 
graphed, Nuremberg). 

3.  NCA,  VI,  p.  929  (N.D.  C- 
123). 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  931  (N.D.  C-124). 

5.  Article  by  Gen.  Blumentritt  in 
The  Fatal  Decisions,  ed.  by 
Seymour  Freidin  and  William 
Richardson,  p.  57. 

6.  Liddell  Hart,  The  German 
Generals  Talk,  p.  147. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  145. 

8.  Haider  Report. 

9.  Heinz  Guderian,  Panzer 
Leader,  pp.  159-62.  The  page 
references  in  this  and  subse- 
quent chapters  are  to  the  Bal- 
lentine  soft-cover  edition. 

10.  Blumentritt  article,  loc.  cit..  d. 

66. 

11.  Interrogation  of  Rundstedt, 


and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

1945.  Quoted  by  Shulman,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  68-69. 

12.  Guderian,  op.  cit.,  pp.  189-90. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  192. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  194. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  191. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  199. 

17.  Goerlitz,  History  of  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff,  p.  403. 

18.  The  Goebbels  Diaries,  pp.  135— 
36. 

19.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations , 
p.  153. 

20.  Haider,  Hitler  als  Feldherr  p. 

45.  ’ v 

21.  NCA,  IV,  p.  600  (N.D.  1961- 
PS). 

22.  Blumentritt  article,  loc.  cit., 
pp.  78-79. 

23.  Liddell  Hart,  The  German 
Generals  Talk,  p.  158. 

CHAPTER  25 

1.  DGFP,  VIII,  pp.  905-6. 

2.  NCA,  IV,  pp.  469-75  (N.D. 
1834-PS). 

3.  The  text,  NCA,  VI,  pp.  906-8 
(N.D.  C-75). 

4.  Raeder’s  report  on  the  meet- 
ing, FCNA,  1941,  p.  37.  Also 

C 152)'  VI’  PP'  966-67  (N’D’ 

5.  They  are  published,  along  with 
those  of  the  subsequent  talks, 
including  two  with  Hitler,  in 
NSR,  pp.  281-316. 

6.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  224. 

7.  FCNA,  1941,  pp.  47-48. 

8.  N.D.  NG  — 3437,  Document 
Book  VIII  — B,  Weizsaecker 
Case.  Cited  by  H.  L.  Tre- 
fousse,  Germany  and  Ameri- 
can Neutrality,  1939-1941,  p. 
124  and  n. 

9.  Text  of  telegram,  NCA,  VI, 
pp.  564-65  (N.D.  2896-PS). 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  566  (N.D.  2897-PS). 

11.  FCNA,  1941,  p.  104. 

12.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  545-46  (N.D. 
3733-PS). 

13.  Falkenstein  memorandum  of 
Oct.  29,  1940,  NCA,  IH,  p. 
289  (N.D.  376-PS). 

14.  FCNA,  1941,  p.  57. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  94. 

16.  Ibid.,  Annex  I (Raeder’s  re- 


Notes 


1515 


port  to  the  Fuehrer,  Feb.  4, 
1941). 

17.  Ibid.,  p.  32  (March  18,  1941). 

18.  Ibid.,  p.  47  (April  20,  1941). 

19.  Ibid.,  May  22,  1941. 

20.  Ibid.,  pp.  88-90  (June  21, 
1941). 

21.  NCA,  V,  p.  56S  (N.D.  2896- 
PS). 

22.  German  Naval  War  Diary, 
TMWC,  XXXIV,  p.  364  (N.D. 
C— 118).  The  partial  English 
translation  in  NCA,  VI,  p. 
916,  is  quite  misleading. 

23.  FCNA,  Sept.  17,  1941,  pp. 
108-10. 

24.  Ibid.,  Nov.  13,  1941. 

25.  NCA,  Suppl.  B,  p.  1200  (in- 
terrogation of  Ribbentrop  at 
Nuremberg,  Sept.  10,  1945). 

26.  N.D.  NG-4422E,  Document 
Book,  IX,  “Weizsaecker  Case,” 
cited  by  Trefousse,  p.  102. 

27.  Ibid.  Numerous  telegrams  be- 
tween Ribbentrop  and  Ott  in 
May  1941,  and  Ott’s  testimony 
in  the  “Far  Eastern  Trial”  in 
Tokyo,  cited  by  Trefousse.  p. 
103. 

28.  Vice-Minister  Amau  on  Aug. 
29  and  Foreign  Minister  Adm. 
Toyoda  on  Aug.  30.  Japanese 
minutes  of  the  two  meetings 
are  in  NCA,  VI,  pp.  546-51 
(N.D.  3733-PS). 

29.  Hull,  Memoirs,  p.  1034.  The 
texts  of  Toyoda’s  telegrams  to 
Nomura  on  Oct.  16,  1941,  are 
given  in  Pearl  Harbor  Attack, 
Hearings  before  the  Joint 
Committee  on  the  Investiga- 
tion of  the  Pearl  Harbor  At- 
tack, XII,  pp.  71-72. 

30.  Hull,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1062-63. 

31.  Documents  4070  and  4070B, 
Far  Eastern  Trial,  cited  by 
Trefousse,  pp.  140-41. 

32.  Hull,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1056,  1074. 

33.  Intercepted  message  of  Osh- 
ima  to  Tokyo,  Nov.  29,  1941, 
NCA,  VII,  pp.  160-63  (N.D. 
D-656). 

34.  Pearl  Harbor  Attack,  XII,  p. 
204.  The  intercepted  Tokyo 
telegram  is  also  given  in 
NCA,  VI,  pp.  308-10  (N.D. 
3598-PS). 


35.  NCA,  V,  pp.  556-57  (N.D. 
2898-PS). 

36.  NCA,  VI,  p.  309  (N.D:  3598- 
PS). 

37.  Text  of  telegram,  ibid.,  pp. 
312-13  (N.D.  3600-PS). 

38.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  236-37. 

39.  TMWC,  X,  p.  297. 

40.  Intercepted  message  of  Osh- 
ima  to  Tokyo,  Dec.  8,  1941, 
NCA,  VII,  p.  163  (N.D.  D- 
167). 

41.  N.D.  NG-4424,  Dec.  9,  1941, 
Document  Book  IX,  Weiz- 
saecker Case. 

42.  I have  combined  here  Ribben- 
trop’s  testimony  in  direct  ex- 
amination on  the  stand  at 
Nuremberg — TMWC,  X,  pp. 
297-98  — - and  his  statements 
during  his  pretrial  interroga- 
tion which  are  contained  in 
NCA,  Suppl.  B,  pp.  1199- 
1200. 

43.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
p.  396. 

44.  NCA,  V,  p.  603  (N.D.  2932- 
PS). 

45.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  p.  237. 

46.  A partial  translation  of  Hit- 
ler’s speech  is  published  in 
Gordon  W.  Prange  (ed. ),  Hit- 
ler’s Words,  pp.  97,  367-77. 

47.  English  translation  in  NCA, 
VIII,  pp.  432-33  (N.D.  TC- 
62). 

48.  FCNA,  1941,  pp.  128-30  (De- 
cember 12). 

CHAPTER  26 

1.  TMWC,  XX,  p.  625. 

2.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  p.  208. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  209. 

4.  Schlabrendorff,  op.  cit.,  p.  36. 

5.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  p.  243. 

6.  The  text  of  the  first  draft 
drawn  up  in  January-February 
1940,  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  368— 
72;  text  of  the  second  draft, 
composed  at  the  end  of  1941, 
Wheeler-Bennett,  Nemesis,  Ap- 

Sendix  A,  pp.  705-15. 
lassell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  247-48. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  247. 

9.  The  German  Campaign  in 
Russia — Planning  and  Opera- 
tions, 1940-42  (Washington: 


1516 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Department  of  the  Army, 
1955),  p.  120.  This  study  is 
based  largely  on  captured  Ger- 
man Army  records  and  mono- 
graphs prepared  by  German 
generals  for  the  Historical  Di- 
vision of  the  U.S.  Army  which, 
at  the  time  of  writing,  were 
not  generally  available  to  ci- 
vilian historians.  However,  I 
must  point  out  that  in  the 
preparation  of  this  and  subse- 
quent chapters  the  Office  of 
the  Chief  of  Military  History, 
Department  of  the  Army,  was 
most  helpful  in  giving  access 
to  German  documentary  ma- 
terial. 

10.  TMWC,  VII,  p.  260  (Paulus’ 
testimony  at  Nuremberg).  Hit- 
ler’s remark  was  made  on 
June  1,  1942,  nearly  a month 
before  the  offensive  began. 

11.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  op.  cit., 
pp.  442-43. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  478-79. 

13.  Ibid.,  pp.  403-4. 

14.  FCNA,  1942,  p.  47  (confer- 
ence at  the  Berghof,  June  15). 
Also  p.  42. 

15.  Haider,  Hitler  als  Feldherr, 
pp.  50-51. 

16.  FCNA,  1942,  p.  53  (confer- 
ence of  Aug.  16  at  Hitler’s 
headquarters). 

17.  Haider,  op.  cit.,  p.  50. 

18.  Ibid.,  p.  52. 

19.  The  quotations  from  Hitler 
and  Haider  are  from  the  lat- 
ter’s diary  and  book,  and  from 
Heinz  Schroeter,  Stalingrad,  p. 
53. 

20.  Quoted  by  Gen.  Bayerlein 
from  Rommel’s  papers,  The 
Fatal  Decisions,  ed.  by  Frei- 
din  and  Richardson,  p.  110. 

21.  Bayerlein  quotes  the  order. 
Ibid.,  p.  120. 

22.  The  source  for  this  and  for 
much  else  in  this  chapter 
about  Hitler’s  OKW  confer- 
ences is  the  so-called  OKW 
Diary,  which  was  kept  until 
the  spring  of  1943,  by  Dr.  Hel- 
muth  Greiner,  and  thereafter 
until  the  end  of  the  war  by 
Dr.  Percy  Ernst  Schramm. 
The  original  diary  was  de- 


stroyed at  the  beginning  of 
May  1945  on  the  order  of 
General  Winter,  deputy  to 
Jodi.  After  the  war  Greiner 
reconstructed  the  part  he  had 
kept  from  his  original  notes 
and  drafts  and  eventually 
turned  it  over  to  the  Military 
History  Branch  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Army  in  Washing- 
ton. Part  of  the  material  is 
published  in  Greiner’s  book, 
Die  Oberste  Wehrmachtfueh- 
rung,  1939-1943. 

23.  Proces  du  M.  Petain  (Paris, 
1945),  p.  202 — Laval’s  testi- 
mony. 

24.  The  Ciano  Diaries,  pp.  541-42. 
Gen.  Zeitzler’s  essay  on  Stalin- 
grad in  Freidin  (ed.),  The 
Fatal  Decisions,  from  which  I 
have  drawn  for  this  section. 
Other  sources:  OKW  War 
Diary  (see  note  22  above), 
Haider’s  book,  and  Heinz 
Schroeter,  Stalingrad.  Schroe- 
ter, a German  war  correspond- 
ent with  the  Sixth  Army,  had 
access  to  OKW  records,  radio 
and  teleprinter  messages  of 
the  various  army  commands, 
operational  orders,  marked 
maps  and  the  private  papers 
of  many  who  were  at  Stalin- 
grad. He  got  out  before  the 
surrender  and  was  assigned  to 
write  the  official  story  of  the 
Sixth  Army  at  Stalingrad, 
based  on  the  documents  then 
in  the  possession  of  OKW.  Dr. 
Goebbels  forbade  its  publica- 
tion. After  the  war  Schroeter 
rescued  his  manuscript  and 
continued  his  studies  of  the 
battle  before  rewriting  his 
book. 

The  Ciano  Diaries,  p.  556. 
Mussolini’s  proposals  are 
given  on  pp.  555-56  and  con- 
firmed from  the  German  side 
in  the  OKW  War  Diary  of 
December  19. 

Felix  Gilbert,  Hitler  Directs 
His  War,  pp.  17—22.  This  is  a 
compilation  of  the  steno- 
graphic record  of  Hitler’s  mili- 
tary conferences  at  OKW.  Un- 
fortunately only  a fragment  of 


Notes 


1517 


the  records  were  recovered. 

28.  Goerlitz.  History  of  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff,  p.  431. 

CHAPTER  27 

1.  NCA,  IV,  p.  559  (N.D.  1919- 
PS). 

2.  Ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  618-19  (N.D. 
862-PS),  report  of  Gen.  Gott- 
hard  Heinrici,  Deputy  Gen- 
eral of  the  Wehrmacht  in  the 
Protectorate. 

3.  Bormann’s  memorandum. 
Quoted  in  TMWC,  VII,  pp. 
224-26  (N.D.  USSR  172). 

4.  NCA,  III,  pp.  798-99  (N.D. 
1130-PS). 

5.  Ibid.,  VIII,  p.  53  (N.D.  R-36). 

6.  Dr.  Brautigam’s  memorandum 
of  Oct.  25,  1942.  Text  in  NCA, 
III,  pp.  242-51;  German  orig- 
inal in  TMWC,  XXV,  pp. 
331-42  (N.D.  294-PS). 

7.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  1086-93  (N.D. 
L-221 ). 

8.  TMWC,  IX,  p.  633. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  634. 

10.  TMWC,  VIII,  p.  9. 

11.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  420-21  (N.D.S 
EC-344—16  and  -17). 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  469  (N.D.  ECM11). 

13.  Ibid.,  VIII,  pp.  66-67  (N.D. 
R-92). 

14.  Ibid.,  Ill,  p.  850  (N.D.  1233- 
PS). 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  186  (N.D.  138-PS). 

16.  Ibid.,  pp.  188-89  (N.D.  MI- 
PS). 

17.  Ibid.,  V,  pp.  258-62  (N.D. 
2523-PS). 

18.  Ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  666-70  (N.D. 
1015-B-PS). 

19.  Ibid.,  I,  p.  1105  (N.D.  090- 
PS). 

20.  NCA,  VI,  p.  456  (N.D.  1720- 
PS). 

21.  Ibid.,  VIII,  p.  186  (N.D.  R- 
124). 

22.  Ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  71-73  (N.D. 
031-PS). 

23.  Ibid.,  IV,  p.  80  (N.D.  1526- 
PS). 

24.  Ibid.,  Ill,  p.  57  (N.D.  016- 
PS). 

25.  Ibid.,  Ill,  p.  144  (N.D.  084- 
PS). 


26.  Ibid.,  VII,  pp.  2-7  (N.D.  D- 
288). 

27.  Ibid.,  V,  pp.  744-54  (N.D. 
3040— PS). 

28.  Ibid.,  VII,  pp.  260-64  (N.D. 
EC-68). 

29.  Ibid.,  V,  p.  765  (N.D.  3044- 
B-PS). 

30.  Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations, 
p.  501. 

31.  Based  on  an  exhaustive  study 
from  the  German  records 
made  by  Alexander  Dallin, 
German  Rule  in  Russia,  pp. 
426-27.  He  used  figures  com- 
piled by  OKW-AWA  in  Nach- 
weisungen  des  Verbleibs  der 
sowjetischen  Kr.  Gef.  nach 
den  Stand  vom  1.5.1944.  AWA 
are  the  initials  for  the  Gen- 
eral Armed  Forces  Depart- 
ment of  OKW  (All  gemeines 
W ehrmachtsamt) . 

32.  NCA,  III,  pp.  126-30  (N.D. 
081-PS). 

33.  Ibid.,  V,  p.  343  (N.D.  2622- 
PS). 

34.  Ibid.,  Ill,  p.  823  (N.D.  1165- 
PS). 

35.  Ibid.,  IV,  p.  558  (N.D.  1919— 
PS). 

36.  TMWC,  XXXIX,  pp.  48-49. 

37.  Ibid.,  VI,  pp.  185-86. 

38.  NCA,  III,  pp.  416-17  (N.D. 
498-PS ) . 

39.  Ibid.,  pp.  426-30  (N.D.  503- 
PS). 

40.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  798-99  (N.D. 
L-51 ). 

41.  TMWC,  VII,  p.  47. 

42.  NCA,  VII,  pp.  873-74  (N.D. 
L-90). 

43.  Ibid.,  pp.  871-72  (N.D.  L-90). 

44.  Harris,  Tyranny  on  Trial,  pp. 
349-50. 

45.  Ohlendorf’s  testimony  on  the 
stand  at  Nuremberg,  TMWC, 
IV,  pp.  311-23;  his  affidavit, 
based  on  Harris’  interrogation, 
NCA,  V,  pp.  . 341-42  (N.D. 
2620-PS).  Dr.  Becker’s  let- 
ter, ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  418-19  (N.D. 
501-PS). 

46.  NCA,  VIII,  p.  103  (N.D.  R- 

102). 

47.  Ibid.,  V,  pp.  696-99  (N.D. 
2992-PS). 


and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


1518  The  Rise 

48.  Ibid.,  IV,  pp.  944-49  (N.D. 
2273-PS). 

49.  Case  IX  of  the  Trials  of  War 
Criminals  [ TWC ] (N.D.  NO- 
511).  This  was  the  so-called 
“Einsatzgruppen  Case,”  enti- 
tled "United  States  v.  Otto 
Ohlendorf,  et  al.” 

50.  Ibid.  (N.D.  NO-2653). 

51.  Cited  by  Reitlinger  in  The 
Final  Solution,  pp.  499-500. 
Reitlinger’s  studies  in  this  book 
and  in  his  The  S.S.  are  the 
most  exhaustive  on  the  sub- 
ject that  I have  seen. 

52.  NCA,  III,  pp.  525-26  (N.D. 
710-PS).  The  English  transla- 
tion here  of  the  last  line  misses 
the  whole  point.  The  German 
word  Endloesung  (“final  solu- 
tion”) is  rendered  as  “desir- 
able solution.”  See  the  Ger- 
man transcript. 

53.  TMWC,  XI,  p.  141. 

54.  TWC,  XIII,  pp.  210-19  (N.D. 
NG-2586-G). 

55.  NCA,  IV,  p.  563  (N.D.  1919- 
PS). 

56.  Ibid.,  VI,  p.  791  (N.D.  3870- 
PS). 

57.  Ibid.,  IV,  pp.  812,  832-35 
(N.D.  2171-PS). 

58.  Hoess  affidavit,  NCA,  VI,  pp. 
787-90  (N.D.  3868-PS). 

59.  N.D.  USSR-8,  p.  197.  Tran- 
. script. 

60.  TMWC,  VII,  p.  584. 

61.  Ibid.  p.  585. 

62.  Ibid.,  p.  585  (N.D.  USSR 
225).  Transcript. 

63.  Law  Reports  of  Trials  of  War 
Criminals,  I,  p.  28.  London, 
1946.  This  is  a summary  of 
the  twelve  secondary  Nurem- 
berg trials,  covered  in  the 
TWC  volumes. 

64.  The  above  section  on  Ausch- 
witz is  based  on,  aside  from 
the  sources  quoted,  the  testi- 
mony at  Nuremberg  of  Mme. 
Vaillant-Couturier,  a French- 
woman who  was  confined 
there,  TMWC,  VI,  pp.  203- 
40;  Case  IV,  the  so-called 
“Concentration  Camp  Case,” 
entitled  “United  States  v.  Pohl, 
et  al.,”  in  the  TWC  volumes; 
The  Belsen  Trial,  London, 


1949;  G.  M.  Gilbert,  Nurem- 
berg Diary,  op.  cit.;  Filip 
Friedman,  This  was  Oswiecim 
[Auschwitz];  and  the  brilliant 
survey  of  Reitlinger  in  The 
Final  Solution  and  The  SS. 

65.  NCA,  VIII,  p.  208  (N.D.  R- 
135). 

66.  NCA,  Suppl.  A,  pp.  675-82 

(N.D.s  3945-PS,  3948-PS, 

3951-PS). 

67.  Ibid.,  p.  682  (N.D.  3951-PS). 

68.  Ibid.,  pp.  805-7  (N.D.  4045- 
PS). 

69.  The  text,  ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  719- 
75  (N.D.  1061-PS). 

70.  TMWC,  IV,  p.  371. 

71.  Reitlinger,  The  Final  Solu- 
tion, pp  489-501.  The  author 
analyzes  the  Jewish  extermi- 
nations country  by  country. 

72.  TMWC,  XX,  p.  548. 

73.  Ibid.,  p.  519. 

74.  Examination  of  Josef  Kramer, 
Case  I of  the  Trials  of  the 
War  Criminals — the  so-called 
“Doctors’  Trial,”  entitled 
"United  States  v.  Brandt,  et 
al.” 

75.  Sievers’  testimony,  TMWC, 
XX,  pp.  521-25. 

76.  Ibid.,  p.  526. 

77.  The  testimony  of  Henry  Hery- 
pierre  is  in  the  transcript  of 
the  “Doctors’  Trial.” 

78.  NCA,  VI,  pp.  122-23  (N.D. 
3249-PS). 

79.  Ibid.,  V,  p.  952  (N.D.  3249- 
PS). 

80.  Ibid.,  IV,  p.  132  (N.D.  1602- 
PS). 

81.  Report  of  Dr.  Rascher  to 
Himmler,  April  5,  1942,  in 
the  transcript  of  the  “Doc- 
tors’ Trial,”  Case  I,  “United 
States  v.  Brandt,  et  al.”  Dr. 
Karl  Brandt  was  Hitler’s  per- 
sonal physician  and  Reich 
Commissioner  for  Health.  He 
was  found  guilty  at  the  trial, 
sentenced  to  death  and 
hanged. 

82.  NCA,  Suppl.  A,  pp.  416-17 
(N.D.  2428-PS). 

83.  Letter  of  Prof.  Dr.  Hippke  to 
Himmler,  Oct.  10,  1942,  in 
transcript.  Case  I. 


Notes 


1519 


84.  NCA,  IV,  pp.  135-36  (N.D. 
1618-PS). 

85.  Testimony  of  Walter  Neff, 
transcript,  Case  I. 

86.  Letter  of  Dr.  Rascher  to 
Himmler,  April  4,  1943,  tran- 
script, Case  I. 

87.  Testimony  of  Walter  Neff, 
ibid. 

88.  Himmler’s  letter  and  Rasch- 
er's  protest,  ibid. 

89.  1616-PS,  in  transcript  of 
Case  I.  The  document  is  not 
printed  in  TMWC , and  the 
English  translation  in  NCA  is 
too  brief  to  be  of  any  help. 

90.  Alexander  Mitscherlich,  M.D., 
and  Fred  Mielke,  Doctors  of 
Infamy,  pp.  146-70.  This  is 
an  excellent  summary  of  the 
“Doctors’  Trial”  by  two  Ger- 
mans. Dr.  Mitscherlich  was 
head  of  the  German  Medical 
Commission  at  the  trial. 

91.  Wiener  Library  Bulletin,  1951, 
V,  pp.  1-2.  Quoted  by  Reit- 
linger  in  The  S.S.,  p.  216. 

CHAPTER  28 

1.  The  Goebbels  Diaries,  p.  352. 

2.  FCNA,  1943,  p.  61. 

3.  The  Italian  minutes  of  the 
Feltre  meeting  are  in  Hitler  e 
Mussolini,  pp.  165-90;  also 
in  Department  of  State  Bulle- 
tin, Oct.  6,  1946,  pp.  607-14, 
639;  Dr.  Schmidt’s  descrip- 
tion of  the  meeting  is  in  his 
book,  op.  cit.,  p.  263. 

4.  The  chief  sources  are  the 
stenographic  records  of  Hit- 
ler’s conferences  with  his 
aides  at  his  headquarters  in 
East  Prussia  on  July  25  and 
26,  published  in  Felix  Gil- 
bert, Hitler  Directs  His  War, 
pp.  39-71;  also  The  Goebbels 
Diaries,  entries  for  July  1943, 
pp.  403-21;  and  the  Fuehrer 
Conferences  on  Naval  Affairs 
[FCNA],  entries  for  July  and 
August  1943,  made  by  Adm. 
Doenitz,  the  new  commander 
of  the  German  Navy. 

5.  The  Memoirs  of  Field  Mar- 
shal Kesselring  (London, 
1953),  pp.  177,  184.  I have 


used  this  British  edition  of 
Kesselring’s  memoirs;  they 
have  been  published  in  Amer- 
ica under  the  title  A Soldier’s 
Record. 

6.  See  Kesselring,  op.  cit.,  and 
Gen.  Siegfried  Westphal,  The 
German  Army  in  the  West, 
pp.  149-52. 

7.  Firsthand  accounts  of  Mus- 
solini’s rescue  are  given  in 
Otto  Skorzeny,  Skorzeny’s  Se- 
cret Missions,  by  the  Duce 
himself  in  his  Memoirs,  1942- 
43,  and  by  the  Italian  man- 
ager and  manageress  of  the 
Hotel  Campo  Imperatore  in 
a special  article  included  in 
the  British  edition  of  the 
Memoirs. 

8.  Hitler  quotation  from  FCNA, 
1943,  p.  46;  the  item  from 
Doenitz’  diary  is  quoted  by 
Wilmot,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 

9.  Haider,  Hitler  als  Feldherr, 
p.  57. 

10.  I have  quoted  the  lecture  at 
length  in  End  of  a Berlin 
Diary,  pp.  270-86.  The  text 
(in  English)  is  in  NCA,  VII, 
pp.  920-75. 

11.  The  above  excerpts  from 
Goebbels’  diary  are  from  The 
Goebbels  Diaries,  pp.  428—42, 
468,  477-78.  Hitler’s  talk  with 
Doenitz  in  August  1943  was 
noted  by  the  Admiral  in 
FCNA,  1943,  pp.  85-86. 

CHAPTER  29 

1.  Dorothy  Thompson,  Listen, 
Hans,  pp.  137-38,  283. 

2.  Hassell,  op.  cit.,  p.  283. 

3.  Zwischen  Hitler  und  Stalin. 
Ribbentrop’s  testimony, 
TMWC,  X,  p.  299. 

4.  George  Bell,  The  Church  and 
Humanity,  pp.  165-76.  Also 
Wheeler  - Bennett,  Nemesis, 
553-57. 

5.  Allen  Dulles,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
125-46.  Dulles  gives  the  text 
of  a memorandum  written  for 
him  by  Jakob  Wallenberg  on 
his  meetings  with  Goerdeler. 

6.  The  account  of  this  whole 
episode  is  based  largely  on 


1520 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  report  of  Schlabrendorff, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  51-61. 

7.  To  Rudolf  Pechel,  who  quotes 
him  at  length  in  his  book, 
Deutscher  Widerstand. 

8.  There  are  a number  of  ac- 
counts, some  of  them  first- 
hand, of  the  students’  revolt: 
Inge  Scholl,  Die  weisse  Rose 
(Frankfurt,  1952);  Karl  Voss- 
ler,  Gedenkrede  fuer  die  Op- 
fer  an  der  Universitaet  Muen- 
chen  (Munich,  1947);  Ri- 
carda  Huch,  “Die  Aktion  der 
Muenchner  Studenten  gegen 
Hitler.”  Neue  Schweizer  Rund- 
schau, Zurich,  September- 
October  1948;  “Der  18  Feb- 
ruar:  Umriss  einer  deutschen 
Widerstandsbewegung,”  D i e 
Gegenwart,  October  30,  1940; 
Pechel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  96-104; 
Wheeler-Bennett,  Nemesis,  pp. 
539-41;  Dulles,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
120-22. 

9.  Dulles,  op.  cit.,  pp.  144-45. 

10.  Quoted  by  Constantine  Fitz- 
Gibbon  in  20  July,  p.  39. 

11.  Desmond  Young,  Rommel, 
pp.  223-24.  Stroelin  gave 
Young  a personal  account  of 
the  meeting.  See  also  Stroe- 
lin’s  Nuremberg  testimony, 
TMWC,  X,  p.  56,  and  his 
book,  Stuttgart  in  Endsta- 
dium  des  Krieges. 

12.  Speidel  emphasizes  the  point 
in  his  book  Invasion  1944, 
pp.  68,  73. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  65. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  71. 

15.  Ibid.,  pp.  72-74. 

16.  Dulles,  op.  cit.,  p.  139. 

17.  Schlabrendorff,  op.  cit.,  p.  97. 

18.  The  telephone  log  of  the  Sev- 
enth Army  headquarters.  This 
revealing  document  was  cap- 
tured intact  in  August  1944 
and  provides  an  invaluable 
source  for  the  German  ver- 
sion of  what  happened  to 
Hitler’s  armies  on  D Day  and 
during  the  subsequent  Battle 
of  Normandy. 

19.  Speidel,  op.  cit.,  p.  93. 

20.  Ibid.  pp.  93-94,  on  which 
this  account  is  largely  based. 
Gen.  Blumentritt,  Rundstedt’s 


chief  of  staff,  has  also  left 
an  account,  and  there  is  addi- 
tional material  in  The  Rom- 
mel Papers,  ed.  by  Liddell 
Hart,  p.  479. 

21.  The  text  of  the  letter  is  given 
in  Speidel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  115- 
17.  A slightly  different  ver- 
sion is  in  The  Rommel  Pa- 
pers, pp.  486-87. 

22.  Speidel,  op.  cit.,  p.  117. 

23.  Ibid.,  pp.  104-17. 

24.  Ibid.,  p.  119. 

25.  Schlabrendorff,  op.  cit.,  p. 
103.  He  was  still  attached  to 
Tresckow’s  staff. 

26.  The  sources  for  these  meet- 
ings of  the  conspirators  on 
July  16  are  the  stenographic 
account  of  the  trial  of  Witzle- 
ben,  Hoepner  et  air,  Kalten- 
brunner’s  reports  on  the  July 
20  uprising;  Eberhard  Zeller, 
Geist  der  Freiheit,  pp.  213-14; 
Gerhard  Ritter,  Carl  Goerde- 
ler  und  die  deutsche  Wider- 
standsbewegung, pp.  401-3. 

27.  Heusinger,  Befehl  im  Wider- 
streit,  p.  352,  tells  of  his  last 
words  that  day. 

28.  Zeller,  op.  cit.,  p.  221. 

29.  Schmidt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  275-77. 

30.  A number  of  guests  at  the 
tea  party,  Italian  and  Ger- 
man, have  given  eyewitness  ac- 
counts of  it.  Eugen  Doll- 
mann,  an  S.S.  liaison  officer 
with  Mussolini,  has  rendered 
the  fullest  description  both  in 
his  book,  Roma  Nazista,  pp. 
393-400,  and  in  his  interro- 
gation by  Allied  investigators, 
which  is  summed  up  by 
Dulles,  op.  cit.,  pp.  9-11. 
Zeller,  op.  cit.,  p.  367,  n.69, 
and  Wheeler-Bennett,  Neme- 
sis, pp.  644-46,  have  written 
graphic  accounts,  based 
mostly  on  Dollmann. 

31.  The  transcript  of  this  tele- 
phone conversation  was  put 
in  evidence  before  the  Peo- 
ple’s Court.  Schlabrendorff, 
op.  cit.,  quotes  it  on  p.  113. 

32.  Zeller,  op.  cit.,  p.  363n.,  cites 
two  eyewitnesses  to  the  exe- 
cutions, an  Army  chauffeur 
who  observed  them  from  a 


Notes 


1521 


nearby  window,  and  a woman 
secretary  of  Fromm. 

33.  This  account  of  what  went 
on  in  the  Bendlerstrasse  that 
evening  is  taken  largely  from 
General  Hoepner’s  frank 
testimony  before  the  People’s 
Court  during  his  trial  and 
that  of  Witzleben  and  six 
other  officers  on  Aug.  6-7, 
1944.  The  records  of  the  Peo- 
ple’s Court  were  destroyed  in 
an  American  bombing  on 
Feb.  3,  1945,  but  one  of  the 
stenographers  at  this  trial— 
at  the  risk  of  his  life,  he  says 
— purloined  the  shorthand 
records  before  the  bombing 
and  after  the  war  turned 
them  over  to  the  Nuremberg 
tribunal.  They  are  published 
verbatim  in  German  in 
TMWC,  XXXIII,  pp.  299- 
530. 

There  is  a great  deal  of 
material  on  the  July  20  plot, 
much  of  it  conflicting  and 
some  quite  confusing.  The 
best  reconstruction  of  it  is 
by  Zeller,  op.  cit.,  who  gives 
a lengthy  list  of  his  sources 
on  pp.  381—88.  Gerhard  Rit- 
ter’s book  on  Goerdeler,  op. 
cit.,  is  an  invaluable  contri- 
bution, though  it  naturally 
concentrates  on  its  subject. 
Wheeler  - Bennett’s  Nemesis 
gives  the  best  account  avail- 
able in  English  and  uses,  as 
does  Zeller,  Otto  John’s  un- 
published memorandum.  John, 
who  after  the  war  got  into 
difficulties  with  the  Bonn  gov- 
ernment and  was  imprisoned 
by  it,  was  present  at  the  Ben- 
dlerstrasse that  day  and  re- 
corded a great  deal  of  what 
he  saw  and  what  Stauffenberg 
told  him.  Constantine  Fitz- 
Gibbon,  op.  cit.,  gives  a lively 
account,  based  mostly  on 
German  sources,  especially 
Zeller. 

Also  invaluable,  though 
they  must  be  read  with  cau- 
tion, are  the  daily  reports  on 
the  investigation  of  the  plot 
carried  oup  by  the  S.D.- 


Gestapo,  which  date  from 
July  21  to  Dec.  15,  1944. 
They  were  signed  by  Kalten- 
brunner  and  sent  to  Hitler, 
being  drawn  up  in  extra-large 
type  so  that  the  Fuehrer  could 
read  them  without  his  spec- 
tacles. They  represent  the 
labors  of  the  “Special  Com- 
mission for  July  20,  1944,” 
which  numbered  some  400 
S.D.-Gestapo  officials  divided 
into  eleven  investigation 
groups.  The  Kaltenbrunner 
reports  are  among  the  cap- 
tured documents.  Microfilm 
copies  are  available  at  the 
National  Archives  in  Wash- 
ington— No.  T-84,  Serial  No. 
39,  Rolls  19-21.  See  also  Se- 
rial No.  40,  Roll  22. 


present. 

35.  The  account  of  the  execu- 
tions was  later  related  by  the 
prison  warder,  Hans  Hoff- 
mann, a second  warden  and 
the  photographer,  and  is 
given  in  Wheeler  - Bennett, 
Nemesis,  pp.  683-84,  among 
others. 

36.  Wilfred  von  Oven,  Mit  Goeb- 
bels  bis  zum  Ende,  II,  p.  118. 

37.  Ritter,  op.  cit.,  pp.  419-29, 
gives  the  details  of  this  in- 
teresting sidelight. 

38.  This  figure  is  given  in  a 
commentary  in  the  records 
of  the  Fuehrer’s  conferences 
on  naval  affairs  ( FCNA , 
1944,  p.  46)  and  is  accepted  by 
Zeller,  op.  cit.,  p.  283.  Pechel, 
op.  cit.,  who  found  the  offi- 
cial “Execution  Register,” 
says,  p.  327,  there  were  3,427 
executions  recorded  in  1944, 
though  a few  of  these  prob- 
ably were  not  connected  with 
the  July  20  plot. 

39.  Schlabrendortf,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
119-20.  I have  altered  the 
English  text  here  given  to 
make  it  conform  more  to  the 
original  German. 

40.  Gen.  Blumentritt  gave  this 
account  to  Liddell  Hart  ( The 


r 


1522 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


German  Generals  Talk,  pp. 
217-23). 

41.  Ibid.,  p.  222.  There  is  consid- 
erable source  material  on  the 
Paris  end  of  the  plot,  includ- 
ing the  account  given  by 
Speidel  in  his  book  and  nu- 
merous articles  in  German 
magazines  by  eyewitnesses. 
The  best  over-all  account  has 
been  rendered  by  Wilhelm  von 
Schramm,  an  Army  archivest 
stationed  in  the  West:  Der  20 
Juli  in  Paris. 

42.  Felix  Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  p.  101. 

43.  Speidel,  op.  cit.,  p.  152.  My 
account  of  the  death  of  Rom- 
mel is  based  on,  besides 
Speidel,  who  questioned  Frau 
Rommel  and  other  witnesses, 
the  following  sources:  two  re- 
ports written  by  the  Field 
Marshal’s  son,  Manfred,  the 
first  for  British  intelligence, 
quoted  by  Shulman,  op.  cit., 
pp.  138-39,  the  second  for 
The  Rommel  Papers,  ed.  by 
Liddell  Hart,  pp.  495-505; 
and  Gen.  Keitel’s  interroga- 
tion by  Col.  John  H.  Amen 
on  Sept.  28,  1945,  at  Nurem- 
berg (NCA,  Suppl.  B,  pp. 
1256-71).  Desmond  Young, 
op.  cit.,  has  also  given  a full 
account,  based  on  talks  with 
the  Rommel  family  and 
friends  and  on  Gen.  Maisel’s 
denazification  trial  after  the 
war. 

44.  TMWC,  XXI,  p.  47. 

45.  Speidel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  155,  172. 

46.  Goerlitz,  History  of  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff,  p.  477. 

47.  Guderian,  op.  cit.,  p.  273. 

48.  Ibid.  p.  276. 

49.  Liddell  Hart,  The  German 
Generals  Talk,  pp.  222-23. 

CHAPTER  30 

1.  Speidel,  op.  cit.,  p.  147. 

2.  British  War  Office  interroga- 
tion, cited  by  Shulman,  op. 
cit.,  p.  206. 

3.  Fuehrer  conference,  Aug.  31, 
1944.  Felix  Gilbert,  op.  cit., 

p.  106. 


4.  Fuehrer  conference,  March 
13,  1943. 

5.  United  States  Strategic  Bomb- 
ing Survey,  Economic  Report, 
Appendix,  Table  15. 

6.  From  U.S.  First  Army  G-2 
reports,  quoted  by  Shulman, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  215-19. 

7.  Eisenhower,  Crusade  in  Eu- 
rope, p.  312. 

8.  Rundstedt  to  Liddell  Hart, 
The  German  Generals  Talk, 
p.  229. 

9.  Guderian,  op.  cit.,  pp.  305-6. 
310. 

10.  Manteuffel,  in  Freidin  and 
Richardson  (eds.),  op.  cit.,  p. 
266. 

11.  Fuehrer  conference,  Dec.  12. 

1944. 

12.  Guderian,  op.  cit.,  p.  315. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  334. 

14.  Albert  Speer  to  Hitler,  Jan. 
30,  1945,  TMWC,  XLI. 

15.  Guderian,  op.  cit.,  p.  336. 

16.  Fuehrer  conference,  Jan.  27, 

1945.  This  is  included  in  Felix 
Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  pp.  111-32. 
I have  slightly  altered  the 
sequence  of  the  text. 

17.  Fuehrer  conference,  undated, 
but  probably  on  Feb.  19, 
1945,  since  Adm.  Doenitz 
notes  the  discussion  in  his 
record  of  that  date.  See 
FCNA,  1945,  p.  49.  Gilbert, 
op.  cit.,  gives  the  Hitler  quo- 
tation, p.  179. 

18.  FCNA,  1945,  pp.  50-51. 

19.  Fuehrer  conference,  March 
23,  1945.  This  is  the  last 
transcript  preserved.  Gilbert, 
op.  cit.,  gives  it  in  full,  pp. 
141-74. 

20.  Testimony  of  Albert  Speer  at 
Nuremberg,  TMWC,  XVI  p. 
492. 

21.  Guderian,  op.  cit.,  pp.  341. 
43. 

22.  Text  of  Hitler’s  order,  FCNA, 
1945,  p.  90. 

23.  Speer,  TMWC,  XVI,  pp.  497- 
98.  This  section,  including  the 
quotations  from  Hitler  and 
Speer,  is  taken  from  the  lat- 
ter’s testimony  on  the  stand 
at  Nuremberg  on  June  20, 


Notes 


1523 


1946,  the  text  of  which  is 
given  in  TMWC,  XVI;  and 
from  the  documents  which 
he  presented  in  his  defense, 
which  are  given  in  Vol.  XLI. 

24.  SHAEF  intelligence  summary, 
March  11,  1945.  Quoted  by 
Wilmot,  op.  cit.,  p.  690. 

CHAPTER  31 

1.  Count  Lutz  Schwerin  von 
Krosigk’s  unpublished  diary. 

I have  given  the  essential  ex- 
tracts in  End  of  a Berlin 

Diary,  pp.  190—205. 

Trevor-Roper,  in  The  Last 
Days  of  Hitler,  also  quotes 

from  it.  Trevor-Roper,  the 

historian,  who  was  a British 
intelligence  officer  during  the 
war,  was  assigned  the  task  of 
investigating  the  circumstances 
of  Hitler’s  end.  The  results 

are  given  in  his  brilliant  book, 
to  which  all  who  attempt  to 
write  this  final  chapter  of  the 
Third  Reich  are  indebted.  I 
have  availed  myself  of  a num- 
ber of  other  sources,  especially 
the  firsthand  accounts  of  eye- 
witnesses such  as  Speer,  Keitel, 
Jodi,  Gen.  Karl  Koller,  Doen- 
itz,  Krosigk,  Hanna  Reitsch, 
Capt.  Gerhardt  Boldt  and 
Capt.  Joachim  Schultz,  as  well 
as  one  of  Hitler’s  women  sec- 
retaries and  his  chauffeur. 

2.  Gerhardt  Boldt,  In  the  Shelter 
with  Hitler,  Ch.  1.  Capt.  Boldt 
was  A.D.C.  to  Guderian  and 
then  to  Gen.  Krebs,  the  last 
Chief  of  the  Army  General 
Staff,  and  spent  the  final  days 
in  the  bunker. 

3.  Albert  Zoller,  Hitler  Privat, 
pp.  203-5.  According  to  the 
French  edition  (Douze  Ans 
aupres  d’ Hitler).  Zoller  was  a 
captain  in  the  French  Army  at- 
tached as  interrogation  officer 
to  the  U.S.  Seventh  Army  and 
in  this  capacity  questioned  one 
of  Hitler’s  four  women  sec- 
retaries; later,  in  1947,  he  col- 
laborated with  her  in  the  writ- 
ing of  this  book  of  recollec- 


tions of  the  Fuehrer.  She  is 
probably  Christa  Schroeder, 
who  served  Hitler  as  stenog- 
rapher from  1933  to  a week 
before  his  end. 

4.  Krosigk’s  diary. 

5.  Ibid. 

6.  Quoted  by  Wilmot,  op.  cit.,  p. 
699. 

7.  Trevor-Roper,  op.  cit.,  p.  100. 
The  account  was  given  by  one 
of  Goebbels’  secretaries,  Frau 
Inge  Haberzettel. 

8.  Michael  A.  Musmanno,  Ten 
Days  to  Die,  p.  92.  Judge 
Musmanno,  a U.S.  Navy  in- 
telligence officer  during  the 
war,  personally  interrogated 
the  survivors  who  had  been 
with  Hitler  during  his  last  days. 

9.  Keitel  interrogation,  NCA, 
Suppl.  B,  p.  1294. 

10.  NCA,  VI,  p.  561  (N.D.  3734- 
PS).  This  is  a lengthy  summary 
of  a U.S.  Army  interrogation 
of  Hanna  Reitsch  on  the  last 
days  of  Hitler  in  the  bunker. 
She  later  repudiated  parts  of 
her  statement,  but  Army  au- 
thorities have  confirmed  its 
substantial  accuracy  as  con- 
taining what  she  said  during 
the  interrogation  on  Oct.  8, 
1945.  Though  Frl.  Reitsch  is 
a highly  hysterical  person,  or 
was  during  the  months  that 
followed  her  harrowing  experi- 
ence in  the  bunker,  her  ac- 
count, when  checked  against 
the  evidence  of  the  others,  is 
a valuable  record  of  Hitler’s 
very  last  days. 

11.  Gen.  Karl  Koller,  Der  letzte 
Monat,  p.  23.  This  is  Roller’s 
diary  covering  the  period  from 
April  14  to  May  27,  1945,  and 
is  an  invaluable  source  for  the 
last  days  of  the  Third  Reich. 

12.  Keitel  in  his  interrogation  at 
Nuremberg,  NCA,  Suppl.  B, 
pp.  1275-79.  Jodi’s  account 
was  given  to  Gen.'  Koller  the 
same  night  and  recorded  in 
the  latter’s  diary  of  April  22- 
23.  See  Koller,  op.  cit.,  pp.  30— 
32. 

13.  Trevor-Roper,  op.  cit.,  pp.  124, 


1524 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


126-27.  The  author  gives  Ber- 
ger’s account,  he  says,  “with 
some  reservations.” 

14.  Keitel  recalled  the  remark  in 
his  interrogation,  loc.  cit.,  p. 
1277.  Jodi’s  version  is  in  Rol- 
ler's diary,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 

15.  Bernadotte,  The  Curtain  Falls , 
p.  114;  Schellenberg,  op.  cit., 
pp.  399-400.  They  agree  sub- 
stantially in  their  versions  of 
the  meeting. 

16.  Speer  on  the  stand  at  Nurem- 
berg, TMWC,  XVI,  pp.  554- 
55. 

17.  Hanna  Reitsch  interrogation, 
loc.  cit..  pp.  554-55. 

18.  Ibid.,  p.  556.  All  the  subse- 


quent quotations  and  the 
events  described  by  Hanna 
Reitsch  are  taken  from  this  in- 
terrogation and  are  found  in 
NCA,  VI,  pp.  551-71  (N.D. 
3734-PS).  They  will  not  there- 
fore be  cited  in  each  case. 

19.  Keitel,  in  his  interrogation,  loc. 
cit.,  pp.  1281-82,  quoted  the 
message  from  memory.  The 
German  naval  records  give  a 
similarly  worded  radio  mes- 
sage from  Hitler  to  Jodi  dated 
7:52  p.m.,  April  29  ( FCNA , 
1945,  p.  120),  and  Schultz’s 
OKW  Diary  (p.  51),  which 
gives  the  same  text,  records  it 
as  received  by  Jodi  at  11  p.m. 
on  April  29.  This  is  probably 
an  error,  since  at  that  hour  of 
that  evening  Hitler,  judging  by 
his  actions,  no  longer  cared 
where  any  army  was. 

20.  Trevor-Roper,  op.  cit.,  p.  163, 
gives  the  first  message.  The 
second  I have  found  in  the 
Navy’s  records,  FCNA,  1945, 
p.  120.  The  further  message 
from  the  naval  liaison  officer 
in  the  bunker,  Adm.  Voss,  is 
also  given  in  FCNA,  p.  120. 


21.  The  text  of  Hitler’s  Political 
Testament  and  personal  will  is 
given  in  N.D.  3569-PS.  A copy 
of  his  marriage  certificate  was 
also  presented  at  Nuremberg. 
I have  given  the  texts  of  all 
three  in  End  of  a Berlin  Diary, 
pp.  177-83,  n.  A rather  hastily 
written  English  translation  of 
the  will  and  testament  is  pub- 
lished in  NCA,  VI,  pp.  259- 
63.  The  original  German  is  in 
TMWC,  XLI,  under  the  Speer 
documents. 

22.  Gen.  Koller,  op.  cit.,  p.  79, 
gives  the  text  of  Bormann’s 
radiogram. 

23.  The  text  of  Goebbels’  appen- 
dix was  presented  at  the  Nu- 
remberg trial.  I have  given  it 
in  End  of  a Berlin  Diary,  p. 
183n. 

24.  Kempka’s  account  of  the  death 
of  Hitler  and  his  bride  is  given 
in  two  sworn  statements  pub- 
lished in  NCA,  VI,  pp.  571-86 
(N.D.  3735-PS). 

25.  Juergen  Thorwald,  Das  Ende 
an  der  Elbe,  p.  224. 

26.  This  account  of  the  death  of 
the  Goebbels  family  is  given 
by  Trevor-Roper,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
212-14,  and  is  based  largely  on 
the  later  testimony  of  Schwae- 
germann,  Axmann  and  Kemp- 
ka. 

27.  Joachim  Schultz,  Die  letzten 
30  Tage,  pp.  81-85.  These 
notes  are  based  on  the  OKW 
diaries  for  the  last  month  of 
the  war  and  I have  used  them 
to  bolster  a good  many  pages 
of  this  chapter.  The  book  is 
one  of  several  published  under 
the  direction  of  Thorwald 
under  the  general  title  Doku- 
mente  zur  Zeitgeschichte. 

28.  Eisenhower,  op.  cit.,  p.  426. 

29.  End  of  a Berlin  Diary. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


. 


. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


Though  for  this  book,  as  for  all  others  that  I have  written, 
I have  done  my  own  research  and  planning,  I owe  a great  deal 
to  a number  of  persons  and  institutions  for  their  generous  help 
during  the  five  years  that  this  work  was  in  the  making. 

The  late  Jack  Goodman,  of  Simon  and  Schuster,  and  Joseph 
Barnes,  my  editor  at  this  publishing  house,  got  me  started  and 
Barnes,  an  old  friend  from  our  days  as  correspondents  in 
Europe,  stuck  it  out  over  many  ups  and  downs,  offering  help- 
ful criticism  at  every  turn.  Dr.  Fritz  T.  Epstein,  of  the  Library 
of  Congress,  a fine  scholar  and  an  authority  on  the  captured 
German  documents,  guided  me  through  the  mountains  of 
German  papers.  A good  many  others  also  came  to  my  aid  in 
this.  Among  them  were  Telford  Taylor,  chief  counsel  for  the 
prosecution  at  the  Nuremberg  war  crimes  trials,  who  already 
has  published  two  volumes  of  a military  history  of  the  Third 
Reich.  He  loaned  me  documents  and  books  from  his  private 
collection  and  proferred  much  good  advice. 

Professor  Oron  J.  Hale,  of  the  University  of  Virginia,  chair- 
man of  the  American  Committee  for  the  Study  of  War  Docu- 
ments, American  Historical  Association,  led  me  to  much 
useful  material,  including  the  results  of  some  of  his  own  re- 
search, and  one  hot  summer  day  in  1956  did  me  a signal 
service  by  yanking  me  out  of  the  manuscript  room  of  the 
Library  of  Congress  and  sternly  advising  me  to  get  back  to 
the  writing  of  this  book  lest  I spend  the  rest  of  my  life  peering 
into  the  German  papers,  which  one  easily  could  do.  Dr.  G. 
Bernard  Noble,  chief  of  the  Historical  Division  of  the  State 
Department,  and  Paul  R.  Sweet,  a Foreign  Service  officer  in 
the  Department,  who  was  one  of  the  American  editors  of  the 
Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy,  also  helped  me  through 
the  maze  of  Nazi  papers.  At  the  Hoover  Library  at  Stanford 
University,  Mrs.  Hildegard  R.  Boeninger,  by  mail,  and  Mrs. 
Agnes  F.  Peterson,  in  person,  were  generous  of  their  aid.  At 

1527 


1528 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


the  Department  of  the  Army,  Colonel  W.  Hoover,  acting 
Chief  of  Military  History,  and  Detmar  Finke,  of  his  staff, 
put  me  on  the  track  of  German  military  records,  of  which 
this  office  has  a unique  collection. 

Hamilton  Fish  Armstrong,  editor  of  Foreign  Affairs,  took 
a personal  interest  in  seeing  me  through  this  book,  as  did 
Walter  H.  Mallory,  then  executive  director  of  the  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations.  To  the  Council,  to  Frank  Altschul  and  to 
the  Overbrook  Foundation  I am  grateful  for  a generous  grant 
which  enabled  me  to  devote  all  of  my  time  to  this  book  dur- 
ing its  final  year  of  preparation.  I must  also  thank  the  staff 
of  the  Council’s  excellent  library,  on  whose  members  I made 
many  wearisome  demands.  The  staff  of  the  New  York  Society 
Library  also  experienced  this  and,  despite  it,  proved  most 
patient  and  understanding. 

Lewis  Galantiere  and  Herbert  Kriedman  were  good  enough 
to  read  most  of  the  manuscript  and  to  offer  much  valuable 
criticism.  Colonel  Truman  Smith,  who  was  a U.S.  military 
attache  in  Berlin  when  Adolf  Hitler  first  began  his  politick 
career  in  the  early  Twenties  and  later  after  he  came  to  power, 
put  at  my  disposal  some  of  his  notebooks  and  reports,  which 
shed  light  on  the  beginnings  of  National  Socialism  and  on 
certain  aspects  of  it  later.  Sam  Harris,  a member  of  the  U.S. 
prosecution  staff  at  Nuremberg  and  now  an  attorney  in  New 
York,  made  available  the  TMWC  Nuremberg  volumes  and 
much  additional  unpublished  material.  General  Franz  Haider, 
Chief  of  the  German  Army  General  Staff  during  the  first  three 
years  of  the  war,  was  most  generous  in  answering  my  inquiries 
and  in  pointing  the  way  to  German  sources.  I have  mentioned 
elsewhere  the  value  to  me  of  his  unpublished  diary,  a copy  of 
which  f kept  at  my  side  during  the  writing  of  a large  part  of 
this  book.  George  Kennan,  who  was  serving  in  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy in  Berlin  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  has  refreshed  my 
memory  on  certain  points  of  historical  interest.  Several  old 
friends  and  colleagues  from  my  days  in  Europe,  John  Gunther, 
M.  W.  Fodor,  Kay  Boyle,  Sigrid  Schultz,  Dorothy  Thompson, 
Whit  Burnett  and  Newell  Rogers,  discussed  various  aspects  of 
this  work  with  me — to  my  profit.  And  Paul  R.  Reynolds,  my 
literary  agent,  provided  encouragement  when  it  was  most 
needed. 

Finally  I owe  a great  debt  to  my  wife,  whose  knowledge  of 
foreign  languages,  background  in  Europe  and  experience  in 
Germany  and  Austria  were  of  great  help  in  my  research, 


Acknowledgments  1529 

writing  and  checking.  Our  two  daughters,  Inga  and  Linda,  on 
vacation  from  college,  aided  in  a dozen  necessary  chores.' 

To  all  these  and  to  others  who  have  helped  in  one  way 
or  another,  I express  my  gratitude.  The  responsibility  for  the 
book’s  shortcomings  and  errors  is,  of  course,  exclusively  my 
own. 


v‘£.  . 


no  - 

I - ’V  . 1C  I 


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. 


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BIBLIOGRAPHY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


This  book  is  based  principally  on  the  captured  German 
documents,  the  interrogations  and  testimony  of  German 
military  officers  and  civilian  officials,  the  diaries  and  memoirs 
which  some  of  them  have  left,  and  on  my  own  experience  in 
the  Third  Reich. 

Millions  of  words  from  the  German  archives  have  been 
published  in  various  series  of  volumes,  and  millions  more  have 
been  collected  or  microfilmed  and  deposited  in  libraries — in 
this  country  chiefly  the  Library  of  Congress  -and  the  Hoover 
Library  at  Stanford  University — and  in  the  National  Archives 
at  Washington.  In  addition,  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Military 
History,  Department  of  the  Army,  at  Washington  is  in  posses- 
sion of  a vast  collection  of  German  military  records. 

Of  the  published  volumes  of  documents  the  most  useful  for 
my  purposes  have  been  three  series.  The  first  is  Documents  on 
German  Foreign  Policy,  Series  D,  comprising  a large  selection 
in  English  translation  of  the  papers  of  the  German  Foreign 
Office  from  1937  to  the  summer  of  1940.  Through  the  courtesy 
of  the  State  Department  I have  been  given  access  to  a number 
of  additional  German  Foreign  Office  papers,  not  yet  translated 
or  published,  which  deal  primarily  with  Germany’s  declaration 
of  war  on  the  United  States. 

Two  series  of  published  documents  dealing  with  the  main 
Nuremberg  trial  have  been  invaluable  in  taking  one  behind  the 
scenes  in  the  Third  Reich.  The  first  is  the  forty-two-volume 
Trial  of  the  Major  War  Criminals,  of  which  the  first  twenty- 
three  volumes  contain  the  text  of  the  testimony  at  the  trial 
and  the  remainder  the  text  of  the  documents  accepted  in  evi- 
dence, which  are  published  in  their  original  language,  mostly 
German.  Additional  documents,  interrogations  and  affidavits 
collected  for  that  trial  and  translated  rather  hurriedly  into 
English  are  published  in  the  ten-volume  series  Nazi  Conspiracy 
and  Aggression.  Unfortunately,  the  extremely  valuable  testi- 
mony given  before  the  commissioners  of  the  International 
Military  Tribunal  is  mostly  omitted  from  the  latter  series  and 
is  available  only  in  mimeographed  form  on  deposit  with  a few 
leading  libraries. 

There  were  twelve  subsequent  trials  at  Nuremberg,  con- 

1533 


1534 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

ducted  by  United  States  military  tribunals,  but  the  fifteen 
bulky  published  volumes  of  testimony  and  documents  presented 
at  these  trials,  titled  Trials  of  War  Criminals  before  the 
Nuremberg  Military  Tribunals,  contain  less  than  one  tenth  of 
the  material.  However,  the  rest  may  be  found  in  mimeograph 
or  photostats  in  some  libraries.  Summaries  of  other  trials 
which  shed  much  light  on  the  Third  Reich  may  be  found  in 
Law  Reports  of  Trials  of  War  Criminals,  published  by  His 
Majesty’s  Stationery  Office  in  London,  1947-49. 

Of  the  unpublished  German  documents  other  than  the  rich 
collections  in  the  Hoover  Library,  the  Library  of  Congress  and 
the  National  Archives — which  contain,  among  other  things, 
the  Himmler  files  and  a number  of  Hitler’s  private  papers — 
one  of  the  most  valuable  finds  has  been  that  of  the  so-called 
“Alexandria  Papers,”  a good  proportion  of  which  have  now 
been  microfilmed  and  deposited  at  the  National  Archives. 
Information  about  a number  of  other  captured  papers  will  be 
found  in  the  notes.  Among  the  unpublished  German  material, 
incidentally,  is  General  Haider’s  diary — seven  volumes  of  type- 
script with  annotations  added  by  the  General  after  the  war 
to  clarify  certain  passages — which  I found  to  be  one  of  the 
most  valuable  records  of  the  Third  Reich. 

Some  of  the  books  which  have  been  helpful  to  me  are 
listed  below.  They  are  of  three  types:  first,  the  memoirs  and 
diaries  of  some  of  the  leading  figures  in  this  narrative;  second, 
books  based  on  the  new  documentary  material,  such  as  those 
of  John  W.  Wheeler-Bennett,  Alan  Bullock,  H.  R.  Trevor- 
Roper  and  Gerald  Reitlinger  in  England,  of  Telford  Taylor 
in  America,  and  of  Eberhard  Zeller,  Gerhard  Ritter,  Rudolf 
Pechel  and  Walter  Goerlitz  in  Germany;  and  third,  books 
which  provide  background. 

A comprehensive  bibliography  of  works  on  the  Third  Reich 
has  been  published  in  Munich  as  a special  number  of  the 
Vierteljahrshefte  fuer  Zeitgeschichte  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Institut  fuer  Zeitgeschichte.  The  catalogues  of  the  Wiener 
Library  in  London  also  contain  excellent  bibliographies. 


PUBLISHED  DOCUMENTARY  MATERIAL 

Der  Hitler  Prozess.  Munich:  Deutscher  Volksverlag,  1924. 
(The  record  of  the  court  proceedings  of  Hitler’s  trial  in 
Munich.) 

Documents  and  Materials  relating  to  the  Eve  of  the  Second 
World  War,  1937-39.  2 vols.  Moscow:  Foreign  Language 
Publishing  House,  1948. 

Documents  concerning  German-Polish  Relations  and  the  Out- 


Bibliography  1535 

break  of  Hostilities  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 
London:  His  Majesty’s  Stationery  Office,  1939.  (The  British 
Blue  Book.) 

Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy,  1919-39.  London:  H. 
M.  Stationery  Office,  1947-  . (Referred  to  in  the  notes 

as  DBrFP.) 

Documents  on  German  Foreign  Policy,  1918-45.  Series  D, 
1937-45.  10  vols.  (as  of  1957).  Washington:  U.S.  Depart- 
ment of  State.  (Referred  to  as  DGFP.) 

Dokumente  der  deutschen  Politik,  1933—40.  Berlin,  1935-43. 
Fuehrer  Conferences  on  Naval  Affairs  (mimeographed).  Lon- 
don: British  Admiralty,  1947.  (Referred  to  as  FCNA.) 
Hitler  e Mussolini — Lettere  e documenti.  Milan:  Rizzoli,  1946. 
/ Documenti  diplomatica  italiani.  Ottavo  series,  1935-39. 

Rome:  Libreria  della  Stato,  1952-53.  (Referred  to  as  DD1.) 
Le  Livre  Jaune  Franfais.  Documents  diplomatiques,  1938-39. 
Paris:  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres.  (The  French  Yel- 
low Book.) 

Nazi  Conspiracy  and  Aggression.  10  vols.  Washington:  U.S. 

Government  Printing  Office,  1946.  (Referred  to  as  NCA.) 
Nazi-Soviet  Relations,  1939-41.  Documents  from  the  Archives 
of  the  German  Foreign  Office.  Washington:  U.S.  Department 
of  State,  1948.  (Referred  to  as  NSR.) 

Official  Documents  concerning  Polish— German  and  Polish- 
Soviet  Relations,  1933-39.  London,  1939.  (The  Polish  White 
Book.) 

Pearl  Harbor  Attack.  Hearings  before  the  Joint  Committee  on 
the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack.  39  vols.  Wash- 
ington: U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1946. 

Soviet  Documents  on  Foreign  Policy,  3 vols.  London:  Royal 
Institute  of  International  Affairs,  1951-53. 

Spanish  Government  and  the  Axis,  The.  Washington:  U.S. 
State  Department,  1946.  (From  the  German  Foreign  Office 
papers.) 

Trial  of  the  Major  War  Criminals  before  the  International 
Military  Tribunal.  42  vols.  Published  at  Nuremberg.  (Re- 
ferred to  as  TMWC.) 

Trials  of  War  Criminals  before  the  Nuremberg  Military  Tri- 
bunals. 15  vols.  Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1951-52.  (Referred  to  as  TWC.) 


HITLER’S  SPEECHES 

Adolf  Hitlers  Reden.  Munich,  1934. 

Baynes,  Norman  H.,  ed.:  The  Speeches  of  Adolf  Hitler,  April 
1922-August  1939.  2 vols.  New  York,  1942. 

Prange,  Gordon  W.,  ed.:  Hitler’s  Words.  Washington,  1944. 


1536 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Rousssy  de  Sales  Count  Raoul  de,  ed.:  My  New  Order.  New 
York,  1941.  (The  speeches  of  Hitler,  1922-41.) 


GENERAL  WORKS 

Abshagen,  K.  H.:  Canaris.  Stuttgart,  1949. 

Ambruster,  Howard  Watson:  Treason’s  Peace.  New  York, 

Anders,  Wladyslaw:  Hitler’s  Defeat  in  Russia.  Chicago  1953 
Anonymous:  De  Weimar  au  Chaos— Journal  politique  d’un 
Ueneral  de  la  Reichswehr.  Paris,  1934. 

Armstrong,  Hamilton  Fish:  Hitler’s  Reich.  New  York  1933. 
Assmann,  Kurt:  Deutsche  Schicksalsjahre.  Wiesbaden, * 1950. 

Badoglio,  Marshal  Pietro:  Italy  in  the  Second  World  War. 
London,  1948. 

Barraclough,  S.:  The  Origins  of  Modern  Germany.  Oxford, 

Bartz,  Karl:  Als  der  Himmel  brannte.  Hanover  1955 
Baumont.Fr.ed  and  Vermeil,  eds.:  The  Third  Reich.  New 

Ba^  Francois:  Croix  gammee  ou  caducee.  Freiburg,  1950. 

(A  documented  account  of  the  Nazi  medical  experiments  ) 
Belgian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs:  Belgium:  The  Official 
Account  of  What  Happened,  1939-1940.  New  York  1941 
Benes,  Eduard:  Memoirs  of  Dr.  Edward  Benes,  From  Munich 
to  New  War  and  New  Victory.  London  1954 
Benoist-Mechin,  Jacques:  Histoire  de  I’Armee  allemande 
depuis  l Armistice.  Paris,  1936-38. 

Bernadotte,  Folke:  The  Curtain  Falls.  New  York  1945 
Best,  Captain  S.  Payne:  The  Venlo  Incident.  London,  1950. 

Staat  ^ V°lk  'n  ihr£n  °r8anisati°nen.  Berlin, 

Blumentritt,  Guenther:  Von  Rundstedt.  London,  1952. 
Boldt,  Gerhard:  In  the  Shelter  with  Hitler.  London,  1948. 
Bonnet,  Georges:  Fin  d’une  Europe.  Geneva,  1948. 

Boothby,  Robert:  I Fight  to  Live.  London,  1947. 

Bormann,  Martin:  The  Bormann  Letters:  the  Private  Corre- 
spondence  between  Martin  Bormann  and  his  Wife,  from  Jan 
1943  to  April  1945.  London,  1954. 

BRf951EY'  °ENERAL  °MAR  N"  A Soldier’s  Story.  New  York, 

Brady,  Robert  K.:  The  Spirit  and  Structure  of  German 
Fascism.  London,  1937. 

Bryans,  J.  Lonsdale:  Blind  Victory.  London  1951 
Bryant,  Sir  Arthur:  The  Turn  of  the  Tide— A History  of  the 


Bibliography  1537 

War  Years  Based  on  the  Diaries  of  Field  Marshal  Lord 
Alanbrooke,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff.  New  York, 
1957. 

Bullock,  Alan:  Hitler — A Study  in  Tyranny.  New  York, 
1952. 

Butcher,  Harry  C.:  My  Three  Years  with  Eisenhower.  New 
York,  1946. 

Carr,  Edward  Hallett:  German-Soviet  Relations  between 
the  Two  World  Wars,  1919-1939.  Baltimore,  1951. 

, The  Soviet  Impact  on  the  Western  World.  New  York, 

1947. 

Churchill,  Sir  Winston  S.:  The  Second  World  War.  6 vols. 
New  York,  1948-1953. 

Ciano,  Count  Galeazzo:  Ciano’s  Diplomatic  Papers,  edited 
by  Malcolm  Muggeridge.  London,  1948. 

, Ciano’s  Hidden  Diary,  1937-1938.  New  York,  1953. 

, The  Ciano  Diaries,  1939-1943 , edited  by  Hugh  Wilson. 

New  York,  1946. 

Clausewitz,  Karl  von:  On  War.  New  York,  1943. 

Coole,  W.  W.,  and  Potter,  M.  F.:  Thus  Speaks  Germany. 
New  York,  1941. 

Craig,  Gordon  A.:  The  Politics  of  the  Prussian  Army,  1940- 
1945.  New  York,  1955. 

Croce,  Benedetto:  Germany  and  Europe.  New  York,  1944. 
Czechoslovakia  Fights  Back.  Washington:  American  Council 
on  Public  Affairs,  1943. 

Dahlerus,  Birger:  The  Last  Attempt.  London,  1947. 

Dallin,  Alexander:  German  Rule  in  Russia,  1941-1944. 
New  York,  1957. 

Daluces,  Jean:  Le  Troisieme  Reich.  Paris,  1950. 

Davies,  Joseph  E.:  Mission  to  Moscow.  New  York,  1941. 
Derry,  T.  K.:  The  Campaign  in  Norway.  London,  1952. 
Deuel,  Wallace:  People  under  Hitler.  New  York,  1943. 
Dewey,  John:  German  Philosophy  and  Politics.  New  York, 
1952. 

Diels,  Rudolf:  Lucifer  ante  Portas.  Stuttgart,  1950. 

Dietrich,  Otto:  Mit  Hitler  in  die  Macht.  Munich,  1934. 
Dollman,  Eugen:  Roma  Nazista.  Milan,  1951. 

Draper,  Theodore:  The  Six  Weeks’  War.  New  York,  1944. 
DuBois,  Josiah  E.,  Jr.:  The  Devil’s  Chemists.  Boston,  1952. 
Dulles,  Allen:  Germany’s  Underground.  New  York,  1947. 

Ebenstein,  William:  The  Nazi  State.  New  York,  1943. 
Eisenhower,  Dwight  D.:  Crusade  in  Europe.  New  York, 

1948. 


1538 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Ellis,  Major  L.  F.:  The  War  in  France  and  Flanders,  1939— 
1950.  London,  1953. 

Eyck,  E.:  Bismarck  and  the  German  Empire.  London,  1950. 

Feiling,  Keith:  The  Life  of  Neville  Chamberlain.  London, 
1946. 

Feuchter,  Georg  W.:  Geschichte  des  Luftkriegs.  Bonn,  1954. 
Fisher,  H.  A.  L.:  A History  of  Europe.  London,  1936. 
Fishman,  Jack:  The  Seven  Men  of  Spandau.  New  York,  1954. 
FitzGibbon,  Constantine:  20  July.  New  York,  1956. 
Fleming,  Peter:  Operation  Sea  Lion.  New  York,  1957. 
Flenley,  Ralph:  Modern  German  History.  New  York,  1953. 
Foerster,  Wolfgang:  Ein  General  kaempft  gegen  den  Krieg. 

Munich,  1949.  (The  papers  of  General  Beck.) 
FRANgois-PoNCET,  Andre:  The  Fateful  Years.  New  York, 
1949. 

Freidin,  Seymour,  and  Richardson,  William,  eds.:  The  Fatal 
Decisions.  New  York,  1956. 

Friedman,  Filip:  This  Was  Oswiecim  [Auschwitz].  London, 
1946. 

Frischauer,  Willy:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Hermann  Goering. 
Boston,  1951. 

Fuller,  Major-General  J.  F.  C.:  The  Second  World  War. 
New  York,  1949. 

Galland,  Adolf:  The  First  and  the  Last.  The  Rise  and  Fall 
of  the  Luftwaffe  Fighter  Forces,  1938-45.  New  York,  1954. 
Gamelin,  General  Maurice  Gustave:  Servir.  3 vols.  Paris, 
1949. 

Gay,  Jean:  Carnets  Secrets  de  Jean  Gay.  Paris,  1940. 
Germany : A Self-Portrait.  Harland  R.  Crippen,  ed.  New  York, 
1944. 

Gilbert,  Felix:  Hitler  Directs  His  War.  New  York,  1950. 

(The  partial  text  of  Hitler’s  daily  military  conferences.) 
Gilbert,  G.  M.:  Nuremberg  Diary.  New  York,  1947. 
Gisevius,  Bernd:  To  the  Bitter  End.  Boston,  1947. 
Glaubenskrise  im  Dritten  Reich.  Stuttgart,  1953. 

Goebbels,  Joseph:  Vom  Kaiserhof  zur  Reichskanzlei.  Munich, 
1936. 

, The  Goebbels  Diaries,  1942—43,  edited  by  Louis  P. 

Lochner.  New  York,  1948. 

Goerlitz,  Walter:  History  of  the  German  General  Staff, 
1657-1945.  New  York,  1953. 

, Der  zweite  Weltkrieg,  1939—45.  2 vols.  Stuttgart,  1951. 

Goudima,  Constantin:  L'Armee  Rouge  dans  la  Paix  et  la 
Guerre.  Paris,  1947. 


Bibliography  1539 

Greiner,  Helmuth:  Die  Oberste  Wehrmachtfuehrung,  1939— 

1945.  Wiesbaden,  1951. 

Greiner,  Josef:  Das  Ende  des  Hitler-Mythos.  Vienna,  1947. 
Guderian,  General  Heinz:  Panzer  Leader.  New  York,  1952. 
Guillaume,  General  A.:  La  Guerre  Germano-Sovietique, 
1941.  Paris,  1949. 

Habatsch,  Walther:  Die  deutsche  Besetzung  von  Daenemark 
und  Norwegen,  1940,  2nd  ed.  Goettingen,  1952. 

Halder,  Franz:  Hitler  als  Feldherr.  Munich,  1949. 

Halifax,  Lord:  Fullness  of  Days.  New  York,  1957. 
Hallgarten,  George  W.  F.:  Hitler,  Reichswehr  und  Industrie. 
Frankfurt,  1955. 

Hanfstaengl,  Ernst:  Unheard  Witness.  New  York,  1957. 
Harris,  Whitney  R.:  Tyranny  on  Trial — The  Evidence  at 
Nuremberg.  Dallas,  1954.  (A  selection  of  the  German  docu- 
ments at  Nuremberg  from  the  TMWC  and  NCA  volumes.) 
Hassell,  Ulrich  von:  The  Von  Hassell  Diaries,  1938-1944. 
New  York,  1947. 

Hegel:  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  History.  London,  1902. 
Heiden,  Konrad:  A History  of  National  Socialism.  New  York, 
1935. 

, Hitler — A Biography.  New  York,  1936. 

, Der  Fuehrer.  Boston,  1944. 

Henderson,  Nevile:  The  Failure  of  a Mission.  New  York, 
1940. 

Herman,  Stewart  W.,  Jr.:  It’s  Your  Souls  We  Want.  New 
York,  1943. 

Heusinger,  General  Adolf:  Befehl  im  Widerstreit — Schick- 
salsstunden  der  deutschen  Armee,  1923-1925.  Stuttgart,  1950. 
Hindenburg,  Field  Marshal  Paul  von  Beneckendorf  und 
von:  Aus  meinem  Leben.  Leipzig,  1934. 

Hitler,  Adolf:  Mein  Kampf.  Boston,  1943.  This  is  the  unex- 
purgated edition  in  English  translation  published  by  Hough- 
ton Mifflin.  (The  German  original:  Munich,  1925,  1927.  The 
first  volume,  Eine  Albrechnung,  was  published  in  1925;  the 
second,  Die  Nationalsozialistische  Bewegung,  in  1927.  There- 
after the  two  were  published  in  one  volume.) 

Hitler’s  Secret  Conversations,  1941—44.  New  York,  1953. 

Les  Lettres  Secretes  Echangies  par  Hitler  et  Mussolini.  Paris, 

1946. 

Hoettl,  Wilhelm  (Walter  Hagen):  The  Secret  Front:  The 
Story  of  Nazi  Political  Espionage.  New  York,  1954. 

Hofer,  Walther:  War  Premeditated,  1939.  London,  1955. 
(English  translation  from  Die  Entfesselung  des  zweiten 
Weltkrieges.) 


1540 


The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 


Hossbach,  General  Friedrich:  Zwischen  Wehrmacht  und 
Hitler.  Hanover,  1949. 

Hull,  Cordell:  The  Memoirs  of  Cordell  Hull.  2 vols.  New 
York,  1948. 

Jacobsen,  Hans-Adolf:  Dokumente  zur  Vorgeschichte  des 
Westfeldzuges,  1939-40.  Goettingen,  1956. 

Jarman,  T.  L.:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Nazi  Germany.  London, 
1955. 

Jasper,  Karl:  The  Question  of  German  Guilt.  New  York, 
1947. 

Kelley,  Douglas  M.:  22  Cells  in  Nuremberg.  New  York, 
1947. 

Kesselring,  Albert:  A Soldier’s  Record.  New  York,  1954. 
Kielmannsegg,  Graf:  Der  Fritsch  Prozess.  Hamburg,  1949. 
Klee,  Captain  Karl:  Das  Unternehmen  Seeloewe.  Goettingen, 
1949. 

Klein,  Burton:  Germany’s  Economic  Preparations  for  War. 
Cambridge,  1959. 

Kleist,  Peter:  Zwischen  Hitler  und  Stalin.  Bonn,  1950. 
Kneller,  George  Frederick:  The  Educational  Philosophy  of 
National  Socialism.  New  Haven,  1941. 

Kogon,  Eugen:  The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Hell.  New  York, 
1951.  (The  German  original:  Der  SS  Staat  und  das  System 
der  duetschen  Konzentrationslager.  Munich,  1946.) 

Kohn,  Hans,  ed.:  German  History:  Some  New  German  Views. 
Boston,  1954. 

Roller,  General  Karl:  Der  letzte  Monat.  Mannheim  1949. 

(The  diary  of  the  last  Chief  of  the  Luftwaffe  General  Staff.) 
Kordt,  Erich:  Nicht  aus  den  Akten.  ( Die  Wilhelmstrasse  in 
Frieden  und  Krieg,  1928-1945.)  Stuttgart,  1950. 

, Wahn  und  Wirklichkeit.  Stuttgart,  1947. 

Kreis,  Ernst,  and  Speier,  Hans:  German  Radio  Propaganda. 
New  York,  1946. 

Krosigk,  Count  Lutz  Schwerin  von:  Es  geschah  in  Duetsch- 
land.  Tuebingen,  1951. 

Kubizek,  August:  The  Young  Hitler  I Knew.  Boston,  1955. 

Langer,  William  L.:  Our  Vichy  Gamble.  New  York,  1947. 
Langer  and  Gleason:  The  Undeclared  War,  1940-1941. 
New  York,  1953. 

Laval,  Pierre:  The  Diary  of  Pierre  Laval.  New  York,  1948. 
Lenard,  Philipp:  Deutsche  Physik,  2nd  ed.  Munich-Berlin, 
1938. 

Lichtenberger,  Henri:  L'Allemagne  Nouvelle.  Paris,  1936. 


Bibliography  1541 

Liddell,  Hart,  B.  H.:  The  German  Generals  Talk.  New  York, 
1948. 

(ed.):  The  Rommel  Papers.  New  York,  1953. 

Lilge,  Frederic:  The  Abuse  of  Learning:  The  Failure  of  the 
German  University.  New  York,  1948. 

Litvinov,  Maxim:  Notes  for  a Journal.  New  York,  1955. 

Lorimer,  E.  O.:  What  Hitler  Wants.  London,  1939. 

Lossberg,  General  Bernhard  von:  Im  Wehrmacht  Fueh- 
rungsstab.  Hamburg,  1950. 

Ludecke,  Kurt:  I Knew  Hitler.  London,  1938. 

Ludendorff,  General  Eric:  Auf  dem  Weg  zur  Feldherrnhalle. 
Munich,  1937. 

Ludendorff,  Margaritte:  A Is  ich  Ludendorffs  Frau  war. 
Munich,  1929. 

Luedde-Neurath,  Walter:  Die  letzten  Tage  des  Dritten 
Reiches.  Goettingen,  1951. 

Manstein,  Field  Marshal  Eric  von:  Verlorene  Siege.  Bonn, 
1955.  (English  translation:  Lost  Victories.  Chicago,  1958.) 

Martiensen,  Anthony  K.:  Hitler  and  His  Admirals.  New 
York,  1949. 

Meinecke,  Friedrich:  The  German  Catastrophe.  Cambridge 
1950. 

Meissner,  Otto:  Staatssekretaer  unter  Ebert-Hindenburg- 
Hitler.  Hamburg,  1950. 

Melzer,  Walther:  Albert  Kanal  und  Eben-Emael.  Heidel- 
berg, 1957. 

Mitscherlich,  Alexander,  M.D.,  and  Mielke,  Fred:  Doctors 
of  Infamy.  New  York,  1949. 

Monzie,  Anatole  de:  Ci-Devant.  Paris,  1942. 

Morison,  Samuel  Eliot:  History  of  the  United  States  Naval 
Operations  in  World  War  II.  Vol.  I,  The  Battle  of  the  At- 
lantic, September  1939-May  1943.  Boston,  1948. 

Mourin,  Maxime:  Les  Complots  contre  Hitler.  Paris,  1948. 

Musmanno,  Michael  A.:  Ten  Days  to  Die.  New  York,  1950. 

Mussolini,  Benito:  Memoirs  1942-1943.  London,  1949. 

Namier,  Sir  Lewis  B.:  In  the  Nazi  Era.  London,  1952. 

, Diplomatic  Prelude,  1938-1939.  London,  1948. 

Nathan,  Otto:  The  Nazi  Economic  System:  Germany’s 
Mobilization  for  War.  Durham,  N.C.,  1944. 

Neumann,  Franz  L.:  Behemoth.  New  York,  1942. 

O’Brien,  T.  H. : Civil  Defence.  London,  1955.  (A  volume  in 
the  official  British  history  of  the  Second  World  War,  edited 
by  J.  R.  M.  Butler.) 

Olden,  Rudolf:  Hitler,  the  Pawn.  London,  1936. 


1542  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

Outze,  B0rge,  ed.:  Denmark  during  the  Occupation.  Copen- 
hagen, 1946. 

Oven,  Wilfred  von:  Mit  Goebbels  bis  zum  Ende.  Buenos 
Aires,  1949. 

Overstraeten,  General  van:  Albert  1-Leopold  III.  Brussels, 
1946. 

Papen,  Franz  von:  Memoirs.  New  York,  1953. 

Pechel,  Rudolf:  Deutscher  Widerstand.  Zurich,  1947. 

Pertinax:  The  Grave  Diggers  of  France.  New  York,  1944. 

Pinnow,  Hermann:  History  of  Germany.  London,  1936. 

Poliakov,  Leon,  and  Wulf,  Josef:  Das  Dritte  Reich  und  die 
Juden.  Berlin,  1955. 

Potemkin,  V.  V.,  ed.:  Histoire  de  la  Diplomatic.  Paris,  1946- 
47.  (A  French  edition  of  a Soviet  Russian  work.) 

Rabenau,  Lieutenant  General  Friedrich  von:  Seeckt,  aus 
seine m Leben.  Leipzig,  1940. 

Rauschnino,  Hermann:  Time  of  Delirium.  New  York,  1946. 

, The  Revolution  of  Nihilism.  New  York,  1939. 

, The  Conservative  Revolution.  New  York,  1941. 

, The  Voice  of  Destruction.  New  York,  1940. 

Reed,  Douglas:  The  Burning  of  the  Reichstag.  New  York, 
1934. 

Reitlinger,  Gerald:  The  Final  Solution — The  Attempt  to 
Exterminate  the  Jews  of  Europe,  1939-1945.  New  York, 
1953. 

, The  SS — Alibi  of  a Nation.  New  York,  1957. 

Reynaud,  Paul:  In  the  Thick  of  the  Fight.  New  York,  1955. 

Ribbentrop,  Joachim  von:  Zwisclien  London  und  Moskau. 
Erinnerungen  und  letzte  Aufzeichnungen.  Leone  am  Starn- 
berger  See,  1953. 

Riess,  Curt:  Joseph  Goebbels:  The  Devil's  Advocate.  New 
York,  1948. 

Ritter,  Gerhard:  Carl  Goerdeler  und  die  deutsche  Wider- 
standsbewegung.  Stuttgart,  1955. 

Roepke,  Wilhelm:  The  Solution  of  the  German  Problem. 
New  York,  1946. 

Rosinski,  Herbert:  The  German  Army.  Washington,  1944. 

Rothfels,  Hans:  The  German  Opposition  to  Hitler.  Hins- 
dale, 111.,  1948. 

Rousset,  David:  The  Other  Kingdom.  New  York,  1947. 

Russell,  Bertrand:  A History  of  Western  Philosophy.  New 
York,  1945. 

Sammler,  Rudolf:  Goebbels:  The  Man  Next  to  Hitler.  Lon- 
don, 1947. 


Bibliography  1543 

Sasuly,  Richard:  I.  G.  Farben.  New  York,  1947. 

Schacht,  Hjalmar:  Account  Settled.  London,  1949. 

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The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich 

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Thompson,  Dorothy:  Listen,  Hans.  Boston,  1942. 
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Witzig,  Rudolf:  “Die  Einnahme  von  Eben-Emael.”  Wehr- 
kunde,  May  1945. 


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INDEX 


INDEX 


Aa  Canal,  959,  963 
Aachen,  401,  1413,  1415,  1416, 
1418 

“AB  Action,”  875-76 
Abbeville,  946,  958,  962,  971, 
976,  982,  997 

Abwehr  (Intelligence  Bureau), 
see  under  OKW 
Abyssinia,  see  Ethiopia 
Adam,  Gen.  Wilhelm,  502,  512, 
513,  525 

Addis  Ababa,  408 
Adlerangriffe  (“Operation 
Eagle”),  1016-1018 
Adlon  Hotel,  598,  789,  791,  814, 
857,  1059,  1440 
Adolf  Hitler  Schools,  352 
A.E.G.,  (Allgemeine  Elektrizi- 
taetgesellschaft),  204 
Africa,  123,  see  also  North 
Africa 

Afrika  Korps,  1191-92,  1201-09, 
1400 

Aga  Khan,  987 fn. 

Ahnenerbe  (Institute  for  Re- 
serrch  into  Heredity),  1276, 
1278 

Air  Force,  German,  see  Luft- 
waffe 

Aisne  river,  970 

Alanbrooke,  Field  Marshal  Lord, 
962 

Albania,  630,  1066,  1070,  1072, 
1076,  1077,  1082,  1307 
Albert  Canal,  954,  955 
Alexander  I,  Czar  of  Russia, 
721,  1318 

Alexander,  Gen.  Sir  Harold, 
1201,  1341,  1437 
Alexandria,  Egypt,  1071,  1191, 
1201 

Alfieri,  Dino,  987,  993 
Algeria,  1067,  1206 
Algiers,  1206 

Allianz  insurance  company,  203. 
287 

Allied  air  operations,  1300,  1347, 


1350,  1418,  1420,  1426;  bomb- 
ing of  Germany,  1021-24, 
1058-1059,  1244,  1310-1312, 
1315,  1333,  1338,  1340,  1347, 
1423,  1428,  1438,  1440 
Allied  commandos,  1245 
Allied  Supreme  War  Council, 
891/n.,  918,  945 

Allies,  Nazi  hopes  for  dissension 
among,  1313,  1340,  1353, 

1411,  1417,  1418,  1425 
Alsace,  541,  1278 fn.,  1416,  1420 
Alsace-Lorraine,  90,  394,  589, 
848,  976 

Altmark  (Ger.  auxiliary  ship), 
897,  898 

Alvensleben,  Werner  von,  255 
Amann,  Max,  79,  120,  339,  998 
Amau,  Vice-Minister,  1157 
Amen,  CoL  John  Harlan,  708 fn., 
1249 

America  First  Committee, 
1085/n.,  1140 
Amery,  Leopold,  808 
Amsterdam,  943,  950 
Andalsnes,  932,  933,  934,  936 
Angell,  Norman,  1029 
Anglo-German  naval  agreement 
(1935),  395-398,  566,  628,  633, 
654/n. 

Anglo-Polish  treaty  (1939),  733, 
740,  751,  757 

Annunziata,  Collar  of  the,  647 
Anti-Comintern  Pact,  410,  481, 
591,  612,  618,  625 /«.,  638,  676, 
697,  718-719,  1160 
anti-Hitler  conspiracy,  505-518, 
547-551,  555-559,  569-575,  690, 
707,  742-745,  784,  790,  856-67, 
870-72,  886,  912-16,  941,  942, 
948,  991/n.,  1109/n.,  1111/n., 
1180-1187,  1302,  1315-1405 
anti-Semitism,  43-48,  59,  67 fn., 
68,  74,  77,  134,  155,  209,  326, 
330,  346,  505,  see  also  Jews 
“Anton,”  1205,  1206 
Antonescu,  Ion,  1050/n.,  1293 
1549 


1550 


Index 


Antwerp,  945,  954,  956,  1000, 
1014,  1410,  1415,  1426 
Arabia,  1062 
Arabian  Sea,  1055 
Archangel,  U.S.S.R.,  1063, 

1138/n. 

Arco-Valley,  Count  Anton,  57 
Ardennes  Forest,  946,  953,  1219, 
1415-23,  1438 

armistice:  of  1918,  see  under 
World  War  I;  of  1940,  see 
Franco-German  armistice; 
Franco-Italian  armistice 
Army,  German  (and  Reichs- 
wehr),  98-102,  132,  137,  170, 
202,  225-26,  258,  280,  293, 
327,  357-58,  359,  363,  368,  403, 
413-14,  418,  448,  616,  1305-06 
Under  the  Republic:  polit- 
ical activities,  17,  54-56,  64, 
73,  75,  84-87,  98,  99-100, 
193-195,  211-213,  224-227, 
245,  251,  255-57,  263,  304; 
policy  on  armistice  and  Ver- 
sailles terms,  55-56,  84,  91- 
94,  96,  98,  100,  387,  391, 
393;  attitude  toward  Repub- 
lic, 54-56,  84-95,  99-100, 
195-200,  260-61;  suppresses 
leftists,  57-59,  86-87,  101, 
232;  relations  with  Nazis  (to 
1934),  73,  74-75,  108-111, 
117,  195-201,  206,  224-226, 
255-57,  258-263,  274-276, 
285-289,  297-300,  305,  313- 
315,  318 

Hitler  Era:  subordination  to 
Hitler,  313-315,  318,  435, 
437-38,  482-83,  870-872, 

991/n.,  1101,  1133-1135;  ex- 
ansion  and  reorganization 
y Hitler,  349-351,  387,  391- 
393,  411,  421,  435-436,  654, 
1132;  generals’  opposition  to 
Hitler,  423-24,  481,  497-504, 
653,  690-691,  851-54,  1088- 
89,  1093,  1121-1124,  1195- 
96,  1199-1201,  1211-1212, 
1417;  Blomberg-Fritsch  af- 
fair, 427-439,  481-484;  gen- 
erals’ plot,  434,  505,  507, 
513-518,  532,  547,  559,  572- 
575,  690-691,  742-745,  856- 
861,  870-872,  913-916,  1 ISO- 
1186,  1316-1318,  1322-1323, 
1324-1327,  1332-1345,  1352- 
1405 

Invasion  Plans  and  Cam- 
paigns: Austria,  457,  458; 


Balkans,  1070-71,  1076; 

Britain,  982,  996-1008, 
1016,  1025;  Czechoslovakia, 
493,  497-503,  511-18,  524- 
5,  532-3,  544,  554,  578,  600; 
Danzig  and  Memel,  613, 
628,  666;  Mediterranean 
area,  1193—4;  North  Africa, 
1084,  1191-3;  Norway  and 
Denmark,  889,  899-901, 
920-24,  932,  935-8;  Poland, 
618,  621-2,  664-6,  677, 

690-1,  707,  711,  731,  740-5, 
756,  782—4,  794,  827,  828, 
832,  838,  872-4,  1231;  Rus- 
sia, 1044-9,  1063,  1065, 

1078,  1087-90,  1093,  1106- 
09,  1117,  1119-39,  1150, 
1161,  1177,  1196-1201, 
1205,  1209-20,  1316-7; 
Western  Europe,  652,  677, 
782,  817,  838,  840,  851-5, 
862,  867,  870-1,  914-15, 
939,  941-72,  958-9,  962-9, 
975 

Setbacks  and  Defeat:  retreat 
in  Africa,  1201-3;  Italy, 
1294,  1298-1300;  Russian 
front,  1307-8,  1351,  1354, 
1409,  1423-5,  1432;  in  west, 
1345-52,  1409-11,  1413-23, 
1427,  1429-31;  total  mobil- 
ization, 1411;  desertions, 
1413,  1428-9;  rout  and  sur- 
render, 1434-37,  1443-5, 

1454-57,  1460,  1462,  1466, 
1476,  1477 

War  Crimes  and  Violations 
of  Geneva  Convention, 
1225,  1233,  1235,  1241, 

1247-50,  1270,  1415/n., 
1422/n.,  1428 
Army,  German,  units: 

Army  Groups: 

— A (eastern  front),  1196 
— A (western  front),  945, 
957,  964,  965,  1001-2 
— B (in  Alps),  1298 
— B (eastern  front),  1197 
— B (western  front,  1940), 
965,  1002 

— B (western  front,  1944- 
45),  1338,  1348,  1351, 
1395,  1434 
— C,  855 

—Center,  1117,  1120,  1122, 
1125,  1128,  1130,  1132, 
1 1 80/n.,  1182,  1235,  1316, 
1322,  1351,  1357,  1409 


Index 


1551 


—Don,  1210-12 
— G,  1477 
— H,  1429 

—North,  664,  827,  828, 
1117,  1121,  1180/n. 

— South,  664,  1088,  1117. 

1121,  1127,  1180/n. 

— Ukraine-North,  1235 
Armored  Groups: 

— Third  Tank,  1130 
— Fourth  Tank,  1130,  1131, 
1133 
Armies: 

—First,  525,  1477 
— First  Panzer,  1127,  1195, 
1197,  1213 
— Second,  525,  1353 
— Second  Panzer,  1130. 
1131 

—Third,  525,  664,  827,  873 
— Fourth,  525,  664,  827, 
1126,  1130,  1131,  1133, 
1137 

— Fourth  Panzer,  1195-97, 
1201,  1209-1211 
— Fifth  Panzer,  1419,  1434 
—Sixth,  951,  954,  956,  958, 
962,  963,  1002,  1008, 

1026,  1127/n.,  1188,  1194, 
1195,  1200,  1205,  1210- 
12,  1214,  1215,  1216-17, 
1219,  1316 

—Seventh,  1347-1349 
— Eighth,  525,  664 
—Ninth,  1001,  1026,  1137, 
1235,  1454 

—Tenth,  525,  664,  827 
— Eleventh,  1249 
—Twelfth,  525,  1083 
— Fourteenth,  525,  664,  827 
— Fifteenth,  1347,  1434 
— Sixteenth,  1001 
— Seventeenth,  1213,  1308 
— Eighteenth,  950,  963,  972 
— Nineteenth,  1477 
— Replacement  (Home) 
Army,  1182,  1184,  1317, 
1322,  1337,  1343,  1356, 
1360,  1362,  1372,  1374, 
1381,  1382,  1393,  1403, 
1411 

— West,  Army  of  the,  502 
Corps: 

—1st,  741 
— Illrd,  557 
— XVth  Armored,  953 
— XVIth  Armored,  956 
— XIXth  Armored,  828,  953 
— XXXIXth,  951 


— XLIst  Armored  (Tank), 
953,  1125 

— XLVIlth  Armored,  1420 
— LXXVth,  1246 
— Afrika  Korps,  1191-93. 
1201-09,  1400 
Divisions: 

— 2nd  Panzer,  958 
— 3rd  Panzergrenadier,  1298 
— 4th  Panzer,  828 
— 6th  Panzer,  1335 
— 9th  Panzer,  951 
— 10th  Panzer,  1336 
— 18th  Grenadier,  1413 
— 21st  Panzer,  1349 
— 23rd  Infantry,  508 
—28th  Rifle,  1395 
— 163rd  Infantry,  927 
— 258th  Infantry,  1130 
— Volksgrenadier,  1361 
Brigades,  Regiments,  Bat- 
talions: 

— 12th  Artillery  Regt.,  483 
— 17th  Bamberg  Cav.  Regt., 
1335 

— 150th  Panzer  Brigade, 
1418 

— Guard  Battalion  Gross- 
deutschland,  1377 
Military  Districts  ( Wehrk • 
reise ) : 

—III  (Berlin),  392,  508, 
1344,  1377;  Berlin  Kom- 
mandanlur,  1337,  1378, 
1380 

— VII  (Munich),  59,  64 
Waffen  (Armed)  S.S.  Units, 
see  under  S.  S. 

Army  General  Staff,  84,  144, 
244,  457,  499,  502,  503,  514, 
515,  541,  572,  652,  653,  666, 
859,  867,  870,  889,  946,  985 fn„ 
994,  996,  1002/n.,  1016,  1088, 
1105,  1121-2,  1195-1201, 
1219,  1336,  1411,  1467,  1478; 
banned  by  Versailles  Treaty, 
91/n.,  96;  re-created  as  Trup- 
penamt,  96;  re-established, 
387,  392,  393/n.;  resignation  of 
Beck  as  Chief,  503-5,  744; 
apptmt.  of  Haider,  503-5; 
Haider  out,  Zeitzler  named, 
1199-1200;  Guderian  named, 
1402-3;  Krebs  named,  1443; 
see  also  Beck,  Ludwig;  Haider; 
Guderian;  Krebs;  Zeitzler 
Army  High  Command  (Ober- 
kommando  des  Heeres — 
OKH),  512-514,  661,  673,  682, 


1552 


Index 


717,  745,  759,  762,  764,  774, 
782,  870,  957-8,  1027,  1028, 
1030,  1057,  1065,  1073,  1078, 
1121-3,  1124 

Army  Law  (July  20,  1933),  289 
Arnhem,  1414 
Arras,  53 

Artists’  Club,  1315 
Aryan  superiority,  65,  122,  127- 
132,  151-152,  155,  204,  328, 
338,  345,  346 
Asch,  526,  544 

Ashton-Gwatkin,  Frank,  562-64 
Asia,  419,  1056,  1141,  1143, 
1155,  1166,  1178,  1309 
Asquith,  Herbert,  521 
Assmann,  Adm.  Kurt,  1365 fn. 
Associated  Press,  640 fn.,  1029 fn., 
1246 

Astakhov,  Georgi,  644-5,  659, 
669-70,  675,  676,  685 
Astor,  Lady,  510 
Athenia,  S.  S„  822,  842-5 
Athens,  1083 

Atlantic,  Battle  of  the,  1147/n., 
1150-55,  1169/n.,  1170,  1173- 
4,  1177-8,  1192,  1193-4,  1308, 
1309,  1427 

Atlantic  Charter,  1181 
atom  bomb,  1427 
atomic  energy,  347-8 
Attolico,  Bernardo,  511,  551, 
552-3,  561,  646,  678-9,  679 fn., 
734,  735,  738,  740,  751-2,  753, 
779-80,  799,  801—4,  850,  906, 
987 fn. 

Aufbau  Ost  (“Build-up  East”), 
1048 

August  Wilhelm,  Prince,  1185 
Auschwitz,  375,  878,  1238/n„ 
1260-8,  1276,  1284-5 
Austria,  41-51,  61,  101,  138-9, 
171,  184,  187,  192,  328-9,  445, 
452-3,  455,  485-6,  1042,  1163, 
1434-5,  1437;  Anschluss,  26, 
68,  125,  291,  385-423;  passim, 
440-89,  493-7,  570,  593,  617, 
691,  707,  723,  769,  784,  793, 
836,  868,  894,  905,  913-4,  937, 
1181;  Dollfuss  murder,  Nazi 
agitation,  309,  385-6,  406-7, 
440-1,  448,  464—5;  German 
invasion  plans,  399,  417-23, 
451,  457-9;  Hitler  ultimatums 
to,  446-51,  462-6,  468;  plebi- 
scite on  Anschluss,  456-61, 
473,  475-6;  Nazi  rule  estab- 
lished, 473—4,  476-7;  see  also 
Italy,  and  Anschluss;  Miklas; 


Schuschnigg;  Seyss-Inquart 
Austrian  Legion,  386,  446 
Austrian  National  Bank,  478 
“Autumn  Journey”  ( Herbst - 

reise),  1008 

Aviation,  Ministry  of,  388 
Avranches,  1397,  1409 
Axmann,  Artur,  1475 
Azores,  1071-2,  1150,  1178 
Azov,  Sea  of,  1213,  1308 

Babarin,  E.,  668-9 
Bach-Zelewski,  1254/rc. 
Baden-Powell,  Lord,  1029 
Bad  Harzburg,  216 
Bad  Nauheim,  299,  1438 
Badoglio,  Marshal  Pietro,  1297, 
1298,  1302/n.,  1303,  1306 
Bagdad,  1086,  1087 
Bahama  Is.,  1031,  1032,  1034, 
1036,  1037,  1039 
Baku,  1047,  1061,  1229 
Baldwin,  Stanley,  415 
Balkan  States,  291,  983,  1042, 
1054,  1056,  1060,  1069,  1070, 
1071,  1073,  1078-88,  1100, 
1107,  1213,  1306,  1415,  1423 
Ballerstedt,  Herr,  70 
Ballestrem,  Countess,  1331 
Baltic  Sea,  731,  891,  916,  936, 
1060,  1092,  1100,  1110,  1117, 
1188,  1434,  1449 
Baltic  States,  649,  661,  662,  670, 
671,  686,  687,  695,  712,  720, 
721,  833-5,  836,  869,  879-80, 
883,  901,  937 fn.,  983,  1041, 
1042,  1045,  1047,  1049,  1051, 
1064,  1078/n.,  1091,  1117, 

1226,  1228,  1377 
Bamberg,  181 
Banat,  1081/n. 

Bank  of  France,  1230 
Bank  of  Norway,  927 
Baranov,  1424 

“Barbarossa,”  1045,  1063-7, 
1073,  1078-81,  1086-8,  1098, 
1107-8,  1142,  1152;  see  also 
Army,  German,  invasion  plans 
and  campaigns,  Russia;  Soviet 
Union,  Hitler’s  aims  toward 
Bardia,  1084 
Barmen,  329 
“barons’  cabinet,”  231-2 
Barth,  Karl,  347 
Baruch,  Bernard,  1029/n., 
1172/n. 

Basel,  749 
Bastogne,  1419-22 
Batum,  1061 


Index 


1553 


Bavaria,  50,  57-61,  65,  69-72, 
77,  81,  97-104,  386,  1435, 
1480;  Hitler  difficulties  with 
govt.,  169,  170,  185,  224,  231 
(see  also  Beer  Hall  Putsch); 
local  govt,  abolished,  279; 
Nazi  rule  in,  280,  305,  1327- 
1328;  see  also  Munich 
Bavaria,  Kingdom  of,  139 
“Bavarian  Joe,”  432 
Bavarian  People’s  Party,  169, 
273,  280 

Bavarian  “People’s  State,”  57 
Bayerlin,  Gen.  Fritz,  1192/n., 
1193/n.,  1203 

Bayreuth,  148,  153,  158,  385, 
408,  1378 

BBC,  342,  743,  818,  992,  1300, 
1347,  1456 

“Beast  of  Belsen,”  see  Kramer, 
Josef 

Bechstein,  Carl,  204 
Bechstein,  Helene,  75 
Beck,  Col.  Jozef,  512,  568,  612- 
15,  617-19,  622-5,  626 fn.,  628, 
630,  637,  638,  714-5,  723 fn., 
763,  770,  777-9,  801/n. 

Beck,  Gen.  Ludwig,  200,  387, 
393 fn.,  429,  457,  482,  506,  918; 
opposes  Hitler’s  military  plans, 
403,  423,  433-4,  496-504,  653; 
resigns  as  Gen.  Staff  Chief, 
503-4,  508,  572-3;  in  anti- 
Hitler  conspiracy,  508,  509, 
516/n.,  517,  570-5,  691,  744, 
859-860,  885,  1109/n.,  1111/n., 
1181,  1186,  1187,  1316-1322, 
1337,  1339-1341,  1344,  1345, 
1353-1354;  named  head  of 
First  Army,  525;  July  1944 
bomb  plot,  1357-1360,  1368, 
1373-1377,  1383,  1385-1387, 
1393,  1396;  death,  1385-1387 
Becker,  Dr.,  1251 
Beer  Hall  Putsch,  19,  26,  30, 
103-19,  162/n.,  168,  197,  206, 
307,  310,  386,  427,  924;  anni- 
versary celebrations,  117,  173, 
863,  1154,  1205,  1209,  1312 
Beethoven,  Ludwig  von,  36,  143, 
334,  446,  1219,  1263 
Beigbeder  y Atienza,  Col.  Juan, 
1031 

Belgian  Army,  945,  954,  958-962 
Belgian  government  in  exile,  961 
Belgium,  90,  404,  415,  421,  631, 
688,  707,  710,  747,  782,  814, 
838,  853,  1102,  1394;  German 
plans  for  invasion  of,  650,  652, 


695 fn.,  852-6,  858-63,  867, 
870,  879,  883,  886-7,  915,  936, 
937,  940-8,  973;  invasion  and 
battle  of,  939,  948,  952,  959- 
62,  970,  972,  1244,  1450;  King 
surrenders,  960-2;  German  oc- 
cupation, 966,  997,  1184,  1230, 
1247,  1311,  1338,  1360;  libera- 
tion, 1409,  1410,  1426 
Belgrade,  1079-83,  1265 
Bell,  Dr.  George,  1320-21,  1329 
Below,  Col.  Nicolaus  von,  1466, 
1467/n. 

Belsec,  375,  1260 
Belsen,  1277 

Benes,  Eduard,  471,  486-9,  492- 
6,  516/n.,  519,  528,  529,  533, 
538,  553,  560 fn.,  567,  568, 
595,  596-9,  603,  614,  624,  1029 
Benghazi,  1074,  1203,  1205 
Berchtesgaden  (and  the  Ober- 
salzberg),  26,  81,  163,  184, 
185,  234,  237,  392,  424,  425, 
443,  490,  491,  493,  494,  495, 
499,  637,  661,  695,  698,  700, 
1209,  1333,  1334,  1348,  1351, 

1435,  1448,  1452,  1463;  Berg- 

hof,  81,  186/n.,  444,  445/n., 
989,  1094,  1098,  1437,  1442; 
Berghof  diplomatic  confer- 
ences, 322,  409,  415,  444-51, 
452,  454,  456,  461,  463,  468, 
474,  521-4,  529,  549,  575,  612, 
614,  667,  677,  680-1,  685,  727, 
729,  734,  748,  1049,  1077- 
1079;  Berghof  military  meet- 
ings, 501-2,  513,  664,  687-91, 
705,  743,  873,  988,  1003,  1046, 
1075,  1108,  1151,  1351;  plot 
to  eliminate  Hitler  at,  1341, 
1357,  1358/n.;  Wachenfeld 

(villa),  127,  185,  188 

Berchtold,  Joseph,  172 
Berg,  Paul,  935 fn. 

Bergen,  899,  917,  918,  925,  933, 
949 

Berger,  Gottlob,  1446-1447 
Berggrav,  Bishop  Eivind,  935 fn. 
Berghof,  see  under  Berchtes- 
gaden 

Berlin:  Allies  advance  on,  1413— 
1414,  1424,  1431-32,  1434, 
1437,  1439;  Battle  of,  1394, 

1436,  1443,  1450-1455,  1463, 

1464,  1466-67,  1470,  1472- 
1475;  bombed  by  Allies,  1021, 
1022;  1024,  1059-1061,  1440; 
govt,  of,  379;  life  in,  dur- 
ing 1920s,  168;  Mussolini 


1554 

visit  414;  peace  rumor  riot, 
850 fn.;  people’s  apathy  to  war, 
536-7,  540,  557,  787,  789,  791, 
793-94,  813—14,  885;  revolu- 
tionary agitation  (1918),  83, 
86-7;  S.  A.  violence  in,  207, 
233 

Berlin,  University  of,  143,  144, 
160,  177,  333,  345,  346,  1027 
Berliner  Arbeiterzeitung,  175 
Berliner  Boersenzeitung,  201, 
920/rt. 

Berliner  Tageblatt,  177,  339 
Berlin  Philharmonic  Orchestra, 
335 

Berlin  State  Opera,  335,  392,  470 
Bernadotte,  Count  Folke,  1446, 
1449,  1456 
Berne,  858,  1321 

Bernstorff,  Count  Albrecht  von, 
507,  1330,  1393 

Bessarabia,  720,  724,  1042,  1049, 
1057 

Best,  Capt.  S.  Payne,  864-66,  913 
Best,  Dr.  Werner,  374 
Bethmann  - Hollweg,  Theobald 
von,  939 
Bialystok,  1117 
Bible,  banning  of,  332 
Biddle,  A.  J.  Drexel,  908 
Bieberback,  Ludwig,  346 
Birmingham,  England,  610,  1028 
Bismarck,  Otto,  Prince  von,  133, 
138-143,  218,  243,  245,  260, 
275,  279,  869,  1330,  1445 
Bismarck,  Otto  Christian,  Prince 
von,  1115 

Bismarck  (Ger.  battleship),  882 
Bismarck  Youth,  216 
Black  Front,  208 
“Black  Reichswehr,”  100,  211 
Black  Sea,  731,  881,  1056,  1064, 
1078,  1108,  1110,  1117,  1125, 
1188 

“Black  Wednesday,”  547-51,  554 
Blackshirts,  see  S.  S. 

Blaha,  Dr.  Frank,  1280 
Blaskowitz,  Gen.  Johannes,  1429 
Blomberg,  Ema  Gruhn,  426-430 
Blomberg,  Gen.  Werner  von, 
212,  256,  258,  289,  293,  298, 
304,  305,  312,  326,  393/n„ 
399-403,  408,  416-18,  422, 
424-38,  442,  453,  485,  507, 
653 

Blood  Purge,  299-304,  370,  372, 
374,  386,  530/n.,  1371-72;  see 
also  Roehm,  Ernst 
“Bloody  Week”  in  Berlin,  87 


Index 

Bluecher  (Ger.  heavy  cruiser), 
926-7 

Blum,  Leon,  468,  479,  1394 
Blumentritt,  Gen.  Guenther,  653, 
967,  1000,  1116 fn.,  1119,  1125, 
1126,  1129,  1131,  1136,  1348, 
1352/n.,  1396,  1397,  1405, 

1416 

Bock,  Field  Marshal  Fedor  von, 
827,  828,  965,  991/n„  1002, 
1117,  1121,  1124,  1128-1133. 
1137,  11807n.,  1182,  1195 
Bodelschwing,  Pastor  Friedrich 
von,  328 

Bodenschatz,  Gen.  Karl,  1298, 
1369/n. 

Boehm,  Adm.  Hermann,  705 fn. 
Boehm-Tettelbach,  Lt.  Col.  Hans, 
517 

Boer  War,  1247 

Boeselager,  CoL  Frh.  von,  1323, 
1393 

Boetticher,  Gen.  Friedrich  von, 
903,  985 fn. 

Bogorodsk,  1128 
Boguchar,  1212 

Bohemia,  488,  492,  518,  544,  578, 
579,  590,  593,  597,  598.  603, 
604,  607,  618,  793,  868,  905, 
1289,  1339,  1465 
Bohemia,  Kingdom  of,  486 
Bologna,  1437 

Bonham  Carter,  Lady,  1029 
Bonhoeffer,  Pastor  Dietrich,  507, 
1320-1321,  1329,  1393 
Bonhoeffer,  Klaus,  1393 
Bonn  government,  1238/n., 
1257/n. 

Bonnet,  Georges,  527,  528,  552, 
558-9,  589,  618,  714-5,  723 fn., 
800-801,  803-7,  810,  814-16, 
850 

Bono,  Marshal  Emilio  de, 
1306/n. 

Bonte,  Rear  Adm.  Fritz,  924, 
932 

book  burning,  333 
Boothby,  Robert,  641/n. 
Bordeaux,  972,  979-80 
Borisov,  1183 

Bormann,  Martin,  209,  332,  379, 
549 fn.,  1099,  1224,  1225,  1228, 
1378,  1433,  1443,  1448,  1451, 
1455,  1458,  1462,  1463,  1465, 
1466,  1469,  1471,  1473,  1474, 
1475 

Borovsk,  1137 

Bosch,  Dr.  Karl,  265 

Bose,  Herbert  von,  303,  309 


Index 


1555 


Bosporus,  Strait  of,  1054,  1058- 
62 

Bottai,  Giuseppe,  1295 
Boulogne,  959,  962,  1000,  1011, 
1014 

Boy  Scouts,  1029 
Bradley,  Gen.  Omar  N„  1397, 
1435 in. 

Brandenburg,  136,  233,  1344, 
1377,  1439,  1440 
Brandenburg  Gate,  19 
Brandt,  Col.  Heinz,  1324-5, 
1364,  1365,  1368 
Brandt,  Lt.  Gen.  Rudolf,  1275 
Bratislava,  594 

Brauchitsch,  Charlotte  von,  437, 
503 fn. 

Brauchitsch,  Field  Marshal  Wal- 
ther  von,  297,  439,  722,  936, 
1071,  1080,  1379;  named  Army 
C.  in  C.,  436;  and  CzechosL 
invasion  plans,  496,  498,  500- 
1,  503-4,  513,  514;  and  anti- 
Hitler  plot,  508,  550-1,  744-5, 
856-61,  870-1,  885-6,  914-16, 
1403;  and  Poland  invasion 

plans,  622-3,  648,  664-5, 

688/n.,  689,  690,  707,  741,  783, 
827,  830;  and  western  offen- 
sive, 838,  846-7,  851,  856,  941, 
945;  and  S.S.  brutality  in  Po- 
land, 872-3;  and  Weserue- 

bung,  899;  Dunkirk  and  stop 
order,  957-8,  963-6,  968-9;  at 
Compibgne,  976,  977-8;  made 
field  marshal,  991  fn.;  and 
Britain  invasion  plans,  1003, 
1007,  1009,  1026;  Russian 

campaign,  1045,  1062,  1078, 
1089,  1101,  1108,  1121-22, 

1123,  1124;  illness  and  “resig- 
nation,” 856-7,  1127/n.,  1131, 
1134,  1180 fn. 

Brauer,  Dr.  Curt,  895 fn.,  920, 
926-31,  935 

Braun,  Eva,  647/n.,  1441-3, 

1454,  1457-8,  1463,  1470,  1471 
Braun,  Gretl,  1455 
Braunau  am  Inn,  21,  25 
Brautigam,  Dr.  Otto,  1226-7 
Breda,  951 

Bredow,  Countess  Hanna  von, 
1330 

Bredow,  Gen.  Kurt  von,  309, 
311,  313,  438 

Bremen,  306,  309,  1434,  1437 
Bremen,  S.  S.,  1008 
Bremerhaven,  1480 
Brenner  Pass,  386,  459,  679,  736, 


909,  910-11,  1015,  1069 
Breslau,  294 
Brest,  1194 

Brest  Litovsk,  90.  721,  828,  831, 
1116/n.,  1236 
Brighton,  1001,  1008 
Bristol,  1002,  1028 
Britain,  139,  142,  353,  419,  605, 
1247,  1257;  collective  action 
with  France  and  Italy.  387, 
392,  397,  398,  407,  409,  420; 
appeasement  policy:  on  Ger- 
man rearmament,  389-92, 
395-8  (see  also  Anglo-Ger- 
man naval  agreement);  on 
Rhineland  remilitarization, 
399-405;  on  Italo-Ethiopian 
war,  398-9,  409;  on  Span,  civil 
war,  412;  on  Anschluss,  442, 
447,  450,  467-71,  480;  on 
Czechoslovakia,  481,  489-577, 
passim,  596,  605-11,  724  (see 
also  Munich  Conference  and 
Pact);  joint  policy  with 
France,  390,  392,  395,  399, 
404,  409,  420,  450,  521,  527, 
536,  539,  611,  620,  624,  630, 
670-4,  800-16;  Hitler’s  con- 
tempt for,  412,  419,  588,  691, 
706;  Hitler  considers  and  plans 
war  against,  410,  417,  420, 
498,  499,  567,  627,  648-52, 
666,  670,  679 fn.,  688,  694,  707, 
753—4,  782,  794-5,  819-822; 
pact  with  Italy  on  Mediter- 
ranean, 413;  policy  toward 
U.S.S.R.,  480,  491,  546,  619, 
625,  641-5,  655-9,  660-4,  670- 
7,  685-9,  695,  698,  699,  700-1, 
710-24,  733 fn.;  presses  Czechs 
to  appease  Hitler,  489,  510-11, 
525-8,  539,  543,  555,  562-4, 
567-8;  protests  Nazi  moves 
against  Czechs,  494-5,  607-8; 
contacts  with  anti-Hitler  Ger- 
mans, 505,  515-8,  547,  572, 
742,  857-60,  912-916,  1320-3, 
1329,  1331-2,  1352-3;  pledge 
of  aid  to  Poland,  619,  624-7, 
630,  633,  641,  644,  662,  677, 
680-1,  686-91,  695,  702,  710- 
24,  726-38,  739-42,  746,  750, 
756-82,  784-6,  790,  795-816, 
839;  pledges  aid  to  Greece, 
Rumania,  630,  662;  mobiliza- 
tion, war  preparations,  726, 
748,  789;  and  1939  “peace 
negotiations,”  756-82,  796- 
800;  ultimatum  and  declara- 


1556 


tion  of  war,  801-20;  at  war, 
838-9,  880,  909,  920,  1026, 
1058,  1084,  1118/m,  1181, 

1293-4,  1345,  1411,  1426, 

1434;  ship  losses,  841-5,  855, 
884,  938,  970,  1017,  1178/n„ 
(see  also  Atlantic,  Battle  of 
the;  British  Navy);  German 
peace  offers  to,  845-50,  966-7, 
982-985,  1030,  1036-7,  1095- 
8,  1314-15,  1477-8;  German 
attitude  and  strategy  toward 
in  war,  869,  884,  999,  1003, 

1009,  1012,  1046-7,  1054, 

1055,  1061,  1108,  1113-14, 
1117,  1140-4,  1195,  1243, 

1459;  joint  strategy  with 
France,  840,  850,  978-80;  ex- 
peditionary force  to  Finland, 
891,  901/n.;  involvement  in 
Norway,  893-4,  896,  901/n., 
915-18;  invasion  of,  988,  990, 
993,  996-1030,  1045,  1066, 
1070,  1075,  1142,  1149,  1349; 
air  operations  against  (Battle 
of  Britain),  993,  1003,  1005, 

1010,  1016-1026,  1061,  1085, 
1113,  1311,  1350,  1426;  Ger- 
man occupation  plans  for, 
1026-1030,  1038;  Vichy  war 
against,  1068-69,  1072,  1206; 
Japanese  war  against,  1141, 
1142,  1147/n.,  1159-62,  1166, 
1169,  1170,  1309;  alliance  with 
Russia,  1098,  1110-11,  1313, 
1341,  1425;  in  Mediterranean, 
1065-66,  1070-73;  U.S.  aid  to, 
1148,  1151-55.  1170,  1176, 
1178 

British  Admiralty,  917-8,  925, 
962,  968,  1166 

British  Air  Force  (R.A.F.),  543, 
841,  925,  988,  1084,  1194, 
1202,  1289,  1323,  1350;  in 
Battle  of  France,  953,  963, 
969-970,  974/n.;  in  Battle  of 
Britain,  997-1000,  1003,  1004, 
1006,  1007,  1011,  1014-24; 
bombing  of  Germany,  1021, 
1023,  1059,  1220,  1310,  1312, 
1387,  1428,  1440,  1448,  1449 

British  Army,  572,  681,  711,  817, 
888,  901/n.,  933,  943,  1244-5, 
1414,  1434;  in  France  and  Bel- 
gium, 722,  839,  840,  944,  945, 
948,  952,  953,  957,  958,  961, 
962,  969-71;  Norway  expedi- 
tion, 918,  932,  934;  defense 
against  invasion,  1002/n.,  1004, 


Index 

1007;  in  N.  Africa,  1073/n„ 
1074,  1084,  1191-92,  1201- 
1202;  in  Greece,  1079,  1083, 
1084;  Normandy  landings, 
1340,  1347-48;  in  Germany, 
1413,  1415,  1430-31,  1434 
1437,  1480 

British  Empire,  397,  419,  730-1, 
757,  763,  967,  971,  982,  985, 
989,  991,  994,  1054,  1057, 
1061,  1069,  1086,  1087,  1095. 
1189 

British  Intelligence,  493,  863-66. 

1032,  1035,  1331 
British  Navy,  542,  543,  652,  738, 
854,  884-5,  896,  925-6,  932, 
953,  962-3,  970,  971,  1066, 
1142,  1204;  blockade  of  Ger- 
many, 906-7,  924,  1194;  ship 
losses,  938.  969-70,  1178/n.; 
defense  against  invasion,  997, 
1000,  1003,  1004,  1006,  1007, 
1011 

British  White  Paper,  390 
Brittany,  1397,  1409 
Broadcasting  House  (Rundfunk- 
haus),  750,  789,  992,  1381 
Brockdorff,  Countess  Erika  von. 
1354/n. 

Brockdorff-Ahlefeld,  Gen.  Count 
Erich  von,  508,  557 
Brockdorff-Rantzau,  Count  Ul- 
rich von,  661 

Brown  House,  Munich,  172-3 
Brownshirts,  see  S.A. 

Bruckman,  Hugo,  204 
Brueckner,  Lt.  Wilhelm.  102, 
385 

Bruening,  Heinrich,  89 /«.,  194, 
195,  212-19,  221-30,  242,  245, 
266,  273,  278,  300,  505 
Bruenn,  Czechoslovakia,  597 
Brunswick,  221 
Brussels,  887,  939,  1410 
Bryans,  J.  Lonsdale  (“Mr.  X”). 

913,  914 
Bryansk,  1125 
Bryant,  Arthur,  962 fn. 

Buch,  Maj.  Walther,  174,  307, 
581-82 

Buchenwald,  375,  479-80,  1237, 
1275,  1280 

Buchrucker,  Major,  100 
Bucovina,  1042,  1049 
Budapest,  1416/n.,  1423 
Budenny,  Marshal  Semen,  1118, 
1122 

Buehler,  Dr.  Josef,  1258 
Buelow-Schwante,  Ambassador 


Index 


1557 


von,  862,  939-40 
Buerckel,  Josef,  594 
Buergerbraukeller,  see  Beer  Hall 
Putsch 

Bug  river,  828,  833,  982 
Buhle,  General,  1362 
Bulgaria,  1049,  1050/n.,  1054, 
1056,  1058,  1060,  1061,  1062, 
1071,  1076,  1079,  1083,  1099, 
1110, 1409 

Bulge,  Battle  of  the,  308 fn., 
1244;  see  also  Ardennes  Forest 
Bullitt,  William  C„  406,  908 
Bullock,  Alan,  278,  554/n„ 

1363/n. 

Bund  Deutscher  Maedel,  171, 
351 

Bund  Oberland,  108,  110,  111 
Burckhardt,  Dr.  Carl,  572 fn., 
668 

Burgdorf,  Gen.  Wilhelm,  1399- 
1400,  1458,  1462,  1465,  1470, 
1475 

Burnett,  Air  Marshal  Sir  Charles, 
673 fn.,  674/n. 

Busch,  Gen.  Ernst,  1001 
Bussche,  Capt.  Axel  von  dem, 
1333 

Busse,  General,  1440 
Butcher,  Capt.  Harry  C„  1301/n., 
1304/n. 

Buttlar-Brandenfels,  Col.  Frh. 
Treusch  von,  1205 

Cadogan,  Sir  Alexander,  760, 
774,  796,  809 
Caen,  1347 

Calais,  959,  963,  1000,  1011, 
1347 

Canada,  902/n.,  991,  1194 
Canadian  Army,  1410,  1413, 
1415,  1431,  1434 
Canaris,  Adm.  Wilhelm,  452, 
508,  516/n.,  547,  622,  627, 
690,  692,  740,  742,  745,  790, 
865,  871-2,  904/n.,  1322,  1329, 
1332,  1342,  1345,  1394 
Canary  Is.,  1066,  1072,  1150 
“Canned  Goods,”  694,  789 
Canterbury,  Archbishop  of,  469 
Cape  Verde  Is.,  1072,  1178 
Cap  Gris-Nez,  1000 
Caprivi  de  Caprara  de  Monte- 
cuccoli,  Gen.  Count  Georg 
von,  245 
Carinthia,  476 
Carlyle,  Thomas,  1439 
Carl,  Prince,  of  Denmark,  see 
Haakon  VII,  King  of  Norway 


Carls,  Adm.  Rolf,  890 
Carol  II,  King  of  Rumania, 
1050 jn. 

Carpathian  Mts.,  1340 
Carpatho-Ukraine,  Republic  of, 
605 

Carr,  Edward  Hallett,  644/«. 
Casablanca  Conference,  1341 
Case  Otto,  417,  457,  458,  466 fn.; 

see  also  “Otto” 

Case  Richard,  417 
Cases  Green,  White,  Yellow,  see 
Green;  White;  etc. 

Caspian  Sea,  1188,  1195 
Catholic  Action,  303,  309,  325 
Catholic  Trade  Unions,  266, 
282 fn. 

Catholic  Youth  League,  325,  349 
Caucasia  (the  Caucasus),  1091, 
1122,  1125,  1127,  1132,  1138, 
1188-1191,  1195-1200,  1213, 
1214 

Caulaincourt,  Marquis  Armand 
de,  1126 

Cavour  (It.  battleship),  1073/n. 
Center  Party,  88,  95,  193.  195, 
221,  231,  233,  238,  242,  254, 
260,  266,  273,  278,  280,  324 
Central  Security  Office,  see 
R.S.H.A. 

Chagall,  Marc,  338 
Chalons-sur-Mame,  957 
Chamberlain,  Houston  Stewart, 
152-159 

Chamberlain,  Neville,  379,  390, 
415,  518,  605,  724,  850,  858, 
863,  868,  891,  897,  943,  1022, 
1321;  condones  Anschluss, 
442,  453,  468-9,  480;  “Mu- 
nich” policy  on  Czechosl., 
395,  481, 489,  494,  510-11,  517, 
520-40,  542-77,  580,  587,  596- 
7,  603,  606-7,  609-11,  629, 
708,  974,  1068;  policy  toward 
U.S.S.R.,  480,  638,  640-4, 
654-5,  658,  662-3,  671-4,  723; 
opposes  Hitler  on  Poland,  611, 
618-9,  625,  626,  627,  690,  715, 
726-8,  730 fn.,  731-2,  739-42, 
748,  756,  760-2,  764,  769-80, 
774,  1096;  warns  Hitler,  de- 
clares war,  805,  808-810,  813, 
818;  says  Hitler  “missed  the 
bus,”  917;  Churchill’s  tribute 
to,  818 

Chamberlain,  Field  Marshal  Sir 
Neville  Bowles,  152 
Charles  XII,  King  of  Sweden, 
1065,  1087 


1558 


Index 


Charleville,  964 
Chautemps,  Camille,  468 
Chelmno,  1260 

Cherbourg,  1002,  1011,  1014, 
1347,  1414 

Chicago  Daily  News,  1029 fn. 
Chicago  Tribune,  1169 fn. 
Choltitz,  Gen.  Dietrich  von, 
1410/n. 

Christian  X,  King  of  Denmark, 
916,  918,  920-924,  929/n. 
Christian,  Gen.  Eckard,  1447 
Christianity,  145,  149-50,  324, 
330,  331 

Christian  Socialists,  42,  44, 

476 

Christiansand,  894,  926 
Chuikov,  Gen.  Vasili  I.,  1473, 
1475 

Church  and  State,  324-33 
Church  Federation,  328 
Church  of  England,  1029 
Church  of  Jesus  Christ,  329 
Church  of  the  Old  Prussian 
Union,  326 

Churchill,  Winston  S.,  405, 

470/n.,  548/n„  573,  660 fn„ 
701-2,  722,  818,  839,  841, 
841/n.,  844,  849,  888,  963, 
969 fn.,  970,  987/n.,  992,  1031, 
1033,  1037,  1054/n.,  1059/n„ 
1061/n.,  1069/n.,  1094-98, 

1144,  1176,  1178/n.,  1181, 

1341/n.,  1435;  contact  with 
anti-Nazis,  515,  742,  1320, 
1332,  1353;  criticizes  Munich 
Pact,  appeasement,  546,  567, 
570-71,  574;  for  co-operation 
with  Russia,  546,  642,  655, 
1043;  strategy  in  Norway,  891, 
917-8,  925,  932,  937;  succeeds 
Chamberlain,  943;  and  French, 
Belgian  surrender,  949,  954, 
956,  960,  980;  determination 
to  fight  on,  971,  982,  983,  985, 
986-87;  Hitler’s  gibes  at,  990, 
1022-23,  1086,  1313,  1314; 
defense  of  Britain,  1002/n., 
1008,  1009,  1020,  1025,  1026, 
1030;  appeals  for  U.S.  aid, 
1086,  1087;  warns  Stalin  of 
Nazi  attack,  1105-1106 
Chvalkovsky,  Frantisek,  590, 
591,  598-602,  604/n. 

Ciano,  Edda,  1305 
Ciano,  Count  Galeazzo.  587-8, 
630,  747,  992,  1023,  1049, 
1052/n.,  1073/n„  1107,  1115, 
1118/n„  1163-64,  1168,  1192, 


1204,  1206;  meetings  with 

Hitler,  409,  680-84,  847, 

912,  967,  974,  988,  993,  1015, 
1069,  1070,  1077,  1079,  1190, 
1206-1207,  1213-14;  negotia- 
tion, pacts  with  Britain,  413, 
606;  mediation  in  Czech  crisis, 
551,  559,  561/n„  569;  Pact  of 
Steel  negotiation,  646-7;  and 
Italy’s  reluctance  to  go  to  war, 
679-85,  731-8,  751^t,  908- 
912;  anti-German  sentiment, 
683-4,  731-8,  847,  879,  1190; 
mediation  efforts  in  Polish 
crisis,  780,  799,  800,  803,  804, 
815;  French  armistice  terms, 
975;  ousted  as  Foreign  Min- 
ister, 1293;  in  anti-Mussolini 
revolt,  1295,  1305;  executed, 
1306 

Ciliax,  Vice-Admiral,  1194 fn. 
Cincar  - Markovic,  Aleksander, 
1079 

Circle  of  Friends  of  the  Econ- 
omy (Freundeskreis  der  Wirt- 
schaft),  204 

Circle  of  Friends  of  the  Reichs- 
fuehrer  S.S.,  204 
City  of  Flint,  S.S.,  855 
Civil  Service  Act  (1937),  344 
Civil  Service  Law  (Apr.  7,  1933), 
370 

Clark,  Gen.  Mark,  1301 
Clay,  Gen,  Lucius  D„  1422/n. 
Clemenceau,  Georges,  89-93, 
123 

Cohen,  Benjamin,  1172/n. 
Cologne,  180,  209,  249-52,  1220, 
1342 

Colson,  General,  816 
Columbia  Broadcasting  System, 
627 fn. 

Combat  League  of  Middle-Class 
Tradespeople,  287 
“Commando  Order,”  1245 
Commerz  und  Privat  Bank,  203 
“Commissar  Order,”  1089-1090, 
1093 

Committee  of  Independent 
Workmen,  61 

Committee  of  Seven  (Austrian 
Nazis),  441 

Communists  in  Czechoslovakia, 
488,  591 

Communists  in  Germany:  in 
post-World  War  I period,  57, 
59,  60,  83-4,  86-7,  99,  101, 
179,  183;  in  Reichstag,  180, 
203,  206,  239,  250;  brawls  with 


Index 


1559 


Nazis,  208,  231,  244,  692;  and 
Bruening,  214,  215;  in  1932-33 
elections,  221,  233,  241,  246, 
272;  suppression  of,  250,  264, 
266-7,  271-4,  278-9,  320; 
strategy  of,  an  aid  to  Hitler, 
257;  and  Reichstag  fire,  268- 
70,  371,  378;  and  anti-Hitler 
plot.  1354-55 
Como,  1468 

concentration  camps,  162,  309, 
320,  322,  330,  372-6,  440,  477, 
478,  666,  680,  691-92,  878, 
1242—43,  1259-1269,  1274- 

1288,  1291,  1303,  1344,  1372, 
1393,  1482;  see  also  Ausch- 
witz; Buchenwald;  Dachau; 
Mauthausen;  Sachsenhausen; 
Treblinka 

Condor  Legion,  408 
Compiegne,  52,  975-76,  996,  998, 
1076,  1115,  1207,  1478 
Confessional  Church,  326,  329, 
330 

Congressional  Record,  985 
Conspiracy  against  Hitler,  see 
anti-Hitler  conspiracy 
Constance,  Lake,  1401/n. 
Conwell-Evans,  Dr.  Philip,  858 
Cooper,  Alfred  Duff,  see  Duff 
Cooper,  Alfred 

Copenhagen,  899,  916,  919-924 
Corbin,  Charles,  805,  810 
Corsica,  975,  1208 
Cossack  (Br.  destroyer),  897 
Coulondre,  Robert,  589,  597-8, 
601,  607-8,  645,  722,  723 fn., 
732-3,  755,  776 fn.,  797,  801- 
803,  810/n.,  815-817 
Council  of  People’s  representa- 
tives, 86 

Courageous  (Br.  carrier),  854 
Coventry,  1025 
Coward,  Noel,  1028 
Cracow,  828,  876 
Craig,  Gordon  A.,  228 fn. 

Crete,  1084,  1086, 1206 
Crimea,  1122,  1123,  1133,  1228, 
1308 

Cripps,  Sir  Stafford,  1043,  1105— 
06,  1110 

Croatia,  735,  1081,  1084/n. 
“Cromwell,”  1009 
Croydon,  1018 
Csaky,  Count  Istvdn,  677-8 
Cuno,  Wilhelm,  203 
Curzon  line,  617 fn. 

Cvetkovic,  Dragisha,  1079 
Cyrenaica,  1073 fn.,  1074,  1084, 


1191/n. 

Czech  Broadcasting  House,  519 
Czech  Maginot  Line,  518 
Czechoslovakia,  125,  390,  405, 
421,  458,  470-71,  480,  481, 
483,  517,  540-41,  568-72,  589- 
611,  616,  633,  678,  724,  784, 
836,  851;  history,  485-89;  Hit- 
ler’s war  plans  against,  293, 
417.  420,  423,  453-4,  485-93, 
495-99,  502,  509,  512-16,  518- 
25,  532,  540,  544,  548-50,  571, 
572,  575-79,  589,  591,  941; 
pact  with  U.S.S.R.,  393,  481, 
492,  529,  531,  576;  mobilizes 
against  German  threat,  493-4, 
532-4,  543;  British,  French 
intervention,  495,  499,  510, 
516-39,  544-6,  551-5,  559-76, 
727  (see  also  Sudetenland); 
German  occupation  of,  603- 
11,  614,  617,  624,  626,  640, 
666,  691,  692,  707,  723,  761, 
769,  770,  869,  937, 1224,  1289- 
92,  1311,  1445 

Czechoslovakian  government  in 
exile,  1029 

Czechoslovak  National  Bank, 
591/n. 

Czernin,  Countess  Vera  (Frau 
von  Schuschnigg),  479 
Czerny,  Josef,  127 

D’Abemon,  Lord,  162 fn. 
Dachau,  294,  310,  331,  374,  375, 
479,  480,  866,  1199/n„  1260/n., 
1265,  1269/n.,  1275,  1277, 
1280-82,  1285-1288,  1419/n., 
1422/n. 

Dahlem,  329,  330,  1360 
Dahlerus,  Birger,  689-90,  757- 
63,  766,  774-76,  781,  785,  795, 
796,  800,  811,  846-7,  906 in. 
Daladier,  Edouard,  489,  520, 
527,  528,  536,  554,  558-68, 
571,  573,  597,  713,  715,  732, 

755,  806,  807 fn.,  809,  815, 
850,  901/n.,  974 

Dallin,  Alexander,  1231/n. 
Dalmatia,  735 
Daniels,  H.  G.,  396 fn. 

Danner,  General  von,  109 
Danube  river,  1079,  1340,  1437 
Danzig,  68,  125,  237,  290,  295, 
488,  590/n.,  612-25,  628,  633, 
649,  653,  665-68,  678 fn.,  680, 
681,  683 fn.,  728,  749,  755, 

756,  760-761,  764,  766,  772, 
773-780,  795.  799,  802-5,  845 


1560 


Index 


Dardanelles,  1054,  1058-62 
Darlan,  Adm.  Jean,  806,  974 fn., 
1206,  1208/n. 

Darrastaetter  und  Nationalbank, 
192 

Darre,  Walther,  209,  355-56 
Davies,  Joseph  E.,  640 fn.,  T2Afn. 
Dawes  Plan,  192,  1230 
Dawson,  Geoffrey,  396 fn. 
Decamp.  General,  806 fn. 

Decline  of  the  West,  The 
(Spengler),  95 

Defense  Law,  Secret  (May  21, 
1935),  358,  393 fn. 

De  Gaulle,  Gen.  Charles,  979, 
1072 

Degesch  of  Dessau,  1266 
Dekanozov,  Vladimir,  1041,  1112 
Delp,  Father  Alfred,  1392 fn. 

De  Luce,  Daniel,  1029/n. 
Democratic  Party  (Staatspartei), 
88,  260,  280 

Denikin,  Gen.  Anton,  119/n. 
Denmark,  90,  139,  631,  661/n„ 
747;  Germany  plans  for  inva- 
sion of,  895,  899-901,  909; 
German  conquest  of,  916-924, 
929 fn.,  936,  937 fn.,  938,  939, 
942,  1040;  German  occupa- 
tion, 693 fn.,  1017,  1247,  1437; 
surrender  of  Germans  in,  1477 
Der  Angriff,  208,  339 
Der  Deutsche  Erzieher,  344 
Der  Fuehrer  (Karlsruhe  newsp.), 
750 

Derousseaux,  General,  960 
Dema,  1192 fn. 

Der  Stuermer,  48,  80,  155 
Der  Totale  Krieg  (Ludendorff), 
357 

Desna  river,  1124 
Deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
339,  814 

Deutsche  Bank,  203 
Deutsche  Kredit  Gesellschaft, 
203 

Deutsche  Mathematik,  345 
Deutscher  Kampfbund  (German 
Fighting  Union),  98,  102,  103, 
111 

Deutscher  Wehrgeist,  196 
Deutsches  Jungvolk,  171,  350, 
352 

Deutsche  Zeitung,  220 
Deutschland  (Ger.  cruiser),  298, 
299,  314 

Deutschland  (Ger.  pocket  bat- 
tleship later  renamed  Luet- 
zow),  621,  691,  694,  842,  855 


“Deutschland  Erwache,”  72 
Deutschlandsender,  1381-83, 
1388 

“Deutschland  ueber  Alles,”  126, 
207,  278 

De  Valera,  Eamon,  635 
Devonshire  (Br.  cruiser),  935 
Dickmann,  Maj.  Otto,  1292/n. 
Die  Chemische  Industrie,  348 
Dieckhoff,  Hans,  542,  585 fn., 
1172 

Diehn,  August,  203 
Diels,  Rudolf,  268-9 
Dietl,  Brig.  Gen.  Eduard,  924, 
932,  934,  938,  1062 
Dietrich,  Otto,  202,  307,  312, 
339,  1118 

Dietrich,  Sepp,  308 fn.,  1119-20, 
1306,  1416,  1422/n. 

Dill,  Field  Marshal  Sir  John, 
1301/n. 

Dimitroff,  Georgi,  270 
Dinant,  952,  953,  1420 
Dingfelder,  Dr.  Johannes,  67 
Dirksen,  Herbert  von,  437,  489, 
495,  510,  611,  655,  672-3,  757 
Dirschau  bridge,  782,  795,  796 
Djibouti,  975 

D.N.B.,  386,  466,  683 fn.,  748-9 
830 

Dnieper  river,  1047,  1064,  1117, 
1122,  1308, 

Dobrudja,  1050/n. 

“Doctors’  Trial,”  1274 fn.,  1276, 
1282,  1284,  1285,  1288 
Doeberitz,  1373,  1378,  1379, 

1382/n. 

Doenitz,  Adm.  Karl,  843-44, 
1154;  Navy  C.  in  C„  1299, 
1302/n.,  1303,  1308,  1309 fn., 
1313,  1371,  1426,  1428;  com- 
mands forces  in  north,  1443, 
1445,  1455;  Hitler’s  successor, 
1462-67,  1469,  1472-77,  1480, 
1483 

Dohnanyi,  Hans  von,  914,  1182, 
1322,  1329,  1332 
Dollfuss,  Engelbert,  309,  318, 
385-6,  406,  407,  443,  444/n., 
452,  455,  464 

Dollman,  Gen.  Friedrich,  1346 
Dombas,  933 

Don  river,  1127,  1196-99,  1201, 
1205,  1209,  1210,  1212,  1214, 
1307 

Dondorf,  524 

Donets  Basin,  1064,  1122,  1188, 
1197,  1308 
Dordrecht,  950,  951 


Index 


1561 


Dortmund,  1310 
Dostler,  Gen.  Anton,  1246 
Doumenc,  General,  671,  710-16 
Dover  Straits,  994,  1004 
Drang  nach  Osten,  124—5;  see 
also  Europe,  German  expan- 
sion aims  in 

Drax,  Adm.  Sir  Reginald,  673, 
712-14,  721 

Dreesen,  Herr,  306,  530 /n. 
Dreesen,  Hotel,  Godesberg,  530, 
533-36 

Dresden,  1435 
Dresdener  Bank,  203 
Dressler-Andress,  Horst,  341 
Drexler,  Anton,  61-62,  65-68, 
73-74,  169 
Dubno,  1252 
Duesseldorf,  863,  1427 
Duesterberg,  Theodor,  221-3 
Duff  Cooper,  Alfred,  536,  567, 
1022 

Duilio  (It.  battleship),  1073/n. 
Dulles,  Allen,  1321,  1332-33, 
1341,  1391/n. 

Dunkirk,  959-60,  983,  1011, 

1014,  1020,  1083,  1346 
Durcansky,  Ferdinand,  590,  593, 
594 

Dyle  river,  943,  945,  954,  956 

Eagle's  Nest,  588 
Eastbourne,  1004,  1006,  1007 
East  Prussia,  228,  251-2,  256, 
295,  298,  326,  1392;  role  in 
Hitler’s  designs  on  Poland, 
612,  615,  618,  623,  629,  664, 
665,  741,  827;  Russian  drive 
on,  1351,  1357,  1409,  1415, 
1423-24,  1431 
Ebbinghaus,  Julius,  347 
Ebbutt,  Norman,  396,  1028 
Eben  Emael,  Fort,  954,  1068 
Ebert,  Friedrich,  58,  83,  85-87, 
88,  90,  91.  92,  100,  101,  110 
Echternach,  1418 
Eckart,  Dietrich,  64-5,  75,  78, 
81,  142,  160,  169 
Eckener,  Dr.  Hugo,  405/n. 
Economics,  Ministry  of,  358-62, 
424,  438,  665,  998 
Eden,  Anthony,  297,  390,  396, 
403-4.  468,  663,  1022,  1176, 
1321 

Education,  ministry  of,  344 
Edward  VIII,  King  of  England, 
see  Windsor,  Duke  of 
Eger.  523,  526,  544 
Egypt,  994,  1066,  1071,  1072, 


1077,  1084,  1086,  1113,  1191- 
93,  1196,  1201 
Egypt,  Khedive  of,  987 fn. 

Eher  Verlag,  121,  339-40 
Ehrhardt,  Captain,  70,  101 
Ehrhardt  Brigade,  58,  70 
Eichmann,  Karl  Adolf,  477, 

1254,  1273 
Eicke,  Theodor,  375 
Eidsvold,  930 

Eidsvold  (Norw.  naval  vessel), 
924 

Einsatzgruppen,  1249,  1254, 

1255,  1259,  1269,  1377,  1478 
Einsatzkommando,  1266 
Einsatzstab  Rosenberg,  1232 
Einstein,  Albert,  333,  345-48, 

1330 

Eisenhower,  Dwight  D.,  1206- 
09,  1293,  1299,  1301,  1301/n„ 
1346,  1396,  1397,  1413-15, 
1419/n.,  1426,  1434-35,  1449, 
1456,  1477 
Eisner,  Kurt,  57 
El  Agneila,  1191  fn. 

El  Alamein,  1191,  1193,  1195, 
1201,  1202,  1204,  1219,  1220 
Elbe  river,  1434-37,  1443 
Elberus,  Mount,  1195 
El  Gazala,  1191/n. 

Elizabeth,  Queen  (Consort), 
1033 

Ellis,  Havelock,  333 
Ellis,  Maj.  L.  F„  964 fn. 

Elser,  Georg,  865-67 
Eltz-Rubenach,  Baron  von,  231 
Elverum,  928,  930 
Emden  (Ger.  light  cruiser),  926 
Enabling  Act  (Mar.  23,  1933), 
273-4,  276-79,  318,  378 
Enderis.  Guido,  1173/n. 
Engelbrecht,  Gen.  Erwin,  927 
England,  see  Britain 
English  Channel,  854,  945-46, 
953,  956-59,  962,  970,  982, 
988,  1000,  1001,  1003,  1009, 
1011,  1014-17,  1024,  1065, 
1066,  1074,  1194,  1293,  1315, 
1338,  1341,  1346 
Epp,  Gen.  Franz  Ritter  von,  75, 
172,  279 

Ernst,  Karl,  269,  306-9 
Erxleben,  Father,  1330 
Erzberger,  Matthias,  59,  70,  81, 
91 

Espirito  Santo  Silva,  Ricardo  do, 
1036-37 

Essen,  305,  1238 

Esser,  Hermann,  79-81,  169 


1562 


Index 


Estonia,  661  fn.,  662,  720,  721, 
724,  834,  1041,  1092,  1254 
Ethiopia  (Abyssinia),  398,  399, 
407,  408,  413,  630,  753,  975 
Europa,  S.  S.,  1008 
Europe,  German  expansion  aims 
in,  122-5,  353,  386,  394,  417, 
422,  547,  577,  579-80,  587 fn., 
589,  649,  653,  1043,  1044, 
1048,  1092,  1095-96  1099- 
1100,  1467;  German  rule  over, 
20,  139-40,  575-7,  981,  994, 
1043—44,  1075,  1223-1292, 

1309, 1404-5, 1480, 1481;  Nazi- 
Soviet  division  or  East,  686, 
687,  697,  720,  731.  748,  835, 
845,  1043,  1059-62;  post-war 
settlement,  1313,  1318,  1340- 
41 

Excalibur,  S.  S.,  1038 
extermination  camps  ( Vemicht - 
ungslager ),  878,  1259-1269 

Falaise,  1397 

Falkenhausen,  Gen.  Alexander 
von,  1184,  1338,  1359,  1394 
Falkenhorst,  Gen.  Nikolaus  von, 
898-900,  918,  931/«„  935 fn. 
Falkenstein,  Maj.  Frh.  von,  1150 
Fall  Gelb,  see  Yellow,  Case 
Fall  Gruen,  see  Green,  Case 
Fall  Rot,  see  Red,  Case 
Fall  Weiss,  see  White,  Case 
Fallersleben,  368 
Fatherland  Front,  62 
F.B.I.,  1105 

Feder,  Gottfried,  60,  61,  66-8, 
125,  180  202,  284,  361,  998 
Fegelein,  Gen.  Hermann,  1446, 
1455, 1457 

Feiling,  Keith,  416/n.,  619/n. 
“Felix,”  1071-72,  1074 
Fellgiebel,  Gen.  Erich,  1337, 
1343,  1362,  1366-69,  1373, 
1374, 1392 
Feltre,  1294 
Femegerichte,  101  fn. 

Fermi,  Enrico,  348 
Feuchter,  George  W.,  1014/n. 
Feuchtwanger,  Lion,  333 
Fichte,  Johann  Gottlieb,  143-145 
“Final  Solution”  of  Jewish  prob- 
lem, 1223-1260,  1273,  1288 
Finke,  Doctor,  1284 
Finkenkrug,  948 

Finland,  388,  662,  671,  720,  721, 
724,  747,  833,  898,  907,  937, 
937/n.,  1047,  1057,  1062,  1229, 
1409;  German  arms,  troops  in. 


1051-57,  1061-63,  1108,  1121- 
22, 1125;  Soviet  attack  on,  879- 
80,  883,  891  893,  901 
Firebrace,  Colonel,  672 fn. 
Fischer,  Dr.  Fritz,  1274/n. 
Fischer,  Louis,  1029 fn. 
Fischboeck,  Doctor,  448 
Fischlham,  27 
Fish,  Mildred,  1354/n. 

Flandin,  Pierre  Etienne,  404 
Fleming,  Peter,  1030 
Flensburg,  868,  1477,  1480 
Florence,  Italy,  1069,  1070 
Flossenburg,  1394 
Foch,  Marshal  Ferdinand,  976- 
77 

Fodor,  M.  W.,  1029/n. 

Foerster,  Wolfgang,  433 
“folkish  state,”  130-32 
Folklore  Museum,  Berlin,  1355 
Forbes,  Sir  George  Ogilvie,  762, 
775-6,  785,  796,  811,  846,  857 
Ford,  Henry,  209,  368 
Ford  Motor  Co.,  1185 
Foreign  Ministers’  Conference, 
Moscow,  1341 

Foreign  Office,  German,  415,  424, 
457,  495,  524,  525,  584,  590- 
94,  607-608,  611,  630,  654, 
667 fn.,  678,  727,  748,  758 fn., 
789 fn.,  793.  902 fn.,  904 fn., 
947,  984-86,  1144,  1151,  1167, 
1172,  1173/tj.;  Hitler  tightens 
control  of,  names  Ribbentrop 
head  of,  437,  443;  subsidizes 
Sudeten  Nazis,  488;  anti-Hitler 
plotters  in,  516/n.,  517,  548; 
prods  Hungary  on  Slovakia, 
579;  negotiations  with  U.S.S.R., 
638-9,  642-3,  657,  658,  668, 
700,  704,  723 fn.,  835 fn.,  881, 
883,  1054,  1059,  1101;  and 
Baltic  States,  662;  see  also  Rib- 
bentrop; Weizsaecker 
Fomebu,  927,  928 
Forster,  Albert,  667 
Forster,  E.  M.,  1028 
Four-Year  Plan,  362,  366,  378, 
412,  424 

France,  125,  311-12,  394,  395, 
404.  411-15,  505,  541,  620, 
630,  631,  706,  707,  748,  891, 
940;  relations  with  pre-Hitler 
Germany,  90,  95,  98,  123, 
139,  290,  293,  295;  op- 

poses German  rearmament, 
391,  392,  397-8;  pact  with 
Russia.  392,  399-400;  and 
Rhineland  remilitarization. 


Index 


1563 


400-5,  447;  policy  on  Spanish 
war,  409-12,  413;  opposition  to 
Anschluss,  387,  407,  442,  447, 
450,  456/n.,  467,  471,  480;  pre- 
war relations  with  Italy,  399, 
409-12,  413,  575,  799,  800-03, 
905,  911;  correlation  of  policy 
with  British,  390,  397-8,  521, 
523—4,  527,  539,  543,  545,  588, 
620,  630,  805-09,  891;  German 
war  plans  against,  417,  419, 
420,  423,  559,  648-53,  666, 
668,  679,  707,  752-5,  782,  785; 
appeasement  of  Hitler  on 
Czechosl.,  481,  489-92,  494-9, 
502,  509,  510,  512-34,  536-9, 
541-8,  552-4,  559-77  passim, 
592,  596,  604,  605-9;  pact  with 
Germany,  589;  supports  Po- 
land against  Germany,  611, 
615,  619,  625,  628,  680,  681, 
687-90,  702,  715-6,  723-4, 
732-3,  737-8,  742,  746,  755, 
756,  769,  777-8,  785,  790,  795, 
798,  800-809,  839;  policy  on 
Soviet  collective-security  bid, 
640,  642,  644,  645,  655-6,  661- 
4,  671-7,  685,  695,  710-16, 
720-4;  declaration  of  war  on 
Germany,  815-17;  at  war,  820, 
822,  836,  839,  840-42,  852-54, 
861,  870,  880,  883,  886,  888, 
909;  German  “peace"  propos- 
als, 846-51,  967;  Battle  of,  943, 
948,  950-51,  958,  966,  970, 
1084,  1114,  1147;  collapse, 
971-75;  German  occupation, 
997,  1017,  1076,  1205,  1206-07, 
1208,  1230,  1232,  1246-47, 
1257,  1262,  1291,  1298,  1311, 
1338,  1341,  1345,  1346,  1359, 
1377,  1381,  1409;  Vichy  govt., 
1057,  1067,  1068-69,  1072, 
1113,  1204,  1206-07;  Allied  in- 
vasion and  second  Battle  of, 
1345-52,  1354,  1359,  1397, 
1409,  1410, 1427,  1477-78;  see 
also  French  Air  Force;  French 
Army;  French  Navy 

Franck,  James,  345 

Franco,  Gen.  Francisco,  408, 411, 
566,  706,  1033,  1038,  1066, 
1067,  1072,  1074,  1142 

Franco-German  armistice 
(1940),  974-82,  996,  997, 

1040,  1041,  1076,  1115,  1207, 
1478 

Franfois-Poncet,  Andre,  20,  230, 
240,  245,  276,  311,  399,  400-1, 


402.  425/n.,  435,  551-2,  562, 
574,  800 

Franco-Italian  armistice  (1940). 

975,  978-79,  981-82 
Franco-Polish  Military  Conven- 
tion (May  19,  1939),  839 
Franco-Prussian  War,  969 
Frank,  Hans,  174,  197,  209,  370- 
71,  380,  874-76,  1224,  1232, 
1236,  1269,  1482,  1483 
Frank,  Karl  Hermann,  519,  603-4 
Frankfurt,  272,  1414-15,  1430 
Frankfurter,  Felix,  117 2/n. 
Frankfurter  Zeitung,  56 /«.,  303, 
339, 354 

Franz,  Josef,  Emperor,  45 
Frascati,  Italy,  1300 
Frauenfeld,  Alfred,  386 
Frederick  the  Great,  133,  237, 
275,  339,  707,  709,  1184,  1411, 
1439 

Frederick  III,  King  in  Prussia, 
136-7 

Free  French,  979 
Freidin,  Seymour,  1116/n., 
1192//!. 

Freikorps  (“free  corps”),  57,  64, 
70,  84,  87,  102,  211 
Freisler,  Roland,  371,  1389-90, 
1397 

French  Air  Force,  806,  970-73 
French  Army,  574-7,  710,  712— 
15,  721-2,  738,  755,  806,  815, 
1410;  mobilization  of,  807, 
817,  839;  Battle  of  France, 
838,  840,  888,  945,  948,  950- 
54,  956-59,  961,  962-63,  969- 
72;  in  Norway,  933;  repulses 
Italians,  973 

French  Army  High  Command, 
958-59,  974/n.,  1031 
French  Army  (Free  French), 
1279,  1410,  1430,  1477-78 
French  Army  (North  African), 
1206 

French  colonies,  1009 
French  Foreign  Legion,  934 
French  Navy,  806,  974,  980, 
1072,  1076,  1208 

French  North  Africa,  980,  1067 
French  Yellow  Book,  609 /«., 
723/n.,  776/n.,  801/n.,  803, 
815 

French  West  Africa,  1149,  1151 
Freud,  Sigmund,  333,  1029 
Frick,  Wilhelm,  105,  202,  206, 
208,  234,  239,  240,  243,  247, 
253,  258,  279,  280,  305,  330, 
341,  374,  379,  472,  666,  1483 


1564 

Fricke,  Rear  Adm.  Kurt,  844. 
998 

Friedeburg,  Adm.  Hans  von. 
1477 

Friedrich  Karl,  Prince  of  Hesse. 
880 fn. 

Friedrich  Wilhelm,  Crown 
Prince,  83,  206,  215,  221,  223, 
275,1185 

Frisch,  Rittmeister  von,  433,  481 
Fritsch,  Gen.  Frh.  Werner  von. 
298-99,  305,  418,  422-24 

428-38,  442,  453,  481-3,  497 
506,  508,  559,  587,  653,  1332, 
1344 

Fritzsche,  Hans,  1482 
Fromm.  Gen.  Friedrich,  859, 
1322,  1337,  1343,  1356  1359 
1367,  1374-77,  1382,  1384-87 
1393,  1397,  1405 
Fuehrerhaus,  Munich,  560.  565. 
976 

Fuehrerprinzip  (leadership  prin- 
ciple), 74,  125,  132 
Fuka,  1202, 1203 
Fuller,  Gen.  J.  F.  C.,  838,  839, 
1073/n. 

Funk,  Walther,  201-4,  234,  240, 
360,  426,  437,  666,  1267-68, 
1481-82 

Furtwaengler,  Wilhelm,  335 
Fuschl,  680,  686,  695, 1032,  1036, 
1141 

Gabeik,  Josef,  1289 
Galen,  Count,  330 
Galicia,  711 
Galland,  Adolf,  1018 
Gamelin,  Gen.  Maurice,  402, 
573,  712,  806,  807,  839,  840, 
945,  954,  956,  958 
Garbo,  Greta,  220 
Garda,  Lake,  1305 
Gauguin,  Paul,  337 
Gaus,  Friedrich,  657,  658,  720 fn., 
931 fn. 

Gdynia,  760,  773,  782 
Gebhardt,  Dr.  Karl,  1274/n. 
Geheimer  Kabinettsrat,  see  Se- 
cret Cabinet  Council 
Gehlin,  General,  1423 
Gembloux  gap,  954 
General  Motors  Corp.,  906 fn. 
Geneva  Convention,  1235,  1240. 
1245, 1428 

Geneva  Disarmament  Confer- 
ence, 256,  285,  293 
Genoa,  974 fn.,  1246 
George  VI,  King  of  England, 


Index 


469,  1033,  1069/n.,  1095 
George  Stefan,  1334,  1335 
Gera,  302,  303,  304 
Gercke,  Col.  Rudolf,  666 
German  Air  Force,  see  Luft- 
waffe 

German  Army,  see  Army,  Ger- 
man; Army,  German,  units; 
Army  General  Staff;  Army 
High  Command 

German  Broadcasting  Co.,  see 
Reich  Broadcasting  Corp. 
German  Christians’  Faith  Move- 
ment, 324,  325-6,  328,  331 
German  colonies,  415.  418-19 
848,982,1096  ’ ’ 

German  Evangelical  Church. 
1320 

German  Fighting  League  for  the 
Breaking  of  Interest  Slavery. 
60 

German  Fighting  Union,  see 
Deutscher  Kampfbund 
Germania,  304 

German  National  People’s  Party 
(Nationalists),  88,  168-9,  195. 
216,  218,  221,  223,  233,  239 
241,  242,  252,  254,  260,  264 
271,  273,  276,  280-81,  328 
German  Naval  Register,  733, 
740 

German  Navy,  see  Navy,  Ger- 
man 

German  Officer’s  League,  305 
German  People’s  Party  (former- 
ly National  Liberals),  88,  260, 
281 

German-Soviet  Boundary  and 
Friendship  Treaty,  835,  836, 


German  Workers’  Party,  61-7,  80 
Germany,  defeat  of,  in  World 
War  I,  52-56,  85 
Germany,  First  Reich,  133 
Germany,  history,  133-142 
Germany,  Republic  of  (1918— 
33),  17,  18,  55,  69,  71,  83- 
100,  133,  140,  162,  168,  172-3, 
193,  211-19,  228,  229,  232, 
239,  245,  279,  346,  370,  616, 
661,  940,  1403,  1439;  armed 
rebellions  against,  57-8,  86-8, 
93,  100-114  (see  also  Beer  Hall 
Putsch;  Kapp  putsch);  repara- 
tions problem,  81,  91,  96,  99, 
162,  167,  192,  194,  214,  217, 
1230;  birth  of,  83-8;  Weimar 
Constitution,  87-9,  93,  95. 
118,  179,  193,  215,  318,  333* 


Index 


1565 


370,  378;  economic  problems, 
95-7,  162,  167,  191-3,  214-5; 
Reichstag  elections,  194-5, 
231,  240,  264,  273;  1932  presi- 
dential elections,  215,  218, 
221-4;  ends  with  Hitler’s  ac- 
cession, 257,  296;  responsibil- 
ity for  death  of,  259-62; 
churches’  opposition  to,  325— 
8,  370 

Germany,  Second  Reich  (1871— 
1918),  133,  139,  141,  143, 
158,  275,  346 

Gerothwohl,  Prof.  M.  A.,  162 fn. 
Gersdorff,  Colonel  Frh.  von, 
1326,  1327,  1333 
Gessler,  Otto,  99,  101/n.,  101 
Gestapo  (Geheime  Staatspolizei, 
Secret  State  Police),  268-9, 
308-9,  320,  380,  405/n„  692- 
3,  693 fn.,  864,  867,  927, 

1027/n.,  1029,  1030,  1206, 

1288,  1329;  Himmler  named 
chief  of,  299,  300;  harass- 
ment of  churches,  325,  328- 
31;  establishment  of,  373-4, 
376;  Fritsch  frameup,  434, 
481,  482,  508;  in  Austria, 
474 fn.,  478-9;  and  anti-Hitler 
conspirators,  516/n.,  580, 

1111/n.,  1184,  1303,  1319, 

1329-31,  1338,  1343,  1344, 
1354,  1360,  1367,  1381,  1388, 
1390,  1393-95,  1398,  1402, 
terror  in  Poland,  873,  876; 
execution  of  Russian  POWs, 
1243;  Jewish  Office,  1254,  1273 
Gibbs,  Sir  Philip,  1029 
Gibraltar,  994,  1009,  1066,  1068, 
1071,  1074,  1204-05 
Gide,  Andre,  333 
Gieseking,  Walter,  335 
Giesler,  Paul,  1327 
Gilbert,  Paul,  1327 
Gilbert,  Felix,  1303/n.,  1316/n. 
Giraud,  Gen.  Henri,  945,  951, 
1206 

Gisevius,  Hans  Bemd,  269, 
432/n.,  507,  548,  550-1,  555, 
557,  690,  743-5,  790,  860, 
867 fn.,  1321,  1341 
Gissinger,  Theodor,  30 
Givet,  945 

Glaesemer,  Col.  Wolfgang,  1382 
Glaise-Horstenau,  Edmund  von, 
448,  457,  460,  462 
Glasgow  (Br.  cruiser),  934 
Glasl-Hoerer,  Anna,  24 
Gleiwitz,  692-4,  789,  793,  796 


Gluecks,  Richard,  878,  1403 
Gneisenau,  Field  Marshal  Count 
August  Neithardt  von,  1334 
Gneisenau,  Germany,  1290 
Gneisenau  (Ger.  battle  cruiser), 
388,  938,  1194 

Gobineau,  Count  Joseph  Arthur 
de.  150-152,  154 
Godesberg,  306,  529-36,  537, 
546,  550,  561,  563,  569,  573, 
575,  818 

Goebbels,  Magda,  647 fn.,  1442, 
1445,  1458,  1470,  1474,  1475 
Goebbels,  Paul  Joseph,  18,  19, 
206,  217-43,  246-53,  254,  258, 
265-9,  811.  1097,  1134, 

1190/n.,  1294,  1297-1306, 

1310-11,  1312-13,  1314,  1378, 
1411,  1428,  1430/n.,  1482;  bio- 
graphical sketch,  176-83;  sup- 
ports radical  Nazi  faction, 
179-81,  202,  285,  299,  306; 
party  propaganda  chief,  207, 
208;  Reichstag  fire,  267-9; 
Propaganda  Minister,  274-6, 
281-2,  284,  303,  315,  322, 
333-43,  380,  387,  405/n„ 

437 fn.,  466,  472,  493,  524, 
536,  538,  598,  749-50,  787-8, 
844,  855,  863,  884/n„  886, 
955,  972 fn.,  1021,  1024,  1127, 
1302,  1341/n.,  1435-36;  role 
in  Roehm  purge,  306,  307; 
book  burning,  control  of  arts 
and  letters,  333-43;  persecu- 
tion of  Jews,  580-1,  583-4, 
1289;  target  of  anti-Hitler 
plotters,  1343,  1379-82,  1384, 
1388-90;  last  days,  1439- 
1445,  1456,  1458,  1462-64, 
1471-76 

Goerdeler,  Carl,  505-6,  507, 
517,  691,  742,  860,  862,  871, 
885,  915,  942,  1109/n., 

Ill  {fn.,  1181,  1186,  1187, 
1315/n.,  1316,  1319-21,  1322, 
1328,  1329,  1332,  1336-38, 
1339,  1344,  1353-54,  1354, 
1358-60, 1392 
Goerdeler,  Fritz,  1392/n. 
Goering,  Carin  von  Kantzow 
(n6e  Baroness  Fock),  79,  206 
Goering,  Hermann,  18-19,  81, 
169,  205,  206,  235,  243,  247, 
252-6,  263-5,  272,  302,  321, 
322,  372,  374,  388,  408,  412, 
416/n.,  436,  630-1,  706,  708, 
745,  811,  886,  887,  902,  905- 
06,  1066.  1094,  1097,  1140, 


1566 


1149.  1206,  1299,  1310,  1401, 
1416,  1425,  1426,  1462-63; 
background,  78;  in  Beer  Hall 
Putsch,  105,  111-4;  drug  ad- 
diction, 206;  in  Reichstag, 
227,  238-9,  274,  634;  heads 
Prussian  police  and  govt., 
258,  266-7,  279,  280,  284, 
300;  and  Reichstag  fire,  268- 
72;  “Hitler  is  the  law,”  283, 
369;  military  rank,  300,  436, 
991/n.;  opposes  Roehm,  brings 
about  purge,  299-301,  305-9, 
312;  anti- Jewish  program, 
327,  580-7;  economic  dictator 
of  Reich,  360,  379,  425-6; 
Nazification  of  courts,  369- 
73;  animosity  toward  Ribben- 
trop,  410,  647;  meetings  with 
Mussolini,  413,  630-1,  641-2, 
1189,  in  on  war  prepara- 
tions, 418,  648,  665-6,  688 fn., 
689-90,  740-41;  and  Blom- 
berg-Fritsch  affair,  427-34, 
438-9,  481;  role  in  An- 

schluss, 457,  461-3,  465-8, 
471,  473;  role  in  Czechosl. 
annexation,  496,  519,  536, 
547,  561,  590,  590/n„  593, 
598,  601-2;  dealings  with 

Russia,  638-42,  740-41,  881; 
“Call  me  Meier,”  689/n.;  last- 
minute  peace  talks  with  Brit- 
ish, 757-60,  762,  765-67,  773- 
77,  781,  784-86,  811-12,  846; 
named  by  Hitler  as  his  suc- 
cessor, 794;  and  invasion  of 
Poland,  795,  796;  Norway 
campaign,  889,  893,  900,  918, 
936;  target  of  conspirators, 
886,  1326,  1343,  1357,  1364, 
1450;  western  offensive  and 
Battle  of  Britain,  948,  951-52, 
963-65.  970,  976-77,  997, 
1007 fn.,  1011,  1014,  1016- 
21,  1025,  1027;  invasion  and 
occupation  of  Russia,  1047, 
1091-94,  1118/n„  1210,  1216, 
1228,  1229;  bombing  of  Bel- 
grade, 1080,  1083;  “New  Or- 
der” atrocities.  1228-29, 
1232-33,  1234,  1240,  1244, 
1255-56,  1257,  1282;  succes- 
sorship  to  Hitler,  1438;  ac- 
cused of  treason,  ousted,  ar- 
rest ordered,  1451-52,  1457, 
1461-63,  1467,  1471-72;  in 
Nuremberg  dock,  1481 
Goerlitz,  Walter,  1219 


Index 

Goethe,  Johann  Wolfgang  von, 
143,  145,  335 

Golden  Badge  of  Honor,  506 
Goltz,  General  Count  Ruediger 
von  der,  898 
Gorki,  U.S.S.R.,  1138 
Gort.  Lord,  954,  961,  963,  968 
Goudsmit,  Prof.  Samuel,  1427 fn. 
Goy,  Jean,  387 

Graf  Spee  (Ger.  battleship), 
691,  694,  842,  855,  884-5, 
896-7 

Graebe,  Hermann,  1252-53 
Graefe,  Albrecht  von,  175 
Graf,  Ulrich,  79,  105,  111,  174 
Grandi  Dino,  1295 
Gran  Sasso  d’ltalia,  1303 
Grassmann,  Peter,  282 
Gravelines,  959,  963 
Gravesend,  1002,  1008 
Graz,  454 

Graziani,  Marshal  Rodolfo, 
1071,  1073/n.,  1074 
Great  Britain,  see  Britain 
Grebbe-Peel  Line,  950 
Greece.  630,  1060,  1069,  1070, 
1071,  1072,  1076,  1077,  1078- 
79,  1082,  1084-85,  1085,  1087, 
1088,  1100,  1102,  1103.  1145, 
1262,  1269/n.,  1291,  1307 
Green,  Case  ( Fall  Gruen ),  417, 
484,  485,  489-493,  495,  496, 
497,  513,  531 fn.,  532,  540, 
579,  941 

Greenwood,  Arthur,  808 
Greer  (U.S.  destroyer),  1153 
Greim,  Gen.  Robert  Ritter  von, 
1452-53,  1454,  1457 
Greiner,  Josef,  38 fn.,  49 fn. 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  521 
Groener,  Gen.  Wilhelm,  85-87, 
91-92,  196-97,  200,  211-12, 
219,  224,  225,  226,  227-28, 
229,  245 

Groscurth,  Col.  Hans,  859 
Grosz,  George,  337 
Grozny,  1188,  1195,  1197,  1213 
Gruene  Post,  340 
Gruhn,  Ema  (Frau  Blomberg), 
426-430 

Grynszpan,  Herschel,  580 
Grzesinski,  Albert  C.,  94 
Guariglia,  Ambassador,  805 
Gudbrandsdal,  932,  934 
Guderian,  Gen.  Heinz,  473,  827, 
828,  944,  953,  957,  959,  962, 
1119,  1121,  1123,  1125,  1126, 
1127,  1128,  1129-30,  1131, 
1133,  1180 fn.,  1402-05,  1417, 


Index 

1423-25,  1426,  1431-32 
Guernica,  408 

Guertner,  Franz,  114,  169,  231 
Gumbel,  E.  L,  347 
“Guns  before  Butter,”  321 
Gunther,  John,  1029/n. 

Gustav  V,  King  of  Sweden,  541, 
938/n.,  983,  986-87 
Gutkelch,  Doctor,  1236 
Guttenberg,  Karl  Ludwig  Frh. 
von,  507 

Guzzoni,  Gen.  Alfredo,  1077 
gypsies,  medical  experiments  on, 
1275 

Haakon  VII,  King  of  Norway, 
918,  921.  928-31,  934,  935, 
960 

Haber,  Fritz,  345 
Habicht,  Theodor,  385,  386 
Hacha,  Dr.  Emil,  568,  593,  597- 
602,  604/n.,  605-7,  614,  768- 
9,  779,  960 

Haeften,  LL  Werner  von,  1361, 
1367,  1385,  1386 
Hagelin,  Viljam,  894 
Hagen,  LL  Dr.  Hans,  1378-9, 
1389-90 

Hague,  The,  939,  950,  951,  1133 
Hague  Convention,  842,  1089, 
1233-35,  1240 
Hailsham,  Lord,  293 fn. 

Haldane,  J.  B.  S.,  1029 
Haider,  Gen.  Franz,  682-3/n., 
731  fn..  733,  740.  783,  991 fn., 
1071-72,  1075,  1080,  1126, 
1177.  1179,  1205,  1311;  ap- 
pointed Chief  of  Staff,  504; 
Czech  invasion  plans,  513;  in 
anti-Hitler  conspiracy,  508-9, 
514,  516/n.,  517,  547-51,  555- 
8,  570,  575,  690,  707,  743^1, 
855-61.  870-71,  915,  1184; 
Poland  invasion.  648,  652, 
665,  688-91,  705 fn.,  709,  729, 
748-9,  756,  769 fn.,  784,  790, 
827-28,  872,  874,  877;  Nor- 
way and  Denmark,  895,  899, 
900,  936;  war  in  west,  828, 
838,  847,  851-52,  856,  861, 
887,  944,  945,  956,  958,  963- 
69,  973,  978;  Britain  invasion 
plans,  983,  989,  998,  1003, 
1006-08,  1011,  1012,  1015- 
16;  Russian  invasion,  1044- 
47,  1063,  1065,  1078,  1088- 
89,  1101,  1108,  1115-16, 

1119-25,  1127 fn.,  1128-38, 

1148,  1191,  1195-96;  ousted 
as  General  Staff  Chief,  1196- 


1567 

99;  in  concentration  camp, 
1394,  1447 

Hale,  Prof.  Oron  J..  191,  340/n. 
Halifax,  Lord,  415-6,  468-9, 
587 fn.,  605,  891;  negotiations 
on  Czechosl.,  489,  494-5,  516, 
536,  554,  555,  558,  607-10; 
contacts  with  anti-Hitler  plot- 
ters, 517-8,  742,  913-14;  sup- 
port of  Poland  against  Ger- 
many, 624,  690,  715,  727, 
729-30 fn.,  757-8,  760-4,  767, 
769-71,  774,  776-7 fn.,  777- 
82,  795-97;  policy  on  U.S.S.R., 
641/n.,  663,  674,  715;  ulti- 
matums and  war  with  Ger- 
many, 801/n.,  803-07,  809- 
12.  813-14/n.,  815;  rejects 
Hitler  peace  bid,  993 
Hallawell,  Wing  Commdr, 
672 fn. 

Hamax,  927,  928,  932,  934 
Hambro,  Carl,  894 
Hamburg.  101,  231,  379,  922, 
988,  1310,  1341,  1434,  1437, 
1475,  1480 

Hamburg-Amerika  line,  203 
Hamilton,  Duke  of,  1095,  1096 
Hammerstein,  Gen.  Kurt  von, 
17.  18,  212,  225,  255,  256, 
289,  313,  507,  516/n„  525, 
856,  1344 

Hamsun,  Knut,  935 fn. 
Hanfstaengl,  Ema,  185 
Hanfstaengl,  Ernst  (Putzi),  75- 
76.  81,  113,  268,  1029 
Hanisch,  Reinhold,  38 fn.,  39 
Hanover,  180-1,  331 
Hansen,  Col.  Georg,  1345,  1393 
Hansestadt  Danzig  (Ger.  troop- 
ship). 922 

Hapsburgs,  the,  36,  43,  45,  49, 
142,  413,  417,  445,  452,  458, 
470/n.,  473,  475,  488 
Hardenberg,  Count  Hans  von, 
1182 

Haraack,  Arvid,  1354/n. 

Harrer,  Karl,  62,  66-67 
Harris,  CapL  Sam,  555-7,  743 
Harris,  Lt.  Commdr.  Whitney 
R..  1249 
Harstad,  933 
Harzburg  Front,  217 
Hase,  Gen.  Paul  von,  1337, 
1344,  1378,  1383,  1389 
Hassell,  Ulrich  von,  409,  413, 
437,  438,  504,  972 fn.,  1111/n., 
1172/n.;  anti-Hitler  conspir- 
acy, 506,  570,  690,  743,  744, 
784-5,  858,  871,  885,  913-15, 


1568 


Index 


1 109/n.,  llllfn.,  1181-1182, 
1184-87,  1319,  1328,  1336, 
1345,  1354;  executed,  1392 
Haug,  Jenny,  185 
Hauptmann,  Gerhart,  336 
Hausberger,  Fritz  von,  903 
Haushofer,  Albrecht,  1393 
Haushofer,  Gen.  (Prof.)  KarL 
77,  1098,  1393 
Havel  lake,  Berlin,  1465 
“Hay  Action,”  1235 
Hegel,  Georg  Wilhelm,  143-5, 
160,  161 

Heidegger,  Martin,  347 
Heidelberg  University,  177,  345 
Heiden,  Erhard,  172 
Heiden,  Konrad,  23,  25,  26,  38, 
49/n.,  65,  74,  113/n„  118, 
153,  176,  181,  185,  187,  188, 
310 

“Heiliger,  Max,”  1267-68 
Heilmann,  Horst,  1354/n. 
Heinemann,  General,  174 
Heines,  Lt.  Edmund,  172,  307, 
312 

Heinrici,  General,  1137 fn.,  1454 
Heiss,  Captain,  101 
Held,  Dr.  Heinrich,  169 
Helhorn,  Anke,  178-9 
Heligoland  Bight,  1008 
Helldorf,  Count  Wolf  von,  226, 
256,  428,  557,  1342,  1375, 
1381,  1393 

Hencke,  Andor,  568,  835/n. 
Hendaye,  1067,  1070 
Henderson,  Sir  Nevile,  469,  494, 
516-7,  522,  537,  539,  544/n., 
546,  552-5,  560,  561,  574, 

607-9,  683/n.,  723/n„  727, 
728,  729-31,  733,  734,  741, 

747,  756,  757,  760-78,  781, 

784-6,  795-8,  801-5,  810- 
11,  813,  814 

Henlein,  Konrad,  488,  489,  493, 
511,  516/n.,  519,  520,  523, 

524-5,  604 

Herber,  Lt.  Col.  Franz,  1385 
Hereditary  Farm  Law  (Sept.  29, 
1933),  355-6,  365 
Herfurth,  Gen.  Otto,  1384 
Hermann  Goering  Works,  360, 
477 

Herrenklub,  249,  268 
Herriot,  fidouard,  589 
Herrlingen,  1338,  1346,  1399 
Hersey,  John,  1269 fn. 

Herypierre,  Henry,  1277-79 
Hess,  Rudolf,  65,  78,  160,  209, 
217,  249,  289,  311/n.,  355, 


372,  379,  794,  976,  1232, 
1393,  1438,  1481-2;  back- 

ground, 76-7;  in  Beer  Hall 
Putsch,  105,  108,  112,  114; 
helps  Hitler  with  Mein 
Kampf,  119,  126;  directs  Nazi 
revolt  in  Austria,  441,  473; 
flight  to  Scotland,  1094-9 
Heusinger,  Gen.  Adolf,  1360/n., 
1364,  1365,  1369/n. 

Hewel,  Walter,  1430 
Heyde,  Lt  Col.  Bodo  von  der, 
1385 

Heydrich,  Reinhard,  373,  692-4, 
789,  867/n.,  1027-28,  1246, 
1328,  1482;  background,  376- 
7;  and  Fritsch  frameup,  431, 
434,  482;  persecution  of  Jews, 
477-8,  581-8,  874,  875,  1249, 
1255,  1256,  1273;  assassi- 

nated, 1288,  1323 
Heywood,  Major  General. 
673 fn.,  710 

Hiedler,  Johann  Georg,  22,  23 
High  Command  of  the  Armed 
Forces,  see  OKW 
High  Command  of  the  Army, 
see  Army  High  Command 
Hildesheim,  955 
Hilgard,  Herr,  583-4 
Hilger,  Gustav,  1059,  1061 
Himer,  Gen.  Kurt,  921-2 
Himmler,  Heinrich,  148,  176, 
204,  249,  332,  348,  374,  379, 
428,  480,  513,  581,  587 fn., 
665-6,  787,  864-67,  877,  886, 
1097,  1289,  1297,  1299,  1303, 
1345,  1427,  1438,  1439,  1443- 
47,  1472;  organization  of  S.S., 
Gestapo,  German  police,  172, 
209,  299,  314,  373-4,  377; 
rumored  to  have  killed  Geli 
Raubal,  187;  aids  in  Roehm 
purge,  299,  300,  305,  308; 
extermination  of  Jews,  327, 
873-5,  878,  1249,  1250-51, 
1253,  1254-5,  1256,  1258-59, 
1267,  1270,  1271,  1273;  Blom- 
berg,  Fritsch  frameups,  428, 
431—4,  481,  482;  Austrian, 
Czech  occupation,  472,  473, 
477-8,  604;  Polish  border 
“incident,”  691—4;  occupa- 
tion-of-Britain  program,  1027- 
8;  and  Russian-occupation 
policy,  1090,  1093,  1223-4, 
1239/n.,  1240,  1243;  medical 
experiments,  1275-6,  1278, 

1281,  1282,  1285-6,  1288;  and 


Index 


1569 


anti-Hitler  plotters,  1319, 
1320.  1326,  1328,  1329,  1332, 
1338,  1343,  1345,  1355,  1356, 
1360-2,  1364,  1369-70,  1372, 
1380,  1388,  1389,  1392-3, 

1450;  army  command,  1380, 
1382,  1393,  1403,  1411,  1422, 
1429;  attempt  to  displace  Hit- 
ler, 1392,  1449-50,  1455, 

1456,  1461,  1465,  1467;  cap- 
ture and  suicide,  1480,  1483 
Hindemith,  Paul,  335 
Hindenburg,  Major  Oskar  von, 
18,  211-2,  246,  253,  256,  315, 
316,  317 

Hindenburg,  Paul  von  Beneck- 
endorf  und  von,  17-21,  85-7, 
89 fn„  133,  194,  211-6,  218-9, 
225-31,  233-46,  250-6,  267- 
8,  271-80,  294,  299,  300,  302, 
304,  312,  378,  438,  707,  1140; 
armistice  of  1918  and  Ver- 
sailles Treaty,  55,  91-2;  1932 
presidential  elections,  201, 
218-25;  meetings  with  Hitler, 
18,  187,  214,  216,  235-7, 
242-3;  appointment  of  Hitler 
as  Chancellor,  18,  204,  257, 
262-6;  senility,  18,  19,  210, 
214;  last  illness,  285,  288, 
297-9;  death,  last  will  and 
testament,  314-9 
Hindenburg  (dirigible),  405/rt. 
Hipper  (Ger.  hvy.  cruiser),  925 
Hippke,  Lt.  Gen.  Dr.,  1282 
Hirohito,  Emperor  of  Japan, 
1166 

Hirt,  Prof.  August,  1275-79 
History  of  Frederick  the  Great 
(Carlyle),  1439 
Hitler,  Adolf: 

Personal  Life:  birth,  family 
background,  21-27;  early 
life  and  education,  27-35; 
artist’s  aspirations,  28,  33, 
34,  38;  women  in  his  life, 
33,  39,  54,  183-188,  647/m 
(see  also  Braun,  Eva;  Rau- 
bal,  Geli);  budding  polit- 
ical ideas,  33,  41,  55-56; 
youth  in  Vienna,  34-41; 
anti-Semitism,  46-48,  54- 
55,  59,  67 fn.,  68;  moves  to 
Bavaria,  joins  Army,  48-50; 
war  service,  wounds,  med- 
als, 53-54;  postwar  Army 
service,  59-61;  citizenship 
problem,  184-5,  221;  in- 
come tax  difficulties,  188— 


191;  his  reaction  to  Hess’s 
flight,  1094-99;  his  health 
failing,  1431-2,  1438;  mar- 
ries Eva  Braun,  1457-8; 
last  will  and  testament, 
1458-1463;  suicide  and  cre- 
mation, 1470-1472 

Party  Leader:  joins  German 
Workers’  Party,  61—70; 
debut  as  orator,  61-62,  70; 
formulates  Nazi  program, 
67-69;  is  jailed  for  assault, 
70;  becomes  party  dictator, 
72-74;  his  lieutenants,  76- 
80,  172-174,  205-210;  as- 
sociation with  Ludendorff, 
98-99;  leads  putsch,  101- 
114;  is  tried  for  treason, 
114-119;  in  prison,  writes 
Mein  Kampf,  119-133, 
163-4,  184;  his  ideological 
sources,  120-164;  rebuilds 
party,  167-210;  tightens 
control  of  party,  169-170; 
defeats  Strasser  faction, 
174—176;  courts  Army  sup- 
port, 195-201,  223-224, 

274-276,  287-290,  297-299; 
“heads  will  roll”  speech, 
198;  wins  big-business  sup- 
port, 201-205,  246-247, 

265-6;  meets  with  Hinden- 
burg, 214-216,  230,  235- 
237,  242,  257;  maneuvers 
toward  chancellorship,  214- 
257;  1932  presidential  elec- 
tions, 218-224;  purges 
Roehm,  party  radicals,  285, 

297- 314 

Fuehrer  and  Reich  Chan- 
cellor  DOMESTIC  POLICY: 

becomes  Chancellor,  17-21, 
255-262;  has  Reichstag  dis- 
solved, 263-7;  suppresses 
Communists,  266-273;  na- 
tionalizes state  govts.,  271, 
279-280;  opens  new  Reichs- 
tag at  Potsdam,  274-5; 
gets  Reichstag  to  abdicate, 
276-278;  dissolves  opposi- 
tion parties,  280-1;  outlaws 
trade  unions,  281-3;  issues 
anti-Jewish  laws,  283;  his 
policies  endorsed  by  elec- 
torate, 294-5;  wins  Army 
backing  for  Presidency, 

298- 9,  305;  succeeds  Hin- 
denburg as  President,  314- 
19;  wins  “unconditional 


1570 


Index 


obedience”  of  Army,  3 14 — 
15;  regiments  churches, 
324-333;  Nazifies  culture, 
333-8;  co-ordinates  labor, 
362-9;  reorganizes  courts, 
369-78;  reshapes  govt., 
377-81;  ousts  Blomberg, 
Fritsch,  Neurath,  Schacht, 
423-39;  assumes  absolute 
power  in  Reich,  1135;  con- 
spiracies to  depose  or  kill 
him,  505-509,  514-518, 

547-551,  555-559,  1316- 

1345,  1352-1405  (see  also 
anti-Hitler  conspiracy); 
presses  persecution  of  Jews, 
586-7,  592,  1223-1292;  pas- 
sim; beer  hall  bomb  plot, 
863-7. 

Fuehrer  and  Reich  Chan- 
cellor— FOREIGN  RELA- 
TIONS: signs  pact  with  Po- 
land, 295-6;  first  meeting 
with  Mussolini,  302;  quits 
League,  Geneva  Confer- 
ence, 293—4;  directs  Nazi 
agitation  in  Austria,  385-6, 
441-2;  aims  peace  propa- 
ganda abroad,  387;  abro- 
gates Versailles  Treaty,  387, 
391,  399-400;  “peace” 
speeches,  291,  292,  393-6, 
399,  413,  632-638,  845-6, 
989-992,  999;  expands 

armed  forces,  war  indus- 
tries, 387-91;  signs  naval 
pact  with  Britain,  396-7; 
remilitarizes  Rhineland,  de- 
nounces Locarno  Pact,  400- 
406;  signs  pact  with  Aus- 
tria, 407-408;  aids  Franco 
rebellion,  408-9;  forms 
Axis  with  Mussolini,  409- 
10,  413;  signs  Anti-Com- 
intern Pact  with  Japan, 
414;  receives  Duce,  gets 
go-ahead  on  Austria,  413- 
14,  467;  meets  with  Lord 
Halifax,  415-16;  annexes 
Austria,  440-481;  meets 
with  Schuschnigg  at  Bercht- 
esgaden,  444-451;  reas- 
sures Duce  on  Austria, 
458—59;  makes  entry  into 
Austria,  472-73;  directs 
Sudeten  Nazis,  486-88; 
urges  Hungary,  Poland 
against  Czechs,  511-12, 
524-25,  579;  demands  “jus- 


tice for  Sudetens,”  519; 
meets  with  Chamberlain  at 
Berchtesgaden,  521-24;  at 
Godesberg,  526-35;  de- 
mands Sudetenland  at  once, 
538-39;  at  Munich  Confer- 
ence, 559-67;  wins  Sudeten- 
land, 569-72;  dissatisfied 
with  Munich  award,  blames 
Chamberlain,  576-77;  an- 
nexes Memel,  578-9;  signs 
pact  with  France,  588-89; 
’‘liberates”  Slovakia,  589— 
97,  604-05;  takes  over  rest 
of  Czechoslovakia,  591-604; 
presses  Poland  to  cede 
Danzig,  Corridor,  612-615, 
617-18,  621-24,  666-68; 

replies  to  Roosevelt  peace 
appeal,  632-37;  signs  Pact 
of  Steel  with  Duce,  647;  ne- 
gotiates treaty  with  U.S.S.R., 
656-63,  668-72,  675-77, 

685-87,  694-705,  717-725; 
meets  with  Ciano  on 
war  against  Poland,  681- 
84;  replies  to  British,  French 
peace  appeals,  726-34,  756- 
781,  785—86;  is  let  down 
by  Duce,  734-742,  750-55; 
thanks  Duce  for  his  help, 
799,  819-20;  receives  Brit- 
ish, French  ultimatums, 
805-06,  810-11,  813-817; 
blames  British  for  war, 
817-818;  invites  Russia  into 
Polish  war,  821-823;  nego- 
tiates boundary  treaty  with 
U.S.S.R.,  833-836;  offers 

peace  to  Britain,  France, 
846-851;  is  criticized  by 
Duce,  879-881;  his  trading 
with  Soviets,  879-884, 
1041-42,  1048;  meets  with 
Sumner  Wells,  902-907; 
his  loyalty  to  Mussolini, 
912,  1370;  intervenes  in  Ru- 
mania, 1049-1051,  1053; 

signs  mil.  pact  with  Italy, 
Japan,  1051;  meets  with 
Molotov,  1054—1061;  invites 
Russia  into  Tripartite  Pact, 
1059-1062;  explains  inva- 
sion of  Russia  to  Duce, 
1112-1115,  81-82;  last 
meeting  with  Duce,  1370- 
71 

Warlord:  tells  generals  his 
plans  re.  Austria  and 


Index 


1571 


Czechs,  416-22;  plans  in- 
vasion of  Austria,  451,  457- 
59;  assumes  command  of 
armed  forces,  435;  ousts  16, 
transfers  44  generals,  435- 
37;  plans  war  on  Czechs, 
485-86,  489-90,  495-96, 

511-13,  539-40,  571,  578- 
79;  rages  at  Czechs*  arm- 
ing, 494-95;  meets  gen- 
erals’ opposition  on  war 
plans,  497-504,  512-14, 

855-6,  868,  1088-89, 

1120-24;  rages  against  de- 
featist generals,  513;  plans 
occupation  of  Danzig,  613- 
14;  takes  over  Memel,  620- 
21;  plans  Danzig  seizure, 
622,  628-29;  plans  war 

against  Poland,  622,  627- 
30,  648-49,  653-55,  664- 
67,  689-94,  706-08,  782, 
788-90;  prepares  for  war  in 
west,  648-55,  688,  706-08, 
782-83;  holds  up  attack  on 
Poland,  740;  begins  war  on 
Poland.  791-94;  directs  war 
strategy,  819-20;  conquers 
Poland,  838;  limits  naval 
operations,  842;  plans  of- 
fensive in  west,  838,  851— 
56,  861-2,  867-71,  885,  886, 
944-47;  Polish  occupation 
policy,  872-78;  plans  for 
war  on  Russia,  884;  ap- 
proves, leads  Norway  cam- 
paign, 889-90,  895-901, 

916-20,  935-38;  gets  Duce’s 
promise  to  enter  war,  910- 
12;  invades  Low  Countries, 
941-43,  948-56,  960-62; 

invades,  conquers  France, 
956-59,  963-81;  offers  peace 
to  Britain,  982-83,  986-94; 
plans  invasion  of  Britain, 
988-90,  993,  996-1039;  pro- 
motes 12  to  field  marshal 
991/n.;  plans  invasion  of 
Russia,  1044  49,  1062-65, 
1076-78,  1088-93,  1107- 

1116;  strategy  in  Mediter- 
ranean, N.  Africa,  1065-77; 
Balkan  campaigns,  1076, 
1078-82,  1088;  N.  African 
campaigns,  1084-86,  1 191— 
1193,  1201-09;  his  “Com- 
missar Order,”  1089-93; 
directs  Russian  campaign, 
1115-39,  1187-91,  1194- 


1201,  1209-20,  1306-8, 
1424;  his  “No  retreat,  no 
surrender”  order,  1 127, 
1132,  1135-37,  1202-3, 
1215;  ousts  generals  who 
retreat,  1127,  1132-33, 
1180/n.,  1199;  takes  over 
C-in-C  post,  1134;  col- 
laborates with  Japan,  1139— 
49,  1155-71,  1177;  policy 
toward  U.S.,  1140-41, 

1145-46/n„  1149-58,  1160; 
declares  war  on  U.S.,  1167- 
79;  takes  over  unoccupied 
France,  1207-8;  his  occupa- 
tion policy,  1223-92,  pas- 
sim; meets  with  Duce, 
1293—94;  orders  take-over 
in  Italy,  rescue  of  Duce, 
1296-1306;  refuses  to  visit 
bombed-out  cities.  1310; 
speculates  on  peace  possi- 
bilities, 1313-14;  directs  de- 
fense in  west,  1345-51, 
1409-1423,  1426-30,  1435- 
6;  orders  enemy  beachhead 
“annihilated,”  1348;  orders 
total  mobilization,  1411; 
directs  Ardennes  counter- 
offensive, 1415-23;  relies 
on  conflict  among  Allies, 
1411,  1417-18,  1425;  issues 
“scorched  earth”  directive, 
1432-33;  his  last  days,  in 
Berlin  bunker,  1437-73 
Hitler  (Schicklgruber)  Alois, 
23-26,  28,  31 

Hitler,  Alois  Matzelsberger,  25 
Hitler,  Angela,  see  Raubal,  An- 
gela Hitler 
Hitler,  Edmund,  25 
Hitler,  Franziska  Matzelsberger, 
24.  25 

Hitler,  Gustav,  25 
Hitler,  Ida,  25 

Hitler,  Klara  Poelzl,  25,  31,  32, 
33,  34,  35 

Hitler,  Paula,  25,  31,  1463/n. 
Hitler  Youth,  171,  344,  348-53, 
1465,  1466,  1475 
Hitzfeld,  General,  1382 fn. 
Hodges,  Gen.  Courtney  H„ 
1410,  1414,  1434 
Hoepner,  Gen.  Erich,  508,  557, 
956,  1130,  1133,  1372,  1373, 
1382,  1384-85,  1387,  1389 
Hoerlin,  Kate  Eva,  311/n. 

Hoess,  Rudolf  Franz,  878,  1255, 
1260-62,  1263,  1266-67 


1572 


Index 


Hofacker,  Col.  Caesar  von, 
1359,  1376,  1393,  1396-99 
Hofer,  Walther,  733/n. 

Hoffmann,  Heinrich,  79,  998 fn., 
1442 

Hoffmann,  Johannes,  57,  58 
Hoffmann-Schonfom,  Colonel, 
1413 

Hohenlohe,  Prince  Max  von, 
987 fn. 

Hohenlychen,  1446 
Hohenzollerns,  the,  84,  90,  123, 
137,  141,  142,  215,  274,  298, 
299,  317,  327,  475,  731,  1185 
Holland,  see  Netherlands 
Holstein,  139 
Holzloehner,  Doctor,  1284 
Hoover,  Herbert  C.,  192,  214 
Hoover,  J.  Edgar,  1105 
Hopkins,  Harry,  1167 
Horak,  Mayor,  1290 
Hore-Belisha,  Sir  Leslie,  894 
Horst,  Anna,  153 
Horst  Wessel  song,  19,  207, 
278 

Horthy,  Adm.  Mikl6s,  511,  605, 
1416/n. 

Hossbach,  Col.  Friedrich,  418, 
422,  423,  432 

Hoth,  Gen.  Hermann,  953, 
1130,  1211-2 
Houffalize,  1422 
Household  Year  for  Girls,  351 
House  of  German  Art,  Munich, 
337 

Hradschin  Palace,  Prague,  494, 
519,  567,  603 
Huber,  Kurt,  1327-8 
Huebner,  General,  1429/n. 
Huehnlein,  Major,  109 
Huetler,  Johann  von  Nepomuk, 
24,  25 

Huemer,  Eduard,  30 
Hugenberg,  Alfred,  195,  217, 
233,  242,  252,  255,  257,  265, 
273,  276,  280,  284,  287,  294, 
355 

Hull,  Cordell,  1105,  1143, 

1147/n.,  1156-57,  1158,  1160, 
1162/n.,  1165,  1169,  1172 
Hungary,  486,  491,  677-78, 

1049,  1060,  1080,  1083,  1107; 
encouraged  by  Hitler  to  seize 
Ruthenia,  511,  525,  541, 

564 fn.,  568,  577,  579,  593-95, 
605;  German  occupation  of, 
1099,  1104;  army  units  on 
Russian  front,  1137,  1187-8, 
1191,  1196;  Nazis’  mass  kill- 


ing of  Jews  of,  1265;  taken 
by  Russians,  1416/n.,  1423, 
1425 

Huntziger,  Gen.  Charles,  978-81 
Hurricanes  (Br.  planes),  1018, 
1019 

Huxley,  Aldous,  1028 

Iceland,  1149-50,  1151-1153 
I.  G.  Farben,  203,  265,  389, 
791-792,  878,  1261,  1266 
Igorka  rivers,  1100 
Illustrious  (Br.  carrier),  1073/n. 
Imredy,  Bela,  525 
India,  743,  745,  1155,  1178, 
1247 

Indian  Legion,  1430/n. 

Indian  Ocean,  1062,  1195 
Indochina,  1157 
Informationsheft,  1029 
Innitzer,  Cardinal,  475-76 
Innsbruck,  113-114,  456-57, 

736 

Institute  for  Military  Scientific 
Research,  1276 

Institute  for  Research  (For- 
schungsamt),  461 
Interior,  Ministry  of  the,  379, 
665-66,  1338 

“International  Commission”  on 
partition  of  Czechosl.,  563 fn., 
567,  568 

International  Military  Tribunal, 
1481 

Iran  (Persia),  994,  1062,  1195 
Iraq,  1086,  1087,  1103 
Ireland,  635,  854 
Irgens,  Captain,  931 
Iron  Cross,  53,  174,  392,  991/n. 
Ironside,  Gen.  Sir  Edmund,  674, 
901/n. 

Iserlohn,  1465/n. 

Istanbul,  1331 
Istria,  1306 

Italian  Air  Force,  739/n. 

Italian  Army,  738,  739/n.,  1071, 
1072,  1082,  1083,  1084,  1114, 
1138,  1189-91,  1192,  1196, 
1203,  1208,  1213,  1214,  1294, 
1300,  1302,  1307 
Italian  Navy,  738,  1073/n., 

1300,  1301/n. 

Italian  Social  Republic,  1305 
Italy,  142,  401,  404,  420-1,  487, 
588,  641-3,  656,  670,  682, 
706,  718,  1049-1050,  1054, 
1058,  1114,  1208,  1293, 

1294;  and  Anschluss,  291, 
386,  393,  407-8,  413,  414, 


Index 


1573 


442,  446,  456-9,  462,  467, 
470 fn.,  472;  prewar  policy  to- 
ward Britain,  France,  392, 
398,  407,  409-10,  413,  541, 
588,  678-9,  798,  906;  inva- 
sion of  Ethiopia,  398,  400, 

407- 9;  aid  to  Spanish  rebels, 

408- 12,  421,  1067;  in  Anti- 

Comintern  Pact,  410;  role  in 
German-Czech  crisis,  511,  545, 
546,  551-4,  559-68;  friction 
with  Germany,  541,  652,  659, 
729,  879-80,  902,  906,  1015, 
1069;  invasion  of  Albania, 
630,  1066;  military  alliance 
with  Reich,  646-8  ( see  also 
Pact  of  Steel);  reluctance  to 
take  part  in  war,  660,  677, 
678,  681-2,  683,  734-41,  746, 
750-4,  792,  798-805,  819- 
820,  850,  853,  869,  906-12; 
enters  war  against  France, 
973,  974,  978-79,  981-2, 

1147  (see  also  Franco-Italian 
armistice);  war  against  Brit- 
ain in  Mediterranean,  N. 
Africa,  975,  994,  1066,  1072- 
77,  1096,  1176,  1191-2,  1194, 
1204;  in  Tripartite  Pact,  1052, 
1059,  1162;  invasion  of 

Greece,  1069-72,  1077-9; 
royal  family  of,  1076,  1295; 
gets  slice  of  Yugoslavia,  1080, 
1083;  war  against  U.S.S.R., 
1115,  1144,  1189-90;  war 

against  U.S.,  1141,  1157, 

1163-64,  1169,  1174,  1177; 
Allied  landing  and  Battle  of 
Italy,  1204,  1246,  1293,  1300, 
1301,  1307,  1309,  1311,  1341, 
1345,  1354,  1428,  1437,  1476; 
ousts  Duce,  makes  peace  with 
Allies,  1293-1301,  1303;  Ger- 
man occupation,  1300,  1303- 
1306,  1311;  Fascist  Republi- 
can Party,  1305 

Jackson,  Robert  H.,  583 In., 

1256 in. 

Jacob,  Franz,  1355 

Jacob,  Major,  1382/n. 

Jaeger,  Dr.  Wilhelm,  1236-38 

Jaklincz,  Colonel,  839 

Japan,  421,  652,  659,  695,  696, 
718,  967,  989,  1046,  1053, 
1055,  1058,  1062,  1100,  1114, 
1157,  1170,  1330;  pacts  with 
Germany,  Italy,  410,  588, 

676,  1051,  1058,  1141,  1146, 


1159-71;  in  Hitler’s  strategy, 
678-9 fn.,  1076,  1140-1171, 

passim,  1195;  war  against 
U.S.,  Britain,  1139—47,  1151. 
1155-71,  1177,  1178,  1309; 
neutrality  pact  with  U.S.S.R., 
1147-48 

Japanese  Air  Force,  1178 fn. 
Japanese  Army,  1147-48 
Japanese  Navy,  1141,  1143, 

1160,  1162,  1165,  1166,  1170 
Jaspers,  Karl,  347 
Jastrzembski,  see  Falkenhorst 
Jeanneney,  Jules,  589 
Jena,  143,  243,  1219 
Jeschonnek,  Gen.  Hans,  821, 
1003,  1013 

Jessen,  Jens  Peter,  1187,  1393 
Jesus  Christ,  Jew  or  no?,  155, 
157,  177 

“Jewish  Immigration  Office,” 
Vienna,  477 

Jews,  202,  221,  250,  483,  849, 
923.  981  fn.,  1085,  1413;  Hit- 
ler’s hatred  for,  46-8,  54,  59, 
65,  68,  122,  125,  129,  142, 
162,  170,  194,  1459-60,  1462; 
German  writings  against,  143- 
7,  155-6,  327;  Nazi  persecu- 
tion of,  283,  290,  299,  326, 
358,  477-8,  580-7,  904,  1335, 
1338,  1390;  exclusion  of  from 
arts  and  professions,  334-5, 
338-40,  344-6,  370;  laws 

against,  296-323,  328;  in 

Czechoslovakia,  519,  591, 

592,  1289;  extermination  pro- 
gram, 872-78,  1223,  1232, 

1234,  1242,  1249-62,  1265- 
74,  1289,  1336,  1377;  in  U.S., 
908,  985/n.-986/n.,  1142, 

1145//!.,  1173,  1175;  used  as 
slave  labor,  1237-38;  Warsaw 
ghetto  uprising,  1269-74;  med- 
ical experiments  on,  1274-77, 
1281 

Jodi,  Gen.  Alfred,  200,  400, 
401/n.,  403,  433,  436-7,  547, 
885,  887-88,  1071,  1077,  1080, 
1082,  1133,  1143,  1190, 

1200/n.,  1204,  1205,  1312, 

1343,  1398,  1425,  1443-1448; 
on  Blomberg  affair,  426-30; 
on  Anschluss,  445 fn.,  452, 
456-8,  473;  on  Czech  prob- 
lem and  annexation,  493,  496, 
497,  501,  502-3,  511-5,  524, 
531  fn.,  569,  572;  on  western- 
front  operations,  513,  572, 


1574 


Index 


840,  851,  946-48,  958,  964, 
982;  on  Norway  operations, 
895,  897-98,  900,  901.  918, 
935,  936;  on  French  armis- 
tice, 976,  978;  on  invasion  of 
Britain,  996,  998-99,  1003, 
1007,  1011;  on  invasion  of 
Russia,  1042,  1045,  1120, 

1124,  1130,  1209,  1216;  on 
Hitler’s  Commando  Order, 
1245;  on  Italian  surrender, 
1297-98,  1300;  on  Allied 

landings  in  Normandy,  1348- 
51;  injured  by  bomb  aimed 
at  Hitler,  1364,  1369;  signs 
surrender,  1477;  executed  at 
Nuremberg,  1483 
Johannmeier,  Maj.  Willi,  1465 
John,  Lieutenant  von,  1363 
Johst,  Hans,  335,  336 
Juenger,  Ernst,  334,  1352/n. 
Jeuterbog,  503,  1373 
Jung,  Edgar,  303,  309 
Junge,  Gertrude,  1458,  1468 
Jungvolk,  171,  350,  352 
Junkers,  84,  137-9,  141,  144, 
216,  221,  228,  251-2,  261, 
276.  280,  285,  299,  327,  354 
Justice,  Ministry  of,  434 
Jutland,  Battle  of,  651,  921,  933 

Kaas,  Monsignor,  264,  278 
Kahr,  Gustav  von,  58,  82,  100, 
101,  102-3,  104,  105,  106-10, 
114-5,  120/n.,  310 
Kaiser,  Jakob,  507 
Kaiserhof  hotel,  Berlin,  19,  217, 
218,  220,  235,  246,  247,  248, 
255 

Kaltenbrunner,  Dr.  Ernst,  1246, 
1389.  1482 

Kampfbund,  see  Deutscher 
Kampfbund 

Kant,  Immanuel,  137,  143,  145 
Kantzow,  Carin  von,  see  Goer- 
ing,  Carin  von  Kantzow 
Kanya,  Kalman,  525 
Kapp,  Dr.  Wolfgang,  58 
Kappel,  377 

Kapp  putsch,  18,  58,  71,  87 fn., 
94,  98.  115,  281 
Karinhall,  1019,  1443 
Karlsruhe,  750 

Karlsruhe  (Ger.  It.  cruiser),  926 
Karmasin,  Franz,  590,  596 
Kasserine  Pass,  1336 
Katzenellenbogen,  Dr.  Edwin, 
1288 

Kaufmann,  Karl  Otto,  1310 


Kaunas,  1042,  1260 
Kearny  (U.S.  destroyer),  1155 
Keitel,  Field  Marshal  Wilhelm, 
388,  436,  646,  722,  851,  881, 
883,  998,  1071,  1080,  1094, 
1143,  1190,  1199,  1205,  1232, 
1298,  1352/n.,  1348,  1429, 

1431,  1442,  1448,  1451,  1467; 
and  Blomberg  affair,  427-9, 
433;  Chief  of  Armed  Forces 
High  Command,  436;  role  in 
Anschluss,  444,  449,  451-2, 
457;  Czech  invasion  plans, 
484,  485-6,  491-3,  495-9, 
513-4,  532,  536,  571-2,  578, 
590,  594,  595,  598;  Poland 
invasion  plans,  622,  648,  665, 
667/n.,  691-2,  740,  741;  and 
anti-Hitler  conspiracy,  744, 
1326,  1343,  1359,  1360/n„ 

1362-6,  1368-69,  1374-76, 

1382,  1394,  1397-8,  1401/n.,- 
western  front,  840,  862,  948; 
and  Nazi  war  crimes,  873, 
1090,  1108,  1228,  1241,  1243, 
1247-48;  Norway  invasion, 
895,  896,  898,  900,  936;  at 
French  surrender,  976-81; 
named  Field  Marshal,  991  fn.; 
Britain  invasion  plans,  1003- 
09;  war  on  Russia,  1045, 
1124,  1133,  1189,  1209;  Bat- 
tle of  Berlin,  1443-45,  1454; 
his  death  ordered  by  Bor- 
mann,  1469;  executed  at 
Nuremberg,  1481-83 
Keller,  Helen,  333 
Kelly,  Dr.  Douglas  M.,  1097, 
1099/n. 

Kelly,  Sir  David,  987 fn. 

Kempka,  Erich,  1442,  1470, 

1471,  1475 

Kennan,  George  F.,  1105/n. 
Kennard,  Sir  Howard,  624-5, 
626 fn.,  763,  777-9 
Kennedy,  Joseph  P.,  908 
Keppler,  Wilhelm,  203,  249, 

462,  463,  466,  596 
Kerr.  Alfred,  333 
Kerri,  Hans,  180,  329,  330 
Kesselring,  Field  Marshal  Al- 
bert, 952,  965,  991/n.,  1017, 
1192,  1300,  1307,  1428, 

1435/n.,  1443,  1445,  1477 
Ketteler,  Wilhelm  von,  474 fn. 
Kharkov,  1219,  1308 
Kiel,  87,  388,  511,  988,  1310 
Kiel,  University  of,  692,  1284 
Kielce,  828 


Index 


1575 


Kiep,  Otto,  1330,  1331,  1393 
Kiev,  1047,  1064,  1117,  1122, 
1124,  1225,  1252,  1308 
King-Hall,  Stephen,  813-14/n. 
Kira,  Princess,  1186 
Kircher,  Rudolf,  339 
Kirdorf,  Emil,  190,  203 
Kirk,  Alexander  C.,  746,  843 
Kirkpatrick,  Ivone,  537,  1096-98 
Kitzbuehl,  454 
Kjolsen,  Captain,  916 
Kladno,  1289-90 
Klagenfurt,  31 

Klausener,  Erich,  303,  309,  325, 
372 

Kleist,  Gen.  Ewald  von,  436, 
507,  516,  741,  953 fn.,  1120, 
1127,  1163,  1195,  1197,  1213, 
1333 

Kleist,  Heinrich  von,  1333 
Kleist,  Peter,  739 fn.,  1320 fn. 
Kletskaya,  1209 
Klintzich,  Johann  Ulrich,  70 
Klop,  Lieutenant,  865 
Kluge,  Field  Marshal  Guenther 
Hans,  436,  827,  991/n„  1126, 
1130,  1131,1133,1137,1315//!., 
1316-1317,  1322-23,  1324, 

1326,  1337,  1351,  1358,  1359, 
1373,  1382,  1395-96,  1397, 
1401,  1405 

Knilling,  Eugen  von,  99 
Koblenz,  1429 
Koch.  Erich,  180,  1225 
Koch,  Ilse,  1279-80 
Kochem,  377 

Koeln  (Ger.  naval  vessel),  919 
Koenigsberg,  137,  474,  717, 

1105/n.,  1388 

Koenigsberg  (Ger.  naval  vessel), 
919,  925 

Koestring,  Gen.  Ernst,  1048 
Koht,  Dr.  Halvdan,  929,  930-1 
Kokoschka,  Oskar,  337-8 
Kola  Peninsula,  1229 
Koller,  Gen.  Karl,  1443-44, 
1447,  1448 

Konev,  Marshal  Ivan  S.,  1424 
Konoye,  Prince,  1157 
Konradswalde,  1392 
Kordt,  Erich,  517,  548,  549-50, 
551,  555,  561/n.,  729-30 fn., 
733 fn.,  739 fn. 

Kordt,  Theodor,  517,  518,  521, 
549,  797,  858 

Korherr,  Dr.  Richard,  1254 
Kori,  C.  H.,  1265 
Korschen,  1325 

Korten,  General,  1365,  1369 fn. 


Kortzfleisch,  Gen.  Joachim  von, 
1344,  1377,  1384,  1393 
Kotelnrkovski,  1212 
Kotze,  Hans  Ulrich  von,  632 
Kraemer,  Gen.  Fritz,  1422/n. 
Kramer,  Gerhard  F.,  372 
Kramer,  Josef,  878,  1276-77 
Krampnitz,  1357,  1373,  1382, 
1448 

Krancke,  Adm.  Theodor,  1205 
Kranzfelder,  Capt.  Alfred,  1360 
Krause,  Dr.  Reinhardt,  328 
Krebs,  Gen.  Hans,  1100,  1443, 
1458,  1462,  1466,  1470,  1472, 
1475 

Kreisau  Circle,  507,  1186,  1317— 
20,  1321,  1336,  1341,  1344, 
1392/n. 

Krejci,  General,  494 
Kremlin.  701,  717-8,  1130 
Kress  von  Kressenstein,  Gen. 
Frh.  Fritz,  102 

Kriegsfalle  (war  eventualities), 
415 

Kristiansand,  894,  926 
Krofta,  Dr.  Kamil,  528,  567 
Kroll  Opera  House,  276,  401, 
792 

Krupp  von  Bohlen  und  Halbach, 
Alfried,  1238//I. 

Krupp  von  Bohlen  und  Halbach, 
Gustav,  204,  265-6,  287,  1237 
Krupp  works,  265,  389,  666, 
1237,  1261,  1266 
Kuban,  1188 
Kubis,  Jan,  1289 
Kubizek,  August,  24/n.,  32 fn., 
33-34,  37,  47 

Kuebler,  Gen.  Ludwig,  1137 
Kuechler,  Gen.  Georg  von,  827, 
873,  950,  972 
Kuestrin,  1440 
Kuibyshev,  1125 
Kunmetz,  Rear  Adm.  Oskar,  927 
Kuntze,  Otto,  152 
Kuntzen,  Major  von,  256 
Kursk,  1307 

Kurusu,  Saburo,  1158.  1160, 
1165 

labor,  German,  18,  36,  83,  251, 
252,  321,  357-8,  360,  365-6, 
483;  see  also  trade  unions 
Labor  Commandos  ( Arbeils- 
kommando ) 100-1 
Laborde,  Admiral  de,  1208 
Labor  Front,  282,  363-68,  388 
Labor  Service,  306,  344,  350, 
351,  353 


1576 


Index 


Lackmann-Mosse,  Hans,  339 
Lacroix,  M.  de,  528 
Ladoga,  Lake,  1063 
Lahousen,  Gen.  Erwin,  789 fn., 
1322.  1332/n. 

Lambach,  27 

Lammerding,  Lt  Gen.  Heinz, 
1292/n. 

Lammers.  Hans,  442,  1228, 

1257,  1448,  1452 
Lampe,  Maurice,  1244 
Landbund,  251 

Landespolizeigruppe  General 
Gocring,  300 

Landsberg  prison,  118,  119,  126, 
132,  162,  174,  1255/n., 

1257/n. 

Langbehn,  Dr.  Carl,  1393 
Langbro  Asylum,  206 
Langer,  William  L.,  1069/n. 
Langsdorff,  Capt.  Hans,  884, 
885 

Lappus,  Sigrid  von,  647 fn. 

La  Roche-Guyon,  1395 
Laski,  Harold.  1029 
Latvia,  631-2.  661/m,  662,  717, 
720,  721,  724,  834-35,  1041, 
1092 

Laval,  Pierre,  980-81,  1207, 

1208 

Law  for  Removing  the  Distress 
of  People  and  Reich,  see  En- 
abling Act 

Law  for  the  Protection  of  the 
People  and  the  State  (Feb. 
28,  1933),  274,  374 
Law  for  the  Protection  of  the 
Republic  (1922),  82 
Law  for  the  Reconstruction  of 
the  Reich  (Jan.  30,  1934), 
279-80,  378 fn. 

Law  Regulating  National  Labor 
(Jan.  20,  1934),  363 
Lawrence,  Lord  Justice,  1089 
League  for  Air  Sports,  388 
League  of  National  Socialist 
German  Jurists,  371 
League  of  Nations,  163,  192, 
292,  293,  387,  392,  394-5, 
397,  400,  402,  404,  408,  467, 
471,  472,  480,  591,  615,  623, 
634,  643,  668,  724,  868 
Lebensraum,  123,  353,  390, 

419,  422,  577,  580,  604,  649, 
653.  869,  1055,  1195,  1228 
Lebenswege  (H.  S.  Chamber- 
lain),  154 

Leber,  Julius,  507,  1337,  1355, 
1381,  1393 


Lebrun,  Albert,  618 
Leclerc,  Gen.  Jacques,  1410 
Leeb,  Field  Marshal  Wilhelm 
Ritter  von,  436,  855,  991/n., 
1117,  1125,  1180/n. 

Leger,  Alexis,  564 
Le  Havre,  1001,  1014,  1346 
Lehndorff,  Count  Heinrich  von, 
1182 

Lehrterstrasse  prison,  Berlin, 
1393 

Leipart,  Theodor,  282 
Leipzig,  197-200,  270,  493,  505, 
1319 

Le  Matin,  387 
Lemnos,  1071 

Lemp,  Oberleutnant,  843,  844 fn. 
Lenard,  Philipp,  345 
Lenin,  Nikolai,  143,  721 
Leningrad,  1063,  1078/n.,  1118, 
1121-22,  1125,  1132,  1210, 
1223,  1229 

Leonding,  27,  35,  472 
Leonrod,  Maj.  Ludwig  von, 
1377,  1393 

Leopold  III,  King  of  the  Bel- 
gians, 415,  746-7,  814,  862- 
63,  960-62 

Lerchenfeld,  Count,  82 
Lessing,  Gotthold  Ephraim.  137, 
143,  339 

Lessing,  Theodor,  347 
Leuschner,  Wilhelm,  507,  1337, 
1340,  1393 

Lewis,  Fulton,  Jr„  985 
Ley,  Dr.  Robert,  180,  209,  248, 
282-3,  363,  364,  366,  367-8, 
380,  388,  886,  1481/n. 

Leyden,  950 
Lezhaky,  1291 
Libau,  717 

Liberals,  National,  88;  see  also 
German  People’s  Party 
Libya,  1071,  1073/n.,  1076, 

1077,  1079,  1083,  1084,  1192, 
1193 

Lichterfelde,  300,  308,  1384, 
1391/n. 

Liddell  Hart,  B.  H.,  964 fn.,  967, 
1000,  1001/n.,  1120,  1197 fn., 
1352 fn. 

Lidice.  1289-92 

Liebknecht,  Karl,  83,  86-87, 

267 

Liege,  1410 
“Lila.”  1208 
Lillehammer,  932,  934 
Lillesand,  917 
Limoges,  1291 


Index 


1577 


Lindbergh,  Charles  A.,  903, 

936 /«„  1085/n. 

Lindemann,  Gen.  Fritz,  1337. 
1393 

Linge,  Heinz,  1471 
Linnertz,  General,  1383 
Linz,  27-S,  30,  31,  33,  34-5, 
46,  49 fn.,  445/«.,  472,  477, 
1437.  1463 
Lippe,  252 

Lippert,  Michael,  308 fn. 
Lippstadt,  1434 

Lipski,  Josef,  295,  612-3,  619- 
20,  622-3,  773,  776,  779, 
780-1,  782,  784,  799 
Lisbon,  1028,  1031-39 
List,  Field  Marshal  Sigmund 
Wilhelm,  828,  991 fn.,  1079, 
1083,  1195,  1196,  1199, 

1200/n. 

List  Regiment,  53,  77,  79 
Lithuania,  417-8,  579,  616, 

620-1,  720,  770,  833-34,  1041, 
1111,  1254.  1270 
Litt.  Theodor,  347 
Liltorio  (It.  battleship),  1073/n. 
Litvinov.  Maxim,  528,  546,  619, 
641/n.,  642,  643-4,  655,  708, 
724 

Lloyd  George,  David,  322,  655, 
715/n. 

Lobe,  Paul,  280 

Locarno  Pact,  163,  192  295, 
387,  389,  390,  392,  395,  399, 
401,  404,  415,  940 
Loire  river,  1346,  1397,  1409 
London,  Jack,  333 
London:  defense  measures,  543, 
547,  789;  air  bombing  of,  571, 
574,  783,  1007-1010,  1013, 
1014,  1018,  1020,  1024,  1025, 
1311,  1350;  Dutch  govt,  in, 
952;  in  German  plans  for  in- 
vasion of  Britain,  1002,  1008- 
10,  1027,  1086 
London,  City  of,  718-9 
London  Daily  Herald,  292 
London  Daily  Mail,  387,  609 
London  Daily  Telegraph,  468 fn. 
London  Spectator,  292 
London  Times,  292,  339,  396, 
404,  468/n.,  510,  518,  521  fn., 
566,  609,  1028,  1194/n. 
Lonesome  Guest  (Goebbels), 
177 

Loraine,  Sir  Percy,  799/n. 
Lorenz,  Heinz,  1456,  1465 
Lorraine,  541 

Lossberg,  CoL  Bernhard  von, 


101 1/n. 

Lossow,  Gen.  Otto  von,  101-10. 
114-5 

Lothian,  Lord,  404,  986 
Louis-Ferdinand,  Prince,  1185 
Louvain,  945,  954 
Louvre,  123J 

Low  Countries,  846,  862,  940, 
1017;  see  also  Belgium;  Neth- 
erlands 

Lubbe,  Marinus  van  der,  269- 
70,  371,  866 

Lublin,  828,  835,  1265,  1268 
Lucas.  Scott,  986/n. 

Ludecke,  Karl,  170 
Ludendorif,  Gen.  Erich,  54,  55, 
58,  75 fn.,  84-5,  88,  98-9, 
106,  107-13,  114,  118,  169, 
173,  175,  203,  211,  357,  427, 
707,  99 1/n.,  1140 
Ludendorif  Bridge,  Remagen, 
1429 

Ludin,  Lieutenant,  197-200 
Ludwig  111,  King  of  Bavaria,  50 
Ludwigshafen,  323 
Luebeck,  330,  893,  1434,  1449 
Lueger,  Dr.  Karl,  44-46,  195 
Lueneburg,  1277,  1480 
Luettwitz,  Gen.  Walther  Frh. 
von,  87,  94 

Luettwitz,  Gen.  Heinrich  von, 
1419 

Luetzow  (Ger.  hvy.  cruiser),  882 
Luetzow  (Ger.  pocket  battle- 
ship, former  Deutschland), 
926-27.  938 

Luftftotten  (air  fleets),  1017 
Lufthansa,  206,  1185 
Luftwaffe  (German  Air  Force), 
392,  434,  436,  571,  573,  758, 
821,  986 fn.,  991  fn.,  1066, 

1073/n.,  1083,  1085,  1113, 

1152,  1180/n.,  1206,  1304, 

1342,  1354/n.,  1371,  1392, 

1461,  1463,  1467;  building  of, 
388,  391,  411,  654,  1117;  in 
Spanish  Civil  War,  408,  413; 
war  preparations,  418,  458, 
492,  501-2.  600.  651,  654, 
665,  689 fn.,  706,  783;  bomb- 
ing of  Poland,  791,  798;  in 
war  in  the  west,  819.  838, 
854,  887,  957,  962,  972,  1346, 
1349,  1350,  1426;  Norway 

campaign,  889,  899,  900,  922, 
926,  927-28,  932,  934,  938; 
operations  in  Holland,  Bel- 
gium, 946,  950,  951-52,  955, 
962;  and  stop  order,  964,  965, 


1578 


Index 


969-70;  Battle  of  Britain,  988, 
994,  996,  997,  1000,  1005-06, 
1013,  1014,  1017-20,  1023- 
25;  eastern  front,  1046,  1126, 
1210,  1225/h.,  1311;  in  Medi- 
terranean area  and  N.  Africa, 
1192-93,  1205;  medical  ex- 
periments for,  1281-84;  Bat- 
tle of  Berlin,  1444,  1448, 
1457;  Goering  ousted,  1453 
Lunding,  Colonel,  1394 
Lupescu,  Magda,  1050/ti. 
Lusitania,  S.S.,  843 
Luther,  Dr.  Hans,  284 
Luther,  Martin,  134,  244,  326- 
28 

Lutze,  Viktor,  307 
Luxembourg,  631,  747,  782,  852, 
854,  859,  941,  948 
Luxemburg,  Rosa,  83,  86-87 
Lw6w  (Lemberg),  Poland,  831, 
1260 

Lyme  Bay,  1002,  1003,  1004, 
1006,  1008 

Maas  (Meuse)  river,  950 
Maastricht,  954 

Mackensen,  Field  Marshal  Au- 
gust von,  275,  313,  392 
Mackensen,  Hans  Georg  von, 
647,  737,  738,  752 fn.,  752, 
754,  906,  1164 

Mackesy,  Maj.  Gen.  P.  J.,  933 
Maddalena  I.,  1303 
Madeira,  367,  1072 
Madrid,  1031-34 
Mafalda,  Princess,  206,  479, 
1280/ti.,  1303 
Magdeburg,  1434 
“Magic,”  1157,  1160,  1162 fn. 
Maginot  Line,  402,  404,  569, 
707,  855,  945,  947,  948,  955 
Magistrate  Count  Massimo,  736 
Maikop,  1125,  1188,  1195 
Mainz,  541,  1430 
Maisel,  Gen.  Ernst,  1400 
Maisky,  Ivan,  641/n.,  663 fn. 
Makins,  R.  M„  801/n. 

Malaya,  1166,  1178/ti. 

Malcolm,  Major  General,  55 fn. 
Maldon,  1002 
Malkin.  Sir  William,  530 
Malm6dy,  1244,  1422/ti.,  1423/n. 
Maloyaroslavets,  1137 
Malta,  1192-93,  1204,  1302/n. 
Manila,  1147 
Mann,  Heinrich,  333 
Mann,  Thomas,  333,  334 
Mannerheim,  Marshal,  901/n. 


Manoilescu,  Mihai,  1050 
Manstein,  Gen.  Fritz  Erich  von 
(Lewinski),  392,  457,  470/ti., 
502,  503,  572,  653,  945^16, 
956,  1089/ti.,  1101,  1180/n., 
1211,  1212,  1317,  1337 
Manteuffel,  Gen.  Hasso  von, 
1416,  1417,  1419-20,  1420 
Marahrens,  Bishop,  331 
Marburg  (Maribor),  30,  302 
Marburg,  University  of,  303, 
304,  347 

Margival,  1349,  1351 
Marienbad,  347 
Marienburg,  353 
Marienwerder,  1392 
“Marita,”  1079,  1080 
Marne  river,  957,  1130,  1413 
Marseilles,  975 

Marshall,  Gen.  George  C., 
1301/ti. 

Marx,  Karl,  143 

Masarik,  Dr.  Hubert,  562-3,  564 
Masaryk,  Jan,  546,  555,  1029 
Masaryk,  Tomas  Garrigue,  486, 
487,  596,  599,  603 
Masefield,  John,  521/ti. 

“master  race”  concept,  41-50, 
122,  127-32,  137,  142,  143^4, 
146,  150-8,  321,  326,  344, 
345,  352,  394,  1223,  1225, 
1289 

Mastny,  Dr.  Vojtech,  470,  562- 
3,  564 

Matisse,  Henri,  337 
Matsuoka,  Yosuke,  1100,  1140, 
1143,  1144—46,  1147,  1149, 
1155,  1161,  1167 
Matuschka,  Capt.  Count  von, 
1337 

Matzelsberger,  Franziska  (Frau 
Hitler),  24,  25 

Maurice,  Emil,  70,  119 fn.,  186, 
307,  310 

Maurice,  Maj.  Gen.  Sir  Fred- 
erick, 55  fn. 

Mauthausen,  375,  477,  1244, 
1246,  1259,  1277 
Max,  Prince  of  Baden,  55,  83, 
87 

Maxwell-Fyfe,  Sir  David,  690 
May  Day  celebration  (1933), 
282 

Maydell,  Baron  Konstantin  von, 
905/n. 

McAuliffe,  Gen.  A.  C.,  1419 
McCarthy,  Joseph  R.,  1422/ti. 
McCloy,  John  J.,  1238/ti., 

1422/ti. 


Index 


1579 


Mechlen-sur-Meuse,  886 
Mecklenburg,  227,  414 
medical  experiments,  Nazi,  1274- 
1288 

Medina  Sidonia,  Duke  of, 
1 194/n. 

Mediterranean,  413,  706,  738, 
912,  994,  1060,  1065-67, 

1072-74,  1084,  1086,  1192- 
94,  1208,  1293,  1308,  1309 
Mehihorn,  Doctor,  693 
Meinecke,  Friedrich,  21 
Mein  Kampf  (Hitler),  120-1, 
163,  183-4,  188,  190,  344; 
autobiographical  material,  27, 
28,  30,  31,  35,  37-44,  46-50, 
59,  62,  65,  67,  73,  159-60; 
cited,  21,  42,  46,  48,  56,  68, 
71,  72,  120-2,  142,  159-61, 
291,  319,  324,  332,  336-7, 
343,  385,  397,  422,  580,  611, 
725 in.,  732,  1044,  1228,  1459, 
1467 

Meissner,  Otto  von,  18,  218, 
235-7,  242,  246,  253-4,  257, 
274 

Mell,  Max,  149 

Memel,  578-9,  614,  619-22, 

1340 

Mendelssohn,  Felix,  334 
Merekalov,  Alexei,  639,  642-4 
Mersa  Matruh,  1071 
Mertz  von  Quirnheim,  Colonel 
von,  1373,  1376,  1385-86 
Mesny,  General,  1428 
Messerschmitt,  Wilhelm,  1094— 
95 

Metz,  1398,  1410 
Meuse  river,  943-945,  952-56, 
1410.  1416/n.,  1418-19,  1420 
Mezieres,  945 

Michael,  King  of  Rumania, 
1050/n. 

Michael  (Goebbels),  177 
Middle  East,  1086,  1087,  1191, 
1201;  see  also  Arabia;  Iran; 
Palestine;  Syria 

Miklas,  Wilhelm,  451,  453, 

456/n.,  461,  462,  463,  464-7, 
471,  472 

Mikoyan,  Anastas,  660 
Milan,  646,  974/n.,  1293,  1468 
Milch,  Field  Marshal  Erhard, 
648,  665,  965,  991/n„  1225 fn., 
1282 

Militaer-Wochenblatt,  359 
Minsk,  821,  1119,  1254/n„  1260, 
1267 in.,  1324 

Mirabeau,  Count  Honore  Ga- 


briel Victor  Riqueti  de,  137 
Mius  river,  1127 
Moabit  prison,  330,  1331 fn., 

1387 

Model,  Field  Marshal  Walther, 
1235,  1397,  1401,  1412,  1416, 
1422,  1434 

Moellendorff,  Captain  von,  1362, 
1367 

Moerdijk,  950,  951 
Molde,  934 
Moll,  Sergeant,  1263 
Molotov,  Vyacheslav  M.,  656, 
723-4 fn.;  named  Foreign  Min., 
643-4;  negotiations  with  Ger- 
mans, 638,  645,  657-61,  671, 
675,  676,  685-7,  694-704, 

713/n.,  717,  719,  747.  821, 
829-30,  845,  881,  1040-43, 
1106;  with  British,  French, 
663,  672,  673,  716;  Berlin 
visit.  1049,  1053-61,  1073; 
replaced  as  Prime  Min.  by 
Stalin,  1103-06;  receives  Ger- 
man war  declaration,  1109-12 
Moltke,  Hans  Adolf  von,  512, 
618,  621,  667 

Moltke,  Field  Marshal  Count 
Helmuth  von,  507,  869,  952, 
1403 

Moltke,  Count  Helmuth  James 
von,  507,  742,  1186,  1317, 
1318,  1331,  1344,  1392/n. 
Monckton,  Sir  Walter,  1036, 
1038 

Monschau,  1418-19 
Montevideo,  884 
Montgomery,  Gen.  Sir  Bernard 
Law,  1201,  1202,  1301,  1410, 
1413-14,  1431,  1434,  1476, 
1480 

Montherme,  953 
Montoire,  1068,  1069/n.,  1070 
Mooney,  James  D.,  906 fn. 
Moravia,  488,  492,  578,  579, 
590,  593,  597,  598,  603,  604, 
607,  618,  793,  868,  905,  1289 
Moravska-Ostrava,  519,  598 
Morell,  Dr.  Theodor,  599,  602, 
1371,  1431 
Morgan,  J.  P„  908 
Morgenthau,  Henry,  Jr.,  1172/n. 
Morison,  Samuel  Eliot,  1155/n. 
Morocco,  408,  1067,  1206 
Morris,  Leland,  1176 
Moscicki,  Ignacy,  746 
Moscow:  German  war  plans 
against,  1047,  1062,  1064, 

1223;  rumors  of  German  at- 


1580 


Index 


tack  in,  1104,  1106;  German 
drive  toward  and  defeat  at, 
1117-18,  1121-28,  1130-39, 
1165,  1182,  1241,  1307,  1308, 
1403;  evacuated  by  govt, 
1123-26 

Moscow  Pact,  see  Nazi-Soviet 
Pact 

Moselle  river,  1410,  1413,  1414, 
1427 

motion  pictures,  Nazi  control 
of,  341 

Mozdok,  1195 

“Mr.  X,”  see  Bryans,  J.  Lonsdale 
Muehlmann,  Doctor,  463 
Mueller,  Heinrich,  693-4,  789, 
1242,  1354 

Mueller,  Hermann,  193 
Mueller,  Dr.  Josef,  857,  858, 
1329 

Mueller,  Ludwig,  326,  328,  329 
Mueller,  Wilhelm,  346 
Muenchener  Neuste  Nachrich- 
ten,  310 

Muenster,  330;  Treaty  of,  852 
Muenstereifel,  948 
Muff,  Lt.  Gen.  Wolfgang,  442, 
463,  465 

Munch,  Edvard,  921 
Munich,  64-73,  75-9,  163,  168, 
171,  175,  182-3,  186,  187, 
195,  208-9,  220,  312,  337, 
374,  386,  548,  615,  916,  1206, 
1437;  Hitler  moves  to,  from 
Vienna,  48-50;  Hitler  returns 
to  after  war  (1918),  54,  57- 
61;  a magnet  for  anti-Repub- 
lic  forces,  58;  Roehm  purge 
in,  305—10;  Hitler-Duce  meet- 
ing in,  973-75;  Hitler-Laval 
meeting  in,  1207;  Cianos  take 
refuge  in,  1305;  conspirators 
plan  to  take  over,  1341,  1342; 
see  also,  Beer  Hall  Putsch 
Munich,  University  of,  77,  177, 
1327-28 

Munich  Conference  and  Pact, 
521,  546,  551,  552-78,  588-9, 
592,  593,  596,  599,  603,  605- 
9,  664,  676,  708,  723,  724, 
741,  748,  752,  753,  758,  759, 
770,  774,  798,  808.  818,  841 
Munk,  Kaj,  1247 
Munters,  Vilhelms,  632 
Murmansk,  881,  917/n.,  1064, 
1125 

Murray,  Gilbert,  1029 
music,  Nazi  control  of,  334-5 
Mussolini,  Benito,  97,  290,  361, 


468,  605-6,  677,  747,  847/n„ 
853,  869,  957,  967,  983,  1074, 
1112-15,  1141,  1206 fn.,  1293- 
94;  meetings  with  Hitler,  302, 
414,  974-75,  1016,  1069-70, 
1077,  1293-94,  1362,  1370-72; 
sends  troops  to  bar  Austrian 
Anschluss,  386;  invades  Ethi- 
opia, 398-9,  407;  Hitler  gains 
support  of,  408-12,  414,  442, 
446-7;  approves  German  an- 
nexation of  Austria,  414,  442, 
446-7,  456,  458-9,  462,  467, 
470,  472;  role  in  Czech  prob- 
lem, 511,  541,  545,  551-5, 
559-66;  reluctance  to  risk 
war  against  West,  588,  646-7, 
660,  678,  679-80,  683,  705-6, 
729,  733-41,  750-5,  758,  879- 
80,  906-12;  conquest  of  Al- 
bania, 630;  attitude  toward 
U.S.,  630-1,  1145/n.,  1163- 
64,  1168;  opposes  Axis  amity 
with  U.S.S.R.,  641-2;  signs 
Pact  of  Steel,  646-7;  media- 
tion in  war  crisis,  779-80,  785, 
799-804,  813-16,  820,  846, 
850;  criticizes  Nazi  policy  to- 
ward U.S.S.R.,  880,  902,  906- 
07,  908;  promises  to  enter 
war,  908-912;  war,  armistice 
with  French,  973-75,  980, 
981;  war  with  British,  989, 
992,  1066—68,  1213;  invasion 
of  Greece,  1069,  1070,  1072, 
1082,  1084;  in  war  against 
U.S.S.R.,  1115,  1189-90;  rela- 
tions with  Japan,  1145,  1 163- 
64,  1168;  urges  Hitler  to 

make  peace  in  east,  1213, 

1293- 94;  deposed,  arrested, 

1294- 97,  1302,  1303;  is  res- 
cued by  S.S.,  1298,  1300, 
1303-07;  assassinated,  1468 

Myth  of  the  Twentieth  Century, 
The  (Rosenberg),  210 

Nacht  und  Nebel  Erlass  (Night 
and  Fog  Decree),  1247-48 
Naggiar,  Paul-fimile,  716 
Namier,  Sir  Lewis  B„  739/n., 
786 fn.,  809 
Namsos,  933,  934 
Namur,  945,  954,  956,  1410 
Nansen,  Fridtjof,  892 
Nantes,  1246 
Naples,  1301,  1302 
Napoleon,  143,  161,  287,  603, 
721,  832,  998/n.,  1010/n„ 


Index 


1581 


1065,  1087,  1115,  1117,  1125, 
1126,  1132,  1135,  1136,  1318, 
1334 

Napoleon  III,  139,  952 
Narew  river,  664,  709,  720,  833, 
835 

Narvik,  891,  893,  899,  917,  918 
924,  932,  934,  935,  938,  949. 
988,  1062,  1216 

National  Assembly,  German.  55. 
87.  93 

National  Club,  Berlin,  72 
National  Liberals,  88 
National  Political  Institutes  of 
Education,  352 
National  Redoubt,  1435 
National  Socialist  Association 
of  University  Lecturers,  344 
National  Socialist  German 
Freedom  Movement,  163.  169. 
175 

National  Socialist  movement 
(ideology),  46,  61.  64,  65,  67, 
124-6,  142-52,  158,  167,  171— 
3.  344,  1335,  1336,  1352, 

1390,  1405,  1458,  1460,  1463 
National  Socialist  German 
Workers’  (Nazi)  Party,  or 
N.S.D.A.P.,  17,  38,  42,  44, 
97-8,  163,  172-6,  184,  216, 
223-4.  225,  231-2,  235-6,  242, 
257,  259,  264-8,  271,  332, 
431,  505,  506,  580-2,  748, 
749.  876,  1093,  1097,  1377, 
1382,  1384,  1402-3;  establish- 
ment and  early  growth,  67- 
81;  “second  revolution”  and 
“socialism”  in,  68,  175,  179, 
182,  202,  208,  246,  251,  284- 
90,  297-9,  321,  361;  Hitler’s 
dictatorship  in,  72-4;  sup- 
pressed after  putsch  attempt, 
109-10,  114,  162-3;  election 
campaigns,  168-9,  194-5,  213, 
215,  219-24,  233,  240-1,  252- 
3,  272-3,  293-5;  structure, 
170-3,  348-50,  351,  363;  fac- 
tional strife  in,  174-5,  179-83, 
201-2,  207-8,  241,  244,  252, 
254,  284-90,  301;  financial 
aid  from  big  business,  190, 
201-5,  241,  246,  249,  251, 
283;  gains  support  in  Army, 
196-201,  206-10;  activities  in 
Reichstag,  227,  238-41,  244, 
250,  254,  276-7;  sole  party  in 
Germany,  281;  control  of 
churches,  324-33;  of  arts  and 
professions.  334,  337-8,  340; 


of  education.  343-5,  346-7; 
of  farmers,  354-5;  of  labor, 
362-5;  of  courts,  369-72; 
terror  tactics,  271,  308,  313, 
320,  323,  327,  331,  374-5, 
380,  477-8,  500-1,  505,  1246- 
55,  1291,  1476;  in  Austria, 
385-6,  407,  441-2,  447,  450- 
4,  459-60/n.,  464,  476,  477; 
in  Sudetenland,  488,  489,  493, 
511,  516 fn„  519 

National  Socialist  Teachers’ 
League,  344 

Nationalists,  see  German  Na- 
tional People’s  Party 

Natzweiler,  1276 

Naujocks,  Alfred  Helmut,  692- 
3,  788-9,  793,  864,  865 

Naval  High  Command,  842, 
844,  1106;  see  also  Raeder, 
Adm.  Erich 

Naval  War  Staff,  844,  896,  997- 
98,  1003-1004,  1006,  1009, 
1011,  1014-15,  1072,  1087 

Navy,  German,  91/n„  293,  418, 

434,  436,  439,  481,  543,  706, 

1006-9,  1014-15,  1117,  1303, 
1309,  1360,  1425,  1455-6, 

1461,  1467;  Hitler’s  pledges 
to,  288-9,  298—9;  rebuilding 
program,  388,  395-8,  411, 
651-4;  Memel,  seizure  of, 
614,  620-1;  preparations  for 
war.  614,  629,  651-4,  691, 
693,  700,  783;  U-boats,  388, 

398,  691,  694,  700,  759,  822, 

841-42,  854,  881,  936,  1150- 
55,  1170,  1179,  1192,  1193, 
1294,  1308,  1309,  1427;  war 
operations:  in  Atlantic,  822, 
841—44,  854,  1149-55,  1170, 
1179,  1193,  1308,  1309,  1346, 
1349;  ship  sinkings,  822,  841- 
2,  843-844,  855,  1193-4,  1308; 
ship  losses,  884,  932,  935,  938, 
1014,  1026,  1300/n.;  Norway 
invasion,  890-891,  897,  899, 
919,  924-5,  932,  935-38;  in- 
vasion of  Britain,  988,  993, 
996-97,  999,  1002-4,  1024-5; 
Mediterranean  offensive  urged, 
1070-75,  1086-7;  operations 
against  Russia,  1107;  surren- 
der negotiations,  1477 

Nazi-Soviet  Pact,  685-9,  693- 
704,  708,  713 fn.,  717-25,  729, 
724-38,  748,  749,  752,  757, 
767,  806,  829,  834,  1042, 

1050,  1052,  1100,  1110,  1112 


1582 


Index 


Near  East,  1065 
Nebe,  Arthur,  507,  1369,  1393 
Neff,  Walter,  1283,  1285 
Netherlands,  388,  421,  631,  688 
707,  747,  - 782,  785,  846,  937, 
945,  947,  952,  1159;  German 
war  plans  against,  650,  652, 
695 fn.,  852-6,  858-63,  867, 
870,  879,  883,  886,  887,  915, 
936,  940—8,  973,  1040;  conquest 
of,  939,  948—54;  German  occu- 
pation of,  997,  1230,  1247, 
1262,  1415,  1426,  1462,  1477 
Netherlands  Air  Force,  1244 
Netherlands  Army,  945,  951. 
952 

Neudeck,  253,  256,  298.  304. 
316-7 

Neuhaus,  875 fn. 

Neumann,  Franz  L.,  94 
Neunzert,  Lieutenant,  110 
Neurath,  Baron  Konstantin  von. 
231,  258,  318,  380,  391,  40L 
406,  409-10,  413,  418,  422 
423,  424,  437,  438,  442,  457, 
469,  496,  561,  604,  875,  1289, 
1339,  1482 

“Neville  Chamberlain”  (Mase- 
field), 521  fn. 

“New  Beginning,  A”  (Hitler 
editorial),  169,  174 
Newton,  Sir  Basil,  528 
New  York,  510,  904 fn. 

New  York  Journal- American. 
984 


New  York  Times,  339,  537 fn., 
640 fn.,  789/n.,  984/n.,  1173/n. 
Nibelungenlied,  149 
Niblack  (U.S.  destroyer),  1151, 
1155/n. 

Nidda,  Krug  von,  1207 
Niederdorf,  1199/n.,  1394 
Niekisch,  Ernst,  507 
Niemen  river,  1115 
Niemoeller,  Rev.  Martin,  325. 
326,  327,  329,  330-1,  479, 
867 fn. 

Nietzsche,  Friedrich  Wilhelm. 
143,  145,  146,  147,  150,  160, 
161-2 

Nieuwe  Maas  river,  950,  951 
Nikitchenko,  Gen.  I.  T.,  1250 
Nile  river,  1193,  1194,  1201, 
1208 


Noel,  L6on,  714,  723 fn.,  778, 
801/n.,  978 

Nomura,  Adm.  Kichisaburo, 
1143/«„  1156-60,  1165,  1167 
Nordic  Society,  893 


Norge  (Norw.  naval  vessel). 
924 

Normandy,  1346,  1347,  1350. 

1397,  1409,  1414,  1418 
North  Africa,  974,  994,  1065, 
1066,  1072,  1073,  1075,  1084, 
1086,  1113,  1178,  1190-94, 
1201-09,  1213,  1293,  1311, 
1336,  1401;  Allied  landing  in, 
1204-09,  1219 

North  German  Confederation. 
139 

North  Germanic  Union,  1009 
North  Sea,  854,  890,  916,  948 
1003,  1009 

Norway,  747,  942-43,  1056, 

1102;  German  war  plans 
against,  889-902,  909,  916; 
Altmark  incident,  896-98;  in- 
vasion of,  920-21,  924-39, 
947,  950,  1040,  1082;  history 
of  monarchy,  929/n.;  German 
occupation  of,  935 fn.,  989, 
1008,  1017,  1051,  1064,  1194, 
1247,  1291 

Norwegian  Army,  893.  895.  928. 

933-34,  935 
Norwegian  Leads,  918 
Noske,  Gustav,  87,  94 
“November  criminals,”  56.  64. 

98,  106,  108,  163 
N.S.  Briefe,  175 
N.S.D.A.P.,  see  National  So- 
cialist German  Workers’  Party 
Nuremberg,  48,  73,  80,  98,  133 
289,  464,  513,  1284,  1436, 
1437,  1442,  1481-83 
Nuremberg  Laws  (Sept.  15 
1935),  323,  378 fn.,  582,  592 
Nuremberg  party  rallies,  133, 
288,  318-9,  364,  464.  519-20, 
548,  573,  691,  748,  1437 
Nybergsund,  930,  932 

Oberg,  Maj.  Gen.  Karl,  1376, 
1396,  1397 

Oberheuser,  Dr.  Herta,  1288 
Obersalzberg,  see  Berchtesgaden 
Occupied  Eastern  Territories, 
Ministry  for  the,  1226,  1241 
Ochs-Adler,  Col.  Julius,  986 fn. 
Ochsner,  Colonel,  1137 
Oder  river,  1425,  1431,  1436, 
1440,  1453 
Odessa,  1064 

Ohlendorf,  Otto,  1249,  1249-53. 
1255 fn. 

OKH,  see  Army  High  Com- 
mand 


Index 


1583 


OKM  (Oberkommando  der 
Kriegsmarine,  High  Command 
of  the  Navy),  844 

OKW  (Oberkommando  der 
Wehrmacht,  High  Command 
of  the  Armed  Forces),  435, 
457,  493,  514,  541,  646,  1042, 
1071,  1082,  1334,  1360,  1362, 
1363,  1392,  1448,  1467;  Aus- 
trian, Czech  invasion  plans, 
457,  490-1,  502,  509,  512, 
513,  524,  532,  568,  578; 

Polish  invasion,  629,  653, 

692-3,  705//!.,  709,  733, 

789/n.,  793,  832,  873-74; 

western  front,  847,  851,  862, 
868,  886,  943-48,  951,  952, 
955-59,  963-68,  1348;  Nor- 
way campaign,  889,  895,  896, 
899,  918;  activities  in  U.S., 
903,  985 /n.;  Battle  of  Britain, 
987,  994,  996,  998,  1003-09; 
Barbarossa,  1045,  1047,  1063, 
1065,  1078,  1086,  1089,  1117, 
1121-4,  1200/n.,  1201,  1209, 
1214,  1218,  1241,  1242;  Medi- 
terranean and  N.  Africa, 
1204,  1205,  1207;  Italian  de- 
fection, 1294,  1298,  1301, 

1307;  surrender,  1477;  see 
also  Jodi;  Keitel 
Abwehr  (Intelligence  Bureau), 
452/n.,  508,  512,  622,  692, 
742.  858,  865,  904,  914, 
1321,  1323,  1329,  1332, 

1336,  1345,  1354/n.,  1357, 
1393;  see  also  Canaris; 
Oster 

Economic  and  Armaments 
Branch,  558 fn.,  690,  881/n., 
1047;  see  also  Thomas, 
Gen.  Georg 

Olav  Trygverson  (Norw.  mine 
layer),  926 

Olbricht,  Gen.  Friedrich,  1182, 
1322,  1334,  1336,  1337,  1344, 
1345,  1357,  1358-59,  1368, 
1372,  1374-75,  1377,  1382/n., 
1382,  1385-86,  1387 

Olden,  Rudolf,  38 fn.,  48,  181 

Oldenburg,  230 

Olympic  games  (1936),  322-3, 
324,  1095 

Operations  (code  names) : 

Aida,  1193 
Alpine  Violets,  1077 
Attila,  1076 
Axis,  1300 
Bernhard,  692 fn. 


Black  (Schwarz),  1300 
Citadel,  1307 
Dynamo,  968 

Eagle  (Adlerangriffe) , 1016- 
1018 

Hash,  1322-25 
Greif,  1415/n.,  1418/n. 
Hercules,  1193 
Himmler,  691 
Isabella,  1072 
Marita.  1079,  1080 
Oak  (Eiche),  1300,  1303 
Punishment,  1083 
Student,  1300 
Sunflower,  1077 
Typhoon,  1125 
Winter  Gale,  1211 
Oppeln,  693 
Oppenheim,  1430 
Oradour-sur-Glane,  1291 
Oran,  1206 
Oranienburg,  375,  758 
Order  Castles  (Ordensburgen), 
352 

Ordnerlruppe,  70 
Orel,  1118,  1129,  1307 
Orleans,  1409 
Orne  river,  1347 
Oshima,  Gen.  Hiroshi,  1141, 
1157,  1160-62,  1163,  1164, 
1165.  1167,  1170,  ini 
Oskar,  Prince  of  Prussia,  1185 
Oskarsborg,  927 
Oslo,  812/n.,  846,  892,  894,  899, 
917,  919,  920,  925,  926-27, 
928,  930,  934,  935 fn.,  936, 
950 

“Oslo”  powers,  747 
Ostend.  1011 

Oster.  Col.  Hans,  508.  515,  517, 
547-8,  549-50,  742,  749,  790, 
858-59,  863,  865,  916,  942- 
43,  1109/n.,  1182,  1321,  1329, 
1394 

Osthilfe  (Eastern  Relief),  252, 
253 

“Ostland,”  1091 

Ott,  Gen.  Eugen,  243,  244, 
1148,  1149,  1156,  1159,  1162, 
1168//!. 

Otto,  Crown  Prince,  of  Austria, 
417,  455,  457 

“Otto”  (Code  name),  1063; 

see  also  Case  Otto 
Oumansky,  Constantine,  724 fn., 
1105 

Oven,  Margarete  von,  1344 
Pacholegg,  Anton,  1281-2 


1584 


Pacific,  1142,  1145,  1147/n„ 

1178 

Pact  of  Steel,  646-8,  683 fn., 
736,  739,  752,  798 
Paderewski.  Igfiace,  1029 
Palatinate,  1429 
Palestine,  636,  1066 
Pan-American  Neutrality  Patrol, 
1151 

Pan-German  Nationalists  (Aus- 
trian), 42-46 

Papen,  Franz  von,  17,  18,  89/n., 
235,  237-8,  238^16,  265,  266- 
7,  268,  273,  300,  315-8,  324, 
439/n.,  485,  1462;  back- 

ground, 230-2;  intrigues  with 
and  against  Hitler,  249-57; 
named  Vice-Chancellor  and 
Prussian  Premier,  256-60; 
booted  out  of  Prussian  pre- 
miership, 284;  protests  Nazi 
excesses,  299,  302,  304;  es- 
capes purge,  309;  minister  to 
Austria,  318,  386,  407-8,  437; 
role  in  Anschluss,  441-54, 
460,  465,  467,  473;  acquitted 
at  Nuremberg,  1482 
Paris,  537,  547,  566,  571,  573, 
581,  589,  652,  789,  956,  972, 
975,  998,  1041,  1233,  1376, 
1395-1396,  1409 
Paris  Peace  Conference,  487 
Parsifal  (Wagner),  150 
“Party  Rally  of  Peace,”  628, 
691,  748 

Pas  de  Calais,  1001,  1346 
Pasewalk,  52,  56 
Pastors’  Emergency  League,  329 
Patch,  Gen.  Alexander,  1410 
Patria,  S.S.,  511 
Patriotic  Front,  461 
Patton,  Gen.  George  S.,  1397, 
1409,  1410,  1414,  1420,  1429, 
1430 

Paul,  Prince  Regent  of  Yugo- 
slavia, 1079 

Paulus,  Field  Marshal  Fried- 
rich, 1088,  1101,  1188, 

1200 fn.,  1200,  1210-11,  1214— 
20,  1316-17 

Pearl  Harbor,  1139,  1160,  1162, 
1165,  1167,  1169,  1171,  1175, 
1178/n. 

peasants,  German,  135-38,  327, 
354 

Pechel,  Rudolf,  742 
Peenemunde,  1311 
Peiper,  Col.  Jochen,  1422/n. 
Peipus,  Lake,  1366 


Index 

Pemsel,  Maj.  Gen.  Max,  1347, 
1349 

People’s  Court  (Volksgericht), 
371,  509,  1328,  1331/n„ 

1377/n.,  1387,  1389-90,  1392, 
1393,  1395,  1397-98,  1402 
People’s  Marine  Division,  86 
People’s  Party,  Bavarian,  see 
Bavarian  People’s  Party 
People’s  Party,  German,  see 
German  People’s  Party 
Pershing,  Gen.  John  J.,  986 fn. 
Persia,  see  Iran 
Persian  Gulf,  1055,  1061 
Perth,  Lord,  551 
Pertinax  (Andr6  G6raud), 
529/n.,  572 fn. 

Petacci,  Clara,  1306,  1468 
Petain,  Marshal  Henri  Philippe, 
850/n.,  971,  972,  975,  980-81, 
983,  1066,  1068-69,  1207-8 
Peter,  King  of  Yugoslavia,  1080, 
1083 

Peters,  Dr.  Gerhard,  1266 
Petersburg,  530 

Petersdorff,  Captain  von,  1229 
Petsamo,  1064,  1108 
Petzel,  Gen.  Walter,  741 
Pfaflenberger,  Andreas,  1280 
Philip,  Prince  of  Hesse,  206, 
458.  467,  479,  1280/n.,  1302 
Phipps,  Sir  Eric,  520,  808,  815 
Picasso,  Pablo,  337 
Piedmont,  738/n. 

Pichelsdorf,  1465,  1475 
Pierlot,  Hubert,  961 
Piffraeder,  Oberfuehrer,  1377 
Pilsudski,  Marshal  J6zef,  290, 
296,  613 

Finder,  Professor,  347 
Pissa  river,  833,  835 
Pitman,  Key,  640 fn. 

Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  487 
Pius  XI,  Pope,  325 
Pius  XII,  Pope,  (Eugenio  Pa- 
celli),  324,  746,  858,  914, 
983,  1329 

Plettenberg,  Countess  Elizabeth 
von,  1331 
Ploen,  1472 
Ploesti,  1409 

Ploetzensee  prison,  1391,  1397 
Poehner,  Ernst,  109 
Poelzl,  Klara,  see  Hitler,  Klara 
Poelzl 

Poetsch,  Dr.  Leopold,  30-31 
Pohl,  Dr.  Emil,  1268 
Pohl,  Oswald,  1255,  1268 
Poincare,  Raymond,  95 


Index 


1585 


Pokorny,  Dr.  Adolf,  1275 
Poland,  68,  125,  290,  293,  389- 
90,  390,  487,  626 fn.,  845-50. 
869,  913,  914,  936;  created 
by  Versailles  Treaty,  91,  616— 
7;  nonaggression  pact  with 
Hitler,  295-6,  394;  relations 
with  France,  295-6,  405,  411, 
420,  575,  615,  616;  German 
plans  for  war  with,  417-8, 
589,  622-3,  627-9,  648-55, 
657,  661,  664-8,  677-83,  685, 
687-95,  700-9,  722,  739-41, 
752,  782-4;  policy  toward 
Czechs,  491,  499,  512,  525-6, 
563 fn.,  568;  toward  Russia, 
512,  615,  617,  619,  623-24, 
629-30,  641,  662,  715,  723; 
Hitler  demands  Danzig  and 
Corridor,  612—19,  622-33, 

667^68,  669;  British,  French 
representations  in  support  of, 
618-19,  623-26,  629-30,  633, 
662,  674,  677,  688-89,  710- 
16,  726-33,  739-40,  748,  755— 
82,  784-87,  795-97,  800-19, 
839;  Nazi-Soviet  talks  on 
partition  of,  645,  670,  675, 
687-95,  720-24,  748;  Italy 
refuses  to  enter  war  against, 
733-41,  750-55,  798-8TO; 

German  propaganda  campaign 
against,  750,  763-65,  787—89; 
German  invasion  and  con- 
quest of,  791,  795,  798,  819, 
827-30,  836,  838,  840,  941, 
947,  948-9,  1098  1459;  Rus- 
sian invasion  of,  829-837, 
845;  German  occupation  of, 
872-78,  907,  1027,  1044, 

1048,  1060,  1090,  1099,  1104, 
1181,  1223,  1224,  1231,  1232, 
1236,  1239,  1247,  1256-60, 
1269-74,  1291,  1311/n.,  1478, 
1482;  liberation,  1308,  1351, 
1415,  1423-24 
Polish  Air  Force,  795,  828 
Polish  Army,  621-22,  629-30, 
633,  693-94,  714-15,  721-22, 
741,  820,  821,  827,  828,  838- 
40,  934 

Polish  Corridor,  295,  612,  615, 
619,  621,  623,  624,  633,  665, 
680,  728,  749,  756,  760-61, 
764,  766,  773,  774,  805,  827 
Polish  Navy,  917 
Political  Workers’  Circle,  62 
Pomerania  (Pomorze),  616,  618, 
664,  827 


Popitz,  Johannes,  506,  871,  885, 
1109/n.,  1182,  1185,  1187, 

1320,  1328,  1392 
Porsche,  Dr.  Ferdinand,  368 
Portugal,  1031,  1034,  1035, 

1039,  1072 

Posen,  295,  616,  828,  872,  1223- 
24,  1232,  1243,  1259 
Potemkin,  Vladimir,  645 
Potsdam,  17,  86-87,  233,  255, 
274,  508,  557,  1392 
Pour  le  Merite  (Ger.  decora- 
tion), 78 
Po  Valley,  1437 
Prague,  453,  511,  519,  565,  567, 
597-98,  601,  601/n.,  603, 

1289,  1290,  1382 
Pravda,  663 

Preuss,  Hugo,  89 fn.,  333 
Preysing,  Cardinal  Count, 
1361 fn. 

Price,  Ward,  387,  391 
Prien,  Oberleutnant  Guenther, 
855 

Priess,  Hermann,  1422/n. 

Primo  de  Rivera,  Miguel,  1033, 
1034 

Prince  of  Wales  (Br.  battle- 
ship), 1178/n. 

Prim  Eugen  (Ger.  hvy.  cruis- 
er), 1194 

Pripet  Marshes,  1062,  1064 
prisoners  of  war,  979,  1118/n., 
1217,  1227,  1229/n.,  1234-35, 
1236,  1237,  1239-1246,  1261, 
1267,  1274,  1335,  1410, 

1422/n.,  1428,  1434,  1447 
Progressive  Party,  88 
Propaganda  Ministry,  234,  274, 
284,  338,  340,  341,  524,  842, 
844,  1378,  1380,  1440,  1455- 
56,  1482;  see  also  Goebbels 
Protestant  Church,  325,  326, 
328,  329,  331,  332,  346 
Proust,  Marcel,  333 
Prussia  (kingdom),  136-43, 
274-75,  327,  357,  1317,  1412 
Prussia  (federal  state),  216, 
218,  224,  232,  258,  260, 

267,  279;  see  also  East  Prus- 
sia, West  Prussia 
Pryor,  Gen.  W.  W.,  921-2 
Puaux,  Gabriel,  456 fn. 

Puch,  1077 

Qattara  Depression,  1201 
Quisling,  Maj.  Vidkun  Abraham 
Lauritz,  892-6,  921,  929,  930, 
931,  935 fn.,  992 fn. 


1586 


Index 


Raczyfiski,  Count  Edward,  733, 
797 

radar,  1017,  1018,  1024,  1308, 
1347 

Raeder.  Gr.  Adm.  Erich,  289, 
298-99,  376,  418,  429,  430, 
434,  439,  496,  542,  621,  648, 
651,  653,  665,  688/n.,  705/n„ 
822,  842-43,  854,  881,  885, 
976,  1143,  1147,  1149/n„ 

1194,  1195,  1403;  naval  build- 
ing program,  388,  651,  822; 
Norway  campaign,  890-96, 
901,  918,  919/n.,  936;  Britain 
invasion  plans,  988,  997-98, 
1002-09,  1011,  1013;  urges 
concentration  on  Mediterra- 
nean area,  1065-66,  1072-76, 
1085-86,  1192-93;  urges  at- 
tack on  U.S.  shipping,  1149, 
1151,  1153,  1170,  1177-78; 
ousted  as  Navy  C.  in  C., 
1299;  sentenced  at  Nurem- 
berg. 1483 

Ramsgate,  1001,  1003,  1006, 
1008 

Rangsdorf,  1361,  1368,  1372, 
1373 

Rapallo,  661 

Rascher,  Dr.  Sigmund,  1280- 
1288 

Rashid  Ali,  1086,  1103 
Rassenkunde,  345;  see  also 
“master  race”  concept 
Rastenburg,  E.  Prussia,  148, 
1112,  1130,  1201,  1202,  1205, 

1209,  1213,  1218,  1228,  1297, 

1300,  1304,  1313,  1317,  1325, 

1332,  1343,  1374,  1379,  1384, 

1388,  1389,  1396,  1399,  1403, 

1438;  attempt  to  assassinate 
Hitler  at,  1357-72 
Rath,  Ernst  vom,  580-1 
Rathenau,  Walther,  59,  82,  333, 
339 

Rattenhuber,  Oberfuehrer,  1362 
Raubal,  Angela  Hitler,  25,  185, 
186 

Raubal,  Friedl,  186 
Raubal,  Geli,  26,  186,  187,  188, 
214,  216,  307,  310,  337 in., 
1442 

Rauschning,  Hermann,  237, 
1029 

Ravensbrueck,  375,  1275,  1286, 
1288.  1290,  1331 
Rdal,  Jean,  153 
Reckse,  Doctor,  1330-31 
Red,  Case,  417 


Reed,  Douglas,  1028 
Regensburg,  109 
Regina  Palace  Hotel,  Munich. 
565 

Reich  Broadcasting  Corp.,  341. 
627 fn. 

Reich  Central  Security  Office. 
see  R.S.H.A. 

Reich  Chamber  of  Art,  337 
Reich  Chamber  of  Culture 
333-338 

Reich  Chamber  of  Films,  341 
Reich  Chamber  of  Radio,  341 
“Reich  Church,”  327-329,  332 
Reich  Committee  of  German 
Youth  Associations,  348-49 
Reich  Defense  Council  (Reichs- 
verteidigungsrat),  289,  379, 
388,  389,  400,  665-66 
Reich  Defense  Law,  secret  (May 
31,  1935),  358,  393 fn. 

Reich  Economic  Chamber,  361 
Reichenau,  Field  Marshal  Wal- 
ter von,  256,  444,  457,  828, 
954,  956,  962,  991/n„  1002, 
1008.  1121 fn.,  1180/n. 

Reich  Food  Estate,  356 
Reich  Governors,  279 
Reich  Music  Chamber,  335 
Reich  Press  Chamber,  340 
Reich  Press  Law  (Oct.  4,  1933), 
338 

Reichsbank,  205,  284,  359,  360, 
425,  478,  591 fn.,  1267-68 
Reichsbanner,  226 
Reichsgericht  (Ger.  Supreme 
Court),  371 

Reichsgeselzblatt  (official  ga- 
zette), 586 

Reichskriegsflagge,  108,  110 
Reichsrat,  215,  277 
Reichstag,  140,  213,  215,  229, 
243,  244,  247,  252,  271,  435, 
745;  Nazi  representation  in, 
168,  170,  175,  195,  206,  209, 
210,  233,  241,  260,  274;  Nazi 
program  in,  180,  202,  227, 
234,  257,  273-81,  318,  327- 
28;  dissolutions  of,  193-94, 
218,  227,  231,  238-41,  250, 
254,  265,  405/n.;  elections  of, 
195,  233,  241,  294.  327-28, 
473;  Goebbels  expelled  from, 
220;  support  of  Hitler-Papen 
govt.,  254,  274-80,  292,  378; 
votes  Hitler  absolute  power, 
1135;  Hitler  speeches  in,  296, 
324,  401,  748-9.  1085,  1093; 
repudiation  of  Versailles 


Index 


1587 


Treaty,  411,  413;  on  peace, 
291,  387,  393,  399,  631-8, 
848-49,  989-92,  999,  1001; 
on  1934  purge,  306,  310,  311, 
314,  370;  on  Anschluss,  474, 
475;  on  Czech  invasion,  496; 
on  beginning  of  Polish  war, 
792,  794,  799,  800;  on  war 
with  U.S.,  1170—77;  on  anni- 
hilation of  Jews,  1256 
Reichstag  fire,  206,  267-72,  274, 
310,  371,  378,  863 
Reich  Statistical  Office,  364 
Reichswehr,  57,  58,  75,  93;  be- 
comes Wehrmacht,  393 fn.; 
see  also  Army,  German 
Reich  Theater  Chamber,  335 
Reichwein,  Adolf,  1355,  1393 
Reims,  1419,  1477,  1480 
Reinberger,  Maj.  Helmut,  886-7 
Reinecke,  General,  1380,  1384 
Reinhardt,  Gen.  Georg-Hans, 
953,  963,  1125 
Reinhardt,  Max,  335 
Reitlinger,  Gerald,  1263,  1267, 
1273,  1331/n. 

Reitsch,  Hanna,  1443,  1452-53, 
1454,  1457,  1470 
Remagen,  1429 
Remarque,  Erich  Maria,  333 
Remer,  Maj.  Otto,  1378-84, 
1388 

Rennes,  1347 

Renthe-Fink,  Cecil  von,  923 
reparations,  German,  World 
War  I,  81,  91,  95,  99,  162, 
167,  192,  194,  214,  217,  1230 
Republican  Party  (U.S.),  984 
Repulse  (Br.  battleship),  1178 fn. 
Reuben  James  (U.S.  destroyer). 
1155 

Reuters,  1456 

Reventlow,  Count  Ernst  zu,  175 
Reynaud,  Paul,  949,  956,  961, 
972 

Rheydt,  176 

Rhine  river,  840,  855,  953,  971, 
1413-1415,  1422,  1427,  1429, 
1431,  1434 

Rhineland,  remilitarization  of, 
293,  389,  395,  399-407,  412, 
415,  447,  513,  617,  707,  723, 
841,  868,  940 

Rhone  Valley,  911,  975,  1410 
Ribbentrop,  Gertrud  von, 

1 ytlfn. 

Ribbentrop,  Joachim  von,  322, 
380,  414,  517,  549/n.,  587 fn., 
677,  740,  745,  789 fn.,  790 fn., 


819,  887,  893,  975,  976, 

987 fn.,  1068,  1208,  1244, 

1320/n„  1425,  1443,  1445 

1462,  1481-83;  personal  char- 
acteristics, 253,  410,  561,  588; 
ambassador  to  Britain,  397, 
410,  457,  469;  appointed 

Foreign  Min.,  437;  and 
Goering,  mutual  dislike,  410, 
630,  647,  1371;  at  Hit- 

ler-Schuschnigg  meeting,  447, 
473;  and  Czechoslovakia,  489, 
494,  496,  510,  511,  548,  551, 
553,  569,  579,  591-6,  598, 
601-2,  605,  607-8;  at  Hitler- 
Chamberlain  talks,  522,  536; 
pact  with  France,  589;  nego- 
tiations with  Poland,  612-5, 
618,  619-20,  623-4,  667, 

780-1;  rejects  British,  French 
protests  on  Memel,  620-1; 
talks  with  Duce,  Ciano  on 
war  co-operation,  587-8,  646- 
7,  679-81,  684,  729,  733-9, 
751,  752,  906-7,  1070,  1077, 
1107,  1190,  1206;  negotiations 
with  U.S.S.R.,  657,  658,  669, 
670,  675,  686-7,  694-704, 

708,  713 fn.,  716-21,  726,  729, 
806,  821-22,  829,  832-35, 

845,  890,  1040-43,  1050-61, 

1110- 1112;  negotiations  with 
West  on  Poland,  747,  757 fn., 
765-8,  771-3,  776/n.,  778-82, 
785,  798,  801-3,  810;  rela- 
tions with  U.S.,  843,  902, 
905,  984,  1140,  1152-72;  pas- 
sim, 1172/n.;  rejects  British, 
French  ultimatums,  813-17; 
relations  with  Norway,  Den- 
mark, 918-21,  927,  928,  931; 
Windsor  kidnap  plot,  1030- 
38;  dealings  in  Balkans,  1042, 
1049,  1050,  1079-80;  declara- 
tion of  war  on  U.S.S.R., 

1111- 12;  relations  with  Japan, 
1140-41,  1144-49,  1152-73; 
declaration  of  war  on  U.S., 
1176-77 

Riccione,  1115 

Richardson,  William,  1116/n., 
1192/n. 

Richtofen  Fighter  Squadron,  78 

Rickenbacker,  Eddie,  903 

Riess,  Curt,  1380/n. 

Riga,  1042,  1260 

Rintelen.  General  von,  1082 

Rio  de  Janeiro  (Ger.  transport), 
917 


1588 


Index 


Riom  trial,  806/n. 

Ripka,  Herbert,  529 fn. 

Ritter,  Gerhard,  1358 fn. 

Riviera,  French,  974,  1410 
Robeson,  Paul,  1029/n. 

Robin  Moor  (U.S.  freighter), 
1153 

Rocca  delle  Caminate,  1305 
Rockefeller,  John  D.,  908 
Roehm,  Ernst,  18-9,  66,  75,  98, 
172,  217,  224,  225,  428,  434, 
504,  912,  1094;  background, 
64;  with  Goering,  organizes 
S.S.,  79;  in  Beer  Hall  Putsch, 
101.  108-9,  112,  114;  break 
with  Hitler  (1925),  169;  re- 
turns to  party,  heads  S.A., 
S.S.,  206-9;  contact  with 

Schleicher,  213,  226,  300; 

friendship  with  Hitler,  288, 
301;  named  to  Cabinet,  289; 
rift  with  Hitler  over  radical- 
ism, 285-90,  297-302;  purged, 
305-309  311—4,  377,  1371 
Roenne,  Colonel  Freiherr  von, 
1337 

Roepke,  Wilhelm,  139,  145/n., 
347 

Rokossovski,  Gen.  Konstantin, 
1214 

Roman  Catholic  Church,  44, 
45,  88,  95,  99,  135,  170,  221, 
233,  280,  324-5,  329,  445, 
453,  464,  476,  483,  501,  507, 
1360,  1377/n. 

Roman  Empire,  152,  154, 

419 

Rome,  587,  605,  630,  981,  1189, 
1295,  1300,  1302,  1304,  1305, 
1306,  1345 

Rome-Berlin  Axis,  410,  413, 
442,  481,  641-2,  646-8,  657, 
679,  729,  879-80,  1049 
Rommel,  Field  Marshal  Erwin, 
953,  1298,  1299,  1409;  in  N. 
Africa,  1084-87,  1178,  1191- 
96,  1201-04,  1220;  in  anti- 
Hitler  plot,  1338—40,  1351— 
52,  1359,  1398-1402;  in  Nor- 
mandy, 1346-52;  urges  Hitler 
seek  peace,  is  cashiered, 
1349—51;  wounded  in  air  at- 
tack, 1352,  1359;  suicide  and 
funeral,  1400-02 
Rommel,  Frau,  1338,  1401 
Rommel,  Manfred,  1400 
Roosevelt.  Franklin  D.,  587 fn., 
ITAfn.,  902 fn.,  906/n„  908, 
1069/n.,  1085/zj.,  1086,  1087, 


1140,  1141,  1144,  1160,  1161, 
1168-70,  1186;  peace  efforts, 
291-2,  541-2,  630-7,  679/n., 
746-7,  762,  902,  903,  906, 
941,  985;  recalls  ambassador, 
585/n.,  904;  negotiations  with 
Japanese,  1143/n.,  1157-60, 

1167;  Nazi  gibes  at,  630-7, 
1145-46/n.,  1172-76;  Atlantic 
naval  policy,  1147/n.,  1151— 
54;  war  aims,  1181,  1341/n.; 
death  of,  delights  Nazis,  1440 
Rosen,  Count  Eric  von,  78-79 
Rosenberg,  Alfred,  65,  103,  111, 
142,  158,  169,  173,  175,  209, 
217,  326,  332,  349,  380, 

1094-95;  background,  77-8; 
contact  with  Quisling,  892-96; 
and  German  occupation  of 
Eastern  Europe,  1091-93, 
1225-29,  1236,  1241-42;  plun- 
der of  art  treasures,  1232-33; 
Nuremberg  trial  and  execu- 
tion, 1481-83 

Rosenman,  Samuel  I.,  1172/n. 
Ross,  Colin,  902 fn. 

Rossbach,  Lieutenant,  101 
Rosterg,  August,  203 
Rostock,  Capt.  Max,  1290 
Rostov,  1125,  1126,  1133,  1197, 
1212,  1241 

“Rote  Kapelle,”  1354 fn. 
Rothschild,  Baron  Louis  de,  477 
Rotterdam,  950,  952,  1010 
Rovno,  1102 

Royal  Oak  (Br.  battleship),  855 
R.S.H.A.  (Reichssicherheits- 
hauptamt,  Reich  Central  Se- 
curity Office),  1027-29,  1249, 
1329,  1332,  1381;  see  also 
S.D. 

rubber,  synthetic,  389,  413,  1101 
Ruegen,  367 

Ruge,  Colonel,  928,  934,  935 
Ruhr,  95-101,  163,  389,  414, 
650,  689/n.,  840,  841,  853, 
1040,  1413-14,  1423,  1424, 
1426,  1431.  1434 
Rumania,  390,  541,  706,  829, 
1048,  1071,  1079,  1080,  1189; 
relations  with  France,  Britain, 
405,  575-6,  630,  662;  policy 
toward  U.S.S.R.,  641,  662, 
711-2,  717 fn.;  Hungary  takes 
Transylvania  from,  1049-51; 
Nazi-Soviet  struggle  for  con- 
trol of,  721,  806,  807,  836, 
1042,  1043,  1045,  1049-50, 
1053-60,  1062,  1063,  1069, 


Index 


1589 


1071,  1076,  1078,  1079,  1099- 
1100,  1104,  1108,  1110,  1123; 
Nazi  driven  out  by  Red 
Army,  1308,  1409,  1426 
Rumanian  Army,  1138,  1191, 
1196,  1209,  1212,  1217 
Runciman,  Lord,  511,  523,  526, 
531,  562 

Rundfunkhaus,  see  Broadcast- 
ing House 

Rundstedt,  Field  Marshal  Gerd 
von,  232,  403,  482,  982, 

994 fn.;  relieved  of  commands, 
(four  times),  436,  1127,  1133, 
1180/n.,  1351,  1427;  in  Pol- 
ish invasion,  653,  664;  in  Bat- 
tle of  France,  945,  957,  963- 
67;  named  Field  Marshal, 
991  fn.;  Britain  invasion  plan, 
1000,  1001;  Russian  cam- 

paign, 1088,  1117,  1119,  1124- 
27,  1133,  1180/n.;  and  anti- 
Hitler  plotters,  1185,  1187, 
1340;  C.  in  C.  West,  1185, 
1200,  1205,  1206,  1345-51, 
1411.  1412,  1414-16,  1420; 
sacked  again,  1427 
Rupprecht,  Crown  Prince  of 
Bavaria.  75 fn.,  98,  103,  110-1, 
504 

Russell,  Bertrand,  146/n.,  1029 
Russian  Air  Force,  672 fn.,  1119, 
1210,  1368,  1428 
Russian  Army,  672 fn.,  711, 
1046,  1062,  1064,  1078;  in- 
vades Poland,  830,  831;  at- 
tacks Finland,  891  ( see  also 
Finland;  Russo-Finnish  War); 
seizes  Baltic  States,  1041; 
takes  over  Bessarabia,  Buco- 
vina, 1043;  war  with  Ger- 
many, 1115,  1118,  1119,  1122, 
1125-27,  1128-32,  1137-38, 
1159,  1188,  1195-96,  1226, 
1267,  1299,  1307-08,  1341, 
1345,  1351,  1353,  1357,  1409, 
1415,  1423,  1424,  1434-35, 
1437,  1454;  at  Stalingrad, 

1196,  1205,  1210-18;  meets 
Americans  at  Elbe,  1307, 
1308,  1443;  Battle  of  Berlin, 
1436,  1439,  1444,  1450,  1452, 
1465,  1466,  1469,  1471-74 
Russo-Finnish  War,  879-80, 
883,  891,  893,  901 
Russo-Japanese  neutrality  pact, 
1146-48 

Rust,  Bernhard,  180,  342-343 
Ruthenia,  593,  597,  605 


Rzhev,  1137 

S.A.  (Sturmabteilung,  storm 
troopers  or  Brownshrrts),  17, 
18,  19,  201,  206-9,  216,  224- 
5,  234-5,  238,  246,  256,  266, 
267,  269,  271,  272,  277-8, 
282 fn.,  328,  344,  363,  373, 

374,  376-7,  1403-04;  begin- 
nings of,  64,  70,  79;  and  Beer 
Hall  Putsch,  102-9;  conflict 
with  Army,  171-2,  201,  285- 
9,  297-301,  314,  434;  Bruen- 
ing’s  ban  on,  225-31;  Hitler’s 
suppression  of,  298,  301-2, 
305-14;  role  in  Austrian  An- 
schluss, 446,  477 

Saalfelden,  705 fn. 

Saar,  390,  394,  755,  756,  972, 
1422,  1429 

Saarbruecken,  401/n.,  587 
Sachsenhausen,  330,  331,  372, 

375,  479,  867 
Sack,  Dr.  Carl,  197 
Saefkow,  Anton,  1355 
St.-Germain,  1399 
St.-Germain,  Treaty  of,  69,  472 
St.-Hardouin,  Jacques  Tar  be  de, 

677 

St.-Lo,  1397 
St.-Omer,  959,  963 
St.  Stephen’s  Cathedral,  Vienna, 
38.  460,  476 fn. 

St.  Wolfgang,  680 
Sakhalin,  1062 
Salerno,  1302 
Salonika,  1079 

Salzburg,  24,  49 fn.,  444,  451, 
455.  460,  473,  476,  680,  727, 
735,  1189-90,  1213,  1294 
Sammler,  Rudolf,  1382 fn. 

San  river,  720,  828,  833,  835 
Sandomierz,  828 
Sanger,  Margaret,  333 
San  Remo,  593 
Santayana,  George,  146 
Sarajevo,  1083 
Sardinia,  1303 

Sas,  Col.  J.  G„  916,  942-^3 
Saturday,  Hitler’s  “surprise  day,” 
391,  413/n. 

Sauckel,  Fritz,  1236/n.,  1239, 
1481-83 

Sauerbruch,  Dr.  Ferdinand,  347, 
1274/n.,  1330,  1336 
Saxony,  101,  492 
Scapa  Flow,  855 
Schacht,  Dr.  Hjalmar  H.  G., 
162,  205,  235,  265.  318,  478, 


1590 


Index 


576,  1199/n.,  1394,  1447, 

1482;  plans  for  war  economy, 
357-61,  379,  393/n.;  out  of 
war  economy  post,  424-5, 
437;  in  anti-Hitler  conspir- 
acy, 506,  548,  555-8,  691, 
743,  745,  860,  871,  1185 
“Schaemmel,  Major,”  864 
Scharnhorst,  Gen.  Gerhard  Jo- 
hann David  von,  1334,  1403 
Scharnhorst  (Ger.  battle  cruis- 
er), 388,  938,  1194 
Schaub,  Julius,  385,  1445 
Schaumburg-Lippe,  Prince. 
693 fn. 

Scheidemann,  Philipp,  58 fn.,  83, 
84,  90,  94 

Scheidt,  Hans-Wilhelm,  896 
Scheliha,  Franz,  1354/n. 
Schellenberg,  Gen.  Walter, 
693  in.,  864-66,  1028-29, 

1030-31,  1032/n.,  1035,  1036, 
1038,  1289/n.,  1384,  1446 
Schelling,  Friedrich  Wilhelm 
Joseph  von,  149 

Scheringer,  Lieutenant,  197-200 
Scheubner-Richter,  Max  Erwin 
von,  103,  106,  107-13,  169 
Schicklgruber,  Alois,  22,  23. 
1458 

Schicklgruber,  Maria  Anna,  22, 
23 

Schiller,  Johann  Cristoph  Fried- 
rich von,  143,  335 
Schirach,  Baldur  von,  209,  348- 
9,  380,  474/n.,  1482 
Schkopau,  389 

Schlabrendorff,  Fabian  von,  507, 
508,  516/n.,  742,  857,  1182, 
1316  fn.,  1323,  1324-26, 

1326/n.,  1330,  1332,  1335, 

1361,  1391,  1 393/n.,  1395 
Schlageter,  Leo,  1260/n. 
Schleicher,  Gen.  Kurt  von,  17, 
89  fn.,  193,  211-18,  224-35, 
238,  242-46,  254,  256,  300; 
background,  211-213;  his 
chancellorship,  246-55,  318; 
purge  victim,  309,  311,  438, 
559 

Schleswig,  90,  139,  1472 
Schleswig-Holstein,  689 
Schlieffen  plan,  944 
Schmid,  Dr.  Willi,  310,  311/n. 
Schmidt,  Gen.  Arthur,  1217 
Schmidt,  Charlotte  (Frau  von 
Brauchitsch),  437 
Schmidt,  Dr.  Guido,  444,  445/n„ 
447,  449-50,  468/n. 


Schmidt,  Hans,  432,  434,  482 
Schmidt,  Dr.  Paul,  403,  413, 
552,  553,  588 fn.,  589,  595 fn., 
717,  734,  738,  740,  771-2, 
803,  810-12,  846,  902 fn.,  905, 
908-09,  979,  1054,  1055, 

1059,  1068,  1069,  1094,  1111- 
12,  1144;  on  Hitler-Chamber- 
lain negotiations,  522,  523, 
531,  534,  535,  537,  539,  539 fn., 
542,  560,  565,  731;  anti-Hitler 
conspirator,  549;  at  Hitler- 
Hacha  meeting,  600,  602;  at 
Hitler-Duce  meetings,  1070, 
1295,  1370;  at  Hitler-Mat- 
suoka  meeting,  1146;  on  Hit- 
ler’s declaring  war  on  U.S., 
1171 

Schmidt,  Theresa,  32 
Schmidt,  Willi,  310 
Schmitt,  Dr.  Karl,  287,  361 
Schmundt,  Gen.  Rudolf,  485, 
490,  513,  648,  650,  1323, 
1326,  1369/n. 

Schneidhuber,  Obergruppenfueh- 
rer,  307,  308 

Schniewind,  Adm.  Otto,  648, 
1006 

Schnitzler,  Arthur,  333 
Schnitzler,  Georg  von,  203,  265 
Schnurre,  Dr.  Julius,  639,  644, 
662,  668,  670,  675,  676,  685, 
700,  882,  883,  1100-01 
Schobert,  Gen.  Eugen  Ritter 
von,  355 

Schoenaich,  General  Freiherr 
von,  56 fn. 

Schoenerer,  Georg  Ritter  von, 
43 

Schoenfeld,  Dr.  Hans,  1320, 
1321 

Schoerner,  Field  Marshal  Fer- 
dinand, 1445,  1455,  1465 
Scholl,  Hans,  1327-8 
Scholl,  Sophie,  1327-8 
Schopenhauer,  Arthur,  150 
Schrader,  Col.  Werner,  1332 
Schreiber,  Capt.  Richard,  893, 
926 

Schroeder,  Baron  Kurt  von, 
203,  249 

Schulenburg,  Herr  von,  317 
Schulenburg,  Count  Friedrich 
Werner  von  der,  510,  638-39, 
645,  656-61,  664,  669,  671, 
675,  685,  687,  694,  695 fn., 
697-704,  720/n.,  821,  829-35, 
1040,  1043,  1050,  1053,  1100, 
1101-02,  1103-04,  1106, 


Index 


1591 


1109-12,  1147;  in  anti-Hitler 
conspiracy,  1341,  1392 
Schulenburg,  Count  Fritz  von 
der,  557,  1359,  1392 
Schultze,  Capt.  Herbert,  841/n. 
Schulung,  399,  400 
Schultz,  Dr.  Walther,  113 
Schulze-Boysen,  Harold,  1354/n. 
Schuschnigg,  Kurt  von,  252, 
386,  406-407,  477,  522,  614, 
768;  Anschluss,  441-68, 
470 fn.,  471-479;  meets  with 
Hitler,  444-51;  appeals  to 
Mussolini,  456-57,  461,  467; 
resigns,  464;  arrested,  479;  in 
concentration  camp,  480, 
1199/n.,  1394,  1447 
Schuschnigg,  Vera  (Countess 
Czemin),  479 

Schutzbar,  Baroness  Margot 
von,  483 

Schutzstaffel,  see  S.S. 
Schwaegermann,  Guenther,  1474 
Schwaerzel,  Helene,  1392 
Schwarz,  Franz  Xavier,  188 
Schwerin  von  Krosigk,  Count 
Lutz,  231,  359,  585,  1230, 
1437,  1439,  1441,  1462 
Science,  Education  and  Popular 
Culture,  Reich  Ministry  of, 
342-43 

Scotland,  891,  901,  1094,  1194 
S.D.  (Sicherheitsdienst,  S.S.  Se- 
curity Service),  373,  376-77, 
431,  581,  692-3,  693,  865, 
1027/n.,  1027,  1030,  1241, 

1242,  1244,  1246,  1248,  1251, 
1254/n.,  1257,  1288-91,  1376- 
78,  1381,  1384,  1395-96,  1399 
“Sea  Lion,”  code  name  for  in- 
vasion of  Britain,  990 
Sebekovsky,  Doctor,  519 
Second  Reich,  see  Germany, 
Second  Reich 

Secret  Cabinet  Council  (Ge- 
heimer  Kabinettsrat) , 379, 

437 fn. 

Security  Service,  see  S.D. 

Sedan,  946,  952,  953 
Seeckt,  Gen.  Hans  von,  58, 
87 fn.,  93,  100-01,  102,  109, 
197,  200,  211,  295,  616,  617, 
661 

Seeds,  Sir  William,  640/n.,  643, 
674/n.,  711,  713 
Seidlitz,  Gertrud,  75 
Seine  river,  1346,  1409,  1410 
Seisser,  CoL  Hans  von,  100-09, 


Seldte,  Franz,  258 
Semmering,  1196,  1202 
Senne,  1430 
Serafimovich,  1209 
Serbia,  1080,  1102 
Serrano  Suner,  Ram6n.  1033. 
1034,  1068 

Seven  Years’  War,  1439,  1440 
Severn  river,  1002 
Sevez,  Gen.  Francois,  1477 
Seyss-Inquart,  Dr.  Arthur,  407, 
448,  451-55,  459-66,  472-73, 
594,  596,  874,  894,  1462, 
1482-83 
SHAEF,  1435 
Shakespeare,  William,  335 
Shaposhnikov,  Gen.  Boris  M.. 
674 

Shaw,  George  Bernard,  335, 
1028 

Shawcross,  Sir  Hartley,  1252 
Sherwood,  Robert  E.,  1147/n. 
Shetland  Is.,  889 
Shkvarzev,  Alexander,  816 
Shulman,  Milton,  437 fn.,  964/n., 
994 fn. 

Siberia,  1092,  1101,  1158,  1159, 
1217 

Sibibor,  1260 

Sicily,  1192,  1294,  1299,  1301/n. 
Sidi  Barrani,  1071 
Sidor,  Karol,  594 
Siegfried  Line,  1410,  1414 
Siemens,  electrical  company, 
204 

Sievers,  Wolfram,  1276,  1278 
Siewert,  Lt.  Col.  Curt,  783 
Silesia,  295,  493,  623,  664,  691, 
764,  828,  1045,  1232,  1423, 
1424,  1426 
Silex,  Karl.  339 
Silvertown,  Eng.,  1024 
Simon,  Sir  John,  390,  396,  554, 
610,  1097 

Simovid,  Gen.  Dusan,  1080, 
1083 

Simpson,  Gen.  William  H.,  1434 
Simpson,  Mrs.,  see  Windsor, 
Duchess  of 
Sinclair,  Upton,  333 
Singapore,  1143,  1144,  1147, 
1155,  1158,  1168 
Sirovy,  Gen.  Jan,  521,  567,  568 
Six,  Dr.  Franz,  1027-28 
Skagerrak,  917,  926 
Skorzeny,  Otto,  692,  1304,  1384, 
1388,  1415/n.,  1418 
Skubl,  Doctor,  460-61 
slave  labor,  162,  649,  667,  1227, 


1592 


Index 


1234-39,  1243,  1258,  1261, 
1269,  1275,  1342 
Slavs,  41.  42,  124,  129,  130, 
136-37,  142,  580,  1223,  1225, 
1238-39,  1239 

Slovakia,  487,  569,  579,  589-96, 
604-05,  606,  618,  692,  828, 
1191,  1246 

Smigly-Rydz,  Marshal  Edward, 
617,  773,  796 

Smith,  Capt.  Truman,  75 fn. 
Smith,  Gen.  Walter  Bedell, 
1435,  1477 

Smolensk,  1117,  1121,  1124, 

1308,  1316,  1323,  1327,  1365 
Snow,  C.  P.,  1028 
Social  Democrats;  Austrian,  36, 
42,  70,  444/rz.,  455,  460/n., 
476 

Social  Democrats,  (Socialists), 
German,  55  fn.,  56-58,  62, 
66-67,  87,  141 fn.,  179,  183, 
193,  195,  215,  218-21,  225, 
232,  233,  241,  244,  249-51, 
254,  259,  260,  266,  271,  273, 
274,  277-78,  280,  292,  320, 
327,  1355;  proclaim  Republic, 
83;  make  deal  with  Army, 
84-88,  94-95;  largest  party 
in  nation,  88,  140,  163,  168- 
69;  party  dissolved,  280 
Socialists,  Left,  83 
Soissons.  1350 
Sola  airfield,  Norway,  925 
Sola  river,  Poland,  1264 
“Soldiers’  Councils,”  59,  86 
Solf,  Anna,  1330 — 1 
Somme  river,  53,  958,  959,  964, 
970,  971,  997 

Sondergericht,  see  Special  Court 
Sonderkommando,  1264 
Song  of  the  Nibelungs  (Mell). 
149 

Sonnenburg,  657 
South  Africa,  1247 
Soviet  Congress  of  Germany,  86 
Soviet  Union,  86,  90,  212,  291, 
321,  387,  389,  411,  419,  420, 
480,  612,  631,  733 fn.,  937 fn., 
989,  1012,  1027,  1077,  1085, 
1087,  1105,  1341,  1355,  1389, 
1425-26,  1433,  1449-50;  Hit- 
ler’s aims  toward,  123-25, 
411,  519,  575,  624,  884,  1016, 
1030,  1043-48,  1062-67,  1073, 
1076,  1078,  1087,  1088-89, 
1098-1110,  1113-14,  1140, 

1143-50;  France,  pact  and 
relations  with,  392-3,  399- 


400,  405,  481,  527,  528,  531, 
546,  576;  German-Czech  is- 
sue, policy  on,  302,  471,  481, 
490,  492,  495-99,  510,  511, 
519,  527,  528,  531,  546,  552; 
collective  security,  talks  with 
Britain  and  France,  480,  618, 
642,  655-59,  662-63,  669-73, 

676,  695,  697-8,  700,  707, 
710-16,  720.  721,  807;  Poland, 
relations  witn,  511,  616,  617, 
619,  623,  628,  641,  645,  649- 
50,  685-89,  695-6,  710-716 
(see  also  invasion  of  Poland, 
below)-,  excluded  from  taiks 
on  Czechosl.,  Poland,  546, 
553,  565,  576,  625 fn.,  626, 
640-41,  644,  655;  rapproche- 
ment with  Germany,  talks  on 
trade  and  Poland,  640,  641, 
643-44,  655-63,  668-72,  675- 

677,  678 fn.,  681-84,  736,  739, 

744,  816,  819-22,  829-35,  845- 
48,  853,  869,  880-85,  890,  907, 
911  fn.,  983,  1041-44,  1049- 
56,  1060-62,  1099-1101,  1103- 
04,  1106  (see  also  Nazi-Soviet 
Pact);  and  Baltic  States,  662, 
670,  671,  687,  695,  712,  717, 
720,  721,  724,  834-36,  869, 
879-81,  882,  901,  983,  1040- 
42,  1045—46,  1050-51;  rela- 
tions with  Japan,  695,  696, 
1146-48,  1149,  1159,  1164-66, 
1170;  invasion  of  Poland, 
828-36,  848;  war  against  Fin- 
land, 879-80,  893,  901,  1057- 
58;  activity  in  Balkans,  983, 
1049-54,  1056-59,  1071,  1099- 
1100,  1102;  German  war 

against,  1109-11,  1117-18, 

1122,  1124-30,  1138,  1152, 
1159,  1177,  1190,  1312-14, 
1320/n.,  1321,  1477;  German 
occupation  of,  1088-93,  1 105— 
06,  1108,  1115,  1119.  1195- 
96,  1223,  1225,  1226-27,  1231, 
1235-36,  1239,  1243-44,  1245, 
1247,  1248,  1253-58,  1274, 
1291,  1335-36,  1477-78;  Italy 
declares  war  on,  1115;  see 
also  Russian  Air  Force;  Rus- 
sian Army 

Spa,  Germany,  85,  92,  215,  1418 

Spaak,  Paul-Henri,  888,  939-40 

Spain,  388;  civil  war,  408-13, 
417,  421,  506,  566,  753,  1067- 
68;  and  World  War  II,  706, 
850,  1031-35,  1038,  1039, 


Index 


1593 


1067-68.  1072,  1074.  1113, 
1191 

Spandau,  1385 

Spartacists,  83,  84—86;  see  also 
Communists  in  Germany 
Special  Court  (Sondergericht). 
jJl,  372,  373 

Speer,  Albert,  1225 fn„  1412, 
1424,  1426,  1432-33,  1442/n„ 
1450-52,  1462,  1482 
Speidel,  Gen.  Hans,  1339-40. 
1346,  1348,  1349,  1350,  1352, 
1359,  1396,  1397-99,  1401, 
1410/n.,  1411,  1413 
Spender,  Stephen,  1028 
Spengler,  Oswald,  95,  290 
Spe.rle,  Field  Marshal  Hugo, 
444,  991/n.,  1017 
Spiller,  Captain,  927,  928 
Spital,  22,  24,  25,  32,  43 
Spitfires  (Br.  fighter  planes), 
969,  1018,  1019,  1193 
Sponeck,  Gen.  Count  Hans  von, 
1133,  1180 

Sportpalast,  Berlin,  220,  288, 
328,  536,  538,  550,  560,  850, 
1022-23 

Spree  river,  1475 
S.S.  (Schutzstaffel),  Blackshirts, 
202-204,  224,  282 fn.,  286,  352, 
363,  371,  380,  414,  474/n„  479, 
501,  505,  598,  620,  1328,  1370, 
1446,  1455-56,  1457,  1461, 
1463,  1465,  1474-75,  1480;  or- 
ganization of,  172,  209,  373, 
376;  control  police,  267,  378; 
conflict  with  Army,  297,  314, 
431,  434,  482,  873,  1329; 
role  in  Roehm  purge,  299, 
305,  308,  311,  314;  atrocities, 
374,  375,  477,  580,  872-78, 
1093,  1220,  1223-24,  1235, 
1242,  1257-61,  1264,  1266- 
73,  1275-77,  1279-82,  1287- 
88,  1335  {see  also  concentra- 
tion camps;  and  see  names 
of  individual  occupied  coun- 
tries)-, and  anti-Hitler  plot- 
ters. 507,  885,  1338,  1342-43, 
1344,  1372,  1376-78,  1381- 
84,  1388,  1393-96,  1399;  in 
Czechoslovakia,  526,  604, 

1289;  Polish  border  “inci- 
dent,” 691-92,  788,  793; 

Venlo  incident,  863-65;  and 
Britain  occupation  plan, 
1027-30;  rescues  Mussolini, 
1304;  arrests  Goering,  1452 
Security  Service,  see  S.D. 


Standarte  89,  385 

Waffen  S.S.,  1270,  1317,  1455 

Waffen  S.S.  units: 

— 1st  S.S.  Armored  (Pan- 
zer) Corps,  1306,  1422/n. 

— 1st  S.S.  Panzer  Div.. 
1422/n. 

— Sixth  S.S.  Panzer  Army, 
1422/n. 

■ — 12  th  S.S.  Panzer  Div., 
1348 

— Bodyguards  (Leibstand- 
arte ),  553,  878,  1182. 

1306,  1350/n.,  1362,  1364 

— Das  Reich  Div.,  1291 

— Panzer  Lehr  Div.,  1348 
Staatspartei,  see  Democratic 
Party 

Stachiewicz,  General,  714,  715 
Stadelheim  prison,  Munich,  307. 
308/n. 

Stahlecker,  Franz,  1253 
Stahlhelm,  216,  221.  267 
Stalin,  Joseph,  380,  576,  638-43, 
663,  686,  687,  696.  701,  868, 
908,  1076,  1100,  1107,  1116/n„ 
1120,  1226,  1335;  German 
pact,  trade  negotiations,  701- 
4,  708,  713/n.,  719,  716-25, 
731,  748,  833-37,  879,  882- 
85,  1048,  1049,  1053,  1054/n„ 
1056,  1062,  1100—06;  warned 
by  West  of  German  attack, 
724 fn„  1043-44,  1105;  inva- 
sion of  Poland,  831-37;  oper- 
ations in  Baltic  and  Balkan 
states,  879,  1041-42,  1045; 
suspicious  of  British,  1094, 
1097—98;  takes  over  as  Prime 
Min.,  1103;  signs  neutrality 
pact  with  Japan,  1146;  war 
leadership,  1188,  1198,  1293, 
1294,  1341,  1424;  and  Ger- 
man peace  offers,  1313,  1315, 
1320/n.,  1341-42,  1472 
Stalingrad,  1088,  1122,  1125, 
1128,  1132.  1188,  1191,  1195- 
1200,  1205,  1207,  1209-20, 
1270,  1294,  1307,  1316-17, 
1327,  1336,  1461 
Stark,  Johannes,  345 
Statistical  Year  Book,  354 
Stauffenberg,  Count  Berthold 
von,  1359,  1360,  1393 
Stauffenberg,  Lt.  Col.  Klaus 
Philip  Schenk,  Count  von, 
1334-39,  1341-45,  1352-69, 
1372-78,  1381-83,  1386-90, 

1393.  1396 


1594 


Stauffenberg,  Countess  Nina 
von,  1336 

Stauning,  Thorvald,  921 
Stavanger,  894,  899,  918.  925. 

933,  949 
Stavelot,  1418 
Stefanie,  33 

Stein,  Lt.  Walter,  875/n. 

Steiner,  Gen.  Felix,  1444,  1454 
Steinhardt,  Laurence,  695 in.. 

723 fn.,  1105 

Stempfle,  Father  Bernhard  127 
188,  310 
Sternberg,  71 

Stevens,  Maj.  R.  H„  864-67, 


Steyr,  28,  32 

Stieff,  Gen.  Hemuth,  1324,  1332. 

1337,  1361,  1389-90,  1396 
Stockholm,  917,  1105,  1320. 

1329.  1332,  1456 
Stockmar,  Baron  Christian 
Friedrich  von,  507 
Stohrer,  Eberhard  von,  1031 
storm  troopers,  see  S.A. 

Storting  (Norw.  Parliament). 
928 

Stotzingen,  Baroness,  309 
Strang,  William,  530,  663, 

672 fn.,  698,  710 
Strasbourg,  1279 
Strasbourg,  University  of,  1275- 
79 

Strasser,  Gregor,  169,  176-83. 
187,  202,  206-10,  214,  217 
221,  224,  234,  240,  243,  244, 
247-49,  252,  300,  309,  311, 
912 

Strasser,  Otto,  175,  179,  180,  207, 

Strauss,  Gen.  Adolf,  1001 
Strauss,  Richard,  335 
Streck,  Major,  113 
Streicher,  Julius,  48,  73,  80,  112, 
155,  169,  349,  1481-83 
“Strength  through  Joy”  (Kraft 
durch  Freude)  movement. 
351,  366-67 

Stresa  Conference,  392,  397 
398,  407 

Stresemann,  Gustav,  88,  99,  102. 

162,  192,  280,  295 
Stroelin,  Dr.  Karl,  1338,  1339 
Strones,  22 

Stroop,  Juergen,  1269-73 
Stuckart,  Dr.  Wilhelm,  472 
Studie  England  (naval  invasion 
plan),  998 

Stuelpnagel,  Gen.  Karl  Heinrich 


Index 


von,  513,  514,  784,  851,  1247, 
1338,  1339,  1359,  1376,  1395- 
98 

Stuka  (Ger.  plane),  949,  953, 

Stumme,  General,  1202 
Stumpff,  Gen.  Hans-Juergen, 
1017 

Sturmabteilung,  see  S.A. 
Stuttgart,  1338 
Styria,  476 

Sudeten  Free  Corps,  524,  526 
Sudetenland,  486-90,  493,  496 
516/n.,  518-20,  522-4,  531-5, 
537-8.  543-6,  549,  552,  554, 
562-3,  569,  570,  573-8,  592 
598,  629,  638,  707,  723,  793, 
868,  913,  914,  1181;  early 
Hitler  designs  on,  68,  125, 
454,  486;  never  part  of  Ger- 
many, 486,  522 fn.;  Nazi  agi- 
tation in,  488,  493,  520,  524- 
5;  Runciman  mission  on,  511, 
523-6;  cession  demanded  by 
Britain,  France,  527,  528,  544, 
562-3;  Hitler’s  “last  territo- 
rial claim,”  538,  579-80,  610 
Suez  Canal,  994,  1009,  1066. 

1071,  1084,  1086,  1087,  1193 
Sukhinichi,  1137 
Sundlo,  Col.  Konrad,  894,  924 
Susloparov,  Gen.  Ivan,  1477 
swastika,  71, 72,  333 
Sweden,  541,  747,  890,  891.  899. 
901,  918,  929 fn.,  937/n„  983, 
986,  1060,  1062,  1064,  1392 
Switzerland,  442,  487,  707  749 
782,  858,  911,  1172,  1320! 
1321,  1329,  1331,  1341,  1392 
Sword,  Colonel,  626 fn. 
synthetics,  389,  413,  1426 
Syria,  635,  1066 


Tallinn,  834,  1042 
Tannenberg,  316,  707,  748,  998 
Tansill,  Charles  C.,  416/n. 
Taranto,  1073/n. 

Tass,  700,  1106 

Tauroggen,  Convention  of,  1318 
Taylor,  Gen.  Maxwell  D.. 
1301/n. 

Taylor,  Telford,  56 fn.,  513 fn., 
964/n.,  972 

Teddy’s  Perspiration  Powder,  39 
Tegemsee,  233,  307,  1465 fn. 
Teleki,  Count  Paul,  677-8 
Televaag,  1291 
Tempelhof  Field,  281 
Terboven,  Josef,  305,  935 fn. 


Index 


Teriberka,  881 
Terneuzen,  959 
Tesch,  Bruno,  1266 
Tesch  & Stabenow,  1266 
Teschen,  512  526,  569,  616 
Teutonic  Knights,  124,  352 
Texas  (U.S.  battleship),  1152 
Thadden,  Elisabeth  von,  1330 
Thaelmann,  Ernst,  221-3 
Thailand,  1159,  1166 
Thames  river,  1002,  1008 
Theresienstadt  1289 
Thiele,  Gen.  Fritz,  1373,  1375, 
1393 

Thirty  Years’  War,  135 
Thoma,  Gen.  Wilhelm  Ritter 
von,  1203 

Thomas,  Gen.  Georg,  358, 
558 /«.,  654,  665,  690,  707, 
744,  851,  859,  871,  881/n., 
914,  1047 

Thompson,  Dorothy,  1318-19 
Thomsen,  Hans,  632 fn.,  903, 
906/n„  983-86, 1169/ti.,  1172- 
73 

Thorkelson,  Congressman,  985 
“Thousand-Year  Reich,”  20,  319, 
1198,  1478 

Thuengen,  General  Freiherr  von, 
1344,  1377,  1393 
Thuringia,  101,  209,  243,  247, 
509 

Thyssen,  Fritz,  190,  203,  204, 
206,  246,  266,  287,  360,  363 
Tiergarten,  Berlin,  19,  1383, 

1430/n.,  1450,  1452,  1454, 
1465,  1470 
Tilburg,  951 

Timoshenko.  Marshal  Semen 
K„  1118,  1121-22,  1131 
Tippelskirch,  Werner  von,  576, 
1052,  1053,  1100,  1136 
Tirpitz,  Grand  Adm.  Alfred 
von,  397,  506,  1354/n. 

Tirpitz  (Ger.  battleship),  627 
Tiso,  Monsignor,  593,  594,  595 
Tobruk,  1084,  1191 
Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  151 
Todt,  Doctor,  512,  688/n. 

Togo,  Shigenori,  1159,  1162, 
1165,  1168/ti. 

Tojo,  Gen.  Hideki,  1157 
Tokyo,  1148,  1149 
Tolischus,  Otto  D.,  147/ti. 
Tomaschek,  Rudolphe,  345 
Topf,  1.  A.,  & Sons,  1264 
Torgau,  1436 
Torgler,  Ernst,  239,  270 
Toscanini,  Arturo,  455 


1595 


Total  War  (Ludendorff),  357 
Toulon,  975,  1076,  1208 
Toussaint,  Col.  Rudolf,  494,  542 
Toynbee,  Arnold,  673/t!.,  836/t!. 
Toyoda,  Admiral,  1149/?!.,  1157 
trade  unions,  58,  190,  215,  218 
221,  225,  232,  241,  244,  252, 
258,  261,  281-83,  321,  362- 
64,  368,  507;  see  also  labor, 
German 

“Transport  Exercise  Stettin,” 
621 

Transport  Ministry,  665 
Trans-Siberian  Railway,  1048/ti., 
1148 


Transylvania,  1049 
Traunstein,  59 

Treblinka,  375,  1260,  1261, 

1270,  1272,  1273 
Treitschke,  Heinrich  von,  140. 
143,  145 

Tresckow,  Maj.  Gen.  Henning 
von,  1183,  1322,  1324-25, 

1327,  1332,  1335,  1344,  1353, 
1361.  1365,  1395 
Tresckow,  Erika  von,  1344 
Trevor-Roper,  H.  R.,  1441, 

1465/?!.,  1467/?!. 

Trier,  401/ti.,  1418 
Trieste,  1306 

Tripartite  (Three-Power)  Pact, 
1053,  1056,  1059,  1079,  1140, 
1141,  1142,  1144,  1145,  1156, 
1157,  1162,  1164,  1169,  1177 
Tripoli,  1077,  1194,  1205 
Tripolitania,  1084 
Tromso,  934,  935 
Trondheim,  899,  918,  925,  932, 
933,  936,  949,  988 
Troost,  Professor,  220 
Trotha,  Admiral  Adolf  von,  349 
Trott  zu  Solz  Adam  von,  742, 
1321,  1359,  1392/ti. 
Truppenamt,  96,  393/ti. 

Tsaritsyn,  1198/ti. 

Tschirschky,  Baron,  474/?i. 
Tuebingen,  University  of,  1339 
Tuka,  Dr.  Vojtech,  487,  492-3, 
605 

Tula,  1130,  1131 
Tunisia,  975,  982,  1208,  1209, 
1293,  1294,  1336 
Turin,  974/ti.,  1293 
Turkey,  706,  1056,  1057,  1060, 
1062,  1067,  1331 
Turkish  Straits,  1054,  1058-62 
Tyrol,  459/ti.,  476,  479,  1306, 
1391.  1394 


Index 


1596 


U -SO  (Ger.  submarine),  822, 
844 

U-47,  855 

U-110,  844 fn. 

V-253,  1152  . 

U-boats,  are  under  Navy,  Ger- 
man 

Udet,  Gen.  Ernst,  1180/n. 

Ukraine,  830,  831,  836,  1047. 

1064,  1078,  1091,  1114,  1117 

1122,  1123,  1125,  1198,  1201, 

1225,  1249,  1252,  1257  1300, 

1360/n. 

Ullstein,  House  of,  339,  340 

Ulm,  197-200,  1338 

Umberto,  Crown  Prince  of 
Italy,  1298 

Union  of  Revolutionary  Na- 
tional Socialists,  208 

United  Press,  1052 

United  States,  167,  368,  902 fn., 
903,  908,  967,  971,  986, 

989,  1009,  1051,  1119/n., 

1207,  1422 fn.,  1426;  war  aid 
to  Britain,  France,  498,  542, 
695 fn.,  801  fn.,  869,  880,  904, 
1012,  1069/n.,  1073,  1144, 

1150-1156,  1174;  anti-Hitler 
conspirators’  contact  with, 
505,  1353;  peace  efforts  of, 
541,  630-37,  902;  sentiment 
against  Nazi  excesses,  584; 
isolationist  and  pro-German 
influence  in,  5887/1.;  possible 
entry  into  war,  679 fn.,  691, 
737,  853,  903-4,  1046,  1054. 
1056,  1066,  1075-77,  1085, 
1113,  1144-45,  1148-1151; 

nationals  of,  on  Athenia,  822, 
843;  Nazi  propaganda,  sabo- 
tage in,  903,  983-87,  1140, 
1141;  German  preparations  for 
war  with,  1117,  1142,  1150, 
1160,  1161-66;  relations  with 
U.S.S.R.,  1104-05,  1313,  1341, 
1425;  Hitler’s  ignorance  about, 
1140,  11457b.,  belligerent  ac- 
tion in  Atlantic,  1152-55;  takes 
over  Iceland  for  British,  1152; 
Japanese  negotiations,  war 
on  U.S..  1155-71,  1 176-78, 
1308;  Italy  declares  war  on, 
1163,  1177;  war  with  Ger- 
many, 1169-79,  1181,  1190, 
1195,  1241,  1244,  1476-77; 
ship  losses  in  Atlantic,  1193- 
94 

U.S.  Army,  903,  986/n.,  10107b., 
1119//1.,  1160,  1244;  in  Ar- 


dennes, 1418,  1420,  1422;  in 
Austria,  1199/n.,  1392,  1394; 
in  France,  1341,  1347,  1397, 
1402,  1415;  in  Germany, 
1415,  1430,  1434-37,  1440, 
1443,  1447,  1480;  in  Italy, 
1246,  1301-02;  in  N.  Africa, 
1336;  Malm6dy  massacre, 
1244,  1422//1. 

U.S.  Army,  Air  Force,  1310- 
11,  13317/1.,  1350,  1391,  1428 
U.S.  Army  units: 

Armies: 

First,  1410,  1413,  1414, 

1415,  1418-19,  1434 
Third,  1397,  1409,  1410, 
1414,  1415,  1420,  1429, 
1437 

Fifth,  1302 

Seventh,  1279,  1410,  1430 
Ninth,  1413,  1415,  1434 
Divisions: 

2nd  Armored,  1420 
4th  Infantry,  1410 
9th  Armored,  1429 
69th  Infantry,  1436 
101st  Airborne,  1419 
U.S.  Army  Air  Corps  Reserve, 
10857/1. 

U.S.  Navy,  1141,  1143,  11477/1., 
1149,  1151-55,  1160,  1167, 
1170,  1174,  1177,  1194 
U.S.  Office  of  Strategic  Serv- 
ices, 1321 

U.S.  State  Department,  406, 
6607n.,  7397/1.,  903,  1104-05, 
11707/1.,  1172 

U.S.  Strategic  Bombing  Survey. 
1230 

U.S.  War  Council,  1160 
United  States  of  Europe,  1340 
United  Steel  Works,  203,  265 
Untermenschen,  1223 
Ural  MU.,  1228 
Urbays,  Juozas,  620 
Urfahr,  31 

USCHLA  (Untersuchung-und- 
Schlich-tungs-Ausschuss,  Com- 
mittee for  Investigation  and 
Settlement),  174,  307 
Uruguay,  884 

U.S.S.R.,  see  Soviet  Union 
Utrecht,  950 

Uxkull  - Gyllenbrand,  Countess 
von,  1334 


V-bombs  (V-l,  V-2),  13117/t., 
1347,  1350-1,  1426 
Vachell,  Group  Captain,  6267b, 


Index 


1597 


Vaernes,  925 
Valenciennes,  959 
“Valkyrie,”  1342-4,  1357,  1368, 
1373,  1376 

Vansittart,  Sir  Robert,  489,  515 
Vatican,  280,  324,  858,  914, 
942,  948,  986,  1293,  1298, 
1328/n.,  1329 
Venice,  302,  1107,  1306 
Venlo,  692/n„  864-6 
Ventotene,  1303 
Verdun,  957,  1396,  1398,  1410 
Vermehren,  Erich,  1331 

Vermeil,  Edmond,  154 

Vernichlungslager  (extermina- 
tion camps),  878,  1260-8 
Verona,  680,  1107/n.,  1306 
Versailles  Treaty,  56,  59,  69, 

89-94,  98,  194,  200,  214,  261, 
291,  293.  295,  320,  616,  621, 
634,  636,  800,  813 fn„  841, 

848;  Hitler’s  repudiation  of, 
387-95,  397-8,  411,  505 
Vian,  Capt.  Philip,  897 
Vichy,  1206,  1207 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  King  of 
Italy,  479,  738 fn„  1295-8, 
1302/n.,  1303, 1305/n„  1306/n. 
Victoria,  Queen  of  England, 
507 

Viebahn,  Gen.  Max  von,  457 
Vienna,  23,  25,  186,  379,  418, 
441,  444 fn„  464,  466,  475-79, 
1050,  1079,  1304;  Hitler’s 

youth  in,  33-50,  54,  62;  Doll- 
fuss  murder  in,  385-86;  Hit- 
ler enters  after  Anschluss, 
473;  anti-Nazi  coup  plans  for, 
1342,  1382;  occupied  by  Red 
Army,  1436,  1437 
Vilna,  711,  1260 
Vinnitsa,  1198,  1201 
Vire  river,  1347 
Vishinsky.  Andrei,  1041,  1389 
Vistula  river,  664,  709,  720, 
828,  833,  834,  877,  1340, 
1409.  1415,  1423,  1424 
Vladivostok,  1147,  1148,  1155, 
1159 

Voegler,  Albert,  203,  265 
Voelkischer  Boebachler,  74-75, 
78-79,  101,  127,  159,  169, 
174,  183,  196,  197,  210, 

217,  223,  290,  305,  339,  437, 
466,  750,  844,  849,  863 
Voelkisch  movement,  175 
Vogt,  General,  349 
Volga  river,  1063,  1125,  1188, 
1194,  1197-8,  1200,  1201, 


1210,  1225,  1229,  1307 
Volksdeutsche,  727,  834,  877. 
879 

Volksgericht,  see  People’s  Court 
Volkssturm,  1458,  1466 
Volkswagen,  368 
Vologda,  1138 

Vormann,  General  von,  733/n. 
Voronezh,  1196 

Voroshilov,  Marshal  Kliment 
E..  673,  674,  711-16,  721, 
1118 

Voss,  Admiral,  1455 
Vossische  Zeitung,  339 
Vyazma,  1125 
Vyborg,  1409 

Wachenfeld,  see  under  Berch- 
tesgaden 

Wagner,  Adolf,  307,  318 
Wagner,  Cosima,  153 
Wagner,  Gen.  Eduard,  872-874, 
1337,  1361,  1374,  1383,  1395 
Wagner,  Eva,  153 
Wagner,  Friedelind,  385 
Wagner,  Richard,  33,  116,  143, 
148-153 

Wagner,  Siegfried,  148-149 
Wagner,  Walter,  1458 
Wagner,  Winifred,  148,  185, 
186 

Wahnfried,  148,  153 
Waldeck,  Prince,  1280/n. 
“Waldsee,"  1262 
Waldtrudering,  172 
Waldviertel,  22 
Wales,  1002 

Wallenberg,  Jakob,  1320,  1322, 
1332 

Wallenberg,  Marcus,  1320 
Wanderer,  The  (Goebbels),  177 
Wangenheim,  Lieutenant  von, 
429 

Wannsee,  1257,  1359,  1360 
War,  Ministry  of,  393 /«.,  435 
war  debts,  see  reparations 
War  veterans:  Germans,  64,  66, 
70,  111,  216,  297;  French, 
387 

Warburg,  Professor,  345 
Warburton-Lee,  Capt.  B.A.W., 
932 

Warlimont,  CoL  Walter,  996, 
1045,  1047-8 

Warsaw,  483,  674,  733/n.,  791, 
795,  828,  829,  832,  835,  845, 
847,  1010,  1223,  1232,  1260, 
1267-71,  1409,  1424 
Warspile  (Br.  battleship),  933 


1598 


Index 


Wasp  (U.S.  carrier),  1193 
Wassennan,  Jakob,  333 
Wavell,  Gen.  Sir  Archibald, 
1073 In. 

Wavre,  954 
Webb,  Beatrice,  1029 
Weber,  Christian,  79,  307,  1455 
Wecke,  Major,  256 
Wednesday  Club,  506 
“Week  of  the  Broken  Glass,” 
580—6 

Wehrle,  Father  Herman,  1311  fn. 
Wehrmacht,  Hitler’s  restoration 
of,  265,  393 fn.;  anti-Nazi 

plotters’  plan  for,  1344,  1368, 
1373-4,  1383,  1388 
Wehrpolitische  Amt  of  the  S.A.. 
170-71 

W ehrwwtsehaft  (war  economy), 

Weidling,  General,  1466 
Weimar,  88,  90,  146,  243 
Weimar  Republic,  see  Germany. 

Republic  of 
Weinbacher,  Karl,  1266 
Weissler,  Doctor,  330 
Weissmann,  Doctor,  1391 
Weizmann,  Chaim,  1029 
Weizsaecker,  Baron  Ernst  von, 
621,  632 fn.,  682 fn.,  121  fn., 
133fn.,  736-37,  746,  843- 
5,  850,  862,  879/b.,  904/n., 
905,  906,  1156;  and  anti- 
Hitler  plot,  517,  784,  858, 
941,  1328;  in  negotia- 

tions on  Czechosl.,  489,  494, 
561,  568,  589,  598,  607-09; 
in  Russian  negotiations,  642- 
43,  657-59,  662,  669,  670, 
675,  686,  696,  704,  723/ii.; 
in  peace  negotiations  on  Pol- 
ish  crisis,  779,  781,  784, 

789/n.,  793,  801,  816 
Welczeck,  Count  Johannes  von. 
580,  671 

Welke,  Ehm,  340 
Welles,  Sumner,  695 fn.,  902, 
904-7,  909-10,  1105 
Wells,  H.  G.,  333,  1028 
Wells,  Otto,  277 
Wenck,  General,  1454-6,  1465, 
1466 

Wendt,  Lieutenant,  197-200 
“Werewolf,”  1198 
Weseruebung  (“Weser  Exer- 
cise”), 889-938 
Wessel,  Horst,  207 
West,  Rebecca,  1028 
Westarp,  Count  von.  88 


Westphal,  Gen.  Siegfried,  1301 
Westphalia,  306;  Peace  of,  135, 
852 

West  Prussia,  1232,  1424 
West  Wall,  406,  499,  502,  513, 
630,  650,  658,  666,  681, 

688/n.,  688,  783,  955 
Weygand,  Gen.  Maxime,  671, 
958,  961,  971,  972,  979-81, 
1206 

Wheeler-Bennett,  John  W.,  55 fn., 
Slfn.,  313 fn.,  516 fn.,  527/n., 
529 fn.,  545 

White,  Case,  627-29,  653,  665, 
733/n.,  740,  782,  791,  795/n. 
White  Book  of  the  Purge,  The, 
310 

White  Rose  Letters,  1327 
White  Russia,  830,  831,  1047, 
1064,  1091,  1254 
White  Sea,  1047 
Whitworth,  Vice-Adm.  W.  J., 
933 

Widerstand  (Resistance),  507 
Wiechert,  Ernst,  334 
Wiegand,  Karl  von,  984 
Wiessee,  301,  307,  430 
Wietersheim,  Gen.  Gustav  von, 
502 

WUdpark-Werder,  1447 
“Wilfred,”  918 

Wilhelm  I,  King  of  Prussia  and 
Kaiser  of  Germany,  139 
Wilhelm  II,  Kaiser,  52,  55,  83, 
85,  88,  91,  138,  140,  145,  150, 
152,  154,  156-57,  159,  215, 

275,  279,  336,  397,  549,  650, 

668,  792,  871,  913,  939, 

972/n.,  991/n.,  1140,  1185, 
1330,  1478 

Wilhelm,  Prince,  1185 
Wilhelmina,  Queen  of  the  Neth- 
erlands, 747,  846,  862,  950, 
952,  960 

Wilhelmshaven,  627,  988 
Willstaetter,  Richard,  345 
Wilmot,  Chester,  1352 fn. 

Wilson,  Sir  Horace,  518,  530, 

536,  537,  538-539,  542,  543, 

550,  561-563,  564,  760,  774, 
lllfn. 

Wilson,  Hugh  R.,  490,  585 fn. 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  83,  90,  1174 
Windau,  717 

“Winds”  message  to  Nomura, 
1159 

Windsor,  Duchess  of  (Mrs. 
Simpson),  410,  1030,  1032, 
1033,  1034,  1035,  1039 


Index 


1599 


Windsor,  Duke  of  (Edward 
VIII),  410,  790 fn.,  987 fn., 
1028,  1030-39 

Winkelmann,  Gen.  H.  G.,  952 
Winterhilfe,  365,  850,  1022 
Wisconsin,  University  of, 
1354/n. 

Wittelsbach  monarchy,  57,  100, 
104,  107 
Wittenberg,  328 

Witzleben,  Field  Marshal  Erwin 
von,  392,  436,  508,  548,  550- 
51,  555,  556-57,  558,  570, 
575,  707,  743,  885,  991/n„ 
1184,  1337,  1344,  1345,  1360, 
1368,  1373,  1382-83,  1389- 

91,  1396,  1401-02 
Wlodawa,  828 

Woermann,  Dr.  Ernst,  579, 
1173/n. 

Wolf,  Otto,  203 
Wolfers,  Alfred,  377 
Wolfsschanze  (Wolfs  Lair), 
1112,  1139,  1152,  1153,  1201, 
1299/n.,  1357,  1361 
Wolzek,  1260 
Woods,  Sam  E.,  1104 
Woolff,  Virginia,  1028 
Woolwich  Arsenal,  1024 
World  Jewish  Congress,  1273 
World  War  I,  157,  389,  391, 
724,  792,  834,  840,  843, 

870,  889,  944,  958,  991/n., 
998,  1042,  1049,  1079,  1172, 
1200,  1247,  1309,  1403;  Hit- 
ler’s service  in,  53,  1459; 
armistice,  52,  55-56,  83,  91- 

92,  976,  1345;  peace  terms, 
see  Versailles  Treaty;  Ger- 
many’s mistakes  in,  650,  728, 
853 

Wrench,  John  Evelyn,  396 fn. 
Wuensdorf,  1373 


Wuerttemberg,  186,  1334 

Yellow,  Case,  900,  936,  944, 
946,  947 

Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  Count 
Peter,  1317,  1319,  1334,  1390 
Young,  Desmond,  1401/n. 
Young  Plan,  192,  205,  1230 
Ypres,  52,  53,  961 
Yugoslavia,  405,  541,  575-76, 
630,  631,  706,  1054,  1060, 
1069,  1080-81,  1082,  1083, 
1085-88,  1099,  1102,  1103, 
1144,  1145,  1291,  1307 

Zander,  Wilhelm,  1465 
Zaporozhe,  1300,  1308 
Zech-Burkersroda,  Count  Julius 
von,  939 
Zehlendorf,  942 

Zeitzler,  Gen.  Kurt,  490,  1195, 
1199,  1200,  1209-11,  1213, 
1219 

Zeller,  Eberhard,  1358fn., 
1363/n. 

Zeughaus,  Berlin,  1326,  1326/n. 
Zhdanov,  Andrei,  663,  1041 
Zhukov,  Gen.  Georgi,  1131, 
1134,  1138,  1165,  1424,  1436, 
1473 fn. 

Zichenau,  1232 
Ziegenberg,  1414,  1417 
Ziegler,  Adolf,  188/n„  337 
Ziereis,  Franz,  1259 fn. 

Zoellner,  Doctor,  329,  330 
Zola,  Emile,  333 
Zossen,  691,  745,  870,  885,  916, 
1374,  1383 
Z Plan,  652,  822 
Zurich,  749,  1321 
Zweig,  Arnold,  333 
Zweig,  Stefan,  45,  333 
Zwoelf-Uhr  Blatt,  750 
Zyklon  B,  1263,  1266 


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